CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A003400080001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 16, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 9, 1957
• Content Type: REPORT

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CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
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9 November 1957
Copy No. 1-3s
DOCUMENT NO.
NO CHANCE fN CLASS. V
DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
Ph k
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
State Dept. review completed
/,
SECRET
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CONTENTS
1. RENEWED MOB ACTION EXPECTED IN INDONESIA
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2. LARGE-SCALE GOVERNMENT PARTY COERCION SEEN
POSSIBLE IN PHILIPPINE ELECTIONS
3. MALAYAN COMMUNIST TERRORISTS OFFER TO SUR-
RENDER
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4. YEMENI CROWN PRINCE BADR?S VISIT TO LONDON
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5. DIFFICULTIES IN IRANIAN-BRITISH RELATIONS
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1. RENEWED MOB ACTION EXPECTED IN INDONESIA
The second phase of Indonesia's drive
to "regain" Netherlands New Guinea
(West Irian) is scheduled to start 10
November, a national holiday commem-
orating the beginning of Indonesia's mil-
itary struggle for independence.
Inflammatory demonstrations and de-
structive mob action which may involve
Westerners are likely. The minister of
information announced some days ago
that this phase will be "executed more
fiercely!' Although moderate forces in Indonesia have spoken
against excesses and have warned that care should be taken
to prevent mob action, the police and army are reported not
to be taking any extraordinary precautions. The campaign is
apparently building toward the General Assembly debate on
the subject, which will take place sometime after 18 Novem-
ber when the third phase of the drive will be activated.
The Communist party is trying to cap-
italize on the West Irian drive and is being aided in its efforts
by its influence in the government and by President Sukarno's
own emotional preoccupation with the issue. The party's sec-
retary general recently proposed either armed action against
.New Guinea or seizure of Dutch interests in Indonesia if Indo-
nesia fails to get the area through UN action. He emphasized
expropriation as allowing not only the army but all elements of
Indonesian society to participate in the effort.
Sukarno has in general tried to link the
West Irian issue with the need for nationwide economic devel-
opment and national unity, apparently believing he can use the
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emotionalism generated by the West Irian drive to develop
loyalty to Djakarta. Although he has left the more inflam-
matory statements to his subordinates, he stated on 7 No-
vember that if UN results are unfavorable, Indonesia will
take action "which will startle the world."
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2., LARGE-SCALE GOVERNMENT PARTY COERCION SEEN
POSSIBLE IN PHILIPPINE ELECTIONS
The final days of the Philippine election
campaign have been marked by bitter
countercharges and sporadic outbursts
of terrorism. Although Nacionalista
candidate President Garcia is still widely believed to have
an edge over his opponents, an upset is possible if the elec-
tions on 12 November are free. Despite current indications
that the Commission on Elections and the constabulary are
making efforts to ensure clean elections, traditional patterns
of political coercion and fraud are expected to develop.
A source close to President Garcia has
told the American embassy in Manila that victory for Garcia,
and possibly also for his running mate Laurel, Jr., will be
virtually assured through last-minute bribery and intimida-
tion. The US embassy fears that blatant illegal efforts could
well provoke bloodshed of serious proportions.
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3. MALAYAN COMMUNIST TERRORISTS OFFER
TO SURRENDER
Malayan Prime Minister Abdul Rahman
reported on 8 November that the Commu-
nist terrorists have agreed in principle
to surrender and thus end the nearly ten
years of "emergency" in Malaya. Accord-
ing to press reports, Rahman received a letter on 12 October
from Communist Secretary General Chen Ping calling for a
preliminary meeting aimed at obtaining a "just and fair agree-
ment" and stating he expected that "agreement can be reached."
Although it has long been evident that the
Communists wish to abandon guerrilla warfare and concentrate
their resources on subversion, they have demanded recogni-
tion of their party and guarantees against detention or investi-
gation of terrorists who lay down their arms. Now, however,
since Malayan independence has further isolated the Commu-
nists from the masses by removing the party2s main propaganda
weapon, Chen Ping may feel that he must retreat from these de-
mands.
Despite the governmentts apparent optimism
that this will bring an end to the "emergency," there is still
likely to be a wide initial divergence between the positions of
the two sides. The Communists, however, probably believe
that settlement at this time, even if it involved considerable
sacrifice, might provide a considerable boost to their goals of
promoting neutralism in Malaya, achieving recognition of Red
China, and undermining the UK-Malaya Defense Treaty by ap-
pearing to remove any need for Commonwealth troops in the
Federation.
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4. YEMENI CROWN PRINCE BADR'S VISIT TO LONDON
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Britain's plan to give Yemeni Crown
Prince Badr the "red-carpet treatment"
during his 10-day visit to London begin-
ning on 9 November is presumably intended
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to facilitate future relations with him in the event he is chosen
as the present Imam's successor. A Foreign Office official's
statement on 7 November that Britain's underlying purpose in
the talks is to detach Yemen from its pro-Soviet orientation
suggests.thAt London now feels the long-standing Anglo-Yemeni
animosity may actually be reduced, with consequent advan-
tages for British interests elsewhere in the Arabian peninsula.
London is also developing contacts with Prince Hassan, the
other principal contender to the throne.
The British appear somewhat more opti-
mistic than formerly that the talks will have beneficial results.
They are especially anxious to set up a procedure for investi-,
gating incidents along the Yemen - Aden Protectorate frontier.
Hoping that implementation of the 1951 agreement providing for
border demarcation can now be agreed upon, London is pre-
pared to accept the present border despite recent Yemeni en-
croachments. London is also willing to carry out technical
assistance provisions of the 1951 agreement by sending a few
technicians to Yemen and training some Yemenis in Britain.
Britain's capacity for maneuver is limited, however, by com-
mitments to sheiks in the Aden Protectorate.
The Imam has actively promoted the visit
for the purpose of enhancing the prestige of the crown prince.
There is reason to believe, however, that the Imam might
maneuver his way out of an commitments undertaken by Badr.
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5. DIFFICULTIES IN IRANIAN-BRITISH RELATIONS
Britain has rebuffed the Shah in his
efforts to discuss cooperation in the
Persian Gulf, and will turn down
Iran's long-standing request for de-
stroyers. This will block the Shah's
plan to expand Iran's influence in the
Persian Gulf through cooperation
with Britain and increased naval pres-
tige.
Although an agreement was reached
in principle with the British in late September to discuss
Persian Gulf questions, the later British restrictions on
the talks would make them meaningless from the Iranian
point of view. The Shah reacted angrily to these limita-
tions. Britain said the discussions could not include sov-
ereignty over Bahrein, the establishment of an Iranian
consulate in Kuwait, or the designations "Persian Gulf"
versus "Arabian Gulf:' Furthermore, Britain insists
that Iran acknowledge Kuwait sovereignty over Farsi Is-
land, occupied by Iran since 1956.
The London Foreign Office has in-
structed the British ambassador to Iran to explain to the
Shah that the costs of an initial destroyer would have to be
met from Iranian funds and that its crew would have to be
trained by the British navy. The American ambassador in
London has been informed that Britain hopes this will end
its discussions with Iran concerning the supplying or sell-
ing of a destroyer.
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