OIR CONTRIBUTION TO: SE-50: PROBABLE REACTIONS TO A CHINESE NATIONALIST INVASION OF HAINAN WITH DIRECT US AIR AND NAVAL PARTICIPATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79S01011A001100030003-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 18, 2005
• Sequence Number: 3
• Content Type: SE

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OIR Contribution to:
0-50: PROBABLE REACTIONS TO A CHINESE NATIONALIST INVASION
HAINAN WITH DIRECT US AIR AND NAVAL PARTICIPATE 7 8 6 3 1
State Dept. review completed
Conclusions
1. The Communists could not accurately determine either the
exact target or the scope of identifiable preparations for a US supported
Chinese Nationalist invasion. Chinese Communist reaction to such prepara-
tions would be to intensify coastal defense measures and press for
additional Soviet commitments and aid but would probably avoid actions
that might precipitate hostilities.
2. Once the invasion commenced, the Communists would bring maximum
force to bear against the attack, probably including air and naval attacks
against Taiwan and operating forces. Peiping would perhaps seek to invoke
the Sino-Soviet treaty.
3. The USSR would exert pressure to localize hostilities and to
restrain Communist China from adopting any position or taking any action
that would lead to full-scale war. The USSR would bring charges of
aggression against the US in the UN, would provide maximum logistic support
to Communist China, and might publicly commit itself to the defense of
Manchuria and north Korea. If, despite Soviet pressure, Peiping insisted
on regarding the Hainan attack as an act of full-scale war, the USSR would
probably, although reluctantly, fulfill its commitments, including, if
necessary, full-scale participation.
4. The Chinese Communist regime would view the loss of Hainan
as a severe psychological defeat, a blow to its military prestige, and a
threat to its position in South China. It would continue to take counter-
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actions after the completion of the invasion. In addition to defensive
measures against a possible mainland invasion, it would prepare for
counterattacks in Hainan, Taiwan, and/or Indochina. Its moves would be
determined largely by military considerations.
5. There would be little popular reaction in mainland China
or Hainan to preparations for the invasion. With the invasion itself,
strongly anti-Communist elements on the mainland would be encouraged to
believe that liberation was imminent and would attempt to organize their
forces, but would not precipitate action. Spontaneous uprisings would
be likely only in isolated instances. The regime would intensify its
control measures to the degree necessary to prevent organized opposition.
6. In general, non-Communist countries would view the operation
as a threat to world peace. Neutralism and hostility toward the US
would increase, and cooperation with the US by pro-Western governments
would become increasingly difficult. Prior consultation might soften
the adverse reaction in a few special cases, such as the Philippines
and Thailand, and might prevent disruptive unilateral action against
north Korea by the ROK.
7. Developments elsewhere would not alter these reactions
significantly. In general, the reactions would be aggravated if at the
time of the operation the Communists were following conciliatory policies
and ameliorated if Communist actions were intensifying international
tensions. But even in the latter case, the operation would be viewed
as a needless and reckless precipitation of hostilities,
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Copy of
SE-50: PROBABLE REACTIONS TO A CHINESE NATIONALIST INVASION
OF HAINAN WITH DIRECT US AIR AND NAVAL PARTICIPATION
I. Probable Communist Reactions
A. Probable Chinese Communist Reactions
1. To Preparations of Chinese Nationalist and US Forces for
an Invasion
The Communist reaction to identifiable preparations for an invasion
would be characterized by uncertainty as to the intended target, the scope
of the operation, and the role of the US. Even if it were public knowledge
that preparations were being made for an amphibious assault against
Communist China, the Communists could not be certain as to the intended
target. The Fuchou-Swatow area or possibly Shantung peninsula would
probably be regarded as a ?nore probable target than Rainsn. Even if the''
Communists, through leaks or espionage, were apprised of the actual target,
they would probable regard the Hainan operation as a phase in an attack
on the mainland or one to be undertaken concurrently with an assault by
ROK forces against north Korea. The US role in the projected amphibious
assault would presumably become increasingly apparent as preparations
proceeded. However, the Communists could not be certain that US partici-
pation would be limited to that outlined in the assumptions above.
Under the above circumstances, the Communist reaction to the
initial preparatory phases would probable involve:
a. Propaganda. Communist propaganda concerning US "aggressive"
plans would be stepped up with efforts to play upon Western desires to
avoid world war.
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b. Military actions. The Communists would accelerate their
defensive build-up of possible target areas, particularly in the Swatow-
Fuchou area. Even if the target were known to the Communists, the build-
up would not be limited to Hainan.
It is unlikely that the Communists would launch preventive
military operations against Taiwan itself during this phase. The
Communists would want to avoid engaging US forces or accepting the
political losses were they to precipitate hostilities. Nor would the
Chinese Communists be likely to seize Indochina and other parts of
Southeast Asia since this would spread their military commitments in
the face of impending attack. The Chinese Communists probably would
step up aid to Indochina and might encourage Southeast Asian Communist
movements to create diversionary pressures.
c. Pressure for Soviet aid. As an amphibious assault against
China became increasingly probable, the Chinese Communists would seek
increased Soviet military aid and specific Soviet guarantees under
the Sino-Soviet treaty of 1950. Chinese Communist propaganda would
probably point up the role of the Soviet alliance in the defense of the
China coast, much as that role was pointed up in regard to Manchuria
and Port Arthur during the Korean hostilities. Peiping would probably
attempt to obtain a Soviet commitment, preferably public, for the
defense of north Korea and possibly Manchuria in the event of a resump-
tion of Korean hostilities. This would enable the Chinese Communists
to concentrate their specialized forces along the China coast.
d. Popular reaction. It is unlikely that the preparatory
phase would evoke any significant popular reaction within China. Chinese
Communist pro a anda has played the theme of US "aggressive" intent
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against China so long and so intensively that actual preparations for
an attack would add little to previous Communist charges, so far as
mainland Chinese are concerned.
2. 'To the
? y aeration Itself
^YYYY.Yl~
Once the invasion of Hainan commenced, the Chinese Communist
reaction would probably involve:
a. Counteraction. The Chinese Communists would bring a
maximum of force to bear against the invasion. Chinese and possibly
Soviet air and submarine units would probably attack convoys and ship-
ping as soon as it became certain that they were headed for a Chinese
target. After the landing started., air attacks would probably be
directed not only against the beachhead, but against Taiwan itself.
b. Intensification of pressure for Soviet aid. At a minimum,
w r r r
the Chinese Communists would attempt to gain further guarantees from the
Soviets regarding the defense of Manchuria and north Korea. If the
Soviets made no public commitments in these areas during the preparatory
phase, the Chinese Communists would press for a public statement from
the Soviets after the invasion of Hainan commenced, in order to minimize
the risk of further attacks. They would also be likely to press for
increased Soviet air and naval support for the defense of Hainan and
possibly for counterattacks against Taiwan and US bases involved in
the operation.
Peiping would expect the USSR to bring charges of aggression
and to obtain sanctions against the US and the National Government of
China in the United Nations.
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It is possible that at some phase during the operation, Peiping
will attempt to invoke the Sino-Soviet Treaty, ether on the basis that
Japan is involved in the attack or on the basis of some hitherto un-
published provision of the Sino-Soviet alliance.
c. Mainland popular reaction. An invasion of Hainan would
probably be viewed in mainland China as the initial operation in a
planned invasion of the mainland. Strongly anti-Communist elements on
the mainland would be encouraged to believe that liberation from the
Communist yoke was imminent, would attempt to organize their forces,
but at this stage would probably avoid precipitant action. Spontaneous
uprisings would be unlikely except in isolated instances. The Communist
regime would intensify its control measures to the degree necessary
to maintain order and prevent organized opposition to the regime.
d. Reaction on Hainan. While the degree of popular support
for the Communists on Hainan is believed to have decreased, it is not
likely that any significant proportion of Hainan's 2,800,000 inhabitants
would actively welcome the invasion. Most of the population and
particularly the 350-400,000 ton-Chinese (Li and Miao) would remain
passive, at least until the invasion was firmly secured. Most of the
population would flee into the hills as the attack commenced, to re-
appear only when fighting had ceased. The reaction of the Hainanese
would not be a reliable measure to the popular reaction to an invasion of
the mainland.
The Korean experience would seem to indicate that initially no
significant military defections on the part of Communist troops should
be expected on Hainan, particularly since these troops will be defending
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what they consider to be a part of China against an attack they will
believe to be in large part foreign inspired. Even in the last phases
of battle, CCF troops would be more likely to take to the hills or
attempt to merge in the population than to surrender.
e. Diversionary action. One of the strong deterrents to
Chinese Communist intervention in Southeast Asia has been the threat
of retaliation against China. The attack on Hainan would to a large
degree remove that deterrent. However, the Communists may avoid expan-
sion of open hostilities to Southeast Asia during the initial phases of
the attack in order to concentrate their military resources for the
defense of China and to avoid actions that might tend to unify the
West. The Communists probably would increase their aid to Communist
military movements in the area and would encourage more active Communist
resistance in an attempt to increase pressure on the West.
The Chinese Communists would conduct maximum air and naval
operations against Taiwan and lines of communication.
3. To US Air Strikes Against CCAF Bases in South China as Part of
the Hainan Operation
Air strikes against the China mainland as part of an operation
against Hainan would not materially alter the reaction to the attack
itself. The considerations that imposed self-restraint on both sides
in Korea would, so far as the Chinese Communists are concerned, not
operate in the case of Hainan, since the Chinese regard Hainan as an
integral part of China and would in any case view the Hainan operation
as part of a more general attack against China. (It should be noted
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that even in Korea at the time of the Chinese intervention the
Chinese Communists apparently expected air strikes against the mainland,
judging from the tempo of air defense preparations in Manchuria and on
the coast. This did not deter Peiping from intervening.)
If it became clear to the Communists that the US would not strike
against Chinese mainland bases and cities, the Communists might avoid
actions that would precipitate such strikes. However, they would not
withhold attacks against Taiwan, merely because of fear of retaliatory
air strikes.
4+. To the Successful Completion of the Invasion
The Communist regime would view the loss of Hainan as a severe
psychological defeat, a blow to its military prestige, and a threat to
its position in South China. It would therefore continue to take counter-
actions. In addition to defensive measures against a possible invasion
of the mainland, It would proTdpe for Counterttttaeke in Hainan, Taiwan,
ag4/cr rndocb.r ,, its s vvee would be determined largely by military
considerations.
Local uprisings could be anticipated, particularly in South China
and in regions where anti-Communist resistance has been developing. In
general, however, the popular reactions would be determined by indica-
tions of whether the loss of Hainan was to be followed up by an invasion
of the mainland.
B. Probable Soviet Reaction
The USSR, in dealing with the problem of the Hainan attack,
would probably exert pressure to keep hostilities localized and to restrain
its Chinese partner from adopting any position or taking any counteractions
that would lead to c'I-ll Rclale w (05/B4?h ab1 b Iff ~ 10DSr30~ le)
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The Soviets would be concerned at the outset that the Hainan action
might lead to a situation in which the USSR would have little or no
initiative and which it might not be able to control. However, so long
as military actions remained localized, the USSR would probably view the
Hainan attack as an opportunity for exploitation by Soviet propaganda,
UN action,'and diplomacy. The Soviets would further view the action as
a source of serious fissures in the Western alliance, as a move of
desperation, and as a serious drain on Western military resources. In
these respects, the Kremlin may view the Hainan attack as potentially
more favorable to the Communist bloc than the Korean war, since the
latter involved an area of direct security significance to the USSR.
The USSR would introduce the question of US aggression in the UN
and demand UN action. It would support Peiping in its countermeasures
at each phase of the operation by providing maximum logistic support
and limited air and naval assistance on the Korean pattern. The USSR
would assume such military responsibilities in Korea and Manchuria as
requ+red to release Chinese Communist forces for the defense of South
China. The USSR might make its commitment public either in veiled
propaganda statements playing upon Western fears of world war, or in an
explicit "greater sanctions" statement.
If Peiping despite Soviet pressure to the contrary insisted upon
regarding the Hainan attack as an act of full-scale war and if Peiping
insisted that it be so treated under the Sino-Soviet alliance, the USSR
would probably, no matter how reluctantly, fulfill its commitments,
including if necessary full-scale participation.
Soviet reactions and the belief that hostilities can be localized
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C. Developments, Particularly in Asia, That Might Alter Communist
Reaction
The principal development affecting Communist reactions, would be
the prior outbreak of hostilities in Asia or elsewhere. If war already
existed, the Chinese Communists would probably take stronger preventive
measures against the preparations for the Hainan attack, including air
attacks on Taiwan and attacks on shipping.
Most other conceivable developments would not greatly affect
Communist reactions. Communist concern over the possibility that the
Hainan invasion represented merely one phase of military operations
including a ROK attack on north Korea would prevail regardless of Korean
developments, unless unification was achieved at the political conference.
In general, Communist reactions might be more decisive if a
situation of great tension existed in Asia at the time the build-up for
the Hainan invasion became apparent. Conversely, if Asian problems
seemed to be on the way toward a political settlement, Peiping would be
more likely to restrain itself, giving greater weight to psychological
factors and leaving the initiative for breaking the peace to the US
and the Chinese National Government.
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II. Probable Non-Communist Reactions
A. Republic of 17Corea
The primary objective of the ROTC is to unify TCorea under its con-
trol. For this reason it would support a war against Communist China that
would force the Chinese Communists to withdraw from "ores. But it would
fear ary US-backed operations that would tend to divert US military sup-
plies to an area other than "orea.
The ROK would probably prfss for an enlargement of the Hainan oper-
ation through a concurrent invasion of north "orea. The ROTC would prob-
ably oppose the invasion if it was to be confined to Hainan alone, since
it would view the operation as tying up anti-Communist strength without
contributing to the objective of unifying torea. (It is significant, in
this connection, that the RO7,' reaction to the Formosan deneutrali.zation
order was generally negative.)
Whether Rhee would unilaterally initiate an attack on north :'orea
at the time of the Hainan operation would depend upon his calculation of
the balance of Western and Communist strength in Corea. Rhee might be
deterred by a firmly--pronounced Soviet "greater sanctions" statement.
Bec,,ruse of close RO'C-Ki1T relations, it would be practically im-
possible to maintain security against ROTC 'knowledge of preparations for
an invasion of Hainan. Prior consultation with Rhee might prevent :thee
from precipitating action in Korea, but consultations might lead to a
leak of information on the part of the R0-' with the intention of agitating
for a broader war.
The principal development that would alter the nature of the ROTC
reaction would be the prior achieve-ment of unification in ?rorea, in
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which case the ROK would strongly oppose the operation as jeopardizing
peace in Asia and the security of. "orea's newly-found unity and inde-
pendence.
B. &~, an
The -)revalent reaction in Japan would be one of uneasiness and
apprehension over what would be generally considered a reckless and
provocative action, es?ecially as it might lead to invocation of the
Sino-Soviet pact, which is directed specifically against Japan. The
Japanese Government would be li''ely to disassociate itself publicly
from the attack once it occured. Intensified neutralist and left-wing
attacks would ma,-e it difficult for the government to continue its pol-
icy of over-all cooperation with the US, unless it could point to -orior
consultation with the US as basis for assurances that Japan would not be
directly affected. However, prior consultations would not affect the
nature of the Japanese reaction.
?;hile Japan would probably refuse the
US the use of Japanese bases in connection with the operation, Ja;.)an
would be willin to fulfill orders for military supplies and equipment.
Japan would continue to be concerned at the danger of war even
after the completion of the invasion. If the successful occupation of
Hainan was not followed by Comm-inist counter-measures, J=apanese fears
would be assuaged, with a boost in the morale of right-wing groups and
possibly a general stiffening of attitudes toward the Communist bloc.
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C. South and Southeast Asia
Reaction in South and Southeast Asia to the Hainan operation would
range from apprehension to acute fears and to opposition on grounds of
principle as well as expediency. The apprehension would be based on a
concern lest the initiation of any military action directed against
Communist China lead to a general Asian war.
The reaction would be tempered, in the Philippines and Thailand,
by the existence of a general anti-Communist orientation and pro-Western
policy, and given prior consultations the Philippine Government might
look with favor on such an operation. These factors would not, however,
dissipate the concern over possible repercussions of offensive action,
which would stem in part from (1) uncertainty over the Chinese Nationalist
and US objective; (2) uncertainty about the nature of Chinese
C:-nnunist and Soviet responcea, particularly, in the`. case of the
Phillipines if US bases in the Philippines were used to stage the attack;
and (3) in Thailand by concern about the fifth-column potential of the
Chinese minority of almost three million.
In Malaya, the anxiety of British authorities would be compounded
of concern over the vulnerability of Hong Kong and uncertainty over the
reaction of the Chinese in Malaya who constitute almost fifty percent of
the population. Tension in Malaya would be increased by revelation that
Hainan was the target; a significant proportion of Malayan Chinese are
Hainanese and this group, particularly those working the tin mines, have
been susceptible to Communist influence in the past.
In India, Burma, and Indonesia, the operation would be interpreted,
by all politically significant sectors of the population, as confirmation
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aggressive action in the Par East. All three countries recognize the
Chinese Communist regime and would not approve a Chinese Nationalist claim
to either the mainland or to Hainan; they would view such action as
preparation for aggression and consider it both dangerous and wrong.
In Indochina, there would probably be grave apprehension -- among
both French and Vietnamese leaders -- that an aggressive attitute toward
Communist China might precipitate Chinese Communist intervention in the
Indochina war in order to eliminate French power and establish more firmly
the security of its southern flank. This general fear would be an ex-
tension of existing French uneasiness that even the prospect of an
imminent victory in Indochina might result in Chinese Communist inter-
vention. To it would be added some concern lest US preoccupation with
an operation directed toward Communist China would reduce American
ability or willingness to provide the substantial assistance which the
French believe necessary to preserve their present position in Indochina
or to assist in the defense of Indochina if the Chinese Communists
attacked as a result of operations against Hainan or the mainland.
If the attack should result in a Soviet appeal to the UN for
collective action, India might support a Soviet-sponsored resolution
and the governments of Burma and Indonesia would be under heavy pressure
from leftist opposition elements to do so. It seems probable, however,
that Burma and Indonesia would abstain,
on the ground that a condemnation of "aggression" would not
contribute to restoration of peace. Soviet UN moves would not receive
support from Thailand or the Philippines. It is possible that India might
introduce a "compromise" UN resolution, in which case Burma and Indonesia
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D. Western Europe
The Western 'uropean reaction, like that of most non-Communist
Asia, would be one of concern at the Ame.ric9n "adventurist" policy, worry
over the possible dispersal of Western military resources, and fear of
world war, neutralism would be encouraged and support for the US lessened.
The most extreme reaction would be that of France. Except for a
few militant anti-Communists, the French would fear the adverse affects
of the operation on Indochina including the danger that it might invite
a Chinese Communist invasion. Even the complete success of the operation
and Chinese Communist acceptance of de'eat without counter-action would
serve to encourage French opinion only to a limited extent if this success
were not accompanied by a solution in Indochina.
Western -':-uropean governments ho'.,ever, would probably support the
US in UN discussions of the subject, but they would do so reluctantly and
over strong domestic opposition.
E. Latin America, the Near `ast, and Africa
The reaction in Latin America, the Near ,]ast, and Africa would
not differ significantly from that in iestern Europe, although -- as in
Asia -- most countries would regard the operation as evidence not only of
US rec'clessness but of US "imperialism." In the UN ciatemala might vote
with the Comm nist bloc and others might abstain, but most countries even
if reluctantly would -side'., with the US. The most nearly favorable re-
actions would probably be those of Greece and Tur'rey, particularly if
these governments had been reassured concerning their own safety.
F. Developments Elsewhere that tight Affect the Above Reactions
In general, the non-Communist reactions to the Hainan operation
would be aggravated if at the time of the operation the Communists were
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following a conciliatory policy, and conversely, the reaction would be
ameliorated somewhat if the Communist policies were provoking increased
international tension. But even in the latter case, most countries would
view the invasion as a needless and rec-less -precipitation of hostilities.
More widespread approval of the operation i?=ould probably be forthcoming
only if Communist China was already involved in open warfare in Asia.
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