THE 22ND PARTY CONGRESS AND ASIAN COMMUNIST PARTIES:

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79S00427A000500020042-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 23, 2004
• Sequence Number: 42
• Publication Date: December 7, 1961
• Content Type: IM

Approved For Re a se 200 -
427AW0002004 o
Mir, I zVour a~,j
25X1 7 December 1961
di
25)
OCI NNo.- 5802/61 Copy -X-0.
20
SUBJECT: The 22nd Party Congress and Asian Communist Parties:
1. Since the 22nd CPSU Congress, Khrushchev has re-
ceived little support from Asian Communist parties in his
attacks on the Albanian leadership and on Stalin's methods
of leadership. Of the 15 Asian parties in attendance at
the congress, only two--from Mongolia and Ceylon--seconded
Khrushchev's attack on Hoxha. Ten Asian parties--from
Communist China, North Korea, North Vietnam, Indonesia,
India, Japan, Burma, Malaya, Australia, and New Zealand--
did not second Khrushchev, although the North Korean and
Indian delegates did offer some implicit support for the
Soviet leader's position on Albania.
2. Messages of greetings on the 20th anniversary of
the Albanian Party on 8 November 1961 were sent by the
Chinese, North Korean, North Vietnam, Indonesian, Australian,
Burmese, New Zealand, Malayan, and Thai parties. This lineup
of Asian parties corresponds closely with the list of those
which had most clearly supported the Chinese refusal to
surrender on the question of international discipline at the
1960 Moscow conference. CCP influence in each of these
Asian parties is probably directly proportional to the
fervency with which each now praised Hoxha.
3. The Burmese message was the most outspokenly pro-
Albanian, even surpassing the one from Peiping. The Malayan
and Thai parties sent messages which closely paralleled the
one from the CCP in warmly praising the Albanian,party and
its leadership. North Korea and North Vietnam, trying to
maintain a pose of neutralism, did not endorse the Albanian
leadership, but restricted themselves to a more or less
routine greeting. Greetings from Australia, New Zealand,
and Indonesia not only failed to endorse the Albanian leader-
ship but seemed to appeal to the Albanians not to exacerbate
relations.
25
Approved For Release 2004/12/13 : CIA-RDP79SO0427A000500020042-7
 . Approved For Release 2004/12/13 : CIA-RDP79SO0427A000500020042-7
4. Khrushchev's tactics have received little support
and his apparent failure to consult or forewarn the leaders
of these parties has stirred clear resentment because his
actions have exacerbated existing factionalism within their
own parties and caught them unprepared to deal with it.
Khrushchev's surprise assaults on Stalin and Albania,
dictated by Soviet national interests, have made increasingly
difficult the role of the leaders of the non-bloc Asian
Communist parties, and is forcing the leaders of the bloc
parties to make an unwelcome choice.
Indonesian Communist Party
5. Recent statements issued by D. N. Aidit, chairman
of the Indonesian Communist party (PCI), on the implications
of the Soviet 22nd party congress clearly indicate his
concern over the effect Khrushchev's power struggle with
the Chinese will have on the party in Indonesia. Aidit,
who has long been a loyal supporter of Moscow, is judged
by Indonesian observers to be firmly secure in the leader-
ship of the party. Although there has been no effective
challenge to his control in the past ten years, a militant
minority faction in the PKI, generally regarded as pro-
Peiping, has vigorously criticized Aidit's support for
President Sukarno and the party's adoption of a peaceful
parliamentary course in order to achieve its final goal.
This faction, closely oriented to Peiping, feels strongly
that the party will gradually lose its identity by continued
participation in a "united front" government and has pressed
for more violent opposition to Sukarno.
6. Aidit was sorely embarrassed by Khrushchev's tactics
at the congress. His apprehensions were realized by the
publication of an editorial in the PKI's major propaganda
organ,while the Indonesian party leader was still in Moscow,
strongly emphasizing that any differences between Communist
parties should be resolved through private consultations.
Following his return to Djakarta, Aidit hurried to a party
meeting which apparently had difficulty in arriving at an
acceptable position on the results of the 22nd party congress.
Reflecting his own desire to consolidate party unity, Aidit,
in a 27 November statement, sought to dissociate himself
from the Soviet action and stressed the necessity to settle
Communist inter-party troubles privately. Although Aidit's
statement appears on the surface to lean toward the Chinese
position, it is more likely an attempt by him to pre-empt
the ground on which his party's pro-Peiping faction bases
its argument and the Indonesian party can be:expected to
chart a middle course in the dispute.
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2004/12/13 : CIA-RDP79SO0427A000500020042-7
 Approved For Rele4&e 2004/ 7A00~0020042-7
7. While the PKI chairman, like a, good many other
Communist party leaders, is obviously angered at Khrushchev's
actions which have encouraged the pro-Chinese faction in the
party, all the evidence seems to indicate that he can contain
the opposition and the party will continue to pursue the pro-
Sukarno,moderate, parliamentary tactics which have proved
so successful in Indonesia. Indonesian elections are tenta-
tively scheduled for 1962 and the PKI is presently engaged
in an ambitious campaign to build up the peasantry as a
broad base of support. Aidit's policy, strongly endorsed
by Moscow, has seen the Indonesian Communist party well-
placed throughout the government apparatus--a unique achieve-
ment for a Far Eastern communist party. Only army opposition
has prevented Communist representation in the cabinet.
Moscow probably hopes that its wholehearted endorsement of
Sukarno's drive to recover West New Guinea, a demand
vociferously advocated by the PKI, and the increased dependence
of the Indonesian Army on the USSR for military assistance in
order to achieve this goal,will upset the dellchtq.balance
Sukarno has tried to preserve between the Army and the
Communists. This prospect gives Aidit a powerful bargaining
position with which to counter those arguing for a radical
change in the PKI's policies.
Indian Communist Partyl
8. Khrushchev's latest campaign against Albania and
his denigration of Stalin apparently have shaken the CPI
thoroughly, reopening the policy controversy which had been
temporarily smoothed over to give the party a platform from
which to campaign for India's national elections in February.
The CPI has not expressed itself formally on the Sino-Soviet
dispute, but individual party leaders and state units--
mostly those under leftist influence--have sharply criticized
Moscow's recent actions. Dissent by leftist elements has
grown strong enough to lead moderate CPI General Secretary
Ajoy Ghosh to avoid normal meetings of the party's National
Council until the elections are over in order not to risk
an open break.
9. While Moscow's moves have undermined the moderate
CPI leadership which it has long supported and stimulated
radical elements to oppose the present "peaceful" party
policy more vigorously than ever, the moderates still appear
to hold control. Peiping's continued intransigence in the
Sino-Indian border dispute, which Ghosh has roundly condemned,
probably will help those elements in the party who follow the
Moscow line retain the upper hand over those who advocate
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 20D4/12/13 : CIA-RDP79S00127A000500020042-7
 Approved For Rele&e 2004/12/13 : CIA-RDP79S00427A0(p0020042-7
r- I
open support for the Chinese Communist party. The strong
leftist faction in the CPI has privately denounced Ghosh
for his Pttaek on Peiping, however, and the. leftist-controlled
and Peiping-oriented West Bengal provincial committee has
refused to distribute the issue of.the CPI organ containing
Ghosh's statement. Both Peiping'`s actions and the continuing
Sino-Soviet rift are likely to further damage the CPI's
already poor election prospects.
10.. The Communist parties in Nepal and Ceylon gen-
erally take their cue from the CPI. The Nepali party also
suffers from deep ideological and personal rivalries, in
which the larger bloc dispute reportedly has been reflected.
Leaders of the party in Ceylon, overshadowed at home by a
rival Trotskyite political party, have given Khrushchev
strong support in public statements.
Japanese Communist Party
11. For the Japanese Communist party leadership, Khru-
shchev's. renewed attack on Albania and implicitly the Chinese
Communists came at a uniquely unfavorable time. Party chair-
man Sanzo Nosaka and secretary-general Kenji Miyamoto,'who
have personally always endorsed Moscow's line, have neverthe-
less attempted to steer a neutral course in the Sino-Soviet
dispute, because the party has a strong militant faction
oriented toward Peiping. Their problems have been increased,
however, by a factional dispute quite outside the Sino-
Soviet dispute, involving a right-wing element which advocates
directing major party activity against Japanese "monopoly
capitalists" rather than against American military influence
and presence. This dispute culminated this past summer with
the expulsion of the leader of the right wing dissident
movement--up to that time one of the senior leaders of the
party. A series of resignations and expulsions of others
who agreed with him followed.
12. The JCP leadership, seriously concerned with the
divisive effects of its internal dispute with the rightists,
are undoubtedly deeply disturbed by Khrushchev's re-awakening
of the Sino-Soviet dispute which will give the pro-Chinese
faction in their party an opportunity to increase their
influence and face them with two fronts upon which to fight.
There are some indications that the pro-Chinese faction may
be increasing its activities. While Nosaka and Miyomoto
were still in Moscow, the JCP issued a statement that selected
works of Mao-Tse tung would be published in Japanese--works
which were described as "great documents of Marxism-Leninism."
Nevertheless, the Japanese Communist party will undoubtedly
attempt to steer the middle course it adopted in 1959 and 1960.
Approved For Release 20Q4/12/13 : CIA-RDP79S00447A000500020042-7
25X1
25X1
 Approved For Releiwe 2004
7AO(0020042-7 25X1
Cambodia, Burma, Malaya and Thailand
13. The Communist party strength in these countries is
small and largely unorganized. For the most part.:the
Communists in this area are under tight security control by
their respective governments and in urban areas conduct their
activities largely through front organizations, which include
trade unions and newspapers. In Burma and Malaya, the
Communists operate clandestinely in the outlying sparsely
populated area and concentrate on guerrilla tactics along
the classic Chinese Communist lines. These Southeast Asian
parties can probably be expected to continue their support
for Peiping as they did in 1959 and 1960.
25X1
Approved For Release 2004/12/13 : CIA-RDP79S00427A000500020042-7