ELECTION OF A CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY IN EL SALVADOR ON 17 DECEMBER 1961

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79S00427A000500020040-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 23, 2004
• Sequence Number: 40
• Publication Date: November 20, 1961
• Content Type: IM

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
20 November 1961
OCI No. 5505/61 Copy No. 35
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: Election of a Constituent Assembly in El
Salvador on 17 December 1961
1. Offices to be filled: The 54 members of a
constituent-assembly that s to name an interim
president of the republic and then become a regular
legislature. This legislature and the interim presi-
dent are to serve until September 1962. Regular
legislative elections are scheduled for March 1962
and presidential elections for May 1962.
2. Background: The 17 December elections are
designed to restore the constitutional legality
which ended with the ouster of President Lemus in
October 1960. Lemus was succeeded by a military-
civilian junta, which came under mounting Communist
influence until it, in turn, was ousted in a military
coup in January 1961. The Civil-Military Directorate
which has exercised executive and legislative func-
tions since January is led by young officers con-
vinced that the only way to prevent an eventual Com-
munist takeover is to launch a program of socio-
economic reform.
Such a program has a special relevance in
the small, overpopulated Central American republic,
where the gulf between the wealthy few and the im-
poverished masses is as wide as anywhere in Latin
America. Encouraged by the concepts of the Alliance
for Progress, the Directorate has decreed a number
of basic reforms, including the first significant
measures any Salvadoran government has taken to
help the peaaants. The reforms have aroused strong
resistance from,the "fourteen families" which long
ruled the country and are still entrenched economically.
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Some elements of the oligarchy appear to be
attempting to subvert the armed forces.
3. Parties participating:
A. National Conciliation party (PCN):
Organized two months ago by the Directorate, the
PCN has the important and traditionally decisive
advantage of government support. Its top leader,
Colonel Julio A. Rivera, was the dominant member
of the Directorate until his resignation last
September to head the PCN. His military colleagues
hope to see him elected president next May.
b. Union of Democratic parties (UPD): A
loose coalition of three opposition parties, the UPD
has the support of most of the oligarchy. However,
at least one of the component parties, the Reform
Action party (PAR), is infiltrated by pro-Communists.
The other two member parties are the Social Democratic
party--formed late last year by followers of farmer
President Oscar Osorio--and the Christian Democratic
party.
c. The Third Front: This coalition of the
National Action party (PAN)' and the Authentic Consti-
tutional party (PAC).opposes the UPD as too far to
the right. It is still unclear whether the group
will back the government's PCN or run its own candi-
dates.
d. Revolutionary Democratic Unification
party P The official po i cal
machine of the oust-'Lemus administration and of the
preceding Osorio regime, the PRUD now is relatively
weak. Opportunistic considerations apparently in-,.
cline it to support the Directorate's PCN.
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4. Present party strengths: While the PCN has
the advantage of governmen support, its formation
only three months before the election has given it
little time to build an effective political machine.
It relies on support from the beneficiaries of the
government's reform program; however, the Salvadoran
lower classes are generally unorganized and illiterate,
and the reforms have yet to have an important impact
in many parts of the country.
The government will almost certainly attempt
to influence the outcome of the elections on behalf
of the PCN. Wholesale rigging of the election will
be difficult, however, because the electoral machinery
includes a number of devices designed to assure a
free election. The opposition, with its greatest
strength in the UPD, has the advantage of support from
most Of the oligarchy, which has the support of the
country's entire press.
5. Principal issues: The basic issue is the
government s program of basic socio-economic reform,
which the oligarchy sees as a challenge to its posi-
tion. Secondary issues include opposition among
large numbers of educated Salvadorans to the influence
of the military in political affairs and to the regime's
obvious support of one political party.
6. Significance for the United States: El Sal-
vador is the first Latin American country where
the Alliance for Progress has become a major domestic
political issue. The United States is under
strong attack from the Salvadoran oligarchy for
encouraging a reform program which challenges its
traditional political and economic domination of
the country. The small but vocal Communist-led
element is also attacking the Alliance for Progress
as a new form of imperialism. Future developments
in El Salvador will have an important bearing on
Communist losses or gains in the Central American
area. The political struggle now going on in El
Salvador over the implementation of long-over-
due reforms is probably only the first of many that
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will occur in Latin America as the Alliance for Progress
becomes an. increasingly important element in relations
between the United States and the Latin American coun-
tries.
25X1
Acting Assistant Director
Current. Intelligence
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