IMPORTANCE OF THE CHILEAN SOLIDARITY MOVEMENT IN EUROPE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01099A002000080002-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 23, 2005
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: December 13, 1974
• Content Type: MF

ILLEGIB
25X1
25X1
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SUBJECT Importance of the Chilean
Solidarity Movement in Europe
1. You recently asked that we look into the importance of the
Chilean Solidarity Movement (CSM) in Europe and what might be done
about it. The question arose when Arnold Silver suggested that it
constituted a serious vulnerability for the US which should be
countered by US moves to cut off aid to Chile and otherwise clearly
disavow the junta. The Congress may have already ameliorated the
problem by the House move this week to cut off aid to Chile, but the
problem will not thereby disappear.
2. In response to your request:
a. I asked DDO to prepare a wrapup of the facts
about the CSM in Europe (copy attached).
I
I convened a session of DDI analysts, together with
of DDO, to discuss the problem in the light of the
3. The discussion led to the following conclusions:
a. The Chile question is popular journalistic stuff all
over Europe and it is true enough to say that it has replaced
Vietnam as a convenient means of focusing anti-US sentiment.
It offers a commoQ ground for communists, socialists and left-
to-moderate Christians and liberals to come together on an
issue -- when they can agree on little else.
b. It is also an embarrassment to our friends in public
and official quarters, and there is no respectable voice,
public or official, actively willing to defend.
c. Whether measured as a rallying point for disparate
groups, or as a public impact issue, it is most significant in
Portugal, Greece, Italy and Sweden; least so in Britain and
West Germany; France is in between.
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d. But measurements of impact are very imprecise. It
should be noted that:
-- Except for Sweden, no European government has
shown itself actively exercised about US policy
toward Chile, and certainly none has exerted
any strong or recurrent pressure on the US to
do anything.
-- In all cases, it is local considerations that
determine whether the communists, socialists
and others come together or stay apart. Con-
sidered as a platform for building a broad
anti-US coalition, the Chile issue is unique
and marginal in that it does not have impact
much beyond the issue itself.
-- Offsetting the near-universal disapproval of
US policy toward Chile, but much less publi-
cised, is the lesson drawn in some quarters that
Chile shows the folly of communists pushing too
far or too fast for control. The Chilean lesson
is central to the PCI's current "historic com-
promise" and "soft opposition" strategy, and is
no doubt reflected in the USSR's general line
of advising European communists to go slow and
avoid risks.
-- In Greece and especially in Portugal, fears that
Chile shows what the US might do to them are no
doubt sharpened by the CSM's activities, but
would also no doubt be there if the CSM did not
exist. They are the result of circumstances
having nothing to do with Chile, and will grow
or diminish for reasons having nothing to do
with Chile.
4. These caveats should not be read as arguments against the
US doing what it can to limit damage in Europe over Chile. Congres-
sional action this week will help, though the credit will not go to
the Administration. Apart from the aid question, there seems no
reason why the US should not come on stronger in deploring any bru-
talities of which the junta is guilty. This could be done without
public mea culpas over the question of covert action capabilities.
5. But one should not hold out hope that the CSM would cease
anti-US attacks or go away. The historical record -- including
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distortions and exaggerations -- is there, and an ostentatious
switch on this issue, given what has been publicly said by the Pres-
ident and the Secretary, would probably not persuade those disposed
to believe the worst. It would certainly not end the CSM's propa-
ganda efforts. It would, however, help our friends to defend us
better in public and private, and would remove an irritant with the
neutrals, most notably the Swedes.
6. It would be marginal in its impact, case by case, compared
to what the US can do on far more critical issues with key countries.
Thus an ounce of help to Greece on Cyprus, or of aid to Portugal,
would no doubt be worth a pound of gestures over the Chile issue in
the country concerned.
7. Finally, and quite apart from the merits and morals of US
policy toward Chile, is the matter of US ability to keep intelligence
secrets. Some of our European friends, no matter how they feel about
the junta and US policy toward it, have been appalled at the fact
that US operational secrets become public in the US press. This gives
them concern about working with us. They would be helped by some per-
suasive assurance that the USG can still keep secrets. This is, of
course, no news to you.
8. If you agree with the argument herein, it would be easy to
adapt this memorandum to become a note to HAK from you. I suggest
that nothing short of that level would do any good.
ILLEGIB
onal Intelligence Officer
for Western Europe
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