CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A003200350001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 7, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 10, 1957
• Content Type: REPORT

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10 August 1957
0001"
Copy No. 136
CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
13 C
-T 0: N"' I L,:V Chit:
/RUTH: HFU 70-2
T
OFFICE OF CURREN
INTELLIGENCE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This document contains classified information affecting
the national security of the United States within the
meaning of the espionage laws, US Code Title 18, Sections
793, 794, and 798. The law prohibits its transmission
or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an un-
authorized person, as well as its use in any manner
prejudicial to the safety or interest of the United States
or for the benefit of any foreign government to the detri-
ment of the United States.
DIA and DOS review(s) completed.
0e, TOP SECRET
2 0 0 2 / 0 7 / 3 0: C I A - R D P 7 9 WZZM ~ xvZX/06.1
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4? LAOTIAN GOVERNMENT CRISIS ENDED
(page 6).
5. INDIAN FINANCIAL CRISIS
10 Aug, 57
COMMITTEE
CONTENTS
ARMED REVOLT REPORTED IMMINENT IN CUBA
6-k- 2, SOVIET SHAKE-UP MAY BE REACHING PARTY CENTRAL
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1. ARMED REVOLT REPORTED IMMINENT IN CUBA
Comment on:
An armed revolt against President
Batista is tentatively planned for the
week end of 9-11 August, according
to information received by the US army
attache in Havana. The source said
Batista had rejected an ultimatum to
turn over power to a military junta.
Revolutionary activity has been delayed
because of the necessity of winning the
support of several officers of the tank unit at Camp Colum-
bia, army headquarters outside Havana. This revolutionary
attempt is probably the same as the one which was reported
to have been planned on 4-6 August.
The general strike which broke out in
Santiago on 1 August presumably was expected to spark spon-
taneous popular support for an uprising. It failed to spread
to Havana, however, and popular enthusiasm for a general
uprising has apparently dissipated.
The government, which imposed modified
martial law on 1 August, has reasserted at least temporary
control over the country. Opposition leaders no doubt feel
that if they fail to act within the next few days, increased re-
pressive measures by the government will make even more
difficult any attempt to oust Batista.
The political situation, especially in San-
tiago and other areas of rebel-dominated Oriente Province,
remains tense, however, and unrest will probably continue.
The press on 9 August reported a clash between government
troops and the forces of rebel leader Fidel Castro in Oriente
the day before as well as the "clandestine arrival" of a plane-
load of revolutionaries during the night, It also reported
that a high-level army shake-up would include the removal
of Col. Pedro Barrera from his position as commander of op-
erations against Castro.
10 Aug 57
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2. SOVIET SHAKE-UP MAY BE REACHING PARTY
CENTRAL COMMITTEE
Comment on:
Aleksandr Sheremetyev, a candidate
member of the USSR's Communist Party
central committee and an industrial ad-
ministrator, has been replaced by party
official Mikhail Solomentsev as chairman of the Chelyabinsk
Council of National Economy (Sovnarkhoz). This action sug-
gests that the June shake-up of the party presidium is being
extended to central committee members who may have shared
the ousted leaders' opposition to some of Khrushchev's policies.
Sheremetyev had been minister of ferrous
metallurgy until that ministry was abolished on 10 May in
Khrushchev's sweeping reorganization of Soviet industrial man-
agement. He was appointed chairman of the Chelyabinsk
Sovnarkhoz shortly after it was created on 29 May.
Solomentsev had been second secretary of
the Chelyabinsk Oblast party committee at least since mid-
1955. He was first identified as chairman of the Chelyabinsk
Sovnarkhoz on 3 August.
The presidium shake-up in which party
careerists replaced governmental officials set the pattern for
changes such as. Sheremetyev's removal, which may presage
further incursions of party functionaries into the industrial
management field.
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4. LAOTIAN GOVERNMENT CRISIS ENDED
Comment on:
The Laotian National Assembly in-
vested Souvanna Phouma premier on
9 August by a 26-to-8 vote with a re-
duced cabinet of only five other minis-
ters. He announced he will press for
a swift settlement with the Pathet Lao,
leading to a broad coalition government.
Party leaders Katay Sasorith and Phoui
Sananikone, however, both of whom are
included in the cabinet, have indicated the government's
first order of business will be to simplify the investiture
voting procedure which caused the protracted cabinet crisis.
Katay estimates the reforms can be completed in about two
months, after which the present emergency cabinet can be
expanded to normal size.
In his speech to the National Assembly
on 8 August, Souvanna termed peaceful reunification of Laos
the "number-one requirement." He pleaded for national unity
to achieve a rapid settlement and called for good faith on the
part of the Pathets in implementing previously concluded ac-
cords for their military and civil reintegration into the na-
tional community.
Phoui,who speaks for exponents of a "hard"
attitude toward the Pathets, has expressed confidence that
Souvanna will be prevented from taking any "dangerous steps."
10 Aug 57
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5. INDIAN FINANCIAL CRISIS
Comment on:
The $38,600,000 decline of India's for-
eign-exchange reserves, during the week
ending 2 August, to $843,800,000 indi-
cates that the government will be forced
to reduce the legal reserve requirement
of $840,000,000 within the next few days. There is widespread
apprehension in Indian financial circles that such a move would
start a financial panic which in turn would result in increased
smuggling, flight of capital, and a weakening of the value of
the Indian rupee in international markets.
While the $21,000,000 first installment of
a loan India is making to Burma accounted for the unusual
size of the recent week's decline, India's foreign-exchange re-
serves, which stood at $1. 566 billion when the Second Five-
Year Plan began on 1 April 1956, have been falling by nearly
$20,000,000 a week in recent months. The reserves are likely
to continue to decline rapidly unless the scope of the plan is re-
duced or large-scale foreign aid is received, Finance Minister
Krishnamachari probably will request such assistance from the
United States during his visit scheduled for September.
The government has emergency powers to
reduce the reserve requirement to $630,000,000.
10 Aug 57 Current Intelligence Bulletin
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