RESEARCH STUDY THE CEMA-EC RELATIONSHIP: THE EAST AND WEST EUROPEANS FRUSTRATE SOVIET DESIGNS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00608R000600170002-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 25, 1999
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: March 1, 1975
• Content Type: RS

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R~~~h sway
THE CE1VlA-EC RELATIONSHIP:
The Fart and Wert Euro~ean~'
Frustrate Sm~iet Deri~n~r
OPR 108
March 1975
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~oPr N ?_ 19
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THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
OFFICE Oi= POLITICAL RESEA-tCH
THE CEMA-EC RELATIONSHIP: THE EAST AND WEST
EUROPEANS FRUSTRATE SOVIET DESIGNS
Pa~;u
I~OIiEW01tl) ............................................ iii
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS .. . ...................... 1
'I'IlE DISCUSSION ? .................... ? ...... , ......... , 3
IN'I'fiODUC'1'IUN ......................... . ...... . ... . . . 3
L SE'C'I'INC'1'tll? S'I'ACI? IN'I'lll: 1~J(i0's ...... . ........ . . 3
A. Diverging Interests in CEMA ...................... 4
R. Frustrating a Community Approach .............. ? .. 4
Il. I:N7'I:It DE1'I?,N'1'I~.. .............................. .. 5
A. Iicthinking the Approach to the EC .................. S
t;. Expanding CEMA's External Role ................... (i
C. Eastrrn and Wcstcrn F.uropc licgin to React ......... , i
III. A CEMA-E~; LINK PROPOSED ...................... 8
A. Soviet Motivations ............................... $
IV. hOCUS ON TILE FORM OF C1:MA-EC 'I'II?5 .......... 9
A. Differing Perspectives Within CEMA ................ 9
l3. East European Resistance Emerges ........... ? ...... 10
C. The Soviets Push fvr a CEMA-EC Link .............. 11
D. Wcstcrn Europe Joins tftc licsistance ................ 12
V. THE SOV1E1'S LOSE TFIE INITIATIVE ... ? .......... 12
A. Soviet Troubles Mount ............................ 13
R. A Second Bid for aCEMA-l'.C Link ................. 13
C. A New Impasse Emerges .......................... 13
D. An Abortive First Official Meeting ................. 14
VI. PROSPECTS ....................................... l5
SOURCE C11'ATIONS ........................ ? ....... ? ? ? ? l8
FIGURES
IMPORTS OF THE CEMA COUNTRIES FfiOM
THE EC STATES (table) ................................ 3
NOTE: !n the preparation of this study, the O(flce of Politird Research consulted olhei offices of the
Central Intelli};ence Agency. Their comments and su~l;cstions e~en+ upprcciuted, but no fornml attempt
at roordinution was undertaken. Further comments s~?ill Ix wclcY!mcd by the author. -
(code 143, extension 56Hi3).
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THE CEMA-EC RELATIONSHIP:
THE EAST AND WEST EUROPEANS FRUSTRATE
SOVIET DESIGNS
In early February the first formal mcctini; between CEMA* and the
EC** took place in Moscow. Although loni; in the -~.akini;, this mcetini;
accomplished very little, primarily because the CEMA side was unwill-
ing to discuss substantive issues. In consequence, the East Gioc is not
appreciably closer than before to defining its intentions toward the
Community and toward the establishment of a new framework for the
conduct of East-West economic relations.
Although the development of new links between Europe's ta~o ma-
jor economic groupings might appear to be inevitable in the present
context of East-West relations, what form and scope such contacts
should take raises complex political and economic issues, Major
differences un these issues have emerged between the USSR and the East
European states, which have in turn had a significant influence on West
European policies. This paper examines the nature of these issues and
discusses the factors working, for and against, a closer CEMA-EC
relationship in the future.
The paper has a different focus but is complementary to the recent-
ly issued OPR Study, "The Prospects for European Unity: The View
from Moscow" (OPR-105, December 1974, SECRET/NFD/NDA/CD','
which concentrates on the perceptions of the various ; nstitutional am
individual contributors to Soviet policy regarding the European Corri
munity.
'CEMA ('I'hc Council for Economic Mutual Assistance) was established in 14)?19 as u regional ernnoniic
organization of the IiSSR and most of the East L'uropcnn states-Albanlu, Iiulgccriu, l;zcchoslovukiu, Hungo,r;~,
I'ulmul, and fiomnnia. Albanlu dropped out in the curly lII'.~0's, and Iscut Ccrmany, Mongolia and Cuba becr~uic
mcnd>crs hr IcJ50, 14Hi2, and 1972 respectivc!y. 1'ar purposes of thb paper Mongolia and Cuba can Iw ignored,
?`AI(hough (he initials EEC, standing for European Economic Community, arc still commonly used unrl arc
technically arrrect when mFerring to the curly years of the organiwtlon, the Community now prefers to drop the
word Ermomlc from its title in recognition of Its broudencYl functluns cmd aspirations. For the sake of consistency,
the initials EC will Ire used throughout this paper.
iii
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C[~,MA has exercised little authority over the external cconoinic
relations of its members and has had few outside contacts. Unly iii re-
cent years has CEMA, under Soviet instigation, turned its uttcntiou
toward the question of its relations with the EC. Mosco:v's interest in
this question had two sources; (1) recognition that the Community haul
become an irnporlunt cog iii European economics and politics, and (2)
its concern to insure Bloc cohesion us it pursued detente and the c~xpuu-
sion of East-West economic relations. Moscow, therefore, sought ways
both to come to grips with the EC reality itself and to control the lust
L"uropcuns' relations with it. The Soviets came to sec the establishment
of relations betwec:: CEMA and the EC us a partial answer to both re-
quirements, and brought growing pressure on the East I~,uropcans to
agree to coordination of Blrc economic policy toward the West and to
in.crcusc CEMA's external role and authority.
By 19^2 the Soviets had decided to move toward establishing a
direct CEMA-EC link,~~~-~? T3rezhnev called for the establishment of
"businesslike" relations betwec;n the two organisations. But when it
came to the question of what for,n contacts between CI?MA and the EC
should take, Soviet-East European differs-noes soon emerged. Four East
European countries in particular--Hungary, Poland, Romania, and
East Germany-have subsequently resisted the establishme~zt of a
CEMA-F,C link which would restrict their ability to develop relations
with the Community bilaterally. They have come t~ accept CEMA as a
point of contact with the Community through which their collective
voice might be used to help facilitate the development of bilateral
economic relations and to minimize any adverse impact of ver levels, It dl(I out do w-
before sollcllln~; h;ust I:urupccut views runrerning both
the Invltutlon to Urtull and (:h,MA?1?(: rcluliuns lu
{;encrul~t~-u reflcetlnn of the Impact of Hurt h:urul>euu
rescrvnllons expressed ensiles. '1'lutl the Hurt h;uropeun
reaction war still very wary, and that tills war curs~
veyed to the I;C: us suggested by the fact that while
striving lu Intruducc the CCI' IH prinripl(' by January
f)7,5, the 1:(; dl(I nut give the ,S'oviets (t new opporlunl-
ly !u push tltruugh a cuunterwtilhtg rule leer Ch.MA?
The (;ummuul!y n'frui-ted from tltreutening crunornlc
sunctlunr against those who did not ttckuuwledge the
CCI',* and postponed any real response to the CEMA
Invitation to the Cununission President.
In the fuse of this Contnm-tity effort effectively to
separate Inh?oductlcm uF the CCP from the question of
u (;I:Mr1-I;C link, the 5ovlet stance latrdcncd, Un ut
Icust one occasion lust full the Soviets threatened u
hreukdo~~n in bilateral cci~numic relations should the
Curnmunily Insist on introducing flu' CCI'through the
Comrnission.~'' 'I'hcy rnudc crude attempts to negofiute
extensions of bilateral trade ugrcentrnts with LC
members, purticulurly hrunce and Ccrnutny-which
were resisted and effectively sidetntcked into' ncgo-
tiutions over relatively innocuous supplerncntury
ruopcrution ugrecntcnts. The Soviets, in addition,
refused to accept the proposed male! agreement
offcre'd them by the Cornmissio(t us u first step toward
intrnductiurt of the CCP.
Most c?~f the I:ust ~ uropeuns joined in this resistance '~
to the iutroductio(t of the CCP. Except for Romania,
which bud already estr.blishcd a relationship with the
25X1 C
25X1 C
25X1 C
Such rerlsfunce ruuld only rclnforcc CouunuHlly
wurlne.rs of slgnlflcuul (;1?MA?I;(.; cuulucls and (~~ler-
rnlne Sovlct arguments fur rlnvtglhcning (:I:MA's
aulhurlty (o enter into them. Neccnt cvlc!e~rre HI~ l,usl,
I?uropc'(-tt ruuccrn el?fccllvely nutkes this point; in dls?
cusslug their h:(; pruhlents with
iu lute Ueeentbcr, the I Iun[;ur uns strc~ ~ ?, ':;"ir
ester fur };renter future uulununty In trru!r :?
:?,.,: ~.
.
pressed their concern that :''(; pnlicler ((nut iS, ?n.
lruductlctn of the CCI') would It~rce fiu~ ('I:MA states
into a canuncm position lu lrudic:h with the C;arn-
nutnlly. 'They urged Instead "ut must" a (.:I:MA?1~,C
umhrc'lla ugn'enu'ul, under which (:IsMA and I?C
rnembcrs could c'cnttinuc to cYmchtct tn-dc bilutcrully.~"
The expression of these I tun ruricut views, which were
pntmpll)' relayed to the NATO urn-
hussudurs In 13udupesl, re eels out only the depth of
?ust 1?urupcun cc-nrcrn which still exists, but u
wllllu[;uess to risk Soviet ire by IobbyiHg against
Western policies seen us serving Suvict interests and
arguing in favor of urrtutgcnu'nts which will minirnizc
Suvict control over I:ust?~4'est rcortumie relations,
Soviet forties In n'sisting the CCP undoubtedly
reflected a large ntcusum ul? frustration over the ron-
linued I:C unwillingncrs to n'cognirc Cf;MA us un
cyuuL 'I'bis nun-rcc?ugnition presents a serious obsturle
to any renewed utternpt to enhance CEMA's role u-
spokcsnuu- for its rne!nhers? 13y helping to foreshdl
stren>;lhening of Soviet control over (:astern Europe it
cviden;ly rcinfurc?cd Soviet reluctuncr to -nakc, or Jo
pcrntil the I?ust l;uropeurts to make, any nerve toward
bilateral folks with the Conunissiun concerning the
CCi'.
D. An Abortive first Official Meeting
Commission when it received trade preferences, As this new irnpussc crncrgcd and the prospects for
C[;MA's East I:uropcun nternbers also refused to exploiting the l:(,"s introduction of the CCP to
accept this model agreement. 'I'bis rejection un_ strengthen control over CEtiL1 faded, the Soviets
duu!)tcdly received Soviet encouragement, but with uppcarcci to become Icss enthusiastic about pursuing
the prospect that their economic access to the Corn- CI:MA-I?C relations ut the substantive level. Shortly
nuutity would be preserved intact for the near future, befnrc the first forrnul meeting of CI;MA and EC
the East Isuropcuns weer probably not rcluctunt to join rcprrscntatlvc'r in curly hrbruury, a leading Suvict
the Soviets in strongly resisting introduction of the c'couon;i.,i ..:pressed very modest hopes fns its results
CCP.
'I'nrnurlh?, Hurst bilutcrul tnulc u};n?cnuvrts bchvicen CF.~1A crnuarl;~ ctnd some joint research emerging during the first stage
and the I?(: nu?rnlx?r stuh?+expircd in Junuury (#~ 5 and should in theory (>f CEMA-EC Coopcration.35 This suggested that the
have been rephuti?d by Hess- ugn'enu?nts ncgotiutcd wills the Cont. Soviets were becoming morn CAUt10Ur ilbUUt tI1C CXMnt
mission, 'I'hen? aus never any exix'c?tutian in Cumnumity circ?Ics. of CI;MA-I;C contact, and that they might again he
hosvcver. Ilud cxislint; truck urnurKcnu'nts would Ix? n'pudiatirl or that
wry I?(: level uarrrds would be reached by the first of the ??wrr, ,- reassessing their upproac'h to the Community through
arse-~rur extension of a few blhacrul u{~recnu'nts bus Ircen Ix?nnitted, but (;I;MA, 'I'hcrc was In fort ttcnv grctwittg Concern wltltitl
in nor t c?:rses Irudc al;rcrnu'nts hove cxpinYt and the so?culled the' ConltillrrlOrl that the prOpOSt'd r11CCting b('tN?('ett
auhnrunurrrs Community Iwlicy, which in effect rnulnhrins the xfafus 1'udevev and Ortoll ryas valued for "polltieal Atld Up-
yrru fu trade n?IuHnns Is behrl; applied. tical" reasons, i.c., tv give recognition to (;Ef~1A,
and envtsuna'd merely un exchange of information
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rather than to uchlrve suhslunllve proi;ress,~10-a vlrw
probably drrlyrd In port front the trcutnteut bt Sovlcl
propaganda of (;h.MA's uchicvrntent of observer
status at the UN lust full,
'I'hr trip la Moscow ul' rut 1':C drlrgutlnn far lhr In-
Illul tnrrting couflrnuxl that CEMA was not prrparrd
la dlscuss suhstuntlve Issues, The rnceling wrist very
badly, with nu real progress un any issue being uchlev-
rd and no rontnntnlgt~~ bring ugrrrd upon, '1'hr
(;I~,Mr1 rrpusrntutivrs wrrc churacterfred us stuhboru,
secrrtlvc, and poorly prrpurcd to discuss anything of
subsluncr, !brit only Intrust being In urrcutl.~ing n visit
by Cumrnission President Ortoli hr Moscow.~17
The (;I;MA positi~rn ut this first rnceting appears to
hove rrflrctcd un iutpassc within the orgunizutiorr,
Nrithcr the bust nor the Wrst t?uropcuns of course
wrrc willing to take uh prospective spheres of coopcru-
tion which could upprcchtbly stungthen CI:MA's
bond in Eust !:uropcun foreign cconnrnic policy. 'I'hc
?C rrportcdly wonted hr folk, rather, about things like
stundurdizu~ion urtd cnvinmmentul protection, and
is:~rlwps c:vcntuully about statistical exchange and
energy policies. I3ul even rnt th~+se topics the CEMA
representatives wrrc unwilling to open ncgotiutions,
'I'bis suggests that bccuusc they were unable to
strengthen CI~,MA's ut~ihurity over I:ustern I?urupc,
the Soviets bud refused to srutction any ncgotiutions
which would prcrvidc opporhutitics for contact and
cooperation to develop bchvecn CL?MA and I?C;
members.
"l'he Community' representatives apparently Houle
things more difficult for the CIsMA delegation by forc-
ing the issue of their respective organizations' corn-
prtrncc. '1'hc F.C delegation insisted that mutual
recognition of each other's represcntational
puwrrs-meaning, on CEMA's part, recognition of the
Commission's authority to introduce the CCP-was a
prerequisite to progress toward cooperation. This, in
turn, it was argued, was essential before Ortoli would
have anything to folk about in Moscow, If main-
htincd, this EC stance mruns that the Commission's
right to repuscnt Cornrnunity members in negotiating
new trade agreements must be accepted by CEMA
before any further real progress on CEMA-EC contact
can be mode and the Ortoli visit brought off. Com-
munity disappointment in this first meeting has in fact
Icd to incrcusrd suspicions of Soviet ;ntentiors and of
the utility of a trip to Moscow by Ortoli,
I3y taking this position, the EC has confronted the
Soviets with tough decisions. Unless the Soviets reverse
their recent hard stand on the CCP by acknowledging
lhr Cununlsslon's nulhurlly uud art prepared to
nrgoUutr un substuntivr Issues In prrpuraliun far un
Urtolf-I~udcyrv nu~rting, corttinucd stulrnutlr upprurs
likely, (~or the Sovlrts nnw to tukr thrsr steps would
upprnr lu rrquirr rithrr a nutJor brruktl~rough on lhr
qursliou r-f increusfug (;I~,MA's uuthorlly or Sovlct
rrrxurninution aF the rule of Cl?Mr1 and of CI?MA-h,C
contort in fulurr I~;ust-West relations,
I~ollowing the urrrliug, nrvcrlhclcss, the Soviets
hour appeared optimistic about fuUtrc CEMA-I~,C
contacts. Ignoring rrulity, they have puhllrly In-
trrprrted the nrrrtlnt; its a success, and a Ieucling
1'ruvclu conuncntator, Yury %hukuv, bus even
pudirtrd a trlp by Urtali to Moscow "wllhin the next
few numths,"~'" '1'hc cxntstruction of this facade of up-
tlrttisnt helps Ur krrp Soviet uptlons open: if a pro-
longed iorpussc develops and Urtali cannot br prr-
suuded to canrc to Moscow the Cornnuutih? can br
blunted fur interrupting a promising rliolagur, yet at
the same lime, this approach can serve to court err
minimize any cuncrssions muds to get hire there, It
also rcFlects the Soviet uttituclc that mrctings, visits
and drrlaratiuns arc wortltwhilc in their awn right,
bccuusc turn if they du nut accomplish unythiug of
substance, they at Icast prevent backsliding and
thereby help to make detente "irrcvcrsible." Just as
far Western participants ut the CSC;I?, in the near
term these Soviet tactics will provide a severe test For
the I?C caul its mernhers of their . ummitment to a
continuing dialogue, their ability to resist unilateral
concessions, and, incrcasingh~, their patience.
It now appears that CEMA-IsC rrlutions will
drvclop along more modest lines than some hoped,
and others feared, a couple of years ago, and that their
establishment is unlikely to precipitate any significant
changes in the conduct of Lusk-West economic or
political r-ffuirs in the foreseeable fulurr. Eastern
Europe will generally lze happy if CEMA-EC relations
amain pro fornut, rnorc a by-product than u shaper of
East-West economic relations. 1'hc clement of tacit
collaboration in resisting Soviet designs which has
evolved bchvecn the Community and Eust European
rnernbers of CEMA should continue to provide uFor-
midahlr harrier to any breakthrough on the closely in-
tcrrelated questions of CEMA-EC tics and a more
authoritative external role for CEMA.
Although willing to sec CEMA-EC contacts develop
cautiously, the EC and its members are not likely to be
more forthcoming us long as East European rescr-
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vutiuns rcuurin undhnlnished and CI:MA's rnembcrs
resist so udunuurtly the uppllculicm of the CCP. Reccul
experience argues that the Eust Europeans will con-
tinue to Flnd a receptive audience for their complaints
among EC members should the Soviets step up
pressure upon them to grunt CEMA a significant In-
rreuse in control over thc~lr external policies, and that
the Conununity is likely to prove unreceptive to the
Soviets' more ambitious ideas concerning CEMA-EC
relations In such spheres us numetury and Inveshnent
policy should they be revived. Now prooccupicd with
much morn pressing problems than the CCP, the Com-
munity In Fuct appears relieved to huvc uchicved Its
nominal introduction with u minirnurn of fanfare or
squabbling among LC members and, while insisting
on the Commission's right to introduce the CCP, to be
Icss inclined to stress its authority in bloc-to-bloc
dealings.
Even if EC members eventually agree to the in-
troduction of u more cornprchensivc CCP toward the
E ust than one would presently anticipate, this will
provide little economic impetus for the development of
un equivalent common policy by CEMA. The in-
stitutions t;nd trading practices in the hvo halves of
Europe rcrnuin so different that-us GA'I'T experience
with :gust European applicants bus shown-there is lit-
tle real hu;is for negotiation over mutual concessions
concerning trade barriers. Until operable tariffs or
other means of trade control Icss subject to menipulu-
tion by control planners arc introduced by CEMA, it
will remain very difficult for it to offer the Community
un effective quid pro qua for commercial concessions.
The EC Commission, therefore, will in all probability
apply the CCP essentially unilaterally for the
foreseeable future.
A major intangible at the moment, however, is
whether dre rapid shift in the economic balance
between the USSR and Euston Europe over the past
year or so will l;e exploited effectively by the Soviets to
break East European resistance to an enlrunccment of
CEMA's authority and to a bloc-tc:-bloc upprouch to
the Community. The Soviets are the primary supplier
of East European row material and fuel requirements,
notably oil. Until this year, changes in world market
prices had relatively little impact on Soviet-East Euro-
pean trade because of long-term contractual
arrangements and the way prices have been set in
CEMA. But prices in Soviet-East European trade are
no~v rising, and closer Soviet-East European economic
tics can be anticipated, which will be reflected in
greater Eust European debt to, investment in, and
trade and cooperation with, the USSR. Because of
their gn:ut stoke in East European stability, the Soviets
will be very reluctant to provoke cries of expluitution ur
to accept the pulitlcul risks which would uccornpuny
economic hardship In Euston Europe, But the present
situation does greatly enhance Soviet economic
bargaining power which can be turned to political
ends if Moscow abases to do so. At u minimum, the re-
cent strengthening of the Soviets' economic position
bus probably reinforced their fading that fn the future
Bloc economic policy can be coordinated mare effec-
tively behind the scenes ut state and, especially, ut P~r-
ty levels-even without a morn direct rule for CEMA.
The Suvict decision on how to pursue the
CEMA-EC Zink will of course turn or, much more than
tactical amsidcrutions of relative economic strength
within CEMA. '1'hc idea of such a link was put
forward in IcJ72. If ut that time the momentum toward
detente was grouter than ut present, it was in port
because expectations of progress toward u new
economic order in I?uropc and expanded Lust-West
economic relations were strongc- The Soviet
willingness to accept the Community us un economic
bloc in return for acknowledgement of CEMA's
authority in Euston Europe could be seen as the
econorrric co:mtcrpurt to the political settlement then
being sought in Ccntrul Europe.
I~or the Soviets the situation bus now changed
rnurkcdly. 'I'hc threat of the Community has
diminished, at Icust For the near future, us u result of
Western political and economic disarray, and the
broader Soviet political objectives in Central Europe
huvc been largely uchicved. In assessing their
upprouch to the LC the Soviets face much the same
question us on Basket III ut the CSCE (freedom of
rnovcrnent for individuals and ideas) and on
emigration; ore the potential gains, which arc now
lurl;cly economic, worth the political risks? In these cir-
cumstunccs, ugood case can now be mode in Moscow
for moving very cautiously in developing uCEMA-EC
link which in the absence of greater authority for
CEMA may offer less proac?ect for increasing Soviet
control over Eastern L'urope th~a:, for allowing East
and West Europeans to develop contacts undermining
that control
I~nrstrutcd in their efforts to exploit the establish-
ment of CEMA-EC ties and -;he introduction of the
CCP to strengthen CEMA, the soviets are likely to be
happy to see these tics develop gradually, while reap-
ing maximum political and propaganda advantage
fror.~ future contacts. They probably will also continue
to resist the introduction of the CCI', seeking instead to
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steer passing issues of conuncrciul policy into bllutcrul
ur quasi-offlciul channels, 'I'hs approach would now
appear to offer significant advantages to the Soviets,
because to the extent that they continue to push for u
"floc approach to the expansion of Lust-West economic
relations, In the absence of firmly established c:ontml
by CLMA the Lust European and EC states wdl boll)
hove greater incentive and opportunity to steer
ncgoliutions toward intcrnutfonul forums in which the
roles of CLMA and the USSR can be minimired? lay
advocating a scpurutiou of the problcrn of expanding
Lull-West economic relations into its com-
ponents-truck barriers, monetary arrangements,
credit policies, etc,-the roles of already involved
orguniiutions, such us GA'I"1' and the Economic Corn-
rnisk)n for Europe (ECL), could be enhanced and
roles for other internutionul orgunlxutions, such us the
IMh and the ULCU, could eventually be found, In-
dications of just such reasoning hove recently appeared
In Ilungury, where CA'I"I' has been cited us the
preferred forum for trtde negotiations with the EC,7D
and in Romania, an 1MF member, which recently in-
dicated its interest in achieving observer status in the
OECD,*1? If the Community can maintain the cxx)r-
dinuted approach to the Eust developed for t:)c CSCE
'Recrnl signs u(Sovict interest in purticiputiug in some huhion ut the
upcrnning, CA'I-1'-sixtnsurecl ruuncl of nntltilutcntl trucle negotiations
nary In port n?flrcl o desire to monitor the Iutst l;umpctut?s uctivitlcs
Iherr-esi>t?clully their anaac?Is a?Ilh the Cornnuntlty, The GCI:, which
btu Itmg been involved in promoting [sttst?~'Vest ecrnutrnic mlatlons, is
defe~rDtg un esuntlaullon of Its current programs txnJiug the rndcrnne of
tht? CtiCl4, sv61c?h It unticiputrs-(xrrhaps hw optimistically-will help
to shuix? its fuhm? rolc,~t
and now guinhtg credence through the introduction of
the CC: P, and can carefully uurlure Its incipient caor-
dinution of foreign economic policy with Lustcrrt
I~uropc, it night be possible to be+gin to shift
ncgotlutlons to these intcrnutlonul forurns? !3y druwint;
the Cl?MA states into the Inlernutionul cconornlc
system, this could eventually help make It possible for
discussions to focus on nu)re fundamental economic
barrier:; to tut expansion of Lust-West economic
rclutiona, such us bilutcrulisrn and non-convcrtibllity.
All of this remains anathema to present Soviet
leaders, '1'hcir rather abrupt rejection of any involvc-
nuatl in intcrnutionul rnonctury negotiations, noted at
the time the approach to the LC was first being
prepared, and their continued reluctance to think
ulont; such lines reflect un awareness of the oppor-
tunitias tills involvement wc)uld provide for subtle sub-
version ar Soviet control and a revival of reformist sen-
linunt h) I:ustern Europe, '1'hc Sovicls hove consi~tent-
lyshown their umvlllingncss to risk either devcloprnent
in formulating plans for detente, This helps explain
why lncir post-CSCL concept of economic relations in
Europe remains so undeveloped, foiling so fur to
proceed beyond ittc notion of a few grandiose pu_t-
Europcan projects and to offer any tangii)Ic in-
stitutiurrul innovations, Yct, until there is u lessening of
Soviet rigidity on the form of future East-West
economic relations and on the extent of bloc control
necessary over them, it is unlikely that either Eastern
L~arope or Community members will become more
grilling to sec the CLM A-EC link now finally being es-
htblished assume u significant role in N)c shaping of
these relations,
17
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2001/08/21 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000600170002-7
 CONFIDEN'flAl
Approved For Release 2001/08/21 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000600170002-7
25X1 A2g L'Eaprrsyn, Rome, 23 February 1075.
^ 3bSeptcruber 14174, CONPIUI;N'17~15X1A2g
22 Uctubcr Ifl74, Lou. 25X1A2g
2O Dcrcm ber I fl74, CON F1 V I.N?rln L25X 1 A2 g
~I(i Junuury 1075, CUNFIDI;N'I'IAI? 25X1A2g
_ '~.'-2 Junuury 1075, CONFIDEN'1'IAL25X1A2g
~7 Febnurry 1075, CONFIUGN1'IA1.. 25X1A2g
'fl April '"Yur}' %hukov, Icudin~ Pruudu commentator, interview in
~CUNFIDEN'I'IA1,. ~ IS November 1074, LOU;
unc 1073, tinnl,~nsdusa~~l Sscrnle. September 1071,
1973. CUNT :DEN'PIA1,.
19FC Cortunission Deputy Secretory Cencrul Klaus Meyer in
remarks to newsmen, RFE Special/Dybvfk, Brussels, ti June 1073;
T/re !'hmncial T(mes, 0 June 107ti; and The Economfsf, 15 June
1073.
Hcxsr2`fVycrsA,2g
24 Junuury 1975, CONFIDIsNTIAQ.5X1A2g
' (i February 1075, Lou. 25X1A2g
18
CONFIDENTIAL
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rl'rnurln, 8 June IDfiO,
yl'AI', from Wuryuw, 21)cecmbcr Ifl7l
~"'I'ho 1'rospecly fur I~,un>peun Unity, , ?" op. cll.
'1'ruudn, IN Mary 1073; Isucalllln, 14) Muy 1073.
? lurortf of C1iAlri AcNulllcs In 11)7?? Mnscuw 14)73.
?Jonuthuu Slcclo, 'I'hc Cuardlun, 2K Murclr 1972; unrl Neal
Ascherson, '1'hc Obserurr, 0 April 14)72. In a preys conference lu
Culnr on (i Aprll If)72, C:cuuscscu sand that he way "not uwarrc" of
auq~ dccislon cunccruha4; finks with the I:C.
? HI' I: Speclul Uyhvick, Luxcmbuurk, 27 Mary 1072.
25X1A2g 25X1A
7r titutemont to I~Innlsh Hudl~r and 'l'V ut the end of September,
quuletl In HI' I'. Sli/3i, 0 OcGrber 1073,
cUNrID1.NV'IA1., 25X1A2g
- coNrll)I"sN'I'IAL,, 25X1A2g
LOU, "'II
25X1A2g
"N. Inoxcudscv, (:undidulc CC urcrnbcr uud Oircchrr of the
Moscow lustitulc of World 1?conomics curd Intcnuatirnul flelullons,
ul the October Intenurtionul Conference in Vurnu ([iulgurlu); ex-
tnrcts fnnn his report reprinted in lc A4nnde, 18 November 1072,
?Chcrmun Cvishiuul, Vice President of tlrc Stutc Conuulltec for
Srlenre uud 'I'echnulogy in the Drench Quarterly 1'rcuvcs.
CONKID[;N'I'IAL.
rrTAS5, 2fi April Ifl72.
r~0, Chukuncv, No. 13, September 14)72,
2G September 1973, CUNFIDI:N'I'IAI,; uud
firer 1073, CONI~IDI:N'1'IAI.,
7?~ &1 September 1073, UNCLASSIFiI'd~X1A2g
sT lil~ Is Special/Vonduykc, linrsscls, I March 1fl74.
25 November 1773, CORIFII)IiN'1'IAL;
UNCLASSIFIED.
~~I(i Muy Ifl74, UNCLASSII~IGD.
'OHude 1'rnuo cditor(aa!, 1N Jamc Ifl74.
'rJcri Fllidek in/,loot Sfran~, Nu. IG, Autiust 14)74, and Rurlc
Pruuo, If) December 1074.
rs 1?ust European sources cited by Michael Parks in the 1)nlllnrurc a
tiun, 17 Jauuurry 1073. ?
1?Sovlet economic officers in liehnule,
1073, LUU.
25X1A2g r
rPAt the 27th CEMA (,~runcil session in I