CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A003200090001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 17, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 11, 1957
• Content Type: REPORT

V, TOP SECRET
2002/07/30: CIA-RDP79T9Q
25X 11 July 1957
Copy No.
0
00
CURRENT
C
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
7Q_
AUTH: H H
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This document contains classified information affecting
the national security of the United States within the
meaning of the espionage. laws, US Code Title 18, Sections
7.93, 794, and 798. The law prohibits its transmission
or the, revelation of its contents in any manner to an un-
authorized person, as well as its use in any manner
prejudicial to the safety or interest of the United States
or for the benefit of any foreign government to the detri-
ment of the United States.
Dept. review completed
~~.Slale
/////////////'d
TOP SECRET
rde 2002/07/30: CIA-RDP7
 25X1 Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO03200090001-6
Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO03200090001-6
 25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
ZORIN ELABORATES 8 JULY SARMAMENT
STATEMENT
2. DEPOSED SOVIET LEADERS GIVEN NEW JOBS
(page 4).
3. PRESIDIUM MAJORITY MAY HAVE OPPOSED KHRUSHCHEV
4. SOVIET LEADERS ARRIVE IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA
(page 6).
1 5. MAO TSE-TUNG REPORTEDLY APPROVES SOVIET PARTY
25X1 PURGE
8.. PEIPING MAY REPLACE NON-COMMUNIST CABINET
25X1 f MINISTERS
9. NEHRU REPORTEDLY AGAIN CONSIDERING RESIGNING
AS PRIME MINIS TE R
0. COMMUNIST-INSPIRED PROTEST MEETING MAY SPARK
UNREST IN CHILE
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
pproved Forelease 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP79T00975A00320p
CONTENTS
7. THE NEW JAPANESE CABINET
REUNIFICATION LINK
l
) 6. BONN SEEN DESIRING AMPLIFICATION OF DISARMAMENT-
11 July 57 Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 2
25X1
Approved ForiRelease 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO03209090001-6
 25X1
Approved Forl
1. ZORIN ELABORATES ON HIS 8 JULY
DISARMAMENT STATEMENT
In a 9 July bilateral meeting with the
United States, Soviet delegate Zorin
expressed surprise at the negative re-
action of the Western delegates to his
8 July statement in the subcommittee. He said everything
in the statement was already included in the Soviet 7 June
memorandum, just as the US delegate had placed in the
record the US position as outlined on 31 May.
Zorin claimed that in some respects
his 8 July statement represented an advance from the 7 June
Soviet memorandum. In contrast, he thought that the latest
Western proposals, which connect suspension of tests not
only with a cessation of production but also with the reduc-
tion of armaments, were a step backward from the US views
of 31 May and that the Western proposal for a committee of
experts to study controls for suspension of tests would delay
progress.
This led him to believe that the United
States had not succeeded in securing the approval of other
Western delegations for its positions of 31 May. He recom-
mended additional bilateral meetings between the Soviet and
other Western delegations.
Zorin said no further advances could be
expected from the Soviet Union until the United States responded
to the Soviet memorandum of 7 June.
11 July 57 Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 3
25X1
 25X1
Approved Fq
2. DEPOSED SOVIET LEADERS GIVEN NEW JOBS
Moscow radio announced on 10 July that
the "members of the Malenkov, Molotov
and Kaganovich antiparty group," deposed
in the June purge, had been transferred
to other work. Malenkov has been assigned
to direct the Ust Kamenogorsk hydroelectric station in east
Kazakhstan. The specific jobs of the other ousted leaders were
not stated.
The broadcast revealed strong sensitivity
to Western press and radio speculation that the recent wave of
meetings and demonstrations in the USSR against the ousted
leaders was preparation for a Stalinist-type liquidation of the
purgees, and insisted that they were justly condemned but were
.not being persecuted. The Communist Party is "not in the habit
of taking petty revenge," it was explained.
Though the possibility cannot be ruled out that
further action might yet be taken against members of the "anti-
party" group, Khrushchev has apparently ruled out the vindictive
persecutions of the Stalinist period.
11 July 57
Current Intelligence Bulletin
25X1
Page 4
Approved Fbr Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP79T00975A00320b090001-6 25X1
 25X1
Approved Forl
3. PRESIDIUM MAJORITY MAY HAVE OPPOSED KHRUSHCHEV
A recent Soviet speech suggests that Khru-
shchev was confronted on 18 June by a
majority within the Soviet party presidium
who demanded that he step down as party
secretary. Frol R. Kozlov, Leningrad party boss who was
upped from candidate to full member of the presidium as a
result of the recent purge, told a Leningrad party meeting on
2 July that the "antiparty group" carried on its work secretly,
trying to organize members of the party presidium "in order
to knock together a majority, even if temporary and formal,"
and to bring about a change in the membership of the presidium
and secretariat of the party central committee. The American
embassy comments that it is unlikely Kozlov would gratuitously
imply that a majority of the presidium had been against the Khru-
shchev leadership unless this were true.
A line-up of the two sides would include
Malenkov, Kaganovich, Molotov, Pervukhin, and possibly
Bulganin and Voroshilov in the "majority" against Khrushchev
and Mikoyan. Saburov was attending a CEMA meeting in War-
saw on 18 June, Kirichenko was at his home in Kiev, and Suslov,
who did not appear publicly in Moscow from 19 May to 1 July,
was probably on vacation. Candidate members do not vote in
the presidium,but all candidate members present, except Shepi-
lov, apparently supported Khrushchev in the argument, since
they were promoted to full membership in the new expanded
presidium.
If Bulganin and Voroshilov did side against
Khrushchev, they will probably suffer in due course. They may
be demoted to presidium candidate status like Pervukhin or ousted
from the presidium like Saburov. Such action would probably be
followed by loss of their government posts.
11 July 57
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 5
25X1
Approved For R~Iease 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP79T00975A003;00090001-6
 25X1
Approved F
P00090001-6
4. SOVIET LEADERS ARRIVE IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA
Khrushchev's speeches since his arrival
in Czechoslovakia on 9 July suggest that
no sweeping changes in the Czech leader-
ship are planned. Khrushchev stated that
'the Soviet leaders had come to make a
"friendly visit... not in order to settle any contentious ques-
tions or differences, for we are in full agreement." In his
greeting to President Zapotocky in Prague, he stated that he
felt the members of the Soviet delegation were now in the
midst of "our closest relatives and faithful friends."
In their initial exchanges with the Soviets,
the Czech leaders have appeared confident and apparently re-
main secure in their positions. Khrushchev has twice referred
to Czech Party First Secretary Novotny in terms of glowing
praise. Although not similarly praised, Premier Siroky made
a major address at the official luncheon in Prague given for
the Soviet delegation and attended by top members of the Czech
government and party.
11 July 57 Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 6
Approved ForiRelease 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP79T00975A0032000p0001-6
25X1,
25X1
 25X1
Approved F4
5. MAO TSE-TUNG REPORTEDLY APPROVES SOVIET
PARTY PURGE
Mao Tse-tung approves of the Soviet
party purge as strengthening those who
support the Chinese Communist view on
intrabloc relations,
Mao reportedly expressed concern dur-
ing Voroshilov's visit to Peiping in April over Soviet rela-
tions with Yugoslavia and Poland, arguing that bloc unity
must be maintained despite differences in the domestic pro-
grams of Communist states. Peiping is said to believe that
Khrushchev's first tasks are the restoration of good relations
with Yu oslavia and the improvement of relations with Poland.
I
Comment Peiping for the past year has advocated
policies in intrabloc relations with which
Khrushchev has been generally identified and which Molotov
is known to have opposed.
In early 1957, when the Kremlin was pub-
licly quarreling with Belgrade and Warsaw, the Chinese crit-
icized the conduct of the dispute and suggested that differences
should be ironed out in private. In recent months the Kremlin
has been attempting to smooth over its disagreements with
Yugoslav and Polish policies. Peiping probably feels that fur-
ther efforts are in order.
11 July 57
Current Intelligence Bulletin
Page 7
25X1
25X1
Approved For gelease 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP79T00975A003200090001-6 25X1 ,
 25X1
Approved
6. BONN SEEN DESIRING AMPLIFICATION OF DISARMA-
MENT-REUNIFICATION LINK
Despite the West German government's
shift in recent weeks to a public position
more favorable toward the London disarm-
ament negotiations, the American embassy
in Bonn believes that actually the government is unenthusias-
tic, particularly as regards the European inspection zone. Em-
bassy officials believe that in private meetings Bonn may seek
a Western agreement spelling out the link between disarmament
and reunification.
While Bonn will yield to popular opinion in
supporting the principle of a European inspection zone, the
embassy feels it may try to set certain conditions for such as-
pects as the location and extent of the area and the need to
avoid recognizing the East German Communist regime. The
Germans may also seek to influence the timing of action on re-
unification, possibly by pressing for Western agreement on a
date for four-power talks with the USSR on that subject.
Comment Despite Chancellor Adenauer's fears that a
disarmament agreement would tend to perpetu-
ate the split of Germany, the Bundestag election campaign is
likely to cause the government to adapt its public stand more
and more to the general eagerness in West Germany for a de-
tente. Bonn may also have to limit its private lobbying in
Western circles, in view of the danger that its demands might
be leaked during the election campaign.
11 July 57 Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 8
Approved F~r Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO03210090001-6 25X1
 Approved Fo
7.. THE NEW JAPANESE CABINET
The Japanese cabinet installed on 10 July
replaces the one Prime Minister Nobusuke
Kishi inherited from his predecessor last
February and is designed to give the gov-
ernment more of a "Kishi look." No radical changes are ex-
pected in either domestic or foreign policy.
Kishi waited more than four months, until
he had gained increased prestige and political strength from
trips to Southeast Asia and the United States, before undertak-
ing cabinet changes which might otherwise have precipitated a
renewal of factional struggles within the conservative Liberal-
Democratic Party. Kishi also changed officials in the top posts
of the party and probably has consolidated his position, Some
factional leaders, however, may not be completely satisfied.
The post of foreign minister, which had been
held by Kishi himself, was given to Aiichiro Fujiyama, 60-year-
old industrial magnate and president of the Japan Chamber of
Commerce and Industry. His selection is an attempt to win
greater support from Japanese business circles and to imple-
ment Kishi's insistence on "economic diplomacy," particularly
with regard to Southeast Asia.
Mitsujiro Ishii was retained as deputy prime
minister. Ichiro Kono, strong man of the former Hatoyama cab-
inet, was named director of the Economic Planning Board.
Hayato Ikeda, whose refusal to surrender the finance portfolio
had threatened to complicate the cabinet reshuffle, was dropped
and replaced by Hisato Ichimada, former finance minister under
Hatoyama.
11 July 57
Current Intelligence Bulletin
Page 9
25X1
25X1
Approved For Relealse 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP79T00975A00320009b001-6 25X1
 25X1
Approv
25X1
The increasingly bitter attacks on non-
Communist "rightists" by the Chinese
Communist National People's Congress
now in session suggest that Peiping is
building up a case for discharging them
m ca ne ? positions and expelling them from "democratic"
puppet parties.
25X1
8, PEIPING MAY REPLACE NON-COMMUNIST CABINET
MINIS `I'E RS
On 10 July, one speaker at the congress
urged all members of his party, the China Democratic League,
to dissociate themselves "politically and ideologically" from
the "rightists."
The ministers of communications, food
and timber industry have.drawn particularly sharp condemna-
tion. On 8 July, Peiping reported that over 3,000 employees
of the Ministry of Communications met to denounce the com-
plaint of the minister, Chang Po-chun, that non-Communist
officials have position but no authority, One employee crit-
icized Chang for excessive absenteeism, failure to attend 37
out of 49 meetings of the ministry, and failure to fulfill his
responsibilities.
Although the "rightists" may have originally
felt there was some support for their positions within Commu-
nist Party ranks, no Communists have yet been singled out as
coconspirators, and a party purge is apparently not imminent.
25X1
11 July 57
Current Intelligence Bulletin
Page 10
25X1
Approved
 Approved Forl
90. NEHRU REPORTEDLY AGAIN CONSIDERING
RESIGNING AS PRIME MINIS TE R
Vice President Radhakrishnan report-
edly believes that if Nehru resigns as prime minister, either
permanently or for a few months only, he will be replaced
by Pandit Pant, the moderately conservative minister for home
affairs. Pant is considered a logical choice to carry on the
Congress Party's program, although Minister of Commerce
and Industry Morarji Desai may challenge his position as ulti-
mate successor.
On several past occasions when he has been
under heavy stress, Nehru has considered stepping down as
formal government leader in order to devote more time to party
affairs and broader work for the welfare of India. The country
is again entering a period of unusual strain, particularly in the
economic field. The decision Nehru must face, now as before,
is whether the country would be provided with stronger and more
effective leadership if he retired. In the past he has decided
each time that his continued leadership was needed.
11 July 57
Current Intelligence Bulletin
Page 11
25X1
25X1
Approved For Rel~ase 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP79T00975A003100090001-6 25X1
 25X1
Approved For
10,, COMMUNIST-INSPIRED PROTEST MEETING MAY
SPARK UNREST IN CHILE
A Communist-inspired National Com-
mand meeting, scheduled for 11 July
in Santiago, Chile, to protest price in-
creases may result in public disturb-
ances.. The price increases of 6 July on essential consumer
items were brought about by the abandonment of costly gov-
ernment subsidies which were causing serious budget def-
icits and endangering the US-backed economic stabilization
program. A similar attempt in early April resulted in wide-
spread disorders which forced the government to retract the
price rises.
The National Command, composed of la-
bor, student and left-wing political leaders, is reportedly
planning boycotts and half-hour work stoppages. Commu-
nist Party leaders are considering mass action to give force
to the protest. The government, which has taken extensive
military and police preparations against potential trouble, ap-
pears confident and has partially relaxed the state of alert or-
dered on 5 July.
11 July 57 Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 12
25X1
Approved For R$Iease 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP79T00975A003400090001-6
 25X1 Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO03200090001-6
Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO03200090001-6
 CHINESE COMMUNIST AIRFIELD LEGEND: 10 JULY 1957
ACTIVE BASE FOR MILITARY & CIVILIAN AIR-
CRAFT. SOME BASES USED BY PISTON TYPES
MAY BE USABLE BY JETS
Approved For ReleaAe 2002/07/30: CIA-RDP79T0q
NANCHAN
~'l 593,000
HENGYANG I TROOPS
4-
1
F I 'y
Q'I
E H
I I _ JHong Kong
IV acao {G.$)
(Port.)
"ric.L Hill
150
So
4b
11
TAIWAN STRAIT
PRIMARY AIRFIELD
CONSIDERED MOST IMPORTANT IN
AREA WITH PREPARED RUNWAY
GENERALLY 5000 FEET OR LONGER.
? OPERATIONAL
SERVICEABLE
UNKNOWN
HSINCHENG f 50A
CHANGJING* LIE
I S-\
'--LUNGCHIO~ ~`ii
AMOV
SECONDARY AIRFIELD
AUXILIARY OR EMERGENCY BASES
OR FIELDS OF LESSER IMPORTANCE.
RUNWAYS GENERALLY LESS THAN
5000 FEET.
r"I
I ~ ~.J rr \
0CHIENOU
4Nanping r
+Ningte
FOOO~MQrW Witt 10 L) 0
Yungan NANTAI 22,400
CHENG 53,000' LUNGTIEN
975AO03200090001-6
w
0,000 84,000
MIG-15
MIG-17
TU-4
IL-28
?` WUCHIU
AOCHI
QUEMOY
T
PENGHU
? SHUIKOU 16,000
USABILITY
I ?
TU-2, Z
IL-10 3
LA-9/11 Z
LI-2 Z
ETC.
o i
z
i
0
* FIELDS NOT CONSIDERED CAPABLE
OF SUPPORTING SUSTAINED OPER-
ATIONS AT PRESENT.
xx~ ~~CHOUSH N IS.'~.
NINGP~ A 30
LUCH IAO 6TACHENq
0
? Juian
SHANGHAI
G A
QYUAN f~UNOSHAN
I Al I-,tl
* -IIAN
HSINCHU
A I W A N
HIAYI310,000
M.A.
P1NGTUNG
* NATIONALIST AIRFIELD
Railroad Primary roads
t+ F+ Under construction or projected Secondary roads
Approvea For ase -
25X1
25X1