OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE DAILY DIGEST OF SIGNIFICANT TRAFFIC

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T01146A000100050001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 7, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 6, 1951
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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COPY NO 39
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
DAILY DIGEST OF SIGNIFICANT TRAFFIC
Date: MAR & 1951
NOTE: 1. This summary of significant reports has been
prepared for the internal use of the Office
of Current Intelligence. It does not
necessarily represent a complete coverage of
all. current traffic in CIA or in the Office
of Current Intelligence.
2. Comment represents the preliminary views of
the responsible analysts and not necessarily
the final view of the Office of Current
Intelligence.
3. Marginal letter indications are defined as
follows:
"A" - items indicating Soviet-Communist
intentions or capabilities
"B" - important regional developments
not necessarily related to Soviet/
Communist intentions or capabilities
"C" - other information indicating trends
and potential developments
NAVY and DOS review(s) completed.
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CZECHOSLOVAKIA. Sovietization of Czechos.lovak_Economy Stepped-U The
decisions reached at 21-24 February meeting of the Central Committee
Czechoslovak Communist Party point to: (1) an increased emphasis on
heavy industry and coal production to be achieved by stepped-up norms
and the introduction of 2 shifts in many branches of the industry, (2) a
speed-up in the socialization of agriculture to provide extra manpower
for industrial and mine production, (3) an increase in the number of
women workers in light industry and services to relieve men for heavy
work, (4) greater Soviet exploitation of the Czech economy. In 1951 the
Soviet Orbit is to account for 59% Czech e ores and to provide 61%
C
zech imports,
"C" HUNGARY. Patriotism Theme Used in Huuna . A resolution of the Hungarian
Workers Party Congress, currently underway in Budapest, stated: "The
results of Socialist construction, the defense of Hungary's independence,
and the peace movement have given rise to a new Hungarian patriotism
which is inspiring our workers to great achievements". This new
atriotis cterized as the main driving force in Hungary today.
25X1 COI NT: This is a new development in the propaganda
line in the Satellites. (Propaganda appeals to Rumanian patriotism, which
had previously been down, are now being made frequently.
25X1 - It follows several months of exceptionally
emen Yugoslav propaganda which has had as its main theme the sub-
servience of the orbit states to the USSR. Recent' nationalist deviations
in Italy and Czechoslovakia add fuel. to the fire. The Communists' sudden
appeal to patriotism, therefore, may be an effort to counteract the
effects of Yugoslav and Western criticism.
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"B" POLAND. New Soviet Commander for Polish Air Force o On 27 Feb the Polish
press reported that General of Weapons, Turkiel,presum.ably Colonel General
Ivan Lukich Turkiel, a high-ranking Soviet Air Force official, had opened
the first meeting of the Polish Air Force political personnel, This is the
first mention of Turrkiel, public or official, that has been made, The US
Emb comments that this announcement indicates a sudden change in the top
command of the Polish. Air Force, With the recent appointment of Soviet
Admiral Czerekow as Commander in Chief of the Polish Navy, all major units
of the Polish Armed Forces are `.der direct Soviet control, No mention
25X1 has been made in the Polish press about Brigadier General Rome ko th
former Commander in Ch.?e of the Polish Air Force,
25X1 CO NT - More information will be needed on
Tur ie s appointment before final assessment of its full significance
can be made. His appointment, however, would seem to indicate Soviet
dissatisfaction with Romeyko, who while not a Russian, had received long
training in the USSR. Romeyko has been described as not giving the
impression of a born leader and completely lacklig the force of character
usually associated with a Commander in Chief.
"C" RUMANIA. New A?opointments, A shaken-up in the Rumanian governmental machine
reflects the continuing ascendency of hard core Stalinist elements, Lt. Gen,
Petre Borila, an able, intelligent Stalinist, has been promoted from Min-
ister of Construction, a post which he has held for almost a year, to
President of the State Control Commission. Replacing Borila at Construction-
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programs, In this connection, the recent relief of Alexandru Moghioros
from his post of President of the Committee for farm Collections and
Establishment of Collective Farms should probably be regarded as an
indication that the capable Moghioros set up an organization capable of
effecting collectivization, and has been relieved for other vital projects;
the relief of Vidrascu, on the other hands may reflect shortcomings in
his office, which is responsible for the efficient operation of the whole
Government machine,
is Gneorghe Hossu, who has served as director of works at the Danube-Black
Sea Canal. Mihail Floreseu, former chief of the Army Political Directorate
and a political writer, has been appointed as assistant Minister in the
Ministry of Metallurgy and Chemical Industry; Ion Vidrascu. has been demoted
from President of the State Control Commission to be Assistant Minister
of Agriculture, F_ I CENT- The promotion of
Borila, Hossi; and orescu reflect the Rumanian, regime a s dependence on
hard-hitting political appointees for the overall e cu:tion of important
YUGOSLAVIA. Controls on Farm Products only PartlallyRemoved, Emb Belgrade
is somewhat skeptical of the recent Yugoslav Goverri entfs decision intro-
ducing a policy of free sales in certain agricultural products, the sale
of these goods to be governed by the law of supply and demand, The Emb
reports that only vegetables and fruits are apparently affected. While the
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purpose of the decision is ostensibly to restore the incentive to middle
peasants, the Emb considers it more likely that the primary concern of
the government continues to rest with the town population and that the
latitude granted to the peasants will be limited.
OO v NTs The announcement is not as sweeping as the recent ar 1cle
stated,.
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SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
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NEAR EAST. Moslem Reaction to Recent Developments in Morocco. Reaction
in the Near East to recent events in Morocco devel-
oped rapidly and unfavorably over the weekend, The enforced accession of
the Sultan to French demands--such as his denunciation of the Moroccan
Nationalist Party Has resulted in political groups
and newspapers from Tunisia to India denouncing not only the often-exag-
gerated reports of French actions in North Africa but also, to a lesser
extent, the US airbase agreement for Morocco and the continued presence of
British troops in the Suez Canal region, Student demonstrations in Egypt
forced the government there to initiate martial law on 4 March, and the
Arab League, responding to the widespread public excitement, summoned its
Political Committee to a special meeting on 10 March to discuss the Moroc-
can situation. Prime Minister Qudsi of Syria, in a conversation with US
Minister Cannon, strongly denounced French policy in Morocco and stated
that French actions there tended to undo his efforts to allay Syrian mis-
trust of the West. Even in Pakistan, prominent Moslems and the influential
newspaper DAWN criticized the French and charged them with defying the will
of the Moroccan people in entering into a secret agreement with the TTS fnr
the establishment of American airbaseso
bably passed its peak with regard to the French Moroccan situation, there
are signs that Arab hostility, originally concentrated on the French alone,
is now being directed toward the West as a whole. Thus, there is danger
that the Western political and military position throughout the Near East
may be weakened. Most serious of all, perhaps, is the possibility that
re-emergence of popular criticism of the British base on the Suez Canal
may become sufficiently strong to counteract the slow but gradual progress
being made by Egypt and the UK on the difficult Anglo-Egyptian treaty
problem.
"B" ISRAEL. Election Prospects, According to US Embassy Tel. Aviv, Prime
Minister Ben Gurionfls failureto form a new government and the consequent
necessity of general elections were officially announced on 1 March by
publication of an exchange of letters between President Weizmann and the
Prime Minister. Ben Gurionls letter, which states that the present govern-
ment will continue to function in the pre-election period, has allayed the
general fear that the Prime Minister intended to form a caretaker govern-
ment composed exclusively of MAPAI members. An election bill is expected
in the Knesset next week to prepare the way for the actual polling, which
25X1 will probably take place next duly, COMMENT.
This report makes it likely that new a ections w111 ally be held.
25X1 The prospect that Ben Gurion might be able
to revive is repudiated government without recourse to general elections
appears less and less likely after a series of conferences between Presi
dent Weizmann and Israeli party leaders failed to produce the means of
forming a workable coalition based on existing political alignments.
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s While popular excitement in the Moslem world has pro-
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"B" Recommendation that US-UK Resolution on Kashmir be Pressed to a Vote.
Before its conclusion on 3 March 1951, the South Asian Regional Conference
of US diplomatic and consular representatives meeting in Ceylon recommended
that the US and UK Jointly press the Kashmir resolution now before the UN
SC to a vote, even though India or Pakistan, or both, state they will not
accept or cooperate. The Conference also recommended, if the resolution
will make it acceptable to both parties without material loss of strength,
that (1) the US should accept the modification, provided it is also accepted
by the UK, but that (2) the sponsors should .urrd against being placed in
25X1 a negotiating position with the parties.
"Brr New National Buffet for l2u On 28 February, the Indian Finance
Minister made his annual speech reviewing the national budget of the past
year and introducing the proposed new budget for the next year. The revised
revenue budget for 1950-51 showed a surplus of 79 million rupees, but the
capital budget showed a deficit of 670 million rupees instead of the ori-
ginally estimated 239 million. The proposed revenue budget for 195152
anticipates a surplus of 256 million rupees and the capital budget a deficit
of 778 million. Defense expenditures of 1.8 billion rupees are about the
same as for 1950-51 (i.e. approximately 50` -f the total revenue budget).
The combined deficit on revenue and capital accounts in 1951-52 is to be
met by drawing down Government cash balances from 954. to 430 million rupees.
25X1 CO MENT: 1950-51 is the third year in which
Indian expenses have far exceeded receipts, and 1951-52 is apparently to
be no exception to the rule, If cash balances are drawn down in 1951?52
at the same rate as in 195051, they will be exhausted by the end of the
year, By 1952, therefore, India may be faced with the immediate prospect
of drastically reducing defense expenditures, of adding to existing infla-
tion by expansion of the money supply, or of increasing taxes. None of
these prospects will be attractive to the Indian Government.
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"B" INDOCHINA. French Anticipate Delay in Formation of Vietnam Army. Referring
to Premier Huu?s assumption of the National Defense portfolio General De Lattre
has stated that the formation of the Vietnam National Army would be retarded,
but that a short delay would not necessarily be fetal"a Dc Lattre said
that, in any case, it would be impossible to develop more than 20 or 25
Vietnamese battalions into first-class fighting groups before the end of
1951. There would not be sufficient officers and NC0 s of real value, he
25X1 stated, for more than that number of battalions
COMMENT. Although the Viet army already has some 12 battalions, only a few
of these are sufficiently trained to take part in frontline engagements.
"C" French Lag in PublicizingBao Dal Cause. No word of the Soviet
attempt to-expel the Vietnam delegation from the Lahore ECAFE meeting and
replace it with Viet Minh representatives has been published in the Saigon
25X1 press o F_ I COMMENT ~ In the past, US officials
have repeatedly prodded the French to undertake a more energetic informa-
tion program on behalf of the Bao Dai government. By giving full publicity
to Soviet unfriendliness toward Vietnamese interests, the French might have
contributed toward a hardening. of Vietnamese antipathy to Communism and,
conversel.y,,toward sympathy for the Bao Dal cause.
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Nationalist Oil Shipment tcj Mainland Confirmed. US Consul General,
Hong Kong, has confirmed reports that a 2,500 ton shipment of diesel oil
from Taiwan was delivered to Macao, undoubtedly for reshipment to the Chinese
Communists, by the Panamanian vessel FLYING DRAGON on or about 21 January.
The same vessel reportedly returned to Macao about 10 February from Singapore
with another cargo of petroleum. COMMENT.
In this connection, 1 although is
currently financing deliver es of about 10,000 tons of oil per month to
Taiwan, the Chinese Nationalist Navy in late January complained that its
fuel supplies were nearly exhausted and (2) a Nationalist Government spokes-
man on 4 Ma~??ch cha ct ed as R t re ort of this shipment as a "mali-
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"C" KOREA. USSR May Be Aiding in NK Rehabilitation, Radio Pyongyang recently
carried the text of a letter from a Korean worker at an "unidentified fac-
tory" thanking a Soviet engineer who assisted in the rehabilitation of a
25X1 wrecked factory. COMMENTS It has been assumed that
Soviet civilians Had been withdrawn rrom Korea and this Pyongyang broadcast
is the first indication to the contrary. It is unknown whether this report
is an isolated instance or an indication of a Soviet rehabilitation attempt
on a modest scale in North Korea,
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SECTION 3 (WESTERN)
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"C" ITALY, Italy Offers Wheat Quota to India, The Italian Government has
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of eyed to give In is par o its in tional wheat quota obtained
under the long-term wheat accord signed last year. At the same time
the Italians are reported to have expressed an interest in the pro-
curement of fats from India, although this is not a condition for
releasing their wheat allotment. This offer has been made despite an
anticipated smaller domestic wheat crop and Italian desires to increase
their wheat, imports at this timeQ F_ I
25X1 COAdP"NTa is gesture-is apparently
an Italian effort to offset . e recen d publicity which they
received in the US over the shipment of important industrial items
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from Italy to the Soviet orbit. The Italians justify such shipments
by pointing to the reduction of Italian wheat, imports from Western
sources and the consequent need for Soviet -rr-nat imports.
"Btt VATICAN. Vatican Rejects Communists' Request to Support Disarmament.
rederic ~Io~i~ urze, Presi den~~ of the Commuriis- backer Wor Peace
Council, recently invited the Vatican to support disarmament, described
as the "final objective of the partisans of peace". Monsignor Montini,
Substitute for Ordinary Affairs in the Vatican Secretariat, replied
that the Pope has always been in favor of a "true and just peace" but
added that "powerful organizations that pretend to work for peace have
tried to convince the masses of the "absurd calumny that the Pope
25X1 desires and favors war".
COM?NT: Vatican leaders clear y recognize the necessity o avoz mg
assoc anon with Communist propaganda projects including disarmament
proposals. Furthermore, US observers have reported that certain
elements in the Vatican, notably those associated with the Roman
Catholic Church in 'Eastern, Europe, believe that war is the only means
which can restore the Church to its previous position in that area,
The US decision to construct a hydrogen bomb was interpreted by the
semi-official Vatican newspaper, Osservatore Romano, to mean that
there is no hope for a peaceful so17io~ n. o. M cold war.
"B" SWITZERLAND. Communists Heed Stalin's Call for Greater "Peace"
c ivitye The Swiss Communes Party as responded promptly oStalints
, i. his recent Pravda interview, for intensified "peace" activity.
M19-
The Partisans of Peace have held "anti war" propaganda and "general
disarmament" meetings in many localities in French-speaking Switzerland.
The President and the Secretary-'General of the Swiss Communists recently
flew to Budapest to attend the Hungarian Communist Party Congress.
25X1 COM? 4ENTe This faithful adherence
to the latest Soviet propaganda irective is another of many indications
that the Swiss Communist. Party continues to be tied to Stalinist
Communism despite the party's increasing unpopularity, decreasing
membership, electoral losses, and harassment by the Goven ment. By
limiting these "peace" demonstrations largely to the French section of
Switzerland, a Communist stronghold, the Communists have attempted to
give the impression of a successful Peace Campaign.
"A" MICO. Possible Formation of Communist Anti-Militarist Bureau. It
is Curren in =ca e that on 5 December 19 O, US E~ mr~gassy Paris
25X1 reportedl the Cominform had
instructed the Communist parties of the and Mexico to establish,
through joint effort, an Anti-Militarist Bureau. in. Mexico City, The
task of this bureau was to be twofold: (1) to carry on anti. militarist
propaganda among enlisted men and to assist draft dodgers in the US, and
(2) to conduct agitation in'the American Republics against US military
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25X1 bases and against any assistance which the American republics might
give the US in event of a world war.
25X1 C?M?',7NT: Latin American Communists have long agi to e
against e use oLatin American troops to further US "aggressive"
and "imperialistic" activities, and against economic and political.
cooperation with the US. The propaganda objectives of the projected
anti militarist bureau do not appear to differ materially from those
of other Communist and Communist-front groups,, such as the various
Peace Committees, However., increased cooperation between US and
Mexican Communists would facilitate USSR sabotage and intelligence
operations, as well as propaganda activities within the armed forces
of the US and its Latin American allies. Such activities might well
be guided by USSR or satellite military and diplomatic personnel in
Mexico. As yet, there is no evidence to indicate that the Anti-
Militarist Bureau,, as such, has been established,
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OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
25X1 DAILY SUMMARY
6 March 1951
SECTION 3 (WESTERN)
FRANCE. French Interest in US Approach to Spanish Role in Western
Defense. A rersc oreign Of ice e fieial has 17-dicated to Massy- Officials in London that the French Government' must be cc-
winced of the strategic and military necessity of including Spain
in the West's defense effort. He implies that this can be done only
if the French assist from the beginning in determining how Spain can
participate. According to the source, who is probably more favor-
ably disposed toward increased cooperation with Spain than his col-
leagues, if the US is interested primarily in Spain's military
facilities, a bilateral relationship between the US and Spain mfr be
best. However, if the emphasis is on the use of Spain's manpower,
then its inclusion in NATO will be necessary - a step that would en-
tail great difficulties Particularly in Britain and France.
C To This is a plausible re-
port o f e rent overnnent's cu77e1x attitude aad possibly re-
flects its sincere desire to avert later political difficulties in
France over the handling of the Spanish question. Consultations
between the US and France on this problem could reduce the hesitancy
of the French Socialists, who are indispensable to the middle-of-the-
road coalition in France. Last surer Schuman stated that the ad-
mission of Spain to NATO was the only way to solve the question of
the strategic utilization of that country.
FRANCE-GERMANY. French About-Face on PLI Speeds German Defense
o ii iv . TFi ?renc a deco e on a ma or change in eir
pos ononn the tang of the relaxation of restrictions on Germany's
Prohibited and Limited Industries (PLI.)" Instead of withholding re-
laxation until the. Germans commit themselves on their defense contri-
bution, the French now agree that the High Commission may set the
effective date for implementation of whatever decision is reached by
the International Study Group (ISG) Steering Coamnittee. The French
qualify their stand, however, by their unwillingness to consider any
sweeping change in steel production or capacity limitations; nor are
they ready to agree now on what relaxations are to be put in effect
in "stage two" (when German defense commitments are known). Never-
theless,, it may now be possible to eliminate, or modify considerably,
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restrictions on some chemicals synthetics,shipbuilding, and machine
25X1 tools. CL'IEN'T: This about-
face breaks a stalemate which might have del.aye or as much as a year
an important part of Germany's contribution to Western defense.
Chancellor Adenauer's interest in an early agreement on the Schuman-
Plan has undoubtedly swayed French thinking on PLI. French concern,
however, for Germany's bargaining power will increase their resistance
to relaxations in "stage twos'.
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