WESTERN EUROPE REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00912A001600010004-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 28
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 29, 2004
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: September 27, 1978
• Content Type: REPORT

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Assessment
k -j
a Center
Western Europe
Review
27 September 1978
Secret
RP WER 78-009
27 September 1978
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WESTERN EUROPE REVIEW
27 September 1978
CONTENTS
Soviet Relations With Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus:
Retrospect and Prospects . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The pace of Soviet relations with Greece,
Turkey, and Cyprus has picked. up in re-
cent years as cold war tensions have abated
and the flareup of Greek-Turkish disputes
has given all four countries room for
maneuver.
Italy: The Socialist-Communist Polemic--The
Practical Consequences of Craxi's Political
Brinksmans ip . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Socialist Party chief Craxi's demand that
the Communists repudiate Leninism has em-
bittered relations between the parties,
highlighted the Socialists' internal party
differences and will add to Prime Minister
Andreotti's difficulties as he seeks com-
promises acceptable to the parties support-
ing his Christian Democratic government in
parliament.
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Western Europe - Angola: Improving Relations . . . . 42
In recent months several West European coun-
tries have received overtures from the Ango-
lan Government for diplomatic links and eco-
nomic cooperation, but they are uncertain
about Luanda's intentions and are skeptical
of its ability to master the country's eco-
nomic and political problems.
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Soviet Relations With Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus: Re-
trospect and Prospects
The pace of Soviet relations with Greece, Turkey,
and Cyprus has picked up in recent years as cold war
tensions have abated and the flareup of Greek-Turkish
disputes has given all four countries more room for
maneuver. From the Soviet perspective, the new situa-
tion has provided an opportunity to woo those states
and further weaken NATO's southern flank. For the
Greeks and even more for the Turks, the Soviet "card"
is a way to increase their leverage with Western allies
and secure political, security, and economic benefits
from a rapprochement with one of the world's two super-
powers. There are limits, however, to such maneuvering.
Among these are mutual suspicions, the obstacles posed
by membership in opposing alliances, Moscow's inability
simultaneously to please both the Greeks and the Turks,
and the basic commitment of both Greece and Turkey to
remaining in the Western orbit.
The improvement in relations has gone further and
faster between Moscow and Ankara. Turkish Prime Minis-
ter Ecevit's visit to Moscow last June resulted in
significant new economic accords and the signing of
a much publicized "political document." Greek Foreign
Minister Rallis' Moscow visit in early September was
much more subdued, but it represented a milestone in
the normalization of Greece's historically cool rela-
tions with the Soviet union and apparently paved the
way for a followup visit by Prime Minister Karamanlis
next year. Cypriot President Kyp:rianou is also slated
to go to Moscow in 1979. In addition, both Greece and
Turkey will exchange warship visits with the Soviet
Union this fall, the first such occurrence since World
War II.
Goals and Policies
The Soviets have been guided by a number of often
conflicting considerations in formulating their policies
toward Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus. These include pre-
serving and enhancing their access routes to the
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Mediterranean through the Turkish straits; weakening
NATO and also preventing its extension to Cyprus;
helping the pro-Soviet Communist parties in Greece and
Cyprus (the Turkish party is minuscule and illegal);
and enhancing Moscow's image as protector of Third World
states against "neocolonialism."
For the most part, Soviet policymakers have been
more concerned with securing their southern access
routes and weakening NATO than with helping client
parties or defending nonaligned states. This has
generally meant paying more attention to Turkey, with
its strategic location and greater military potential.
Although in the immediate post - World War II period the
Soviets threatened Turkey and made territorial demands,
Moscow gradually has come to rely on a softer approach
emphasizing economic assistance. Turkey has become one
of the main benefactors of such aid, having received
more than $1.5 billion in Soviet pledges. Clearly, the
Soviets hope that their largesse will produce political
payoffs such as easier access to points south and a
loosening of Turkey's Western ties. The Ecevit govern-
ment and many of its predecessors have been receptive
to Moscow's blandishments in the belief they can exploit
them without incurring any binding political costs and
use them as leverage to secure more help from Turkey's
allies.
The
Soviets have never shown as much interest
in
Greece.
There was no attempt to bully the Greeks
after
World War
II; in a meeting with Churchill in 1944,
Stalin
accepted
a division of influence in postwar Greece
that
gave the British "90 percent" influence to Moscow's "10
percent." Nor did Moscow give much encouragement at first
to the Greek Communist insurrection--even though the
Greek elite and much of the populace considered the
Soviets responsible. Soviet indifference, combined with
Greek anti-Sovietism, produced three decades of generally
cool relations that only recently began to thaw as the
Greeks sought to secure their flanks in the event of a
military clash with Turkey. One measure of that coolness
is that the Soviets have never proffered--nor have the
Greeks requested--the kind of economic aid that has been
flowing to Turkey for some time.
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Soviet relations with the government of Cyprus--i.e.,
with the Greek Cypriots--have generally been more cordial
than those with Greece, but increasingly less so than
those with Turkey. Past Soviet support for Cyprus was
based on Moscow's awareness that an end to Nicosia's
independence at the hands of either Greece or Turkey
would extend the NATO umbrella to Cyprus. The Greek
Cypriots have welcomed Soviet assistance, even in the
face of Athens' wrath, since they thereby gain leverage
against the West and preserve their nonaligned status.
And unlike mainland Greek governments, which for three
decades proscribed Communist parties, the government in
Nicosia permits the Cypriot party to operate freely,
even consulting it on major government decisions. Once
Moscow began trying to exploit Turkey's disenchantment
with the West over such issues as the US arms embargo,
however, its support for the Greek Cypriots became more
rhetorical and relations have cooled.
Turkish-Soviet Relations: The Primacy of Pragmatism
When the left-of-center Ecevit government was in-
stalled last January, Ecevit made clear that Turkish
foreign policy would take on a "new look" regardless
of what happened to Turkey's relations with its NATO
allies. Part of that new look would entail an improve-
ment and broadening of Turkey's relations with the So-
viet Union. Ecevit called both for more extensive
economic cooperation and for a regional detente whereby
Turkey would no longer act solely as a bastion or outpost
of the West in that part of the world. The Soviets
quickly responded to Ecevit's signals: they doubled a
$650 million credit that had been offered in 1975, made
a veiled offer of military assistance (which the Turks
deflected), and invited Ecevit to the Soviet Union.
Ecevit's trip to Moscow resulted in a significant
broadening of economic and political ties. The two
countries concluded a long-term trade agreement in
which they undertook to more than double the volume of
their trade over the next three years; the Soviets also
agreed, in principle at least, to provide Turkey with 3
million tons of oil annually in return for Turkish wheat
and raw materials. The Soviets went out of their way to
be accommodating on other issues. They agreed to an
equal delimitation of the Black Sea continental shelf,
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and they also showed a willingness at least to examine the
question of a greater Turkish role in control of Black Sea
air traffic. Moreover, they appeared to minimize their
differences with the Turks on the Cyprus issue.
In return, Ecevit signed a political document of
"friendly and good neighborly relations" in which the
two sides agreed to deepen their growing detente and to
abjure the use of force or use of their territory for
subversion or aggression. The document included the
important caveat, however, that obligations arising out
of their membership in different alliances would not be
affected. Ecevit in fact fended off suggested Soviet
language smacking of a nonaggression pact.
The Ecevit government's relations with Moscow are
indicative of a pragmatism that has long been character-
istic of Turkish-Soviet relations. As far back as the
1920s, the fledgling Soviet and Ataturk regimes found
it in their interest to enter into a treaty of friend-
ship that freed them to concentrate on other matters.
Post - World War II Soviet territorial claims set back
relations for two decades, and another low point was
reached during the first Cyprus crisis in early 1964,
when the Soviets under Khrushchev tilted firmly toward
the Greek Cypriots and warned Ankara not to intervene.
The emergence of new leadership in Moscow later in
1964 and Turkey's growing disenchantment with its NATO
allies--particularly over the so-called "Johnson letter"
that June, which warned that NATO might not come to
Turkey's assistance if Soviet intervention followed any
Turkish invasion of Cyprus--combined to prompt both sides
to seek a new modus vivendi. With minor exceptions,
Turkish-Soviet relations have been improving ever since,
with Moscow making most of the initiatives. These have
included substantial economic assistance, a more even-
handed Cyprus policy, and a tilt toward Turkey on the
Aegean dispute.
The improvement has been highlighted by a series of
exchanges at the foreign minister, prime minister, and
presidential levels. Ecevit's trip to Moscow was the
most dramatic and widely publicized of these, since it
came amid speculation of a reorientation in Turkish
foreign policy as a result of the arms embargo. Earlier
there had been reciprocal visits by the foreign ministers
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in late 1964 and 1965 as well as a visit in 1965 by
Turkish Prime Minister Urguplu, the first at this level
since 1938. In the course of those consultations, the
Soviets promised their first significant loan totaling
$200 million; they also for the first time acknowledged
the existence of two "communities" on Cyprus as well as
the feasibility of a federation. Visits by Premier
Kosygin and Prime Minister Demirel followed in 1966 and
1967. While in Ankara, Kosygin offered additional economic
assistance and made a clearer reference to the two
Cypriot communities. Demirel, for his part, declared
that his trip to Moscow had "eliminated" the last trace
of hostility in Soviet-Turkish relations, although he
took care to note that Turkey's ties with the US and
NATO would not be affected.
. The exchange of visits by Presidents Sunay and
Podgorny in 1969 and 1972 resulted in additional Soviet
loans of $325 million and in the issuance during Podgorny's
visit of a joint statement of principles, where for the
first time the two sides pledged not to permit their
territory to be used for subversion or aggression. That
statement represented the first Soviet effort to collect
major political dividends from its economic assistance.
Congressional imposition of the US arms embargo
against Turkey in 1975 and Turkey's subsequent suspension
of US base operations prompted Kosygin to visit Ankara
later that year with promises of $650 million in assis-
tance and an "offer" to enter into a far-reaching treaty
of friendship. The Demirel coalition government accepted
the aid, but fended off a Soviet proposal that Demirel
come to Moscow to sign such a treaty. Instead, Foreign
Minister Caglayangil signed an agreement in Moscow in
1977 that merely restated the 1972 principles.
Viewed in this context, Ecevit's visit and his
policies toward the Soviet Union do not necessarily
herald a new departure in Turkish-Soviet relations. To
be sure, the economic arrangements worked out in Moscow
will represent a significant increase in economic ties
if they are fully implemented, but they are not so ex-
tensive as to reorient Turkey's economy and make it de-
pendent on the Soviet Union. And while Ecevit signed the
political document that his more conservative predecessor
had balked at, he made certain that it was no more than
a restatement of the 1972 principles and the Helsinki
Final Act.
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Still, Turkey's desperate need for economic help
and the scope of Moscow's assistance have given the So-
viets more potential leverage than they have had earlier
on the political and security aspects of Turkey's foreign
policy. of perhaps greater importance may be Ecevit's
seeming inclination to achieve a qualitative as well as
quantitative improvement in Turkish-Soviet relations and
his willingness to discuss political and security issues
as well as economic topics. Whether this is anything
more than empty verbiage--whether, for example, Ecevit
will impose more stringent restrictions on US and NATO
activities in Turkey--will become more clear when
negotiations on the agreement governing the operation
of US bases commence later this fall. The Soviets clearly
are hoping for such restrictions and have said as much
to the Turks.
Greek-Soviet Relations: Toward Normalization
With few exceptions, Greece's relations with Mos-
cow have been heavily burdened by ideological enmity
and diplomatic apathy. That Foreign Minister Rallis'
trip to Moscow was the first of its kind since the
establishment of diplomatic relations in 1924 attests
to this, especially when compared to the comings and
goings between Ankara and Moscow. Although the positive
atmosphere surrounding the Rallis visit approximated
that accompanying Ecevit's, Rallis' trip was far shorter
on substance, suggesting that Athens' relations with
Moscow have a long way to go before they equal those
of Ankara. The two sides signed cultural and consular
agreements, but these were preceded by two years of
drawn-out negotiations in which the Soviets drove a
hard bargain on cultural exchanges and ethnic Greek
emigration from the Soviet Union. Agreement was also
reached to conduct followup discussions on the possibility
of greater cooperation in such areas as energy and trade.
Acknowledging that "mistakes" had been made in the
past, Soviet leaders stressed the need to bring political
relations up to the level of commercial and economic
ties. Kosygin also invited Karamanlis to visit Moscow.
But there apparently was no discussion of signing a
political document similar to that signed with Turkey,
and the two sides avoided discussing most political
subjects on which they disagreed, such as Balkan
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cooperation and Greek-NATO relations. Moreover, they
simply agreed to disagree on Aegean issues. And while
this time the Soviets appeared to endorse basically
pro - Greek Cypriot UN resolutions on the Cyprus issue,
the communique language was bland enough not to antago-
nize Turkey.
Overall, the Rallis visit was simply one more step
in a slow process of normalization. The only previous
thaw occurred in 1963 and 1964, when the centrist
government of George Papandreou came to power and Mos-
cow backed the Greek Cypriots against the Turks. The
low point in Greek-Soviet relations since the civil
war period was the seven years (1967-74) of military
rule, which the junta justified as necessary to prevent
a Communist takeover. Ideological antipathy, together
with the junta's persecution of local Communists and
its efforts to subvert the Makarios government in Cyprus,
combined to produce severe strains between Moscow and
Athens.
The restoration of democratic rule in 1974, Karamanlis'
legalization of Greece's Communist parties, his withdrawal
of Greece from the military side of NATO in reaction to
Turkey's Cyprus intervention, and his intimations that
he was interested in normalizing relations seemed to
open the way for a rapid improvement of ties with
USSR. Such has not been the case. The Soviets expressed
some incredulity over whether the Greeks really had
withdrawn from NATO, an impression reinforced by Karamanlis'
repeated declarations of Greece's continued commitment
to the West. Moscow also seemed to harbor some lingering
suspicions about Karamanlis himself, who during his first
stint as Prime Minister developed a reputation as a
staunch anti-Communist who was very responsive to Western
defense needs. Karamanlis and his colleagues in fact
continued to express their dislike for Communism and
for the Soviet Union, even as they gave Greek Communists
free rein and sought to normalize relations with Moscow.
Procedural and substantive differences on law of the
sea issues, in which Moscow's preference for bilateral
talks over international adjudication and its opposition
to restrictions on Aegean shipping and extension of
territorial waters coincided more with Turkish views,
also slowed a rapprochement. So too did Moscow's Cyprus
policy, which the Greeks have interpreted as duplicitous
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and designed to please Ankara. Indeed, perhaps the
main reason for the tepid state of Soviet-Greek rela-
tions is the belief shared by both sides that Turkey
is more important to the Soviets.
Moscow's tilt toward Turkey has been underscored
by such slights as Kosygin's avoidance of a meeting with
Karamanlis at the Helsinki Conference in 1975 while he
managed to meet with Demirel. In deference to the Turks,
the Soviets also refused to participate in ceremonies
last year commemorating the 150th anniversary of the
decisive naval battle of the Greek War of Independence,
when a combined British, French, and Russian armada
defeated the ottoman fleet. Such behavior, together with
other instances of Soviet standoffishness and footdragging
in the talks on the consular and cultural agreements,
prompted Karamanlis to declare in both his 1976 and
1977 policy speeches that if Greek-Soviet relations had
not reached a desirable level, the blame was not with
the Greek side.
It was the Soviet response to this charge that
finally culminated in the Rallis visit and the invita-
tion to Karamanlis. But given the many suspicions and
differences between them, not to mention Moscow's greater
interest in Turkey, even an exchange of visits at the
prime ministerial level may not suffice to improve Greek-
Soviet ties significantly.
Cypriot-Soviet Relations: The Primacy of Rhetoric
The gradual decline in Soviet support for the Greek
Cypriot cause is evidenced by the rather unenthusiastic
invitation to President Kyprianou to visit Moscow "some-
time next year," and the Soviets' success in fending off
a Makarios visit for the three years before his death
last year. To be sure, the Soviets along with their
allies have extended considerable diplomatic support
to the Greek Cypriots at the UN and other international
forums. They have also sought occasionally to prod the
Turks into showing more flexibility on a Cyprus settle-
ment. And they have made clear that they favor an inde-
pendent, nonaligned, and territorially integral state.
But beyond their opposition to partition, the Soviets
have shown little inclination to help the Greek Cypriots
bring about a major reversal of the situation brought
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on by the Turkish invasion. They have lately refused,
for example, to provide military assistance as they did
in 1964 when the Greek Cypriots faced a Turkish threat,
or as their Czechoslovak proxy did in 1972 in the face
of anti-Makarios machinations by the Greek junta. Nor
have they been willing to bring heavy pressure to bear
on Ankara.
Moscow's principal initiative since the 1974 Turk-
ish intervention has been its repeated call for an inter-
national conference on Cyprus, attended by the permanent
members of the UN Security Council and certain other
states. The idea was approved in principle by the Greek
Cypriots but opposed by Ankara and Athens, which tradi-
tionally have sought to keep the Soviets out of the Cy-
prus problem. Moscow, however, has never really pressed
the idea. Overall, Greek Cypriots have become cynical
about Soviet willingness to help their cause. Nonethe-
less, they continue to welcome whatever support Moscow
is willing to extend.
Prospects
Of Moscow's relations with the three countries,
those with Turkey clearly carry the greatest potential
for further improvement. The staggering needs of the
Turkish economy make it likely that Moscow will continue
to look to economic assistance as the best way to draw
Turkey away from NATO and secure other political benefits.
The Turks are apt to remain receptive to Moscow's bland-
ishments, both for leverage with the West and as a sup-
plementary source of much-needed economic assistance.
Ecevit's apparent predilection for making his own "contri-
bution to detente" may be an additional factor leading
to an improvement of ties.
There are other factors, however, that will limit
the extent of Soviet-Turkish rapprochement. On the So-
viet side, there are bounds beyond which Moscow would be
unable or unwilling to provide Turkey with the hard cur-
rency and credits its economy needs, particularly since
there is unlikely to be any assurance that such largesse
would have significant political. payoffs. The Turks, on
the other hand, will remain reluctant to make too much
of the Soviet connection: Ankara's aim is to prod its
Western allies to provide more help, not to alienate them.
Within Turkey, the military and most other members of
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the Turkish elite remain pro-Western and distrustful of
the Soviet Union. Ecevit himself, moreover, is essen-
tially a pro-Western nationalist, albeit a left-of-center
one, who does not want to exchange one dependence for
another.
Soviet-Greek relations are not likely to advance
very far even if Karamanlis does journey to Moscow. The
prospering Greek economy and Greece's excellent inter-
national credit rating do not give the Soviets room to
use economic assistance for political leverage. Soviet
interests in the Aegean dispute coincide more with those
of Turkey, and Moscow is unwilling to press the Turks
too hard on Cyprus. The pro-Soviet Greek Communist Party
gives Moscow some potential. influence, which it could
use either to create trouble for Karamanlis or to support
him. Thus far, the Soviets have counseled the party to
follow policies in between those extremes and have thus
tended to squander that leverage. Moscow also has some
leverage in the fact that its Bulgarian ally borders
northern Greece, a situation that could be used to help
or hinder the Greeks in the event of a clash with Turkey.
Both the Soviets and the Bulgarians, however, have given
the Greeks assurances that their northern border is secure.
The Greeks' concern about safeguarding their flanks
has probably been the single most important reason behind
Karamanlis' effort to normalize relations with Moscow.
Recognizing that their smaller size gives them fewer op-
tions than Turkey, however, the Greeks are likely to con-
tinue to refrain from using the Soviet card to prod
their allies and will continue to concentrate instead on
maneuvering within the Western orbit. Perhaps of most
importance, Karamanlis and his colleagues, in contrast
to the Younger Ecevit and his entourage, matured during
the cold war and harbor a deep distrust and dislike for
the Soviet Union. This is even more true of the Greek
military, whose civil war campaign is an important part
of its institutional memory. Thus, while Greek-Soviet
relations will continue to improve, the process will be
slow and is not apt to amount to more than normalization
of diplomatic ties and a modest increase in economic
cooperation.
In Cyprus, Moscow will probably keep straddling the
issue by providing the Greek Cypriots with diplomatic
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support while otherwise acquiescing in the current situ-
ation on the island. In this way, the Soviets hope to
mollify the Greek Cypriots and also help the local Com-
munist Party while not unduly ruffling the Turks. And
while the Soviets may continue to peddle their call for
an international conference, they are not apt to inject
themselves more deeply into the issue so long as the
island's territorial integrity and nonaligned status are
not threatened.
The Greek Cypriots would be more than willing to
cater to Soviet interests if the Soviets would exert
more pressure on Turkey, but they recognize that Cyprus
is far less important than Turkey in Soviet eyes. Nor
do they see any way to increase their leverage with Mos-
cow. Indeed, the Greek Cypriots' maneuvering room is
also limited by Athens' insistence that they keep their
distance from Moscow, as well as by their own desire not
to alienate the West, which they still see as being in
the best position to effect a Cyprus settlement because
of its influence with Turkey. Significant movement in
the Soviet-Cyprus relationship is thus quite unlikely.
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Ital : The Socialist-Communist Polemic--The Practical
Consequences of Craxi's Political Brinksmanship
The Debate
As the pace of political activity increases follow-
ing the traditional August vacation, a sharp ideological
debate between the Socialists and Communists dominates
the Italian scene. The debate revolves around Socialist
Party chief Bettino Craxi's allegation that the Communist
Party cannot be considered democratic until it repudiates
Leninism. This dispute has embittered relations between
the two parties, highlighted the Socialists' internal
party differences, and will add to Prime Minister Andre-
otti's difficulties as he seeks compromises acceptable
to the five parties--including the Communists and Social-
ists--that support his Christian Democratic government
in parliament.
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Craxi raised the issue as the latest and most am-
b:,ti.ous effort in his campaign to promote socialist auton-
-omy and distinguish the PS:[ from the Communists and Chris-
tian Democrats. Craxi believes the PSI's low electoral
.:areding--9.6 percent compared to the Christian Democrats'
38.7 percent and the Communists' 34.4 percent--reflects
Mainly the Socialist Party's failure to project itself
as an effective alternative to either of the larger par-
ties.
Craxi triggered the debate late last month with a
magazine article entitled "The Socialist Gospel." It
was a response to an earlier interview given by Communist
Party Secretary Enrico Berlinguer, in which he had de-
fended his party against critics who demand it repudiate
Lenin as proof of the Communists' integration into the
west European political system.
Berlinguer argued that the Communists do not inter-
pret Lenin's contributions as static or doctrinaire and
that they intend to revise their views on the subject at
the next party congress. In the meantime, Berlinguer
said, many of Lenin's contributions to the elaboration of
revolutionary theory remain valid. Some Communists as-
sert that Berlinguer's comments were intended primarily
to dampen rank-and-file dissent over his moderate poli-
cies and support for the government.
In any event, Craxi seized the issue as an oppor-
tunity to draw some major ideological distinctions be-
tween his party and the Communists. The Socialist Party
leader directed his attacks against the Communists'
attachment to "Leninism," identifying the concept ex-
clusively with authoritarianism and collectivism and ar-
guing that it inevitably subordinates the working class
to the intellectual elite of the Communist Party. On
the other hand, Craxi associated his party with a liberal,
pluralistic political tradition more receptive to the
diffusion of economic, social, and political power. Craxi
concluded that so long as such a dichotomy exists, there
is no possibility of a "united Left" to counterbalance
the political power of the Christian Democrats.
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The Response
Communists have responded initially with an ideolog-
ical defense and a practical warning against the focus of
Craxi's challenge. Communist spokesmen have unanimously
accused the PSI leader of interpreting socialist history
in a simplistic and inaccurate way while denying the two
parties' common ideological and political heritage. Echo-
ing Berlinguer's arguments, Secretariat members Gianni
Cervetti and Giancarlo Pajetta defended Lenin's thought
for its theoretical and historical value, while denying
that the Italian Communist Party approaches the issue
dogmatically.
Communist Secretariat member Giorgio Napolitano
took Craxi to task on practical rather than theoretical
grounds. He advised the Socialists to drop their ideo-
logical attacks on the Communists, because the public
will judge each party primarily on its contributions to
the resolution of Italy's problems? Napolitano reminded
Craxi that a degree of cooperation between the two major
parties of the Left will be necessary to overcome Chris-
tian Democratic opposition on a number of programmatic
issues. In this way, the Socialists can assert their
autonomy within the current governing arrangement by
linking any ideological debate to the solution of Italy's
problems.
Craxi's thesis has also stimulated a lively debate
among the PSI's various factions. Although Socialists
generally consider the debate a useful way to distinguish
themselves from the Communists, they still want to avoid
a complete break with the largest party of the Left.
Secretariat member Fabrizio Cichitto has defended
the Socialist leader's tactics and contends that the
initiative is not aimed at a break but a "rebalancing
of forces" between the Socialists and Communists. Claudio
Signorile, vice secretary of the party and Craxi's key
ally, adds that Craxi's ultimate objective is participa-
tion in a Leftist alliance that might eventually govern
Italy and cooperate more closely with other West Euro-
pean socialist parties. These Socialists insist, how-
ever, that such an alliance is impossible unless the
Communists break definitively with Moscow and renounce
Leninist practices such as democratic centralism.
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On the other hand, Michele Achilli, leader of the
tiny, "new Left" faction in the PSI, has led an attack
on Craxi and attempted to sound the battle cry for old
party warhorses such as Riccardo Lombardi, Giacomo Man-
cini, and Francesco De Martino.* Achilli has called for
a Central Committee debate of Craxi's initiative, charg-
ing that he is transforming the character of the party
and making it virtually identical to the Social Democratic
Party--whose distinguishing characteristic has always
been its anti-Communism.
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The Christian Democrats have reacted ambivalently
to Craxi's initiative. While welcoming the opportunity
to snipe at the Communists, many Christian Democrats
fear that the polemic will complicate and eventually
undermine the current governing arrangement--with no
workable alternative in sight. Christian Democratic
Secretary General Benigno Zaccagnini and party president
Flaminio Piccoli agree, for example, that the Socialist-
Communist debate is a useful means of focusing attention
on the ambiguities and contradictions in the Communists'
position. Consequently, these Christian Democratic lead-
ers urge the Communists to be more explicit, especially
concerning relations with the Soviet Union and on the
issue of democratic centralism.
Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti, on the other hand,
is more concerned with the possible effects of Craxi's
*Lombardi and Mancini have responded in a lower key, acknowledging
that Craxi's approach is simplistic but helpful in clarifying in-
tellectual issues within the Italian Left, creating a new, more
equitable relationship with the Communists, and adding ultimately
to the parties' joint efforts at overcoming Christian Democratic
hegemony in government.
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polemic on the future of his government. Andreotti has
advised Craxi to limit his attacks on the Communists,
arguing that a split in the Italian Left would slow the
Communists' evolution toward democracy and independence.
This evolution, in Andreotti's view, might lead eventually
to the possibility of a Leftist alternative government--a
prospect the Christian Democrats should view as enhancing
political stability in Italy. In any event, the Prime
Minister asserts Communist cooperation is necessary now
for the adoption of specific programs aimed at solving
the country's economic and social problems.
Many Christian Democrats have also begun to worry
that Craxi's efforts are designed to draw support from
the Christian Democratic left. In response, party lead-
ers are playing down their conservative heritage and em-
phasizing recent developments that highlight the party's
progressive side--the revival of the Christian Democratic
youth movement, the direct election of the Secretary
General, and the increased number of younger members in
the party's parliamentary delegation.
Practical Consequences
With the recent opening of parliament, concrete po-
litical issues will probably soon take precedence over
the ideological debate. To maintain the momentum and
credibility he may have established by proclaiming the
"Socialist gospel," Craxi will be under pressure to shift
his attacks on the Communists from the theoretical to
the practical. This could encourage the Socialists to
assume positions in opposition to the Communists on a
number of sensitive issues and especially on the govern-
ment's economic plan. Such a stance would compound the
government's problems and increase the possibility of a
classic Italian stalemate on a variety of issues.
The chief constraint on Craxi will be the desire
of all three major parties to keep the current govern-
ment in place for the foreseeable future. There is no
consensus on an alternative formula, and none of the
parties feels prepared for the elections that might fol-
low a governmental collapse. The Communists want more
time to prove their own maturity and moderation as part
of the governmental majority and to convince party sup-
porters that cooperation is paying off in concrete terms.
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The Christian Democrats are not yet convinced of Craxi's
reliability as an ally, despite his apparent desire to
eventually revive the Christian Democratic - Socialist
alliance. For their part, the Socialists want more time
to establish a credible image and resolve internal party
differences. They are also reluctant to move toward a
new center-left coalition if it would mean binding them
to governmental responsibility while leaving the Commu-
nists free to criticize from the opposition benches.
These factors highlight the difficulty of Craxi's
position. Despite the parties' common interest in the
prolongation of a relatively stable government, the logic
of the Socialist leader's strategy implies at least peri-
odic confrontations with the Communists and Christian
Democrats over programs. In these circumstances, Craxi
will have to be a master of political brinksmanship if
he intends to persist in his autonomist course and yet
avoid missteps leading to a premature governmental col-
lapse--the "crisis in the dark" that all Italian Do
ticians seek to avoid.
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Western Europe - Angola: Improving Relations
In recent months, several West European countries
have received overtures from the Angolan Government for
diplomatic links and economic cooperation. Many West
European officials welcome these moves because they hope
that Western economic support and technical expertise
will eventually displace Soviet political influence and
the Cuban role in Angola. But the West Europeans have
been frustrated so far by Luanda's desultory approach to
normalizing relations. They remain uncertain about the
Angolan Government's intentions toward the West and skepti-
cal of its ability, even with Cuban help, to gain control
of the country's economy or withstand political and mili-
tary challenges from rebel groups.
Portugal
Portugal's ties with its former colony are in many
ways the most intense and complex. While many Portuguese
who fled Angola after 1974 remain hostile to the revolu-
tions both there and in Portugal, President Eanes hopes
that a reconciliation with Angola will serve Portugal's
commercial interests and enhance its status in Western
circles as a "bridge" to southern Africa.
At the same time, the Portuguese are concerned to
align their Angola policy with that of other Western
countries, especially the US. They have been eager to
learn whether the US views a Cuban withdrawal or a recon-
ciliation between President Neto and the UNITA rebels
as conditions for establishing formal relations with
Luanda. On these points several Portuguese officials
argue that Neto wants to pursue genuine nonalignment, but
is restrained by the Soviets and Cubans on whom he depends
for internal security. Similarly, they say, East Germans
control the Angolan media, whose attacks on UNITA block
any reconciliation between Neto and the rebel group.
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About 30,000 Portuguese remain in Angola, but this
number may increase as some of the refugees now in Portu-
gal return to Africa. In addition, some Portuguese tech-
nicians are on temporary tours of duty in Angola. Eanes
intends that this sort of cooperation, as well as trade
should grow.
Belgium and France
Belgian and French policies toward Angola reflect
two distinct approaches to southern African problems.
Belgium--with important interests in diamond and copper
mines in Angola and neighboring Zaire as well as in the
Benguela railroad--has sought a reconciliation between
Angola and Zaire that would dampen the activities of
rebels that each shelters against the other. Similarly,
to facilitate their economic enterprises, the Belgians
have favored a resolution of the Shaba conflict in Zaire
that would ensure efficient administration of the region's
economy, regardless of who holds control politically.
These policies have made Belgian officials welcome
in Luanda. This month Belgian Foreign Minister Simonet
visited Angola for extensive talks on economic coopera-
tion--especially in Angolan mining and oil development,
enlarging the port of Lobito, technical training, and ir-
rigation projects. Simonet also encouraged Angola to
build closer relations with the European Community through
participation in the Lome Convention.
In contrast, French officials have stressed the So-
viet and Cuban threat to Western interests in Africa, and
they have defended Mobutu against what they perceive as
Cuban-supported attacks from Katanga rebels based in
Angola. The French have viewed the Neto government in
Luanda as allied to the Soviet and Cuban effort and have
reportedly supported Angolan rebel groups like UNITA.
Thus, France has been kept at arm's length by the
Neto government. Angolan officials have characterized
France as in league with imperialist and racist forces
in Africa, especially in the wake of French support for
Mobutu against the Shaba rebellion. The French maintain
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a strong interest in Angola's oil, but they fear that
Neto may prove fundamentally hostile to the West and
may threaten Mobutu's regime in Zaire.
Other Western Links
In other moves toward normalization of West European
relations with Angola, Swedish and Dutch officials held
talks with the Angolans this spring, and Madrid has con-
cluded a fishing agreement: with Luanda. Among the
European Community countries, only West Germany has no
formal links with Angola. Angolan officials have argued
that relations between the two are blocked because of
African concern about the West German company Otrag and
its rocket testing in Zaire.
Among other West Europeans, the Italians have been
especially successful in trade negotiations with Luanda.
British officals note Angolan interest in commerical ties
with the UK as well, but have only recently named an am-
bassador to Luanda, partly because they expected delays
like those met by the French.
EC Relations
In the West European view, Angola's prospective ties
to the European Community through the Lome Convention will
be especially effective in drawing the Africans away from
Soviet influence. In June, at the same time that Neto
requested that a US official come to Angola for talks, he
asked that EC Commissioner for Aid and Development Claude
Cheysson come to discuss Angolan accession to the Conven-
tion. Cheysson believes Angola wants a definite tie to
the EC, partly because the EC does not put political
conditions on aid. At present, the Lome Convention is
being renegotiated in Brussels, and Angola intends to
send an observer to those talks.
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Outlook
For both political and economic reasons, West Euro-
pean governments will continue to seek closer relations
with Angola, especially as regards trade and investment
in that country's rich mineral resources. But the Euro-
peans will meet both political and administrative delays
on Angola's side, partly because of Luanda's dependence
on the Soviets and Cubans and partly because of the
economic and political disorder likely to plague Angola
for some time.
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