LATIN AMERICA REGIONAL AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00912A000700010018-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 4, 2005
• Sequence Number: 18
• Publication Date: May 26, 1977
• Content Type: REPORT

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Latin America
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LATIN AMERICA
26 May 197'1
CONTENTS
Jamaica: Tension Between
Manley and the Radicals . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Mexico-US: A New Effort To
Solve Old Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Cuba: The Small Farmers Hang Tough . . . . . . . . 9
Honduras: Peasant Land Invasion . . . . . . . . . .11
NOTE: The twice weekly Latin America Regional and
Political Analysis will be published once a week on
Thursday beginning June 2.
This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington community by
the Latin America Division, Office of Regional and Political Analysis, with oc-
casional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of Intelligence.
Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to the authors of the
individual articles.
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Jamaica: Tension Between Manley and the Radicals
There is mounting evidence that Prime Minister Man-
ley's recent turn to a more moderate course has provoked
a strong reaction from the radical members of the ruling
People's National Party and has strained their relation-
ship with the Prime Minister.
Early this year, Manley asked party radicals--headed
by Minister of National Mobilization D. K. Duncan and a
group of left-wing university political economists--to
draft an emergency economic program. Their contribution
was long on rhetoric but offered little prospect for re-
dressing the island's grave economic ills. Manley re-
jected the radicals' draft and turned to the more tradi-
tional economists from the moderate wing of his party
and to the civil service to devise a plan that would pro-
vide some hope of attracting aid from the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) and Western countries.
The radicals have taken pains to dissociate them-
selves from the emergency program and from overtures to
Western donors.
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Mexico-US: A New Effort To Solve Old Issues
On May 26, Secretary of State Vance and Mexican
Foreign Secretary Roel will establish a new Mexican-US
mechanism to negotiate agreements on a whole range of
bilateral issues. This arrangement agreed upon in prin-
ciple by Presidents Carter and Lopez Portillo during the
latter's state visit in February, will be a continuing
effort operating in the future through assistant secre-
taries from several cabinet offices on both sides.
The Lopez Portillo administration genuinely hopes
the commission will cut through bureaucratic and diplo-
matic barriers to achieve major progress on outstanding
bilateral problems. The Mexicans held out for an open-
ing session in which each country's leading foreign pol-
icymaker could be present in order to give the concept a
symbolic high-level sendoff. The personalistic Mexican
political system, moreover, is unaccustomed to realizing
systematic resolution of complex questions without the
direct involvement of top-level decisionmakers.
In addition to representatives from as many as seven
cabinet offices, the commission will have five working
groups to deal with economic, financial, energy, undocu-
mented alien, and border issues. Mexico will be primarily
interested in gaining improved access to US markets for
its products, measures to increase tourism, US assurances
that it will not act unilaterally to solve the undocu-
mented alien problem, US support of Mexico with inter-
national lending institutions, and joint promotion of
border industries. The Mexicans in turn will address
US concerns on these issues, as well as narcotics traf-
ficking and Mexico's future role as a major oil exporter.
These complex questions have defied solution for
years, but the Mexican government is optimistic that un-
precedented high-level concern over the whole range of
outstanding bilateral issues will be the key ingredient
in finding answers.
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Cuba: The Small Farmers Hang Tough
The outcome of the Fifth National Congress of the
Cuban National Association of Small Farmers (ANAP) last
week indicates that the Cuban government is still having
a difficult time convincing the small farmers to give up
their privately owned farms. The congress adopted a
proposal calling for the "transformation of the current
forms of peasant production." The implementation of this
resolution apparently will be gradual, but it will event-
ually require 162,000 farm owners to surrender their
small farms to the government. The land and the peasants
will then be merged into an existing state farm or into
a new cooperative.
Although the resolution passed without difficulty,
Cuba's small farmers have little interest in its execu-
tion. The peasants are the most conservative and inde-
pendent members of Cuban society and have been a head-
ache for the Castro regime since the creation of ANAP in
1961. Controlled by the government, the organization in-
cludes only farms of 66 hectares (165 acres) or less;
larger farms were nationalized during the First and Sec-
ond Agrarian Reforms of 1959 and 1963.
In theory, the original purpose of ANAP was to in-
crease agricultural production of the small farmers by
providing credit grants and guaranteeing the supply of
materials needed for production. It was also designed to
integrate the farmers into the Cuban Revolution. In
practice, it proved less than satisfactory. The chaotic
conditions of 1961 made smooth operations impossible.
Moreover, the government violated its often repeated
pledge to respect the farmers' ownership rights; the
properties of farmers who had cooperated with counter-
revolutionary bands were frequently confiscated. In ad-
dition, local officials, without legal basis, attempted
to force farmers to sell their produce exclusively to
the state at low prices. As a result, the farmers became
increasingly disenchanted with the government, and many
chose to throw in their lot with the anti-Castro guer-
rillas.
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Even after the guerrillas were eliminated, peasant
resistance to the Revolution continued. At the Third
National Congress of ANAP in 1967, it was publicly ac-
knowledged that serious difficulties remained. Similarly,
during the Fourth National Congress in 1971, the ANAP
leadership criticized the recalcitrance of the small
farmers. The proceedings of that congress included the
statement that "the participation of the Cuban peasantry
in the economic and social development of the country
must be through the progressive incorporation of their
lands and labor force into the (state-owned farms) which
make possible the massive use of technology and the mecha-
nization of agriculture as the most ideal way of emerging
from underdevelopment." Nevertheless, the fourth con-
gress reaffirmed the government's policy of not expro-
priating small farms unless "exceptional reasons" existed.
The results of the fifth congress which ended on
May 17 indicate that little progress has been made to-
ward this goal. Almost every speaker alluded to the
necessity for integration of the peasants' land. At the
same time, it was emphasized that the process would be
gradual and that the state still recognizes the right of
the peasants to individually work their own land.
The Cuban government has little choice but to ap-
proach gradually the problem of the integration of the
peasants' lands. The peasants and their families make
up a significant proportion of the Cuban population--over
10 percent--and the Castro regime can ill afford to al-
ienate such a large number of people. Moreover, the
small farmers produce a significant amount of the island's
'
s
agricultural output. They produce 18 percent of Cuba
sugar, most of the coffee and tobacco, almost half of
the production of fruit and vegetables, and they control
26 percent of the livestock population.
Given Cuba's current economic difficulties, the
government cannot afford to risk a significant drop in
agricultural production. Gradually, however, more and
more of the peasant land will be absorbed by the national
government. The peasant and his way of life are inevita-
bl doomed under the present political system.
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Honduras: Peasant Land Invasion
Honduran military units have forcefully evicted
several hundred peasants who had seized private lands as
a protest against the government's failure to expedite
land reform, according to press reports from Tegucigalpa.
Last December, former National Agrarian Institute
(INA) director Rigoberto Sandoval Corea expropriated
about 35,000 hectares belonging to the United Brands
Company for redistribution to the peasants. Although
Sandoval's excessive zeal in undertaking agrarian reform
was praised by the peasants, it led to increased criti-
cism from conservative landowners and moderate govern-
ment officials, and President. Melgar Castro delayed im-
plementation of the decree. Peasant groups began to
criticize Sandoval for stalling. Finally, in March,
when Sandoval attempted to circumvent the negotiations
with the company and proceed with the redistribution,
Melgar Castro, with the backing of the moderates, forced
Sandoval to resign.
Peasant groups continued to criticize the govern-
ment for delaying implementation of the decree and began
to seize some private lands. The government, trying to
avert a confrontation, acted with restraint. It legalized
the seizures on the grounds that the lands had been un-
cultivated by the previous owners and therefore subject
to expropriation, and by announcing a preliminary trans-
fer of land compromise with United Brands. The govern-
ment also reiterated its support for agrarian reform proj-
ects. These measures, however, failed to placate the
peasants and more land seizures occurred.
Conservative land owners have warned of retaliation
against squatters and have pressed the government to act
more forcefully. The recent use of military force to
evict illegal squatters will stir up the peasants even
further; peasant leaders have warned of further confron-
tations.
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