THE LIKELIHOOD OF SINO-SOVIET HOSTILITIES: A PROGRESS REPORT ON A QUANTITATIVE PROJECT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00889A000800160001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 16, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 12, 1976
• Content Type: REPORT

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The Likelihood of Sino-Soviet Hostilities:
A Progress Report on a Quantitative Project
DIA review(s) completed.
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12 October
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DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
OFFICE OF POLITICAL RESEARCH
Progress Report No. 18 12 October 1976
THE LIKELIHOOD OF SINO-SOVIET HOSTILITIES
This project consists of two quantitive approaches to Sino-Soviet relations.
A team of analysts, drawn from various components of the CIA and concerned
with different aspects of Chinese and Soviet affairs, examines on a continuing
basis evidence on the possibility of one or another level of Sino-Soviet hostilities.
The analysts' latest numerical assessments of the likelihood of such hostilities,
calculated according to the Bayesian formula of probabilities, are presented in
the bar graph on page 2. Below this, a second graph shows the movement of the
group's assessments over the past few months. The second part of this project
is a chart of overall Sino-Soviet tensions, based upon subjective evaluations by
the participants. Progress reports will be published on a periodic basis by the
Office of Political Research.
Since Mao's death on 9 September, there has been no strong evidence
of preparations for imminent hostilities by either side. The probabilities of hos-
tilities within the next six months (next page) remain quite low. The current
level of tension has fallen slightly, despite the uncertain succession in China;
this is mainly due to an apparent Soviet interest in pursuing the possibility of
improved relations.
In addition to the regular scenarios of hostilities reported in this project,
various scenarios of improved Sino-Soviet relations are being assessed on an
experimental basis. Initial results, based on the events of the past month, indicate
a slight Soviet willingness to improve relations and a clear Chinese aversion
to any type of improvement, especially in party-to-party relations. Future issues
of this publication will attempt to follow the probability of improved relations
also.
D
NOTE-Comments on these reports will be welcomed by
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A Bayesian Analysis of the Likelihood of Sino-Soviet Hostilities
Before 1 April 1977
Current Status of the Assessment -- as of 6 October
Probability %
A The Soviets will undertake a
nuclear strike against Chinese
strategic or nuclear targets.
B The Soviets will launch a large-
scale conventional attack against
China.
C The Soviets will launch a localized
cross-border attack, with limited
tztjectives, on a scale larger than
the 1969 incidents.
D The Chinese will launch a localized
Cross-border attack, with limited
objectives, on a scale larger than
the 1969 incidents.
1= One or more minority groups on
either side of the border will revolt,
following instigation by the opposite
side.
F Neither side will undertake any of
the above types of major hostilities.
Lowest estimate by a Average of it Highest estimate by any of
any of the participants all estimates the participants
A Time Chart Showing the Movement of the Group's Averages for
Probability % Hypotheses A Through E (as described above)
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NQrg, For the essessments lrymrJune 2974 t o July 1976 see OPR 501-5, 11 Dec. 1974,
QPR l71- , 22 May 1976, and P,76-10055, 2 July 1976.
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ITEMS OF EVIDENCE CONSIDERED IN
THE REVISION OF 6 OCTOBER:
1. The message of condolence sent by the CPSU to the Chinese on the
occasion of Mao's death was rejected. A spokesman for the Chinese Foreign
Ministry was quoted as saying that the message was unacceptable because the
Soviet and Chinese Parties do not have formal relations. Messages from Poland
Hungary, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany were also rejected. A
government message sent by Hungary was accepted. Later, the messages sent
by the French and Italian Communist Parties were also rejected because, as
the spokesman said, the Chinese Party Central Committee had decided to refuse
any message from "revisionist" parties. Virulent anti-Soviet propaganda continued.
(Hong Kong AFP through FBIS, 14 and 15 September, 1 -1
4. The Soviets are building strong points near the Sino-Soviet border on
5. There has been a marked shift in Soviet propaganda on China since Mao's
death. There has been a complete halt to direct attacks, and the Soviets are
instead replaying material recalling the halcyon days of cooperation in the 1950s.
They seem to be targeting their broadcasts to all elements who may figure in
the succession struggle, and they are citing previous Chinese statements about
the value of Soviet aid to China. (FBIS, 10-30 September,
6. In late September, following his 23-day tour of China, former US Sec-
retary of Defense James Schlesinger told Defense Minister Yeh Chien-ying that
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China's defenses against the USSR are weak. During and after visits to areas of
the Sino-Soviet border, he expressed his concern at the Chinese emphasis on
the use of the militia rather than regular forces to contain a Soviet attack. He
also expressed his view that China lacked weapons capable of stopping modern
Soviet tanks and high-flying Soviet planes. (Schlesinger saw rifles and bazookas,
whose shells would merely bounce off the latest Soviet tanks, and antiaircraft
practice against plane-pulled balloons at an altitude far below where Soviet
planes would fly.) He and his party expressed concern that Chinese weapons
would inflict only small damage on Soviet forces attempting to slice off a piece
of China. Yeh reportedly thanked him for his remarks. (Washington Post, 29
September,
7. The two sides continue to dispute the location of the main navigation
channel in the vicinity of Knyazhevskoye (Ta-t'ung) Island
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9. In line with Soviet efforts to improve their air defense capabilities in the
Far East, APVO regiments at Khabarovsk/ Blagodatnoye and Uglovo e North-
west may have begun re-equipping with MIG-23 FLOGGER-Bs.
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10. Hua Kuo-feng's eulogy for Mao on 18 September reaffirmed Peking's
view of the Soviet Union as China's most dangerous adversary. Routine Chinese
media commentary on foreign affairs since Mao's death has underlined Peking's
anti-Soviet bias by harshly attacking policies of the "Brezhnev clique." (FBIS,
11. PLA Deputy Chief of Staff Wu Hsiu-chuan stated that there have been
no serious incidents along the border since 1969, a relatively rare claim. This
is in line with Soviet statements, but Chou En-lai once claimed more than 200
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14. A Soviet official state that the death of Mao would
not result in a significant improvement in mo- ovict relations in the foreseeable
future. He said that the parties are so far apart on basic issues, and the negative
regard for China has so permeated the CPSU, that at least 20 ears is likely to
pass before any major change in relations occurs.
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17. Soviet Ambassador Tolstikov, cutting short his vacation to the USSR,
returned to Peking on 11 September and headed a small Soviet embassy dele-
gation which paid last respects to Mao on 13 September. His haste to return
h
t.
was such that he came on a Chinese civil airlines flig
18. General Gankovsky, Deputy Chief of Moscow's team at the border talks,
returned to Peking. It is not clear whether he had been on vacation and whether
his return is an attempt to test the waters. The Yugoslav pres said he had been
absent from Peking for six months. (AFP Tanug, 27 September,
19. The Soviet Political Counselor in Tokyo told a US embassy officer
that the alternatives facing the Chinese have been neither war nor an alliance
with the Soviets, but rather limited rapprochement or continuation of hostility
short of war. He thinks limited rapprochement is possible after the Chinese
sorts itself out, but assesses the chance of this as less than 50-50.
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2 oviet
MFA, that there are at least 12
different groups in the Chinese leadership, one of which favors better relations
with the USSR. He said, however, that that group is too weak and too small
and is distrusted by the others. Especially suspect are those of the group educated
in the USSR. Therefore, there is no prospect for an immediate improvement in
Sino-Soviet relations. He concluded that there would be a period of chaos fol-
lowing Mao's death after which the Shangbai radicals would likely gain
the upper hand.
22. A Soviet sinologist and former member of the Soviet-Chinese border
talks team told US embassy officers on 21 September that regardless of the
Chinese leadership outcome, he did not expect any significant improvement in
relations in the near future. He said that whoever succeeds to power cannot
escape the pervasive intellectual shaping of the ancient Chinese thought patterns.
The Chinese, he said, operate from a historical perspective of Chinese "centrism"
which will not change and which will continue to make any change in the Chinese
attitude toward the Soviet Union difficult.
23. stated that it
was his conclusion that the USSR would intervene in _ ina i the occasion pre-
sented itself, and that the Chinese leadership shared the same view. The Soviets
would be pleased if some faction, either in the provinces or nationwide, called
for their assistance.
24. Brezhnev reportedly
expresse concern about-the possibility ot US arms sales to China. He doubted
this would happen, but said that any military aid would be dangerous. It would
increase Chinese confidence, which might lead to new border incidents or possibly
even a local war, "which the USSR fear greatly."
26. Figures supplied by the USSR in Peking for the first half of 1976 suggest
that there will be an increase in Sino-Soviet trade in 1976. There was a con-
siderable dropoff last year.
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ANALYTIC TECHNIQUES USED IN THIS PROJECT:
The graphs on page 2 show the range and average of analysts' estimates of
the likelihood of hostilities; the Bayesian method of calculation is used. This
method, as applied here, systematizes a series of appraisals of incoming intelli-
gence made independently by individual analysts. Every participant weighs each
new piece of relevant data in terms of the hypotheses shown, which, for the
purpose of this exercise, are considered to be mutually exclusive. Simple mathe-
matical calculations, applying the new evidence to the analysts' previous esti-
mates, then yield updated estimates, which serve as the basis for the chart.
The chart on page 7 is an ongoing measurement of the level of Sino-Soviet
tensions. It is not a Bayesian analysis: no specific hypotheses are posed and no
mathematical calculations are made on the basis of prior estimates. Instead, at
the start and at bimonthly intervals, each of the participants selects a position on
the scale of 0 to 100 to represent his best judgment of the current general state
of tensions between Moscow and Peking. (The points 10 and 70 have been
designated as reference points, as explained on the chart.) Small shifts from the
analysts' initial positions may not prove to be meaningful, but abrupt or sustained
movement in the lines will be significant.
The measurement of the degree of general tension should be considered as
complementary to-but independent of-the estimates of the likelihood of hos-
tilities. Taken together, the two approaches ensure continuing examination of the
probabilities of conflict and of the overall state of relations between the USSR
and China.
The items of new evidence considered each period are identified by the par-
ticipants themselves, consolidated by OPR, and then resubmitted to all the ana-
lysts for their evaluations-both in terms of the Bayes hypotheses and as factors
bearing on the general state of tension.
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