WESTERN EUROPE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00865A002300350001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 4, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 15, 1975
• Content Type: NOTES

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CONTENTS
Radical Left in Turkey Resumes Active
Role . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
West Germans To Give Lisbon Jet Trainers,
Pilot Instruction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
The Netherlands Tackle Economic Woes . . . . . 5
Nordic Investment Bank Established . . . . 6
Iceland Requests UN Security Council
Meeting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
EC Still Uncertain on the Spanish Question . . . 9
Differences Narrow Over Resumption of Cypriot
Talks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Italian Socialists Step Up Criticism of Moro
Government . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Results of Public Opinion Poll in West Germany . 15
December 15, 1975
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Radical Left in Turkey Resumes Active Role
Turkish military and government leaders are
concerned that renewed activity among radical
leftists could lead to an eventual replay of the
spiral of civil violence and political polariza-
tion of the late 1960s early 1970s.
Disrupted and scattered by the martial law
regime of 1971-74, the extreme left in Turkey
began to regroup following the controversial polit-
ical amnesty bill of May 1974. Both the legitimate
political parties and the loosely organized under-
ground groups emerged, but the latter have been
the most active in recent months.
The Marxist-Leninist Revolutionary Youth
Union--a direct descendent of the notorious "Dev
Genc" organization of the late 1960s--has been
the most lively. Others, such as the Ankara
Higher Education Organization and the Middle East
Technical University Students' Association also
have been active. These groups recently have been
organizing on campuses and sponsoring such activ-
ities as:
--A December 3 rally that treated nearly
10,000 attendees to a high-pitched Marxist
tirade;
--The formation of leftist "discussion cells"
at the Middle East Technical University;
--The virtual take-over of the student council
at the same university.
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by his archrival Bulent Ecevit--for allowing the
members of once-banned radical leftist groups to
renew their efforts under new names. He also
emphasized the dangers posed to Turkey by "inter-
In a press conference on December 10, Prime
Minister Demirel condemned the 1974 amnesty--issued
e government succeeded early last week in
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canceling a scheduled political demonstration in
Istanbul by threatening to close down the leftist
teachers' union organizing the rally if it carried
out its plans. Similar coercive measures can
probably be expected from the current leadership
in Turkey in response to further evidence of grow-
ing radical leftist influence.
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West Germans To Give Lisbon Jet Trainers, Pilot
Instruction
West Germany reportedly has decided to give
the Portuguese air force six G-91 jet trainers.
According to the US defense attache in Bonn, the
decision--which now has surfaced in the press--re-
portedly was made early this month. A West German
newspaper article on Friday discussed the transfer
and said several Portuguese pilots would be trained
at no cost to Lisbon.
The G-91s, which are being phased out of the
West German air force, offer Bonn a cheap but ef-
fective means of providing military assistance to
a NATO ally in need.
The gift is another example of Bonn's efforts
to cultivate relations with Lisbon, and especially
the Portuguese military, with an eye toward influ-
dncing developments in Portugal.
Last week, the West Germans signed an agree-
ment under which they will grant Portugal about
$27 million in capital aid.
The G-91 is an old but reliable trainer and
light ground attack aircraft that will be a wel-
come addition to Portugal's obsolete air force.
The US defense attache in Lisbon had reported that
the air force's pilot training program has fallen
on extremely bad times because of a lack of fly-
able trainers.
The G-91s should not only help improve Portu-
guese air force morale, but will also strengthen
the position of anti-Communists who wish to re-
establish strong m'1' ary ties with NATO.
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French Cabinet Shuffle Expected Next Month
Claude Pierre-Brossolette, the Secretary-
General of President Giscard's staff, has told
French journalists to expect a cabinet shuffle
"probably in early January." He said the changes
are designed to increase efficiency and will
have no political significance because there
will be no change in the proportion of positions
alloted to the three members of the governing
coalition.
:Pierre-Brossolette refused to mention
names, but most speculation has centered on
Foreign Minister Sauvagnargues, who has been
rumored to be on the skids almost from the
day he took office. He reportedly will become
ambassador to the US. Pierre-Brossolette himself,
Industry Minister d'Ornano, and the Quai's
Foreign Affairs Director de Lipkowski have
been mentioned as possible successors. Justice
Minister Lecanuet may also be in trouble.
The final form of the new cabinet may
not yet have been decided upon. The journalists'
discussion with Pierre-Brossolette revealed
that the Elysee and the Prime Ministry disagree
in their evaluations of several ministers.
For example, Health Minister Veil stands high
on the Ministry's scale, but rather low on the
Elysee's; the reverse is true of d'Ornano.
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The Netherlands Tackle Economic Woes
The government's proposal for new wage-price
policies provide a little something for everyone but
not enough to satisfy anyone. The "half-way measures,"
prompted when talks between Dutch unions and employers
broke down last month, may buy the government of Prime
Minister den Uyl another six months in office.
The government proposals are bound to disappoint
the unions, which have become accustomed to expect
more from the Labor Party-dominated government. Most
wage increases will be limited to 8.5 percent in 1976,
instead of the 10.5 percent asked by the unions. Strict
guidelines will prevent increases in industrial prices
and fees charged by doctors, dentists and other profess-
ionals. The government will also postpone the planned
increase in the value added tax, and subsidize those
industries that?will'be critically affected by the
scheduled 11 percent increase in the minimum wage in
1976.
The proposals have been approved by the lower
house of parliament and are expected to pass the upper
house. The government's suggestions, however, came
under heavy attack from both Labor and various liberal
and conservative elements in parliament. The Labor
Party continues to criticize publicly the proposals,
but reportedly is in agreement behind the scenes.
Nevertheless, if the unions and management are still
dissatisfied six months from now, the government may
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Nordic Investment Bank Established
The Nordic Council has agreed to establish a Nordic
Investment Bank to attract foreign capital, principally
oil money, to the Scandinavian area.
The bank, headquartered in Helsinki, will grant
loans and guarantee projects involving two or more Nordic
countries. Common energy projects, such as pipelines
for natural gas, will have first call upon the bank's
lending capacity;
The bank's basic capital will total about $500
million, and will be raised by levies on each Nordic
country, according to the size of its gross national
product. Eventually, Norwegian oil profits could also
help finance the bank.
Preferential tax treatment. will almost guarantee the
bank's financial success and will give it a competitive
edge over all other financial institutions in Scandinavia.
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Iceland Requests UN Security Council Meeting
The UN Security Council tomorrow will consider
Iceland's complaint against Britain following an
incident on December 11 in which an Icelandic patrol
boat was rammed by a British support ship inside
Iceland's 12-mile limit. Iceland considers the in-
cident a "flagrant violation of Iceland's sovereignty
endangering peace and security."
The Icelandic move suggests that British Foreign
Secretary Callaghan's recent conciliatory offers to
Icelandic Foreign Minister Augustsson at the recent
NATO meeting in Brussels will not receive an
enthusiastic response from the Reykjavik government.
Callaghan offered to reduce the size of the British
annual catch to a figure below the 110,000 tons
London had been demanding in order to get the stale-
mated fisheries negotiations going again. So far
there has been no response from Reykjavik.
Reaction in Reykjavik to the ramming episode
has been predictably sharp, with politicians of every
persuasion vehemently denouncing the British action.
Prime Minister Hallgrimsson said the incident was
"unusually serious" and demonstrated British "reck-
lessness and violence." Most officials are responding
more stridently to this incident than to previous
cod war skirmishes because the incident occurred
within Iceland's 12-mile zone, which Britain recognizes.
Iceland has already appealed to NATO and for
several weeks has been considering an approach to the
UN as part of an effort to gain world-wide sympathy
and support. Reykjavik decided last week to put off
an approach to the UN General Assembly for a resolution
branding the UK an aggressor until it weighed the re-
sponse from NATO. Iceland's UN Representative then
sent a letter to the President of the UN Security
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Council on December 11 outlining the issues in the
dispute and reserving the right to approach the
Security Council. The ramming incident provoked the
request for an emergency meeting of the Council.
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EC Still Uncertain on the Spanish Question
The EC is not yet ready to reopen the trade
negotiations with Spain that were formally suspend-
ed earlier this fall to protest the execution
of Basque. terrorists. Some Commission officials
and several of the member states believe that the
EC should move only when there are clear indications
that democracy is taking root in Spain. Others
suggest that early community action would support
and reinforce liberal tendencies.
Commission officials believe that the Spanish
may not be ready to focus on relations with the
community until at least early spring. They argue
that, although Spanish relations with the EC loom
large in Spain's foreign policy, domestic issues
facing the new Spanish government are more pressing.
Even in the spring, Madrid may wait for the community
to make the first move. The Commission nevertheless
feels itself under some pressure to be prepared to
recommend a course of action to the EC Council.
Commission officials recognize that Spain is
likely to want a closer relationship with the EC
than would be entailed in a mere updating of the
trade agreement of 1970. They are apprehensive
that Madrid may apply for full membership and.-thus
pose the political dilemma for the community most
acutely. The application would be hard to turn
down on economic grounds because of progress under-
way toward membership for Greece, no better off
than Spain. Nonetheless, Spain's 35 million inhabitants--
as compared to Greece's nine million--may in fact
prove more of an economic burden to the EC.
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Spanish Socialists are encouraging the West
Europeans to take a hard line on Spain. A delegation
from the governing Dutch Labor Party ended a recent
visit to Spain as guests of the Spanish Socialists
with a warning that the Netherlands will oppose
Spain's entry into the EC until democratic freedoms
are fully established and all political prisoners
freed. The visits abroad by Spanish Socialists
have also been effective. A recent visit of a Socialist
leader to Norway, for example, provoked such press
headlines as "No Change in Spain under King Juan
Carlos" and "Tourist Boycott Should be Permanent."
Confidential talks this week in Paris between
representatives of all non-falangist Spanish politi-
cal groups and members of the 18-nation Council
of Europe may provide a broader perspective on
the strategy advocated by Spaniards as likely
to promote progress toward democratic freedoms in
Spain.
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Differences Narrow Over Resumption of Cypriot Talks
The Greek and Turkish foreign ministers narrowed
their differences over the manner of reactivating the
moribund Cypriot intercommunal talks in their meeting
in Brussels on Friday. Although the specifics of the
meeting are not known, enough goodwill was generated
to provide for a compromise resolution on the renewal
of the mandate of the UN force in Cyprus the next day.
Greek Foreign Minister Bitsios and Turkish Foreign
Minister Caglayangil were reported to be "very encouraged"
as a result of their lengthy discussion. A communique
issued at the close Qf their meeting noted they had
decided to ask UN Secretary General Waldheim to try to
get the talks resumed in consultation with the interested
parties.
Prior to the meeting, Ankara had called for enlarg-
ing the talks to include Greek and Turkish representatives
and opposed holding the talks under the direct auspices
of Waldheim. Athens and the Greek Cypriots had been
unenthusiastic about the Turkish proposal and had called
instead for the resumption of the talks under the old
format and with an open agenda. The communique, along
with official and press commentary in the respective
capitals, suggests that a compromise may be under con-
sideration entailing a continued role for Waldheim in
the talks and their enlargement at some point to include
Greek and Turkish observers.
The Security Council resolution on the extension
of the mandate for the UN force artfully combined the
position of the two sides. It "noted" but did not
reaffirm the earlier General Assembly resolution as
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demanded by the Greek side. While it made no mention
of the Turkish Cypriot administration whose recognition
the Turkish side has been trying to secure, the UN force
commander did sign a document with Turkish Cypriot leader
Denktash governing the force's activities in the Turkish
Cypriot zone.
Denktash had earlier threatened to expel the force
from the zone in retaliation for the unfavorable treat-
ment accorded the Turkish Cypriot case in the General
Assembly last month. Although the compromise agreement
still bestows some recognition on the Turkish Cypriots,
it will serve to deter the increase in tensions that
would have accom anied the force's ouster.
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Italian Socialists Step Up Criticism of Moro
Government
The Italian Socialists last week sharpened
their criticism of the Moro government but postponed
until their congress in February a decision on
whether to bring it down by withdrawing the party's
crucial parliamentary support. Socialist leader
De Martino has been under strong pressure from
members of his party who maintain that continued
support for the government will hurt the Socialists
in the next election.
In a speech that was approved unanimously
by the Socialist directorate, De Martino rendered
a sharply negative judgment of the government-
but argued against challenging it now. The Socialist
leader noted that to do so would run the risk
of:
--interrupting difficult negotiations
between organized labor and the
government, as well as complicating the
debate now taking place in parliament
over economic recovery measures;
--precipitating early parliamentary
elections, to which most politicians
remain opposed and for which the
Socialists would be held responsible;
--strengthening the hand of those Christian
Democrats and Social Democrats who
are opposed to the trend in their
parties toward closer relations with
the Socialists.
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While he did not mention it, De Martino is
probably motivated also by a desire to avoid charges
of political irresponsibility prior to his visit
to the US in January. In addition, divisions
among Socialists over what course to follow if
the government falls could destroy the thin veneer
of unity that De Martino hopes to maintain through
the party congress in February.
The harsh view of the government taken by
the Socialist directorate will make it difficult
for the party to support Moro for long after the
congress. In the meantime, the increased likelihood
of a Socialist-initiated crisis after February
will strain relations between them and the two
parties--Christian Democrats and Republicans--
who hold cabinet posts under Moro.
The resulting tensions could, in turn, jeopardize
Moro's survival. There are already reports that
some Republicans--angered by Socialist criticism--
are suggesting that their party reassess its participation
in the cabinet.
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Results of Public Opinion Poll in West Germany
Underscore Importance 'of Franz Josef Strauss
The results of a recent West German opinion
poll suggest that next fall's national election will
be a close one. The poll also indicates that op-
position chancellor-candidate Helmut Kohl would
improve his chances if he could somehow distance
himself from Franz Josef Strauss, the controversial
leader of the Bavarian affiliate, the Christian"
Social Union.
The results of the poll, conducted by the re-
spected Allensbach Institute in early November, were
published by the weekly magazine Stern on December
4. When asked which party they would vote for if
the election were held the following week, 50.7
percent of the respondents selected the Christian
Democratic Union/Christian Social Union, as opposed
to 53 percent a year ago. Of the respondents, 39.7
percent picked Chancellor Schmidt's Social Democratic
Party, and 8.6 percent selected the Free Democrats,
as against 38 percent and 7 percent, respectively,
in December 1974. Twenty percent of those polled,
however, were undecided.
The poll strengthens the view that the West
German voters are more concerned about the personali-
ties of the party leaders than with the parties
themselves, and that Strauss will cost the CDU votes.
When asked which party would receive the most votes
in the next election, 39 percent of those who ex-
pressed an opinion said it will be the CDU/CSU. Only
31 percent picked the SPD/FDP. But when asked if
the SPD/FDP coalition led by Schmidt and Hans-Dietrich
Genscher or the CDU/CSU led by Kohl and Strauss would
win the most votes, 33 percent picked the Schmidt/Genscher
team and only 31 percent picked the Kohl/Strauss ticket.
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When asked which political leaders were best
suited to be in a government, 79 percent said Schmidt;
70 percent, Kohl; and only 51 percent supported Strauss
for any government position. In addition, only 39
percent of the respondents admitted to having a good
opinion of Strauss, while 51 percent voiced a negative
view of the Bavarian leader. on the other hand, 67
percent of those polled have a good opinion of Schmidt,
while 63 percent regard Kohl favorably.
When asked which government would deal most
effectively with domestic economic problems, a
CDU/CSU government led by Kohl and Strauss had an
edge of more than five percent over the present
coalition led by Schmidt and Genscher. When the
same question was asked, but the choices were the
Schmidt/Genscher coalition or a CDU/CSU government
led by Strauss, ten percent more people picked the
SPD/FDP coalition.
The poll illustrates the dilemma facing Kohl.
He needs'the?full support of Strauss and his Bavarian
conservatives to become chancellor, but somehow Kohl
must also distance himself from Strauss and appear
to be independent. Accomplishing this task will be
extremely difficult, and may prove impossible. It
is already clear that the SPD and FDP will hammer at
the theme of the Kohl/Strauss team, and that it is
Strauss rather than Kohl who is holding the reins.
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