PRC MILITARY OPTIONS IN THE TAIWAN STRAIT AND THE SOUTH CHINA SEA IN 1976

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00608R000700100001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 32
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 14, 2000
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 1, 1975
• Content Type: MEMO

GYA/OSR' /`MEMO EF 7'S
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Naro~N ~-~ 5 s
MEMORANDUM
PRC Military O tions in the Taiwan Strait
and the SOuth China Sea in 1976
ClaesIJled by
Exempt Ir .
cm
of # 0
17 ecSndulo
This blind memorandum was prepared in the Eastern Forces Division,
Office of Strategic Research and distributed to the NIO, China and the
National Security council *in September 2975.
be addressed to the rrinn_,.nn7 Queries and comments may
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NOT RELcAc,\GLE TO
FOREIGN NATIONALS
PRC Military Options in the Taiwan Strait
and the South China Sea in 1976
Principal Conclusions
Although the Chinese traditionally have shown
restraint in their use of force, they have not hesitated
to engage in military operations after determining
that a sufficient threat or provocation existed and
that there were reasonably good prospects for success.
This was illustrated by Peking's actions in the Paracels
in early 1974.
There are four areas in the East and South China
Seas where the Chinese conceivably could exercise
options; these include Pratas Island, the Spratlys,
the Offshore Islands, and the Pescadores. Peking,
however, probably will not initiate military operations
in 1976 unless the threat to its interest escalates
perceptibly.
From Peking's point of view, the major constraints
on initiating military actions in 1976 appear to be:
--reluntance to alter the delicately balanced
Sino-US-soviet triangle
--fear of further growth of Soviet influence
in southeast Asia
--desire to avoid a deterioration in Sino-
Vietnamese relations
--inability'to mount amphibious operations on
a large scale
Several contingencies, however, could alter the
prognosis for 1976.
--A US abrogation of its defense treaty with
the ROC, or any limitations on the grounds
for US intervention, could remove major
constraints to PRC action.
--A pronounced deterioration in Sino-US
relations could induce China to probe US
resolve in the Taiwan Strait area.
S!=~; ^"i
NOT R22LEnSAGLE TO...__
._...
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NOT RELEASABLE TO
FOFEIGN NATIONALS
--Any lessening of the Sino-Soviet dispute
could increase Peking's freedom of action in
regard to any of its options. The converse
would be true if Sino-Soviet relations
worsened.
--A serious rift with Vietnam might cause the
PRC to intervene in the South China Sea.
--Confirmation that Taipei was close to
developing a nuclear device could conceivably
provoke PRC action against the ROC.
1i'
SECRET
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NOWT r,ELC-ASACLE TO
J:c:.=:%. i_; i?,.'j!ONALS
Page
Introduction 1
The Likelihood of the PRC's Initiating Military
Operations in the Taiwan Strait and the South
China Sea in 1976
Situations Which Could Alter the Peaceful Prognosis 4
US Actions
Soviet Actions
DRV Actions
ROC Actions
PRC Military Capabilities Against Specific Targets
in 1976
PRC Military Capabilities
Likelihood of Initiating Military Action
Opposing Forces
Background
Discussion
Spratly Islands 10
PRC Military Capabilities
Likelihood of Initiating Military Action
Opposing Forces
Backgrot:.nd
Discussion
Offshore Islands 14
PRC Military Capabilities
Likelihood of Initiating Military Action
Opposing Forces
Background
Discussion
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(Continued)
P a
Pescadores 19
PRC Military Capabilities
Likelihood of Initiating Military Action
Opposing Forces
Background
Discussion
Maps
Islands in the. South China Sea
Spratly Islands
Pratas Island
Republic of China (showing the Offshore Islands
and the Pescadcres)
S[_C?.;_ NOT r;E;F,',SA2[E TO
LOREIGI, NATIONALS
IV
NOT F REASABCE TOE
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1
NOT RL?LEASAA~-LF. TO
FORE!GN NATIONALS
PRC Military Options in the Taiwan Strait
and the South China Sea in 1976
Introduction:
Peking's past military operations have been characterized
by caution and restraint. Nevertheless, the PRC has shown
little hesitation to use force after determining that
a sufficient threat or provocation existed and that there
were reasonably good prospect for success. Peking's inter-
vention in the Korean Conflict in 1950 and actions taken
against India in 1962 are prime examples. Nor did Peking,
in its limited military actions in 1958 and 1962, hesitate
to use force against Taiwan. Only recently, PRC spokesmen
indicated that force continues to be an option in the
Paracels last year demonstrated a capability to jnitiate
limited military operations over water successfully.
With the past as prologue, this paper will examine a
variety of military options--those regarding Pratas Island.
the Spratlys, the Offshore Islands, ar;-l the Pescadores.
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Paracel Islands
Amphitrite Group
Canton
HONG KONG
MACAO (U K.)
I Port.)
PRATAS
ISLANO,
Pr.S s
Red
Macclesfield
Bank
SOUTH
CHINA
SEA
Northeast car,'
? Tkitr,` __-Wear York
Losito\
Its Aki Ilueka
$PretIY\
Spratly Islands,,''seeitc+
Cewe
PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF CHINA
BRUNEI
Taipei
REPUOLIC
OF
CHINA
TAIWAN
Kao?hsiung?.
J
J - Manila'
PHILIPPINES
r7
.r ,
-~1
Miler
3537i3 z-14 - 01-4
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NOT RELEA... 3LE TO
FOREIGN NAl',0NALS
The Likelihood of the PRC's Initiating Military Operations
in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea in 1.976
Even in the short term, predicting any nation's intentions
to engage in a.military adventure is difficult. In the past
Peking's decisions regarding the use or non-use of force
appear to have involved rational considerations of national
interests based on military, political, and economic factors.
An assessment of these considerations in terms of risk, gain,
and military capabilities constitutes one .means of predicting
the likelihood of future military operations, but the con-
clusions reached must be considered as only rough approximations.
The major constraints on PRC military actions in
1976 appear to be China's reluctance to alter the delicately
balanced Sino-US-Soviet triangle, Peking's fear of further
growth of Soviet influence in Southeast Asia and a related
desire to avoid a deterioration in Sino-Vietnamese relations,
and China's inability to mount amphibious operations on a
large scale. The primary impetus for military actions is
the long-standing desire to recove all Chinese-claimed
territory, particularly Taiwan's reunification with the
mainland, and an avid interest in the potential economic
resources in the adjacent East and South China Seas.
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NOT P=1.EASPJE E TO
Clearly, the prize most coveted by the PRC is Taiwan.
In the short term, however, peaceful reunification appears
highly unlikely and, as long as the US maintains its defense
commitments to the Republic of China, a PRC invasion would
offer no expection of success. We have therefore excluded
this option for the PRC in 1976.
Pratas Island, controlled by the ROC and claimed by
Peking, could be overwhelmed by a PRC assault or blockade
at any time. The island has no strategic importance, however,
and Peking probably is willing to defer action there--pending
the resolution of the overall Taiwan issue--when Pratas would
fall to the PRC by default.
In the Spratlys, unless there is confirmation of large
deposits of exploitable natural resources, Peking probably
is willing to let time take its course. The ROC presence on
Itu Aba in the Spratlys for now may be sufficient protection
for a "Chinese" claim to the islands, whereas the projection of
Peking's forces into the area would run the tisk of military
confrontations both with Vietnam and the Philippines--countries
with which Peking would be reluctant to precipitate a deterior-
ation in relations.
Unlike the preceding areas, the Offshore Islands have
formidable defenses. A PRC blockade to force the Nationalist
garrisons to capitulate is feasible and would be the least
risky course for Peking, but would require six to twelve
NOT p-3.
AELr TO
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~~r?f'r'-
NOT f"'_".SABLE TO
Fc'.
months to achieve success. Peking's fears that a campaign
against Lhe Offshore Islands might disbalance the Sino-US-
Soviet triangle or cause the US to reassess its support for
Taiwan, however, appear to be the most important constraints
to PRC military actions there in 1976.
A PRC assault or blockade of the Pescadores is the most
improbable option. Such an action would be regarded in Taipei
as a prelude to an attack on Taiwan, requiring a maximum
defensive effort. In any event, the chances of PRC military
operations in 1976 against the Pescadores are highly unlikely
because of the strong possibility of intervention in some
fashion by the US.
Situations Which Could Alter the Peaceful Prognosis
US Actions. A US abrogation of its defense treaty with the ROC,
or any limitations on the grounds for US intervention, could
remove major constraints to PRC action against the Offshore
Islands, the Pescadores, and even Taiwan. Nonetheless, fear
of destroying the improving relations with the US probably
would still act as an important deterrent to PRC military
adventures.
Sr n V-%
10 P~.L 5~ E TO
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NOT F.71
LC:1S'''1 _ ?O
FOREIGN NATION,-,!.S
A pronounced deterioration in Sino-US relations also
could lead China to probe US resolve in the Taiwan Strait
area. If the US acted withfirmness, Peking probably would
pull. back from the brink of confrontation--especially in the
case of the Pescadores and probably in the case of the
Offshore Islands as well.
Soviet Actions. Any lessening of the Sino-Soviet dispute
could increase Peking's freedom of action in regard to any of
its options. Under such circumstances, additional military
forces would be available and, more important, Peking might be
willing to accept some deterioration in Sino-US detente.
On the other hand, worsening of Sino-Soviet relations
would further reduce Peking's freedom of action. Under
such circumstances, Peking probably would avoid any military
operation that reduced the capabilities of PRC forces assigned
to ordesignated as reinforcements for the northerh border.
Thus, the PRC also would be particularly unwilling to take
any action leading to a deterioration in Sino-US detente.
Vietnamese Actions. A serious raft with Vietnam might cause
the PRC to intervene in the south China Sea. Specifically,
action by the Vietnamese to seize all the Spartlys might
oblige the PRC to react v ith force. However, the likelihood
of such a confrontation, assuming a maximum Vietnamese effort,
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LOREiC'11 RATION,'-.L
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NOT EELtASA2LE TO
FC ;E GN NATIONALS
is difficult to judge. In fact, the PRC may concede that
its capabilities, in an area so far from the mainland bases,
are insufficient against the well-equipped and experienced
Vietnamese.
ROC Actions. Confirmation that Taipei was close to developing
a nuclear device could conceivably provoke PRC action
against the ROC. Peking might first attempt to pressure
Taipei to terminate the project by urging the US to exert its
influence. Failing this, military action might be considered.
But any such action, diplomatic or military, seems beyond
the time frame of this memorandum.
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ANNEX
NOT rF1[,%SAgLE TQ'
FO S;GN NATIONALS
PRC Military Capabilities Against Specific
Targets in 1976
Pratas Island
PRC Military Capabilities:
Likelihood of Initiating Military Action: unlikely
Opposing Forces*:
PRC ROC
Ground 1,500-2,500 300-500
Air 650 fighters 0
50 bombers
Navy 2 LSTs 0
4 LSMs
1 Luta DDG
1-2 f:iga OEGSs
2-3 Kiangnan DEs
2-3 MSFs
2-3 PCs
(2-3 Osas and Huchwans, if required)
Background: Pratas Island is a circular coral barrier reef,
roughly 13 miles in diameter, with an island on the west
side. It is about 135 miles from the mainland and 340 miles
southwest of Taiwan. The reef, located a few miles northeast
of the sea lane between Hong King and Manila, is a
* Data included in the tables of opposing forces are in part judg-
mental. After the size of the garrison was determined in each
case; the likelihood of reinforcements to augment those troops
committed to defend the area was assessed. This led to estimates
of the PRC forces--required and available--based on such factors
as distances from the mainland and ranges of weapon systems.
Ground force requirements were developed the assumption that, at
minimum, a 5-1 numerical superiority was essential.
.OREIGN NATIONALS
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 Pratas Island
n runway
bratas'lsland
(Tung?sha Tao)
--
?
?
South ..t H
WV "013i CNAO)
SOUTH t Y G' ?4 5' t t o' S0'
? ; Northwest Horn
? ? 1 (Pe,hatChrao)
'?o a .d94
? a0
SOUTH CHINA
? s? a
C. ~
p 0
CHINA SEA
?s.
r,..,,,~.t~r ..-p._ ~? Northeast Po.nf
(Pe?tung Chao)
8 EA
11I
? ~~ East
o ? _ * 1 Pont
(rung
F . chao)
? T
a
u up'-r (Nan-lung Chao)
I >
91MV0. -"
7 - A
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? ?~1 t'?~~' .v?91J
shipping hazard because soundings give little warning of its
proximity. Most of it uncovers at low tide. Its lagoon is
studded with coral heads and a few rocks. Anchorages are
available only for small ships.
Both Chinas claim ownership of Pratas, but neither
has made a public issue of it in recent years. The PRC
has never occupiedthe island. The ROC maint,iins a military
garrison there of about 300 troops and in 1964 constructed
an airfield with a 5,000 foot concrete runway on the north
arm of the island. Fev, if any, prepared defensive positions
have been built. The ROC also operates a weather observatory
and a radio station on the island.
Discussion Peking would gain little by occupying the island.
..Pratas has little military or economic significance, and the
PRC probably is willing to maintain the status quo, awaiting
settlement of the larg,?r issue of Taiwan. Peking may fear
that seizing Pratas would have some adverse effect on achieving
its long range objectives of reducing US ties with the
Nationalists and reunifying Taiwan with the mainland.
But if the PRC decided to dislodge the ROC from Pratas,
it -could easily establish sea and air supremacy. Furthermore,
the small PFtC garrsion probably could be quickly, overcome,
because ample forces are avilable for an invasion. Geographic
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 ME07Q010,,Q01~ 4 .M ~......_.~ ......,,.~__~ y
assault against Pratas be made by
factors require that any
small boats or rubber rafts approaching from the west.
Coincident with an amphibious assault, an airborne force
and
of 200-300 troops could be used to secure the runway
disrupt ROC defenses. The PRC also is capable of blockading
the island--?a method that would result in far fewer
casualties.
The distance from Taiwan'to Pratas would severly
limit any Nationalist reaction to PRC movements.
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86WOraOSROOD7001.09,D, t 4:.._. .
Spratly Islands
PRC Military Capabilities:
Likelihood of Initiating Military Action: doubtful
Opposing Forces: :PRC ROC DRV Philippines
Ground 2,500 500 100 200
Air* 10 IL-28RS 0
(used for
reconnais-
sance only)
Navy i 2 LSTs 0
4 LSMs
1 Luta DDGSs
1-2 Riga DEGSs
1-2 Kiangnan DEs
4-5 MSFs
2-3 AOs
2-3 AKs
200 MIGs 0
17/19/21s
100 F-5s/A-37s
3 Komars 0
`4-36
patrol gun
Boats
Background: Sovereignty over the Spratlys
80 small islands, islets, reefs and rocks, has been* in dispute
for over a century. As recently as January 1974, the PRC reiterated
its claim to the Spratlys, but unlike the other claimants--
Vietnam, the Philippines, and the ROC--it has not established a
presence there. Although the total land area of the islands is
only one square mile, the possiblity of discovering exploitable
seabed resources in the area insures continuing friction over ownershi:
* PRC TU-16 bombers could operate over the Spratlys, but because
they would be without fighter escorts are not likely to be
used.
SECR T
10 -
NOT F.NL'_ASA!CE TO
Fr ' :r .j D.1T ~ntn
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Spratly Islands
110 its
6
'sI
E
tl
-=1
/Palawan
Fnrndsh p Shoal
SOUTH CH IN
A SEA
Northeast Cay
r' I'ti
.(7.r~.,?,i
Southwest Cay ;,? 7
Thitu Island? k , West York Island
loaita island 4(4r Flat Island
4gN Nanshan Island
flu ACa Island Sand Cay
*Namyit Island
and Rcrl s Sin Cowe
Island
SPRATLY ISLANDS
(NAN-SHA CH'UN TAO)
Spratly. (DAO TRUONG SA) i
Island {
Lpd Shoal.
f.
~--- -~ IN DON ES IA
so too noulicel "Vies
t1o too teo luw
?
.
.:r
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raoC r.ri,'i~c~ TO
RD'.GN N,\ !3NALS
Discussion Peking clearly considers the Spratlys its ter-
ritory, 1,,2t probably recognizes that, for the moment,
the ROC presence satisfactorily protects the interests and
claims of both Chinas. If the PRC attempted to establish its
own presence, it would only marginally advance its claims of
sovereignty and would run the risk of embroiling itself in a
military confrontation with the Vietnamese, Philippine, and
Nationalist garrison-Z- posted there. At minimum, protest from
the other claimants would be vociferous. Peking probably could
expect more complicated relations with Vietnam and some loss
of influence. Recent improvements in Sino-Philippine relations
also would be jeopardized. Under such circumstances, the PRC
probably is willing to negotiate the question of sovereignty
and, for the present, is content to observe the status quo.
Nevertheless, if one of the claimants, most likely Vietnam,
attempted or threatened to resolve the question of sovereignty
by force, the PRC might be provoked to intervene. Peking may
possess the military capability to seze the Spratlys by force.
Only the Vietnamese would be able to mount a
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i I ~._LEAS.~ELE TO
FO; ZiGN NATIONALS
The PRC navy is capable of directly attacking any of the
islands. All are basically flat, without defensive positions,
and are highly vulnerable to shore bombardment. Moreover,
no other navy, alone could successfully challenge the PRC, if
it deployed its missile-equipped surface ships. Putting
troops on the Spratlys, however, would be more difficult
because in many instances only small boats and rubber rafts
could be used. The 300-500 Nationalist soldiers on Itu Aba
and the Vietnamese garrisons could be expected to put up a
much stiffer resistance than that-which the Chinese encountered
in the Paracels.
The decisive factor for the PRC would be the amount of
air power the Vietnamese would be willing to commit. Only
the PRC's medium jet bombers and light jet reconnaissance
aircraft have the range to operate over the Spratlys. But
its'forces would be operating with essentially no air cover
making it unlikely that bombers would be used. If the
Vietnamese mounted concentrated and repeated air attacks,
Peking probably would be forced to withdraw. If air attacks
were sporadic--an unlikely possibility--then the PRC navy
would have a reasonable chance of defending itself.
It any event, before establishing a military presence
in the Spratlys, the PRC probably would take preparatory
12 -
r.=Lt.,,:,?1,-3Lc TO
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steps to minimize the risks to its naval force, which
hitherto has performed little more than a coastal defense
mission. Such steps might include extensive surveying and
charting of the archipelago, additional training of.
main surface force units in shore bombardment and in long-
range navigation. Rehearsals also would be desirable for
coordinating amphibious assaults--duplicating as closely
as possible the beach and offshore conditions to be en-
countered. Except for limited amphibious training, which
probably is normal military training not directly related,
there has been no evidence that the PRC is preparing for
operations in the Spratlys.
EGRET
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NOT p =i '-j\Sr'~'Sl'~ J
FO~c',GN N1.T1O, iALS
Offshore Islands
PRC Military Capabilities:
Likelihood of Initiating Military Action: doubtful
Opposing Forces:
Ground
Air
400,000
(from coastal MRs
if required)
1750 fighters
240 bombers
80,000
250 fighters
2 DDGSs
3 DDGs
Navy
23 submarines
12
DDs
70 fast guided
3
DEs
missiles boats
3
PCEs
1 Luta DDGS
10
PFs
1 Kiangtund DEG
6
PTCs
1 Kiangnan DE
22
MSs
11 patrol
28
Amphibious
Ships
frigates
300 PTs, and motor
gunboats
3 motor transport
boats
Background The Offshore Islands, controlled by the ROC,
consist of four island groups. Only two of these--Quemoy
(Chin-men) and Ma-tsu--are defended in strength. The island
of Guemoy, which commands the entrance to Amoy harbor, has
been made into a nearly impregnable fortress. The two
smaller island groups, Wu-chiu and Tung-yin, are included in
the Ma-tsu Defense Command,
14 -
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lrnns'T
25X6
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Republic of China
Mdnfnal admn'haMe boundary
0 Mh.nal admRRahah.e capital
-~--~.w Radvoad
Road
Philippine
Sea
Lit ra.,
?- Mnf Nlffl7an?L? ?II.Ft?...a.lv1
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1f;,
1 l
~.._I ~U.~nq ~.tn run P'n /an
#JI PP. Aon fang rte
v-
I t'tltu rac East C h i in a
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+~rC ~irw._~+..JU.w.wr..t.3 ~~~.d~...uu.w - -.Nwra4...4.w ..-..-.1:........r....~rr~~/. .u~.4~i .1..:.au.. .... .._.'.)r?:.I Fit~1: ..1..1..A'~~. it::.c~ ;'..h:4.'.It,: e..:.:. .