EXPANSION AND MODERNIZATION IN THE SOVIET THEATER FORCES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00608R000700080018-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 43
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 17, 1999
• Sequence Number: 18
• Publication Date: September 1, 1975
• Content Type: IR

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~I:~OSf~I~ 75-14 ~ I
txpansion and Mod,. -mthe 5ov: I heater Forces
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Intelligence Report
Expansion and Modernization in the
Soviet Theater Forces
SR I R 75-14
September 1975
Copy
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NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
Classified by 005827
Exempt from general declassification schedule
of E.O. 11652, exemption category:
? 58(1), (2i, and ;3)
Automatically declossifiid on:
Date Impossible to Determine
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 Appr
Expansion and Modernization in the
Soviet Theater Forces
Key Findings
Soviet ground and tactical air manpower has increased nearly 50 percent since the early
to mid-sixtie_, reaching a present total of over two million men. During the same period
annual procurement expenditures also increased by more than 40 percent in order to
substantiativ modernize active inventories of primary combat weapons such as medium
tanks and high-performance aircraft and to increase the size of these inventories by 30 to 50
percent. Overall, the changes of the past ten years-in addition to expanding the size of the
Soviet ground and tactical air forces-have resulted in more balanced and operationally
flexible theater forces with substantially improved capabilities for conventional as well as
theater nuclear w, r.
The buildup of Soviet forces opposite China has been a prime factor in this
expansion-with the addition of more than 300,000 men in new units since about 1965.
Increases also occurred in the manning of old units and formation of new units opposite
NATO following the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. Manpower and equipment levels
also increased as a result of organizational changes which strengthened motorized rifle and
tank divisions as well as non-divisional combat and support units. Major increases in
equipment development and procurement have resulted in an increasingly modern and
sophistic-ited array of theater force weapons.
Soviet ground forces stationed in Central Europe (East Germany, Poland,
Czechoslovakia) have increased by almost 140,000 men and over 2,600 tanks. Almost half of
this increase occurred as a result of the introduction of Soviet forces into Czechoslovakia in
1968 and the rest as a result of organizational expansion since the mid-sixties.
Extensive production of new, more sophisticated equipment is expected to continue
through the end of the seventies as new tactical aircraft, air defense systems, self-propelled
artillery, and the T-72 tank enter units in greater numbers and other weapons currently
undergoing testing begin production. The rate of growth in manpower and inventories
appears to have slowed over the past two years or so, at least in part because the buildup of
combat units opposite China appears to have run its course, For this reason, the growth of
the iheater forces ma; be somewhat more gradual over the next several years than it was in
the late sixties.
The ultimate extent of the ground and tactical air force expansion, however, is
particularly difficult to assess. Once having perceived in the mid-sixties, a general need for
improved capabilities, the Soviets initiated and vigorously pursued this broad array of
programs. As a result, they have achieved a very strong relative position in conventional
forces both cn Europe and on the Sino-Soviet border. Although a preponderance of
capability clearly is important to them, there is no basis in evidence on which to estimate
that point at which the Soviets would be satisfied that they had achieved an acceptable
balance of forces.
Overall it does seem that the momentum of the current force improvement programs
combined with the strong institutional position of the military and the apparent inclination
of the current political leadership to support a superior overall posture is likely to lead to
continued gradual expansion-possibly adding another hundred thousand men-and
modernization of Soviet theater forces through the early eighties. To reverse this trend
probably would require the ascendency of new political leadership with different priorities
and the power base to overcome current institutional positions.
3R IR 75-14
SECRET Sep 75
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
September 1975
INTELLIGENCE REPORT
Expansion and Modernization in the
Soviet Theater Forces
In the late sixties it became increasingly appar-
ent that extensive changes were under way in the
Soviet ground and tactical air forces. Organizational
changes in existing units together with the formation
of a large number of new units--particularly opposite
China--were adding substantial numbers of equipment
and men to the theater forces. At the same time
equipment modernization appeared to be increasing
rapidly.
The military forces of any major power can be ex-
pected to undergo continual change and modernization.
The current Soviet programs have been of particular
concern, however, because of their apparent magnitude
and the fact that they have become most clearly evi-
dent at a time when NATO and the Warsaw Pact have
entered into force reduction talks and Western nations
are examining various new options for conventional de-
fense in Europe.
Assessment of the significance of Soviet force
developments is largely dependent on perception of
their timing, rate of implementation, and scope.
Because of limitations in earlier collection systems,
25X1A9a
Comments and queries regarding this publication are welcome.
They may be directed to the Theater Forces
Division, Office of Strategic Research, code 143, extension 5300.
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information gaps, and previous low collection pri-
orities for theater forces, the magnitude and nature
of some changes have become apparent only in the last
few years. The purpose of this report is to describe
these developments in the light of improved informa-
tion and to discuss the implications of the changes
that have occurred. It also examines possible Soviet
motivations for making these changes and considers the
prospects for future developments in Soviet theater
forces. A summary and conclusions begin on page 34.
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Page
Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Theater Forces in the Early Sixties . . . . . . . . 5
Events of the Mid-Sixties . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Force Developments Since the Mid-Sixties . . . . . . . . 7
Formation of New Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Expansion of Existing Force Elements . . . . . . . . 9
Divisional Artillery Units . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Divisional Motorized Rifle Units . . . . . . . . 12
Divisional Tank Units . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Organizational Changes at Higher Echelons . . . 13
Equipment Modernization Programs . . . . . . . . . . 13
Increased Procurement in the Late Sixties . . . 15
New Items of Equipment Fielded in the Early
Seventies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Impact on Soviet Forces in Central Europe . . . . . . . 30
Summary and Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
Scope of the Improvements and Remaining
Problem Areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
Recent Trends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3:;
Outlook for Further Growth . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
Changes in the Size of Soviet Theater Forces,
1962-1975 (Chart) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . 8
Principal Changes in Motorized Rifle Division,
1964-1975 (Chart) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Principal Changes in Tank Division, 1964-1975 (Chart) 11
Estimated Ground Force and Tactical Air Procurement
E:?_-~enditures, 1955-1974 (Chart) . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Soviet Self-Propelled Artillery (Photographs
and Charts) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Pxmored Vehicles (Photographs) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
New Tactical Aircraft (Photographs) . . . . . . . . . . 22
New Helicopters (Photographs) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
New Air Defense Weapons (Photographs) . . . . . . . . . 26
Motor Transport (Photographs) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Tactical Surface-to-Surface Missiles (Photographs) . . . 28
3
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Background
Theater Forces in the Early Sixties
Until the mid-fifties the Soviets maintained
extremely large ground and tactical air forces which
were organized and prepared to fight much as they had
in World War II. During the late fifties and early
sixties, the number of personnel in these forces was
reduced by considerably more than half. Many divisions
were eliminated, the active strength of most other di-
visions was reduced, and selective cuts were made
throughout the force. Equipment modernization programs
for many of these same theater force elements were cur-
tailed as more resources were allocated to the buildup
of Soviet strategic nuclear forces.
This shift in military priorities was rational-
ized.by some Soviet military theoreticians who argued
that any future war with the West would either begin
as or immediately escalate to a global nuclear war and
that theater conflicts would be largely decided by
the outcome of the overall strategic nuclear exchange.
According to this view a relatively small theater
force would be adequate to exploit the effect of the
nuclear strikes. This strategic emphasis was not uni-
versally accepted within the Soviet military, and there
continued to be a strong advocacy for a large conven-
tional theater force as a necessary complement to
nuclear power. Khrushchev, however, for a variety
of political and economic reasons supported the advo-
cates of strategic nuclear power at the expense of
conventional theater forces.
Because the prevailing military planners believed
that nuclear weapons would be able to replace the
massed artillery and extensive tactical aviation for-
mations of World War II in achieving breakthroughs,
major reductions were made in the artillery and tac-
tical air elements. Most of the light bombers, along
with many older MIG-15 and MIG-17 fighter-bombers,
were removed from service. Conventional field artil-
lery in tank divisions was reduced by one-half and in
motorized rifle divisions by one-third. Non-divisional
artillery was cut by as much as two-thirds.
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Tank forces were one of the few elements to avoid
large cuts. It was believed that armor, because of
its mobility and protection from nuclear effects, was
particularly well suited for exploitation of nuclear
st:-ikes. Despite the relatively favorable treatment
of armor, many divisions remained equipped with obso-
lete equipment, and there were insufficient armored
personnel carriers available to equip many divisions.
Throughout the early sixties the Soviet theater
forces remained a tank-heavy force with a limited
support structure. Artillery consisted of towed
guns and multiple rocket launchers, many of which
were models dating back to World War II. Antitank
units were also equipped mainly with towed guns and
recoilless weapons. For surface-launched air defense
the theater forces were dependent on the SA-2 missile
system and a large number of older antiaircraft artil-
lery weapons. Although transportable, the SA-2--
orginally developed as a point defense system for the
strategic defense forces--does not have good tactical
mobility.
In the tactical air forces, primary emphasis was
placed on battlefield air defense and nuclear strikes.
There was no effort to deploy tactical aircraft with
extended range or the capability of carrying large
conventional payloads. Few helicopters were in use,
command and control equipment was limited, and logis-
tical elements were geared to the low conventional
ammunition consumption levels expected in nuclear war
and to the general belief that such a war would be
relatively short.
Procurement of most types of new equipment pro-
ceeded at a slow pace during the early sixties
although, even after the cutbacks, the still-large
Soviet Army required substantial procurement just to
provide minimum replacements for worn-out equipment.
The few new weapons which entered service during the
period could be characterized mainly as simple evolu-
tionary developments, systems apparently reactive to
specific NATO capabilities, or--as in the case of the
T-62 medium tank--equipment which could be rationalized
as necessary for ground combat in a nuclear environment.
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Events in the Mid-Sixties
Several events occurred in the mid-sixties which
created an entirely new situation for Soviet theater
forces planners.
Khrushchev was removed from office in 1964.
This permitted the views of the Soviet
advocates of large land combat forces to
gain much wider official acceptance.
The US advocated a more flexible conven-
tional and limited nuclear response policy
for NATO. Although not officially adopted
until 1967, the new doctrine was tested in
1964 NATO exercises which the Soviets closely
monitored and evaluated.
The Sino-Soviet split became more severe
after Khrushchev's ouster. His successors
authorized a major buildup of theater
forces opposite China.
Force Developments Since the Mid-Sixties
Formation of New Forces
In response to the deepening of the Sino-Soviet
split after 1964, the USSR added more than 300,000
men to their forces along the Sino-Soviet border
between the mid-sixties and the early seventies.
About 25 divisions were added together with almost
1,000 tactical aircraft and several hundred heli-
copters. In addition to military equipment, the
buildup involved a major facility construction pro-
gram extending over a number of years. Although the
buildup on the Sino-Soviet border may have slowed
expansion and modernization of Soviet forces facing
NATO, it built up the overall strength of Soviet
ground and tactical air forces.
The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968
also resulted in net increases in the Soviet theater
forces. After the invasion most of the additional
troops mobilized for the operation were released from
7
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Increase in the Size of Soviet Theater Forces Since 1962
Men Added
(Thousands)
1,000 r-
Ground Force
Divisions Added
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r67oo9 8-75 CIA
Ground and Tactical Air Manpower
250
1.35million men in 1962
0
it
1962 63
I I I I I I I I
NATO Flexible-Response Doctrine:
Tested in Exercises ? Adopted
MBFR Npgotiations Begun
I 1 I_ I I I I
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duty, but five Soviet divisions and a small air force
were retained in Czechoslovakia, a country in which
no Soviet troops had been stationed since shortly
after World War II. These forces were drawn from the
western USSR, where at least the ground elements were
maintained at lower manning levels than was the case
after these units were filled out for movement to
Czechoslovakia. Further, increased activity at the
garrisons in the USSR which had formerly been occupied
by the divisions now in Czechoslovakia indicates that
a number of those divisions have been replaced.
Over the past five years, there have been improve-
ments in the quality and amounts of equipment of
Soviet forces throughout the Baltic, Belorussian, and
Carpathian Military Districts. Training activity of
these forces also has increased. It is likely that
these changes have been accompanied by some increases
in manning. The 29 divisions stationed in the western
military districts of the USSR form the immediate rein-
forcements for Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces in Eastern
Europe opposite NATO.
Expansion of Existing Force Elements
Some of the earliest and most basic force devel-
opments appeared as organizational changes within the
Soviet divisions. A variety of changes were made over
an extended period of time which had the cumulative
effect of adding large amounts of equipment and per-
sonnel to the division. (See charts, pages 10 and 11.)
The estimated personnel strength of a fully manned
motorized rifle division has increased from about
10,000 to more than 12,000 men, while the tank divi-
sion has increased from about 8,000 to about 9,500.
Details of these changes w're not clear in the
late sixties. In many cases he changes had occurred
at that time in only a few units or only in one par-
ticular area. It was not immediately clear, for ex-
ample, that a number of changes first detected in
Soviet divisions on the Sino-Soviet border would also
be made in units facing NATO. Since then, although
the process is not complete, these improvements have
appeared in an increasing number of units and areas
and apparently represent a new standard. In general,
these changes improved the combat capabilities of
motorized rifle units mr: than those of tank units.
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Principal Changes in Motorized Rifle Division, 1964-1975
(Only major combat units shown)
1964 Motorized Rifle Division 10,000 men
Motorized
Rifle
Regiment
Tank
Regiment
95 tanks
3 x 31 tanks 4 ZSU-57/2
3 x 66 APCs SP AA guns
3 x 15 120mm mortars
3 x 6 Snapper ATGM
launch vehicles, plt.s light AT
guns and recoilless guns
3 15 towed AAMGs
FROC
Battalio,
Antitank
Battalion
Multiple
Rocket
Launcher
Battalion
3 launchers 6100mm
guns
Air
Defense
Regiment
1975 Motorized Rifle Division 12,000+ men
Motorized
Rifle
Regiment
Ind. Tnnk
Battalion
(In some divisions)
Tank
Regiment
3 x 40 tanks
3 x 92 APCs
3 x 6 122mm guns
40 tanks 95 tanks
4 SA-9 launch
vehicles
4 ZSU-23/4s
3 x 18 120mm? mortars
3 x 9 Sagger ATGM
launch vehicles, plus
manpack Saggers and
recoilless guns
3 x 4 SA-9 launch vehicles
3 x 4 ZSU-23/4 SP AA guns
Division Increases, 1965-1975
2,000+ men
27- 67 tanks (many T-62s)
90 APCs (many BMPs)
1 FROG launcher
24 122mm and 152mm guns
6 multiple rocket laur,-hers
9 120mm mortars
12 100mm antitank guns
54 122mm and
152mm guns
9 ATGM launch vehicles, plus numerous
manpack and BMP- mounted Sagger ATGMs
20 SA-6 launch vehicles
16 SA-9 launch vehicles
12 self-propelled AA guns
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567010 8-75 CIA
I
Artillery
Regiment
launchers 48 122mm and
152mm guns
Multiple
fz~d I Battalion)
Rnckef
Launcher
Battalion
Artillery
Regiment
4 launchers 18 100mm 18 40-round
guns launchers
Air
Defense
Regiment
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Principal Changes in Tank Division, 1964-1975
(Only major combat units shown)
Tank
Regiment
3 x 95 tanks
3 x 4 ZSU-57/2
SP AA guns
r Tank
Regiment
Z
Motorized
Rifle
Regiment
31 tanks
66 APCs
15 120mm mortars
6 Snapper ATGM
launch vehicles
15 towed AAMGs
Motorized
Rifle
Regiment
FROG
Battalion
Multiple
Rocket
Launcher
Battalion
3 launchers 12 16-round
launchers
Air
Defense
Regiment
FROG
Battalion
40 tanks
3 x 95 tanks 92 APCs
3 x 4 SA-9 launch 6 122mm guns
vehicles 18 120mm mortars
3 x 4 ZSU-23/4 9 Sagger ATGM
SP AA guns launch vehicles, Air
plus manpack Defense
Saggers and Regiment
recoilless guns
4 SA-9 launch 20 SA-6 launch
vehicles vehicles
4 ZSU-2314
SP AA guns
'Aultiple
locket
dncher
Battalion
18 40-round
launchers
Artillery
Regiment
Artillery
Regiment
54 122mm and
152mm guns
Division Increases, 1965-1975
1,500 men 3 120mm mortars
9 tanks (many T-62s) 20 SA-6 launch vehlcles
22 APCs (many BMPs) 18 SA-9 launch vehicles
1 FROG launcher 4self-propellad AA guns
24 122mm and 152mm guns
8 multiple rocket launchers
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Divisional Artillery Units
In about 1966, additional field artillery started
to appear in Soviet divisions in East Germany and the
Soviet Far East. Over the next few years most of the
division-level artillery eliminated during the fifties
was restored, bringing about an increase of roughly
50 percent in division artillery.
Even after these increases, however, Soviet artil-
lery suffered from a number of limitations. None of
the Soviet cannon artillery was self-propelled or
armored, and this substantially limited its ability
to support fast-moving armored forces. The effec-
tiveness of Soviet artillery also remained limited by
rigid doctrine, outdated tactics, and less sophis-
ticated fire direction techniques and ammunition than
was used by US forces.
Divisional Motorized Rifle Units
In the late sixties the Soviets reorganized the
motorized rifle units of their divisions to increase
their mobility. The armored personnel carrier (APC)
transportation platoon in each rifle battalion was
disbanded and its APCs were integrated into the rifle
companies. This change, along with a gradual shift
to newer APCs designed to carry fewer men, not only
improved the mobility of the motorized rifle units
but also led to an increase in the number of APCs in
divisions. A motorized rifle division gained at
least 90 APCs, increasing from a maximum of 211 to
more than 300 APCs at present. The overall increase
in APCs has been even greater than this comparison of
authorized strengths indicates because many more divi-
zions have their full complement of APCs now than was
true in the earlier period.
Divisional Tank Units
The first changes which appeared in tank units
also were organizational. Evidence began to accumu-
late that many motorized rifle divisions included an
extra battalion of approximately 40 tanks, apparently
for use as the division commander's reserve. Because
small units of additional tanks for training purposes
already existed at various echelons, it is difficult
to date precisely the beginning of the formation of
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these new units. It was probably in the mid-sixties
and even somewhat earlier in a few cases.
Starting in about 1969, the Soviets also began
to expand the tank battalion of motorized rifle regi-
ments in both tank and motorized rifle divisions from
31 to 40 tanks. Overall these two changes raise the
number of tanks in a motorized rifle division from
188 to approximately 255, an increase of about 36
percent. The additional tanks probably are intended
in part to permit sustained operations in the face of
the high losses the Soviets may expect to incur from
improving NATO antitank capabilities and tactical nu-
clear weapons. In addition, this increased armor
strength, together with similar increases in other
areas such as artillery, should allow the motorized
rifle divisions to better achieve and sustain the mo-
mentum of a breakthrough using organic, conven?,_ional
weapons. These changes are still not complete through-
out the Soviet Army, although nearly all Soviet motor-
ized rifle divisions stationed in Central Europe appear
to be fully equipped.
Organizational Changes at Higher Echei,ns
Reserve combat strength also was somewhat improved
at higher echelons through the reorganization of
training units and the introduction of additional sepa-
rate tank regiments and battalions subordinate to the
headquarters of armies or groups of forces. For example,
in earlier years the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany
had a wide variety of small groups of tanks and other
equipment held mainly in motorized zifie and tank divi-
sions which were used for training. The GSFG now has
seven tank and motorized rifle training regiments, not
subordinate to divisions, which could be used as reserves
or replacement units in combat. Together, these separate
tank units and training regiments contain some 1,300 of
the GSFG's 7,100 tanks.
Equipment Modernization Programs
The increased stress on theater forces since the mid-
sixties has been accompanied by a marked increase in ex-
penditures for ground and tactical air equipment. Since
the ouster of Khrushchev, expenditures on equipment fc'-
Soviet theater forces (not including nuclear materials)
have risen by more than 40 percent (see chart, next page).
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Estinrnated Ground Force and Tactical Air
Procurement Expendltures*
New;equipment5isgrouped by first substantial impact on operational capabilities;
1,00%
T-62 tank
BTR-60PK APC
D-30 122mm
howitzer
BIA-21 multiple
rocket launcher
FROG-7
T-72 tank
T-55 tank
Scud-B (wheeled)
BTR-60PB APC
BTR-50PK APC
T-54 tank
Scaleboard
BMP
STR-60P APC
missile
combat vehicle
BTR-50P APC
BM-14-17
Sagger ATGM
D-''0
multiple
cconbat vehicle
152mm howitzer
rocket launcher
T-12 100mm
AT gun
122mm S, gun
S-60
FROG (models
57mm AA gun
1 through 5)
7SU-23/4
152mm SP gun
SP AA gun
ZSU-57/2
Scud A, B
SA-6 missile
SP AA gun
(tracked)
SA-4 missile
SA-9 missile
SA-2 missile
Snapper ATGM
SA-7 missile
Fighter-bombers:
Fighter-bombers:
ZU 23/2 AA gun
MIG-21 J
MIG-21 K
L
MIG-17
SA-3 missile
fighter-bomber
,
MIG-23
MIG-19
MIG-21
MI-8 helicopter
MIG-25
SU-17
SU-7
fighter-bomber
MI-10 helicopter
SU-19
MI-6 helicopter
URAL-375 truck
MI-24 helicopter
'Av r8
"';q) 04
60?.
1965;;=09
1,970-7
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