WESTERN HEMISPHERE BRIEF 150-75.4
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP86T00608R000300010052-2
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
S
Document Page Count:
20
Document Creation Date:
December 12, 2016
Document Release Date:
February 21, 2001
Sequence Number:
52
Case Number:
Publication Date:
September 26, 1975
Content Type:
CABLE
File:
Attachment | Size |
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CIA-RDP86T00608R000300010052-2.pdf | 776.01 KB |
Body:
;: Approved Far Release 2009108Y11(. CIA-RDP86T00608 OU300010052 2 `
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No Foreign Dissem
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SECRET MO FOREIGN DISSEf9
? WESTERN MENISPHERE BRIEP 350-75?V
Z.//BOLIVI:At BOLIVIA'S PRESIDENT NOGO BANZCR IS STEPPING UP
THE DIPLOMATIC PRESSURE ON CHILE IN HOPES OF REGAINING HIS COUNTRY'S
ACCESS TO THE SEA, LOST NEARLY A CENTURY .AGO.//M
//BOLIVIA HAS REPORTEDLY PROPOSED THAT IT BE GIVEN SOVEREIGNTY
OVER AN 6 8-f4ILE CORRIDOR THROUGH CHILEAN TERPirOF'.'r CLOSE TO THE
PERUVIAN BORDER- LA PAZ WOULD CONTINUE TO USE THE CHILEAN PORT OF
ARICA UNTIL IT CAN BUILD A PORT OF ITS OWN. AS COMPENSATION FOR THE
TERRITORY, RANZER IS SAID TO HAVE OFFERED TO PROVIDE CHILE WITH OIL,
GAS, AND AGRICULTUPAL PRODUCTS.//M
//DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN CHILE AND BOLIVIA LICRE P'E-
ESTABLISHED EARLY THIS YEAR APTER A 33-YEAR BREAK, AND BANZER HAS
BEEN P'?ESSING CHILE TO NE60TIATE OM THIS SUBJECT. ACCORDING TO A
RECENT REPORT. BANZCR 11AY TAKE HIS COUNTRY'S CASE TO THE UN GENERAL
ASSE11BLY IF AN AGREEMENT IS NOT REACHED BY THE END OF NEXT WEEK//Y
I/CHILE WILL NOT CEDE ANY TERRITORY TO BOLIVIA, BUT 17 APPARENTLY
DOES WANT SOME SORT OP A RESOLUTION SOON, PRESIDENT PINOCIIET COULD
? BEGIN BY LEASING TO BOLIVIA THE RAILROAD AND OIL PIPELINE TH{AT RUN
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SECRET NO PORCXG'4 3;TSSCM
BETWEEN BOLIVIA AND T14E PORT Of ARICA; TNI:. WOULD PROBABLY NOT
PRODUCE flAJOR OPPOSITION FRO11 CHILEAN NATIONALISTS OR FROM Nt IGMk30RI- G
PERU- LATER, NE HIGHT EVEN CONSIDER A LONG-TERM LEASE OF A STRIP OF
TERRITORY. //'?
//THE l'I29 TREATY BE7;JEEN PERU AND CHILL THAT SETTLED THE WAR
OF THE PACIFIC {18791-18821;, PROHIBITS EITHER COUNTKY FROM CEDING AMY
Of THE TERRITORY THAT CHANGED HANDS DURING THE WAR UITHOt1T THE APPROVAL
Of ! E OTHER- PERU LOULD PROBABLY NOT AGREE TO THE CESSION OF FORMER
PERUVIAN TERRITORY TO BOLIVIA- NEITHER THE CHILEAN NOR THE PERUVIAN
PRESIDENT, HGNEVER, WANTS TO UNDERCUT 6ANZER' S INITIATIVE, SINCE BOTH
VIEW IT la THEE INTEREST TO KEEP ;!I'll IN POSER. {SECRET SdG FOREIQd
DISSEMWY
2?//OAS. THE OAS PERMANENT COUNCIL HAS RECONVENED ANXIOUS TO
NURTURE THE CURRENT FLEXIBILITY IT DISCERNS IN US PROPOSALS TO TIE
UNi THE RESUI1PTION Of THE CANAL NEGOTIATIONS. AND THE LIFTING OF
THE SANCTIONS k.GAINST CUBA. THE DELEGATES ARE TRYING TO CLEAR THE
OAS REFORtf BACK:, OG, MO'v"%YATED BY A DESIRE TO BUILD ON RECENT SUCCESS
IN AMENDIIA THE RIO TREATY. BY T'iE RENEWED COMMITMENT TO THE OAS ON
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4
SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEN
THE PART OF CRITICAL 60VERNMENTS LIKE MEXICO, AND BY THE ANTICIPATION
OF UNSCHEDULED WORK AHEAD. THEY SEE AN ARRAY OF PROBLEMS THREATENING
THE CURRENT SPIRIT OF GOOD WILL: THE TRADE REFORM ACT' DISCRIMINATORY
PROVISIONS; THE POSSIBILITY JF A GUATEMALAN MILITARY RESPONSE TO
INDEPENDENCE MOVES BY BELIZE; THE FRAGILITY OF THE CANAL TALKS AND
BORDER TENSIONS IN THE ANDES AND IN CENTRAL lMERICA.//M
//PERU IS PRESSING FOR A SEPARATE INTER-AMERICAN TREATY THAT
WOULD PROVIDE FOR SANCTIONS AGAINST "ECONOMIC AGGRESSION" AND HAS
PROPOSED AMENDING THE OAS CHARTER T1 INCLUDE THE GOAL OF "COLLECTIVE
ECONOMIC SECURITY." THIS AND OTHER ISSUES THAT DIVIDE THE LATINS
AND THE US SEEM BOUND TO RENEW INTER-AMEkICAN FRICTIONS.//M
(SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEil}//Y E-2 IMPDET.rI
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EAST ASIA BRIE'-* 150-75.Y
1. CHIN/,,., THE HEALTH OF PREMIER CHOU Eli-?LAI HAS APPARENTLY
TAKEN A TURN FOR THE WORSE. THIS MAY BE TEMPORARY, BUT REPETITION
OF THE CONDITION CAN BE EXPECTED YN THE FUTURE.Y
CHOU FAILED TO MEET NORTH VIETNAMESE PARTY CHIEF LE DUAN AND
FORMER BRITISH PRIME MINISTER HEATH DURING THEIR VISITS TO CHINA
THIS MONTH. BOTH VISITORS MET CHAIRMAN MAO F.ND WOULD NORMALLY HAVE
TALKED WITH CHOU. HEATH WAS INFORMED THAT THE PREMIER WANTED TO
MEET HIM `BUT WAS PREVENTED FROM DOING SO BY HIS DOCTORS.Y
THE CHINESE PRESS IS NOT KEEPING THE PREMIER'S FRAGILE HEALTH
A SECRET FROM THE POPULACE. IT PUBLISHED THE REMARKS OF CAMBODIAN
DEPI17Y PRIME MINISTER KHIEU SAMPHAN LAST MONTH THAT CHOU WAS
"NOT IN THE BEST OF HEALTH." {CONFIDENTIAL}Y
2. KOREA: NORTH KOREA HAS REACTED NEGATIVELY TO THE RECENT
US - SOUTH KOREAN PROPOSAL FOR A CONFERENCE AIMED AT EASING
TENSIONS IN KOREA.Y
A FOREIGN MINISTRY STATEMENT YESTERDAY WAS MILD IN TONE BY
NORTH KOREAN STANDE,RDS, BUT IT CONTAINED A POINT-BY-POINT REJECTION
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OF THE US - SOUTH KOREAN RECOMMEt`,:,ATIONS. PYONGYANG SAID:
--THE KOREAN ARMISTICE AGREEMENT CANNOT BE PRESERVED, AS
THE US URGES, BUT MUST BE REPLACED BY A US - NORTH KOREAN PEACE
TREATY-Y
--SOUTH KOREA, NOT A SIGNATORY TO THE ARMISTICE, CANNOT
BE MADE A PARTY TO ANY NEW ARMISTICE ARRANGEMENTS.Y
--RECIPROCAL RECOGNITION-OF NORTH KOREA BY THE US AND OF
SOUTH KOREA BY PYONGYANG'S ALLIES-AND DUAL UN MEIMBERSHIP FOR THE
TWO KOREAS ARE UNACCEPTABLE BECAUSE THEY WOULD PERPETUATE THE
DIVISION OF THE COUNTRY?Y
THE NORTH KOREANS REFUSED TO ACKNOWLEDGE THAT THE U5 - SOUTH
KOREAN PROPOSAL CONTAINS A MAJC.c NEW ELEMENT-THE CALL FOR A
CONFERENCE ON KOREA, TO BE ATTENDED INITIALLY BY THE PARTIES DIRECTLY
CONCERNED WITH THE ARMISTICE {THE US, NORTH AND SOUTH KOREA, AND
CHINA}. THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT PYONGYANG IS OPPOSED TO SUCH A
CONFERENCE NOW. THE NORTH KOREANS MAY LELL HAVE AVOIDED A
CATEGORICAL REJECTION OF THE PROPOSAL IN ORDER TO MINIMIZE
CHARGES THAT IT IS UNWILLING TO ENGAGE IN DIALOGUE, A CONSIDERATION
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OF SOME IMPORTANCE NOW AS THE VOTE AT THE UN ON COMPETING KOREAN
RESOLUTIONS NEARS. THE NORTH KOREANS ARE PROBABLY CONCERNED THAT THE
US INITIATIVE COULD BENEFIT THE US AND SOUTH KOREA TACTICALLY IN
THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY.''
THE CHINESE HAVE NOT YET COMMENTED ON THE US - SOUTH KOREAN
PROPOSAL. A HIGH-LEVEL CHINESE DELEGATION LED BY POLITBURO MEMBER
CHANG CHUN-CHIAO ARRIVED IN PYONGYANG ON SUNDAY AND THE PROPOSAL,
AS WELL AS STRATEGY FOR THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY DEBATE ON THE
KOREA QUESTION, IS UNDOUBTEDLY UNDER DISCUSSION. NEITHER SIDE
HAS RELEASED ANY DETAILS ON THE TALKS.Y
IN COMING TO GRIPS WITH THE NEW PROPOSAL, THE CHINESE WILL
HAVE TO TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION THEIR DEVELOPING TIES WITH THE
US AND THEIR KEEN INTEREST IN AVOIDING INCREASED TENSIONS ON THE
KOREAN PENINSULA. AT A WELCOMING BANQUET SUNDAY NIGHT, HOWEVER,
CHANG REITERATED STANDARD EXPRESSIONS OF CHINESE SUPPORT FOR
PYONGYANG, SUGGESTING THAT WHEN PEKING'S RESPONSE IS VOICED-PERHAPS
IN FOREIGN MINISTER CHIAO KUAN-HUA'S SCHEDULED SPEECH AT THE
GENERAL ASSEMBLY-IT WILL FIRMLY SUPPORT PYONGYANG'S POSITION.
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LIKE PYONGYANG, PEKING'S RESPONSE WILL PROBABLY BE AIMED
PRIMARILY AT BLUNTING ANY POSSIBLE TACTICAL BENEFITS SEOUL MIGHT
GAIN AT THE UN FROM THE US PROPOSAL?Y
THERE HAS BEEN NO SOVIET REACTION TO THE KOREAN PROPOSAL.
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SEPTEMBER 26, 19?5
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EUROPEAN ' BRIEF ,7,50-75IY
1. PORTUGAL: SEVERAL THOUSAND PORTUGUESE MILITARY ENLISTED
PERSONNEL LED AN ANTI-GOVERNMENT DEMONSTRATION IN LISBON LAST NIGHT,
'OPENLY' CHALLENGING' A' PLEDGE BY THE NEW' GOVERNMENT TO RESTORE PUBLIC
ORDER AND ENFORCE MILITARY DISCIPLINES'
AFTER THE' DEMONSTRATION ENDED, THE 'PAR'TICIPANTS;-REINFORCED
BY THOUSANDS OF LEFTIST CIVILIANS, WENT TO A MILITARY PRISON IN
TOE SUBURBS. Of. LISBON. AND -DEMANDED THE RELEASE? .OF. TWO OF THEIR.-
COMRADES. WHO. HAD BEEN ARRESTED, EARLIER. AN,. UNCONFIRMED., PRESS
REPORT SAID THE TWO PRISONERS WERE SUBSEQUENTLY FREED, BUT'THAT
'IT'HAD NOT BEEN DETERMINED 'WHO-,AUTHORIZED THEIR RELEASES'
THE-MILITARY POLICE FIGURED IN ANOTHER DISTURBANCE IN LISBON'
ON WEDNESDAY, WHEN THEY CLASHED WITH HUNDREDS OF JOBLESS ANGOLAN
REFUGEES. BECAUSE OF THEIR WELL-PUBL.iCIZED LEFTIST LEANINGS AND
THEIR REFUSAL TO EMBARK FOR ANGOLA, THE MILITARY POLICE ARE
SPECIAL TARGETS FOR THE WRATH OF THE RETURNEES.Y
ACCORDING TO LOCAL OBSERVERS, ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF FABIAO
MET WITH MILITARY REGION COMMANDERS AND OTHER KEY OFFICERS ON
DATE:
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WEDNESDAY TO DISCUSS DETERIORATING?DISCIPLINE.?THF SUB'JECT^
REPORTEDLY WAS ALSO TAKEN UP THURSDAY IN A MEETING OF THE
REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL, WHICH CONTINUED LATE INTO THE NIGHT.Y
BEFORE IT CAN HOPE TO DISCIPLINE THE ENLISTED PERSONNEL, THE
COUNCIL, IT SEEMS, WILL HAVE TO PLACE SOME RESTRAINTS UPON TWO OF
ITS OWN MEMBERS, ADMIRAL ROSA COUTINHO AND GENERAL CARVALHO, BOTH
LEADERS OF THE EXTREME LEFT NATIONALIST FACTION. UPON THEIR RETURN
THURSDAY FROM SWEDEN AT THE HEAD OF AN OFFICIAL DELEGATION, THE-
.TWO OFFICERS MADE STATE?M?ENTS, WHICH. CAN ONLY...PRQVIDE ENCOURAGEMENT
.TO THOSE ELEMENTS THAT HAVE DECIDED TO-DEFY THE GOVERNMENT AND
TEST ITS METTLE.Y
ROSH COUTINHO DESCRIBED BOTH LAST NIGHT'S DEMONSTRATION AND
THE COMMUNIST-BACKED STEELWORKERS! STRIKE ON WEDNESDAY, WHICH WAS
AN OPEN CHALLENGE TO THE NEW ANTI-COMMUNIST LABOR MINISTER, AS
"JUSTIFIED WARNINGS." NOT TO BE OUTDONE, THE OUTSPOKEN CARVALHO
SAID HE WAS NOT WORRIED THAT ARMS HAD BEEN HANDED OVER BY ONE OF
HIS OWN SECURITY OFFICERS TO LEFTIST FORCES. HE WOULD BE WORRIED,
CARVALHO SAID, IF THE WEAPONS IN QUESTION HAD GONE TO THE RIGHTISTS,
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2. ITALY: ITALY'S CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS AND SOCIALISTS HAVE
EACH HELD PARTY LEADERSHIP MEETINGS RECENTLY TO GRAPPLE WITH
POLITICAL. PROBLEMS BROUGHT ON BY THE COMMUNISTS' STRONG SHOWING
IN THE' NATIONWIDE LOCAL ELECTIONS LA'ST' JUNE. THE TWO PARTIES'
DIFFERING VIEWS ON HOW TO DEAL WITH THE COMMUNISTS REMAIN A MAJOR
..OBSTACLE TO.-.RENEWAL- OF : THE- COOPERATION BETWEEN THEM THAT HAS ? BEEN. .
THE BASIS FOR MOST ITALIAN' GOVERNMENTS ,SINCE. 1963.4'
BOTH PARTIES SAID THEY STILL SEE PRIME MINISTER MORO'S FRAGILE
GOVERNMENT-IN WHICH ONLY THE CHRISTIAN" DEMOCRATS AND THE REPUBLICANS
HOLD"CAB?INET POSTS-AS THE ONLY VIABLE POS%IBILITY UNDER PRESENT
CIRCUMSTANCES. THE SOCIALISTS, HOWEVER, SEEMED TO CONDITION THEIR
CONTINUED SUPPORT ON THE GOVERNMENT'S RESPONSIVENESS TO ORGANIZED
LABORS DEMANDS IN MAJOR CONTRACT TALKS THAT GET UNDER WAY THIS
WEEK-4'
AT THEIR GATHERING, THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS TOOK A STEP TOWARD
THE SOCIALISTS BUT DID NOT GO FAR ENOUGH TO BRIDGE THE GAP ON THE
COMMUNIST ISSUE. IN A COMPROMISE REFLECTING THE SHARP DIVISIONS
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BETWEEN THE PARTY''S? LEFT AND RIGHT WINGS, THE CHRISTIAN DE10CRATS
VOTED TO MAINTAIN THEIR OPPOSITION TO THE COMMUNISTS BUT TO OPEN
A ".COMPETITIVE DIALOGUE" WITH. THEM-PRQ..VIDE?D SUCH ? AN?.EX.CHANGE
DOES NOT BLUR THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN MAJORITY AND OPPOSITION.Y
PARTY LEADER ZACCAGNINI AND PRIME MINISTER MOR,O ARE.THE.
MAJOR ADVOCATES OF THE "DIALOGUE" PROPOSAL, BUT THEY FACE
AN UPHILL FIGHT IN TRYING TO MAKE THIS VAGUE FORMULATION SPECIFIC
ENOUGH TO SATISFY THE-SOCIALISTS AND STILL?OBTAIN AGREEMENT WITHIN
THEIR OWN PARTY. CONSERVATIVE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS HIWE WARNED THAT
DIALOGUE WITH THE COMMUNISTS, IS A LOSING PROPOSITION UNLESS THEIR
PARTY FIRST DEVELOPS'ITS OWN CLEAR- LINE ON MAJOR POLICY -QUE-STIONS-Y
THE SOCIALIST MEETING, MEANWHILE, UNDERLINED THE GROWING FEAR
AMONG PARTY LEADERS THAT THEIR POST-ELECTION MANEUVERS HAVE HURT
THE PARTY BY IDENTIFYING IT TOO CLOSELY WITH THE BETTER ORGANIZED
AND STRONGER COMMUNISTS?Y
SINCE JUNE, THE SOCIALISTS HAVE SHARPLY INCREASED COLLABORATION
WITH THE COMMUNISTS BY FORMING GOVERNMENTS WITH THEM IN MOST MAJOR
ITALIAN CITIES, 5 OF THE 20 REGIONS, AND ABOUT A THIRD OF THE 94
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PROVINCES, AND THEY HAVE REFUSED TO FORM ANOTHER NATIONAL COALITION
WITH THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS WITHOUT A FORMAL PROCEDURE FOR
C&NSIDERING.COMMUNIST VIEWS ON POLICY.OPTIONS?M
MOST, SOCIALISTS AR,E.CONVINCED ,T.HAT THEY' .SUFFERED IN THE. LAST
ELECTION .AS ..A RESULT. OF COOPERATION. -WITH THE GOVERNMENT AND BELIEVE
THEY,???CANNO?T ..'COMPETE WITH -THE' COMMUIV.ISTS?? FOR.- V.OTER? SUPPORT.UNL?ESS THE
COMMUNISTS' OPPOSITION STATUS IS DILUTED. EMPHASIS AT THE LEADERSHIP
MEETING WAS ON ESTABLISHING AN "AUTONOMOUS" LINE OF ACTION TO SET
THE SOCIALISTS APART'F.ROM'BOTH THE 'COMMUNISTSAND THE CHRISTIAN
AEMOCR.ATS.-NO SMALL T.A.SK ?.Y
CVMI1UNIST CHIEF. BERLINGUER IS STAYING OUT OF. THE'
MUSUAO. RIPMRINC^ NUM..w
SOCIALIST - CHRISTIAN DEMOCRAT DISPUTE OVER HIS PARTY'S RELATIONSHIP
WITH THE NEXT NATIONAL GOVERNMENT. NEVERTHELESS, THE SOCIALISTS ARE
CONCERNED OVER HIS INSISTENCE THAT COMMUNIST STRATEGY AT THE
NATIONAL LEVEL HAS NOT CHANGED. BERLINGUER IS STILL AIMING FOR
AN EVENTUAL "HISTORIC COMPROMISE' AGREEMENT WITH THE CHRISTIAN
DEMOCRATS WHICH1 IF ACCOMPLISHED, WOULD MAKE SOCIt.LIST SUPPORT
SUPERFLUOUS.M
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THE COMMUNISTS ARE NOT OVERLY JUBILANT THEMSELVES, HOWEVER,
AND ARE BEING CAUTIOUS IN THOSE LOCALITIES WHERE, THEY NOW HOLD-POWER
FOR THE. FIRST :TIME.:.. ,THEY, FEAR THA T...PUBUC,.REACTION TO THEIR .
INITIATIVES COULD SEND PROTEST VOTERS BACK. TO??THE. CHRISTIAN .DEMOCRATS
OR TO'' THE FAR RIGHT IN THE NEXT' ELECTION.- {CONFIDENTIAL]- E-2
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MEA BRIEF 150-?5.Y
1. RHODESIA: THE RHODESIAN AFRICAN NATIONAL COUNCIL-THE
UMBRELLA ORGANIZATION FORMED BY FOUR BLACK NATIONALIST GROUPS LAST
DECEMBER-IS SCHEDULED TO HOLD ITS FIRST NATIONAL CONGRESS IN
SALISBURY THIS WEEKEND. THE MEETING WILL FOCUS NEW ATTENTION ON
THE BITTER LEADERSHIP STRUGGLE AMONG THE NATIONALISTS THAT IS THE
MOST IMMEDIATE BARRIER TO A RESUMPTION OF SETTLEMENT TALKS WITH
PRIME MINISTER IAN SMITH.M
THE CONGRESS IS A TACTICAL VICTORY FOR JOSHUA NKOMO, A FORMER
LEADER OF ONE OF THE COUNCIL'S CONSTITUENT GROUPS, WHO NOW
APPARENTLY CONTROLS A MAJORITY OF THE COUNCIL'S BRANCHES INSIDE
RHODESIA. NKOMO'S EXPECTED BID FOR THE CHAIRMANSHIP OF THE COUNCIL
MAY RUN INTO TROUBLE, HOWEVER, AND THE MEETING COULD END IN RIOTING
BETWEEN HIS FOLLOWERS AND SALISBURY-BASED ADHERENTS OF EXILED
NATIONALIST LEADERS WHO WANT TO SCRAP SETTLEMENT TALKS AND GET
FOREIGN BACKING FOR A GUERRILLA OFFENSTVE.Y
TWO WEEKS AGO BISHOP MUZOREWA, THE FIGUREHEAD CHAIRMAN OF THE
COUNCIL WHO HAS BEEN TFAVELING EXTENSIVELY OUTSIDE RHODESIA,
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EXPELLED NKOMO FOR ENGINEERING THE CALL FOR THE CONGRESS OVER
MUZOREWA'S OBJECTIONS. ALTHOUGH MUZOREWA HAS ADVOCATED A NEGOTIATED
SETTLEMENT WITH SMITH, HIS BREACH WITH NKOMO HAS SEALED HIS
DEPENDENCE ON NDABANINGI SITHOLE AND OTHER MILITANT EXILES.Y
SHORTLY AFTER MUZOREWA EXPELLED NKOMO, ZAMBIAN PRESIDENT
KAUNDA AND THE PRESIDENTS OF TANZANIA, MOZAMBIQUE, AND BOTSWANA
MET WITH THE RHODESIAN NATIONALISTS IN LUSAKA BUT FAILED TO RESOLVE
..THE SCHISM. THE..FOUR:.P.RESIDEN.TS WARNED-THAT- THEY WOULD WITHHOLD,.
FURTHER SUPPORT-. UI\NTIL THE COMPETING. LEADERS'--MUZOREWA; NK.OMO -I'.' AND
SITHOLE-AGREED TO WORK TOGETHER. {CONFIDENTIAL}Y
2. BANGLADESH: LOCAL OBSERVERS REPORT THAT AFTER ALMOST SIX WEEKS
IN POWER, THE NEW GOVERNMENT IN BANGLADESH HAS DONE LITTLE TO
DISTINGUISH ITSELF FROM THE OUSTED REGIME OF THE LATE PRESIDENT
MUJIB. THE NEW LEADERS HAVE REAFFIRMED THE FOUR BASIC PRINCIPLES
OF BANGLADESH'S CONSTITUTION-NATIONALISM, SECULARISM, SOCIALISM,
AND DEMOCRACY- BUT HAVE MADE VIRTUALLY NO OTHER MAJOR POLICY
ANNOUNCEMENTS.Y
DOMESTICALLY, PRESIDENT MUSHTAQUE'S REGIME HAS IMPOSED SECURITY
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M'.ASURES THAT APPEAR ALMOST AS AUTHORITARIAN AS THOSE OF ITS
PREDECESSOR. THE COUNTRY'S ILLS HAVE. BEEN BLAMED ON IIUJIB'S ABUSES
OF POWER, BUT NO SWEEPING C-?ANGES IN HIS POLICIES HAVE BEEN
INSTITUTED. THE FEW ECONOMIC MOVES MADE BY THE NEW LEADERS HAVE
BEEN POLITICALLY MOTIVATED, AND SOME HAVE BEEN IN LINE WITH
PRE-COUP POLICIES.Y
IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS-, OBSE..RVERS .SEE.. THE. IMPROVED P,ROSPECT?.
FOR TIES' WITH PAKISTAN AND CHINA . AS A, REAFFIRMATION OF. MUJIB'S??
POLICY OF FRIENDSHIP WITH ALL. MUJIB HIMSELF HAD SOUGHT, ALBEIT
UNSUCCESSFULLY, TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH PAKISTAN AND CHINA
TO BALANCE THE INFLUENCE IN BANGLADESH :!F INDIA AND THE SOVIET
UNION. THE NEW GOVERNMENT DOES NOT WANT ITS TIES TO ISLAMABAD
AND PEKING TO CROW TO THE EXTENT THAT THEY SOUR BANGLADESH'S
GOOD RELATIONS WITH INDIA AND THE SOVIET UNION, AND IT HAS MADE
EFFORTS TO REASSURE THESE COUNTRIES .Y
THE GOVERNMENT'S SLOW PACE MAY BE A RESULT OF ITS
PREOCCUPATION WITH POLITICAL CONCERNS, SUCH AF SORTING OUT
LEADERSHIP ROLES AMONG CIVILIAN AND MILITARY FIGURES IN THE
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Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000300010052-2
, Approved For Release 2001/08/21: CIA-RDP86..IVIT006081~~Q03Q0(~~,QQ;
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' HIERARCHY 'AND PROTECTING ITSELF AGAINST SECURITY THREATS. THE
POST-COUP LEADERSHIP STRUGGLE BETWEEN THE MAJORS WHO LED THE
COUP AND-SOME SENIOR OFFICERS HAS SUBSIDED, BUT THE YOUNGER
OFFICERS HAVE STILL NO.T RETURNED TO. THEIR UNITS. THEY ARE
ADVISING MUSHTAQUE AND IN ONE CASE ARE REPORTED TO HAVE
OVERRIDDEN HIS DECISION. MUSHTAQUE IS AWARE OF HIS UNCERTAIN
POSITION WITH THE MILITARY AND IS PAYING CAREFUL ATTENTION TO THEIR
(ONCERNS.M
INTERNAL SECURITY SEEMS-TO BE THE. GOVERNMENT'S' BIGGEST'
CONCERN. IN ADDITION TO IMPOSING TOUGH MARTIAL LAW REGULATIONS,
THE GOVERNMENT HAS ROUNDED UP SOME ASSOCIATES OF MUJIB, SUSPENDED
POLITICAL ACTIVITY, LAUNCHED A NATIONWIDE CAMPAIGN TO CONFISCATE
ILLEGALLY HELD ARMS, AND ABSORBED INTO THE ARMY THE RAKKHI BAHINI,
A PARAMILITARY GROUP SET UP BY MUJIB AND BELIEVED LOYAL TO HIM.
THE GOVERNMENT'S FEARS MAY HAVE BEEN COMPOUNDED BY PERSISTENT
RUMORS THAT SOME OF MUJIB'S SUPPORTERS ARE SEEKING REVENGE FOR
THE COUP.Y
MOST BENGALEES ACCEPT THAT THE
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GOVERNMENT MUST-SET ITS HOUSE IN ORDER. THEY APPEAR WILLING TO
ACQUIESCE IN THE TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF RIGHTS AND POLITICAL
?ACTIVIT?Y' FOR THE TIME BEING--.V
LIE BELIEVE DISENCHANTMENT IS INEVITABLE BEFORE LONG. ANY
GOVERNMENT-WOULD FIND IT TIFFICULT 10 CONSOLIDATE ITS CONTROL
OVER POLITICALLY AND ECONOMICALLY TROUBLED BANGLADESH. THE
MUSHTAQUE REGIME, WITH ITS INTERNAL DIVISIONS AND LITTLE OF THE
MASSIVE POPULAR APPEAL ENJOYED .'BY MUJIB*IN 'HIS EARLY. DAYS,
'WILL HAVE AN ESPECIALLY 'DIFF'ICULT 'TIME ? tCONFIDENTtALY
25X1A'
DATE: SEPTEMBER 26, 1975
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