TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00608R000200170023-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 35
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 18, 1999
• Sequence Number: 23
• Publication Date: May 21, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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[rBiS
TRENDS
In Communist Propaganda
Confidential
21 MAY 1975
VOI ~~vvI NO. 20)
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 CONFIDENTIAL,
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This propaganda analysis report Is based exclusively on material
carried in foreign broadcast and press medin. It is published
by FBIS without coordination with other U.S. Covctnment
components.
Classified by o0Qtt73
subject to 04~01 D.elauiHcatt.n S(hI t.
Of 1.0. 11637, Automatically Daleulli.d
Twe Years trans Data of Icw.
Matl.n.a Security information
Un.uth.riI.d dleclewro subject te
critmin.t .emctiM.
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21 MAY 1975
CONTENTS
Hanoi Unveils Communist Party Leadership in South Vietnam . . . . .
1
DRV, PRG Lzadors Speak at Rallies Marking Victory, Ho's Birth . . .
4
CAMBODIA
Phnom Penh, Communist Allies Defend Mayaguez Ship Seizure . . . . .
7
U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS
Soviet Media Play Down Gromyko's Criticism of Kissinger . . . . . .
10
WARSAW PACT
Pact 20th Anniversary Marked by Low-Key observance . . . . . . . .
11
MIDDLE EAST
Kosygin Visits Continue USSR Mideast Diplomatic Momentum . . . . .
14
PRC FOREIGN RELY%ONS
Peking Raps Both Superpowers on Anniversary of Mao Statement . . .
18
PRC-TAIWAN
Peking Increases Invective Against Kuomintang Leaders . . . . . . .
19
CHINA
Campaign Pushes Communist Ideas To Replace Bourgeois Rights . . . .
21
YUGOSLAVIA
Belgrade Rebukes Austria on Anniversary of State Treaty . . . . . .
24
CUBA
Havana Ignores, Moscow Approves OAS Move To Lift Sanctions . . . .
26
NOTES
Hungarian Premier Change; PRAVDA on Japanese Socialists;
New Burmese CP Chairman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
29 '
Moscow, Peking Broadcast Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
i
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CONFIDENTIAL
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V I E T N A M
The Vietnamese communists' formal celebration of their victory
in South Vietnam was marked by the unprecedented visit to Saigon
of a high-level party and state delegation from Hanoi and the
surfacing of the top Vietnam Workers Party (VWP) leaders
responsible for South Vietnam. The highlight of the emergence
of the communist party organization in the South was the appear-
ance in Saigon of Pham Hung, a VWP Political Bureau member whose
activities have not been publ~,cly reported since he became chief
of the party organization in the South eight years ago--a position
which the media only now acknowledge.
The lenders of the PRG, Nguyen Huu Tho and Huynh Tan Phat, also
made their first postwar public appearance on the occasion of the
arrival in Saigon of the North Vietnamese delegation which
included DRV President Tong Duc Thang and Political Bureau members
Le Duc Tho, Le Thanh Nghi, and Van Tien Dung. Communist media
reports on the lineup of officials at arrival ceremonies and at
festivities in Saigon clearly reflected the party's dominant
position, however, listing party leaders ahead of the PRG officials.
The role of the PRG as the international representative for South
Vietnam has been consistently maintained by Vietnamese media, but
there has been no r:mparable evidence in the postwar period
indicating an active role for the PRG domestically.
The communists' celebration of their takeover in the South and the
85th anniversary of Ho Chi Minh's birth (19 May) provided public
forums for Hanoi and PRG leaders to expound on postwar policies.
First Secretary Le Duan in his 15 May victory day speech in Hanoi
maintained that the events in Vietne% will have a positive effect
on developments in Southeast Asia, and NFLSV Chairman Nguyen Huu
Tho, in his remarks of the same day in Saigon, reiterated longstanding
PRG willingness to have diplomatic relations with all countries.
Speaking in Hanoi on the 19th at festivities marking Ho's birthday,
DRV National Assembly Standing Committee Chairman Truong Chinh for
the most part eulogized the later DRV leader but also seemed to take
a harder line on treatment of those conquered in the South than had
communist propaganda in the immediate wakens the takeover.
HANOI UNVEILS CO'l1UNIST PARTY LEADERSHIP IN SOUTH VIETNAM
Hanoi openly acknowledged its control of the revolution in South
Vietnam with the appearance at the victory celebrations of VWP
officials who are responsible for the South. Media identification
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of the officials has also surfaced the broad framewor 9,. of the
party organization, with references to the "South Vietnam
Party Organization"--apparently the equivalent of the formerly
clandestine Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN) which was
responsible for the southern portion of South Vletnruli--and to
the VWP's Committee for Zone Five, controlling the northern part
of the South. During the war Hanoi media regularly attributed
to the VWP the major guiding role in the revolution but still
explicitly claimed that the South Vietnamese people's struggle
was being led by the PRG and the National Liberaticit:t Front (NFLSV).
North Vietnam's longstanding policy of camouflaging its control in
South Vietnam was dropped on 14 May when Hanoi radio reported that
the North Vietnamese delegation to the Saigon vica,cory celebrations
had been met at the airport on the prr;v;.eus day by VWP Political
Bureau member Pham Hung, who was furtl;er identifi,i d as the
"Secretary of the South Vietnam Party O.?ganizati,in." A later Saigon
radio report on the 15 clay celebration in additirm noted that he
was "political commissar of the South Vietnam PI.AF Command." Pham
Hung last appeared in public at a reception in North Vietnam on
29 September 1967. A list of H;o Chi Minh's funeral committee in
September 1969 included Pham Hung, identifying him in his positions
as a member of the Political Bureau and a DRV vice premier, but he
was not reported as being present to Hanoi. He was formally
relieved of his government positions in 1971 when in April he
failed to run for election to the fourth legislature of the DRV
National Assembly and in June his name was not included in, the
list of vice premiers elected by the new legislature.
Surfacing in Saigon along with Pham Hung was Nguyen Van Linh--
identified as deputy secretary of the South Vietnam Party
Organization. Linh had previously been identified by the media
on at least one occasion as the deputy sec'etary general of the
People's Revolutionary Party (PRP), the name given the communist
party in South Vietnam when it first publicly emerged in
January 1962.* The role of the PRP in South Vietnam was mentioned
periodically in media comment from 1962 to 1966, but rarely
mentioned thereafter.
* A 6 September 1969 Liberation Radio report listing the South
Vietnamese delegation to Ho's funeral identified him as the PRP
deputy secretary general. For background on media references to
the PRP, see the F51S SURVEY Supplement of 15 September 1969,
pages 1-4, and the FBIS SPECIAL REPORT of 24 July 1969, RS. 97,
"Provisional Revolutionary Government and the People's Revolutionary
Party in Stith Vietnam."
CONFIDENTIAL
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Another South Vietnamese party official showed up in Saigon on
19 May when the main speech at the rally marking Ho Clii Minh's
birthday was delivered by a Nguyen Van If o,* who was said by
Saigon radio to be a "member of the Standing Committee of the
Executive Committee of the Saigon-Gia Dinh Municipal Party
Organization" of the PRP, as well as the chairman of the Saigon
Federation of Liberation Trade Unions and a representative of
the Saigon-Gia Dinh Municipal NFLSV committee. (The meeting was
not attended by either Pham Hung or Nguyen Van Linh, and th(,i
head of the Saigon. military management committee, Tran Van Tra,
was also absent. Although Pham Hung and Linh were present at
the 15 May victory celebration in Saigon and later meetings on
the 16th, neither is known to have appeared since the departure
of the North Vietnamese delegation from Saigon on the 17th.)
Another figure formerly associated publicly with the PRP, Vo Chi
Cong, was reported by Saigon radio to have attended 15 May victory
celebrations in Danang and was for the first time acknowledged to
be a member of the VWP Central Committee. Cong was the only
official named as attending the Danang ceremonies, and his position
as the leading party figure in the northern half of the South was
confirmed by the radio's further identification of him as "Secretary
of the Zone Five VWP committee" and "Zone Five Political Officer."
Further reflecting the anomalous ties emerging between northern and
southern organizations, the radio also listed Vo Chi L'ong's long-
standing public position as a vice chairman of the NFLSV Central
'Committee Presidium.
PRG/NFLSV ROLE The relationship of the PEG and the NFLSV to the
communist party in postwar South Vietnam can be
inferred from Vietnamese media reports on appearances in Saigon by
PRG President Huynh Tan Phat and Nguyen Huu Tho, NFLSV chairman
and chairman of the PRG Advisor Council. The Hanoi radio report
on the"airport arrival ceremony greeting the North Vietnamese
delegation on 13 May listed Pham Hung first among the welcomers,
* Other reports on the recent activities of Nguyen Van Ho have
identified him in the abbreviated form as Nguyen Ho. Although the
present media reports do not indicate his background, there was
a Nguyen Ho identified by Vietnamese communist media in the
early 1950's as the vice president of the Saigon-Cholon resistance
administrative committee. In the late 1950's--following the
communist regrouping in North Vietnam--and as late as 1963, a
? Nguyen Ho was a member of the presidium of North Vietnam's trade
union federation.
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followed by Nguyen Huu Tho and PRG President Fhat. Other
radio reports on activities in Saigon in the following days have
also listed Pham Hung's deputy Nguyen Van Linh ahead of Tho and
Phat.
While Hanoi claims that Vietnam has been "reunified," there
apparently will be two governments for some time. However, it
seems clear that the domestic administration of the South will
be controlled by the VWP. The time#rame and plan for the
transiticn to a single government has not yet been revealed by
Hanoi and may not yet have been decided. Le Duan, in his 15 May
victory rally speech only briefly touched upon the question in
tasking the South with building a "national democratic regime"
and a national and democratic economy and culture.
DRV, PRG LEADERS SPEAK AT RALLIES MARKING VICTORY, HO'S BIRTH
LE DUAN Speaking at the 15 May victory celebration in Hanoi,
VWP First Secretary Le Duan briefly recalled
Vietnam's long history of thwarting foreign invaders and noted
that the recommendations contained in Ho Chi Minh's testament
to rid the country of "U.S. imperialists" and reunite it "under
one roof" love now been accomplished. The First Secretary declared
that the credit for the victory should be given to the armed forces,
the party, and international benefactors, such as the Soviet Union
and China, for the support and aid they provided. He gave
particular emphasis to the concept of "national independence,"
and made frequent allusions to Vietnam's heroic past. According
to Le Duan, national independence has a twofold importance:
domestically, once having achieved it, the laboring people
can be freed of "oppression and exploitation," and internationally,
it can influence the "world revolutionary movement."
Le Duan did not specify what responsibility Hanoi may feel for
encouraging revolution in neighboring countries, but he did
suggest that North Vietnam will use its new strength and influence
to bring about a further rc.iuction of the U.S. position in Southeast
Asia. The First Secretary boasted that Vietnam's victory, coupled
with that in Cambodia and Laos, had "created new favorable conditions
for safeguarding peace and national independence :.n Indochina and
Southeast Asia." He went on to promise that the 1)RV would "persist
in its policy of strengthening solidarity and friendship with its
neighbors in Southeast Asia and in countries of the third world, in
their struggle to regain and maintain national independence,
consolidate sovereignty, and oppose all schemes and maneuvers of
imperialism and old and new colonialism."
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21 MAY 1975
A 2 May NHAN DAN editorial entitled "The Irreversible Trend
of Southeast Asian Nations" echoed Le Duan's speech regarding
the future of the region in the aftermath of the communist
successes in Indochina. The editorial contended that "a rare
opportunity for the independent and free development of Southeast
Asian nations has come," and predicted that the people in the
region would "surely rise up and take their destiny into their
hands and get rid of all control by the barbarous imperialists."
It optimisticly maintained that Southeast Apia is now facing
"unprecedentedly favorable perspectives" and it enthusiastically
applauded the "firm and punitive blows" the Cambodian army
recently dealt the "U.S. aggressors" and the current "widespread
anti-U.S. feelings in Bangkok."
NGUYgN HUU THO NFLSV Chairman Nguyen Huu Tho's address to
the 15 May victory rally in Saigon expressed
the same jubilance as Le Duan did for the "liberation" of the
southern half of the country. Thus, Tho declared that "from
now on, our country is no longer partitioned, and the North and
the South are together under the same roof again." Vietnamese
communist leaders have consistently spoken of Vietnam as a single
country, a concept also voiced in the opening articles of the Paris
agreement. Whatever specific steps Hanoi and Front leaders might
now have in mind for formal amalgamation of the two separate
entities that exist in Vietnam were not articulated in the rhetoric
of the ceremonies.
It is clear, however, from Nguyen Huu Tho's assertions, that the
PRG will continue to function separately in the field of foreign
relations. In professing the PRG's policy of "peace and nonalinc-
ment," Tho noted that his government was ready to establish
diplomatic relations with "all countries without distinction as
to the political and social systems." WhIle not specifically
excluding the United States from his invitation for recognition,
he did point out in the same context that the Unified States
must still fulfill its "obligations" under the Paris agreement.
Earlier statements by PRG leaders have been more specific with
regard to tha United States. For example, when asked by an AFP
correspondent--in an interview transmitted by LPA on 7 April--about
the likelihood of the PRG establishing relations with the United
States after the war, Nguyen Huu Tho reiterated the standard PRG
policy that relations with all nations would be entertained, and
he specifically mentioned the United States. The PRG has been
consistent in its willingness to have diplomatic relations with the
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United States, and language to this effect was included in the
PRG's 12-point program issued in June 1969 at the time of the
government's formal establishment. And'PRG President Huynh Tan
Phat, in remarks at a June 1971 celebration marking the second
anniversary of the PRG, cited the conun.nists' proposals for
ending the war as "creating conditions for future relations . .
between us and the Americans."
TRUONG CHINH Speaking at the Hanoi rally marking the 85th
anniversary of Ho Chi Minh's birth,* politburo
member and National Assembly Standing Committee Chairman Truong
Chinh was notably harsh regarding treatment to be meted out to
the defeated southerners. According to Truong Chinh, communists
in the South will have to "continue to struggle to completely
smash the war machinery and the puppet administration from top to
bottom, to root out all vestiges of the neo-colonialism of U.S.
imperialism, . . . to check and punish all acts of counterrevolution,
hooliganism, and gangsterism."
Truong Chinh indicated that the VWP Central Committee had been
focusing its attention on the problem of party building, and he
quoted generalized guidance on the subject from what is apparently
the resolution of the rarely mentioned 23d party plenum. The fact
that the plenum had been held was first noted in Hanoi media in an
editorial in the January issue of the DRV party journal HOC TAP.**
* The anniversary is one of three major holidays that Vietnam is
celebrating this year. The first, the 45th anniversary of the
founding of the Indochinese Communist Party--the presently
constituted Vietnam Workers Party--was marked on 2 February and is
discussed in the TRENDS of 5 February 1975, pages 9>-11. The last
of the major holidays will be the 30th anniversary of the founding
of the DRV, on 2 September.
** For a discussion of the 23d plenum, see the TRENDS of
29 January 1975, page 8.
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CAMBODIA
PHNOM PENH, CC'1UNIST ALLIES DEFEND MAYAGUEZ SHIP SEIZURE
Cambodia's newly established communist regime denounced the U.S.
military operation to recover the freighter Mayaguez in a 16 May
press communique from the RGNU information ministry which charged
that the U.S. action on the previous day was an "act of aggression"
and that air attacks on Cambodian facilities had occurred hours
after Cambodia had released the Mayaguez crew. The communique,
like a communique from the same ministry released on the 15th
while the U.S. operation was under way, justified the seizure
of the Mayaguez as a defense of Cambodian sovereignty against
the intruding "spy ship" and insisted that the United States had
provu::1-r4 the incident. Phnom Penh's response at this level--through
communiques signed by RGNU spokesman and Minister of Information
and Propaganda Hu Nim--is consistent with the precedent set by
its only other foreign policy pronouncement since the RGNU seized
control of the country in mid-April. Hu Nim likewise signed a
statement on 10 May protesting "dishonest propaganda" allegedly
spread by the United States about repressive Cambodian internal
policies and maltreatment of foreigners.
Outside of Cambodia, head of state Prince Siha,,touk sent a message
from Peking on 16 May to Algerian President Bo-.mediene appealing
for Third World support, and on 18 May he expressed "full support"
for Cambodia's action in a cable to RGNU Deputy Prime Minister
Khieu Samphan. North and South Vietnam and North Korea each
backed Cambodia's position with authoritative statements at foreign
ministry or ministry spokesman level, while China's first leadership
comment came in a speech by Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien. Soviet
media reaction thus far has been restricted largely to low-level
reportage on the incident.
CAMBODIA The 15 May Phnom Penh communique, which announced
the RGNU decision to release the Mayaguez just as
the U.S. recovery operation was getting underway, was replete with
avowals of Cambodia's wish to "provoke no one or to make trouble."
The communique alleged that the ship had intruded into Cambodian
territorial waters on a spy mission as part of what it described
in detail as a continuing campaign to conduct sabotage, espionage,
and blockade against Cambodia, and it afFirmed Cambodia's right to
protect national sovereignty and territorial integrity. The
communique contained one critical reference to the Ford Administration
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by name--the first such mention by the Communists since their
17 April takeover of Phnom Penh. It referred to U.S. planes sinking
"two" Cambodian patrol boats on 14 May, saying that Phnom Penh
still had "no precise idea" of the damage or the number of killed--a
possible indication of communications difficulties between Phnom
Penh and the coast.
The briefer 16 May pronouncement labeled the landing of U.S. Marines
on Tang Island and the bombings of the Sihanoukville area the
previous day as "savage, ferocious, insane aggressive acts,"
claiming that they had begun three and one-half hours after
Phnom Penh had "returned" the crew. It said Washington's actions
were "proof" that the. United States had provoked the incident
as a pretext to intensify its "blockade" and "sabotage" against
Cambodia.
The Mayaguez incident also drew passing mention in a 1.9 May
Information and Propaganda Ministry statement devoted mainly to
denouncing as "tricks of U.S. imperialism and its hirelings"
recent Western press reports of a Cambodian ultimatum to
Thailand over their common border. Noting the U.S. use of
bases in Thailand during the fray, this statement predicted
that "despite these historical facts" Cambodia and Thailand
"can live peacefully as neighboring countries."
Sihanouk's 16 May cable to Algerian President Boumediene, carried
by NCNA on the 17th, appealed for Third World condemnation of the
"cowardly and monstrous act of aggression" of the United States.
Declaring that the United States would "always remain a paper
tiger," Sihanouk charged that the United States was attempting
to revenge its "ignominious and undeniable defeat" in Cambodia
and Vietnam. His 18 May cable to Khieu Samphan, reported by
NCNA on the 19th, expressed full support for RGNU measures and
the CPNLAF's effectiveness in handling the incident, and added
that "for all its ridiculous bragging, the Ford-Kissinger clique
has not emerged any nobler from this frantic adventure."
FOREIGN SUPPORT PRC Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien made Peking's
initial response to the incident, in brief
remarks delivered at a 15 May reception given by the DRV envoy
in Peking to celebrate the communist takeover of Saigon. Li accused
the Mayaguez of intruding into Cambodia's territorial waters,
backed Cambodia's "legitimate measures" against the ship, and
denounced as "an outright act of piracy" the U.S. bombing of
Cambodian ships and territory. Peking's formal response to the
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Cambodian protests come in a 17 May PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator
article, which denounced the "acts of piracy pure and simple"
by the United States and offered a perfunctory, generalized
pledge of Chinese support. Chinese comment has avoided all
mention of the Ford Administration and did not directly condemn
the United States in the name of the Chinese Government. By
contrast, Peking's response to the January 1968 Pueblo incident
off North Korea had come at the formal level of a PRC Government
statement on 28 January which had offered the "firm support" of
the Chinese Government and people against "U.S. imperialism's
flagrant provocation."
A 15 May DRV Foreign Ministry Statement denounced the alleged
violation of Cambodian territorial waters by the "spyship"
Mayaguez and the dispatch of U.S. Marines to Thailand as "an
extremely serious act of war." Attacking the Ford Administration
by name, the statement concluded that the United States was
persisting in its "policy of intervention and aggressicn" against
Cambodia and demanded that the United States cease its "acts of
war and withdraw its Marines from Thailand. It promised to
"resolutely support" Cambodia's right to defend its "territory,
airspace, and territorial waters." A 16 May PRG Foreign Ministry
statement closely paralleled the DRV statement Most comment did
not criticize Thai involvement in the episode, but a 17 May Hanoi
radio station commentary broadcast in English, noted that it was
"regrettable that the Thai authorities had allowed the United
States to freely encroach upon their sovereignty, thus causing
a bad effect on their relationship with neighboring countries."
However, the commentary singled out only the "Ford Administration"
as the party to be held "fully responsible for all the consequences
arising therefrom."
A 18 May DPRK Foreign Ministry spokesman statement, offering to
"fully support" the RGNU's stand, denounced the U.S. military
response as evidence that the United States was "still persistently
clinging to the policy of aggression and interference" in Indochina
and Asia. An 18 May NODONG SINMUN commentary pointed out that the
"frantic use of force" by the United States demonstrated its
"aggressive ambition to hang on in Asia at all costs, even while
being hit hard and kicked out of Asia." The commentary noted
the Thai Government protest over the "blatant infringement" of Thai
sovereignty by the United States and predicted that the United
Stares would "surely be kicked out" of Asia, including Korea.
CONFIDENTIAL
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 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
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-10-
U,S,-SOVIET RELATIONS
SOVIET MEDIA PLAY DOWN GROMYKOIS CRITICISM OF KISSINGER
Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko's criticism of Secretary Kissinger
in his 14 May Warsaw Pact anniversary speech in Moscow has been
played down in subsequent Soviet accounts of the speech. The
passage criticizing the Secretary, included in the live Moscuw
radio broadcast, was omitted from the TASS English-language
version, which TASS described as a "text" but which in fact was
a report based on paraphrases and extensive excerpts. The
critical passage was also omitted from the account carried in
PRAVDA on the 15th, which appeared tr be the same TASS report
with minor editorial revisions. Neither the TASS English nor
PRAVDA report, moreover, indicated that Gromyko had even so much
as mentioned Kissinger.
After asserting that Kissinger, in his 12 May St. Louis speech,
had made "a number of correct points," Gromyko said:
But the same U.S. Secretary of State was rather sharp
in.his criticism of those American officials who have
been timid and not very insistent in general, but have
all the same opposed the spiraling military budgets
and favor cuts in military budgets, including the
United States' own military budget. The U.S. Secretary
of State criticized those critics; he defended the
spiraling military budgets and the course of their
further spiraling. To put it mildly, these two things--
support for a policy of detente and increasing military
budgets--do not go together very well.
The theory expressed in some Western news reports that Gromyko's
criticism of Kissinger may have been extemporaneous does not
jibe with the character of the remarks nor the background against
which they were made. It seems likely that Moscow felt that
some sort of response to Kissinger's criticism of the Soviet
Union in his St. Louis speech* was necessary, particularly in
view of the scheduled 19-20 May Vienna meeting between Gromyko and
the Secretary. At the same time, by refraining from exploiting
the issue, Moscow has served notice that it remains committed to
improving the atmosphere of U.S.-Soviet relations.
* In St. Louis, Secretary Kissinger had said that "the willingness
of the Soviet Union to exploit strategic opportunities . . . constitutes
a heavy mortgage on detente. If detente turns into a formula for more
selective exploitation of opportunities, the new tread in U.S.-Soviet
relations will be in jeopardy."
CONFIDENTIAL
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WARSAW PACT
PACT 20TH ANNIVERSARY MARKED BY LOW-KEY OBSERVANCE
The only joint meeting held on the 20th anniversary of the
Warsaw Pact was a low-level gathering of parliamentary leaders
of the member countries in the Polish capital on 14-15 May.
Elsewhere the anniversary was marked by meetings held in the
respective capitals, including one in Moscow addressed by Gromyko.
The East European meetings were addressed by speakers at the
Politburo, deputy premier, or defense ministry level.
While the 10th anniversary in 1965 had been observed in low
key, it might have been expected that the second decennial--
marking the end of the Pact's statutory 2')-year span and the
start of its 10-year renewal period--would be marked by a Pact
Political Consultative Committee meeting or other top level
joint gathering. The absence of such a gathering had the
advantage for Moscow of avoiding any show of militance which
might jeopardize early conclusion of the European Security
Conference. It also averted possible difficulties with the
kamanians, who might have refused to attend such a meeting,
oz? would likely have been recalcitrant partners if they did
attend. As it was, the Romanians sans- a less prominent repre-
sentative to the Warsaw session than did the orthodox Pact
members. Following the lead of a similar document issued by
the Soviet governing bodies on 9 May, the Warsaw Pact anniversary
meeting issued an innocuous peace appeal calling on European
parliaments to help speed the conclusion of the CSCE.
Leading Soviet pronouncements on the anniversary emphasized the
harmony between the peaceful objectives of the defensive Warsaw
alliance and Moscow's detente policy. They also reasserted the
Pact's readiness to dissolve itself simultaneously with dissolution
of NATO. Gromyko, in voicing this readiness in his address at
the 14 May Moscow anniversary meeting, refrained from adding the
usual followup proviso that as long as NATO exists, the Warsaw
Pact must strengthen its defenses. Both parts of the formulation
were, however, included in PRAVDA's 14 May editorial article on
the anniversary. In a tougher stance in keeping with his position,
Pact Commander Yakubovskiy in an IZVESTIYA article on the 14th
did not include a reference to mutual dissolution of the blocs,
declaring instead simply that as long as the "aggressive NATO
bloc" exists and effective disarmament measures have not been
implemented, the socialist countries deem it necessary to
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strengthen their defenses. The three pronouncements included
now routine references to the Warsaw Pact's "defense of
socialist gains"--Moscow's ex post facto, rationale for the
August 1968 Pact intervention in Czechoslovakia. This phrase
had appeared for the first time in a Soviet bloc treaty in
the new Soviet-Czechoslovak friendship pact of 6 May 1970.
The Moscow statements also welcomed what were described an the
positive manifestations of detcnte,attributing the credit for
these developments to the peace program announced by Brezhnev
at the 24th CPSU Congress. All three statements balanced
characterization of the Pact as the main center for coordination
of foreign policy with insistence that the Warsaw alliance was
based on principles of equality, independence, sovereignty, and
noninterference.
ROMANIA As reported by AGERPRES, the speech by Grand National
Assembly deputy chairman Mocuta at the Warsaw
parliamentary session on the 15th was devoted largely to inoffensive
generalities. He called on the European Security Conference to
ensure security from the threat or use of force and the right of
all countries to develop according to their own interests. More
characteristically, the speech by the Romanian chief of staff,
Colonel General Coman at a 14 May Bucharest meeting on the
Pact anniversary asserted in effect that the more devoted a
socialise army is to its people, party, and state the stronger is
"the entire world socialist system." He added that Bucharest
was developing relations with the armies of "all" socialist
countries, as well as those of the Warsaw Pact states. Stressing
the same points, a SCINTEI.A anniversary article added Bucharest's
stock demand, embarrassing to Moscow, calling for concrete steps
to dismantle military bases on and to withdraw foreign troops
from the territories of other states. The article also stated
that the Pact's defenses must be strengthened as long as NATO
exists, stipulating that priority in this regard should be
given to "political" measures--improving mutual information
and consultation among the Pact members.
YUGOSLAVIA In apparently the only Yugoslav comment on the
Warsaw Pact anniversary, Zagreb commentator Sundic
on the 13th cited Belgrade's traditional aversion to blocs in voicing
the conviction that none of the existing world alliances could
justify its existence. He added that there were no prospects
whatever for the dissolution of either the Warsaw Pact or NATO
and that both groups have become, for the great powers, more
political and ideological than military alliances. In keeping
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with the current dour Yugoslav mood over recent Soviet alighting
of the role of Yugoslav partisans in World War 11, Sundic
recalled sarcastically that in Hungary ip 1956 and Czechoslovakia
in 1968 "the Warsaw Pact had major tanks which it carried out,"
adding that few if any membern of either, bloc want the allinnces
"to bra reduced merely to the establishing of a certain order or
system." Sundic reiterated Belgrade's readiness to cooperate
with any country, bloc member or nonalined, on the beaia of
full equality and noninterference.
ALBANIA A 7 May ZERI I POPULLIT editorial article used the
anniversary for a new denunciation of the Pact as
an instrument of Soviet hegemonism. Tirana had joined the
Pact an a charter member in 1955, stopped all participation in
its activities in 1962, and formally withdrew in 1968 after the
Pact intervention in Czechoslovakia. Soviet forces, it added,
perform the function of "a colonial occupying army" in
Czechoslovakia, Poland, the GDR, Hungary, and Bulgaria. As
usual there was no mention of the seventh Pact member--Romania.
CONFIDENTIAL
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21 MAX 1975
MIDDLE EAST
KOSYGIN VISITS CONTINUE USSR MIDEAST DIPLCIIATIC I t4111i
With Premier Konygin's official visits to Libya (12-15 Hay) and
to Tunisia (15-17 Hay), Moscow bas continued the momentum of
its activity aimed toward eventual resumption of the Geneva
Hideaat conference, Konygin's trips, his first to each country,
came on the heels of the recent round of high-level Arab
visitors to Moscow in April and early May. Koeygitt does not
appear to have been very eucceaful, however, in obtaining
agreement with the two countries on key issues of a Mideast
settlement. This wan especially evident in Libya, which continues
to oppose a negotiated Arab-lgraeli settlement and to nopport
radical factions within the Palestine Liberation Organization
(PLO). In Tunisia, despite predictable general agreement on
the broad elements of a negotiated Mideast settlement, differences
remained over the basis for a settlement, with President nourguiba
reiterating luninle a lonhatanding advocacy of a return to the
1947 UN partition plan for Palestine. On the other hand, there
was a strong emphasis throughout. both vinits on strengthening
bilateral relations. And aotae Libyan sources hinted strongly
that an increase in mutual Soviet-Libyan military cooperation
wan discussed.
ARAB-ISRAELI During Koeygin'a stay in Libya, it was clear that
ISSUE Moscow and Tripoli continued to advocate conflicting
approaches to a Mideast settlement. Libyan sources
Ignored the insue of resumption of the Geneva Hide-ant conference;
and, as expected, the 15 Hay Soviet-Libyan cot-vunique made no
mention of the conference. Kosygin in his dinner speech on the
12th, however, told his Libyan audience flatly that "the situation
requires resumption of the.work of the Geneva conference." He
added--an Soviet sources frequently have over the past two months--
that the conference must "of course" be thoroughly prepared. But
perhaps reflecting the difficulties Moscow has experienced in
preparations and alinement of inter-Arab and Sovie:-Arab positions,
he did not repeat the standard Soviet tornulation of recent months
calling for "speediest" or "earliest" resumption of the conference.*
Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko, in a 14 May speech In t:occow
marking the Warsaw Pact 20th anniversary, used a similar expression
in noting simply that the Soviet Union "proposes to resume" the
work of the Geneva conference. He added that the USSR has in mind
"serious preparations" and a "serious approach to Its tasks, although
we are not so sure that all the conference's participants want the sassse."
CONFIDENTIAL
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itosygin stated that the essence of the Soviet position "remains
unet'anged" and reaffirmed iioseow's stand on the three broad
? elements it has regularly stresRed as part of a settlementi
Conpletewithdrawal of Israeli fortes froi all Arab
territories occupied In 1967; implementation of
Palestinian legitimate national rights, Including
the right to create their own state: and safe-
guarding of the independent existence and deviklop-
taent of all states In the region.
In predictable contrast to Libya, Tunisia was willing to join
Moscow in calling for a political solution to the Arab-Israeli
con?lict. The joint c~ . uitique on the 17th stated that both
sides believed it desirable to resume the Geneva conference
"as soon as possible after careful preparation" and with PLO
participation on an equal basis with other participants. Tunisia
also agreed--as gpypt and Syria had agreed in cer uniques
issued after their foreign ministers' visits to Moscow in
April--that "any partial treasures should be part and parcel
of the overall settlement."
The Soviet-Tunisian communique also stated that both sides advocated
a settlement "on the basis of implementing the well-kn(_1wn VU;
Security Council and General Assembly resolutions." That this
formulation was an attempt to paper over differences on the precise
basis for a settlement was suggested in renarks by President
11ourguiba on the 15th and their subsequent handling by :ioviet
media. Reaffirming Tunisia's longtitte stand on a settlement,
fourguiba Aof:ertod that the internatlensil iiit had .;+ - ii tt=:
a serious injustice in Its 1947 decision to partition Palestine
and that Israel oust now he forced to respect the international
law to which It owes its existence. In this context 13ourr.ulba
said that the Geneva conference could, with the participation of
the 11LO, "achieve a political solution Jr. confOt ity with the
133; rennlution" -by which he clearly grant, as he has often said
in the past, the 1947 tU General Aasr bly partition vote and cot,
as in Soviet references, the U3: Security Council Resolution 242
of 1967 or kenolution ))8 of 197). TASS, reporting lic.urguiba's
remarks on the 16th, rendered their pore in line with Moscow's
position. TASS cited bour.guiba as stressing that Israel shouls3
be compel led "to respect international law, to which it owes its
existence" and that the Geneva conference "nt~truld lead to a
peaceful settlement in accordance with the U`; resolutions."
#RAVDA'o text Loa the 17th emitted Aourgufba"s reference to the
)4'47 partition decision.
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Both the Soviet-Libyan and Soviet-Tunisian communiques sought
to suggest hutttal agreeesant on the it3sue of gengtal support for
the Palestinian cause. (loth, for example, routinely conditioned
the establishment of a t1ideast peace on Israel's withdrawal front
all occupied Arab territories and on assurance of Palestinian
"national legitimate rights, including their right to self"
deteroination and to establishment of their own state." There
were ample indications during Kosygin's visits, however, that
Moscow and t.ibya have continued to differ sharply over the kind
and degree of support which the Palestinians should receive.
On It flay, the day of Rosygitt's departure for Libya, Tripoli's
ARAII Ri:VoLlltloN UM S' AGL.4GY (ARUA) underlined Libya's long-
conflrnred position on Palestinian goes tons In reporting that
the previous evening I'ritse Minister Jallud had received a delegation
of the Popular Front for the Liberation of I'aleatine/General
Co and (PF'LP/Gc), led by Ahmad fibril, PrLP/GL general secretary.
This group is one of the "rejectionist front" factions in the PLo
that reject the notion of a negotiate,] settlement with Israel.
Reflecting the hardline policy of the tejectionists, the AREA
repott stated that the two sides held "identical" points of view
on th3 Palestinian iq"awe as well as on the "firms rejection of the
direct negotiations conference at Geneva ai"ed at authoria.ing
suspicious plots." After Yosygin's visit, there were indications
frog Tripoli ncdia that Libya continues to advocate a military
solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict and to support the radical
factions within the PLO. Jallud. for exanple, in a speech on the
15th before the "Uation.l Seminar To ,upport the Palestinian Arab
Revolution." held i')-lg .fay in Tripoli, urge the Palestinians
to forty a "revolutionary government" that would define a clear
way to liberate iatestine--by force--and indicated that the
goverment could be had in Libya. As reported by MO,% on the
16th, Jallud also sought to distinguish between creation of a
Palestinian state, on the one hand. and a Palestinian revolutionary
government on the other, asserting that the former would result
from an international decision and the later iron a Palestinian
decision. Jallud said that the conflict with Israel "cannot be
settled by a conference, a third party,, or the Vnitcd Nations,"
and that he had been una-,le to 6teterftine what heads of state meant
by the expression "legiti=ate national rig, i of the Palestinians."
He added that "force alone can Impart a avi .t to this.'"
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21 HA l_~ S
iilLATCltA1 Perhaps partly to offset the lack o'~ accord on key
ittl.ATI(Y s Arab-1sraell, issues, a pronounced emphasis on expanding
and improving bilateral relations was evident In the
publicity, dinner speeches, and final couniques for both visits.
In the case of Tunisia, the etophasia seeped essentially pro forr4a,
and the agreements signed or discussed appeared of minor importance.
Ai noted in the tnviet-Tunisian cf Mmunigi-e, (or eitanple, a program
for cultural and scientific cooperation tot l91-16 was signed;
and both Aides called tot regular relations at all levels and or
political consultations to further mutual cooperation.
In the case of Libya, however, the ftutual emphasis on expanding
and improving bilatetal relations-while also enco;passing routine
aspects--was notable for the strong hints that increased military
cooperation between the two countries had been at least considered.
.lallud in his dinner speech on the 12th, for e*as:ple, in tearks
carried by 14Vt5TIYA and PRAVDA on the lfth and by ARNA on the
13th, expressed his conviction that #Kosygin's visit would lend to
.'concrete acts to strengthen mutual cooperation in various fields,
in particular econo=mic, cultural, technical, military, and others.'.
Thanking the I1SsA for the econot!!ic and nilitaty aid presently being
given, .lallud said that "possibilities exist for further development
of this assistance." Additionally, Tripoli's "Voice of the Arab
llc ?eland" on the 13th broadcast to -arl.s by Kosyr.in, during a side
trip to fenghani on the llith, that his visit to Libya sought to
develop and strengthen Soviet-Libyan cc*operatien "in the political,
economic, and military f ie:ds."' And AR;cA, repotting on the 15th
the signing of agrecr.ents on ncene??ic, technical, and cultural
matters, noted that l.ihyan lr:a detc' taiYS aeith t'o c cin 1+a4 coveted
"all f iolsle."
There were no indicatietss, i-m=-uever, of vbbethet 4h' tsev ?i rFg~r,ehtfi
on Dilitvey coo.tetatlon vote in fact achieved during Fosygita's
talks wit,, the Lib attc. In line vitia )Gos,.1119t
a TIC #=attic to 'h#s~ t r?c'4'r~A ++? 4w ,
ih Ectfiref ~Aa~s4 ~ ~-. ~t 4 K~#e1s t "t to 1v5tfr0 wt nt i1.e,; s #r 3; ?~zs
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