TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00608R000200170013-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 36
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 18, 1999
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: March 19, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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Confidential
FBIS
TRENDS
In Communist Propaganda
Confidential
19 MARCH 1975
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CONFIDENTIAL,
This propaganda analysis report is based exclusively on material
carried in foreign broadcast and press media. It is published
by FBIS without coordination with other U.S. Government
components.
[
Classified by 000073
Sui.sct to General Declassification Schedule
of E.O. 11652, Automatically Declassified
Two Years from Date of Issue
National Security Information
Unauthorized disclosure subject to
criminal sanctions
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CONFIDENTIAL EMS TRENDS
19 MARCH 1975
C ONTENTS
EAST-WEST RELATIONS
Brezhnev Stresses Detente Themes, Sees CSCE Summit 1
COMMUNIST RELATIONS
Kadar Renews Call or World CP Conference, Attacks Maoism 3
MIDDLE EAST
USSR Disparages "Shuttle Diplomacy," Brezhnev Urges Geneva Talks. . 5
INDOCHINA
PRG Claims Ban Me Thuot Takeover; Fate o( Americans Discussed
? ? ? 8
HOC TAP Claims Saigon Army Weak, Urban Struggle Crowing 10
Hanoi Offers Cordial Welcome to PRC Military Delegation 13
Cambodian Front Sees Victory Near; Sihanouk Claims Support 15
CYPRUS
USSR Sees UN Resolution as Offering Little Prospect for Talks . . . 17
WI.SIERN EUROPE
PRC Denounces Soviet Economic Penetration of West Europe 19
Moscow Radio Suggests U.S. Hand In Abortive Portuguese Cour 20
CUBA
Castro in IZVESTIYA Rejects Concessions for Lifting Blockade 22
USSR
Police Official Asserts All Peasants To Receive Internal Passpots. . 25
PRC-TAIWAN
China Frees KMT "War Criminals," Permits Return to Taiwan 27
NORTH KOREA
Kim Il-Song Urges Expanded Trade Ties with Capitalist States 29
NOTE
Titu Visit to Poland 31
APPENDIX
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EAST-WEST RELATIONS
BREZHNEV STRESSES DETENTE THEMES, SEES CSCE SUMMIT
FBIS TRENDS
19 MARCH 1975
General Secretary Brezhnev presented a generally positive
assessment of conditions in the socialist countries and of the
prospects for East-West relations in his 18 March speech to
the lith congress of the Hungarian communist party in Budapest.
Clearly aiming at putting the best possible face on current
Soviet policies, Brezhnev stressed Lhe prospects for the
continuing progress of detente in Europe. He asserted that a
"malority" of states participating in the CSCE were now willing
to hold the concluding session at the summit level, and he
interpreted this as signifying that the relations of the Soviet
Union and the majority of the socialist countries with the major
capitalist counties were entering a "more or less normal
channel." Although Brezhnev dwelt mainly on European issues,
in keeping with the occasiAl, he referred briefly to unresolved
issues in other parts of the world and stressed the importance
in this connection of good relations between the Soviet Union
and the United States, "which have such important significance
for the cause of general peace."
Brezhnev acknowledged routinely the need for continued ideological
struggle with the West within the framework of peaceful coexistence
and, echoing his major "victory of communism" speech in Alma-Ata
of August 1973, he stressed the "special importance" of efforts
to disseminate "the truth about socialism and of the struggle
against all kinds of ideology alien to socialism." He criticized
"opponents of detente," whom he said were becoming more active
with the "acute crisis in the capitalist system." Urging all
those "fighting for peace" to retain their vigilance, Brezhnev
noted that there were still "hotbeds of dangerous tension, conflicts,
and potential military flareups, both in the Near East, in Southeast
Asia, and in other areas of the World."* Brezhnev then went on to
say that "peace" must be extended to other continents of the world,
not just Europe, and he singled out "the serious attention" that
Moscow is giving "to the strengthening of relations of peaceful
coexistence and mutually advantageous cooperation between the
Soviet Union and the United States."
* See the Middle East section of this TRENDS for a discussion of
Brezhnev's remarks on the Middle East.
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CSCE, MBFR In his remarks on the CSCE, Brezhnev did not
reL'er to his recent personal letters to Western
leaders proposing 30 June as the date for convelng a 35-nation
summit conference in Helsinki--letters which were publicized
in the Western media the day before his speech. But Brezhnev
assessed as "a gratlfyiag move" the fact that one "can now
apparently say that a majority of the other conference partici-
pants are inclined to conclude its work during the next few
months, and at the summit level at that." indirectly acknow-
ledging that outstanding CSCE problems could further delay the
final summit, Brezhnev added that "those who persistently
attempt to hinder the speediest conclusion of the all-European
conference take upon themselves all the greater responsibility."
Once the "political foundation" of the European scene has been
established by the CSCE, Brezhnev said, the "foremost" task
will be "practical implementation of military detente." In
this regard, Brezhnev said that what he had in mind for the
Vienna force reduction talks was "not only limitation but also a
gradual reduction of the size" of the various armed forces and
armaments, quickly adding that "of course, this is not the kind
of question that can be solved overnight" but that such efforts
were being made both in the Geneva strategic arms talks and at
Vienna. Brezhnev's Budapest speech eschewed the strong criticism
of the Western negotiators at Vienna contained in his last previous
speech on 14 February--during Prime Minister Wilson's visit--when
he had accused the West of trying to gain "unilateral advantages"
at the force reduction talks.
At the commentary level, Moscow and its allies have continued to
criticize the lack of Western "initiatives" at the MBFR talks,
with comment in the past two weeks stressing the "new," "compromise"
amendments which the Warsaw Pact states had offered on 6 March to
revise their basic November 1973 proposal and claiming as before
that the new move took into consideration certain aspects of
Western criticism of the East's position.
ECONOMIC CRISIS In discussing the current "deep economic crisis,"
Brezhnev at first suggested that only the
capitalist word was affected, but went on to acknowledge that "it
goes without saying that the state of affairs un the world market
cannot fail to have a certain effect on our economic affairs"--a
ohich Hungarian party leader Kadar in his keynote address to
the congress on the 17th had stressed, in unusually frank terms for
an East European communist leader.
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COMMUNIST RELATIONS
KADAR RENEWS CALL FOR WORLD CP CONFERENCE, ATTACKS MAOISM
In his 17 March speech at Hungary's 11th party congress, First
Secretary Kadar reconfirmed the credentials of his party as a
staunch ally of Moscow on questions of international communism
by issuing another call for a world conference of communist
parties and denouncing Peking's brand of communism. Brezhnev
responded the following day with praise For the Hungarian party's
"steadfast" Marxist-Leninist line and its "high prestiage" within
the communist movement, as well as personal recognition of
Kadar as a "convinced internationalist." Mc.nwhile, Brezhnev
continued to refrain from directl; endorsing a world meeting and
also avoided condemning the Chinese Communist Party. He did,
however, deem to hint at the desirability of a world gathering
in noting the likely contribution of the impending European
communist party conference and then adding that "of course,
comrades, o.e must not rest on one's laurels." And although Brezhnev
withheld criticism of Peking, he noted that in the past the
fraternal parties had succesFiully united to protect "correct"
Marxism-Leninism against devAtionist parties of both the right
and the left.
Kadar strongly reasserted his party's dogged allegiance to the
CPSU on international issues and contended that the standard
for measuring each communist party's international outlook was
the strength of its ties to "Lenin's party." However, as he
had done at the 19-21 December Budapest preparatory meeting for
the European CP conference attended by both orthodox and inde-
pendent parties, Kadar acknowledged that "no organizational center"
exists within the communist movement. On the other hand, he
reiterated his position that the European conference should aim
at working out a "joint line" and a "concrete program" to be
adhered to by all parties. Contending that the value of joint
guidelines was proven by the success of the 1969 ',.)scow world
conference, Kadar--who in December 1973 became one of the initial
proponents of a world gathering--called for a "new, great interna-
tional conference of communist and workers parties." He went
on to condemn deviationism of whatever form, especially "nation-
alism" and "anti-Sovietism," and put his party on record as
waging a "principled fight against Maoism." A TASS account of
Kadcr's remarks reported his call for a world conference as well
as his denunciation of the Chinese.
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4
Recognition of the Hungarian party's orthodox position by the
maverick Romanian and independent Yugoslav parties was under-
scored when those parties sent second-level delegations to the
congress. While Poland, the GDR, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria
were all represented by their party chiefs, Romania dispatched
Political Executive Committee member 'lie Verdet, and Yugoslavia
a Presidium member, Jure Bilic. Belgrade, moreover, sent its
spokesman at international party meetings, AleksEndar Grlickov,
to the Italian party congress which opened on the 18th. During
the previous round of communist party congresses in 1971, Tito
had also sent lower level officials in his stead, while
Ceausescu attended only the Soviet and Pi7lish congresses.
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19 MARCH 1975
IIDDLE EAST
USSR DISPARAGES "SHUTTLE DIPLOMACY," BREZHNEV URGES GENEVA TALKS
As during Secretary Kissinger's previous negotiating efforts in the
Mideast, Moscow continues to give his current mission only scanty
attention. Domestic service newscasts are not known to have mentioned
the Secretary's activities since his visit to Ankara on 10-11 March;
however, limited comment for the Soviet as well as foreign audiences
has been more outspokenly skeptical of the Secretary's "shuttle
diplomacy" than was the case during the disengagement negotiations
last year. Brezhnev, in his 8 March address to the Hungarian party
congress, did not take the occasion to repeat the criticism in
his 14 February speech at a luncheon for visiting British Prime
Minister Wilson of "partial steps" toward a Mideast settlement.
Instead, he confined himself to reiterating the need for "speediest
resumption" of the Geneva conference. Comment on partial steps has
adhered to Brezhnev's February formula that such measures are useful,
but--with stress on the "but"--only if they lead to a real settlement
and do not "freeze" the situation.
This stress on an overall settlement is in line with Soviet treatment of
the initial Suez and Golan accords last year, which were described as
"positive" if they were followed by a "radical" settlement. By not
dismissing the "step-by-step" approach outright Moscow may be preparing
to claim some share of the credit, as Gromyko did in January last year in
depicting the Suez disengagement as a result of the Geneva talks. At
the same time, Moscow commentators have continued to convey some
annoyance at being left out of the action: TASS director general
Zamyatin observed that no information on the "essence" of the talks
was available other than from American press reports.
MOSCOW COMMENT ON Of the limited comment dealing specificall with
KISSINGER TRAVELS Kissinger's negotiations, the most authoritative
spokesman was Zamyatin in the 15 March "International
Situation" domestic radio feature. Told by the moderator that listeners
were asking about the aims and implication of Kissinger's "so-called
shuttle diplomacy," Zamyatin responded that "so far we do not have any
official statements about these shuttle operations"--"Kissinger is in
Cairo one day, in Tel Aviv the next, and then returns to Cairo again."
Attributing his information to "the American press," Zamyatin said the
talks concerned "some kind of agreement on a partial withdrawal of
Israeli forc2s in exchange for some kind of assurance from the other
side." He contrasted this American "partial step" approach with the
Soviet view that negotiations should be conducted not from the standpoint
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"of some concessions from one side or the other, but from that
of their detailed productivity." Reiterating Brezhnev's qualified
February statement on the usefulness of partial oeasures, Zamyatin
asserted that partial steps which are not linked with a general
settlement of the Middle East problem "can hardly speed up the
solution." Similarly, a panelist on the weekly Moscow domestic
service observers roundtable program on the 16th declared that
partial withdrawal "can only be one step" leading to a genuine
settlement, and "nothing of the kind can be said" of the first
troop disengagement last year.
Somewhat more detailed accounts of the issues in the negotiations
were provided in a Losev foreign-language commentary on the 13th
which noted from "press reports" that Egypt was calling for return
of the Sinai passes and oilfields while Israel was demanding an
Egyptian pledge not to resume military operations against Israel for
several years, and also to open the Suez Canal to ships carrying
Israeli cargo. Losev additionally reported Israeli demands for
demilitarization and UN control of evacuated territory. Citing
the Paris L'ECHO as wondering to what extent Egypt would agree to
a separate settlement, Losev pointedly went on to mention Syria's
"resolute" opposition to such an agreement.
For Arab audiences, a commentary on the 13th, noting Kissinger's
talks in pursuit of "the so-called step-by-step solution," said
that the first Israeli demand was, "as usual," an Egyptian promise
to end the state of war with Israel "regardless of whether or not
the other issues" pertaining to a settlement would be solved. The
commentary recalled that before the current talks started President
as-Sadat had said Egypt reject2d such an "individual agreement,"
and cited Syrian, Palestinian and Libyan leaders as voicing
"apprehension" over the idea of partial agreements.
Two brief Moscow radio news items on the 18th--one broadcast in
Arabic and the other in English to Great Britain--conveyed the
idea that Secretary Kissinger was making little progress. The items
dealt with different aspects of the Kissinger/as-Sadat press
conference in Aswan following their latest round of talks.
As-Sadat was reported, in the Arabic-language item, as saying
that no agreement on Israeli withdrawal had yet been reached. The
English-language account cited "reports from the Middle East"
to the effect that Kissinger's efforts "have so far come to
nothing," and that the Secretary "admitted the difference" in
the sides' views. President as-Sadat was reported as saying that
no agreement had been reached so far on the principles of a new
disengagement, and as stressing the importance of the Palestinians'
rights in a Mideast settlement. '
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BREZHNEV SPEECH Brezhnev's Hungarian party congress speech
on the 18th was notable more for the omission
of any critical remarks on "partial steps" toward a Mideast
settlement than for what he did say. Presumably, his avoidance
of any implicit criticism of U.S. diplomatic methods related more
to the nature of the occasion than to any show of restraint in
connection with Secretary Kissinger's current negotiations. His
most forceful criticism of partial measures--in his 14 February
speech at a luncheon for the British Prime Minister--came as
Kissinger was in the midst of a Mideast tour. Carping by Soviet
leaders over the U.S. approach began shortly after the first
Israeli-Egyptian disengagement accord in Janua-...-y last year: Late
that same month, Brezhnev warned in a speech in Havana against
the substitution of "partial accords" for an overall settlement.
In April last year, at a dinner for visiting Syrian President
al-Asad, he referred to "ersatz plans" for a settlement in effect
replacing a general solucion with "partial agreements of different
kinds." And in May, while Kissinger was in the Middle East
holding talks on the Israeli-Syrian disengagement, Kosygin
complained, at a dinner for visiting Libyan Prime Minister Jallud,
thaL "the aggressor and its patrons want to substitute some half
measures, which only create a semblance of detente," for an
overall settlement.
Now, in his Budapest speech, Brezhnev merely repeated the standard
Soviet position that the Geneva conference was the proper forum
for the solution of the main problems. These he again defined as
liberation of all Arab lands occupied in 1967, satisfaction of the
Palestinians' lawful rights including creation of their "own
statehood," and the "effective guarantee" of secure, independent,
and free existence for all states of the Middle East.
Soviet commentators have been following the same script in outlining
the chief problems: TASS commentator Krasnikov on the 13th and TASS
director general Zamyatin two days later, in the Moscow radio
"International Situation" program, listed the same elements, both
insisting that these provisions muct be "parts of a single whole."
Moscow has for years insisted on a "package deal" approach to a
settlement; for instance, a TASS account in February 1970 of Kosygin
letters to the United States, Britain and France on a Mideast
solution stated Soviet support for "interconnected fulfillment"
of all provisions of Security Council Resolution 242, and Mideast
specialist Belyayev in an April 1970 INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
article called such a package approach "reasonable."
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INDOCHINA
PRG CLAIMS BAN ME THUOT TAKEOVER; FATE OF AMERICANS DISCUSSED
Vietnamese communists have announced that they have "seized complete
control" of the Darlac provincial capital of Ban Me Thuot as well
as a number of district capitals in South Vietnam. According to
a 14 March Liberation Radio broadcast, the city was captured on
the afternoon of the 11th as a result of "attacks and uprisings"
launched by the "Darlac armed forces and people" the previous
morning. While the nine Americans reportedly in the city when the
fighting erupted have not been specifically accounted for in the
communist media, a spokesman of the PRG military delegation
stationed at Tan Son Nhut airbase outside Saigon has indicated
at a press conference that those who are U.S. "miliEary advisers"
would not be released. fn commenting on events elsewhere in the
highlands, the media have only indirectly mentioned Western press
reports that President Thieu was planning to pull his forces out
of the three provinces of Pleiku, Kontum, and DarhIc.
AMERICANS IN Communist propaganda has only alluded to the
BAN ME THUOT Americans who were reportedly in Ban Me Thuot.
A 16 March Liberation Radio broadcast discussing
the removal of the ARVN Second Military Region headquarters from
Pleiku to Nha Trang claimed this was done to "escape danger and
especially to spare the U.S. advisers in Pleiku the fate of the
nine Americans in Ban Me Thuot, who were described by a U.S.
Embassy spokesman as being boxed in." The same broadcast quoted
the deputy chief of the PRG military delegation at a 15 March
press conference at Tan Son Nhut as ominously declaring:
"Foreigners, including honest Americans, will be well treated
and released if they are captured, but this treatment will not
be given to U.S. military advisers. They are special cases because
they have violated the Paris agreement." Monitored Vietnamese
communist propaganda is not known to have made any other mention
of U.S. personnel who might have been captured in the recent fighting.
'LIBERATION' OF DRV and PRG propaganda following the takeover
BAN ME THUOT of Ban Me Thuot and a number of district capitals
throughout the South has justified the communist
military action as punishment for the United States and Thieu because
they were "continuing" the war and "sabotaging" the Paris agreement.
General Westmoreland's recent public statement deploring the President's
current lack of authority to use U.S. aircraft to bomb communist
supply lines and mine Haiphong harbor was offered as evidence of U.S.
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culpability in this respect. The media have also attempted to
portray the local populace of Ban Me Thuot, especially the
ethnic minorities, as having now been rescued from the "opprssion"
and "exploitation" they allegedly suffered under the GVN
administration.
In defending the latest communist military gains in the South,
Hanoi and PRG comment has echoed the line taken after the fall
of Phuoc Binh city in early January.* According to media commentaries
at the time, Phuoc Binh had been used as a GVN "staging area"
for launching attacks on PM-controlled territory, and its takeover
by the communists was therefore in compliance TALI the calls to
"counterattack" such areas, contained in earlier PLAF orders.
Likewise, a 15 March Liberation Radio commeutary claimed that
Ban Me Thuot and "adjacent military subsetors" have been used by
the ARVN as the "staging bases for thousands of operations to
terrorize and massacre the people." An earlier Liberation Radio
commentary on the initial fighting in the area--broadcast on the
12th--predictably evoked the 15 October 1973 PLAF Command order as
authority for "counterattacking," claiming that it "clearly pointed
out that the PLAF has the right to counterattack the U.S.-Thieu
clique's acts of war anywhere. . . to compel. . . implementation
of the Paris agreement."**
NHAN DAN and QUAN DOI NHAN DAN commentaries of 14 and 15 March,
respectively, were particularly vehement in castigating the
ARVN 23d infantry division and "diehard cruel ranger units" for
committing "untold crimes" against ethnic minority peoples in
Darlac. Media comment has also depicted social and economic
conditions in Ban Me Thuot as deplorable under the GVN,
characterizing the fall of the city as an "inevitabl2 outcome of
struggle against the U.S.-Thieu fascist regime." Saigon denials
that the city was under the total control of communist forces were
scornfully rejected by the media as a "Goebbels-like propaganda
trick that can deceive no one." In an apparent attempt to
demonstrate popular support for the communists, Liberation Radio
claimed that rallies were held in Ban Me Thuot on the 12th, 13th,
and 14th, to "acclaim the victory of the people throughout Darlac
Province and the complete liberation of Ban Me Thuot."
* The capture of Phuoc Binh is discussed in the TRENDS of
15 January 1975, pages 10-12.
** See the TRENDS of 17 October 1973, pages 7-9, for a discussion
of the 15 October 1973 PLAF order.
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HIGHLANDS Western press reports of Nguyen Van Tnieu's alleged
EVACUATION intention to abandon the highland provinces of
Pleiku, Kontum, rnd Darlac have not been directly
acknowledged in Vietnamese communist media. While Hanoi and
Liberatlon radio broadcasts cited earlier Western reports on the
evacuation of the ARVN regional headquarters in Pleiku city,
more recent Liberation Radio broadcasts on the withdrawal from the
area are vague abo,.t indicating its extent--mentioninl, only Pleiku
and "other localities in the Central Highlands," but without
specifying whether this meant Pleiku city or the province. These
broadcasts are focused instead on the supposed misery of the people
involved in the "so-called evacuation campaign." For example, a
19 March Liberation Radio report charged that the people were being
forced against their will to flee, and in areas where Thieu has
been unable to "herd and remove them, he has sent aizcraft and
troop' to barbarously bomb, strafe, and massacre them." The
broadcast of the 19th concluded with an appeal for these people
to "rise up, oppose, and punish" the troops who were "forcing
them to leave their homes" and urged them to "coordinof.e their
activities with those of the PLAF and be determined to stay close
to their land. . . ."
HOC TAP CLAIMS SAIGON ARMY WEAK, URBAN STRUGGLE GROWING
An unusually optimistic assessment of the communist military position
in South Vietnam was offered in an article published in the January
issue of the North Vietnamese party theoretical journal HOC TAP.
The article--attributed to Truong Chi Cuong, a byline not seen
previJusly--echoed other Hanoi comment at the turn of the year in
its basic appraisal that the communists in 1974 successfully
countered the South Vietnamese.: Government's "nibbling" operations
and pacification.* In two respects, however, HOC TAP went further
than other comment--in its detailed analysis of what it portrayed
as Saigon's deteriorating military position and in its stress on
the role of the urban struggle in the future. Some passages of the
article appeared to reflect Hanoi's evaluation of the results of
the first phase of the communist dry season offensive in December
and early January, and that appraisal may have been the source of
its r-Jre optimistic tone. It cannot be determined when the article
was written, since it was not broadcast and HOC TAP does not
publish a signed-to-press date.
* Vietnamese communist media comment at the end of December and
early January on the military situation in South Vietnam is discussed
in the TRENDS of 8 January 1975, pages 9-10.
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In the course of analyzing alleged ARVN weaknesses, the HOC TAP
article cited n. specific engagements. It claimed that "in
recent battles" in uistrict military sectors and district
capitals the GVN resistance was "very weak" and that troops in
"many stronghold complexes" could not "resist more than one
day." It maintained that some posts were being abandoned without
being attacked and, in this context, claimed that a "very high"
number of ARVN officers and troops had been captured and that
the number of deserters was the highest since 1965. The article
also dwelt upon ARVN materiel shortages, maintaining that there
had been a decrease in Its firepower and the amount of its
mobile equipment in the third quarter of the year and citing
specific figures to demonstrate reduced ARVN capabilities.
HOC TAP portrayed the GVN political and economic siLuation in
equally bleak terms, claiming that the economy is stagnating,
"70 percent of the population have not had enough food to eat
September 1974," and that Thieu is increasingly isolated with mi
political base and deserted by former supporters. The article
maintained that another factor in the GVN's worsening situation
WAS the decEning U.S. ability or willingness to support Saigon.
It noted, among other things, that Congress had reduced by one-half
the military aid requested for the current fiscal year.
URBAN STRUGGLE The HOC TAP article gave notable prominence to
the antigovernment movement in southern cities,
even claiming that the development of the favorable situation for
the revolution in the South would "lead to disturbances in the
southern cities . . and in areas that reflect the present acute
contradictions in the Saigon administration in a concrete manner."
It also seemed to reflect a communist commitment to become directly
involved in the urban opposition to the Thieu government. It
claimed that "new opposition forces" had appeared in most provinces
in the South "down to the basic level" and quoted First Secretary
Le Duan's advice on the importance of the organization of such
forces: ". . Once the mass movement has taken shape, leading
the masses in submitting to the established order of organization
is a key problem of decisive significance."
HOC TAP does not cite the source of the Le Duan quotation, but it is
similar to passages in his lengthy February 1970 article, written on
the occasion of the 40th anniversary of the Vietnam Workers Party.
In analyzing revolutionary methods, the 1970 article had stressed
that "prior to the seizure of power, and to seize power, the sole
weapon of the revolution and the masses is organization." More
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More recently, the first secretary's 3 February speech on the
occasion of the party's 45th anniversary did not discuss the
problems of organization, but was notable for its detailed
recounting of the importance of political struggle in the
Vietnamese revolution.*
* The 3 Febrtary 1975 article is discussed in the TRENDS of
5 February 1975, pages 9-11.
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HANOI OFFEI;S CORDIAL WELCOME TO PRO MILITARY DFLEGATION
Hanoi's desire to treat equally its two major communist allies
was reflected in DRV handling of a Chinese military delegation's
visit to North Vietnam from 28 February to 14 March. Hanoi's
treatment closely followed the pattern set in its welcome last
December for a high-level Soviet military delegation headed by
Chief of the General Staff V. G. Kulikov, the few differences
reflecting the differing protocol requirements for visitors of
unequal rank.* The latest Chinese delegation visit was the
first of a purely military nature known to be acknowledged by
Hanoi and Peking since 1961, when a PRC military delegation led
by CCP Politburo member Yeh Chien-ying visited Hanoi. A PRC
aid delegation headed by Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien,which visited
Hanoi in September 1971,was the last PRC mission to the DRV
acknowledged by either Hanoi or Peking to have included high-
level PRC military officers.
The PRC delegation, led by Sinkiang Military Region commander
Yang Yung, was net on arrival by Vice Minister of Defense and
VPA Deputy chief of the General Staff Hoang Van Thai, who acted
as host during the visit and led the Vietnamese side in
working-level talks with the Chinese. Reflecting the higher
rank of the Soviet delegation, Kulikcv hod b2en greeted on
arrival by his counterpart, Chief the VPA General Staff Van
Tien Dung, who also led the Vietnamese in discussions with the
Soviet visitors. The other high-level Vietnamese military
officers who attended the negotiating sessions with the Chinese--
Lieutenant Generals Tran Sam, Trah Quy Hai, Le Trong Tan and
Le Quang Hoa and Major General Vu Xuan Chiem--had also attended
talks with the Soviet delegation in December.
The PRC delegation's schedule of activi.cies also closely
paralleled that for the Soviet delegation: the Chinese were
welf.omed at a reception on the evening of 28 February attended
by Defense Minister Giap and addressed by Hoang Van Thai. (Giap
had attended and spoken at the 21 December 1974 welcoming
reception for Kulikov.) The Chinese also duplicated the !'oviet
itinerary in meeting with DRV Premier Pham Van Dong and in visiting
DRV military sites and points of interest.
* The visit of the Kulikov delegation on 21-27 December is
discussed in the TRENDS of 31 December 1974, page 11.
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Testimonials to Sino-Vietnamese friendship made by North
Vietnamese speakers and media during the Chinese visit virtually
duplicated expressions of Hanoi's praise for Soviet-Vietnamese
ties during Kulikov's visit. Clap, speaking at the welcoming
reception for the Soviet group on 21 December, had characterized
the visit as "a brilliant manifestation of militant solidarity
and close friendship," while Hoang Van Thai's welcoming speech
for the Chinese on 28 February said the PRC visit was "a brilliant.
manifestation of militant solidarity and wart friendship." Giap
on 21 December had noted that the Soviet Union and DRV were
bound by "ties of great friendship and militunt solidarity based
on the principles of Marxism-LerCnism add proletarian internation-
alism," and Hoang Van Thai hailed the "great friendship and close
militant solidarity built upon the basis of Marxism-Leninism and
proletarian internationalism" between. the PRC and DRV in his
28 February speech. Similarly, Giap had characterized Soviet aid
to Hanoi as "strong support and great, effective, precious
assistance," while Hoang Van Thai expressed DRV gratitude for
"the great, precious, effective, and all-sided assistance" of the
PRC. Hanoi media described Pham Van Dong's reception of both the
Soviet and PRC delegations as being conducted in an atmosphere
of "friendship and fraternal militant solidarity," and characterized
the premier's talks with both delegations as "cordial." Both
delegations' visits also occasioned similarly warm QUAN DOI NHAN
DAN editorials.
NCNA, whose reportage of the Yang delegation closely followed
that of Hanoi, reported the delegation's departure from Hanoi
on 14 March and its arrival in Peking on the 17th, but it provided
no details on the delegation's itinerary during the intervening
three days.
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CAMBODIAN FRONT SEES VICTORY NEAR; SIHANOUK CLAIMS SUPPORT
A growing confidence of the Cambodian insurgent Front (NUFC) that
It will attoio a total military victory in the very near future
was reflected in a 15 March appeal by Khieu Samphan, insurgent
military chief and RGNU deputy prime minister. Almost simultan-
eously, Prince Sihanouk issued a statement on the fifth anniversary
of his own overthragon 18 March 1.970 in which he zlaimed
continued insurgent support for his role as Cambodian head of
state and reaffirmed the Front's uncompromising position on a
Cambodian settlement. Hanoi media have been treating Cambodian
developments over the past week with restraint, at a time when
Peking has stepped up its own attention, including a lengthy NCNA
rebuke to President Ford's support of Lon Nol and a sharp warning
in PEOPLE'S DAILY against Soviet policy towaru Cambodia.
FRONT POSITION The 15 March appeal from Khieu Samphan to
citizens under Phnom Penh's control, broadc&st
by the insrrgents' recently inaugurated radio station targeted
specifically at Phnom Penh listeners,* combined calls for antiregime
actions with optimistic appraisals of the Front's current strength
and position, but avoided any specific prediction as to when the
Front might gain victory. The appeal directly compared the Front's
presently rosy prospects with its less favorable position prior to
the start of the dry season offensive in early January. Pointing
out that "the situation has increasingly altered and been extremely
favorable to us in all fields," the deputy prime minister stressed
that the Front's current relative strength vis-a-vis Lon Nol "is
far differeat from the situation in January," as Phnom Penh is now
confronted with "general collapse." He flatly predicted that
Phnom Penh "has no hope" of reopenirg the Mekong River supply
route, and that the Lon Nol leadership, the U.S. "imperialists,"
and the rest of the world were now aware that the Phnom Penh
administration's fate "has come to its end."
The appeal called for an upsurge in anti-Lon Nol mass demonstrations
inside Phnom Penh and warned the citizens of the capital that "the
time has come for us to put an end to the existence of the traitors."
The appeal took note of last week's resignation of Phnom Penh Defense
Minister Sosthene Fernandez, depicting this as evidence of the Lon
Nol administration's internal squabbling as it approached its end,
but it continued to identify Fernandez as one of the seven top
enemies of the Front in Phnom Penh.
* Called "The Voice of the NUFC of Phnom Penh," the new station was
first monitored by FBIS on 24 January 1975. For background, see the
TRENDS of 29 January 1975, page 9.
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Sihanouk's 18 March statement, thus far available only in summary
from Peking's NCNA, highlighted as proof that he remains the "only
legal head of state of Cambodia" the fact that the 26 February
communique on the Front's second National Congress in Cambodia
had referred to him as head of state and chairman of the NUFC.
The prince ciaimed that nil Cambodian patriots have come to accept
his March 1970 five-point position on Cambodia, swore to remain
true to the Front's po1itical program and to the Cambodian people--
whom he characterized as "the sovereign holder of legislative,
exe'llitive, judicial and military power" in Cambodia?and pledged
to continue uncompromising fighting until complete liberation is
achieved.
PEKING ON A 16 March NCNA commentary departed from customary
FORD POLICY Peking restraint and avoidance of direct criticism
of U.S. leaders, assailiag the President by name
for attempting to shore up Lon Nol, achieve a compromise settlement,
and prevent a total Front victory. Like other recent Peking comment
on the Cambodian issue, NCNA dwelt upon the futility of U.S. efforts
in Cambodia and adopted a tone more of regret than anger. The NCNA
article also replayed statements by Sihanouk and Khieu Samphan
supporting the argument that U.S. withdrawal of support was the key
to solving the Cambodian question.
Earlier, a 27 February NCNA article had noted efforts by President
Ford and Secretary Kissinger to gain Congressional support for the
Phnom Penh regime but had conveyed PRC disapproval only indirectly,
by citing criticisms from U.S. Congressmen of the Administration's
policy.
PEKING ON A 19 March PEOPLE'S DAILY artic.e under the byline
SOVIET POLICY Tung Fang offered Peking's first comprehensive
indictment of Soviet policy 11 Cambodia in over a
year. It portrayed recent comment by PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA in
support of the Front as evidence of Soviet "opportunism" designed
to win favor with the insurgents when they were near victory. It
charged that the USSR has continued aid and diplomatic contact with
Lon Nol for the past five years and that the Soviet "gamblers"
have now been constrained to switch their policy because their "bets"
on Lon Nol "are all going up in smoke." Peking concluded with a
warning Liat Moscow hopes to use its enhanced support for the Front
in order to pave the way for future intervention ir Cambodian internal
affairs.
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CYPRUS
USSR SEES UN RESOLUTION AS OFFERING LITTLE PROSPECT FOR TALKS
Moscow has shown little enthusiasm for the three-week Security
Council discussion of the Cypru,: problem, convened in the wake
of the 13 February Turkish Cypriot proclamation of a "federated
Turkish Cypriot state." Soviet comment since the )roclamation
has been based largely on the 16 February TASS statement which
called the action a "new aggravation" of the situation.* Soviet
media have continued to avoid criticism of the Turkish role in
the Cyr us issue, but on at least one occasion Moscow strongly
implied criticism of the Turkish Cypriots: A 21 February TASS
report on the opening of the Security Council debate dismissed
the speech of Turkish Cypriot representative Celik as nothing
more than a "biased representation of the history of the conflict."
Comment during the council session has continued to promote
the Sovie proposal for an international conference on Cyprus,
with Soviet ITN representative Malik asserting in the counril
that this was the "only" way of achieving a settlement. Ccmment
on the council resolution, adopted by consensus on 12 March,
pointed out some positive elements but saw the resolution as not
improving the prospects for intercommunal talks.
INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS, The council debate was summed up on the
SOVIET PROPOSAL 13th in similar terms by TASS commentator
Romantsov and by Igor Penchenko in a
foreign-language commentary. Both indicated dissatisfaction with
the resolution, Romantsov citing Greek Cypriot delegate Kliridhis
as calling it "less effective" than his delegation had thought
necessary, while Pachenko said it "unfortunately" had not removed
anxieties about Cyprus' independence and sovereignty. But both
singled out positive aspect,--mentioning elements which, according
to TASS on the 3d, President Makarios had also commented on
favorably. Thus they cited the fact that the resolution "condemned"
the TtIrkish community's "separatist action" as "undermining" the
intercommunal talks. (The resolution in fact "regrets" the 13
February decision as "tending to compromise" the continuation of
the negotiations.)
Both Romantsov and Penchenko complained that the council, in
recommending a resumption of the intercommunal talks, left the
procedure unchanged, a procedure which "has had no result." And
* The TASS statement is discussed in the 20 February TRENDS,
pages 5-7.
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both seemed to sidestep the matter of the vague role assigned
in the resolution to UN Secretary General Waldheim to convene
the intercommunal talks "under new agreed procedures" and
"under his personal auspices and with his direction as appro-
priate." The commentators merely noted that the resolution
authorized Waldheim to play an "important" or "active" role
in the talks "when they resume."
With Lhe venue and participants of the intercommunal talks
still unresolved, Moscow is unlikely to offer any observations
on their prospects, hut will continue t) espouse the idea of an
international conference under UN auspices. Romantsov cited
Soviet UN representative Malik as emphasizing that "only" at
such a widely-representative international forum could a settle-
ment be achieved. Malik "regretted" that the Soviet proposal
had encountered "obstinate resistance" from NATO countries
and China. The comment again routinely charged "NATO quarters"
with trying to impose their own plan on Cyprus, and lamented
that the attitude of NATO circles interfered with the endorse-
ment of a resolution proposed by the Cyprus delegation which
would have served as the basis for a prompt and just settlement.
KISSINGER TALKS Moscow offered no comment of its own on
Secretary Kissinger's meetings with the Greek
foreign minister and Turkish leaders during the final days of
the Security Council debate, but replayed critical Greek Cypriot
assertions that the Secretary was seeking to block a greater
UN role in the crisis. Prior to the Secretary's 7 March meeting
with Greek Foreign Minister Bitsios in Brussels, a Drobkov article
in PRAVDA on Coe 4th had attributed to the London DAILY TELEGRAPH
the observation that Kissinger's "tactics in settling the conflict"
were motivated by Pentagon interest in securing monitoring facilities
on Cyprus. Moscow briefly noted Kissinger's 10-11 March visit to
Ankara, and PRAVDA on the 13th reported Turkish Foreign Minister
Esenbel as commenting, with regard to favoring resumption of the
intercommunal talks, that the Secretary and Ankara were in accord
on the prospects for a Cyprus settlement.
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WESTERN EUROPE
PRC DENOUNCES SOVIET ECONOMIC PENETRATION OF WEST EUROPE
Peking has extended its recent attacks concerning an alleged Soviet
strat gic threat to West Europe to warnings against Soviet attempts
to enlarge its economic influence in the area, in a 15 March
PEOPLE'S DAILY signed article by Cheng Wei-ming.* Although in
the past Peking has occasionally criticized Soviet attempts to
"beg for loans" from West European and other capitalist states,
the Cheng article represents Peking's first comprehensive attack
on Soviet efforts to exploit the deepening economic crisis in
West Europe and its first denunciation of Brezhnev's efforts to
accelerate bilateral economic cooperation in his recent talks
with leaders of the new governments in West Germany, France and
Great Britain. NCNA had confined itself to factual reportage,
without comment, on Brezhnev's talks with French President
Giscard in December 1974 and British Prime Minister Wilson in
February 1975, and is not known to have reported the October 1974
talks between Brezhnev and FRG Chancellor Schmidt.
The main thrust of the Cheng article portrays Moscow as intent
upon using its markets and raw materials to lure West European
states into the Soviet orbit, characterizing West Europe as a
"key point" in Soviet-U.S. rivalry in both economic and strategic
fields and enumerating Soviet attempts at economic penetration
there. The article underscored Peking's confidence that Western
efforts, led by the United States, would successfully check the
Soviet efforts. It critically cited as examples of these Brezhnev's
moves since last October to borrow 5 billion dollars from France,
West Germany and Great Britain, as well as Soviet efforts to
exploit West European technology in enterprises such as the Volga
and Kama auto plants, and the expansion of Moscow's banking network
in West European cities.
The article argued that Moscow was attempting to exploit "the West
European countries' hank-ring after Soviet energy" to increase
Soviet energy exports to West Europe and thereby make states there
economically dependent on the USSR. Moscow is trying to use the
economic lever, the article charged, in order to break up the
Common Market, edge out the United States, and pave the way for
further Soviet expansion in Europe.
* Peking's latest treatment of Soviet strategic aims in Europe is
discussed in the TRENDS of 12 March, pages 18-19.
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The article confidently predicted, however, that the USSR would
continue to run up against firm resistance from the Uaited
States and West Europe. It claimed that the United states
already has "counterattacked" Moscow by attempting to exploit
Soviet bloc dissatisfaction with Moscow's economic dominance
in East Europe, and by Washington's efforts to prevent West
European countries from exporting advanced technology and
granting low-interest loans to the USSR. The article saw a
further check on Moscow's attempts to gaia access to West
European capital, technology and markets io LIie. fact that
these countries were becoming increasingly aware of Soviet
designs and were determined--particularly in the current period
of high inflation in the West--to obtain high prices for their
equipment and loans. These developments, the article concluded,
were "a blow" to Soviet "craving" for inexpensive machinery and
low interest investments.
MOSCOW RADIO SUGGESTS U.S. HAND IN ABORTIVE PORTUGUESE COUP
Moscow comment has reflected obvious satisfaction over the failure
of the 11 March coup attempt and subsequent events in Portugal.
Initially, Moscow maintained a cautious silence with regard to
the implication by a Lisbon official that the United States, and
specifically Ambassador Carlucci, may have been involved in the
abortive coup. But subsequent comment has intimated that there
might be evidence to support such a conclusion. Such a suggestion
has appeared at least twice in Moscow radio programs, although it
has not as yet appeared in the central press. Press comment, at
first guarded with repact to the possibility of involvement by
"external forces" in the attempted coup, has now made generalized
charges of outside interference. Thus V. Osipov claimed in
IZVESTIYA on the 15th that NATO, unnamed Western powers, and West
European Social Democrats were attempting to influence political
life in Portugal. This and other comment reviewing the alleged
interference of external forces leading up to the abortive coup
has closely followed the substance of the authoritative PRAVDA
editorial article of 22 February, the only such Soviet comment on
Portugal since the overthrow of the Caetano government last April.*
The first intimation on Moscow radio of possible U.S. involve-
ment came in a broadcast in English to North America on the evening
of 13 March, with commentator Viktor Moskvin reporting that the
* See the TRENDS of 26 February 1975, pages 8-10, for a discussion
of this article.
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military governor of Lisbon, after the failure of the coup, had
"advised" the United States to "recall its ambassador for security
reasons." While acknowledging that the State Department had
"rushed to dispel rumors that the United States might be
involved in the coup," Moskvin said that the Lisbon government's
inquiry into the abortive coup would shed light on whether or
not the "rightwing factions acted on their own or received some
prodding from the outside." Moskvin went on to ask rhetorically
"why of all people" the U.S. ambassador had been "denied guarantees
of physical security." He then recalled allegations that the
U.S, ambassador in Santiago and the CIA had "destabilized" the
Chilean situation prior to the overthrow of the Allende government,
and pointed out that similar charges had been made about CIA
activities in Portugal.
A second and more direct suggestion was made on the 16th in
Moscow radio's international observers roundtnble program, broad-
cast both to the domestic audience and in the international Russian
service. Radio commentator Vladimir Dunayev cited Western press
reports to the effect that not only some military units but also
civilians from the Portuguese banking and industrial sectors and
"a number of Western diplomats" were involved in the conspiracy.
Again noting that the military governor of Lisbon "came right out
and named" Ambassador Carlucci and "stated that he would have a
hard time trying to stay in the country after these events,"
Dunayev declared that "evidently the allusion is based upon certain
evidence."
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CUBA
CASTRO IN IZVESTIYA REJECTS CONCESSIONS FOR LIFTING BLOCKADE
Moscow has publicized a wide-ranging IZVESTIYA interview with
Castro in which the Cuban prime minister predicted that the
United States "sooner or later" would have to alter its policy
toward Cuba. Castro made no reference to Ser-etary Kissinger's
1 March Houston policy speech on Latin America, and there was
no indication when the interview, conducted by "special corres-
pondents" Bovin and Vernikov and pablIshed on 6 March, took
place. Castro's remarks in the interview were consonant iih
Havana?and also Moscow?cumment over the past year which aas
maintained that "U.S. imperialist circles" have failed in their
attempt to "suffocate" the Cuban revolution with a diplomatic
and economic boycott, and that Cuba's isolation from its
neighbors was coming to an end, with or without U.S. compliance.
The IZVEST1YA interview was loosely pegged to the "approaching"
first congress of the Cuban Communist Party (FCC), and the
correspondents said they asked Castro to describe "pre-congress
Cuba and the problems disturbing the country's communists."
Castro, however, "took the initiative" to discdss the situations
in Chile, Brazil and other Latin American countries before
coming round to the correspondents' questions on Cuban domestic
affairs.
ATTITUDE TOWARD U.S. The IZVESTIYA correspondents, who remarked
that "the conversation did not take place
quite as we supposed," managed to interject a question on U.S.
adherence to the "bankrupt doctrine" of isolation of Cuba. Castro
agreed with the journalists that Americans were "pragmatic," but
he speculated that it was hard for them to "admit defeat"; possibly,
he said. the United States was clinging to its policy in hopes of
exacting concessions in return for lifting the blockade. He
insisted that "we do not intend to make political concessions,"
while conceding tKat Havana was interested in liquidation of the
blockade because ":t is causing us harm"--an admission he had
earlier made in a L'HUMANITE interview last September. Claiming
that the U.S. Government had "long ago realized that the blockade
could not break the revolution," Castro asserted that regardless
of U.S. policy, Cuba would continue to "achieve considerable
successes in social and economic fields."
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Castro's attitude toward the United States was mirrored in Cuban
comment on Secretary Kissinger's I March speech in Houston on
U.S.-Latin relations.* A 5 March Our America commentary on
Havana's international service portrayed the speech as a rehash
of the untenable policy of urging dialogue while simultaneously
threatening Latin governments that have adopted a "policy of
defense of natural resources." The Our America feature?which
strives to build an image of Cuban solidarity with Latin America--
indicated that Kissinger's suggestion of dialogue was a hollow
one after the United States had "trampled on the rights of the
ations of our America." Noting that "it is not the first time
that Kissinger has said that the United States seeks a new
dialogue," the commentary concluded that the time of the "absolute
omnipotence of the United States" had passed, and that the
veF,tion of dialogue no longer depended "on the will of the
imperialists."
The Our America commentator did not mention Secretary Kissinger's
reference to Cuba, which was taken up by a more outspoken "Letter
from Freddy," broaCcast in Guido Garcia Inclan's domestic service
feature on 5 March. "Freddy" seemingly attributed the Secretary's
Cuba remarks to inconsistencies in U.S. policy and to congressional
pressures on the White House, noting that Ford administration
officials were "frequently correcting themselves because they have
to face a powerful Senate." In the most rer.ent of several Cuban
allusions to senatorial attempts to change the administration's
Cuba policy, "Freddy" asserted that "the Senate now has realized
that the sanctions imposed against Cuba are useless," and added
that "maw Senators want to put an end" to the problem of sanctions.
Hailiu Haw?lals growing wealth and prestige in the Americas,
"Freddy" claimed that Cuba's "white gold"--sugar--was in great
demand and said that "today Cuba can demand and command."
CUBAN-COLOMBIAN RELATIONS Castro in the IZVESTIYA interview
remarked that the United States
understood that maintenance of the blockade was complicating its
relations with other Latin countries, many of which, "despite U.S.
pressure," have diplomatic relations with Cuba. He noted that
* Initial communist media reaction to Kissinger's speech, which
foresaw a thaw in U.S.-Cuban relations once OAS sanctions against
Cuba were lifted, is discussed in the TRENDS of 5 March 1975, pages
25-26. Havana and Moscow comment on the most recent attempt to
remove the OAS sanctions is discussed in the TRENDS of 27 November
1974, pages 20-22.
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this process was continuing, rind said relations with Colombia
"will possibly be resumed in the near future." Restoration of
relations was in fact announced on 6 March, the day the INESTIYA
interview was published. Havana is not known to have commented
on the renewal of ties, although the action was promptly reported
by Havana radio's international and domestic services.
Moscow welcomed Bogota's move, PRAVDA 'ailing it a "telling
blow" aimed at the "decrepit wall of the blockade" which was
expected to "collapse finally in a not so distant future." Thc
PRAVDA article, reported by TASS on the 13th, repeated Soviet
encouragement to the Latins to establish ties with Cuba in order
to demonstrate their independence from the United States. PRAVDA
asserted that "Cuba's heroic struggle" had aroused "deep fellow-
feeling" among Latin Americans who no Longer chose "to reconcile
themselves to dictates in any form whatsoever." Similarly, a
Moscow radio Spanish-language broadcast on 7 March said that
Colombia's step would "undoubtedly have great impact" not only
in Latin America "but all over the world." The broadcast praised
Bogota's independence and saw the resumption of relations as evidence
of the "irreversible and total rupture" of the blockade against Cuba.
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USSR
POLICE OFFICIAL ASSERTS ALL PEASANTS TO RECEIVE INTERNAL PASSPORTS
An Azerbaydzhani police official, interviewed In the 15 January
Azerbaydzhan paper BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY, has provided the first clear
indication that the new Soviet internal passport system may provide
such passports for all Soviet peasants. The new passport law
adopted last August, as well as subsequent commentary, have treated
ambiguously the touchy question of whether thc millions of Soviet
peasants currently without passports would Leceive them under the
new system. Such a change, if true, would have far-reaching con-
sequences, since the withholding of Internal passports has long
been used as a repressive measure to keep peasants from leaving the
farms and has recently come under fire from economists and
sociologists.*
Azerbavdzhani Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs T. A. Aliyev
toucb,,.d on the extension of internal passports in the context of
indicating the huge amount of work the police face in introducing the
new system. He stated that "for the first time the whole rural
population will also be provided with passports," a process that
won't be completed until December 1981. He added that those who
leave their villag-2s for over 45 days and those reaching their 16th
birthday would be among the first receiving passports, while rural
residents presently without one would receive them only later.
According to other press articles, a majority of kolkhozniks still
have no passports, although the practice of issuing passports varies
"'rom oblast to oblast.
The original 28 August statute setting forth the details of the new
passport system had declared that all citizens reaching age 16 would
have passports, but said nothing about peasants who currently lack
passports. However, the USSR Council of Ministers decree adopted
along with the statute ad-2,7.11 a special excer.'ion for rural residents,
indicating that such peasants would receive passporis if they left
*heir homes for over 45 days--seemingly implying that they might not
receive them otherwise and leaving open the possibility that local
authorities might not permit them to leave their farms.
* For background, see the TRENDS of 31 December 1974, pages 19-22.
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But an explanation by the Agriculture Ministry's le!;a1 department in
the 10 December RURAL LIFE declared that the new statute stipulated
that all citizens over t() must possess a passport, including those
rural citizens who orcvionsly had not been issued passportc. This
appeared to overstate the new law, since this latter clause in fact
appears nowhere in the published statute. The 10 December explanation
also included the decree's special. 45-day exception for rural residents,
which appeared to contradict the assertion that all rural citizens
would receive passports.
On 25 December the press announced decisions by the CPSU Central
Committee and USSR Council of Ministers to alter the passport system,
and in the next few days various Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD)
officials commented on the new system in the press. However, while
the announcement and the commentary indicated that henceforth all
citizens would receive passports at age 16 and that a uniform system
for issuing passports was being established for both city and village,
they all avoided the question of whether the huge number of rural
citizens without passports would now receive them. The ambiguity has
persisted, since following the initial MVD commentaries there have
been no articles on the new system in the Moscow press, nor has the
subject been raised in letters on legal questions published regularly
in journals anti papers. The new statement removes this ambiguity
by indicating that local officials understand the law to apply to
the older generation of peasants which has never had passports, as
well as to the younger generation as they reach the age of 16.
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PRC-TAIWAN
CHINA FREES MT "WAR CRIMINALS," PERMITS RETURN TO TAIWAN
Peking has added a new amnesty twist to it:: ongoing efforts to
reunify Taiwan with the mainland, announcing that all Kuomintang
and other "war criminals" now under PRC custody will be released
and that those desiring to return to Taiwan will be allowed to
do so, with travel expenses paid by Peking. NCNA reported on
the 18th the 17 March decision by the Standing Committee of the
National People's Congress(NPC), which held its second session
in Peking on 17 and 18 March. The NCNA account disclosed that
Premier Chou En-lai had submitted the proposal for amnesty,
"acting on instructions from Chairman Mao Lnd the Central Committee
of the CCP," and that the NPC body had "unanimously approved."
On 19 March Peking radio broadcast the complete NCNA reports on
the amnesty decision in its service for Taiwan listeners.
According to a statement at the NPC session by Vice Premier and
Minister of Public Security Hua Kuo-feng, the Chinese decision
involves the release of 293 war criminals, most of whom were formerly
attached to the "Chiang Kai-shek clique." He said that Peking's
gesture reflects the "greater stability and unity" in China today
and is of "major significance for developing the revolutionary
united front" and for "promoting the patriotic struggle of the people
in Taiwan against the Chiang Kai-shek clique." Hua pointed out
that those wishing "to return to Taiwan may do so," adding that
"whoever wishes to come back after going there will be welcome."
He indicated that the former prisoners would be received in Peking
by party and state leaders upon their release.
The new Chinese move complements longstanding efforts by Peking
to promote greater interchange with the people on Taiwan and thus
put on the defensive the Chiang government in Taipei, which has
consistently opposed interaction between the two sides. NCNA did
not mention a PRC pardon for those "war criminals" who reside in
or hold government posts in Taiwan, but NPC Standing Committee
Member Liu Fen pointed to the amnesty decision as evidence that
Kuomintang officials on Taiwan should "repent as soon as possible"
and take the "sole correct way out" to atone for their crimes by
contributing to the liberation of Taiwan and national reunification.
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BACKGROUND Peking in the past has used the release of captives
to signal its goodwill to a former adversary, notably
releasing detained U.S. fliers in mid-1955 at the start of the
Sino-U.S. ambassadorial discussions in Geneva, and freeing several
U.S. prisoners during the recent years of Sino-U.S. rapprochement.
A more comparable example to the current PRC move waL the decision
of the Standing Committee of the NPC in April 1956 to release 335
Japanese war criminals, a forthcoming gesture underlining extensive
PRC effeLts at the time to normalize relations with Tokyo.
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NORTH KOREA
KIM IL-SONG URGES EXPANDED TRADE TIES WITH CAPITALIST STATES
A Kim 11-song speech, broadcast by Pyongyang's domestic radio on
4 March, has acknowledged with striking forthrightness that
North Korea "must actively go out to the capitalist markets to
purchase materials and machinery we need." Kim's speech to a
meeting of industrial activitists was the first explicit admission
of the North's need to trade outside the socialist market to be
publicized for the domestic audience. Although the North's trade
with the West has been growing fo._ several years, Kim's previous
discussions on the need for trade ties with the West had always
been confined to interviews with foreign media that were not
publicized by Pyongyang.
Kim noted that trade confined to the socialist countries was no
longer sufficient for the North's Ceveloping economy. He argued
that foreign trade provided the means to "enhance our country's
external standing and dignity" and to develop "favorable relations"
with other countries. The decision to publicize Kim's speech
stressing the importance of foreign trade and calling upon those
in export industries to improve their work may have been prompted
by the difficulties Pyongyang's foreign trade program has encountered
securing foreign exchange and overcoming a reputation for inferior
merchandise. One year ago, for example, in a speech to an industrial
congress, Kim had touched indirectly on the foreign exchange problem,
urging the production of more goods for export in order to earn
"precious foreign currency." In his current speech, however, Kim
did not raise the foreign exchange issue, conc2ntrating instead on
the need for high quality exports in order to earn the "confidence
of the international market." While products for dcmestic consumption
must be "neat and useful," Kim noted, export goods must be of "better
quality" and be "neatly" packed. As part of the program to "conduct
foreign trade well" and help justify the "confidence placed in us,"
Kim urged that enterprises fulfill export plans "ahead of schedule--
at the beginning of each month." Lest the North's current shortage of
sea transport stand in the way of expanding foreign trade ties,
Kim instructed the foreign trade ministry to make greater use of
'chartered ships."
A major element of Kim's philosophy of nation-building, and a
frequently repeated theme in DPRK media, has been the insistence
on economic independence based on substantial--but not total--
economic self-sufficiency. Kim's forthright admission now that
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the DPRK must trade with capitalist countries, particularly
in a speech publicized for his domestic audience, thus suggests a
break with past dogma. There was an attempt by Kim to
rationalize this ideological shift: he asserted that the need
for such trade sprang from the DPRK's economic success, and that
the North's heavy industry was so developed that the country
only imported equipment for which it had "no great need."
Furthermore, Kim was careful to note that the North, aware of
the "intrthsic defects" of a capitalist economy, would not
become dependent on the capitalist market for raw materials.
This point was reiterated in a 17 March KCNA report which asserted
that the North meets domestically more than 70 percent of its
demand for industrial raw materials, and relies on the socialist
countries for the rest, thereby safely insulating the North from
the "worldwide crisis of the capitalist economy."
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NOTE
TITO VISIT TO POLAND: The communique on Tito's 10-13 April "friendly"
visit to Poland followed tte pattern used on his previous visits to
bloc ountries by stressing that continuing differences in domestic;
and international policies did not hinder the development of bilateral
relations. Tito professed to be "very satisfied" with his talks
with Gierek and described the relations between the two countries ?
as "very good." Tito, as well as Gierek, also indicated a proximity
of views on internatioaal affairs in general; however, the communique--
like that following Cierek's May 1973 visit to Yugoslavia--omitted
any formulation indicating a resolution of standing differences.
Belgrade's continued reluctance to commit itself to attending a
European conference of communist parties was indicated by the fact
that neither the communique nor Tito in his public remarks mentioned
the subject. Warsaw media, on the other hand, reported that the
two leaders did take up the subject in their talks; and Gierek,
in a 10 March dinner toast, made a pointed effort to identify
Yugoslavia with the conference by hailing the "essential contribu-
tion" being made to its preparation by both Yugoslavia and Poland.
On the prospects for the Conference on Security and Cooperation
in Europe, the communic.ue said Tito agreed with Gierek that
realistic conditions e..cist for its "quick," summit-level conclusion.
However, in his dinner toast, Tito expressed his reservations about
the conference in pointing out that it will not be a panacea
for Europe's problems pnd reiterating his standard position that
Europe's security is dependent on security in the Mideast and
Mediterranean.
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19 MARCH 1975
APPENDIX
MOSCOW, PEKING BROADCAST STATISTIC
Moscow (2541 items)
Upcoming V-E Day 30th (8%)
Anniversary
China (6%)
Supreme Soviet Dee- (--)
gation in Jordan
Finland President (--)
Kekkonen in USSR
S 10 - 16 MARC11 1975
Peking (1030 items)
11% Guyana Prime Minister
Burnham in PRC
5% Cambodia
3% UN Industrial Develop-
ment Organization
3% Meeting, Lima
OPEC Summit Meeting,
Algiers
Zambia Foreign Minister
Mwaanga in PRC
These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and
Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used
to denote the lengthy item?radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, govern-
ment or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items extensive reportage are
counted as commentaries,
Figures in prentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.
Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always
discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in pi ior issues;
in other case'. the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.
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