TRENDS IN COMMUNIST MEDIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00608R000200160026-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 28
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 19, 1999
• Sequence Number: 26
• Publication Date: December 10, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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FBIS
FOREIGN BROAnCAST
INFOi'91AATION SERVICE
Trends in Communist ~Aedia
10 DECEMBER 1975
CVOL. XXVI, N0. 491
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This report Is based exclusively on foreign ~nedlo
motorlols and Is published by FBIS without cc ~rdinotlon
with other US. Government components.
NATIONAL SECURr7Y INFORMATION
Uneu iorl:ed Disclosure Sub{act to Crlminel Sanellons
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to ~ECr!~BER 7.975
CO~IT~NTS
Bxezhnev Affirms CSC1~ Commitment, Attacks the Weat
1
lirezhnev Praises Gierek, Stresses 131uc Harmony .
2
Gierek Gi?;n.Q Candid Review of Economic Problems
3
'J.S.-VIETNAM
Hanoi Noncommittal on 'word Remarks on Indochina Relations
5
PRESIDENT'S CHINA TRIP
Peking Reports Visit Conclusion? Silent on "Pacific Dc~ckrine"
7
Moscow Sees Sino-U.S. Disagreement oti Detente, Accord on Asi~i
$
East Europeans Stress Presidenf:'s Unshaken Support of Detente
9
EAST TIMOR
PRC, DR'J, tend Cuba Score :udonesian Invasion of Former Colony
10
CY.]:N.A
Peking Signals New Campaign Against Education "Revisionists"
i4
USSR
Huge 1975 Gxain Shortfall Hin^ed at Supreme Soviet Session
19
KOMMUt1IST Article Attacks Kosygin's 1965 Economic Reform
?,0
NOTES
DPRK Ideological Campaign; PRAVDA Correction
23
APPENDIX
Moscow, Peking Broadcast Statistics
i
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PALISH PARTY ~';'i~~VGRESS
The 7th Congress of the Poi: ih ~Jnited Workers Party, which opened in
Warsaw on 8 December, pro~~~i. red the setting fo?r CPSU General Secretary
Brezhnev's first mayor sp~'~~et..h on foreign policy issues sin,_e his
31 July address to Lhe CS(,'1: meeting in llelsinki. Like his Helsinki
address and most of his o4:'..~er spe.~eches this year, his 'Warsaw speeo?h
was n short one, running rtlnly 29 m,:inutes. It covered th~:ee main
topics--Polish party achii:?vemenc.R, +:elations among the socialist
states, and East-West rea.?s?tions generally.
Aside from an zinc haractcl:?.:isticaLly critical attitude toward the
West, Brezhnev struck p~r.~~,dictable notes on all sub3ects. He d:.d
balance his criticism e` th.e West with a renewed assurance of the
Soviet Union's commitme~.tt to detente. Notal;ly, he failed to
mention either the projected European communist parties conference or
the Chinese leadership--both of which mere mentioned by Gierek. In
leis last appearance e" an East European party congress, in Budapest
in March 1975, Brezhnev mentioned thQ European CP conference and
criticized the Chinese obliquely.
Overal.t, Brezhnev's focus on defensive themes--.:riticism of *h~~ West
and stress on social9~?st unity--seems to reflect astand-pat attitude
on East-[lest relations combined with an effort to reemphasize
Moscow's socialist c:reden*ials.
BREZHNEV AFFiRNt'' CS,r,E, COMMITMEivi', ATTACKS THE WEST
Brezhnev provided ?:new momentum to Moscow's developing campaign of
criticism of the West by strongly attacking what he described as a
"campaign of slanc.~zr" against the socialist countries that has
allegedly emerged in the West in the wake of Helsinki. Denouncing
this campaign as directly counter to the "spirit" of the CSCE
decisions, he said that the creation of a climate of "mutual trust"
and "an appropriate moral and political atmosphere" were precondi ticna
for further development of East-West relations. Brezhnev had some other
harsh words for the West, as he warned of "bourgeois" attempts to weaken
the unity of the socialist bloc through "ideological penetration" and
the use of "economic levers" and maintained that people of "all
continents" could expect help from *he Soviet Union in "rebuffing
Western aggression." He did not specifically discuss S~~~iet-U.S.
relations.
Brezhnev':s remarks on CSCE are the most extensive and detailed by
any Soviet leader since the conclusion of the CSCE summit. They
serve to emphasize Moscow's annoyance over Western attempts to
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pN~Ytray a discrepaneZ` between commitments at Helsinki and Soviet
practice since the summit. Brezhnev criticized those who failed
to see the significance c,r the CSCE agreement "as a whole" and who
tore tl~e document "into little bits" for "tactical convenience."
Tlbe "needling" and "pinpricks" of "cprhain influential cj.rcles"
in the West, lie charged, are aimed at "ar~~~sing retaliatory reaction
and poisoning the atrnoaphere." All these activities, lie said, are
"far from being 9.n accord" with the lielsinlci spirit a,nd impede
the strengthening of mutual trust and constructive cooperation.
Brezlutev seemed to g~~ out of his way to suggest a linlc between the
1Jest's future behavior on the'CSCE agreements and tine Soviet
Union's future attitude toward other East-West issues. In an
unusual reference to the CSC)/ followup meeting scheduled to re
held in Belgrade in 1977--Soviet leaders and the media have rarely
mentioned the 1977 meeting in post-CSCE comment--Brezhnev asserted
that there "could" be "concrete positive results" if the Helsinki
agreements are implemented "step-by-step " and if there is a
"strengthening of mutual trust." Without this, he said, there "can
be nn talk of genuine blossoming of international cooperation."
Brezhnev's lengthy x'emarks on CSCE did serve to underscore Moscow's
belief in tl~e continued efficacy of the Helsinki framework for
structuring European relations despite the adverse developments
about which he complained. Brezhnev further underliT-ed the continuity
of So~~iet foreign p~~licy in observing that despite the "complex and
contradictory nature" of the cu~?rent international situation, detente
continues to be its dominant feature, and in calling for further
"concrete acti~~ns" to strengthen it. lie mentioned specifically the
need for progress in MB:'R and for point action in areas such as
environmental protection and transportation.
His emphasis on threats to the unity of the socialist bloc elsewhere
in the speech acid his failure to touch upon specific international
issues other than CSCE seemed to suggest, however, that Moscow is
at the m~?Qnt looking inward to relations with its socialist allies
and seeking to reaffirm its socialist credentials.
BRE7J~INEV PRAISES GIEREK, STRESSES BLOC HARMONY
Brezhnev paid warm tribute to the Polish party's efforts. under Tirst
Secretary Edward Gierelc'a leadership, to overcome ita domestic
economic difficulties. The Soviet lEader's praise for Gierek went
beyond the endorsements of the Polish leader voiced at *_tie 1971 PZPR
congress or or. the 3l:th anniversary celebration of communist Poland
in July 1974, where he had praised Gierek as a national leader only.
Now, in his 9 December speech, Brezhnev hailed Gierek as "an outer
standing figure of People's Puland, the socialist community, and the
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international communist movement." The tribute was more in line
with those given by Brezhnev to other )last );uropean party leaders
in recent years, which have usually cited the leaders' role in
the world communist movement.
Implicitly taking note of the crisis experienced by Poland five
years ago, Brezhnev praised "the atmosphere which exists in ~he
country now." In tune with Gierek's own sober assessment of
Poland's economic situation, Brezhnev noted in restrained terms that
the Polish communists "have every reason to be satisfied with the
results of theft work" in recent years and voiced "no doubt" that
the PZPR would "do everything possible" to carry out the "complEx
tasks, tasks of great magnitude" in the future.
Presumably with Romanian complaints about Soviet dominati~:i chiefly
in mind, Brezhnev; praised the socialist community as "a voluntary
alliance of equal, sovereign and independent states." He went an
to take the West to t~+.sk for alleged efforts to weaken the unity
of the socialist community and undermine socialism "in various
socialist countries" through ideological subversion "and the use of
economic ].ewers." The. reference to econom.].c levers could be a
possible warning about dangers inherent in trade with the West by
such countries as Romania, Hungary, and Poland i.taelf.
Brezhneti's reference in this connection to "traitors to the socizlis;:
cause" who "denigrate our community" and distort the socialist
countries' mutual relations could be an allusion to deposEd
Czechoslovak leader Dubcek and his Prague Spring follo~rers, whose
denunciations of the 1968 Warsaw Pact intervention ann the present
Husak regime have been aired in Western media during the past year.
Husak, shortly after his return iron a Moscow visit in March of
this year, had explicitly branded the activities of these dissidents
as "treason" in a mayor Prague speech. Brezhnev had used much the
same formula in referring to the Czech dissidents in his welcoming
speech for Husak during the letter's visit to Moscow in late
vovember. lie described them as "renegades who have given up the
cause of socialism." Gierek, also, in his earlier report to the
congress had referred to "class enemies both in our country and, above
all, among those striving to influence us from abroad" who attack
the unity of the soci.~liat countries "and in particula_? our alliance
with the Soviet Union."
GIEREK GM'S CANDID REVIEW OF ECONOMIC PROBLEMS
In his opening report to the congress on the 8th, Polish party
leader Gierek devoted most of his attention t~ domestic matters,
particularly the state of the Polish economy. Attributing some of
the blame for the shortages of various consumer goods, including
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CAST EUROPEANS STRESS PRESIDENTS UNSHAKEN SUPPORT OF DETENTE
Moscow's East Europaau allies emulated Soviet media treatment of
the visit in highlighting the President's reaffirmation of his
support for detente in the face of Peking's anti-Soviet attacks.
A Budapest television commentary on the 2d was typical of other
comment by M^scow's Warsaw Pact allies in saying that the President
had "adhered to the sober rules of the game of peaceful coexist--
Ence" despite Peking's efforts to "incite" the United States
against the Soviet Union. EVen stronger satisfaction was expressed
by th.e Polish daily DZIENNIK LUDOWY which, according to PAP on tl~e
6th, contended that the visit "confirmed" that the United States
attaches the highest priority to its relations with Moscow.
However, the Moscow-allied countries also expressed caution about
the visit. For example, the 6 December Prague daily PRACE, while
noting U.S. resistance tc Peking's ante-Soviet overtures, warned
that i;. would be "wrong to view this idealistically," since the
United States had also sought to avoid antagonizing Peking by
"satisfying" it in other areas, particularly economic. Similarly,
scattered East European.. commentaries alleged that the two countries
shared cotmnon ground i.n support of U.S, efforts to assert an
"imperialist" presence in the Far East.
Bu^harest treated the visit in noncommittal fashion, :~imiting its
coverage to brief, factual reports. This contrasted with the
Highly favorable comment which welcomed President Nixon's 1972
visit. Bucharest's. gingerly treatment of the Ford visit probably
reflects its unwillingness to become embroile3 in the Sino-Soviet
dispute; a stance demonstrated by its policy. of ignoring attacks
on Peking by the other Warsaw Pact members. Yugoslav comment
accords with Belgrade's traditional position of neutrality regard-
ing tensions among the big powers. Thus, in noting the U.S.-
Chinese differences over detente, Belgrade studiously avoided
discussing the merits of their respective positions. Belgrade
comment generally tended to disparage the significaYice of the
U.S.-Chinese talks by portraying ;.l~P~n as yielding notl-.ing more
than a clarification of the differing stands of the two sides.
TANJUG's Washington corresponden= on the 9th, however, commented
that the visit exceeded the "expectations" of U.S. observers and
professed to see "at least a hint" of "more coordinated actions"
of the two countries ir. dealing with international problems. At
the same time, the correspondent echoed earlier Belgrade comment
in asserting that the U.S. had no intention of subordinating its
relations with Moscow for the sake of greater rapprochement with
Peking.
Peking's ally Albania took the same approach as during the 1972
i7ixon visit in limiting its coverage to terse reports.
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~~,ST TIMOR
PRC, DRV, AND CUBA SCORE INDONESIAN INVASION OF FORMER COLON`,'
Peking, Hanoi, and Havana havF publicly condemned Indonesia f~~r
its 7 Decemuer invasion of the farmer Portuguese colony of Enait
Timor. The Chinese reaction represents a mayor departure fr:*-
Peking's circumspect treatment of the Jakarta government in recent
years, when it has been attempting to improve relations with its
noncommunist Southeast Asian neighbors. Both Hanoi and Havana,
but not Peking, lulus linlced the Indonesian action with President
Ford's visit to Jakarta, with ARV media portraying it as part o.f
a larger U,S. strategy for Southeast Asia. Mo9cow med~'a are not
known to have commented on their own authority on the events in
East Timor, although TASS }ices carried reports o:~ the situation and
noted the Portuguese Government's appeal for convocation of the UN
Security Cou~~cil to end Indonesia's "armed aggression."
PEKING The first authoritative Chinese comment on the Indonesian
mili~ary ac~t,ton in East Timor came in a 9 December
PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article which criticized the Indonesian
move and, for the first time, extended explicit :?~upport to the
East Timor "people's" struggle. Low-level PRC criticism of
Indonesian military intervention was vaiced before the Commentator
article, however, in a brief NCNA report on 5 December remarks by
the Chinese representative in the ',inltpd Nations and in a
7 December NCNA report on militar~~ developments in East Timor.
The commentator article refrained from attac:lcing Indonesian leaders
by name, but it bluntly labeled Jakarta's military action an
"armed invasion" designed to "annex" East Timor. Rebuffing
Indonesian "pretexts" for sending troops into the territory, it
charged that the action not only threatened Fast Timor's security
but also undermined the "peace and stability of the area." While
criticizing Indonesia for "turning a deaf ear" to repeated appeals
for friendship from the newly established Democratic Republic of
E~^_~t Timor, the article held out "hope" that Indonesia and East
Timor might yet peacefully solve their problems, provided Jakarta
withdraws its forces.
Th.e Commentator article portrayed the founding of the Democratic
Republic of East Timor on 28 November by the Revolutionary Front
far Independence c+F Rest Timor (FRETILIN) zs a reflection of the
"East Timor peopl~.'s aspiration for independence." It did not
offer explicit Chinese support for the new government, however,
instead noting the resolve of the "people of East Timor" to "carry
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put rttmcd reaiatr.tnce" i.n def.rnae of. J.ndrpectdcncc~ and p]edYLn); thrtt:
"thy Ch.lncnc pcopJ.c 1'.LrmJ.y r~upporr: l'he I:nnt 'I'lmor pcopl.e'u rttruggie
for nut?ional .LiLeratiun r-rd independence."
Peking media mince m1.d-October had cac~r. Led occa~alonal. NCNA cLia~-
patchcs favor.rtbly notl.ng FRE'L'LL7:N opporrltt.on t'o Lndoncr-In and
rival East Timor. pc~.l.iticrt]. groups, but hnd not cxp 1 is t t.1 y atnted
u Chinese poait:Lon.*
Thr_ current Chinese denuncirrti.on ol. lndonealu's actions contrasts
aharp].y with the Peking med.La's care,.ul. CrcatmenC oC ~alucrta in
recent. years. In concert with Peking'r+ c~Cf.orl'e to improve rcl.a-
tions w:tth noncommunist neighbors, Chinese media r3.[nce 1970 have
i;:uCClod criticism of the Indonesian regime rna sh.:rply reduced
attenti,~n to the Indunertian Communist l'arLy (I'Kl) . Advc.~se
Chinese reporting on I;tdoncaian affairs in the past throe yearn
has peen limited to NCNA reports in Aubust 1973 on anti-Cnancsc
riots and in January 197G on student demonstrations. u~ring this
same period, Peking has acknowledged the presence in China of PKI
lender Jusu# Ad;Jitorop only in noting his appearance rtt annual
May Day and Chinese National Day celebrations. This pattern was
recently broken when NCNA reported that Ac?jitorop had attended r.
29 November Albanian National Day reception in Peking.**
E?W~O1 Vietnamese media have condemned the Indonesian invasion
of Last Timor, voiced support for rRETILIN, and warned
that the United States was the mastermind behind Jakarta's actions.
The first direct Vietnamese criticism of Jakarta in available media
was in a 9 December NHAN DAN article which accused "the reactionary
forces in power in Jakarta" c` t?ttemptinE to "annex" East Timer,
"strongly condemned" Indonesian "aggression," and "demanded" the
ir:unediate withdrawal of Indonesian troops from East Timor.
Indonesia's military involvement in the East Timor conflict had
been noted in Hanoi media since a 3] October NHAN DAN article on
the fighting, but comment had stopr.ed short of explicitly condemn-
ing Jakarta's actions. The 9 December NHAN DAN article also
explicitly criticized East Timor ;tolit:ical groups attacking
FRETIL'iN, charging that they were "fostered by the Indonesian
'* For a discussion of Peking's earlier treatment of the East Timor
question, see the TRENDS of 3 December 1975, page 25.
** For bacl!:ground on previous Peking media treatment of Indonesia,
see the 22 August 1975 FBIS SPECIAL REPORT ON COMMUNIST. PkOPAGANDA
No. 310, "Peking's 'Dual-Traclc' Policy in Southeast Asia Produces
Gains,'' pages 8-9.
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authorities." "Warm support" oC the Vietnamese "pcnr].c" for
FRI.I'Ii,iN hnd been voLced ear..l.icr to n 3 December NIIAt~ DAN article,
but was not repented In nubnrcluent' Ilano! comment.
ilanol'n conteneioa that Lndoncnia's actions in 1?ant '1:Lmor. were
encouraged by the United States wets underlined in the 9 December
NIUN i)AN nrtic].e and nt: rtr.tic.le in Ql1AN b0l NIiAN DAN on the
fo1]owing clay, NRiAN DAN charged Chrtt the CimEn~a of the invnni~n
demonstrated that Washington hnd "pivcn the grren ''.,l,ght" for it--
ci>:ang the fact that the military move came on the heels of
:%resident Ford'rt visit to .lnkltrtn and reports that Secretary
Kissinger had stated that the Unltc;l States would not recognire
the DemocrnGic People's Republic of l.nat 'Cimor. The QUAN ~OI
NIUi`1 DAN arr.icle made rt similar ].inkagc and charged that Indonesia
playa "nn important rota" in U.5. effgrts to "patch ila military
l~.nc o[ defense in Southeast Anin rind the western Pacific." The
paper reJccted its a decryption President Ford's reported remark
that he was c.atcerned with Indonesl.a's use of force and hoped for
peaceful settlement.
Although llanoi comment in the wake of the communist takeover of.
5outit Vietnrtm last spring ltnd called attention to Vietnam's desire
to ar.rengthen relations with Southeast Aatan states and had
suggested that conditions were favorable for such a move, ,:he
media itncl also continued to note crit!c:.rlly evidence of Indonesia's
continuing ties with the United States. llanoi commentaries on
Southeast Asia also pointedly recalled Indonesia's anticommunist
me,~surea following the 1965 coup attempt, asserting that "nobody
can forget" the "mass^cre of hundreds of thousands of communists"
and outer progressives in "one of the Southeast Asian countries."*
HAVANA A I?adio Navarra report on 9 December condemned Jakarta's
invasion of East Timor as "2noth~~ product of the
imperialist conspiracies against popular governms,.rs" and further
proof that "reactionar~- intervention continues to be q general
phenomenon for Third '~lorld countries." Like Hanoi, Ha~ona linked
the Unf.ted States to the invasion, quoting the East Timor Foreign
Ministry as having "denounced the collusion of the U.S. Government
in this interventionist action by Indonesia" and pointing to the
"very significant fact" that the invasion came on the heels of the
Indonesia visit by President Ford and Secretary Kissinger.
Although Cuban media in the past Save scant attention to Timor,
Radio :iavana's current repor,: i~ consistent w'~th the Castro regime's
tendency to see a U.S. hand ir.t internal disturbances in Third World
* Hanoi's postwar policy toward Southeast Asia is discussed in
the TRENDS of 11 June 1975, pages 9-12.
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Ilungl:,deuh coup whlca, nccuned "Clrc: 1nec,-nnCLonnl ~:ou-,kerrevolukion
hendcrl by U. S. .lmper.iul.inm" of brl.np,i.n}; ubouk "taic~ over.Lhr.ow cif
rmokher pol~uanr, unki-imper.iul.l.nk f;overnmr..nt." 'll,c cur.r.enk repor.k
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Wor1J counkr.ien rind oppoaikion ko nnnexr,ki.on of nc~wl.y .lnclcpcnclenk
rerrLkoC:[es by lurger ttei.gbboru, rru 1.nd1c:,L'ecl by t?lu: rzlrong beck--
1.ng Cubtt ;u,tc recenely ~:Lven Ile].1.zc.
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Cf~INA
PEKING SIG~WLS NEYJ CAMPAIGN AGAINST EDUCATION "REVISIfJNISTS"
Cl~inn's ong.{ng controversy over educational policy between cidv~cates
of radical, revoiutionoxy education and L?he moderate "revisionists"
wl~o place more stress on t:nditional academic values appears to l~avc
taken another turn, in n new campaign pressing tl~e revol~itionnry
line. The new drive was signalod by nn unuBUally critical attic le in
the December issue of RED FLAG attnck.ing "bad elements in educe tionnl
circles," who Peking evidently sees as seeking to restore "revisionist"
pr?~ctices in China's schools. T}a+s ~qED rLAC, article, 'orientation of
Educational Revolution Should Not lie '?'n~~pered With," was written by
the mass :riticiem groups of Peking University and Tsingl~un University,
China's ~`.wo most preatigiaus universities. It was broadcast by Peking
radio on 3 December r+nd printed in PEOPLE'S DAILY on the 4th.
A Peking broadcast on 29 November lad icnted that the same issue cif
RED FLAG contains other articles c~n tnc politics of educational
reform--r_ot yet available in translation--tlint apparently will also be
used to criticize cadres who have charged that th,~,, educational system
that has developed since China's cultural revolution is inadequate to
meet China's needs. The n,ew campaign also is reflected in another
signed article in PEOPLE'S DAILY on 9 December and initial provincial
radio reports defending the educational reforms of the cultural
revolution sad warning of the need for vigilance u~uinst attempts to
"sabotage" the educational reform of that period.
The new campaign comes against the background of recent calls in
the Chinese provincial media for improving the quality of education,
particular~y for students engaged in scientific study. Tt~e mod crate
line on educational reform now under fire appears to be linke3 to
the recently concluded national conference on learning from Tachai
in agriculture. Ever since that conference ended in Peking in October,
the Chinese media have been dominated by exhortations to heed the
Tachai tall to speed the modernization of agriculture, industry,
natio;.:.?i defense, science and technology. These ambitious modernization
goals, which will require the full support of larger numbers of skilled
workers, may have caused overzealous education officials to go too far
in improving the quality of education at the expense of political
stu~ay--an imbalance the new campaign appears to be designed to correct.
There is evidence that in the new campaign Peking hopes to straighten
out the line on educational reform without recourse to disruptive mass
sctiona of the type used in the cultural revolutii~n, in the 9 December
PEOPLE'S DAILY article seconding RED FLAG. Tb:s a*ticle, published on
the paper's front page, was signed by Liang IIeiao, an authoritat{ve
fin.I11N fri 0f10017
~elenMicNl~ 9.tlnN11N
u. iwiAM Ifeni ~Ne of lew..
Approved For Release 1999/09/26 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000200160026-6
 CONFIDGNTUL 1~ 14 C;i '1'ItLi;1)S
Approved For Release 1999/09/26 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000QIQD;Al6Afl2~6
ChineuC commentator. l.irmg crugycr~ted thnl' "these irnpor.tant
problemrr" over the educati.onsl. ] ine