TRENDS IN COMMUNIST MEDIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00608R000200160023-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 32
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 19, 1999
• Sequence Number: 23
• Publication Date: November 26, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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Tr~nd~ ~n ~o~r~~mun~st Media. ~6 Nov ~75 ~~ ,TCM 75
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26 NOVEMBER 1975
"exercise administration and jurisdiction over them." It cites
Chinese claims going back as far as 2,000 years and alleges that
Peking's current stance is supported by recent archeological
discoveries on the islands and by the fact that past Chinese
governments had long exercised administrative control there. It
also cites for support maps and atlases recently published in the
United States, Japan, West Europe, as well as the Soviet Union.
In maintaining that Soviet atlases had Craditionally supported
China's island clams, the article offers Peking's first acknowledgment
of Soviet media criticism of Chinese military actions ~n the Paracels.*
It complains that following the Chinese move in January 1974 the
"Soviet revisionists" launched a "venomous" attac?z on China. Since
January 1974, low-level Soviet propaganda has continued to criticize
China's claims to the disputed islands and its use of force in the
Paracels. Moscow has implied backing for Vietnamese claims, but has
avoided voicing explicit support. Thus, most recently, a 24 November
commentary broadcast by Moscow's Radio Peace aid Progress in English
to Asia labeled China's January 1974 military action an "annexationist
act" reflecting Peking's "big power chauvinism" and noted that Asian
public orinion had rightfully branded the attack as an "outright
betrayal of the cause of the Vie*_namese patriots."
PAST TREATMENT OF Following its military victory over Saigon in
CONTESTED CLAIMS the Paracels in Jan~zary 1974, Peking had muffled
comment on the disputed islands, and did not
respond to the Hanoi medl.a's 5 May 1975 report that communist
Vietnamese forces ha.d captured several islands from the forme_ Saigon
regime, including six islands in the Spratly archipelagoes. However,
immediately prior to the China visit by Vietnamese Workers Party First
Secretary Le Duan in September 1975, Peking radio broadcasts to
Vietnam and Taiwan had carried a report by the station's correspondent
which reaffirmed China's claims to the disputed islands and recalled
for the first time in months the 1974 PRC victory in the Paracels.**
In addition, an extensive articJ..e on recent Chinese development of
the Paracel Islands was published in issue No. 10 of the PRC inter-
national magazine CHINA PICTORIAL.
* The author or the article, Shih Ti-tzu (0670 2769 4371), has
previously engaged in polemics with the Soviets. An article attributed
to him in the March 1974 issue of the PRC journal GEOG~tAPHICAL
KNOWLEDGE dealt with the background of Peking's claims to the Amur
River region and pointedly criticized Soviet claims that the Amur had
been in Russian hands for over a thousana yeas.
** This issue is discussed in the TRENDS of 24 September 1975, page 14.
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Hanoi media have not pressed Vietnamese claims againsl? Pelcing; and
they avoided even mentionin;, the Chinese takeover of the Paracel
Islands in January 197~-, Since the Vietnamese occupied islands in
the Spratlys in May 1975, Hanoi has occasionally reaffirmed that
Vietnam will defend all of its territory, including the islands.
Thus, 1;or example, North Vietnamese Chief of Staff Senior General
Van Tien Dung, speaking at the recent Saigon consultative conference
on unification., noted that the Vietnamese armed forces would "firmly
defend our territorial integrity, including the territorial waters
and airspace of the unified socialist fatherland from Lang Son to
Ca Mau, t'rom the frontier Co the islands, from the mainland to the
c8:?tinental shelves. ."
Peking's heightened stress on the island claims in the current
article also has passible implications for PRC policy toward the
Taipei governme?~:t, which claims all the islands and maintains a
military garrison on an island in the Spratlys, and toward the
Phi.iippines, which claims some cif the Spratly Islands. China's
dir;pute with the latter may have been recently eased, h~~~ever, as
both sides agreed in the 9 June 1975 ,joint communique marking
President Marcos' visit to China to settle all bilateral disp4tes by
"peaceful means without resorting to the use or threat of
force."*
* Tf~ communique is discussed in the TRENDS of 11 June 1975
17-18. , pages
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V I ETNA~~I
NOP,TH-SOUTH CONFERENCE ON STATE UNIFICATION CLOSES IN SAIGON
Vietnamese media reports cn the 21 November closing session of the
Saigon political consultative conference on reunification announced
that the respective heads of the North and South delegations signed
Cwo "importanC" documents, the conference's final communi,~ue and a
"list of problems unanimously agreed upon."* The "list oi` problems"
has not been released, and reports on the conference do not project
a specific timetable for the creation of a single Vietnamese
government.
The media have publicized the conference communique, however.
According to a VNA transmission on 21 Dovember, the communique
stipulated tYiat general elections for a new nations]. assembly will
be held in the first half of 1976, under the supervision of a
''national election council" to be made up of an equal number of
representatives from the North and South. In addition, the North
and South are to have their own separate organs in charge of the
e1ections in Cheir areas--th.~ National Assembly Standir:;~ Committee
acting in this capacity in the North, and the PRG Advisory Council
in the South. In line with this allocation of responsibility, the
first session of the ?tcommon national assembly" is to be presided over
by DRV National Assembly Standing Committee Chairman Truong Chinh, the
head of the NorCh's delegation to the consultative conference, and
by PRG Advisory Council Chairman Nguyen Huu Tho, deputy head of the
South's conference delegation.
The goal of holding the nationwide elections during the first half of
1976 may be somewhat optimistic, in view of Truong Chi:h's assertion
at the 15 November session of the conference that a population census
would :~e required in the South prior to the balloting. It could take
several months to carry out the census in the South, judging by the
experience of the last census in North Vietnam, where conditions should
have been better than those prevailing in the South today. The tipril
1974 census in North Vietnam was f:~rst publicly announced in late
February, but it was some sip; months later--on 29 August 1974--before
its results were finally released. Presumably northern vot;.ng districts
wall also have to be revised prior to C:~e elections, since the communique
indicates there will be one delegate for every 100,000 people--a require-
ment which would reduce the total of 420 deputies for North Vietnam's
24 million population in the present DRV National Assembly.
~* For a discussion, of the opening of the consultative conference, see
the TRENDS of 19 November 1975, pages 17-19.
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Several delegates at the consultative conference reportedly referred
i:~ their speeches to overwhelming int?.ernational support for
reunification. but Vietnamese media coverage of foreign reaction
to the conference has been sparse. Among the few published
congratulatory greetings was one from Shitikov and R~,,ben, chairmen
of the two chambers of the USSR Supreme Soviet. There has beer,. no
similar message from the PRC, but Peking, like Moscow, carried
routine factual, rEports on the conference.
LE DUAN RETURNS TO HANOI FOLLOWING VISITS TO POLAND, ROMANIA
Vietnam Workers Party (VWP) First Secretary Le Duan and a North
Vietnamese party-government delegation have concluded a nearly
two-iaonth-long your of East Europe a..d the Soviet Union, arriving
back in Hanoi on 22 Noverber following final visits to Poland
(8-13 November) and Romania (13-18 November). Le Duan's tour began
in early October. and included visits to Hungary, Bulgaria, East
Germany and Czechoslovakia prior to leis arrival in Moscow on 27 October
for five days of offic~~al talks with Soviet party and government
leaders. Le Duan vacationed briefly in the Soviet Union Lefoze
departing for Warsaw on 8 November.*
A 24 November NHAN DAN ed:!torial welcoming the delegation home
recalled an earlier Le Duan visit to Peking in September, as well as
the visits to Moscow and East Europe, and hailed the tour as Yaarking
a "new and splendid development" in the solidarity and cooperation
between Vietnam and the "fraternal parties," NHAN DAN avoided any
suggestion that policy differences might have ariser. between the
Vietnamese and their hos~y, claiming a "complete identity of views"
::ad been reached during talks between Le Duan and the leaders of the
fraternal parties.
Le Duan's visits to Warsaw and Bucharest followed the pattern set
during his October stops in East Europe, including the standard
i~ilateral talks with party leaders, banquets and friendship rallies,
The joint statements issued at the conclusion of each visit--on
12 Novemr,Pr in Warsaw and 17 No~~=tuber in Bucharest--introduced no
new policy post*_ions and routi;tely affirmed the East Europeans'
intention to strengthen bilateral relations with the Vietnamese.
* Le Duan's ~~isit to Moscow is discussed in the `rFENDS of ___.
5 November '..~75, pages 8-10; his East European tour in the TRENDS
of 30 Octo~ier 1975, pages S1-S3; and his visit to China in the
TRENDS Uf 1 October 1975, pages i3-15, and 24 September 1975,
pages 12-14.
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Neither statement indicated that a unanimity of views was reached in
Che Callcs, although such claims were made for Le Duan's earlier talks
in Moscow and Budapest. A notable change appeared in Le Duan's
speeches in Poland and Romania, where he omitted the specific csl~
for "restoration" of solidarity among socialist countries which he
had voiced on the earlier leg of his East European tour and again
in Moscow. It is nc,t clear whether the absence of this formula,
which implies Pek~ing should be accepted into the fold w~.th other
communist states, reflects any shift in Hanoi's posture in the
Sino-SovieC dispute. Hanoi media routinely reported on the Polish
and Romanian visits, focusing reportage primarily on the portions
of speeches dealing with bilateral relations.
ECONOMIC AGREEMENTS During both the Warsaw and Bucharest visits
economic agreements were signed covering
the 1976-1980 Vietnamese five-year plan. In Poland the 12 November
signing ceremony included an agreement on "long-term economic
cooperation an~i trade exchange" for 1976-1980, and protocols on
"goods exchange" for 1976 and on the results of the intergovernmental
commission on economic, scientific and technical cooperation.
1ietnamese media reported that long-term loans were included in the
agreement. In addition, VrTA reported on 23 November that another
agreement ccverina Po~.and's "non-refund economic aid to Vietnam in
1975" had been signed in Warsaw on tl-e 21~t.
Romanian-Vietnamese economic pacts, signed on the 17th, included
agreements on long-term loans and goods exchange and nay~ents during
Che next five years, and protocols on trade for next year and on the
results of the intergovernmental cooperation commission meeting.
The point statement also provided for waiving repayment of loans
granted by Romania to Vietnam in 1966 and 1970-1973. The Soviet
Union and all it~ East European allies except Poland had announced the
cancellation of Hanoi's wartime debts following the Paris pea::e
agreement in 1973.
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A(VGOLA
HAVANA IGNORES FOREIGN CIJ~IMS OF CUBAN A[D, U.S. WARNI~;G
Havana has not acknowledged Secretary of ~;tate Kissinger's warning,
in his 24 November Detroit speech, that "tCte United States cannot
remain indifferet~.t" .*.o Soviet and Cuban military intervention in
Angola and the Se~:ret;ary's admonition that "Cuban meddling" in
the Angolan c~.vil war could destroy chances for a rapprochement
between Washington and Havana. (A TASS report. of the Secretary's
speech on the 25th similarly ignored Kissinger's remarks on
Angola.) Although Cuban media have given extensive coverage to
Angola in recent weeks, Havana's lack of response to the secretary's
warning is in line with its complete avoidance of. any acl~.nowledgement
of Western press reports of Cuban and Soviet invol?vemenc. Unlike
Moscow, Havana also has avoided any polemical references to Peking's
supporC to A.ngoian groups,*
There was no reticence in Cuban media aoout charging other countries
with interference in Angola, however, with Havana deploring
"imperialist" maneuvers said to have been carried out by "mercenaries"
from the United States, Zaire and South Africa against the Popular
Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MI'LA), whj_ch the Cuban
Government recognized on 11 November as ":he one and only l~:gitfmate
representative of its people." Thus, Cuban ambassador Ricardo
Alarcon, in a UN speech reported by the Havana domestic service oi~
13 November, said that Angela was "confronting the aggression of
imperialism and its colonialist and racist mercenaries." And
Luis Gomez Wanguemert, commenting on Havana domestic television on
tha 12th, asserted that the fortes f ightinf against the MPLA
"receive U.S. war material through the area bordering Zaire" and
that thy: b1PLA's enemies also "have the support of the racis*_
regimes of southern Africa which are allied to Yankee monopolist3."
Emphasizing U.S. culpability, Gomez Wanguemert quoted PRENSA LATINA
dispatches as providing evidence of an alleged "vast plot of the
U.S. Central Intelligence Agency" aimed against Portugal and against
the MPT~A. Claiming that the "CIA plot" was based on "shock forces"
recruited from Portuguese "reactionaries" evacuated from Angola,
the commentator said "no less than 300,000" were involved in this
threat to the MPLA, "the only true representative of the A.ngola-:
people."
* For a xeview of Moscow, Pek3.ng, Tyongyang and Hanoi treatment
of Angola, see the TRENDS of 19 November, pages 9-13.
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The Cuban leadership's only~allua~on to direct Cuban support for
Angola came fti~om PCC Secretariat member Jorge Risquet, speaking at an
Angolan solidarity rally reported by the domestic service on the
12th. Risquet a~?id that Cu~:a.ns "must reiterate our militant
solidarity" and addE.3 that ~"we are ready to demonstrate cur
solidarity in any field and even give our blood to the Angolar.
peop.te."
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MIDDLE EP,ST
MOSCOW CONTINUES PUSH TO REOPEN GENEVA CONFERENCE, WITH PLO
Routine follow-up rloscow comment on the 9 November Soviet Govern-
mer" note to the United States proposing reconvening of the Geneva
conference on the riddle East has continued to stress the need for
Palestine Liberation Organization participation.* Soviet comment.
has dismissed U.S, and Israeli opposition to PLO attendance as
"obstructionism," and also has sought to contrast the usefulness
of Moscow's proposal with an alleged failure of the "separatist"
Sinai II agreement, viewing the Soviet initiative as proof that
Moscow continues to play as important a role in the Middle East
as the United States. There has been only sparse, disapproving
Moscow comment cn proposals for new Syrian-Israeli negotiations
as the 30 Nover,~ber expiration date for the mandate authorizing UN
peacekeeping forces in the Golan Heights approaches. Comment, as
before, has left open the option of bilateral "partial measures"
within the Geneva framework as part of a comprehensive set~.lement.
U.S. RESPONSE TO Soviet media are not known to have acknowledged
SOVIET NOTE thus far Secretary Kissinger's 12 November
remarks at a Pittsburgh press conference in
which he said the United States was studying the Soviet note and
would be consulting "with all of the interested parties." L1~i
indirect Soviet acknowledgement was publicized in an unattributed
NOVOSTI agency article, published ~n the Jordanian newspaper
AL-A_KHBAR on the 22d. The NOVOSTI article commented that "as
expected, Washington has objections" and went on to assert that
Kissinger had recently discussed the Soviet proposal in Pittsburgh
and had "refused to grant the PLO a seat" at Geneva "unl^.s it
changes it.s attitude toward the aggressor." (Kissinger had called
the issue of PLO participation at Geneva "the major difficulty" in
the Soviet proposal and had reaffirmed that negotiations caith the
PLO were not possible unless it recognized Israel`s right to exist.)
A TASS report of the Secretary's Pittsburgh remarks on the 14th
omitted any comments related to the Soviet note on the Geneva con-
ference.
* The Soviet Government note to the U.S. Government, first publi-
cized and carried in full text by Tr1SS and Moscow radio in various
foreign languages on 10 November, is discussed in the TRENDS of
12 November, pages 9-10.
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The NOVOSTi article also referred to a U.S. proposal, Eirst made
in mid-September, for an "informal" meeting of the Geneva partici-
pants preparatory to convening the normal Geneva conference. The
Moscow media had previously ignored this suggestion; NOVOSTI called
it a "trial balloon" and "alternative proposal" to Geneva, but did
not criticize it.
PLO ISSUE Dismissing U.S. and Israeli opposition, Soviet media
have continued to stress the need for PLU participa-
tion at Geneva, occasionally adding, as in a PRAVDA international
review by Tomas Kolesnichenko on the 16th, that the t,ilks would be
"an idle exercise" without the PLO. Comment has waffled on the
timing of a PLO presence--the most notable feature of Moscow's
proposal--with some comment repeating the call for PLO participa-
tion "from the very beginning," and other comment avoiding the
issue.
much of *~Ioscow's comment has merely voiced common complaints against
alleged Israeli policies, and at times against U.S.. Mideast policies.
A 17 November TASS report on Prime Minister Rabin'?i remarks at a
week,~',~ cabinet meeting, for example, denounced his statement that
Israel would not attend the Geneva conference if the PLO were
present and r_harged Mat Israel's position proved it did not want
a political solution. Other comment has attributed Israel's ada-
mant stand to U.S. moral and political support, arguing twat the
t',a~~ governments' policies on the PLO issue coincide ,
USSR ROLE To drive home the point that Geneva talks are
necessary, Soviet commentators have sought to
contrast the ineffective "separatist" approach of the Sinai II
accord with Moscow's 9 November call for "joint coJ.lective efforts"
at Geneva. Some. comment has reiterated Moscow's displeasure at
being left out of the Sinai II negotiations and its intention to
b? part of future Arab-Israel~? r._alks. An IZVESTIYA article by
V. Kudryavtsev on the 13th expressed this attitude explicitly,
He argued that Moscow's recent initiative on Geneva had put the
lie to contentions by American and "certain shot.*.-sighted Arab
circles" that tr.e USSR had "virtually dissociated itself from
Mideast affairs, as though the o;