TRENDS IN COMMUNIST MEDIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00608R000200160002-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 28
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 19, 1999
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: June 25, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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FBIS
FOREIGN BROADCAST
INFORMATION SERVICE
Treads in Communist Media
~ide~tieF
25 JUNE 1975
(VOL. XXVI, NO. 25)
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This report is based (jxclus:v&ly on foreign media
materials and is published by FBIS without coordination
with other U.S. Government components.
NATIONAL SECURITY IN' uPMATION
Unauthorl[ed Dlscloture Sublet to Cnminal Sanctions
Clasuhad by OOOO13
Automatics". declassibed
s,x months hom dale of issue
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25 JUNE 1975
CONTENTS
U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS
TASS Head Defends Arms Talks, Elucidates Brezhnev's Proposal. . .
1
PRC-U.S.-USSR
Peking Assesses U.S. Gains in World Competition With Soviets. . .
3
VIETNAM
Hanoi Paper Scores Kissinger Speech on U.S. Asian Policies. . . .
6
Corrccti.on to 18 June TRENDS Article on Role of PRG . . . . . . .
8
MIDDLE EAST
USSR Speculates on Outcome of U.S. Talks With Arabs, Israel . . .
9
EAST EUROPE
Romanians Register Satisfaction With Results of Zhivkov Visit .
13
LATIN AMERICA
Communist Party Conference Stresses "Firm Unity," Attacks PRC . .
16
USSR
Mazurov, Kiril.enko Again Diverge on Economic Priorities . . . . .
19
NOTES
Pyongyang on Schlesinger; Peking on USSR-Japan;
PRC-U.S.-Taiwan; Peking South Asia Broadcasts;
Phnom Penh Radio on Sihanouk.
22
Moscow, Peking Broadcast Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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U. S, - SOVIET R ELATIONS
TASS HEAD DEFENDS ARIAS TALKS, ELUCIDATES BREZHNEV PROPOSAL
A recent defense of the USSR's current arms negotiations with the
United States by TASS' general. director and Soviet medi.a discussions
of a current Washington emphasis on further increasing U.S. military
power suggest that the question of how much Moscow has gained to
date in the arms negotiations remains a sensitive point for Soviet
policymakers. TASS General Director Leonid Zamyatin joined a
regular Moscow radio panel discussion of foreign affairs on 20 June
to defend the arms negotiations with the United States and shed a
little light on the new arms control proposal made recently by
General Secretary Brezhnev. Zamyatin was responding to listeners
who had written to express puzzlement over why the USSR continued
to talk with the United States about limiting arms while U.S.
policy continued to emphasize the desirability of further increases
in military might.
Zamyatin defended the success of U.S.-Soviet efforts in isolating
and effectively limiting certain aspects of the arms race, emphasizing
that the USSR did not adhere to a policy of "all. or nothing" in arms
control negotiations. Brezhnev had first taken issue with unnamed
advocates of an "all or nothing" policy in negotiations witi the
West in a September 1973 speech at Tashkent. Zamyatin's defense of
the U.S.-Soviet arms talks is only the latest of such efforts since
then.
The panel in which Zamyatin was participating expressed its concern
over recent directions in U.S. defense policy. Soviet media have
focused renewed criticism on Western arms developments in the wake
of Brezhnev's 8 May V-E Day address reasserting the impossibility of
an indefinite coexistence of "international detente and a constant
increase in the military potential of nations" and the joint S,wviet
party-government appeal issued the next day calling for new steps to
limit the "arms race in all its forms." Commentaries have been
particularly critical of recent statements by Defense Secretary
Schlesinger on the need for improvements in NATO's arsenal and of
the emphasis on NATO's nuclear potential reflected in the results
of the mid-June meeting of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group in Monterey,
California. Soviet leaders had expressed their own concern over the
thrust of recent statements on defense policy by U.S. leaders in the
republic Supreme Soviet election campaign which ended with Brezhnev's
address on 13 June.
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BREZHNEV ARMS Zamyatin also offered an opinion on what type
PROPOSAL of weapon Brezhnev may have had in mind in urging
a ban on "new categories of mass destruction
weapons" in his 13 June election speech. The TASS director gave
as an example alleged U.S. research on "supcrbombs" which kill by
the emission of electromagnetic radiation "such as X-rays and
gamma-rays" but without the attendant dispersion of radioactive
material. Some Moscow reports of reaction to Brezhnev's speech
in Europe and the United States have quoted without comment
speculation that he was referring specifically to military
applications of environmental modification. The 15 June PRAVDA
quoted an observation by the New 'York TIMES that the Brezhnev
proposal "could figure at the Soviet-U.S. SALT talks which will
resume in Geneva this month."
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PRC-U, S, -USSR
PEKING ASSESSES U.S. GAINS IN WORLI) COMPETITION WITH SOVIETS
Peking's first comprehensive assessment of the international "super-
power" competition between the United States and the Soviet Union
since U.S. setbacks early this spring in the Middle East and
Indochina portrays the UniLed States as bouncing back and holding
the upper hand over the USSR. The assessment was offered in a
lengthy 16 June Peking domestic radio program on current inter-
national events which focused on U.S.-Soviet rivalry in Europe, the
Middle East, and Southeast Asia in the aftermath of the March
stalemate of Secretary Kissinger's Middle East mediation efforts and
the April collapse of U.S.-sponsored regimes in Cambodia and Vietnam.
New elements in the Peking assessment included the view that the
Soviet-U.S. competition in Europe has reached a "new stage" as the
United States solidifies its relations with its West European allies
in oppouition to alleged Soviet expansionism there, a Peking claim
for the first time that the United States has regained the
initiative over Moscow in the Middle East, and Peking comment
hailing the U.S. withdrawal from Indochina and its continued firm
stand against the USSR in the Asia-Pacific region.
In recent months Peking had originated little comment on U.S.-Soviet
rivalry, instead relying on extensive NCNA replays of third-party
comment expressing encouragement to the United States to exploit the
"opportunity" offered by its withdrawal from such "secondary" areas
as Indochina in order to concentrate on blocking the USSR in "r)re
vital" areas such as Europe and the Middle East.*
EUROPE Peking's new assessment cited as evidence of the "new
stage" in U.S.-Soviet rivalry in Europe the "new
circumstances" and "new trends" in the region. The (commentary noted
that in the past Moscow had taken advantage of Washington's "over-
extended" international efforts to expand its own inf'-tence in
Europe, but that the recent U.S. withdrawal from Indoc_liina had
allowed the United States to unite more closely with its European
allies to counter Soviet designs. Following the U.S. "failure in
Indochina," the commentary stated, "the United States was able to
pull out of there, shorten its line of operations and concentrate its
strength on the principal area of contention with Soviet revisir.iism."
* For an example of NCNA use of foreign comment interpreti.ig President
Ford's European trip as the first step in a major U.S. diplomatic
offensive in Europe and the Middle East, see the TRENDS of 4 June 1975,
pages 6-7.
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Peking viewed as especially disquieting to the USSR the recent
U.S. efforts to strengthen the Atlantic Alliance during the NATO
summit, and it noted increased Western resistance to Moscow's
efforts to promote the European Security Conference and to undercut
West European unity. The comment cited as recent evidence of a
newly developing U.S.-West European unity and strength against
alleged Soviet expansionism President Ford's visits to Spain and
Italy, the talks between Turkish and Greek leaders, reaffirmations
of ties with NATO by French and Portuguese leaders, the results
of the British referendum on the EC, and Greece's formal request
to join the Common Market.
MIDDLE EAST Peking noted that Moscow had attempted to gain
influence at U.S. expense in the Middle East
following the collapse of U.S.-sponsored mediation efforts in March,
but claimed that "the going has not been very smooth" for the USSR,
its "impact has not been impressive," and its efforts to "meddle"
under the cover of the Geneva peace conference have "met considerable
resistance." "Not much progress has been made toward improving
Soviet revisionism's passive position in its contest with the United
States in he Middle East," the commentary added.
By contrast, Peking saw he United States as having successfully
"readjusted" its Middle East policy and mapped out a "new strategy"
to strengthen its hand against Moscow. It highlighted President
Ford's recent talks with Egyptian President as-Sadat and Israeli
Prime Minister Rabin, and claimed that "public opinion in the West"
judges that "the United States has once again gained the initiative
in the Middle East and has the edge over its adversary in its
contention with Soviet revisionism."*
SOUTHEAST ASIA While Peking acknowledged that the U.S. position
in Southeast Asia has become "increasingly weak
and strategically passive" in the wake of its Indochina defeat, it
has favorably played up recent signs of U.S. determination to sustain
* Following the successful U,S. mediation efforts in 1974, Peking had
consistently portrayed the United States as having the "upper hand"
against Moscow is the Middle East, but the Chinese fell silent on the
issue after the March 1975 collapse of Kissinger's mediation efforts.
An unusual NCNA report in March had depicted Moscow gaining ground
as a result of the U.S. failure, but the report was quickly cancelled
by NCNA and replaced I?y another report which depicted neither power as
in a dominant positi~;n. This unusual NCNA handling is discussed in
the TRENDS of 26 March `.~75, pages 4-5.
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its interests against Soviet expansion. The commentary reported
that Washington has been compelled to "readjust its strategic
deployment," and noted favorably that "it is reluctant to abandon
its interests in t'is region." The commentary also acknowledged
for the first time Assistant Secretary of State Habib's recent
tour of Southeast Asia, viewing it as evidence of U.S. determination
to maintain its position as an "Asian and Pacific country" and to
play "its deserved and responsible role for the Bake of the
interests of the United States and this region." By contrast, the
Soviet Union was portrayed negatively as the main menace to
Southeast Asian states and as trying hard "to replace the United
States and dominate Asia."
Peking earlier had indicated support for a post-Indochina U.S.
Asian presence to offset the USSR by giving unusually full NCNA
reportage to favorable U.S. comment on the U.S. Navy's Indian
Ocean presence and base at Diego Garcia. Peking has also favorably
reported the New Zealand Prime Minister's recent ri'ging endorsement
of the ANZUS pact with the United States, and has maintained silence
on other U.S. security pacts in the area, while sharply denouncing
Soviet attempts to attain hegemony there.
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VIETNAM
Secretary of State Kissinger's 18 June speech focusing on U.S. policies
in Asia has drawn only low-level media criticism from Hanoi. An
unattr.ibuted commentary, published in the party paper NHAN DAN on
21. June, charged that the Secretary's remarks demonstrated the United
States has not drawn the necessary lessons from Indochina and continues
to follow a "neocolonialist" policy of intervention in Asia. Other
Hanoi comment also condemned the U.S. role in the region, including a
22 June commentary in the army paper QUAN DOI NHAN DAN which took
exception to Washington's contention that Southeast Asian nations
believe North Vietnam has expansionist tendencies and are concerned
that Hanoi may foment subversion in the area. The paper maintained
that "the people of Southeast Asia, including many governments," are
recognizing the mutual advantages of improving relations with Vietnam.
In the past few days there has been a reduction in monitored material
on the situation in South Vietnam us a result of an unexpla:.ned
interruption of radio transmissions originating in Saigon. The Saigon
radio failed to come on the air with its scheduled 1100 GMT program
on 23 June and has since been heard only twice in unscheduled broadcasts
of an hour or less. LIBERATION PRESS AGENCY radioteletype transmissions,
which began originating from Saigon for the first time on 16 June, have
also not been monitored since the 23d.
Vietnamese media contained several references to DRV delegations in
South Vietnam, including a group of North Vietnamese writers who were
said to have attended a two-day conference of "liberation writers" in
Saigon which began on 17 June. A meeting of North and South Vietnamese
social scientists was also reported to have taken place there on the
same day. The media have noted recent visits to Danang by Hanoi
municipal party and government officials, and to Quang Nam by officials
from the DRV province of Thanh Hoa.
Security problems in South Vietnam continue to be reflected in the
media, with Saigon radio noting that the admir.istration was carrying
out efforts to eradicate "organizations of the U.S.-puppet regime" which
had refused to disband and were opposing the revolution. Both Saigon
and Liberation Radio reported that security cadres were "building a
network of security organizations," and that "most of the wards and
subwards" were organizing security cells, "red flag" cells, and armed
self defense cells to assist security forces.
HANOI PAPER SCORES KISSINGER SPEECH ON U.S. ASIAN POLICIES
The 21 June NHAN DAN commentary on secretary Kissinger's 18 June speech
before the Japan Society in New York sharply objected to the Secretary's
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criticism of Vietnam and Cambodia, denouncing him for "slandering"
the Vietnamese people with "distorted allegations" about the
situation in Indochina. While alluding to Kissinger's remarks
on the lessons the United States had learned from its Indochina
experience, the paper stressed his admonition that the lessons
should be applied carefully and charged that "the United States
will not renounce its policy of interference in other Asian
countries because of its debacle in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos."
The commentary treated in a similar negative manner the Secretary's
remarks on relations with Vietnam and Cambodia. NHAN DAN did not
quote Kissinger's affirmation with regard to the new regimes in
Asia--that "we are prepared to look to the future." However, the
commentary did denounce his remarks surrounding that declaration,
rejecting his criticism of the regimes for flouting international
agreements and standards and protesting his statement that the U.S.
attitude toward them would be influenced by their conduct toward
their neighbors and their attitude toward the United States.
NUTAN DAN charged that Washington was attempting to distort the
situation and "drive a wedge" between the Vietnamese people and the
people of other countries. It maintained in this regard that "the
solidarity and friendly cooperation between the three peoples of
Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos are very closc, everlasting and
unbreakable," and that "relations between Vietnam and Thailand and
other countries in Southeast Asia are also being improved."
On the question of Vietnam's policy toward the United States, the
commentary repeated Hanoi's stock demands that the United States
abide by articles of the Paris agreement guaranteeing U.S. noninter-
vention and Vietnamese sovereignty, independence, and unity, and
that the United States "strictly implement" Article 21 on its
"obligation" to assist in postwar reconstruction. It went on to'
state that "on this basis" DRV-U.S. relations could be normalized
and "other pending problems" settled, thus holding out no immediate
prospect for DRV cooperation in obtaining information on U.S.
personnel missing in action. The commentary did not repeat DRV
Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh's statement in his report to the
North Vietnamese National Asser')ly on 4 June that the DRV Government
was "ready to discuss with the U.S. Government" the questions of U.S.
aid, the search for the Americans missing in action, and the
exhumation and repatriation of the remains of Americans killed in the
war.*
* Trinh's report to the Assembly is discussed in the TRENDS of
11 June 1975, pages 6-8.
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CORRECTION
The TRENDS of 18 June 1975 erroneously st4.ted on page 17 that
monitored Hanoi media had failed to mention the 4 June PRG
Council of Ministers meeting. A recheck of monitors' program
summaries indicates that the PRG Council meeting was in fact
reported by Hanoi broadcasts in Vietnamese on 6 and 7 June.
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MIDDLE EAST
USSR SPECULATES ON OUTCOME OF U.S. TALKS WITH ARABS, ISRAEL
Moscow continues to speculate inconclusively on the possible out-
come of the U.:ited States' Mideast policy review and the prospects
for a new Israeli-Egyptian accord, viewing such a "partial settle-
ment" with skepticism. While continuing to regard renewed step-by-
step negotiating approaches with distaste, Moscow seems to have
placed its call for renewal of the Geneva conference on the back
burner. ThR Israeli report that the Labor Party had agreed on a
"map"--or at !east on negotiating positions---for Israel's post-
settlement borders drew predictable Soviet criticism of Tel Aviv's
"annexationist" stance and predictions that the Arabs would
refuse to negotiate on Israel's terms. Syrian Foreign Minister
Khaddam's talks in Washington on 20 June drew only minimal TASS
reportage. Boris Ponomarev, CPSU secretary and Politburo candidate
member heading a CPSU delegation to Damascus, may well have
sought to obtain a first-hand assessment of Khaddam's talks--the
delegation's visit, originally announced by Damascus as scheduled
for only four days, lasted from 20 to 25 June, the day after Khaddam's
return to Damascus.
DIPLOMATIC Soviet commentators have summed up recent U.S.
PROSPECTS diplomatic activity vis-a-vis the Middle East in
stock terms, with TASS General Director L. Zamyatin,
for example, asserting on the 20th that President Ford's talks with
as-Sadat in Salzburg and with Israeli Prime Minister Rabin in
Washington concerned a "limited agreement, not settlement of the
Middle East problem as a whole." In the. most wide-ranging discussion
of recent developments, Mideast specialist Igor Belyayev, on
Moscow radio's 22 June roundtable program, explored various inter-
pretations of peace prospects following President Ford's meetings
with as-Sadat and Rabin. One approach, he said, was the possible
resumption of "shuttle diplomacy," either by Secretary Kissinger or
some other diplomat. He cited recent remarks by Egyptian Vice
President Mubarak to convey the impression that Cairo regarded this
as an unlikely possibility.
Turning to the U.S. policy reappraisal, Belyayev remarked that it
was "still unclear" how this policy would be formulated. Possibly
inadvertently, he misquoted President Ford's 9 June news conference
statement that possible options were a resumption of the step-by-step
negotiations, or reconvening of the Geneva conference, or "a step-by-
step process under the Geneva umbrella." Belyayev rendered this as
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"using the stage-by-stage solution and a total solution as one
means" of solving the M:',deast situation. He claimed that the
importance of the Soviet position lay in the fact that it was
firm and open, calling ii "practical terms" for liberation of
all Arab territory occupied in June 1967, insuring the Palestinians'
national rights, and guaranteeing to all cot:ti:ries and peoples
of the region, including Israel, that the area would not be
troubled by new outbreaks of war.
ISRAELI Belyayev and other commentators have seized on reports
BORDERS that the Israeli Labor Party had agreed on a "map"
of post-settlement borders to belabor Tel Aviv again
for its "intransigence" and expansionism. Stressing that the
"map" confirmed many of Israel's 1967 conquests, Belyayev noted
that it proposed annexation of the Golan Heights and the Gaza
Strip, set the Jordan River as Israel's security line, and only
left open for negotiation the question of sovereignty over the
West Bank, Sharm ash-Sltaykh, and the eastern shore strip along the
Gulf of Aqaba. Belyayev did acknowledge that the Labor Party was
proposing that the government support the map, which was not yet an
official position, but lie implied that this was only a formality,
pointing out that the Labor Party was the "ruling party." He
expressed doubt that the leaders of the Arab countries directly
involved in military conflict with Isra'' "would be willing to
negotiate on the basis S;f this ne'?? wap."
TASS on the 20th called the "map of Israel's final borders" evidence
of Israel's "insatiable appetite," noting that it would almost
certainly become official policy. And TASS commentator Losev on
the 20th drew attention to the fact that reports about the map
coincided with Rabin's return from his visit to the United States,
where he has sought continued military aid. Losev charged that
U.S. aid had encouraged Is.cael to take "an even more intranrigent
position" on an Arab-Israeli settlement, and that Israel viewed
another disengagement agreement with Israel merely as a means
to consutidate its occupation of Arab land. In a .^.1_ June article,
PRAVDA's Glukhov called the map an "alarming signal" that Israel
sought to preserve tension in the area.
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POt,IOMAREV IN SYRIA Moscow I-aii provided :little ol. Hubi;Lnnce in Its
coverage of the 20-25 June visit to D,lmasc;H
by a CPSU delegation led by Boris Ponomnrev.* The only Soviet
re fcrencc , huu far to 1onomarev' u mceting with Syrian President
al-Arad came in an Arabic-Ianl;i age commentary by A. Tinmuhkin on the
23d, which noted that they had had "a f;?icndly converru-tIon."
Damascus radio accounts, not much more informative, said that al-AHnd
had been handed a mer;sage from Brezhnev (luring the three-hour meeting,
which dealt with bi.iat'!ral relations, the Middle East, and international.
questions. During the visit a CPSU-IIa'th Party "cooperation plan"
for 1975-76 was signed, and the CPSU delegation held talku with the
Syrian Communist Party.
Ponoarev also met with Ynsir 'Arafat, chairman of the Palestine
Liljeration Organization (PLO) Executive Committee, accordin,; to
reports by TASS and Cairo's MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY (MENA) on the 23d.
TASS said they discussed "prospects for resolving the problems of
the Palestinian Arab peoples within the framework of efforts to attain
a lasting and just peace" in the P'.iddle East, and that the Pal,stinians
"highly apprecipted" the Soviet positions. According to MENA's
account, PLO spokesman Abu M.ayzar claimed that Ponomarev had reaffirmed
the Soviet Union's every support to the PLO "in its capacity as the
sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people"--an official
recognition that the USSR has been rclucrant to extend publicly.
Moscow's first, and apparently only, formal. public recognition of the
PLO as the "sole legitimate representative" came in a low-level
communique on the visit of a Sovie: trade union delegation to Algeria
in March this year. This may well have been at Algerian insistence:
Algiers radio on 23 June reported still another Algerian-Soviet
c^ mmunique on the visit of a Soviet trade union delegation, which
again said the two sides "stressed that the PLO is the sole
C --presentative of the Palestinian people." There is as yet no
available Soviet report on this communique.
TALKS WITH CP Shortly before his Damascus visit for talks with the
DELEGATIONS Syrian fia'th Party, Ponomarev held talks in Moscow
with a series of visiting Mideast communist party
delegations. T'.,e most recent visitors, from the Iraqi CP, were
repoiLed by TASS on the 21st to have ended a two-week stay during which
they had talks with unidentified Soviet participants. Ponomarev's
Previously, Ponomarev led a delegation to Iraq for talks in
November 1973; in July 1971 he was in Egypt for the 19th anniversary
of the 23 July revolution and the Arab Socialist Union congress, and
he held talks with the ASU in Cairo in December 1970.
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meeting whit it L,r.b:tnenc CI' de Iegat Ion wart retorted by 'J'ABS
on 15 June, and If lrt Of 1k wIOf an Inrnei i CI' do I eg:; Li on Willi reported
on the 120h. I;nrI icr, In mid-May, I'onornarev had receivedI .1ordanItin
CI' Firnt Secretary Fund Nanaar, who wan presented WII.h i IFricn(1nh1p
of the I'coplen Order during hIn Mon(-ow vinlt. ';n the occ'anlon of
his 60L1t birthday. 'I'll(! Syrian CI', whIch nlrio unu:tlly ham LnIkrt
with the CI'SU about: once it year, .1 ppnrcnI 1 y h:;n not nenL it
(Iclegal?on Lo Moacow hln yenr, but Ponotnarev met with Syr-I1111
CI' lenuera during file aunt-compioted vino to Damanctut.
Such CI'SU meetIntga with Mi(leant CI''n do not normally uvcm to come
.in 11 Cluster, but, 1'onomarcv--and ,tometimen Sunlov or Kirlltrnko or,
rarely, firc7hnev--have held talk;; with the main Arab Cl'';; In
recent, yearn on the avernpe of once it year. Tun Iraqi Cl' t:alk;t
were reported in October 1974, November 1973, and October 1972;
Lebancne CI' delegations were in Moscow In September and February
1,974 and in June 1972; Syrian CP delegations met with CI'SU of t iclain
in August 1974, October 1973, atxi July 1972. Israeli CI' visitors
apparently have been oomewhat less frequent, but party secretary
general Meir VL1ner- led delegations for talks in June 1973, Ucc-'mber
1971, and June 1969. During the Dcccmb'r 1971. viulL Vilner met
with Demichev; in 1969 he was received by Brezhnev, after attending
the Into rnatIona! communist conference in Moscow that month.
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Approv
EA T EUR01)1
ROMANIANS RU-3 I:;Tut !A1 VA of T I ON W: T11 RESULTS OF Z) I I VKOV V i S i T
Itntnatlia'u (; t?: t;lr;rr;,?.II II:tt, voirrd rttrottg, s;:Iir;Iit cIIoil with I:tr rrfill Itn
of Itulgari:tn Ieadrt lhlvkov'r, I6-7O .tint- official itrtrlilt rrat vir,il,
marked by tilt, nip,nIng of a "Joint (Irclarat Ion'' which won not IceabIy
ac conmuulnt flip, toward Romanlntr ponlt Ionn on the Itlt-pendettrr of
Individual (cart Ira and r;t alrtr. '71ivkov'n wI I1 IW-gtt'ran to go part
wiry toward the Itomnni;rn ponit Iona; In the Jolla t;tat.ement slid not
carry over Io 111n; owl. rernarkn, however, which relt.c'rat'd ctnttomary
urtlusdox Bulgarian virwn. 'I?Le two Ralkon tu'Ig,hbnrt; alno nlgned a
numht-r of tcnport.nnt vcunomic and t+clcnt If it--terrtiicnl np,rrrmt-nt.n,
inri idin' acrot?dti on roordinatlon of I1vr-yr:rr? devt'loptnrnt plant,
count rust lot) of a major powerplttnt on the IJnnttbr and t.rttnnntir;t;lon
of ('14ctririty over. Ronut;tl,tn territory from the Soviet Union Lo
llttlf;aria. At the .?onClur;ion o; the visit Ccaunrncit chilractrrized
relationc, with til(. ortl,odnn Sol la rt'};Init, on a "model" for relntlonn
between .)clalls;l cou'itI Iv:; and Iill- tlier? Intlfca Iecl hit; n:;t.lt;factIon
by , ing, "warm great Ind;:; from tilt' hot torn of my heart to our denr
i riend odor ?,hIvknv." lit another endortwment the Itomtnirin party'n
f':,l It ical F.xt'c ut lve Committer hnl lt-d tilt- vii;It "with particular
warmtIt."
Joint dt-clar.tt Lou pu',1 Inccd in ';C1`TEIA on tilt- 21r;t. war, strong
'rile
on lilt, theme of Imltpendrnc?e and meager on rommuni:iI unity language,
omitting, entirely the cut;tomary orthodox call for greater bloc
"unity and cohenion," which Bucharest on occasion has accepted in
communiques; with bloc countries;. In a departure from recent practice
the (Ice!aratin:: -olr:ios;::Iy at Romanian fttsstigatiov--invoked the 1970
I riends;hip treaty between the two countries; to stress that the
genwtrally accepted Principles; of rclatlonn between countries with
different ;oci.a1 systems; apply also to relatlons; between bloc parties
and ,tales;. Thos;, the Bucharest declaration employed standard
cornmunist }argon in characterizing relations; between Romania and
Bulgaria as based on "'Marxism-Leninism, socialist internationalism
and the treaty of friendship, coot,cration and mutual ass;lstancc" but
went on to add "and the prin-1ples; of national sovereignty and
independence; equality of rights, comradely assistance, noninterference
in domestic affairs and mutual adv.,ntage . . . ." Although these
principles are spelled out in the tlulgarian-Romanian friendship treaty
and in Romania's treaties with oth_r bloc countries, communiques
between bloc countries normally cite these principles only in the
section dealing with general international relations.
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The -ccct.lon on communist pnrty relatb un nlno nuggest.ed llulgarlnn
Juno to Ronuurlnn nenrtlt.IV it.Iert. 'I'hun, the derlnrat:fon
nutted Iliat Life, two parties at trtrh "great rrly,nI l lean' c1" to bilateral
and molt fin tern I cooprrnt:Ion board not only on the prlnclplen of
"Marxlnrn-Lcttnlnm, proietar Inn Internet Ioffal fstn, aoI IdarIty,
comradely artnlntnttce and mutfill I support:" but. rtlr;o on the Ill, Iticfill ell
of "Indepenctenc'e, equal Ity cf rights and nottlrtterforenre In dontrnt Ic
niInfrrt." The two Ieadevi; rout.Ine:y endot'ned the prop-rued l{uropertn
c:omrrtr:nlrit party rontc'renet' by "p' lilt Ively" ,trutrnrrleg the preparatory
work thus fill- rind pledging to work for the unity of the "part.1cipatIng,"
par I.IvFi if if well rte of "r; II denocrif tle' nrul progrenr;Ive Iorceif . . . In
Europe.
I'll,, declarat.loll made lIt t Iv more than pro forma referencert to CI{MA,
In noting, the importance of carrying out. Lime complex program, rind
to the Warsaw Pact. Although the two leaders nrited the l'out.'0
"Important role" and the need for cooperation among its member:;,
their call for rttrengtltening ltrt defense cnpacfty as long all NATO
exists wan coupled with if reiteration of Life 1'a.-t's proposal for
mutual dinsolut foil of hot.h organizntlontt.
Zhtvkov's effort to appear accommodating toward homtnla In Life
Joint declaration wall balanced by remarks he delivered on the final
day of the visit In which he strongly asnert.ed orthodox position,.
Thus lie repeatedly called for greater "unity and cohesion" within
the bloc, emphasizing Sofia's in? 'rest in greater economic Integration
within CEMA and in the "Indissoluble unity" of the Warsaw fact. The
Bulgarian leader also repeated his earlier calls for a world communist
party conference to follow the European party conference.
ROMANIAN D1PLOMATIC To recent months Ceausescu has shown strong
AGRLLWNTS interest in publicizing diplomatic agreements
and statements emphasizing Rcmanircn independence.
In addition to "solemn declarations" signed t.fth numerous nonalined
and Western countries, recent accords have included:
4- A Joint communique on Foreign Minister Macovescu's 9-13 December 1974
visit to the Soviet Union, in which Moscow agreed to the Romanian
language stating principles of relations between states are to be based on
"equal rights, the observance of independence, national sovereignty and
noninterference in internal affairs, mutual advantage, and refraining
from the use of force and threat of force."
?- r "treaty of friendship and cooperation" with a non-Warsaw Pact
communist state after the 22-26 May visit of the DPRK's Kim I1-song;
Moscow signed a "treaty of frietdship, cooperation and mutual
assistance" with the DPRK in 1961.
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4. An unprecedented "trcnty of triandnhip and coopr_rntior" with n
NATO rnrmber nftar Portuguenc Prenldent Contn Gornea' 1.3-15 June
vtnit.
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2.5 IUNF 1.975
LATIN AMERICA
COt11UNIST P/WY CONFERENCE STRESSES "FIRM UNITY," ATTACKS PRC
I'he decIaria loil I.rtnurcl by tiit, 9-13 June conference of Latin Amer Ic it it
communist portIvs in Havana---the fIrut such pan-I,st;n gathering
nlnct' 1.964--Indic-sites t:ltnt reltitIonn bet.wern Cnntro and the I,ntin
portler+ hove nlilftrd from tt'e open confronto'tion of the Iate ,150'n
to renewed accommodation. Both Havana radio ,in(] 'PASS polnted out
t'slat. (he conference-- in what TASS, but not liavana, ident.i.fled stn all
''off i.cial communique"--hod ntrcaned the "firm unity" of the parties.
'f'lu major conference clocnment , it declaration on the sltuat.ion In
Latin America, while prafning the "grent achievements" of the Cuban
revolution under Castro'n irm, bold and correct lcadernhi;>,"
asrncrtrd that the Latin revolutionary movement count use "the most
diverse" ft)rim; n'.ir methods of struggle according to the different
coedit tons in e.+0+ country.
Conference attendance won apparently confined to the Western
hemisphere, Havana .ad TASS I:siting 24 Latin partici.pantt and
no'Ing chat the Catuulion and 11.S, communist parties vent delegations
an observern; no mention wnt; made of any Soviet participation.
In reimrtir}; the, conference declara~Ion, 'PASS naid it pointed out.
that Cuba had demonsIrat.ec+ it. way; possible to take the road of
social int. construct ton on the American continent. 'PASS predictably
highlighted the declaration's "resolute condemnation" of PRC policy,
ranging from Peking's "overtures to imperialism" to its, "slander of
the USSR." TASS also noted that the conference "came out" for an
international conference of communist and workers parties, a point
not mentioned thus far in Cuba.-s reportage. Havana radio, which did
not announce the holding of the conference until a day after its
conclusion, Is now in the process of broadcasting the declaration
text in installments.
LATIN CP UNITY The major conference document--the declaration on
"Latin America in struggle against imperialism,
for national independence, democracy, the well-being of the peoples,
for peace and socialism"--reflects the rapprochement between Cuba
and the other parties achieved in the past few years. In the
mid- and late-1960's Castro assailed most of the orthodox parties at
one time or mother and often backed guerrilla groups which clashed
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w;.th the party leadership in various Latin countries.* But Cubn
huts gradually shifted from ILu single-minded inriutence on
armed struggle toward favoring "diverse paths" to socialism, and
has recognized the vanguard role played by the communist parties.
The conferer.ce (lecl.aration, judging by iiavana'ta broadcast, summary
vcruion, in effect emph,uil?zcd the vanguard role in noting.~ that
the "working class must have the leading role" and that the
communions were "linked to the matuaes in the labor movement" and
therefore "understand their immediate needs." The document also
called for contribut.lona by other forces in stating that "the
participation of the broadest social sectors" was essential. The
declaration said that the Latin revolutionary movement m~tnt use
the moot diverse forma and methods of struggle, "correctly
adapting I.tu locution and timing according to the different
conditions in each country."
According to Havana's summary, the declaration placed the major
blame for the region's poverty and failure to attain true
independence on "the brutal exploitation by the U.S. imperialists."
Praising the "magnificent example" of the Cuban people, whom the
imperialists could not crush, and noting favorable developments its
certain other countries, the CP declaration concluded that historic
circumstances favored Latin America's "second and definitl.ve
struggle for independence," which would be achieve?I throug;; socialism.
ATTACK ON PRC, ;he conference declaration digressed from itc.
WARNING TO OPEC general preoccupation with Latin affairs to
blast Peking's "flirtation" with imperialism--
including the PRC's "Justification" of NATO and its "shameless
collusion" with the Chilean Junta--and claimed that the Chinese
party leadership "slandered the USSR with the same skill. as the
worst spokesmen for international reactionaries." The harsh
language, even given the pro-Soviet orientation of the parties, seems
to point up the poor state of Sino-Cuban relations since at least
1973, when Castro's openly pro-Soviet stance at the nonalined
conference in Algiers met with disfavor in Peking.**
* Castro's vitriolic attacks on the traditional parties before and
during the Havana-based Latin American Solidarity Organization
conference in 19b7 are discussed in the TRENDS of 17 August 1967,
pages 4-13.
** NCNA's critical handling of Castro's speech defending the Soviet
Union at the Algiers conference is discussed in the TRENDS of
12 September 1973, pages 8-9.
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According to Havana's summary, regarding the only other
extracontinental issues discussed, the document *'rnlsed the "great
Vietnamese victory" and a plored "imperialist maneuvers" against
oil-producing countries. Although the conference declaration
apparently made no other mention of the oil question, a 11RIENSA
LAT1NA dispatch of 16 June reported that the conference had issued
a statement "warning" that OPEC must "express firm economic
solidarity" with the underdeveloped world if the oil producers
expect to have the continued backing of the non-oil-producing,
underdeveloped countries. PRENSA LATINA also reported that the
conference had approved Castro's proposal that surplus income
obtained from petroleum price increases should be invested in
underdeveloped countries or made available to them through credit
arri.ngements, a suggestion Castro has often made.
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USSR
MAZUROV, KIRILENKO AGAIN DIVERGE (N ECONOMIC PRIORITIES
Divergent vicwpotntn on Soviet investment priorities for heavy
industry and consumer goodu were again expressed in June speeches
for the RSFSit Supreme Soviet election campaign by CI'SU Central
Connnit:tee Secretary Ki rillenko and First Deputy Premier. Mazurov,
both of whom concentrate their actlvitien on industry. Kirilenko
favored more investment for heavy industry, and Mazurov more for
consumer goods. 'Chic year, In contrast with the 1974 election speeches,
Mazurov appeared on the defensive while Ki.rilenko confidently cited
Central. Committee support for his position, apparently reflecting
the December. 1,974 CPSU plenum approval of higher growth rates for
producer goods and lower rates for c..muumec' goods. irezhnev and
Kosygin, who app_ared to lead the conflicting sides during the
19'4 debate,* have not recently sided with either secto?. publicly.
Last year, in the June 1974 USSR Supreme Soviet election speeches,
Mazurov had clc;'rly urged fnore investment in construction of
consumer goods capacity, while Kirilenko had stressed the enormous
amount already invented in new consumer goods capacity. According
to the 8 .luny. 1974 PRAVDA, Mazurov, In discussing construction,
declared that "we should adopt special measures to speed construction
and expansion of enterprises producing consumer Foods" and he also
stated that the party would continue to stress fuller satisfaction
of the material demands of Lite public. Four days later, as reported
in the 12 Juite 1974 PRAVDA, Kirile.^' .. "stressed that one of the
characteristics of present-day economic development is that almost
half of all newly constructed large projects are enterprises of the
light and food industries," which "has permitted it significant
increase In output of consumer goods."
In this year's election speech Kirilenko appeared on the offensive,
declaring, according to the 11 June 1975 LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA
version, that "the Central Committee considers it necessary for machine
building to develop at higher rates" and "it is hardly necessary to
1?:ove how important it is" to achieve a level of development "which
will more fully satisfy the growing needs for new, improved and more
productive machines . . . ." He added that 800 enterprises of the
light and food industries had already been built during the current
five-year plan, permitting a "noticeable increase in production of
consumer goods."
* For background on evidence of the positions of Brezhnev and Kosygin
on priorities, see the TRENDS Supplement "Soviet Factions Renew Debates
over Economic Priorities," 23 May 1975.
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Mnzurov, on the defensive in hill current: election speech, only urged
"constant attention" for the consumer goods Industry and pubIic
services and argued, according to the 5 June 1.975 LLNINGRADSKAYA
I'RAVI)A ver.aion, that at the present stage of economic development
one could develop heavy Industry and strengthen defense while also
"simultaneously aIgnifieanIly raising the people'a welfare."
Mnzurov received little encouragement from past consumer goods
advocates i'odgornyy and Kosygin in their own election speeches this
year. I'odgornyy, who back In 1965 had also argued that it. was time
for consumer goods to grow along with heavy industry and defense,
declared this year that "no society can consume more than It produces,
and the further growth of the people's welfare will depend directly
on the increase in the economic might of our country and on the
labor participation of each and all." Kosygin, who as recently as
November 1973 had insisted on higher growth rates for consumer goods
than for producer goods, this year made a statement similar to
I'odgornyy's, while Brezhnev did not even address economic issues.
Brezhnev, despite his long association with heavy industry, in 1974
had offered some encouragement for the consumer goods industry. In
his June 1974 election speech he had declared the slow growth of the
light and food industries unsatisfactory, but he did not call for
more investment to help these branches. In his 11 October. 1974 Kishinev
speech Brezhnev called for a deemphasis on new construction in general
and, as if aiming at both side:,, he complained of poor return on
investment "both in the work of heavy industry and in production of
consumer goods."
Nevertheless, Brezhnev appears to have sided with his old heavy industry
colleagues in deciding where new investments should go. Addressing
the Council of Ministers chaired by Kosygin in early October, he
apparently laid new priority on heavy industry: the council adopted
a decision listing heavy industry first, then agriculture, and finally,
consumer goods. Further, when the Central Committee met in December
it approved raising the growth rates for producer goods and lowering
those for consumer goods. The plenum also produced two new slogans
reemphasizing heavy industry: on the. need for further development of
heavy industry-- the backbone of our economy"--and on the "two main,
basic levers" to raise production--"speeding of scientific-technical
progress and improvement of the mechanism and methods of management,"
(At the December 1973 plenum the "two pillars" of economic policy had
been defined as "improvement of leadership of the economy" and "mobili-
zation of the widest masses of workers" in socialist competition.)
CI..