CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A024400010001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 13, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 3, 1973
• Content Type: REPORT

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Central Intelligence Bulletin
State Department review completed
Secret
3 May 1973
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No. 0106/73
3 May 1973
Central Intelligence Bulletin
CONTENTS
CUBA: Castro, in May Day speech, attempts to place
Cuba at forefront of a Latin America united against
the US. (Page 1)
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LEBANON-FEDAYEEN: Heavy fighting breaks out between
army and guerrillas. (Page 4)
INDIA: Mrs. Gandhi denies government plans large
grain purchases. (Page 6)-
WEST GERMANY: Imports grow 17 percent in quarter.
(Page 7)
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CUBA: Fidel Castro's May Day speech gave no
hint of movement in his attitude toward relations
with the US. The thrust was rather an attempt to
place Cuba at the forefront of a Latin America
united against the US.
Castro championed.--as Cuban spokesmen have
repeatedly done in recent international forums--
all of the major complaints the Latin Americans
have raised against US economic policies in the
hemisphere. As evidence of Cuba's common cause
with Latin America, he pointed to Havana's support
for Latin American positions on such issues as
sovereignty over natural resources, US trade bar-
riers, and the planned sale of US mineral stock-
piles. He described specific Cuban grievances,
such as the Guantanamo naval base, as less im-
portant than the problems Latin America has with
Washington, and repeated Cuba's willingness to
cooperate with nations that demonstrate their in-
dependence of the US, implying that his definition
of such independence is increasingly flexible.
Castro's comment that Cuba can wait as long
as necessary for a new Latin American organization
without the US was a recognition that Cuba still
lacks the influence with other Latins to press
actively in this direction. But he continues to
insist that Cuba wants nothing to do with the OAS
as long as the US is a member and the headquarters
are located there.
On relations with the US, Castro returned to
the subject of the economic blockade as a bar to
any dialogue. Because he does not expect any early
change in the US position on this and other out-
standing problems, he rejected any secret, direct
talks with Washington.
(continued)
3 May 73
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Castro's frigid tone on the subject of US-Cuban
relations may be related to a growing concern over
the implications for Cuba of the expected Brezhnev
trip to Washington. Fidel may press Brezhnev, who
has never been to Cuba, to stop off in Havana either
before or after his trip to the US in return for the
two visits by Castro to the USSR last year. If such
a visit takes place, Castro will undoubtedly seek
reassurances that Cuban interests will not be com-
promised.
3 May 73 Central Intelligence Bulletin
SECRET
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C LEBANON-FEDAYEEN: Heavy fighting broke out be-
tween the army and guerrillas in Beirut yesterday.
The clashes are the most serious since those of 1969
which left Lebanon without a government for several
months.
According to the Defense Ministry, the crisis
developed when guerrillas fired rockets at army po-
sitions in the southern suburbs of the capital. At
that time, negotiations were under way for the re-
lease of two Lebanese soldiers seized by the guer-
rillas. Lebanese forces, supported by tanks and
armored vehicles, immediately surrounded all Pales-
tinian refugee camps in the Beirut area and returned
fire against fedayeen positions.
Twelve Lebanese were killed and 40 wounded.
Guerrilla losses are not known, but are presumed to
be heavier. Fedayeen rockets set fire to an army
fuel station-and damaged barracks and a city post
office. The situation outside Beirut is thus far
relatively stable.
President Franjiyah met with his top security
officials to deal with the situation. The govern-
ment had already moved to improve coordination be-
tween the army and other security forces in actions
against the fedayeen.
For his part, guerrilla leader Yasir Arafat con-
tacted Lebanese authorities to arrange a cease-fire.
An agreement was reached, but sporadic firing con-
tinued throughout the day. The subsequent release
of the kidnaped soldiers helped to calm the situa-
tion,but independent action by some fedayeen could
trigger further fighting. For example, during yes-
terday's fighting, terrorists fired rockets in the
direction of the US Ambassador's residence,but there
were no casualties or damage.
(continued)
3 May 73 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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C Increased fedayeen activity in Beirut and their
movement into areas near the southern border with
Israel since the Israeli raid on 10 April have
strained Lebanon's relations with the Palestinians.
During the past week three guerrillas were arrested
at the Beirut airport as they tried to smuggle ex-
plosives out of the country. A number of others
have been detained in connection with an apparent
attempt to stage an action against the US Embassy.
The kidnaping of the two soldiers was intended to
force the release of these fedayeen.
3 May 73
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INDIA: Mrs. Gandhi has denied widespread
Indian press reports that India plans to import
an additional 6-7 million tons of foodgrains
"during the next several months." The press re-
ports were attributed to Ministry of Agriculture
officials who apparently wanted to discourage
hoarding and speculative buying, and forestall
further food riots. Mrs. Gandhi's denial probably
was intended to reduce the potential impact of
the press reports on world grain prices.
Foodgrain supplies to the consumers have in-
deed declined recently as the government depleted
its remaining stockpiles to meet demand and to
avoid further unrest in Maharashtra State, where
riots broke out last month. Regular distribution
channels have also been disrupted following the
government's nationalization of the wholesale
grain trade on 1 April. As a result, farmers are
withholding grain in hopes of forcing the govern-
ment to raise its procurement price for wheat,
which is currently below the free market price.
The ministry's statements were an effort to
shake loose these grain stocks. US Embassy offi-
cials were told privately that New Delhi actually
plans to import only 2-3 million tons "quickly,"
in addition to the 1.65 million tons already
bought this year. The government will then re-
evaluate the situation. If farmers sell enough
grain to the government, and if the summer monsoon
beginning in June is favorable, these initial pur-
chases may be enough to get India through the next
critical months. If this strategy fails, New
Delhi probably will try to obtain credit in lieu
of using foreign exchange to purchase the entire
3 May 73 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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WEST GERMANY: A first-quarter trade. surplus
in excess-3T72--.7 billion may indicate another re-
cord is in the making. Exports were up 19 percent
from the first quarter of 1972. Imports grew 17
percent in the same period, but most of the increase
came from rapidly rising prices. The trade surplus
for the rest of the year may be reduced somewhat by
the growing demand for foreign goods, despite their
high prices, as the West German economy continues
to boom. Leading economic research institutes have
also predicted some adverse effects on exports from
the recent currency realignments, although past
German experience with revaluation does not bear
this out.
3 May 73
Central Intelligence Bulletin
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