IS AN AMERICAN PROTECTORATE IN ASIA WORTH WAR?

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP66B00403R000200140045-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 30
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 2, 2005
• Sequence Number: 45
• Publication Date: May 6, 1964
• Content Type: OPEN

9-64
ing will not connt as another appear-
atiee; d With the further understand-
ing th4the remarks by the distinguished
Senator from Alaska will appear else-
where in the RECORD.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. GRUEN-1NQ. I thank the distin-
guished Senator from South Carolina for
his unfaihng courtesy.
Mr. President, many businessmen in
the disaster areas of .Alaska face the
unhappy prospect of assuming new, huge
debts to reestablish themselves in busi-
ness while at the same time having to
r6pay debts on business assets which
have been destroyed in the Good 'Friday
earthquake and resulting tidal waves.
The able Administrator of the Small
Business Administration, Mr. Eugene
Foley, has wisely seen the necessity for
aiding the private sector of the Alaska
economy and has offered to make dis-
aSter loans to refinance the old indebted-
'legs of these stricken businessmen and to
finance the reestablishment of the busi-
nesses involved. He has seen the need
for generous terms and has offered dis-
aSter loans for $0 years at 3 percent in-
terest per annum with a moratorium on
the payment of interest for 1 year and -
a moratorium on the repayment of prin-
cipal for 5 years.
Last week Isuggested to Administrator
Foley that we should be at least as gen-
erous With laorrowers here at home_ as we
have been with borrowers under our for-
eign aid program where we loan huge
stuns at three-fourths of 1 percent inter-
est with a 40-year repayment and a 10-
year moratorium on the repayment of
principal.
'Under the law governing the small bus-
iness program, the Administrator can set
the interest rate for loans at any rate
from 0 percent to a maximum of 3 per-
cent. I have asked the Administrator to
equate our domestic loan program with
that of our foreign aid loan program and
set the interest rate on small business
disaster loans in Alaska at three-fourths
of 1 percent per annum. To do less is to
act unjustly to our owncitizens.
I have today renewed my request to
Adminiatrator Foley citing instances of
direct loans by the United States to pri-
vate industry abroad in sizable sums at
three-fourths of 1 percent interest per
annum, repayable in 40 Years with a
Moratorium on the repayment of princi-
pal for 10 years.
I ask unanimous consent that the let-
ter to Administrator Fole4y, in which the
request is made, be printed in the RECORD
at the conclusion of my remarks.
There being no objection, the letter
was ordered to be printefi in the RECORD,
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C NGRESS1ONAL RECORD ? SENATE
as follows:
U.S. SENATE,
Washington, DC., April 24, 1964.
? Mr. EUGEI9E P. POLVE,
Administrator, Small business Administra,
tion, Washington, D.C.
DEAR MR. PIGLET; Yesterday at the Meeting
of the Federal Reconstruction Commission
for Alaska you brought up my efforts to
Secure the same interest rate of three-fourths
of 1 percent per annum on small business
loans in disaster areas of Alaska as the
United States ilas charged for development
loans under the foreign aid program. You
sought to distinguish these foreign loans
from your domestic small business loans on
the ground that the foreign loans were made
directly to foreign governments and not to
the private sector of the foreign economy.
- After the meeting, when I informed you
that you were mistaken, you said that if I
could produce the evidence that some of
these three-fourths of 1 percent loans were
made to the private sector of the foreign
countries, you would feel that you could
Modify your position from your declared
Intent of requiring the maximum interest
rate prescribed by law (3 percent per an-
num) for small business loans made in the
disaster areas in Alaska.
The evidence you desired is set forth in
detail below.
In the first place, the foreign governments
to which three-fourths of 1 percent loans
are made are merely the conduits of those
loans to the business and industrial sectors
of those countries. True, many of those
foreign governments?not having our Amer-
ican concept of free enterprise?may retain
a part control or a nominal control of those
industries and businesses or may own and
operate them. But in essence loans to 'for-
eign countries to be used in the industrial
Sector of their economies produce precisely
the same effects as loans by the Small Busi-
ness Administration in the United States
and are identical in nature with our loans?
they help produce jobs for individuals, profits
for stockholders, and economic wealth for
the country.
If form rather than substance is the
stumbling block to your modifying your
stand, I could suggest a sizable loan to the
State of Alaska or to the Alaska Develop-
ment Corporation?the political equivalent
of foreign governments?at three-fourths of
1 percent interest to be loaned to business-
men in the, disaster areas of Alaska. But
it is not necessary to resort to such a device
since the evidence isabundantly clear that
three-fourths of 1 percent loans are made
in the foreign aid program directly to pri-
vate industrial and business concerns, as I
shall detail below.
Pursuing for a moment the economic ef-
fects of our three-fourths of 1 percent loans
to foreign governments for industrial pur-
poses, it is evident that when we gave (not
loaned) for the development of fisheries -re-
sources $848,000 to Taiwan, $159,000 to Cam-
bodia, $907,198 to Indonesia, $1,908,500 to
Vietnam, $5,351,000 to Korea, $1,128,620 to
India, $1,355,670 to Pakistan, $337,000 to
Somali, 8200,000 to Ivory Coast, $195,000 to
Nigeria, and $151,971 to Peru, these dollars
went directly to building canneries in those
countries (canneries of exactly the same type
as Pete Deveau of Kodiak, Alaska, is trying
to rebuild and for which he is seeking a
Small Business Administration loan) or to
build fishing boats operated by individual
fishermen (just like the fishing boats which
were destroyed at Seward, Valdez, and Kodiak
and for which Small Business Administra-
tion loans are now being sought by the fish-
ermen of those Alaska communities).
But we do not have to rely on this obvious
interpretation of what takes place in our
foreign aid program for reasons why your
position should be modified, for the foreign
aid program is replete with instances 'of
three-fourths of 1 percent per annum loans
made directly to private concerns repayable
in 40 years with a 10-year moratorium on re-
payment of principal.
Here are some exasmples of such three-
fourths of 1 percent 40-year loans:
Afghanistan: Loan on March 23, 1963, of
$2,625,000 to the Ariana Afghan Airlines, 49
Percent of the stock of which is owned by
Pan American World Airways (a private U.S.
corporation) and the major portion of the
remainder of the stock owned by private'-
Afghanistan banks; _
India: (a) Loan on June 28, 1962, of $17,-
900,000 to the Tata Hydroelectric Power Sup-
8719
ply Co., Ltd., and the Andra Valley Power
Supply Co., Ltd. (both private companies)
for the Trombay Thermal Power Station;
(b) Loan on September 25, 1962, of $13,-
700,000 to the Tara Engineering & Loco-
motive Co., Ltd. (a private corporation) for
expansion of a private truck plant;
(c) Loan on July 27, 1962, to NAPCO Bevel
_ Gear of India, Ltd. (a private corporation)
of 82,300,000 for expansion of privately op-
erated precision gear plant;
Egypt: Loan on April 26, 1962, of $3 million
to the Societe Misr Pour La Rayonfaa for the
construction of a cellophane plant. This
company was a privately owned company, but
by nationalization decree of the Egyptian
Government, a controlling interest in the
company was nationalized;
Brazil: (a) Loan on March 6, -1963, to the
Credito e Financiamento S. A. (a private cor-
poration) of $4 million for the establishment
of a development bank;
(b) Loan on March 11, 1963, to the Corn-
panhia De Carbonos Coloidois (a private cor-
poration) of 82 million for a carbon black
plant;
Mexico: Loan on June 30, 1962, to the
Nacional Pinanciera, S. A. (a private corpora-
tion) of $20 million for supervised agricul-
tural credit.
These examples among many illustrate my
point that there is no justification for this
double standard and that borrowers in the
disaster areas of Alaska should at least be
treated equally with foreign borrowers under
our foreign aid program (who have suffered
no disaster) and that you should exercise the
authority you have under the law and lower
the interest rate on disaster small loans to
three-fourths of 1 percent per annum.
The act sets no minimum rate of interest,
only a maximum rate of 3 percent per annum.
In conversations with me you indicated that
you had sufficient authority and discretion to
set the interest rate at any rate up to 3 per-
cent per annum.
It should be borne in mind that when, for
example, the loan of $13,700,000 was made in
India to the Tata Engineering & Locomo-
tive Co., Ltd., on three-quarters-of-l-percent,
40-year-payment terms, there accrued no
economic benefit to the American economy.
All benefits?assuming adequate tax laws and
collections?flowed to the economy of India
and every other country benefiting by our
three-quarters-of-l-percent loan. On the
other hand, small business loans in the dis-
aster areas of Alaska will generate jobs and
tax dollars and will relieve the taxpayers of
Alaska and the United States of the necessity
of, welfare and unemployment compensation
payments.
I therefore renew my request to you that
you modify the terms of disaster small loans
in Alaska so as to put the Alaska borrower on
terms of equality with those in foreign coun-
tries to whom we loan American tax dollars
at three-fourths of 1 percent interest per
year, with a 10-year moratorium on repay-
ment of principal.
With best wishes, I am
Cordially yours,
ERNEST GRUENING,
U.S. senator.
IS AN AMERICAN PROTECTORATE
IN ASIA WORTH WAR?
During the delivery of Mr. THURMOND'S
speech,
Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, some days
ago?almost 2 weeks ago, as I recall?
I announced that I was at work on an
analysis of international law principles
vis-a-vis the unilateral military inter-
vention of the United States in South
Vietnam. I have completed that study;
and at this time I propose to present my
findings. This- will be a major foreign
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il 2 4
8720 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENA1E A
policy speech, one of the more important
foreign policy speeches I have made in
my 20 years in the Senate. It is one that
I wish had not been necessary to make,
because in this speech I shall set forth
my reasons for complete and total dis-
agreement with my Government In con-
nection with the conduct of what I call
McNamara's war in South Vietnam.
But, Mr. President, I desire to be con-
structive and to offer my criticisms of
U.S. policy as constructive criticisms, and
to do in this case as I have always done?
offer affirmative proposals as substitutes
for what !believe is a most unfortunate,
most unwise, and completely unjustifiable
American foreign policy in South Viet-
nam.
Mr. President, the war the United
States is fighting in South Vietnam is a
menace to the American people, for two
reasons:
First, it is outside the legal framework
of international law and American treaty
obligations;
Second, it threatens to engulf the re-
sources and manpower of the American
people on the continent of Asia for an
undefined time and purpose.
Either of these reasons alone is suf-
ficient reason for the American people
to draw back from the brink. These
reasons together make it imperative that
we draw back.
Most of this speech will deal with the
legal problems of our intervention in
Vietnam, although I shall refer also to
the sheer stupidity of a unilateral Ameri-
can war in Asia.
HISTORY OF II.S, POLICY. IN VIETNAM
One cannot review the history of
American policy in Indochina, and later
Vietnam, without concluding that the
U.S. Government wanted France to stay
there; and that when that failed, we
took up where France left off.
We refused to sign the Geneva Agree-
ment, which took France out of Indo-
china. Our refusal gave fair indication
of our intention to stay on and carry out
the French role there alone.
Mr. President, at the outset I wish to
eall the attention of the Senate to my
opinion that our failure to sign the
Geneva agreement is of tremendous sig-
nificance in connection with the subse-
quent development of American foreign
policy in Vietnam.
In 10 years time, we have effectively
established a United States protector-
ate over South Vietnam. When our first
choice of a local ruler proved totally in-
efficient, we encouraged his overthrow.
I say "encouraged," because the extent
of the American participation in the
coup that overthrew Ngo Dinh Diem is
still unknown. But it is widely known
that not only were Americans in Saigon
dissatisfied wjth the Diem government,
but our officials also spread word that we
would welcome a change in governments.
High administration officials said pub-
licly that U.S. aid woul be reduced un-
less the Diem government changed its
policies. Ambassador Lodge told Pres-
ident Diem that we wanted his brother,
Ngo Dinh Nhu, removed from his posi-
tions of office and influence. A resolu-
tion introduced in the Senate, with 22
cosponsors, called for an end to U.S. aid
unless the Diem government changed
Its policies of repression.
When the coup finally came, we quick-
ly welcomed and recognized the new
government headed by General Minh.
We resumed the aid that had been sus-
pended in order to put pressure on Diem.
It mattered little that 3 months later,
another coup deposed General Minh,
and installed General Khanh. The
Diem, Minh, and Khanh regimes have
all ruled South Vietnam only because of
heavy financial backing by the United
States. When we found one hopelessly
incompetent, we have brought about a
replacement.
Today, South Vietnam does not run
the war against the guerrillas. She does
not make her own foreign policy or mili-
tary policy. The United States does.
The U.S. Air Force is fighting in South
Vietnam. Its planes and men are pro-
viding the air support and air transpor-
tation for the government ground forces.
Americans numbering at least 15,000 are
fighting with the ground forces. When
they are shot at, they shoot back.
If hot pursuit of guerrillas is under-
taken into Cambodia, it is the Americans
who authorize it and make possible its
execution. Several weeks ago, or more,
we had to apologize to Cambodia, be-
cause we were caught bombing a Cam-
bodian village; we were caught dropping
a shocking, inhumane firebomb on a
Cambodian village. The village was
burned, and 16 persons were killed. How
were we caught? We were caught be-
cause our plane was shot down, and the
precious life of the American pilot was
snuffed out. This is an ugly picture, and
It is a picture that will blot the history of
this glorious Republic. Therefore, I will
continue to plead that we correct this
mistaken policy and that we change our
course of action in South Vietnam.
As I have said, if action is carried into
Cambodia, it Is the Americans who au-
thorize it and make possible its execu-
tion. If "hot pursuit" into Laos is under-
taken, it will be on our say-so and exe-
cuted by American military aircraft
manned by the U.S. Air Force.
If the war is carried into North Viet-
nam, it will be done on American orders,
not on General Khanh's orders, and It-
will be done by the U.S. Air Force alone.
South Vietnam has become a protec-
torate of the United States. We have
made it one, in order to protect what we
regard as American interests in south-
east Asia.
11. POLICY IN INDOCHINA
Our intentions in this respect are clear,
from the history of the French with-
drawal. I refer Senators to the memoirs
of Anthony Eden, who was British For-
eign Secretary in 1954. His volume of
memoirs covering this period is entitled
"Full Circle"; and he writes as follows
of the early months of 1952:
There was a growing feeling in Paris,
partly inspired by rumors of impending
Chinese military intervention in Indochina,
that Great Britain and the United States
should give more help. The French com-
plained that they could not be expected to
defend the interests of the free world in
Indochina singlehanded and at the same
time make the contribution to European de-
fense which was being demanded of them.
Underlying this argument was the fear that,
owing to her commitments in Indochina,
France would find herself militarily inferior
to a rearmed Western Germany in the pro-
posed European army.
These were the views with which the
French Government confronted Mr. Dean
Acheson and myself when we flew to Paris
at the end of May for three-power discussions
on the problems of Europe and southeast
Asia. On the 26th. before the formal discus-
sions opened, I had a long talk with Mr.
Acheson at the British Embassy. He told me
of the U.S. determination to do everything
possible to strengthen the French hand in
Indochina. On the wider question of the
possibility of a Chinese invasion, the UB.
Government considered that it would be dis-
astrous to the position of the Western Powers
if southeast Asia were lost without a strug-
gle. On the other hand, the Americans were
determined to do nothing in that area which
would provoke a third world war. Their
present thinking was that deterrent action
was the best course. At an appropriate mo-
ment there might have to be some form of
warning to the Chinese. If the warning were
ignored, Mr. Acheson believed that a block-
ade of the Chinese coast and the dislocation
of her communications would have to be
considered. I agreed generally with Mr.
Acheaon's approach, though I personally
thought it unlikely that China would enter
the war, and said so. The present state of
affairs suited China very well and she would
have nothing to gain by internationalizing
the conflict. I told Mr. Acheson that Her
Majesty's Government were strongly op-
posed to any course of action in southeast
Asia which would be likely to result in a war
with China. We both agreed that although
possible means of deterring China should be
examined, any provocative action must at all
costa be avoided.
On May 30, Mr. Acheson and I had a long
and difficult conference with the French
Prime Minister. M. Piney. and, the principal
members of his Government. M. Pleven, the
Minister of Defense, took the lead in present-
ing the French case, which confirmed our
Ambassador's warning, and made depressing
hearing. Mr. Acheson remained sympathetic
but firm. There was no doubt, he said, that
France's effort in Indochina was in the gen-
eral interest. He pointed out, however, that
the United State was already bearing a third
of the cost. The French Ministers repeat-
edly argued that if further aid was not forth-
coming, there would be grave parliamentary
difficulties in France. These would prejudice
the ratification of EDC and the continuation
of French efforts in Indochina.
As we were driving away from the confer-
ence, Dean Acheson told me, more in sorrow
than in anger, that if further aid were ap-
proved by Congress, the United States would
be bearing about half the cost of the Indo-
china war, yet to hear the Freqach talk, one
would think that his Government were only
supplying them with the odd revolver or two.
I reflected that if the French really wanted
American aid, they were going about it in
the worst possible way.
When we held a further three-power meet-
ing in London at the end of June, I learned
that I had been wrong in doubting the French
method. Mr. Acheson told me, before the
talks began, that his Gdternment had agreed
to increase their aid to the French in Indo-
china by 5150 million during the coming
fiscal year. This was an increase of 40 per-
cent, and generous by any standards.
By late 1953, a new American admin-
istration was in office, and the French
postion in Indochina had slipped still
further. In December of 1953, the Viet-
minh, the Communist-led rebels against
the French, had embarked on a new of-
fensive. and Mr. Eden says of it:
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.1964 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE 8721
The new offensive was no doubt intended
to show the ineffectivenesi of the French
guarantee to Laos in the recently concluded
treaty. It may not have succeeded in this
purpose, but it did serve to arouse concern
for the fUture of the French military posi-
tion. 'This concern, and fears of Chinese in-
tervention, were becoming particularly acute
in the United pt,Aes. On December 29, Mr.
Dulles told a press conference that in the
event of an invasion of -Indochina, the Amer-
ican reaction "would not necessarily be con-
fined to the particular theater chosen by the
Communists for their operations." On Janu-
ary 12, 1954, after proclaiming the doctrine
of instant retaliation, Mr. Dulles gave warn-
ing that Chinese intervention would have
"grave consequencee Which might not be
confined to Indochina." These admonitions
did not seem to me on the mark. I did not
- believe that any Chinese intervention was
imminent; there was no need for it. The
.Vietminh were doing wellenough as it was.
More practically, the view was already being
canvassed in. the American press that the
United States should step in to help the
Frenoh with sea and air power before the
mllitary Situation deteriorated further.
But the French, Russians, and British
were ready to sit down and dis-
cuss a political settlement in Indochina.
"It was essential," continuing to quote
the British Foreign Secretary of the
time:
That the French should hold their ground
militarily, in order that their bargaining
po:41-tion at Geneva should not be weakened.
But I did not consider it to be in the best
interests? of France that the scale of the
fighting should be increased, or that she
should be encouraged to expend her
straitened resources in trying to force a mili-
tary decision. The Americans took a dif-
ferent view. On February 8, our Ambassador
was told at the State Department that the
U.S. Government was perturbed by the fact
that the French were aiming not to win the
war, but to' get into a position from which
they could negotiate.
At this time Mr. Bedell Smith, the Ameri-
can Under Secietaly of State, was reapprais-
ing the situation with a small group invited
by the President to consider the Indochina
problem. He told our Ambassador that there
was no intention of sending American troops
into Indochina; the President would not do
it -even if he had the power. Yet the Ameri-
can Ainbassador in Saigon had succinctly re-
marked that "the French would not be al-
lowed to skedaddle unless China gave abso-
lute guarantees." I did not see how this dual
purpose was to be realized.
On March 29, in a speech to the Overseas
Press Club of America, Mr. Dulles said that
the Imposition of the Communist system on
southeast Asia "should not be passively ac-
cepted but should be met by united action.
This might involve serious risks, but these
risks are far less than those that will face
us in a few years from now if we dare not
be resolute today." I had no objection to
strong American words, but I wanted to be
sure that they meant what they appeared
to say. We had been told that the United
States was not prepared to intervene in
Indochina in the only effective way, on land.
It was important not to encourage the
French by the offer of lesser means which
could not succeed.
Meanwhile, the position of the besieged
French garrison at Dien Bien Mu had de-
teriorated further, The American Govern-
ment now approached the French and our-
selves with a new proposal. This was to the
effect that all the countries coicerned should
issue, before Geneva, a solemn declaration
of their readiness to take concerted action
No. 80-6
under article 51 of the United Nations Char-
ter against continued interference by China
in the Indochina war. We were informed
that the proposed warning would carry with
it the threat of naval and air action against
the Chinese coast and of active intervention
in Indochina itself. This ad hoc coalition,
comprising the United States, France, the
United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand,
Thailand, the Philippines, and the three As-
sociated States of Indochina, would simul-
taneously set about organizing the collec-
tive defense of southeast Asia.
Reports from Paris indicated that this idea
had met with a lukewarm reception there.
On April 5, President Eisenhower sent a
message to Sir Winston Churchill urging
him to fall in with the American plan and
suggesting that Mr. Dulles might fly to Lon-
don within a few days to discuss his proposal.
This offer was accepted, but at the same time
I warned Sir Roger Makins in Washington
that he should say nothing at this stage
which might commit us to the joint action
proposed.
Secretary Dulles set out to London to
discuss an American proposal for a joint
Allied intervention in Indochina. From
what has been written and related about
the position of the United States, Secre-
tary Dulles and Admiral Radford were
advocating prompt American interven-
tion of any degree necessary to save the
French position. President Eisenhower,
whatever his personal views of its wis-
dom, wanted congressional authorization
and the participation of other countries.
So Dulles and Radford both went to Lon-
don to try to get participation from the
British.
Mr. Eden writes that he summarized
his own position in writing shortly before
the Dulles visit:
I quote the British Secretary:
The U.S. proposal assumes that the threat
of retaliation against China would cause her
to withdraw aid from the Vietminh. - This
seems to me a fundamental weakness. There
is a distinction between warning China that
some specified further action will entail
retaliation, which might be an effective de-
terrent, and calling upon her to desist from
action in which she is already engaged. I
cannot see what threat would be sufficiently
potent to make China swallow so humiliating
a rebuff as the abandonment of the Viet-
minh without any face-saving concession
in return. If I am right in this view, the
joint warning to China would have no ef-
fect, and the coalition would then have to
withdraw ignominiously or else embark on
warlike action against China.
Neither blockade nor the bombing of
China's internal and external communica-
tions, which the U.S. Government appear
to have in mind, were considered by our
Chiefs of Staff to be militarily effective when
these were discussed in connection with
Korea. They would, however, give China
every excuse for invoking the Sino-Soviet
Treaty, and might lead to a world war. Nor
should we commit British forces to opera-
tions in Indochina.
The British Foreign Secretary, Mr.
Eden, also paraphrases the conversation
he had with Secretary Dulles:
The battle at Dien Bien Phu had reached
a crucial phase and American military au-
thorities did not rate the French chances
of victory highly. For these reasons, Mr.
Dulles went on, the U.S. Chiefs of Staff had
suggested 3 weeks ago that American
naval and air forces should intervene in the
Indochina war. He told us that some air-
craft carriers had already been moved from
Manila toward the Indochina coast. On ,
reflection, Mr. Dulles had considered that
the United States should not act alone in
this matter and that before a decision to
intervene were taken, two conditions should
be met. First, there must be some assurance
that the French Government were willing to
grant the associated states real independ-
ence within the French Union, so as to pro-
vide the necessary political basis for ef-
fective resistance. Second, the U.S. Govern-
ment must ascertain whether their allies,
especially the United Kingdom, Australia
and New Zealand, took an equally grave view
of the situation. For these reasons, al-
though he no longer had in mind a warning
declaration specifically directed against
China, Mr. Dulles wanted to see the forma-
tion of an ad hoc coalition which might
develop into a southeast Asia defense orga-
nization. He thought that this in itself
would deter China from further interference
in Indochina, and would strengthen our posi-
tion at Geneva by giving evidence of our
solidarity.
Eden's reply to the Indochina pro-
posal of Dulles was as follows:
If there was to be any question of Allied
intervention, military or otherwise, or of
any warning announcement before Geneva,
that would require extremely careful con-
sideration. It was doubtful whether the
situation in Indochina could be solved by
purely military means and we must at least
see what proposals, if any, the Communists
had to make at Geneva. Accordingly, I told
Mr. Dulles that, in my view, the com-
munique which would be issued after his
visits to London and Paris should not go
beyond a warning that we would not allow
the work of the Geneva Conference to be
prejudiced by Communist military action.
I was not convinced that any immediate
mention should be made of any decision
concerning collective security in southeast
Asia, if that were agreed upon.
Our formal talks on April 12 and 13 added
little to this initial conversation. I said
that I could agree to no more than to en-
gage in preliminary discussions on the pos-
sibility of forming a mutual security system
in southeast Asia. On the question of in-
tervention, Mr. Dulles was convinced that
Indochina was the place for such action,
should it become nccessary, provided that
two requirements could be met. First, an
unequivocal declaration by the French Gov-
ernment of independence for the associated
states and secondly, the placing of the con-
flict on an international basis. This, he
said, with the addition of outside air and
naval support, would create the possibility
of victory. Mr. Dulles added that he was
confident that Congress would authorize the
President to use U.S, air and naval forces,
and possibly even land forces. I was not
convinced by the assertion which Mr. Dulles
then made, that the situation in Indochina
was analogous to the Japanese invasion of
Manchuria in 1931 and to Hitler's reoccupa-
tion of the Rhineland. I explained that the,
British chiefs of staff did not believe that
Allied intervention could be limited to the
air and the sea. I told Mr. Dulles that Brit-
ish public opinion, with the Geneva Con-
ference in prospect, would be firmly opposed
to any present commitment to become in-
volved in war in Indochina. * I *
About this time, American opinion
was being explored by Vice President
Nixon. In his famous speech to the
American Society of Newspaper Editors
in New York City on April 16, 1954, he
spoke not for attribution. According to
the account in the New York Times of
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April 17, he said that if the French
? stopped fighting in Indochina and the
situation demanded it, the United States
would have to send troops to fight the
Communists.
"We must take the risk of putting
American boys in the fighting" if there
was no other way. Those were the words
of Richard Nixon in 1954.
I ask unanimous consent to have the
New York Times story of April 17, and
that of April 18 identifying the speaker
as Vice President Nixon, reprinted in the
RECORD at this point in my remarks.
There being no objection, the news
articles were ordered to be printed in
the RECORD, as follows:
HIGH AID SAYS TROOPS MAT BE SENT FP THE
FRENCH Wrrsreaaw
(By Luther A. Huston)
WASHINGTON, April 18.?A high adminis-
tration source said today that if Franca
stopped fighting in Indochina and the situa-
tion demanded it the United States would
have to send troops to fight the Communists
In that area.
He said he hoped this country would not
have to send troops but if it could not avoid
it the administration would have to face up
to it and would do it. As the leader of the
free world, the United States cannot afford
another retreat in Asia, he said.
The source of these statements does not
hold press conferences and he is not the ad-
ministration spokesman on foreign policy.
Those were the reasons he gave for refusing
to permit his name to be used, his remarks
to be attributed to him or the tone or place
where his statements were made to be dis-
closed.
He has, however, a voice in the formation
of policy. He said that if the situation re-
quired it he would support sending troops
to Indochina.
EISENHOWER AID SILENT
The statement on possible U.S. armed in-
tervention in the fighting came in answer
to A question after the highly placed official
had expressed the opinion that there was no
reason why the French could not win in
Indochina.
What prompted the question was his
statement that while the Vietnam forces
would continue fighting in event of a French
withdrawal, Indochina probably would be
Communist-dominated within a month of
that act.
James C. Hagerty, White House press sec-
retary, now in Augusta with President Eisen-
hower, would not say whether the state-
ments made by the administration source
reflected the views of the President.
"I have no knowledge of the story," said
Mr. Hagerty. "I was not in Washington and
I cannot comment on anything I did not
hear."
Congressional reaction to the anonymous
statement was scattered but to the point.
Senators Bouens B. HICKENLOOPER, Repub-
lican of Iowa; and HUBERT HUMPHREY, Demo-
crat of Minnesota, said the administration
official's comments on Indochina went far
beyond the Eisenhower-Dulles policy as they
understood it.
Senator Mtge MANSFIELD, Democrat of
Montana and another member of the Foreign
Relations Committee, asked that the official
identify himself "so that Congress can ques-
tion him to find out who and what he is
speaking for."
Senator William F. Knowland of Califor-
nia, the majority leader, declined any com-
ment on the statement, presumably because
he was among those who heard it firsthand
and felt bound to respect the official's desire
to remain anonymous.
Adopting a phrase used only recently by
President Eisenhower, the official remarked
that "the United States, as the leader of the
free world. cannot afford further retreat in
Asia." He expressed the view that the
Communist forces could be stopped "with-
out American boys." but added "we must
take the risk of putting American boys in
the fighting" if there was no other way.
The source of some of the most provoca-
tive statements that have been made re-
cently by any Washington official ranged
wide in the field of troubled Asian affairs and
showed an unusual familiarity with the sub-
ject. His auditors were impressed with his
knowledge and ability to marshal his facts.
GENEVA PROSPECT SURVEYED
Among the statements he made were these:
The situation in southeast Asia Is cur-
rently the most important issue facing the
United States. It relates to a war we might
have to fight in the future and that we might
lose.
The main target of the Communists in Ko-
rea and in Indochina is Japan. Conquest
of areas so vital to Japan's economy would
reduce Japan to an economic satellite of the
Soviet Union.
The Geneva Conference on Far Eastern
Problems, opening April 26. will end in an
impasse on Korea, The United States would
come out where it went in at Geneva.
At Geneva, however. the United States
has to take a position and try to sell it to
the reluctant French and British.
The Geneva conference will not create a
free. independent, and united Korea, hot
even so, Dr. Syngman Rhee, President of
South Korea, will not move alone. He will
continue to use the threat of unilateral ac-
tion, however, as a strategic weapon.
Korea and Indochina, the source said,
will be the two major items on the agenda
at Geneva. The allies will be for a free
united and independent Korea, he declared,
but the Communists cannot agree to that
because they know that if an election Is held
they will lose.
What, then, will the South Koreans do? he
asked. It is hard to be dogmatic, he said,
but his guess was that President Rhee would
not like it but would not take unilateral ac-
tion that would reopen the war.
President Rhee is a complex man, both a
conspirator and a realist, according to this
thesis, who knew he could not win without
U.S. support so would not move alone, but
thought it unwise to announce he would not
move alone. So long as the Communists are
afraid President Rhee will act unilaterally,
they will be forced to act differently at the
Geneva conference table, the source said.
Indochina. he said, needs a Syngnum Rhee.
The war in Indochina involves the future
of France. of Asia. of Europe and, finally, the
United States, he declared.
From the Communist point of view the
war in Korea is about Japan, he continued,
and so is the war in Indochina, which is es-
sential to Japan's economic survival. With-
out trade with Indochina and Korea and with
these countries under Communist control,
Japan would become an economic satellite
of the Soviet Union, which is the Commu-
nists' aim, he said.
But he saw no reason why the French forces
should not win In Indochina with their
greater manpower and tremendous advantage
In materials.
The problem is not materials but men, he
said, and they will not come from France.
which is tired of the war; they must come
from Vietnam. Cambodia, and Laos. But the
French have been slow in training the native
soldiers.
Even more difficult is the problem of giving
the Indochinese the will to fight, he went
on. He took issue with the view that if the
French got out, the Indochinese would fight
00
A
3R000200140045-4 ?
April 24
to keep their independence, saying Indochina
would be Communist-dominated within a
month if the French left.
So the United States must go to Geneva
and take a positive stand for united action
by the free world, he asserted, or it will have
to take on the problem alone and try to sell
it to the others.
There will be French pressure at Geneva
to negotiate and end the fighting at any
cost, he said, and the British position will be
somewhat similar because of mounting Labor
Party pressure and defections in the Conser-
vative ranks. The British do not want to
antagonize Red China, which they have
recognized.
The United States is the only country that
Is strong enough politically at home to take
a position that will save Asia, the official
continued.
NEGOTIATIONS OPPOSED
He raised the question of negotiating to
divide the territory, saying the United States
could invite the Communists into the gov-
ernment or could negotiate to get the Com-
munists to invite It in, but that negotiations
In any form would end up in Communist
domination of a vital new area.
Perhaps Communist intransigence about
Korea would teach the French and the Brit-
ish the futility of negotiation and bring them
over to the plan of united action put forward
by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, he
suggested.
The United States completely opposes any
suggestion that admission of Communist
China to the United Nations be used as a
bargaining point at Geneva, he declared. He
stressed that It WAS important to contain
Communist China in the area it now holds
and that recognition of the Peiping Govern-
ment, which admission to the United Nations
would involve, would emasculate the con-
tainment policy.
The three things the United States must
do, he said, are to keep up the program of
aid to the French forces, encourage France
to give real independence to Vietnam, Cam-
bodia. and Laos, and try for a program of
united action in Asia.
With regard to the view that it might be
politically expedient to agree to negotiations
with Red China, he said the answer was that
if the United States left its policy to an un-
informed public opinion, it would go down
the long road to disaster. This country must
take the long risks now, he said.
DANGER OF SUBVERSION
An alliance, however, will not meet the real
danger in Asia, which is not aggression but
interrup subversion, he declared.
The free world must face the fact that a
pact cannot be effective unless internal sub-
version can be stopped, he continued, and
one way to do this would be to associate the
United States with the legitimate aspirations
of its friends and potential friends in the
Far East.
These aspirations were termed threefold:
independence from any foreign domination,
recognition of equality, and peace.
U.S. information programa should be
be maintained and strengthened to carry as-
surance of this country's sympathy with
those aspirations to the Asian countries. The
source said he would oppose any curtailment
of those programs or cuts in appropriations
that would lessen their effectiveness.
All Asians want to be on the winning side
and we must let them know that by joining
with the United States they would be on the
winning side, he said. The leaders making
U.S. policy were pictured by him as compe-
tent, imaginative, courageous, and dedicated
and he said the policies being formulated for
Asia would win if public opinion supported
them.
But with or without the support of public
opinion, if the situation in Indochina re-
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19 4
Approved For R
quires that American-troops be sent there to
prevent that aMa from disappearing behind
the ?Tion,-C,urtairi-,' the administration must
'face the ,issUe an4, send ,the troops, he de-
clared.
? - ? ;
? Nxxoxl ra-RiVE4En- AS 'AUTHOR OF 'STIR OVER
INDOCTIINA:VICE PRESIDENT T9LD EDITORS
UNITED STATES IVIMHT INTEAYENE WITH
TROOPS IF THE FEENCH QUIT?STATE DE-
. TPARTKEN DECLARES IT IS HIGHLY UNLIKELY
FORCE WILL EE SENT TO ASIA
.; (EY lolin b. Morris)
WAsmimroisi, April 11.--V1ce President
Richard M. Nixon is the ,adrininfstratiOn offi-
cial who said yesterday that the United
'States might have to send troops to Indo-
'china if the French quit fighting there.
The disclosure coincided with, the -develop-
ment in Congress of much concern, consid-
erable resistance, and some scattered support
for the, possible use of US. ground forces
, as a last rasOrt in the crueial Par g4rtein
was, as silggeSted by ir. Nixon.
senator William P. Itnowland?,_ of Cali-
fornia, the Senate majority leader, voiced
"agreeffient that troops should- be sent,' if
neCeSSary, to keep southeast Asia from fall-
ing into the hands of the Communists. He.,.
atide4,;` however; that he did not think it
would be :necelsary.
Senator .Knowland isicled that congress
. add the people would not "be satisfied" with
, the development of another Korea situation
In 'whicli this country would "assume 90
percent of the burden."
- ?
COOPERATION IS SOUelIT
He added he thought the time had arrived
when all nations giving' liPseriite to the
free .world defense should takp part in the
collective security system, and in an allu-
sion to the role of other United ?Nations
-
members in the Korean war? he expressed the
view ,that Americans would, not care, again
to See "60 backseat drivers", holding back
the use Of the? full military power of the
United States. The United Nations has 60
members. . . ,
Elsewhere, questions arose as to the ,pro-
priety of presenting so grave a possibility
- to ?the American, people through an anony-
- inous "high official," as the Vice President
was identified at his own inqatence in ini-
tial news accounts of his speech.
-
In the ,first official. _reaction to the Vice
President's statement from, .the, executive
branch, the State Department p,nnounced
that the dispatch of U.S. troops to Indochina
was "highly unlikely."
Without accepting the identification of
Mr. Nixon except as "a high Government_offi-
cia1," the Department said his, address "ex-
pressed full agreement" with policies pre-
Tiously set forth by President Eisenhower ,
and Secretary of State John roster Dulles.
"Iri regard to a hypothetical question at
to Whether U.S. forcer should be sent to In-
dochina, in the event of Frerkeh withdrawal,
the high Government official categorically
rejected the premise of possible French with-
drawal," said the State Department.
"Insofar, as the USQ Of U.S. forces Was
eolicernecl?, he was stating a course of pos-
sible action which he was personally pre-
pared to support under a, highly unlikely
hypothesis.
"The answer to the question correctly em-
phasized the fact that the interests of the
United States and other free nations are
vitally involved with the interestkof France
and the associated, stat,es in resisting Corn.-
munist domination, of Indochina."
Vice President Nixon delivered his speech
,
\ yesterday at the annual convention of the
American Society of Newspaper Editors.
If France stops fighting in Indochina and
the situation deinauCis it, he said, the United
States ri1 have to_send, troops to prevent
the CoMmunists 4oin taking over this gate-
way to southeast Asia, This was during a
aigggiV10.1. it&SIFIS6-1!9M13
question period that followed his prepared
speech, in which he discussed Far East prob-
lems.
Mr. Nixon spoke to the editors on the con-
dition that his remarks would not be attrib-
uted to him, News mediums in the United
States observed the stipulation in reporting
the speech yesterday.
However, the account carried by the Times
of London, was worded in such a way as to
make It umrstakable that Mr. Nixon. was
the high official speaking, and France-Soir in
Paris identified the Vice President as the
speaker.
Representative Clare Hoffman, Republican,
,of Michigan, meanwhile attributed the speech
to the Vice President in an interview with the
Daily Star of Niles, Mich.
As a consequence, the editors' society
-made It known that there was no longer any
restriction on publication of the speaker's
identity. Mr. Nixon, for his part, made him-
self unavailable for questioning.
Among editors who heard the speech, the
consensus was that Mr. Nixon was testing the
reaction of the public and Congress.
'REVIEW rtY CONGRESS ' URGED
Senator Knowland voiced doubt that the
public would react favorably to the estab-
lishment of such, a policy in the absence of
adequate arrangements for a joint defense
force in the Indochina area.
Secretary Dulles is now seeking to egtablish
a l0-nation alliance to guard Indochina
,and southeast Asia against new aggression.
"It is my belief," Senator Knowland said,
"that prior to commitment of any armed
forces?land, sea, or air?the President would
and should came to Congress and lay the
facts before it with his recommendations.
"I believe the reaction of Congress and the
American people would to a considerable ex-
tent be influenced by what nations would
contribute to collective action."
- Congress and the people, he said, "would
not be satisfied with having this country as-
sume 90 percent of the burden as it did in
/Corea."
"Nor do I think that they would care to
see 60 back-seat drivers restraining the use
of our full military potential as they did in
Korea," he added.
mr. Knowland left no doubt that he re-
ferred to other members of the United Na-
tions, and added:-
think the time has arrived when those
nations giving lipservice to free world de-
ense should be willing to take part in the
collective security system."
Senator Knowland expressed the belief that
French withdrawal from Indochina was un-
likely .and that 'U.S. ground forces would not
be required in any event.
There is ample manpower among the free
nations of Asia "to meet the threat in south-
east Asia if supported by the air and sea
forces of other nations with the potential to
do so," he asserted.
Senators LEVERETT SALTONSTALL of Massa-
chusetts and BOURKE B. HICKENLOOPER of
Iowa, Republicans, were among those regis-
'tering outright opposition to the use of U.S.
troops.
Mr. SALTONSTALL, chairman of the Armed
Services Committee, said that "from the in-
formation that has been given me thus far,
my opinion is that we should not send men
Into Indochina."
Senator HICKENLOOPER, a member of the
Foreign Relations Committee, said he had no
reason to change his past position against
such action.
In separate interviews, Senators Ralph E.
Flanders, Republican, of Vermont, and John
F. Kennedy, of Massachusetts, Estes Ke-
fauver, of Tennessee, and Hubert M.
Humphrey, of Minnesota, Democrats, stressed
the need for assurances that the United
States backed complete independence for
the three Indo-chinese states.
?
8723
Senator Kefauver said he as "unalterably
_opposed" to sending troops.
Senator GEORGE SNIATHERS, Democrat, of
Florida, called on the administration to first
"Put our- enemies_ on notice that if we are
drawn into a war, we are going in with
everything we have."
Senator Alexander Wiley, Republican, of
Wisconsin and chairman of the Foreign Re-
lations Committee, commented merely that
. ,
"I don't think that [the dispatch of troops]
will ever come to pass."
Among other complications caused by the
anonymous nature of the speech, the U.S.
Information Agency decided not to mention
it in yesterday's broadcasts to foreign
countries.
One reason, according to officials, was the
awkwardness of quoting an anonymous
source. But the main hitch, it was said,
came from standing instructions to regard
President Eisenhower's statement of Febru-
ary 10 as guiding policy on Indochina.
U.S. TECHNICIANS SENT
In his news conference on that day the
President said he could not conceive of a
greater tragedy for America than to get
heavily involved now in all-out war in the
Far East. No one, he asserted, could be
more bitterly opposed to ever getting the
United States involved in a hot war in that
region.
Four days earlier, the Government had
announced it was sending 200 technicians to
help service U.S. planes being used by the
French in Indochina. This precipitated pro-
tests in the Senate, arid assurance was given
by the Government that the technicians
would be withdrawn in June.
On March 25, at another news conference,
the President said the defense of Indochina
was "of transcendent importance."
On March 29, Secretary Dulles announced:
"Under the conditions of today, the im-
position on southeast Asia of the political
system of Communist Russia, Chinese Com-
munlet ally, by whatever means, would be
a grave threat to the whole free community.
"The United States feels that that possi-
bility should not be passively accepted, but
should be met by united action. This might
have serious risks, but these risks are far
less than would face us a few years from now
If we dare not be resolute today."
- Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, British
.Foreign Secretary Eden's memoirs con-
tinue to outline the effort by Secretary
Dulles to bring the United States into
active participation in Indochina.
Mr. SPARKMAN. Mr. President, will
the Senator from Oregon yield at that
point?
Mr. MORSE. I am glad to yield.
Mr. SPARKMAN. From whom was
that quotation made by Vice President
Nixon?
Mr. MORSE. From the New 'York
Times of April 17 and 18, 1954.
Mr. President, continuing with the
quotation:
On the evening of April 23, we were assem-
bled at the Qual d'Orsay for an official din-
ner, which was being given by the French
Government for the NATO powers, when Mr.
Dulles drew me aside. Then he told me that
a telegram had arrived from General Navarre
to the French Government, to the effect that
only a powerful airstrike by the United
States in the next 72 hours codld save the
situation at Dienbienphu. * * *
The French Air Force had heavy commit-
ments on supply duties and had to give close
tactical support to the garrison. They could
not effectively interrupt the flow of Viet-.
minh supplies from the Chinese border to
the main depot, northeast of Dienbienphu.
It was the bombing of this depot, dispersed
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8724 April 24
over a wide area 8 miles square, which Gen-
eral Navarre now wished to see undertaken
by the Americans. The French Air Force
could then concentrate on attacking the
enemy strongpoints in the Dienbienphu
area. The French general staff argued that
bombing by an outside force, apart from the
material damage It would cause, would have
a considerable effect on the morale of troops
in the fortress and on French an native
forces in Indochina generally. They told
our general staff that the Americans had of-
fered CO B-29 aircraft, which would operate
from Manila. Each sortie could drop ap-
proximately 450 tons of bombs and would
operate from 20,000 feet. We were also told
by the French that a U.S. Air Force general
and 10 officers had visited Dienbienphu to
study conditions and discuss the general
situation.
On the following day, April 24, I discussed
the situation further with Mr. Dulles and
Admiral Radford, the Chairman of the Ameri-
can Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee. Mr.
Dulles began by saying he was now con-
vinced that there was no chance of keeping
the French in the fight unless they knew
"that we would do what we can within the
President's constitutional powers to join
them in the fight." The French had said
that it would not be enough if we were to
assure them that we would join them in
defending the rest of Indochina. In the event
of the fall of Dien Bien Phu. Unless we par-
ticipated, by an airstrike, in the battle for
the fortress itself, that would be "their last
battle." Mr. Dulles wished to make it plain
that there was no possibility of U.S.
participation in the Dien Bien Phu battle, be-
cause the President had not the power to act
with such speed and because it was per-
fectly clear that no intervention could now
save the fortress, where the situation was
desperate. I asked Mr. Dulles what measures
he had in mind. Admiral Radford replied
that there must be some military effort to
assist the French without delay. He sug-
gested that British participation might take
the form of sending RAF units into Tong-
king from Malaya or Hong Kong. He also
inquired whether we had not an aircraft
carrier in the area. Neither he nor Mr. Dulles
gave any more explicit account of the joint
military action they contemplated. Admiral
Radford went on to say that he thought it
most likely that when Dien Bien Phu fell,
the whole military ,situation in Indochina
would get out of control within a few days.
There might be riots in Saigon and Hanoi,
and the whole population might turn against
the French. The only way be saw of pre-
venting this was to demonstrate that France
now had powerful allies in the fight.
In reply to this. I said that the French
had not painted anything like so desperate
picture to us. On the contrary. the French
Government's line with Her Majesty's Am-
bassador that morning had been that the
situation at Dien Bien Phu was very bad, but
that they would fight on elsewhere if It fell.
I asked Admiral Radford U he really thought
that air intervention by the United States
and the United Kingdom could decisively
alter the situation. Had the Americans con-
sidered the effect on world opinion and how
the Chinese would react? I said that / as-
sumed they had not forgotten the Russo-
Chinese alliance. It was possible that if we
went into Indochina we should find our-
selves fighting Vietnam as well as Vietminh,
and in addition heading for a world war. Ad-
miral Radford replied that he had never
thought that the Chinese would intervene in
Indochina, nor had they the necessary re-
sources available. If they attempted air
action, we tould eliminate this by bombing
the Chinese airfields, which were very vul-
nerable. At the end of our meeting. I told
Mr. Mlles that he was confronting British
opinion with about as difficult a decision as
it would be possible to find. I would at once
oonsult my colleagues.
Shortly after this, Maurice Schumann rang
me up to say that both Lanlel and Bidault
were now strongly in favor of my returning
to London, and hoped that I would urge
my colleagues to agree to proceeding on the
lines desired by Dulles. During the course
of the evening, however, the French appeared
to have second thoughts. Denis Allen sent
me a message after my departure from Paris
to say that Bidault was, on reflection. far
from enthusiastic about the American pro-
posals. If Dulles pressed the matter, it was
probable that Bidault would advise Ltiniel
not to accept American intervention.
From London Airport. I drove to Chequers
to give the Prime Minister a full report on
the situation. As happened so Often in the
years we worked together, I found that Sir
Winston and I, though physically separated
by hundreds of miles, had formed exactly
the same conclusion. We agreed that it now
seemed inevitable that the French garrison
at Dien Bien Phu would be overwhelmed or
compelled to surrender. I said that Mr.
Dulles and Admiral Radford evidently feared
that this would promptly be followed by the
collapse of all French resistance throughout
Indochina and, in order to avert it, favored
some dramatic gesture of Angio-American
Intervention in Indochina. They now rec-
ognized that this could no ionger save Dien
Bien Phu, but still wanted to rally French
and Vietnamese morale and to prevent a
general disintegration. Congress would be
more likely to approve such action if inter-
vention were to be on an Anglo-American
basis. The Americans had therefore pro-
posed that the United States and the United
Kingdom Governments should give the
French a joint assurance that they would
join in the defense of Indochina, and That,
as an earnest of this, they should be given
immediate military assistance, including
token British participation. I told the
Prime Minister that I disagreed both with
the American belief that such intervention
could be effective and with the view that it
could be limited to the use of air forces. I
doubted whether intervention would have
any substantial effect in rallying public opin-
ion in Indochina, and I was certain that it
would not be welcomed by nationalist opin-
ion in southeast Asia generally. Militarily,
I did not believe that the limited measures
contemplated by the United States could
achieve substantial results; no military aid
could be effective unless it included ground
troops. Sir Winston summed up the posi-
tion by saying that what we were being
asked to do was to assist in misleading
Congress.
Mr. President, I repeat this statement.
This is a report on the attitude of the
Prime Minister of Great Britain, Sir
Winston Churchill.
Sir Winston summed up the position by
saying that what we were being asked to do
Was to assist in misleading Congress into ap-
proving a military operation, which would
In itself be ineffective, and might well bring
the world to the verge of a major war.
We agreed that we must therefore decline
to give any undertaking of military assist-
ance to the French and Indochina.
The Dulles mission failed. Dulles
failed to draw the British into a U.S. plan
to start a major military operation in
Indochina.
I say to my colleagues in the Senate
that we cannot ignore that history. I
express my view on the floor of the Sen-
ate today that the failure of Dulles to
get the British to go along in starting a
war in Indochina of a different type?an
Anglo-American war?must be carefully
considered when we try to figure out why
the United States did not sign the
Geneva agreements.
It is my view that we did not Sign
the Geneva agreements because we did
not intend to go along. We have not
gone along. Therefore, we stand here
today in this ugly, shocking posture of
the United States before the eyes of the
world, engaging in a unilateral military
action in McNamara's war in South
Vietnam, unjustffiably killing American
boys, with the military and the Secre-
tary of Defense and the President of the
United Stater trying to alibi it.
ikfr. President, it cannot be alibied. It
is wrong. We cannot act alone. We are
not justified in acting alone. The uni-
lateral military action, with all the po-
tentialities of threatening the peace of
the world, cannot be justified on the basis
of the international law obligations that
I shall shortly proceed to discuss in my
speech.
I wished to draw this line in my speech
at this point. In my judgment, the his-
tory of the U.S. operations in Indochina
look a turn in London. So Winston
Churchill and Sir Anthony Eden turned
down Dulles' proposal to start an'Anglo-
American war in Indochina.
The rejection by Britain of joint action,
and the coolness of the French Govern-
ment effectively ended the plan pushed
by Dulles abroad and by Nixon at home
to put Americans into the fighting in
Indochina.
But Dulles did not give up trying.
This record shows how we got ourselves
Into our present situation in Vietnam. It
must be considered as part of the whole
context of our actions today.
Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. MORSE. I yield.
Mr. GRUENING. Is it the Senator's
thought, in trying to Make his speech
early in the day, that the press of the
United States would pay a little more
attention to it than it has to some impor-
tant utterances on this subject made by
him on the floor of the Senate, which
have hitherto been completely ignored?
Mr. MORSE. I say most good-
naturedly to my friend from Alaska that
I will leave that up to the press.
Dulles did not stop trying to get others
to involve themselves with us in Indo-
china.
Eden tells us of the events during the
Geneva Conftrence itself. The confer-
- ence on Indochina had as participants
Great Britain, France, Russia, China, the
United States, Cambodia, Laos, the State
of Vietnam, and the Republic of Vietnam.
Eden states:
I said that we must really see where we are
going. If the AffleriCSIls went into the Indo-
china war, the Chinese themselves would in-
evitably step up their participation. The
next stage would be that the Americans and
the Chinese would be fighting each other
and that was in all probability the beginning
of the third world war.
Meanwhile Mr. Robertson, U.S. Assistant
Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs,
whose approach to these questions is so emo-
tional as to be imprevious to argument or
Indeed to facts, was keeping up a sort of
"thane song" to the effect that there were
in Indochina some 300.000 men who were
anxious to fight against the Vietminh and
were looking to us for support and encourage-
ment. / said that if they were so anxious to
fight I could not understand why they did
not do so. The Americans had put in nine
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19'64 - CO
?
times 'hihre Bu1i?of intaerial than the
Chinese, and jilenty-natiet-b-e-- available for
their 1-07Se: f:Tiad no fafth in this eagerness
a tieVfethaek to -fight for Bao Dai.
:? Our litheridan -116-sts then 'introduced the
topic of thetraining of Vietnamese forces
to,clefend their own country. Whatever the
attractions of thre scheme, they admitted
that it would take perliatie-2 -Years to finish.
The problem was whatmean:.
while-. - When Lord Reading asked Mr. Dul-
lea What yhe thought about this, he replied
that "-their' would have to hold some Bart of
bridgehead, as been done in Korea 'until
the Inchon landings could be carried out.
Lord, Reading commented that this meant
that things would remain oh the boil for
several years to come, -and Mr. Dulles replied
that this would be a very goodthing.
, ,Was concerned at this time by develop-
ments outside Geneva Which; it seemed to
me; 'might endanger our admittedly slender
chances of making progress in negotiation.
On May 15 I was surprised to find reports in
the Siailie Morning lovers of Franco-Ameri-
can *otiastone on the possibility of military
intetTentinn, by the United Mlles in Indo-
china. That this lasue -ahottld have been
?
resurrected at such a moment was startling.
I at once asked Mr. Bedell Smith if there
was any truth in these reports, and he told
me he knew nothing about the matter.
When M. Bidault came to see me laterin the
friOrnift, I asked him if he could cOhfirm
the rumors; and he gave me a vague denial
which largely reassured me. However, at the
end Of our meeting, M. de Margerie, his prin-
cipal adviser on that occasion, led me to the
window and said that he had a document
which he had been instructed byM. Bidault
,to read to me. This contained the condi-
tions for 'United States intervention in Indo-
china. - rcommented:- "Then What the news-
said is tine." "Certainly," 1Vlargerie
replied, -"very much so." He gave me the
, conditions, which' were for intervention
either after the failure of Geneva, or earlier
if the French so desired; and he emphasized
that the American preference had been clear-
ly expressed for the earlier date.
- - ,
The sad, historic filet is that the
Alnerican Secretary of State - was at
Geneva; doing everYthinilie-billil to get
a war started in Indochina With Amer--
- can and British participation; trYing-to
convince the French to stay in with such
, ,
assiStanpe.
' That is in the backgrOUnd of McNa
- - - - - _
mara's .War South
Vietnam. That is
in the, ,),,ackgroiiiirl, ,Of -the Unfortunate
and, in MY opinion, unjustifiable 'killing
Of American boys in South Vietnam. It
Is not the. most pleasant chapter of
? ArneriCan history. Such feats Stir 'up a
rude_ wakening, on the part Of thinking
Americans ,who too frequently come to
assuMe4alielY tli6;t,Itheir_c?iintry Can do
wrOng.
,I am proud to Say that the total record
of my country IS a glorious one. But one
cannot it on the Committee on rcireign
Rf el a tio_k* and cannot serVe, in thi.s:, body
for 20. years ,withOnt knowing that some-
timeS., the record Of the United States on
41gge$,',18 :pot ,pneithat the', sunlight
ofirnth Shines upon, or that our fore-
gathers, who sacrificed sO'iiiiich to Make-
'
us free, wouldhe proud' of.
This lp o? orffiese chapters. tVe are
writing a continuing chapter in this Story
that Will_ net- be .pleasant reading to
American linden:is in the year -2000,
2020, 2050;2075, or the Year' 3000: It will
also be _regretted by many _ more Ameri-
Cats Mitch sooner than" that.
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GRESSIONAL RECORD -- EN E 8725
Eden reported to Churchill: oision in any case. He repeatedly emplia-
I myself fear that this new talk of inter- sized that Dulles' suspicions about a de-
vention will have weakened what chances re- parture from the "seven points" were wholly
main of agreement at this conference. The unjustified; it was precisely because he
Chinese, and to a lesser extent the Russians, wished to secure them that he was anxious
have all along suspected that the Americans for Dulles to come to Geneva.
intend to intervene in Indochina whatever I had already been warned by Bedell Smith
arrangements we try to arrive at here. The that the U.S. Government could not associ-
Chinese also believe that the Americans plan ate themselves with the final declaration,
hostilities against them. These reports. could The most they could do was to issue a deo-
help to convince them that they are right, laration taking note of what had been de-
and I Ao not accept the U.S. argument that cided and undertaking not to disturb the
the threat of intervention will incline them settlement. Since Dulles had been at least
to compromise. as responsible as ourselves for calling the
Geneva Conference, this did not seem to be
On May 29, reports Eden: reasonable. I also feared that it might lead
As I reported to London at the time, the to serious difficulties at our final meeting.
Americans seemed deeply apprehensive of for the Chinese had indicated that they
reaching any agreement, however innocuous, would insist upon signature of the final dee-
with the Communists. Their delegation had laration by all the delegations. I thought
recently been expressing concern about the that I had better have this out with Molotov
contacts which they believed to be taking before the meeting. I went to see him and
place between the French and Vietminh dele- we eventually agreed that, in order to elim-
gations, and seemed to fear that they would Mate the problem of signature, the declara-
make a deal of their own. I saw no reason tion should have a heading in which all the
to worry about this. There were signs, too, participating countries would be listed.
that the bogey of intervention was once
again with us. Sir Gladwyn Jebb reported Mr. President, the rationale given to
from Paris on May 31 that the United States the American people for our refusal to
had practically reached agreethent with sign the Geneva agreement of 1954 was
France on the conditions for intervention, that we were not party to the war. That
should the conference fail. Bidault con- was nonsense, for our Secretary of State
firmed to me on the same day that, if no was there, doing everything he could to
the ex-
American help was contemplated to , get us involved in intervention in Indo-
agreement were to be reached at Geneva, get
tent of three divisions. By 1954, we were financing 75 percent
But the conference did not break down, of the French war effort in Indochina.
Instead it agreed on a settlement based From 1950 to 1954, we poured in more
on seven points that Dulles himself had than $1.5 billion of our money for the
worked out with Eden. As the confer- French; we were already intervening
ence came to an end, Britain and France with our money and our supplies. Rus-
both tried to get the United States to sta, China, and Britain were far less in-
sign the Geneva accords. Of this effort volved in it than we were, if at all; but
Eden writes: they signed the Geneva Agreement. If
M. Mendes France's main purpose in these our reason for not signing had been
and skill, was to dispel Mr. Dulles' suspicion valid, we should not have participated
conversations, which he pursued with drive
in the conference. But we did, because
that there would inevitably be some depar-
ture by France from the seven points on we wanted to have a hand in it; and, as ?
which we had agreed in Washington. He Anthony Eden said, seven basic prin-
described to us his negotiations with the ciples of the accords came from Dulles.
Vietminh on the question of the demarcation Yet we refused to sign the agreement.
line in Vietnam, and effectively demonstrated I repeat that, in my opinion, when
that at no point had his position diverged from the minimum terms which had been this matter is studied from its four cor-
ners, it will be found that there is a clear
defined by the Americans and ourselves. He
said that it would be of the greatest help to indication that at that very time, Dulles
him if Mr. Dulles would come on to Geneva and Smith and Radford intended to
and give France full backing there; success have the United States become involved
or failure might depend on this. I did all I in Indochina; but they could not very
reinforce his request. I told Dulles that we well engage in unilateral action and also
could to support Mendes France and to
have us sign the Geneva accords.
were on a knife-edge, with an even chanceSo, Mn.Mr President, why did not our
of getting the sort of agreement we all
wanted. His decision might well decide the representatives sign that treaty? Why
issue, did not South Vietnam sign it? I think
Our combined arguments at first pro- the answer is that their refusal to sign
duced no impression. Mr. Dulles told us it was based on the fact that the United
that after discussion with-the President, it States had already decided to step in to
had been agreed that he should not return South Vietnam at least, and carry on
to Geneva. He reiterated his fears that, in where France had left off?to keep South
the event, France would be compelled to de-
part from the seven points, and the United Vietnam as a western protectorate and
.70 As" Asia.
-
States would then have to dissociate herself eh0ld in
from the resulting agreement. He said that By January 1, 1955, Secretary Dulles
even if the settlement adhered to the seven was denouncing the Geneva agreements
points faithfully, the United States still as "a major setback."
could not guarantee it. American public GENEVA ACCORD, DECLARATION, AND I.S. POLICY
opinion would never tolerate "the guaran- STATEMENT
teeing of the subjection of millions of Viet-
namese to COTOMUniSt rule." Dulles con- Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
cluded by saying that he did not want to put sent to have printed at this point in the
himself in the position of having to say "no" RECORD three documents relating to the
conclusion of the French wax in Indo-
that the United States would not escape the china: the provisions of the Geneva
in public. To this Mendes Prezio() replied
dilemma by refusing to appear at Geneva.
Since they were already represented at the
conference, they would have to make a de-
agreement relating to Vietnam; the
Final Declaration of the Geneva Confer-
ence; the U.S. Declaration on Indochina,
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8726 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENAVE April 24
made by Under Secretary of State Walter
Bedell Smith; and the press conference
statements of the time by President
Eisenhower and Secretary billies.
There being no objection, the docu-
ments were ordered to be printed in the
RECORD, as follows:
DOCUMENT No. 5?AGREEMENT ON TIM CESSA-
TION OE HOSTILITIES IN VIETNAM, TOLY 20,
1954 ?
Chapter I?Provisional military demarcation
line and demilitarized zone
Article 1
A provisional military demarcation line
shall be fixed, on either side of which the
forces of the two parties shall be regrouped
after their withdrawal, the forces of the
People's Army of Vietnam to the north of
the line and the forces of the French Union
to the south.
The provisional military demarcation line
is fixed as shown on the map attached.,
It is also agreed that a demilitarized zone
shall be established on either side of the
demarcation line, to a width of not more
than 5 kilometers from it, to act as a buffer
zone and avoid any incidents which might
result in the resumption of hostilities.
Article 2
The period within which the movement
of all forces of either party into its regroup-
ing zone on either gide of the provisional
military demarcation line shall be completed
shall not exceed BOO days from the date of
the present agreement's entry into force.
Article 8
When the provisional military demarcation
line coincides with a waterway, the waters
cf such waterway shall be open to civil iaavi-
igation by both parties wherever one bank is
controlled by one party and the other bank
by the other party. The Joint Commission
shall establish rules of navigation for the
stretch a waterway in question. The mer-
chant shipping and other civilian craft of
each party shall have unrestricted access to
the land under its military oontrol.
.Article 4
The provisional military demarcation line
between the two final regrouping zones Is
extended into the territoral waters by a line
perpendicular to the general line of the coast.
, All coastal islands north of this boundary
shall be evacuated by the armed forces of the
French Union, and all islands south of it
shall be evacuated by the forces of the
People's Army of Vietnam.
Article 5
To avoid any incidents which might result
in the resumption of hostilities, all military
forces, supplies, and equipment shall be
withdrawn from the demilitarised zone
Within 25 days of the present agreement's
entry into farce.
Article 8
No person, military or civilian, shall be
permitted to cross the provisional military
demarcation line unless specifically author-
ised to do so by the Joint Commission.
? Article 7
No person, military or civilian, shall be
permitted to enter the demilitarised zone
except persons concerned with the conduct
of civil administration and relief and per-
sons specifically authorised to enter by the
Joint Commission.
Article 8
Civil administration and relief in the de-
Militarised zone on either side of the pro-
visional military demarcation line shall be
the responsibility of the commanders-in-
chief of the two parties in their respective
Map not printed.
zones. The number of persons, military or
civilian, from each aide who are permitted
to enter the demilitarised zone for the con-
duct of civil administration and relief shall
be determined by the respective Command-
ers, but in no case shall the total number
authorised by either side exceed at any one
time a figure to be determined by the Trung
Cita Military Commission or by - the Joint
?omission. The number of civil police and
the arms to be carried by them shall be
determined by the Joint Commission. No one
else shall carry arms unless specifically au-
thorised to do so by the Joint Commis-
sion.
Article 9
Nothing contained in this chapter shall be
construed as limiting the complete freedom
of movement, Into, out of or within the de-
militarised zone, of the Joint Commission,
Its joint groups, the International Commis-
sion to be set up as indicated below, its in-
spection teams and any other persons, sup-
plies or equipment specifically authorised
to enter the demilitarised zone by the Joint
Commission. Freedom of movement shall be
permitted across the territory under thp mili-
tary control of either side over any road or
waterway which has to be taken between
points within the demilitarised zone when
each points are not connected by roads or
waterways lying completely within the de-
militarised zone.
Chapter ff--Principles and procedures gov-
erning implementation of the present
agreement
Article 10
The Commanders of the Force* on er.ch
aide, on the one side the Commander in
Chief of the French Union forces in Indo-
china and on the other side the Command-
er in Chief of the People's Army of Vietnam,
shall order and enforce the complete ces-
sation of all hostilities in Vietnam by all
armed forces under their control, including
all units and personnel of the ground, naval
and eir. forces.
Article 11
In accordance with the principle of a
simultaneous cease-fire throughout Indo-
china the cessation of hostilities shall be
simultaneous throughout all parts of Viet-
nam, in all areas of hostilities and for all
the forces of the two parties.
Taking into account the time effectively
required to transmit the cease-fire order down
to the lowest echelons of the combatant
/orces on both sides, the two parties are
agreed that the cease-fire shell take effect
completely and simultaneously for the dif-
ferent sectors of the country as follows:
Northern Vietnam at 8 am. (local time) on
July 27, 1954.
Central Vietnam at 8 am. (local time) on
'August 1, 1964
Southern Vietnam at 8 am (local time)
on August 11, 1954.
It is agreed that Peking mean time shall
he taken as local time.
From such time as the cease-lire becomes
effective in Northern Vietnam. ban parties
'undertake not to engage In any large-scale
offensive action in any part of the Indo-
-Chinese theatre of operations and not to
commit the air forces based on Northern
Vietnam outside that sector. The two
parties also undertake to inform each other
of their plans for movement from one re-
grouping sone to another within 25 days of
the present Agreement's entry into force.
Article 12
All the operations and movements en-
tailed in the cessation of hostilities and re-
grouping must proceed in a safe and orderly
fashion:
(a) Within a certain number of days after
the cease-fire Agreement shall have become
effective, the number to be determined on
the spot by the Trung Ma Military Commis-
sion, each party shall be responsible for re-
moving and neutralising mines (including
river- and sea-mines), bobby traps, explo-
sives and any other dangerous substances
placed by it. In the event of its being im-
possible to complete the work of removal and
neutralisation in time, the party concerned
shall mark the spot by placing visible signs
there. All demolitions, mine fields, wire
entanglements and other hazards to the free
movement of the personnel of the Joint
Commission and its joint groups. known to
be present after the withdrawal of the mili-
tary forces, shall be reported to the Joint
Commission by the commanders of the op-
posing forces:
(b) From the time of the cease-fire until
regrouping is completed on either side of the
demarcation line:
(I) The forces of either party shall be
provisionally withdrawn from the provisional
assembly areas assigned to the other party.
(2) When one party's forces withdraw by
a route (road, rail, waterway, sea route)
which passes through the territory of the
other party (see article 24), the latter party's
forces must provisionally withdraw three
kilometres on each side of such route, but in
such a manner as to avoid in Cl el-Lug with
the movements of the civil population.
Article 13
From the time of the ceasefire until the
completion of the movements from one re-
grouping zone into the other, civil and mili-
tary transport aircraft shall follow air-cor-
ridors between the provisional assembly
areas assigned to the French Union forces
north of the demarcation line on the one
hand and the Laotian frontier and the re-
grouping zone assigned to the French Union
forces on the other hand.
The position of the air-corridors, their
width, the safety route for single-engined
military aircraft transferred to the south and
the search and rescue procedure for aircraft
in distress shall be determined on the spot
by the Trung Clia Military Commission.
Article 14
Political and administrative measures in
the two regrouping zones, on either aide of
the provisional military demarcation line:
(a) Pending the general elections which
will bring about the unification of Vietnam,
the conduct of civil administration in each
regrouping zone shall be in the hands of the
party whose forces are to be regrouped there
in virtue of the present agreement.
(b) Any territory controlled by one party
which is transferred to the other party by
the regrouping plan shall continue to be
administered by the former party until such
date as all the troops who are to be trans-
ferred have completely left that territory so
as to free the sone assigned to the party in
question. From then on. such territory shall
be regarded as transferred to the other party,
who shall assume responsibility for it.
Steps shall be taken to ensure that there
is no break in the transfer of responsibilities.
For this purpose, adequate notice shall be
given by the withdrawing party to the other
party, which shall make the necessary ar-
rangements, in particular by sending admin-
istrative and police detachments to prepare
for the assumption of administrative respon-
sibility. The length of such notice shall be
determined by the Trung Gia Military Com-
mission. The 'transfer shall be effected lb
successive stages for the various territorial
sectors.
The transfer of the civil administration
of Hanoi and Haiphong to the authorities of
the Deraocratic Republic of Vietnam shall be
completed within the respective time-limits
laid down in article 15 for military move-
ments.
(c) Each party undertakes to refrain from
any reprisals or discrimination against per-
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196.4 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
sons or Organisations on account Of their
aCtivitiee,durirf.,g the hostilities 9,nd to guar-
antee then' democratic libejties,
(d) From the "late of entry into force o
the present agreement until the movernen
of troops is completed, any civilians residin
In a district controlled by one party who
Wish to go and live in the zone assigned to
the other party shall be permitted and helped
to do so by the authorities in that district.
Artiele 15,
'The disengagement of the Combatants, and
the withdrawals arid transfers of military
forces, equipment and supplies shall take
place in accordance with the following
principles:
(a) The withdrawals and _transfers of the
military forces, equipment and supplies of
the two parties shall be completed within
800 days, as laid down in article 2 of the
present agreement;
(b) Within either territory successive
withdraWals shall be made by sectors, por-
* tions of sectors or provinces. Transfers from
one regrouping zone to another shall be
made in successive monthly instalments pro-
portionate to, the- number of tRoops to be
transferred;
(c) The two parties shall undertake to
carry" out all troop withdrawals and trans-
fers in accordance with the aims of the
present agreement, shall permit no hostile
act and shall take no step whatsoever which
might hamper such withdrawals and traw-
lers. They shall assist one another as far
? as this is possible;
(d) The two parties shall permit no de-
struction or sabotage of any public property
and no intury to the life and property of the
WW1 population. They shall permit no in-
terference in local civil administration;
(e) The Joint Commission and the Inter-
national Commission shall insure that steps
are taken to safeguard the forces in the
course of withdrawal and transfer;
( f) The Trung Gia Military Commission,
and later the Joint Commission, shall de-
termine by common agreement the exact pro-
cedure for the disengagement of the com-
batants and for troop withdrawals and trans-
fers, on the basis of the principles mentioned
above and within the framework laid down
_ below:
1. The disengagement of the combatants,
illeluding the concentration of the armed
forces of all kinds and also each party's
moveraents into the provisional assembly
areas assigned to it and the other party's
provisional withdrawal from it, shall be com-
pleted within a period not exceeding 15 days-
after the date when the cease fire becomes
effective.
The general delineation of the provisional
assembly areas is set out in the maps 2 an-
nexed to the present agreement.
In order to avoid any incidents, no troops
shall be stationed less than 1,500 metres from
the lines delimiting the provisional assembly
areas.
I:luring the period until the transfers are
_ concluded, all the coastal islands west of the
- following lines shall be included in the
Haiphong perimeter:
Meridian of the Southern point of Kebao
Island.
Northern coast of Ile_ Rousse (excluding
the island), extended as far as the meridian
of Canipha-Mines.
Meridian of Campha-Mines.
2. The withdrawals and transfers shall be
effected in the following order and within
the following periods (from the date of the
entry into force of tio present agreement) :
Forces of the French Union
Day
Hanoi perimeter 8
Halduong perimeter 10
Haiphong perimeter 30
2 Maps not printed.
Forces of the People's Army of
Vietnam
8727
arrival or departure and the number of per-
s sons arriving or departing;
0 (g) The International Commission,
0 through its Inspection Teams, shall supervise
0 and inspect the rotation of units and groups
of personnel and the arrival and departure of
individual personnel as authorised above, at
the points of entry enumerated in article 20
below.
Days
Ham Tan and Xuyenmoc provisional as-
sembly area 80
Central Vietnam provisional assembly
area?first instalment 80
Plaine des Jones provisional assembly
area 100
Central Vietnam provisional assembly .
area?second instalment 100
Pointe Camau provisional assembly
area 200
Central Vietnam provisional assembly
area?last instalment 300
Chapter 111?Ban on the introduction of
fresh troops, military personnel, arms, and
munitions. Military bases
Article 16
With effect from the date of entry into
force of the present agreement, the intro-
duction into Vietnam of any troop reinforce-
ments and additional military personnel is
prohibited.
It is understood, however, that the rota-
tion of units and groups of personnel, the
arrival in Vietnam of individual personnel
?on a temporary duty basis and the return to
Vietnam of the individual personnel after
short periods of leave or temporary duty out-
side Vietnam shall be permitted under the
conditions laid down below:?
(a) Rotation of units (defined in para-
graph (c) of this article) and groups of per-
sonnel shall not be permitted for French
Union troops stationed north of the pro-
visional military demarcation line laid down
in article 1 of the present agreement during
the withdrawal period provided for in ar-
ticle 2.
However, under the heading of individual
personnel not more than 50 men, including
officers, shall during any one month be per-
mitted to enter that part of the country north
of the provisional military demarcation line
on a temporary duty basis or to return there
after short periods of leave or temporary
? duty outside Vietnam.
(b) "Rotation" s defined as the replace-
ment of units or groups of personnel by other
units of the same echelon or by personnel
who are arriving in Vietnam territory to do
their overseas service there;
(c) The units rotated shall never be larger
than a battalion?or the corresponding
echelon for air and naval forces;
(d) Rotation shall be conducted on a Man-
for-man basis, provided, however, that in
any one quarter neither party shall introduce
more than 15,500 members of its armed
forces into Vietnam under the rotation
policy.
(e) Rotation units (defined in paragraph
(c) of this article) and groups of personnel,
and the individual personnel mentioned in
this article, shall enter and leave Vietnam
only through the entry points enumerated in
article 20 below;
(f) Each party shall notify the Joint Com-
mission and the International Commission
at least two days in advance of any arrivals
or departures of units, groups of personnel
and individual personnel in or from Vietnam.
Reports on the arrivals or departures of
units, groups of personnel and individual
personnel in or from Vietnam shall be sub-
mitted daily to the Joint Commission and
the International Commission.
All the above-mentioned notifications and
reports shall indicate the places and dates Of
Article 17
(a) With effect from the date of entry
into force of the present agreement, the in-
troduction into Vietnam of any reinforce-
ments in the form of all types of arms, muni-
tion and other war material, such as combat
aircraft, naval craft, pieces of ordnance, jet
engines, and jet weapons and armoured ve-
hicles, is prohibited.
(b) It is understood, however, that war
material, arms and munitions which have
been destroyed, damaged, worn out or used
up after the cessation of hostilities may be
replaced on the basis of piece-for-piece of the
same type and with similar characteristics.
Such replacements of war material, arms and
ammunitions shall not be permitted for
French Union troops stationed north of the
provisional military demarcation line laid
down in article 1 of the present agreement,
during the withdrawal period provided for
in article 2.
Naval craft may perform transport opera-
tions between the regrouping zones.
(c) The war material, arms and munitions
for replacement purposes provided for in
paragraph (b) of this article, shall be in-
troduced into Vietnam only through the
points of entry enumerated in article 20 be-
low. War material, arms and munitions to
be replaced shall be shipped from Vietnam
only through the points of entry enumerated
in article 20 below.
(d) Apart from the replacements per-
mitted within the limits laid down in para-
graph (b) of this article, the introduction
of war material, arms and munitions of al/
types in the form of unassembled parts for
subsequent assembly is prohibited.
(e) Each party shall notify the Joint Com-
mission and the International Commission
at least two days in advance of any arrivals or
departures which may take place of war ma-
terial, arms and munitions of all types.
In order to justify the requests for the in-
troduction into Vietnam of arms, munitions
and other war material (as defined in para-
graph (a) of this article) for replacement
purposes, a report concerning each incom-
ing shipment shall be submitted to the Joint
Commission and the International Commis-
sion. Such reports shall indicate the use
made of the items so replaced.
(f) The International Commission, through
its inspection teams, shall supervise and in-
spect the replacements permitted in the cir-
cumstances laid down in this article, at the
points of entry enumerated in article 20
below.
Article 18
With -effect from the date of entry into
force of the present Agreement, the estab-
lishment of new military bases is prohibited
throughout Vietnam territory.
Article 19
With effect from the date of entry into
force of the present Agreement, no military
base under the control of a foreign State
may be established in the regrouping zone
of either party; the two parties shall ensure
that the zones assigned to them 40 not ad-
here to any military alliance and are not
used for the resumption of hostilities or to
further an aggressive policy.
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RD ? SEISA
to the International Commisison and its in-
spection teams in the performance of the
functions and tasks assigned to them by the
present Agreement.
Article 26
Article 20
The points of entry into Vietnam for rota-
tion personnel and replacements of material
are fixed as follows:
Zones to the north of the provisional mili-
tary demarcation line: Lacikay, Langeon,
Tien-Yen, Haiphong. VI nh, Dong-Hol.
Muong-Sen:
Zone to the south of the provisional mili-
tary demarcation line: Tourane, Qulnhon.
Nhatrang, Bangoi, Saigon, Cap St. Jacques,
Tanchau.
Chapter IV?Prisoners of war and civilian
internees
Article 21
The liberation and repatriation of all
prisoners of war and civilian internees de-
tained by each of the two parties at the corn-
ing into force of the present Agreement shall
be carried out tinder the following condi-
tions:
(a) All prisoners of war and civilian in-
ternees of Vietnam. French and other na-
tionalities captured since the beginning of
hostilities in Vietnam during military opera-
tions or in any other circumstances of war
and in any part of the territory of Vietnam
shall be liberated within a period of 50 days
after the date When the cease-t'e becomes
effective in each theater.
(b) The term "civilian internees" is un-
derstood to mean all persons who, having in
any way contributed to the political and
armed struggle between the two parties, have
been arrested for that reason and have been
kept in detention by either party during the
period Of hostilities.
(c) All prisoners of war and civilian in-
ternees held by either party shall be surrend-
ered to the appropriate authorities of the
other party, who shall give them all possible
assistance in proceeding to their country of
origin, place of habitual residence or the
zone of their choice.
Chapter V?Inseellanecrus
The costs involved in the operations of the
Joint Commission and Joint groups and of
the international Commission and its in-
spection teams shall be shared equally be-
tween the two parties.
Article 27
The signatories of the present agreement
and their successors in their functions shall
be responsible for ensuring the observance
and enforcement of the terms and provi-
sions thereof. The commanders of the
forces of the two parties shall, within their
respective commands, take all steps and
make all arrangements necessary to ensure
full compliance with all the provisions of
the present agreement by all elements and
military personnel under their command.
The procedures laid down in the present
agreement shall, 19 henever necessary, be
studied by the commanders of the two par-
ties and. if necessary, defined more spe-
cifically by the Joint Commission.
Chapter VI?Joint Commission and Inter-
national Commission for Supervision and
Control in Vietnam
Article 28
Responsibility for the execution of the
agreement on the cessation of hostilities
shall rest with the parties.
Article 29
On International Commission shall ensure
the control and supervision of this exectition.
Article 30
In order to facilitate, under the condi-
tions shown below, the execution of provi-
sions concerning joint actions by the two
parties, a Joint Commission shall be set up
in Vietnam.
Article 22
The commanders of the forces of the two
parties shall ensure that persons under their
respective commands who violate any of the
provisions of the present agreement are suit-
ably punished.
Article 23
In cases in which the place of burial is
known and the existence of graves has been
established, the commander of the forces of
either party shall, within a specific period
after the entry into force of the armistice
agreement, permit the graves service person-
nel of the other party to enter the part of
Vietnam territory under their military con-
trol for the purpose of finding and removing
the bodies of deceased military personnel of
that party, including the bodies of deceased
prisoners of war. The Joint Commission shall
determine the procedures and the time limit
for the performance of this task. The com-
manders of the forces of the two parties shall
communicate to each other all information
in their possession as to the place of burial
of military personnel at the other party.
Article 24
The present agreement shall apply to all
the armed forces of either party. The armed
forces of each party shall respect the demili-
tarised zone and the territory under the
military control of the other party, and shall
commit no act and undertake no operation
against the other party and shall not engage
in blockade of any kind in Vietnam.
For the purposes Of the present Article.
the word "territory" includes territorial wa-
ters and air space.
Article 25
The commanders of the forces of the two
parties shall afford full protection -and all
possible assistance and cooperation to the
Joint Commission and its joint groups and
of the following States: Canada, India, and
Poland.
It shall be presided over by the Represent-
ative of India.
Article 85
The international Commission shall set up
fixed and mobile inspection teams, composed
of an equal number of officers appointed by
each of the above-mentioned States. The
mixed teams shall be located at the following
points: Laokay, Langson, Tien-Yien, Hai-
phong, Vinh, Dong-Hol, Muong-Sen Tourane,
Quinhon, Nhatrang, Bangol, Saigon, Cape St.
Jacques, Tranchau. These points of location
may, at a later date, be altered at the request
of the joint commission, or of one of the par-
ties, or of the international commission it-
self, by agreement between the international
commission and the command of the party
concerned. The zones of action of the mo-
bile teams shall be the regions bordering the
land and sea frontiers of Vietnam, the de-
marcation lines between the regrouping
zones and the demilitarised zones. Within
the limits of these zones they shall have the
right to move freely and shall receive from
the local civil and military authorities all
facilities they may require for the fulfillment
of their tasks (provision of personnel, placing
at their disposal documents needed for su-
pervision, summoning witnesses necessary for
holding enquiries, ensuring the security and
freedom of movement of the inspection
teams. Ac.) They shall have at their dis-
posul such modern means of transport, ob-
servation, and oommunication as they may
require. Beyond the zones of action as de-
fined above, the _mobile teams may, by agree-
ment with the command of the party con-
cerned, carry out other movements within
the limits of the tasks given them by the
present agreement.
Article 36
The international commission shall be re-
sponsible for supervising the proper execu-
Article 31 tion by the parties of the provisions of the
The Joint Commission shall be composed agreement. For this purpose it shall fulfil
of an equal number of representatives of the the tasks of control, observation, inspection,
commanders of the two parties. and investigation connected with the appli-
cation of the provisions of the agreement on
Article 32 the cessation of hostilities, and it shall in
The Presidents of the delegations to the particular:
Joist Commission shall hold the rank of (a) Control the movement of the armed
general. forces of the two parties, effected within the
The Joint Commissiousshall set up Joint framework of the regroupment plan.
groups, the number of which shall be deter- (b) Supervise the demarcation lines be-
mined by mutual agreement between the tween the regrouping areas, and also the de-
parties. The joint groups shall be composed militarised zones.
of an equal number of alleere from bell' (c) Control the operations of releasing
parties. Their location on the demarcation prisoners of war and civilian internees.
line between the regrouping zones shall be (d) Supervise at ports and airfields as well
determined by the parties whilst taking into as along all frontiers of Vietnam the exe-
account the powers of the Joint Commission. cution of the provisions of the agreement
. Article 33 on the cessation of hostilities, regulating the
The Joint Commission shall ensure the introduction into the country of armed
execution of the following provisions of the forces, military personnel, and of all kinds
Agreement on the cessation of hostilities: of arms, munitions, and war material.
(a) A simultaneous and general cease-fire Article 37
In Vietnam for all regular and irregular The International Commission alai',
armed forces of the two parties.,
through the medium of the inspection teams
(b) A regroupment of the armed forces of mentioned above, and art soon as possible
the two parties. . either on its own initiative, or at the request
(c) Ohservanbe of the demarcation lines of the Joint Commission, or of one of the
between the regrouping zones and of the de- parties, undertake the necessary investiga-
militarised sectors. Lions both documentary and on the ground.
Within the limits of its competence it shall Article 38
help the parties to execute the said provi- The inspection teams shall submit to the
Mons, shall ensure liaison between them for International Commission the results of their
the purpose of preparing and carrying out supervision, their investigation and their
plans for the application of these provisions, observations, furthermore they shall draw
and shall endeavour to solve such disputed up such special reports as they may consider
questions as may arise between the parties necessary or as may be requested from them
in the course of executing these provisions, by the Commission. In the case of a die-
Article 54 agreement within the teams, the conclusions
An International connnieeion elan be get of each member shall be submitted to the
up for the control and supervision over the Commission.
application of the provisions of the agree- Article 39
ment on the cessation of hostilities in Viet- If any one inspection team is unable to set-
nam. It shall be composed of representatives tie an incident or considers that there is a
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1964
violation or a threat of a serious violation, the
International Commission shall be informed
the, latter shall study the reports and the
conCluelpi4 of, thejnspectiori team i and 'iliall
1?ufprM,,th. parties of_ the measures-Which
cr
shoultil?e? alt,eii2fOr:the settlernent Of thq In-
cident, en _Frig Of the violation or removal Of
the threat of viOiation, - " . ?
. .? ., .. .
-. Article 49 . _.
When the Joint Commission is unable to
reach an agrdement on the interpretation
to be given to some provision or On the ap-
praisal of 'a fait, the International Commis-
sion s1411 -he infornied of the ;disputed ques-
tion; Its recommendations shall besent di-
rectly to the parties and shall be notified to
the Joint Corruniselon. ?
'Article 41
The reconimSnAations of thp?tritcrnation,a1
ConandesiOn. shall .i..),e ,adOpted_hy majority
vote, subject to the provisions Contained in
0430.1q 0. :,XttliivOtee ar0.0,4cied,-the chair-
11We 17,ete shall-be decisive.
The International Commission may-forinu-
, late recommendations concerning amend-
ments and additions which should be made
0 the provisions of the agreement on the
cessation cg. .49,940.1tie4 41 Victuam?in, order
to engtr,,94 .th'-0,,,;,r9. PIT'gggfPexo-P,uttitP4 01,4liat
agreement,anese recommendations shall be
?
adopted Unanimously.
?
Article 42
Approved For 4161%16f4X1, EFt8iiff-?13,REW
When dealing with questions concerning
Violations, or threats, of viOlationi, which
might lead to a resumption of hostilities,
namely;
) Refusal by the armed forces of one
party ,to elIect the movements provided for
In the regroupment plan;
(b) Violation by the armed forces of one
of the parties of the regrouping zones, ter-
ritorial waters, or air space of the other
party; the decisions of the International
Corninission must be,unaninioug.
Article 43
If one of the parties refuses to put into
effect a recommendation of the,Intnnational,
Commission, the parties concerned , or the
Commission itself shall /inform :the, mem-
bers of the Geneva Conference. ,
If the ?International Commission ,does, pot
reach 'unanimity in the cases provided for
in article 42,, it shall subnilt a majority re-
port and one or more minority reports to
the members .of the ,Conference,?
. The International Commission shall In-
forin the members of the Conference In all
cases where its activity is being hindered.
/4.r9plp44.
The ;ntcinatiOnal ?Collin:48'49n ,shali he sot
up at the time of the cessation of hostilities
-hi Indochina in order that it shoulci be able
to fnifil the tasks provided' for in article 36.
? , , - - , ,
.? ? .
,J41:491c 45 _
The International coral-414cm for puper-
vision and Control in Vietnam shall_ apt in
close, cooperation with the International
Commissions fOr;Siipervielort and Control in
,
?,C6,_ ?.nil?9-414?Otp?Fl Lays,
The 5SO:04;40-General of these three
Commissions shall be responsible for coorcli-
.
nating their work and for relations between
them.
Article 46
, `-
'The International Commission for Super-
vision_andlContxol ?Irt _Vietnap may, after
cOn-B11.4.01P4_.?*Itlat? ttiV,-,41terrlati911,41 COM-
missioners,pr,?Superyision and Control in
Csmbeelie,spetWe,_sx14 haying regard to the
development of the situation PI Cambodia
and Laos, Progressively reduce Its activities,
Such a deOPIOn must be adopted imsni-
- MouSly.
001400454
Article 47
All the provisions of the present Agree-
ment, save the second subparagraph of ar-
ticle 11, shall enter into force at 2400 hours
(Geneva time) on July 22, 1954.
Done in Geneva at 2400 hours on the 20th
of July, 1954, in French and in Vietnamese,
both texts being equally authentic.
For the commander-in-chief of the French
Union Forces in Indochina:f
DELTIEL,
Brigadier-General.
For the commander in chief of the People's
Army of Vietnam.
TA-CivaNa-Buu,
Vice-Minister of National Defence of ,
the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.
MS. DECLARATION ON INDOCHINA
(Norm?Following Is the text of a state-
ment made by Under Secretary Walter B.
Smith at the concluding Indochina plentary
session at Geneva on July 21:)
As I stated on July 181 my Government is
not prepared to join in a declaration by the
Conference such as is submitted. However,
the United States makes this unilateral dec-
laration of its position in these matters:
DritsasrfoN
The Government of the United States be-
ing resolved to devote its efforts to the
strengthening of' peace in accordance with
the principles and purposes of the United
Nations takes note of the agreements con-
cluded at Geneva on July 20 and 21, 1954 be-
tween (a) the Franco-Laotian Command and
the Command of the Peoples Army of Viet-
nam; (b) the Royal Khmer Army Command
and the Command of the Peoples Army of
Vietnam; (c) Franco-Vietnamese Command
and the Command of the Peoples Army Of
Vietnam and of paragraphs 1 to 12 inclusive
of the declaration presented to the Geneva
Conference on July 21, 1954 declares with
regard to the aforesaid agreements and par-
agraphs that (I) it will refrain from the
threat or the use of force to disturb them,
in accordance with article 2 (4) of the Char-
ter of the United Nations dealing with the
Obligation of members to refrain in their
International relations from the threat or
use of force; and (II) it would view any re-
newal of the aggression in violation of the
aforesaid agreements with grave concern
? and as seriously threatening international
peace and security.
In connection with the statement in the
declaration concerning free elections in Viet-
nam my Government wishes to make clear
its position which it has expressed in a dec-
laration made in Washington on June 29,
1054 2 as follows:
"In the case of nations now divided against
their will, we shall continue to seek to
achieve unity through free elections super-
vised by the United Nations to insure that
'they are conducted fairly."
With respect to the statements made by
the representative of the State of Viet-
nani., the United States reiterates its tradi-
tional position that peoples are entitled to
'determine their own future and that it will
not join in an arrangement which would
hinder this. Nothing in its declaration just
made is intended to or does indicate any
'departure from this traditional position.
We share the hope that the agreements
will permit Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam to
play their part, in full independence The important thing from now on is not
sovereignty, in the peaceful community of to mourn the past but to seize the future
nations, and will enable the peoples of that opportunity to prevent the loss in northern
area to determine their own future. Vietnam from leading to the extension of
communism throughout southeast Asia and
the Southwest Pacific. In this effort all of
1 Not printed. the ,free nations concerned should profit by
2 Bulletin of July 12, 1954. theIessons of thepast.
8729
NEWS CONFERENCE ,STATEMENT BY THE
PRESIDENT
I am glad, of course, that agreement
has been reached at Geneva to stop the
bloodshed in Indochina.
The United States has not been a belliger-
ent in the war. The primary responsibility
for the settlement in Indochina rested with
those nations which participated in the
_ _
fighting. Our role at Geneva hap been at
all times to try to be helpful where desired
and to aid France and Cambodia, Laos, and
Vietnam to obtain a just and honorable set-
tlement which will take into account the
needs of the interested people. Accordingly,
the United States has not itself been party
to or bound by the decisions by the Confer-
ence, but it is our hope that it will lead 'to
the establishment of peace consistent with
the rights and the' needs of the countries
'concerned. The agreement contains fea-
tures which we do not like, but a great deal
depends on how they work in practice.
The United States is issuing at Geneva a
statement to the effect that it is not pre-
pared to join in the Conference declaration,
but, as loyal members of the United Nations,
we also say that, in compliance with the
obligations and principles contained in ar-
ticle 2 of the United Nations Charter, the
United States will not use force to disturb
the settlement. We also say that any re-
newal of Communist aggression would be
viewed by us as a matter of grave concern.
As evidence of our resolve to assist Cam-
bodia and Laos to play their part, in full
independence and sovereignty, in the peace-
ful community of free nations, we are re-
questing the agreement of the Governments
of Cambodia and Laos to our appointment
of an Ambassador or Minister to be resident
at their respective capitals (Phnom Penh
and Vientiane). We already have a Chief of
Mission at Saigon, the capital of Vietnam,
and this Embassy will, of course, be main-
tained.
The United States is actively pursuing dis-
cussions with other free nations with a view
to the rapid organization of a collective de- ,
kensa in southeast Asia in order to prevent
direct or indirect Communist aggression in
that general area.
NEWS CONFERENCE STATEMENT BY SECRETARY
DULLES
The Geneva negotiations reflected the
military developments in Indochina. After
nearly 8 years of war the forces of the French
Union had lost control of nearly one-half
of Vietnam, their hold on the balance was
precarious, and the French people did not
desire to prolong the war.
These basic facts inevitably dominated the
Indochina phase of the Geneva Conference
and led to settlements which, as President
Eisenhower said, contain many features
which we do not like,
Since this was_ BO, _and since the United
States itself was neither a belligerent in
Indochina nor subject to compulsions which
applied to others, we did not become a party
to the Conference results. We merely noted
them and said that, in accordance with the
United Nations Charter, we would not seek
by force to overthrow the settlement. We
went on to affirm our dedication to the
principle of self-determniation of peoples
and our hope that the agreements would
permit Camboia, Laos, and Vietnam to be
really sovereign and independent nations.
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8730 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENA Aprit 24
One lesson Is that resistance to commu-
nism needs popular support, and this in turn
means that the people should feel that they
are defending their own national institu-
tions. One of the good aspects of the Geneva
Conference is that it advances the truly in-
dependent status of Cambodia, Laos, and
southern Vietnam. Prime Minister Mendes-
France said yesterday that instructions had
been given to the French representatives in
Vietnam to complete by July 30 precise proj-
ects for the transfers of authority which will
give reality to the independence which
France bad promised. This independence is
already a fact in Laos and Cambodia, and it
was demonstrated at Geneva, notably by the
Gevernment of Cambodia. The evolution
from colonialism to national Independence is
thus about to be completed in Indochina,
and the free governmenta of this area should
from now on be able to enlist the loyalty of
their people to maintain their independence
as against Communist colonialism.
A second lesson which should be learned
Is that arrangefnenta for collective defense
need to be made in advance of aggression,
not after it fs underway. The United States
for over a year advocated united action in
the area, but this proved not to be practical
under the conditions which existed. We
believe, however, that now it will be practical
to bring about collective arrangements to
promote the security of the free peoples of
southeast Asia. Prompt steps will be taken
in this direction. In this connection we
should bear in mind that the problem is not
ifterely one of deterring, open armed aggres-
sion but of preventing Communist subver-
sion which, taking advantage of economic
dislocations and social injustice, might
weaken and thirdly overthrow the non-Com-
munist governments.
_ If the free nations which have a stake in
this area will now work together to avail of
present opportunities in the light of past
experience, then the loss of the present may
lead to a gain for the future.
Governments of Cambodia and Laos of their
resolution not to request foreign aid, whether
In war material, in personnel, or in instruc-
tors except for the purpose of effective de-
fense of their territory and, in the case at
Laos, to the extent defined by the agreements
on the cessation of hostilities in Laos.
"5. The Conference takes note of the
clauses in the agreement on the cessation of
hostilities in Vietnam to the effect that no
military base at the disposition of a foreign
state may be established In the regrouping
zones of the two parties, the latter having the
obligation to see that the zones allotted to
them shall not constitute part of any military
alliance and shall not be utilized for the re-
sumption of hostilities or in the service of an
aggressive policy. The Conference also takes
note of the declarations of the Governments
of Cambodia and Laos to the effect that they
will not join in any agreement with other
states if this agreement includes the obliga-
tion to participate In a military alliance not
in conformity with the principles of the char-
ter of the United Nations or, In the case of
Laos. with the principles of the agreement
on the cessation of hostilities in Laos or, so
long as their security Is not threatened. the
obligation to establish bases on Cambodian
or Laotian territory for the military forces of
foreign powers.
"6. The Conference recognizes that the es-
sential purpose of the agreement relating to
Vietnam is to settle military questions with a
view to ending hostilities and that the mili-
tary demarcation line should not In any way
be interpreted as constituting a political or
territorial boundary. The Conference ex-
presses its conviction that the execution of
the provisions set out in the present declara-
tion and in the agreement on the cessation
of hostilities creates the necessary basis for
the achievement in the near future of a
political settlement in Vietnam.
"7. The Conference declares that, so far as
Vietnam is concerned, the settlement of po-
litical problems, effected on the basis of re-
spect for the principles of independence,
unity, and territorial integrity. shall permit
the Vietnamese people to enjoy the funda-
mental freedoms, guaranteed by democratic
institutions established as a result of free
general elections by secret ballot.
"In order to insure that suflicient progress
in the restoration of peace has been made,
and that all the necessary conditions obtain
for free expression of the national will, gen-
eral elections shall be held in July 1956, under
the supervision of an international com-
mission composed of representatives of the
member states of the International Super-
visory Commission referred to In the agree-
ment on the cessation of hostilities. Con-
sultations will be held on this subject be-
tween the competent representative author-
ities of the two zones from April 20, 1955,
onward.
"8. The provisions of the agreements on the
cessation of hostilities intended to Insure
the protection of individuals and of property
must be most strictly applied and must,
in particular, allow every one in Vietnam to
decide freely in which zone he wishes to live.
"9. The competent representative au-
thorities of the northern and southern zones
of Vietnam, as well as the authorities of Laos
and Cambodia. must not permit any in-
dividual or collective reprisals against per-
sons who have collaborated in any way with
one of the parties during the war, or against
members of such persons' families.
"10. The Conference takes note of the dec-
laration of the French Government to the
effect that it is ready to withdraw its troops
from the territory of Cambodia, Laos. and
Vietnam, at the request of the governments
concerned and within a period which shall
be fixed by agreement between the parties
except in the cases where, by agreement be-
tween the two parties, a certain number of
TEXT or FINAL DECLARATION
"Final declaration, dated July 21. 1954, of
the Geneva Conference on the problem of
'restoring peace in Indochina, in which the
representatives of Cambodia, the Democratic
Republic of Vietnam, France. Laos, the Peo-
ple's Republic of China, the State of Vietnam,
the Uhion of Soviet Socialist Republics, the
United Kingdom and the United States of
America took part.
"I. The Conference takes note of the agree-
ments ending hostilities in Cambodia, Laos,
and Vietnam and organising international
control and the supervision of the execution
of the provisions of these Agreements.
"2. The Conference expresses satisfaction
at the ending of hostilities in Cambodia,
Laos, and Vietnam. The Conference ex-
presses its conviction that the execution of
the provisions set out in the present declara-
tion and in the agreements on the cessation
of hostilities will permit Cambodia, Laos,
and Vietnam henceforth to play their part,
In full independence and sovereignty, in the
peaceful community of nations.
"3. The Conference takes note of the decla-
rations made by the Governments of Cam-
bodia and of Laos of their intention to adopt
measures permitting all citizens to take their
place in the national community, in particu-
lar by participating in the next general elec-
tions, which, in conformity with the consti-
tution of each of these countries, shall take
place in the course of the year 1955. by secret
ballot and in conditions of respect for funds-
mental freedoms.
"4. The Conference takes note of the
clauses in the agreement on the cessation of
hostilities in Vietnam prohibiting the Intro-
duction into Vietnam of foreign troops and
military personnel as well as of all kinds of
arms and munitions. The Conference also
takes note of the declarations made by the
French troops shall remain at specified
points and for a specified time.
"11. The Conference takes note of the
declaration of the French Government to the
effect that for the settlement of all the
problems connected with the reestablishment
and consolidation of peace in Cambodia,
Laos. and Vietnam, the French Government
will proceed from the principle of respect for
the independence and sovereignty, unity, and
territorial integrity of Cambodia. Laos, and
vietaam.
"12. In their relations with Cambodia,
Laos, and Vietnam, each member of the
Geneva Conference undertakes to respect the
sovereignty, the independence, the unity,
and the territorial integrity of the above-
mentioned states, and to refrain from any
interference in their internal affairs.
"13. The members of the Conference agree
to consult one another on any question
which may be referred to them by the Inter-
national Supervisory Commission, in order
to study such measures as may prove neces-
sary to insure that the agreements on the
cessation of hostilities in Cambodia, Laos,
and Vietnam are respected."
Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I do not
believe the United States wanted to put
Its name on the text of that agreement
of July 21, 1954, because a few weeks
before we.had decided to back Ngo Dinh
Diem as head of a government in South
Vietnam. He was appointed Premier by
the former Emperor. Bao Dai, on July 7.
If all the facts behind the American
decision to put its full support behind
Diem are ever published, they will show
the heavy hand of the Central Intelli-
gence Agency in that decision. It was
a decision recommended and supported
not through State Department channels,
but through CIA channels.
A letter of October 21, 1954, from Pres-
Merit Eisenhower to Premier Diem put
our commitment in writing. It called
upon Diem to make certain reforms. We
do not talk about that any more. When
Diem did not make the reforms that we
believed were the minimum needed to
make his government even look like a
success, we dumped him. We got an-
other boy, so to speak. In fact, we have
gotten two other Boys; and we have
stopped talking about needed reforms as
a condition of aid.
We no longer talk about freedom in
South Vietnam, for there is little there.
The United States is supporting a mil-
itary Fascist dictatorship, as ruinous to
human liberties and rights as vicious
communism is, for there are no differ-
ences between police states, when it
comes to human rights. Mr. President,
that is not going to be pleasant reading
for our descendants. When one is mak-
ing history, sometimes it is easy to over-
look what one is doing. Of course we
are making history in our foreign policy
In South Vietnam; and it is a history of
foreign policy, in connection with Mc-
Namara's war, that is completely out
of line with the glorious chapters that
comprise the overall volume of Amer-
ican history?so much out of line, Mr.
President, that I wish we could tear out
that part; I wish we could erase it. But,
of course, we cannot. However, we do
not need to continue to write it. So my
plea is that we stop writing it. We need
to keep faith with the man whom I con-
sider the greatest leader in the field of
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CON6AESSIONAL 1EU:61111 -- SENATE
foreign policy in his ody during My
many sears of ser-viiehere?a -great Ile:
_ . _ . _
publican, great'Cliairnian of the Sen-
ate roretin Relations -COrninittee, the
incoMparable -Arthur-Vandenberg.
The Senate has heard me say it many
times. But I want it in the,. speech. It
presents an oppOsirig view to the policy
of mydevernmerit in -Setith 'Vietnam.
This great tenet Of-Vanderiberg's, Which
Is a tenet affecting The -Whole' philosophy
1,k.1 rElt, TO
MINISTERS
ANC'E -FOR
8731
-
THE PRESIDENTOF THE COUNCIL Of eign, countries and foreign problems in
OF VIETNAM REGARDING ASSIST- anything but military terms.
THAT COUNTRY, OCTOBER 25, 1954
AMERICAN RESPONSIBILITIES UNDER GENEVA
AGREEMENT
Not being a party to the Geneva Agree-
ment, and South Vietnam not being a
party to it, what possible right does the
United States have to enforce it unila-
terally? None. The United States has
Uo rights under it at all. South Vietnam
may have some, since her territory is
governed by it.
We have claimed that the Geneva
agreement has been violated by North
Vietnam, and we have pointed to the
1962 report of the International Control
Commission, which reported violations?
by North Vietnam.
But what about the 1957 report of the
Commission which found that both
North and South Vietnam had violated
the Geneva Agreement, and what is more,
that the United States had aided, abetted
and earticipated in the South Vietnam-
ese violations?
Take a look at the language of article
16 of the Geneva Agreement:
With the effect of the date of entry into
force of the present agreement, the introduc-
tion into Vietnam of any troop reinforce-
ments and additional military personnel is
prohibited.
I wonder if Secretary McNamara ever
read it. Look at article 17:
With effect from the date of entry into
force of the present agreement, the intro-
&action into Vietnam of any reinforcements
in the form of all types of arms, munitions,
and other war material, such as combat air-
craft, naval craft, pieces of ordnance, jet
engines and jet weapons and armoured vehi-
cles, is prohibited.
Secretary McNamara can talk all he
likes about violations of the agreement
by North Vietnam but the United States
and South Vietnam began violating the
agreement on January 1, 1955, when we
began our military aid program to South
Vietnam.
Paragraphs 59 and 60 of the Interna-
tional Commission for Supervision and
Control in Vietnam report of 1957 state:
59. In paragraph 27 of the fifth interim
report reference was made to complaints re-
ceived from the -PAVN High Command re-
garding alleged violations of articles 16 and
17 of the Geneva Agreement. The Commis-
sion has not been able to carry out its in-
vestigation mentioned in that paragraph re-
garding the alleged construction of a new
airfield at Nha Ban in South Vietnam, the
reasons being alleged insecurity conditions
in the area and the stand of the Govern-
ment of the Republic of Vietnam, mentioned
In paragraph 44 above. The PAVN High
Command has also alleged the construction
of two other airfields in South Vietnam. This
is under investigation.
60. During the period under report, the
Commission has received a total of 24 com-
plaints alleging 76 specific instances of viola-
tions of articles 16 and 17 in South Vietnam.
In two cases where United States and Viet-
namese Military personnel were introduced
Into South Vietnam without any notifica-
tion under article 16(f),. the Operations
Committee of the Commission came to the
conclusion that there had been a violation
of article 16. In one case where a U.S. mil-
itary plane brought to Saigon a consign-
ment of aircraft wheel tires the Commit-
tee concluded that there had been a techni-
cal violation of article 17. In the first two
(Released Oct. 25, 1954, dated Oct. 1, 1954)
Ms Excellency Ns? DINH DIEM,
President of the Council of Ministers,
Saigon, Vietnam.
DEAR M. PRESIDENT: I have been following
with great interest the course of develop-
ments in Vietnam, particularly since the con-
clusion OS the conference at ,Geneva,? The
implications of the agreement concerning
' of our foreign policy, 1..s unanswerable. Vietnam have caused grave concern regard-
The advocates of expediency in foreign ing the future of a country temporarily di-
policy, which means the advocates Of the Tided by an long and
exhausting
wargrouping,nac
policy of intellectual dishoneSty, can- weakened by a g d
faced with enemies without and by their
not answer it,
P for there is nothinglac- subversive collaborators within.
'--' -
WO about the expediency.Your recent requests for aid to assist in
Vandenberg pointed out tat there is no the formidable project of the movement of
hope for permanent peace in the world ' several hunched thousand loyal Vietnamese
- until all of the nations of the world are citizens away from areas which are passing
willing to pet up a system of international tindar a de facto rule and political ideology
justice through law, to the procedures of which they abhor, are being fulfilled. I am
which would be submittql, for final and glad that the United States is able to assist
in this humanitarian effort.
binding decision, every issue that threat- We have been exploring ways and means
ens the peace of the world. They would to permit our aid to Vietnam to be more
be enforced by an international organi- effective and to make a greater contribution
zation such as the United Nations. to the welfare and stability of the Govern-
TY* great American ideal cannot be ment of Vietnain. r am, accordingl
y
, in-
'Meer/Wed with American for Polley
inflicting the American Ambassador to Viet-
in south Vietpam They are poles apart. harn to examine with you in your capacity as
Chief of Government, how an intelligent pro-
We liaVe not _even suggested that the gram of American aid given directly to your
South Vietnam, issue'should be taken to government can serve to assist Vietnam in
the 'United Nations, We have:_not even i..present hour of trial, provided that your
urged that an international peace- government is prepared to give assurances
th he standards
keeping organization ought to be set up as al
_ of performance it would
In south Vietnam to keep the warring be able to maintain in the event such aid
pafties apart, as We participate in the Were supplied.
Congo, Middle East, and Cypus
r. 'this The purpose of this offer is to assist the
Is one of the p-urposes of the uoited fia_ Government of Vietnam in developing and
maintaining a strong, viable state, capable of
tions Charter. ' resisting attempted subversion or aggression
As far as our policy in relationship t,o
our obligations under the United Nations taisroliugh military means. The Government
Willt be Yl'ileiteg States expects that this aid
In Sguth Vietnam is_concerned, it would y performance on the part of
appEar that we think the thafteet Na- the Government of Vietn,am in undertaking
tions Charter is a scrap, of paper in re- needed" reforms. It hopes that such aid,
sped to south vie-than). But it Is - t Wccirrillbeinonedtriwbuitthe
It is still a treaty binding upon all -the pendent Vietnam endowed with a strong
signatories, including the United States,
___ government. Such a government would, I
for we signed the charter. we have the hope, be so responsive to the nationalist aspi-
- BaM0 Obligation today that we had when tened in pur-
It in ari.,Franolsco, and that
we had who al,- ch.,rt PT ...? bY
the Senate, and that we had, when it Xle7.-
came an international 1.W 4"eaty ,com-
mitting the United States to fulfill:Molt
of its obligations. We_capp_ot square that
with our record.,in poutti ?Vietnam-
I do not believe the Vnited States
wanted to put its name on the text of the
treaty of July ?21, 1954. A:letter 0 Oc-
tober 21, 1954; from President Eisen-,
hewer to Premier plem, put our Corn-
ititment in writing, and as I said, set
forth certain conditions for reform that
the President made conditions precedent
to U.S. support.
But the commitment was to Diem.
This was the letter President Johns011
referred to _on IVIarc.h 24, 1964, when he
said befound himself the same place
President Eisenhower found himself in
10 years ago. Unfortunately, this is just
where weare?in the same place, and
perhaps even less so.
I ask unanimous eoment that the text
of this letter l)e printed at this point in
the REcoRp.
There being no objection, the letter
was ofdered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
yeoffuerc toiwv enl y c o towardnt nui nagne ffi no dr tes
rations of its people, so enli
pose and effective in perfor
will be 'respected both at ho
and discourage any who mig
pose A foreign ideology on y
Sincerely,
DWIGHT D.
Mr. MORSE. This lett
treaty; it was not a resol
gress carrying the weigh
was the promise of one he
rnent to ask Congress to do
if certain conditions were
Neither man remains i
conditions were not met.
was sent anyway. Even af
remove Diem from office,
port continued.
_Why? Because we have
ed or treated South Vietna
eign country. We have
treated it as our protector
through local rulers, jut
did. But the strings are pu
lean hands, and with Ameni
Of course, our interest
manly military. With t
was primarily economic, an
the TJnited States has pu
"reeking tube and iron shar
we scarcely know how to d
ance, that it
e and abroad
t wish to im-
ur free people.
ISENHOWER.
r was not a
tion of Con-
of law. It
d of govern-
ertain things
Get by Diem.
office. The
But the aid
er we helped
erican sup-
ever regard-
as a sover-
egarded and
te. We rule
the French
led by Amer-
an money.
here is pri-
e French it
still is. But
its trust in
"for so long
al with for-
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8732 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE April 24
eases, mentioned above, the Commission
asked the French High Command to show
cause why a finding of violation of article le
should not be given, and in the third case
why a finding Of violation of article 17
should not be given. The French Liaison
Mission In its reply dated the 21st July has
not denied the facts but has stated that
due to lack of coordination between the vari-
ous Vietnamese services, notifications were
not given. The matter is under the con-
sideration of the Commission.
In another case the Commission decided
that there had been no violation as on the
date mentioned by the PAW/ High Command
in its complaint, no U.S. plane had landed
at Tourane and, in one more case, that the
allegation had not been proved. In two
cases the Commission declined to under-
take any investigation as the allegations
were too general. For the same reason the
Commission just noted two complaints from
the PAVN High Conlniand. The other com-
plaints are under inquiry. In some cases it
has been found that team reports bear out
the allegations made by the PAVN High
Command of violations of articles le and
17. In such cases the party has been asked
to explain why notifications as required un-
der the agreement have not been given and
why the procedure laid down in protocol 23
for the introduction of war material and
military personnel has not been followed.
Paragraph 63 states:
63. One major case of a foreign military
mission in South Vietnam came up during
the period under report. On April 25. 1956,
the Commission received a request from the
French liaison mission and the Republic of
Vietnam for grant of permission for the
entry of 350 military personnel of the US.
Army Service Corps into South" Vietnam.
It was stated that these persons would con-
stitute a mission called TERM?Temporary
Equipment Recovery Mission?whose duties
would be to examine war- material and mili-
tary equipment lying in South Vietnam
which was the property of the UR. Govern-
ment for the purpose of selecting material to
be exported from Vietnam and to protect and
preserve this material. The Corpmission was
Informed that the members of TERM would
start entering South Vietnam by the teat
week of May 1956. The Commission informed
the French Liaison Mission that the matter
was under consideration and that, pending
the decision of the Commission, no entry
should be effected. In spite of this, 290
U.S. military personnel belonging to the
TERM have been introduced into South Viet-
nam, thus facing the Commission with a fait
accompli.
The Commission takes exception to this
method of procedure adopted by the French
Liaison Mission and the Government of the
Republic of Vietnam. The Commission gave
due consideration to the request of the Re-
public of Vietnam and communicated Its
decision on May 29, 1956. In this letter
the Commission asked for assurances that
the functions of Term would be solely the
selection of material for export from the
country and that it would not be used for
any other purpose. The Commission fur-
ther asked for details regarding the mis-
sion, number, and names of personnel, their
postings in the country and the tasks as-
signed to each one of them. Lastly, the
Commission proposed certain conditions on
acceptance of which the Commission would
be prepared to agree to the entry of the
Term personnel. These conditions include
submission of fortnightly progress reports on
the work of Term, submission of notifica-
tions regarding entry and exist of Term per-
sonnel, right of the Commission and its fixed
teams to control entry and exit, and the right
of the Commission to conduct spot checks
at any place where Term personnel were
functioning. The matter is being pursued
with the authorities of the Republic of Viet-
nam, whose final acceptance of the Com-
mission's conditions has not yet been re-
ceived. The Commission has also received
complaints from the PA.V.N. High Command
regarding alleged activities of certain U.S.
military missions in South Vietnam as con-
stituting violations of articles 16, 17, 18, and
19 of the agreement. The matter is under
the consideration of the Commission which
is awaiting the comments of the French
High Command.
I ask unanimous consent to have the
full text of this report printed at the
conclusion of my remarks.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. MC-
INTYRE in the chair). Without objection.
It is so ordered.
(See exhibit I.)
Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, any aid
to North Vietnam from China and Rus-
sia put together cannot come close to
matching the aid we have given to the
South Vietnam Government. In a sense,
the United States Is arming the rebels,
too, because much of their equipment is
captured from the Government forces.
I digress to say that the American
people would be greatly surprised if they
knew how much American equipment
has been captured by the Vietcong. The
briefings we have received, in which
we have asked questions on this subject,
always produce information that great
quantities of American military equip-
ment have been captured from the South
Vietnamese by the Vietcong, which is
being shot back at American boys.
That is why the American military
officers who have communicated with me
talk about the nature of this operation
and point out that it really is not a war
Operation in the sense that our military
proceeds to take the steps it would pro-
ceed to take if we were conducting an
out-and-out war operation, giving the
protection to American boys that they
ought to have. That is why military
officers who have communicated with
me have pointed out that we are not
fair to the American boys who are dying
in South Vietnam. We are not giving
them the military protection to which
they are entitled. One of those officers
said, "Senator, many times American
boys are sitting ducks." We cannot give
protection to Americans in helicopters,
the way the military operations are being
conducted. We cannot give them the
protection they should have as we send
them out in jeeps and other military
vehicles along with the Vietnamese.
They are greatly outnumbered. In those
forays we not only lose precious Ameri-
can lives, but much American equipment,
which gets into the bands of the Viet-
cong, who use it to fight back.
I think it is probably the strangest,
most ludicrous, paradoxical, inexcusable
American military operation in the his-
tory of the Republic.
From whatever angle one looks at Mc-
Namara's war in South Vietnam, he
cannot justify It from the standpoint
of desirable American policy. How long
are we going to continue it? How long
Is it going to take for the American peo-
ple to finally make clear that they want
no more of it, as the French people
finally made clear to the French Govern-
ment they wanted no more of it?
The policy should change. We should
participate with the United Nations, as I
shall say in some detail toward the close
of my remarks as I discuss the blueprint
for action which I believe should be the
substitute for our present foreign policy
In South Vietnam.
Mr. Nixon is proposing that we expand
the war into North Vietnam, which
means beyond any question of doubt a
proposal that our country become an
out-and-out aggressor nation. Unbeliev-
able. Fantastic: Yet there it is?an ugly
reality.
Rationalizers and alibiers are trying to
wave the flag into tatters to justify it.
They cannot justify it. This is a sorry
record of the history of American par-
ticipation in the development of the =-
fortunate plight in which we now find
ourselves, starting with the account of
what happened prior to the Geneva ac-
cords.
Mr. President, I do not like to stand on
the floor of the Senate and charge my
government with violating the Geneva
agreement, but I am satisfied that we
are violating it. Why did we never take
our own complaints about violations to
the signers of the Geneva agreement?
They are the nations responsible for its
enforciiment, not the United States.
I am at a loss to understand the Sec-
retary of State and other officials of the
State Department, who give us the same
kind of rationalization?that we are in
South Vietnam because North Vietnam
and possibly other countries are violating
the Geneva treaty. We are not even a
party to the Geneva treaty, and neither
is South Vietnam.
But the Secretary of State does not
have to be told that, He knows. He
knows that if any country is violating a
treaty and endangering the peace of the
world, any member of the United Nations
not only has the right but also the duty
to take the offender before the United
Nations for an accounting.
I said to the Secretary of State the
other day, "Give me one reason for not
going before the United Nations."
I have listened to weak, meaningless
replies when one takes a look at the sub-
stantive problem involved. All I could
get out of the Secretary of State was that
he did not believe the United Nations
would do anything about it.
I do not have to tell the Senate what
my reply was: "Mr. Secretary, how will
you ever know until you try."
I will tell the Senate why we have not
taken it to the United Nations. We do
not wish to do so because the United Na-
tions would never support our policy, be-
cause we want to continue to treat South
Vietnam as an American protectorate.
What are we doing with a protectorate?
All I can hope for is that before it is
too late the American people will become
fully aware of what their country is up
to. Let me warn again?and I have
raised this warning on the floor of the
Senate before as I have discussed Mr.
McNamara's war in South Vietnam?ex-
pand the war into North Vietnam and
there well not be a person in Government
who can be sure Red China will not come
in. There will not be a person in Gov-
ernment who can be sure, if we make the
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1964
stupid mistake of expanding the war into U.S. RESPONSIBILITIES UNDER
'North VietnaM, that it will not provide
a meeting ground for Khrushchev and
the Red Chinese to get back together
again. I do not know what facts anyone
in the State Department or the Pentagon
can point to which would indicate that
Khrushchev will let the Western Powers
take over southeast Asia.
thought we learned our lesson from
what happencl in Korea. In the past 10
days I pointed out on the floor of the
Senate that our leading military officials,
except for General MacArthur, were very
much concerned about the danger of the
Red Chinese and the Red Russians com-
ing in if we bombed beyond the Yalu.
That was when the old slogan was
developed:
There is no substitute for victory.
Approved For ReMilkaggiegliki]
There was also talk about privileged
? sanctuaries beyond the Yalta. General
? MacArthur wished to bomb beyond the
Yalu against the orders of his Command-
er in Chief not to bomb beyond the Yalu.
We all know that President Truman
took an unjustifiable castigation and a
great deal of criticism on that score. It
has now cpme out into the open. It is
known that every high American military
official in command at the time advised
? the Commander in Chief, the President
of the United States, that if we bombed
beyond the Yalu and Red China and Red
Russia came in, they would control the
air and massacre American soldiers by
the thousands. At that time, we did not
cOntrol the air, and they would have
driven the American Air Force out of the
Skies. This contributes to a better un-
derstanding of why, during my service in
? the Senate, I voted for more money for
air power than any President whom I
have served had recommended. 1
? But military power lone will not save
us. I know that if thb road that man-
kind is to walk is merely the road toward
greater and greater armaments and
Power to kill, all civilized nations are
through.
Why have we not taken our complaints
about violations of the agreements to the c
signers of the treaty itself? They are s
the nations who are primarily respon-
sible for its enfordement.
CHARTER
Our declaration of Jul 21, 1954, sai
the United States wouldrefrain fro
the use of force to disturb the Genev
Agreement "in accordance with articl
2(4) of the Charter of the United Na
tions dealing with the obligation o
members to refrain in the internationa
relations from the threat or use of force.'
I call attention to the fact that we too
note then of our obligation under th
U.N. Charter not to use force in the con
duct of our international relations.
Yet we did use force to disturb the
Geneva Agreement. We armed South
Vietnam. Today we have even brought
in American forces. We are talking about
using South Vietnam as a base from
which the United States may attack
North Vietnam.
How, Mr. Secretary of Defense and
Mr. Secretary of State, does all that
square with our obligation not to use
force in international relations, except
in our own self-defense
You say North Vietnam violated the
agreements, too, maybe even first? Then
why did we not complain to the members
of the Geneva Conference and ask them
to act? Or why did we not bring up
the matter in the United Nations, as is
implied from the Smith stateMent recog-
nizing our U.N. obligations and saying
that we would view any renewal of ag-
gression as seriously threatening inter-
national peace and security?
We all know that anything that
threatens international peace and secu-
rity is a matter for the United Nations.
It is not a matter for the U.S. Air Force,
or the American Secretary of Defense,
to handle as they see fit on a U.S. uni-
ateral basis.
If the conflict in Vietnam is viewed as
an aggression by North Vietnam, then
we have no choice but to take the matter
to the U.N. Every minute that we pur-
ue the war in Vietnam, we are doing it
n violation on the U.N. Charter.
What are the specific sections of the
harter that are controlling? Article II
tates, in its paragraphs 3 and 4:
3. All members shall settle their interna-
ional disputes by peaceful means in such a
anner that international peace and secu-
ty, and justice, are not endangered.
4. All members shall refrain in their inter-
ational relations from the threat or use of
orce against the territorial integrity or pa-
tical independence of any state, or in any
ther manner inconsistent with the Purposes
the United Nations.
DP66B00403R004400140045-4
RD --SENATE 8733
UNITED NATION
5 shoulder with President Johnson on the
overwhelming majority of issues?well
d over 90 percent of the issues. I am sad
m that I must completely disagree with
a him on his South Vietnam policy. I be-
e lieve he is following some very bad
- advice.
f I find myself in some disagreement
1 with him on certain phases of foreign
' aid. Yet, as a member of his party, I
k owe it to him to express my disagreement
e when I think he is wrong, because that is
- the best way to serve one's President.
One does not serve the President well by
being a yes-man or a rubberstamp.
I would much prefer to be with my
President on this issue, but I cannot be
with him on this program and fulfill ?
what I consider to be my trust as a Sen-
ator from my State.
It is not only paragraphs 3 and 4 of
articleI
Was it because the United States has ri
never really accepted the ousting of
Western Powers from Indochina? Is it n
because we planned to stay in South f
Vietnam no matter what the Geneva II
agreement decided?
Certainly that is what the record in- ci
dicates. There is not one single treaty
or internatienal law document that au-
thorizes this country to involve ourselves
In South Vietnam or to police the Geneva
agreement. On the contrary, all our
internatiOnal legal obligations require us
to stay out.
We have riot even observed the dec-
laration by Under Secretary Smith that
we would refrain from the threat or the
use of force to disturb the Geneva
agreement,
That declaration at least set forth the
theoretical duties we would undertake
with respect to Vietnam.
Our participation in the war? in South t
Vietnam violates paragraphs, 3 and 4, t
and our open threat to make war on
North Vietnam violates para"graph 4.
Mr. President, Nixon would take us to s
war. Nixon wanted to take us to war c
when he gave his speech to the editors t
in New York in 1954. Ten years later t
he is at the same gate trying to enter ti
into an area of war.
To the everlasting credit of President U
Johnson, he has not yet proposed that we
go into North Vietnam. As my col- w
leagues in the Senate know, the senior di
Sen t
ar er that we are
violating. I invite Senators to look with
me at article 33, which reads:
The parties to any dispute, the continu-
ance of which is likely to endanger the
maintenance of international peace an cl se-
curity, shall, first of all, seek a solution by
negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation,
arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to
regional agencies 6r arrangements, or other
peaceful means of their own choice.
We have said ourselves that the war in
Vietnam is a threat to peace. That is
our rationalization for being in South
Vietnam.
We say that is why the United States
is in South Vietnam, but we are not es-
tablishing peace. The presence of the
United States in South Vietnam is only
expanding the war. Yet the charter
says that "first of all" we must seek a
peaceful solution.
Now let us look at article 34 for a mo-
ment. Article 34 provides:
The Security Council may investigate any
dispute, or any situation which might lead
to international friction or give rise to a
dispute, in order to determine whether the
continuance of the dipute or situation is
likely to endanger the maintenance of in-
ternational peace and security.
And article 35 states, in paragraph 1:
Any member of the United Nations may
bring any dispute, or any situation of the
nature referred to in article 34, to the at-
tention of the Security Council or of the
General Assembly.
Under articles 2 and 33, we are
obliged to seek a peaceful solution of the
South Vietnamese issue. We could ask
for the Geneva Conference of 1954 to re-
onvene, or we could even seek to have
he Southeast Treaty Organization try
o settle it. The SEATO statement out
f Manila on April 15 recognized that the
ecurity of South Vietnam, and all of
outheast Asia is threatened by what it
ailed Communist aggression. Why,
hen, did not SEATO members undertake
o deal with it? Why did they not no-
fy the U.N. of the threat? That is
heir duty under both SEATO and the
.N. Charter.
I will give Senators my _opinion as to
hy they did not. The United States
d not want them to. That would not be
easing to the United States. This is
? a or from Oregon stands shoulder to pl
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8734
a "hot one" for the United States to
handle. Review again with me who
"they" are.
New Zealand and Australia?if South
Vietnam is vital to the interests of any
area, it is vital to the area of New Zea-
land and Australia. But we do not find
New Zealanders and Australians dying
In Vietnam.
Pakistan, Thailand, and the Philip-
pines?one would think that if South
Vietnam were vital to any area, it would
be vital to Pakistan, Thailand, and the
Philippines. Yet we do not find men
from those countries dying in South
Vietnam.
Great Britain and France?France has
made it very clear that she will not send
her boys into South Vietnam to die. She
has had enough. She tried it. She lost
the flower of her manhood.
My account of the position of Great
Britain preceding the Geneva Accords,
when Dulles was trying to sell Great
with the idea that she should
esh4 ornik
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CONGRESSIONAL Kt
The Secretary cannot "sell" that, be-
cause it is an insult to the intelligence of
the American people. His duty is clear;
his duty is to take the Issue to the United
Nations. Even by invitation, we have no
legal right to take part in a civil war. If
there has been an armed aggression
against South Vietnam, then it is clearly
and simply an issue for the United Na-
tions.
So I say these SEATO members have
an obligation to make it a subject of
peaceful settlement at the regional level
of SEATO and at the Geneva Conference
level. These two levels are available, as
is also the United Nations level.
I refer also to article 37 of the United
Nations Charter:
Should the parties to a dispute of the na-
ture referred to in article 33 fall to settle it
by the means indicated in that article they
shall refer It to the Security council.
"They shall," are the words used. As
every lawyer in the Senate knows, those
are mandatory words; they create an oh-
Britainparticipate in a war In Indochina, ligation and a duty. But we have no
ample proof why we do not find Great carried out that obligation and that duty.
Britain willing to go into South Viet- Let no one try to give me the excuse that
nam. we are not the only ones, for all of us
But that does not excuse Australia, know, as parents. that we had to deal
New Zealand, Pakistan, Thailand, the many, many times with that sort of ex-
Philippines, Great Britain, and France, cuse, in the process of raising our chil-
nor does it excuse' the United States, dren. Just because John or Mary has or
from taking the issue to the United Na- has not done something, so we have said
tions. That is why I charge?serious to our children, is no excuse for them.
though I know the charge is?that my Our signature is on the charter; we
country stands in violation of its oblige- signed it; and we undertook the oblige-
ticms under the TJnited NatlOn3 Charter. tion and the duty carried by the words
? ll " But we have not carried
24
necessary in order to maintain or restore in-
ternational peace and security.
I wish to repeat the reading of part of
the article, for it knocks into a cocked
hat the alibi excuse about "self-defense."
The article states:
Measures taken by members in the exercise
of this right of self-defense shall be imme-
diately reported to the Security Council and
shall not In any, way affect the authority
and responsibility of the Security Council
under the present charter to take at any time
such action as it deems necessary in order to
maintain or restore international peace and
security.
Mr. President, in that connection I
stress the point that the words used are
"shall be."
What is the burden of my argument
on this point? The burden of my argu-
ment is that the United States has not
taken the issue to the Security Council, if
It wishes to make the claim that it has
some right of self-defense in South Viet-
nam--although such a claim is, of course,
a ridiculous one. But even if one wishes
to make for a moment, for the purpose
of debate, that absurd contention, I point
out that the United Nations Charter
states very clearly what our duty is;
it states that we shall take the issue to
the Security Council. However, we never
have done so.
That neither of the two Vietnams sep-
arately; nor the eountry as a whole, is
a United Nations member is not the real
issue; the basic issue is the role of the
United States in helping South Vietnam
defend itself against rebel warfare,
Why is not such a threat the subject. abetted from North Vietnam.
of peaceful means of settlement? WhY them out. Sol ask the Secretary, 'When
There is no self-defe for the United
are all these countries ducking, hedg- are we going to recognize those ?bliga- States here. Neither is there any treaty
ing, and evading their obligations under tions?" that calls upon us to defend South Viet-
the United NationsCharter, along with There have been those who have tried
the United States?although we arc the to confuse this issue and to mislead the
worst actor, for we are actually in South American people into going along with
Vietnam with troops on the basis of a the present unilateral action by the Unit-
unilateral military intervention? ed States in South Vietnam, on the basis
We read in the newspapers this morn- of the claim of self-defense. Of course,
Mg the most recent alibi of the State such a claim always strikes a sympathe-
Department and the Defense Depart- tic note with people?"He did it in self-
ment. They cited figures to show that defense"--even though lawyers know
Britain has eight advisers in South Viet- that self-defense is not necessarily a
nom and that Australia has 30 men there, valid excuse for killing someone. In
advising. But they are a long way from South Vietnam, we are not even acting
the combat zones. in self-defense.
Mr. Secretary of State and Mr. Secre- Mr. President, in my Judgment, the
tary of Defense, the American people will self-defense argument is completely in-
not accept that kind of evasive answer competent, irrelevant and immaterial, as
to the question: Why are not the SEATO we lawyers say, in the face of the obliga-
nations In South Vietnam, in keeping tions of the United States to take the
with their commitment? South Vietnam problem to the United
We have not heard recently, but we Nations. When are we going to recog-
shall hear it again, Secretary Rusk's nize them?
standard alibi for our being in South II.N. AND SZLV-DETZNSE
Vietnam and other countries not being The article a the U.N. Charter relat-
there: "The United States was invited
in."
Mr. President, we were not invited in.
Who invited the United States in? Our
own puppet, the puppet we set up in the
first place?Diem; and now. IC.hanh. I
was aghast when the Secretary of State
PUlled that one out of the hat, for that is
the same kind of unjustifiable alibi that
Russia gives for being in East Germany,
where she maintains a puppet govern-
ment; namely, that she is in East Ger-
many because her puppet asked her to
come in.
Ing to self-defense also requires exami-
nation. It is article 51. Article 51 states: this subject, which appeared in the
Nothing in the present charter shall tin- American Journal Of International Law
pair the inherent right of individual or col- in 1960, be printed at the conclusion of -
lective self-defense If an armed attack oc- these remarks.
curs against a Member of the United Nations
until the Security Council has taken meas- The PRESIDIgG OFFICER (Mr.
,
urea necessary to maintain international MiniKIE in the chair). Without objec-
peace and security. Measures taken by mem- tion, it is so ordered.
Security Council and shall not in any way Mr. MORSE. Of course, Mr. Presi-
affect the authority and responsibility of the dent, Quincy Wright is one of the great
Security Council under the present charter scholars of international law. He is
to take at any time such action as it deem' widely recognized as such, and he is ree-
nom.
Yet even if there were, we are obliged
to undertake that action only until the
United Nations has taken over the prob-
lem; and we must report to it any action
taken in "collective self-defense."
Thus, Mr. President, I say that we
stand in violation of this article, too,
along with all the others.
Heretofore, I have been referring to
the war as involving an aggression by
North Vietnam. We have no legal basis
of law or treaty for participating in it.
Neither do we have a legal basis for
participating in it if it is viewed as a
civil war. International law recognizes
the right of revolution; hence, it does
not recognize any right of outsiders to
intervene in the fighting. But we have
directly intervened in the fighting in
South Vietnam. That also is a violation
of article II of the charter.
I ask unanimous consent that excerpts
from the article by Quincy Wright on
hers in the exercise of this right of self- (See exhibit 2.)
defense shall be immediately reported to the
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196
Approved For ,.461116ftiggpffit2 :filealaS611WA
ognized by international lawyers as
among their great teachers. I have
leaned heavily on him in connection
with my work' in the field of interna-
tional law and in the preparation of this
speech, as I have also leaned heavily
upon the writings of another great ex-
pert in this field, Ben Cohen.
I am at a loss to understand why the
State Department has been following a
course of action so completely inconsist-
ent with the great teachings of these
reutilized authorities on international
law.
The 'United Nations Charter does not
call for U.N. jurisdiction over domestic
affairs of a nation, But article 34 makes
it very clear that the Security Council
does have the authority to "investigate,
any dispute, or any situation which might
lead to international friction or give rise
to a dispute, in order to determine
whether the continuance of the dispute
or situation Is likely to endanger the
maintenance of international peace and
security."
So even if the Vietnam war is viewed
as basicallA a civil war?which I think
it is?the United Nations may determine
whether it is a threat to peace, and if it
finds it is, it may deal with it. When
third parties enter the confilct?as the
United States has, on one side, and pos-
sibly China and Russia, on the other
side?it is a dispute that falls under sev-
eral articles of the 'United Nations
Charter, and requires us?and makes it
mandatory that we do so?to take the
Issue to the United Nations, although
we never have taken it there.
There is no getting away from the
many provisions of the United Nations
Charter that require the Vietnam issue to
be handled by the 'United Nations,
whether it is considered a foreign ag-
gression or a civil war.
Are we prepared to say, in so many
words, what our policy is already_ saying:
The United States has no more interest
than Russia has in working through the
United Nations when we think our in-
terests are at stake?
Are we interested in working through
the United Nations only when the inter-
ests of other countries are at stake? We
cannot possibly defend that premise.
Yet we are following a course of action
which subjects us to that criticism so
far as our, unilateral action in South
Vietnam is concerned, in open defiance
of our obligations under the United Na-
tions Charter.
That is what Secretary 1VIcNamara's
defefise policy statements amount to so
far as Vietnam is concerned. He is try-
ing to foreclose diplomatic handling of
the issue. He is trying to keep it a mili-
tary issue, a military war, with a military
solution.
That is why so many Senators take
umbrage when I refer to it as 1VIaNa-
mara's war, But it it his blueprint, his
basic policy, that the administration has
accepted.
I hope the next time he goes to Viet-
nam he goes by way of Paris and talks
to some of the French leaders, military
and civil, who found out after 8 years
that there was no such thing as a mili-
tary victory for a Western power on the
Asia mainland.
OUTLOOK IS STEAD/LY DETERIORATING
Everything I have said about the il-
legality of our war in South Vietnam
will be even more true if we expand the
war by attacking Laos and North Viet-
nam,
How policymakers who are bound to
refrain from force in international af-
fairs, except in self-defense, can keep
repeating that such a thing is under study
is beyond me.
Whenever we are briefed, neither the
Secretary of State nor the Secretary of
Defense has been willing to eliminate
completely the possibility of an expan-
sion of this war. And until they are will-
ing to commit themselves against an ex-
pansion of the war, they deserve the
criticism I make now?namely, that they
are endangering the security of this
country and the peace of the world. An
expansion of the war into North Vietnam
might very well bring in the Red Chinese
and Russia. And I need not say that if
that happens the holocaust is on.
It is highly dangerous for the United
States still to be keeping a possible door
ajar through which we can go into North
Vietnam for an expansion of the war.
It is the old threat that Dulles made so
often in 1954.
We should be no party to it. We should
assure the world that we have no Inten-
tion of doing so. We should call upon
the members of the United Nations to
come in and help us to maintain peace
in South Vietnam and to separate the
two warring factions by means of United
Nations operations.
The talk about the possibility of ex-
panding the war into North Vietnam is
a desperation move. It is the frantic act
of throwing in a whole bankroll to draw
one more card, when the pot has been
lost by the cards already dealt.
Look at the history of that war.
For 8 years the French carried the bur-
den, financed at the end largely by the
United States. From 1946 to 1954, we
put $2 billion into the French war effort.
In 1954, we were spending $800 mil-
lion on it, and carrying 78 percent of the
Cost. Over a million casualties, military
and civilian, had been suffered by all
the parties in the conflict.
In 1955, when we had moved into
South Vietnam in place of the French,
It cost us $300 million a year to support
the Diem government.
In 1961, conditions were so much worse
that the annual rate of aid went up to
$400 million, and our military help in
the person of "advisers" was an unknown
added cost out of our regular defense
budget.
In 1964, the annual rate of aid is up to
$550 million. McNamara went over
there and promised them we would stay
forever. "Forever," he said. He prom-
ised them also that we wOuld pick up the
check for the cost of the imposition of a
draft in the amount of another $50 mil-
lion. It Is a bottomless pit, I say to the
American taxpayers. It is a sinkhole
for our money. We ought to stop it.
The cost of the American Air Force and
military advisers is probably much more
than that.
Yesterday, President Johnson said our
aid would be increased still more It is
8735
difficult for me to understand to what
possible use more aid could be put to in
South Vietnam. Press reports indicate
that South Vietnam has long since been
saturated with American aid.
The ground troops and our uncon-
tested air power together have not been
able to destroy Vietcong bases in South
Vietnam. Who can believe that air at-
tacks alone are going to destroy them in
Laos or North Vietnam?
Those air attacks would be nothing at
all but the first installment ma an Ameri-
can land war in Asia. Mr. Nixon was
"talking it up" in 1954. It is no sur-
prise that he is still talking it up now.
Remember that the prognosis offered
by Secretary McNamara for the war in
South Vietnam is "forever." Who is
willing to guess how long it will take
Americans to wipe. out supply lines in
North Vietnam, especially if China gets
nervous about our presence and enters
the fighting as she did in Korea, and
Russia finds a basis for joining her and
comes in, too? It is my position, Mr.
President, that wisdom and duty both
call for a peaceful settlement.
In all the pronouncements and publi-
cations of the State and Defense Depart-
ments on Vietnam, we proclaim that
North Vietnam is committing aggres-
sions that threaten the peace.
But we have not intervened to bring
peace, to provide a peaceful settlement.
Our intervention has not even brought
freedom. It has brought a military dic-
tatorship. To South Vietnam, American
intervention has brought more fighting,
more war, more death, more destruction,
mote terror, and less freedom. We have
not taken people out of the fighting; we
have only brought more people into it.
McNamara now wants us to finance the
draft in South Vietnam, to get men into
the fighting. And the American tax-
payer will pay for it.
The territory under full control of the
Khanh junta is declining. Casualties
inflicted on Government forces are
higher than ever, despite the complete
control of the air by the United States.
Although Vietcong casualties are also
said to be high, the estimate of 20,000
"hard core guerrillas" is the same as
it was 2 years ago.
It is hardly any wonder that despera-
tion measures to save our puppet gov-
ernment are being considered.
Aside from the illegality of our inter-
vention, there is the even more serious
question of what its objective is and how
much it is going to cost.
What does "victory" mean in South
Vietnam? Does it mean until rebels
stop fighting the Government? If so, I
predict that rebellion will never stop un-
til the Americans leave The United
States is the best source of weapons they
have. They are constantly capturing
?them from the retreating South Vietna-
mese. It is interesting also that at one
time we decided we would arm some of
the villages, particularly in the delta
areas.
We tried to build up a sort of village
minuteman or militiaman or civil patrol,
and we supplied them with much equip-
ment, only to learn that, strangely
enough, much of the equipment, seemed
-
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April 24
8736 CONGRESSIONAL REtORD? SENA
to get into the hands of the Vietcong. tell me that the white man's army can- But there is the Geneva Conference.
That has been an oriental practice for not win on the mainland of China. And there is the United Nations.
a long time. Do Senators remember That Is why we all know, or should Surely the Mediterranean is impor-
when Chiang Kai-shek was still on the know that if we get into a war with tant to this country. When trouble broke
Mainland of China? We were pouring China and with Russia. it will be a nu- out in Cyprus, we tried first to handle
military aid to him at that time. Our clear war. One of the most shocking that issue through a regional organize-
intelligence reports at that time showed experiences I had was at a briefing not tion?NATO. When that highly Map-
that much of the aid seemed to get into long ago when there was talk to the proprlate mechanism did not work,
the hands of the Communists, without effect that if we followed the objective of we agreed to go to the United Nations.
even being uncrated?and we know expanding the war in Vietnam we would So did we in the case of Suez. So did
strange negotiations seemed to be car- have to use nuclear weapons. we in the case of the Congo.
ried on between the Communist rebels I am convinced that with the first. Why did we in those cases and not in
and the Chiang Kai-shek forces. Much nuclear bomb?I care not what its size? the case of Vietnam? I believe it Is be-
of the military equipment got into the dropped on North Vietnam or anywhere cause of our heavy emotional commit-
hands of the so-called Communist war- else in Asia, the holocaust will be on ment, which is turn led to our heavy
lords and was used against the National- If anyone thinks the United States financial and military commitment.
tat forces. Finally, those forces were can start dropping nuclear bombs and The stranglehold these commitments
. driven off the mainland of China, not be held to an accounting by the nu- have on our policymakers is evident.
Earlier in the Vietnamese war, when it clear powers that are against us, he Whenever President Johnson speaks of
was discovered that a good deal of has lost his mind. If we resort to the South Vietnam, he mentions the corn-
American equipment which had been use of nuclear power in Asia, nuclear mitment of President Eisenhower in
made available to the people of the vil- bombs will start dropping on both sides. 1954.
'ages, allegedly for their self-defense, I do not have to tell Senators what Yet, President Johnson inherited many
was getting into the hands of the Viet- they all know. The advisers tell them things from the Eisenhower and Ken-
cons, we learned, in one of our briefings, that both the Communist world and the nedy administrations that he has sought
that the United States decided to go out, free world have the power to destroy to change. He inherited a 5-year-old
collect, and bring back and keep under each other in the relatively short time railroad struggle. But he did not per-
its control as much of that equipment as of not too many days. petuate it. He settled it. He inherited
possible. But there is a great deal of That is why the senior Senator from "a chronic state of poverty and tmemploy-
equipment there yet. Oregon dares to talk on the floor ef the ment. But he is not perpetuating it; he
Moreover, the Vietcong seem to have Senate about morality. That is why is trying to change it.
been making steady progress since 1954. the senior Senator from Oregon dares He inherited a cold war confrontation
We have steadily raised the ante, both to suggest to his Government that, tin- with the Soviet Union. But he has not
financially and militarily, but we are less American foreign policy is built stood fast to keep it going; he has tried
still losing. Yet the only proposals forto alter it.
upon foundations of moral principles, it
change have been to escalate the war so cannot be justified. A nuclear war, large The Vietnam policy he inherited from
as to involve other countries. If we or small, cannot be justified on moral the Dulles-Eisenhower administration is
escalate it into North Vietnam, we can grounds. And it will not be possible to the most dangerous and illegal policy of
look forward to an American war there keep it small. Such a war is immoral. all. Why should it be perpetuated?
that will bring in China in one way or That is why I say, take it to the United President Johnson may cry "peace,
another. Nations. Insist that the other signato- peace" but he will not bring peace until
The illogic of our policy is that if wehe changes what we are doing in Viet-
show
to the charter assume their oblige-
-show any sign of success, the Chinese tions to enforce the peace. It is in our nam
will step up their participation. Con-historic interest to do .
All this 10-year-old Vietnam policy has
so
versely, as the guerrillas show signs of Perhaps someday it will be a subject brought the American people is war by
success, tree have stepped up our partici- of historical study that will reveal the executive agreement. There is no
pation. This escalation on both sides causes for an American obsession with treaty; there is not even a United Na-
can only lead to a disaster for the United Asia. It is an obsession that has not tons action under the treaty of the
States. It can only lead from being gripped our policy in any other part of U.N. Charter, as there was in Korea.
bogged down in South Vietnam to being the world so completely. It Is an obses- The only legal basis for a war in Vietnam
bogged down in North Vietnam and then don about an area of the world that is would be the U.S. Constitution. But
to being bogged down in China. completely beyond the perimeter of there has been no declaration of war
That is why the interest of the United American defense, for South Vietnam is under that. either.
States require a negotiated settlement not within the perimeter of Arne. rican de- No Member of Congress has proposed
or an international peace force, just as fense. If we got into a war with Russia a declaration of war. The administra-
French interests finally required it. . tomorrow, we would not keep one single tion has not proposed a declaration of
I am greatly concerned about what American boy there. Why are American war. But we are making war. -
military officials tell me would happen ifboys over there now? Oh, of course, the political pitch is
we let the situation develop so that it I believe we should get out now, ex- made that this is a confrontation with
became necessary, or we thought it be cept for participating in the maintenance communism and as Americans we must
came necessary, to put masses of Amer- of a peacekeeping United Nations force all fall in line with whatever our military
lean ground forces in Asia. and trying to bring the killing to an end. advisers say must be done about it. That
I am waiting to listen to the first high, Even in Cuba, during the missile crisis, is why Senators praise McNamara ',f pa-
responsible American official who will we moved to internationalize our defen- triotism. That way they hope to avoid
testify, under examination, that he sive action through the Organization of having to go into the illegality of his
thinks the prognosis is good for a ground American States, and we immediately Policy.
victory by an American Army in China, called the Security Council of the U.N. I praise his patriotism, too. I praise
All the briefings on that subject matter together to notify It of our proposed ac- his brilliance. But, in accordance with
that I have received thus far in my many tion in Cuba. What is more vital to the his policy on South Vietnam, I believe
years in the Senate show that that is not interests of this country than Cuba, just he has suffered a lapse of judgment.
the place to pick as a battleground with 90 miles away" Why is it that South In cloakrooms and behind closed
communism. I cannot think of any- Vietnam, 7,000 miles away, is consistent- doors, it is said that it is all right to go
thing that would be more awful than to ly handled as a unilateral issue, when we to the U.N. where the issue is not a direct
continue the present course in South recognize that Cuba, only 90 miles away, one between the United States and a
Vietnam until we get into a position must be handled as an international is- Communist power; the U.N. is all right
where it will be said that we have no sue?. or the Arabs and Cypriots and Congo-
choice, that we cannot retreat, that we Of course, it is said behind closed lese and to head off great power involve-
must not give the impression that we doors that there is no effective regional ments; but in Vietnam the United States
are backing out, but must go in deeper. organization in Asia. That is the trib- itself is directly and heavily involved
The French did that. Military advisers ute our officials pay to SEATO in private, and our prestige and our interests must
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1964 c?,u ESSIoNAL RECORD ? $ENATE 8737
not be jeopardized by the uncertainties
Of the U.N. which we cannot, control.
I asi5, What are the uncertainties of
epinpared to the uncertainties
of continuing and escalating this war in
South Vietnam? , We do not control
Vietnam, either, we do not control the
rebels, we do not control the North Viet-
narneae, We do not control China. The
United Nations, which we do not con-
trol, could not do any worse M this sit-
uation than we have done,
Neither Vietnam as a whole, nor its
two parts, has membership in the United
Nations. But _that does not affect the
capacity of the organization to deal with
them.
point to paragraph 6 of article III
of the charter:
The Organization shall insure that states
Which are not members of the United Na-
tions act in accordance with these princi-
ples so far as may be necessary for the
Maintenance of international peace and se-
curity.
Most recently, President Johnson has
said he hopes to see "some other flags
there," referring to SEATO members.
The only legitimate right they have in
Vietnam is in trying to settle the dispute
by pacific means.
Otherwise, the only flag, other than
the Vietnam flag, that has any right
'there is the United Nations flag. If it
chooses, the U.N. can direct SEATO to
handle military operations there on be-
half of the U.N.
I ask President Johnson why the
United Nations flag has not been Invited
into Vietnam.
I believe that should be a basic part of
our foreign policy. I believe that when
the peace is threatened anywhere in the
world the United States should take the
'position that we will raise the issue be-
fore the Security Council and, if neces-
sary, before the General Assembly, to
have the United Nations carry out the
clear obligations that the Charter makes
mandatory upon the signatories thereto
It is not the fighting flags of other na-
tions that we need or should want in
South Vietnam. I say to my President
that what is needed is to send United
Nations flag in, and have the signatories
to the United Nations Charter jointly
give support to the United Nations in
Aestablisbing and maintaining a force
In South Vietnam, aimed at maintain-
ing the peace.
It would be difficult. It would have its
ups and downs. But it is an entirely
different psychological approach to the
problem of South Vietnam. It is the dif-
ference between trying to establish peace
and expanding war. It is the difference
between an approach to peace and an ap-
proach to war.
In the absence of a U.N. action, in the
absence of a joint SEATO action, and in
the absence of a congressional declara-
tion of war, men and planes fighting un-
der the Amexicen,flag have no business
In South Vietnam. The longer they fight,
and the more of them we send, the harder
we will find it to encl,the conflict.
President Johnson and the American
people have a challenge before them, not
to make a bigger war in Asia but to bring
No. 80-8
the United Nations into Asia. If he wil
turn his talents to that end, he will be
acting in accord with the legal and for-
eign policy principles which the United
States has long professed. He will be
acting in accord with the United Nations
Charter. And I believe he will be acting
In the best interests of the safety of the
. United States.
Mr. President, I recognize full well
that others as sincere and as patriotic
and, as dedicated to our country as I am,
will thoroughly disagree with my views.
That does not relieve me of my respon-
sibilities, as I see those responsibilities,
to raise Questions of international law in
respect of American policy in South Viet-
nam.
I do not expect agreement from the
very able and distinguished Secretary
of Defense, although he will find me on
the same side with him on many issues.
However, I am irreconcilably opposed
to his position in South Vietnam.
In fairness to him I believe I should
say, as I close my speech, that I have
just been handed a news ticker reference
to him, which reads as follows:
WAsmno?ron.?Secretary of Defense Rob-
ert S. McNamara, replying to news confer-
ence questions, said today he was' "pleased
to be associated" with the operation of the
war in Vietnam.
"I don't object to it being called McNa-
mara's war," he said, referring to a descrip-
tion used by Senator WAYNE MORSE, Demo-
crat, of Oregon.
, The Pentagon chief added that "I have
high regard for Senator MORSE, but not in
this respect"?the Senator's continuing crit-
icism of the role of the United States in
Vietnam.
Mr. President, I understand the Sec-
retary's view. We continue to agree
to disagree. As long as this war, which
I consider to be an unjustifiable war, a
war which involves a violation by the
United States of its Charter of the United
Nations, a war which in my opinion is
an unjustifiable killing of American boys
in South Vietnam, is continued I expect
to be against it in the Senate and in the
country.
I close by saying I do not believe Con-
gress can escape its obligation to take
official jurisdiction over the subject mat-
ter. Congress ought to decide whether
or not by official action?and the proper
official action would be a declaration of
war in South Vietnam, against which I
would vote?it wants to support McNa-
rn.ara's war by officially declaring it to
be that, as it only has the authority to
do under the Constitution of the United
States,
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent to have printed in the Recoab a
letter dated March 14, 1964, addressed
to me, and signed by David Stall and
Alice H. Stall, in commendation of my
stand relative to South Vietnam.
There being no objection, the letter
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
Yotni Town PRESS, INC.,
Salem, Oreg., March 14, 1964.
Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR WAYNE: We are moved to commend
your wisdom and courage for the stand
1 taken on. South Vietnam. Surely, the U.S
policy formulations should be guided by
someone other than Secretary, of Defense
and the CIA. Our involvement in that area
has been too much by executive fiat without
adequate reference to legislature and the
people. As far as the moral basis for it all
goes, this certainly dwindles as the truth
of Diem regime became revealed and is
hardly strengthened by the succession of one
military strong man for another.
Education and retraining for industrial
skills; medical needs; civil rights; our rate
of economic growth?these are all problems
of relevant and pressing concern. We know
that you are conscious of this and take this
opportunity of strengthening your com-
mendable resolve.
Cordially yours,
DAVID STALL.
ALICE H. STALL.
SIXTH INTERIM REPORT-OF THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMISSION FOR SUPERVISION AND CONTROL
IN VIETNAM, DECEMBER 11, 1955, TO JULY 31,
1956
(Presented by the Secretary of State for For-
eign Affairs to Parliament by command of
Her Majesty, January 1957)
FOREWORD
The first five interim reports of the Inter-
national Commission for Supervision and
Control in Vietnam, covering the period from
August 11, 1954, to December 10, 1955, were
published as "Vietnam No. 1 (1955) ," Cmd.
9461 (containing the first two reports);
"Vietnam No. 2 (1955) ," Cmd. 9499; "Vietnam
No. 3 (1955)," Cmd. 9654; and "Vietnam No.
1 (1956) ," Cmd. 9706. The present white
paper contains the text of the Sixth Interim
Report. This was received at the Foreign
Office on October 2, 1956, and, in accordance
with the procedure described in the Foreword
to Command Paper 9461 of 1955 is now pub-
lished after the distribution of copies to all
members of the Geneva Conference of 1954.
2. After the publication of the Fifth Re-
port, representatives of the two cochairmen
of the Geneva Conference met in London to
discuss the difficulties being experienced by
the International Supervisory Commission as
outlined in chapter VII of the report herein.
As a result of this discussion the cochairmen
sent messages on May 8, 1956, to the Govern-
ment of France, jointly to the Governments
of the Republic of Vietnam and of the Peo-
ple's Republic of Vietnam, and to the Inter-
national Supervisory Commision. These
messages were published in the white paper
"Vietnam No. 2 (1956)," Ctad. 9763.
FOREIGN OFFICE, January 1957.
SIXTH INTERIM REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMISSION FOR SUPERVISION AND CONTROL
IN VIETNAM, DECEMBER 11, 1956, TO JULY 31,
1956
Table of contents
Page
Introduction 4
Chapter I?Establishment and machinery
of the International Commission in
Vietnam 5
Chapter II?Provisional military demar-
cation line and demilitarized zone 5
Chapter III?Democratic freedoms?ar-
ticles 14(c) and 14(d) 10
Chapter IV?Prisoners of war and civil-
ian internees 14
Chapter V?Ban on the introduction of
fresh troops, military personnel, arms
and munitions?military bases in Viet-
mm 19
Chapter VI?Cooperation of the parties
to the agreement 26
Chapter VII?Conclusions 30
INTRODUCTION
The International Commission for Super-
vision and Control in Vietnam has so far sub-
Mated Ave Interim reports covering its ac-
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8738 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SE ATE Al 24
tivities from August 11, '1054, to December telephone cofnmunication between Mobile the administration of the zones are governed
10, 1955. Team 78 and the P.A.V.N. Headquarters at by articles 6. 7, 8, and 9 of the agreement
2. This is the sixth interim report of the 1101CA. As both parties had accepted these and are closely regulated by a protocol signed
Commission containing a summary of its az- suggestions. they were nnalleed by the cora- by the two high commands in September
tivities from December 11, 1955, to July 31, mission. 1954 (decisions Nos. 6 and 11). This protocol
1956, and a review of the progress made by Category III: Items which had been ac- provides for the practical implementation
the two parties in the implementation of the cepted by one party and net accepted or par- of these articles including the establishment
agreement on the cessation of hostilities in tinily accepted by the other party. of a permit system. Different types of per-
VietnEun.I This report should be read along After considering the comments offered by mita are prescribed for the crossing of the
with the relevant chapters of the five earlier the two high commands on this categorY, the demarcation line and for the entry of per-
interim reports, commission decided to convert the sugges- sons into the demilitarized zones. These
CHAPTER t---zerastismentre AND MACHIN/my tions in this category into recommendations permits are, according to decision No. 11.
OP THE INTERNATIONAL
and the two high commends were directed to to be issued by the joint subcommission in
COMMISSION IPT
implement them. The recommendations un- the demilitarized zone and have to be en-
VISTNATA der this category were: dorsed by the two parties represented therein.
During the period under review, the Inter- .,
(1) That permits should preferably bear 7 However, the actual implementation of
national Commission continued to carry outthe photographs of the persons in whose f a-
the task assigned to it under articles 29, 34, vor they were issued to facilitate checking.
and 36 of the agreement; namely, the super- In view of the practical difficulties. however,
vision and control of the proper execution the parties were called upon to consider ways
by the parties of the provisions of the agree-
meat. The Commission held 58 meetings and means of providing photographs on .per-
during the period under review for the trans- mita The commission further added that
permit holders should not be prevented from
action of its day-to-day business. The corn- crossing the demarcation line on the ground
mittees of the Commission; namely, the
that the permits did not have photographs;
Operations Committee, the Freedoms Corn- ,
' (2) That the people in the demilitarized
rnittee and the Legal Committee, continued
zones should have the right of assembly and
their activities. Twenty-one mobile teams
the right to hold public meetings organized
were sent out for investigation, reconnals- ICH political purposes. However, as political
sauce and control thus making a total of 153 sympathies were bound to be mixed and
since the Commission started its activities.
The difficulties experienced by the Commis-
sion's fixed and mobile teams are described
In subsequent chapters of this report.
2. As in the past, the Commission has con-
tinued to pay official visits to Saigon. The
question of transferring the Commission's
headquarters from Hanoi to Saigon still re-
mains unsettled. The matter has been
raised with the French authorities in the
south as well as with the Government of the
Republic of Vietnam but so far no satisfac-
tory solution has been found. The Commis-
sion will continue to pursue this matter.
9. In accordance with the provisions of
article 45, a coordination conference of the
secretaries-general of the three Commissions
of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia was held
at Stem Reap in Cambodia on January 10 and
11, 1956. Questions of an administrative
nature including the accounting procedure
of the Commissions were discussed and sat-
isfactorily settled.
CHAPTER II--PROVISIONAL MILITARY DEMARCA-
TION LINE AND DEMILITARISED ZONE
C. In the month of September 1955 the
meetings were likely to create public excite-
ment. public meetings organized for political
purposes should be regulated without in any
way restricting the right of assembly or asso-
ciation. Before a political meeting was held,
adequate notice should be given by the or-
ganizers to the local authorities Indicating
the time and place where the meeting would
be held. Intimation of such meetings should
be given by the local authorities to Mobile
Team 76;
"(3) That the parties be allowed to in-
creaae the police strength in the zone under
their control for the proper maintenance of
law and order and that the first increase
should not be more than 50 percent of the
present authorized strength. Any additional
Increase would require the approval of the
central joint commission and In case of dis-
agreement that of the International commis-
sion; and
-(4) That Mobile Team 76 be advised by
telephone in advance whenever the joint
coma:Onion was considering any serious in-
cident or threat of such an Incident, so that
the team could observe at the meeting and if
commission had made certain suggestions to the joint commission machinery failed to
the two high commands for the improvement take necessary action, could report immedi-
of the administrative arrangements on the ately to the commission and take prelimi-
demarcation line and in the 'demilitarised nary action to prevent or limit the incident
zones. Mention was made of this in para- in pursuance of the commission's responst-
h 3 d 4 of the Fifth Interim Report. batty under article 36(b) of the agreement.
the provisions of decision No. 11 relating
to the permit system has been far from
satisfactory. The French High Command
has since November 1955 unilaterally in-
troduced certain innovations which have re-
sulted in stopping the movement of permit-
holders across the demarcation line into the
southern demilitarized zone. They are re-
quired, at the points of crossing on the
southern side of the demarcation line, to
deposit the permits issued by the joint sub-
commission in the demilitarized zone and to
take temporary ones to move within the
southern. demilitarized zone. They are re-
quired to recross at the same point in order
to collect the original permit even though
men Luong Bridge has been accepted by
both the parties as a common point of cross-
ing. The Commission has received numerous
petitions from the demilitarized zone in
which objections to the new procedure have
been stated.
ff. The Commission considered the situa-
tion and made certain suggestions in a letter
dated February 24, 1956, to the French High
Command. The high command was in-
formed-that the Commission did not see any
reason for changing the present system un-
der which the permits for crossing the de-
marcation line were issued by the joint
subcoramission. The Commission further
suggested that the check posts should have
complete nominal rolls of all permitholders
and the post at Hien Luong bridge should
have master lists of all persons holding per-
mits authorizing them to cross the demarca-
tion line. The high command was also in-
formed that it should not collect permits at
the demarcation line, but that the Commis-
sion had no objection to the issue of addi-
tional authorization slips to the permit-
holders. The P.A.V.N. High Command has
complained to the Commission that hinder-
ances to the freedom of movement of the
permitholders continue and that in many
cases the French High Command has refused
The initial reactions of the two high corn- 5. These recommendations were conveyed to renew the permits already issued and has
mandato the commission's suggestions were to the two high commands on February been progressively reducing the number of
also recorded in that report. The detailed 24. 1958. So far the Commission has not permits. The Commission has again asked
comments of the two high commands on the received any reply regarding the implemen- the French High Command in July 1956, to
commission's suggestions were examined by tation of the recommendations from the accept the stIggestions made by the Commis-
the operations committee. The reconimen- French High Command. The pA.V.N. High sion in its letter of February 24, 1956. The
dations of the operations committee were Command has replied to the Commission's high command was further informed that if
carefully considered by the commission. It recommendations in April 1956. Of the four no satisfactory reply was received within 3
was seen that the response of the parties fell recommendations made by the Commission, weeks the Commission would consider
into three categories: the P A.V.N. High Command has not accepted whether it should not convert the suggestions
Category I: Items which both parties had (2) and (3) and has not commented on (4) ? into recommendations. According to the
not accepted. With regard to the increase of police strength report received by the Commission from its
There was one such item; namely, the ques- in the demilitarized zones (recommendation team in the demilitarized zone, movement of
tion of fixed market places. The Commission No. 3) the P.A.V.N. High Command did not the people entitled to cross the demarcation
agreed to drop this suggestion, consider any such increase above the num- line into the demilitarized zone south has
Category IL Items which had been ac- ber fixed in the statute of the demilitarized eirtually come to a standstill during the last
cepted by both parties, zones was necessary and expressed the view 8 months. The Commision is of the opinion
These included: (1) The checking of move- that any additional reinforcement should that the freedom of movement guaranteed
menta of personnel by the check posts on be approved by both parties in the Central to the permitholders under article 9 of the
the demarcation line; (2) the setting up of Joint Commission. With regard to argent- agreement is being denied to them, and that
mobile patrols on either side to stop people ration of political meetings (recommends- no action has been taken by the French High
crossing at unauthorised places in between tion No. 2) the P.A.V.N. High Command did Command to remedy the situation.
the check posts; and (3) the provision of not consider it necessary that modalities 9. The Commission has received from the
should be laid down for the regulation of P.A.V.N. High Command during the period
iReferences to "articles" in the report are such meetings- under report 28 complaints relating to 236
to the articles of this agreement. See "Mis- 6. The movement across the demarcation alleged incidents in violation of article 7,
ceflaneous No. 20 (1954)," Cmd. 8239, page line and the entry into the denailitarized including 118 alleged incidents in violation
27, et seq. zones of persons not directly concerned with of article 14(c) in the southern demilitarized
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164 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD --- SENATE 8739
Earle. Out or the n-umber of incidents re- mission, after investigation, has concluded ihdicated in its separate note of ilay 3, 1956,
ferred to above 154 pertain to the Period that there has been a violation of article 7 to the 000hairmen, while not fully agreeing
under report. in reply he French High of the agreement by the French High Conf-
Comb:tend hes forwarded to the Commission mand. The P.A.V.N. High Command lodged
a letter !rem the Government of thii Republic another complaint with the commission that
of Vietnam which denies the allegations and on the 17th and 25th of January 1956, the
'states that a few of the incidents were caused French High Command in contravention of
by supporters of the North. The complaints article 7 permitted the entry of a number
are under inquiry. The Commission has not of persons into the demilitarised zone. The
so far received any reply from the Govern- French High Command forwarded a letter
rrient of the Republic of Vietnam with regard from the Government of the Republic of
to 155 of the above alleged incidents. Vietnam which admitted that there had been
10. In paragraph 41 of the Fifth Interim an infraction of the status of the demili-
Report the commission had made reference tarised zone and stated that this was due
to Mobile Team 87 which was to investigate to lack of liaison between the French repre-
\ Certain alleged violations of articles 7 and sentative on the joint subconimission. and
14(c) in the demilitarized zones. It had the local authorities. The commission has
been reported that the commission had de- sent a letter to the French High Command
aided to sena the team back to the Reid as stating that the procedure for the entry into
the Government of the Republic of Vietnam the demilitarised zone should be strictly
had withdrawn itp condition that liaison followed.
officers attached to this team should be in 12. The situation in the demilitarised
Civilian clothes when the team operated in zone has not shown any improvement since
the southern demilitarized zone. How- the Fifth Interim Report. If anything, the
ever, soori after the Republic of Viet- difficulties have increased. As mentioned
nam qualified this concurrenee by stat- in the foregoing paragraphs, hindrances to
Ing that, Should the presence of the the free movement of the permitholders,
P.A.V.N. liaison staff in uniform provoke any numerous complaints about alleged infrac-
inCident, the responsibility would be that House the status of the demilitarised zone
of the international commission. The corn- and article, 14(c), inadequate implementa-
mission informed the French 'High Command tion of the commission's recommendations
that it could not accept any responsibility regarding the administrative arrangements
for any incident that might occur as it was in the demilitarised zone and the unsatis-
the duty of the high command concerned factory functioning of the central joint corn-
to assure full security to the teeth under mission and its subordinate agencies have
article 25. Since the commission Waaarueious largely contributed to this deterioration.
to conduct the investigation* as soon as pas- 13. It has been the experience of the corn-
Sible, it proposed to the P.A.V.N. High Corn- mission that the central joint commission,
!nand that, as a special case, its liaison staff through the agencies under it, has dis-
attached to Mobile Team 87 should wear charged its duties very unsatisfactorily. It
civilian clothes, The P.A.V.N. High Corn- has become increasingly necessary for the
mond did nct agree to. this on the ,ground commission to intervene and to take more
that the cormnis,sion itself had decided Dia active steps even though under article 36
Ilovemer 8, 1955, that liaison officers ih the (b) its responsibilities are limited to super-
demilitarized, zones could wear uniforms if visjon. It has also been found that the cen-
so desired by the high command concerned. tral joint commission did not meet for days
In the Meanwhile, the Republic of Vietnam together even though cases referred to it by
laid down a few more conditions in the Pun the P.A.V.N. delegation were pending with it.
of suggestions. These suggestions were not It has not resolved the iroportant questions
accepted by the commission. At the begin- described in the previous paragraph such as
ming of March, the French Liaison Mission the question of freedom of movement of
/ informed the commission that the ?Covern_- permit-holders and it has failed to under-,
ment of the Republic of Vietnam could agree take investigations through its joint groups
to theyesumption of investigation by Mobile into a large number of incidents, as the
Team. 87 provided the P.A.V.N. liaison staff French High Command did not agree to par-
was sent in civilian clothes. In view ef this, ticipate. Furthermore, the disputes which
the commission requested the P.A.V.N. High have arisen in the joint subcommission in
the demilitarised zone from time to time
have not been settled. Since the dissolution
of the French High Command there have
been no meetings either of the joint subcom-
mission in the demilitarised zone or of the
central joint commission. The P.A.V.N.
High Command has therefore sought the
commission's intervention as its efforts to get
the central joint commission to meet have
yielded no results.
14. The cochairmen in their message dated
May 8, 1956, to the French Government
invited them to discuss with the authorities
of South Vietnam the question of the reso-
lution of the practical problems with a view
to reaching an arrangement which will
facilitate the work of the International Su-
pervisory Commission and the Joint Commis-
sion in Vietnam. They also requested that
until the arrangements envisaged above were
put into effect the French Government
should preserve the status quo. However,
the staus quo maintained by the Govern-
ment of the Republic of France has not in-
cluded the continued functioning of the
central joint commission and its agencies,
with the result that the day-to-day problems
in the demilitarised zone have remained un-
solved.
15. The international commission has, in a
previous communication of May 2, 1956, to
the cochairmen, emphasised the importance
which it places on the work of the joint
commission. The Canadian delegation, as
Command to agree as a special case with
respeat to Mobile Team 87 to the wearing of
civilian clothes by the P.A.V.N. liaison staff
accompanying the team. The P.A.V.N. High
Command again did not agree to the com-
mission's request for the same reasons as
given before. It further requested the corn-
inissio:a to take up a firm stand toward the
French High Command and demand that it
withdraw the unacceptable condition of
civilian clothes. On Ally 7, 1956, the corn-
MiaSion converted its suggestion into a rec-
ommendation that in the demilitarized zones
and on the demarcation line the representa-
tives of the high commands sent for liaison
duties may be in uniform if so required by
their high command. In view of this recom-
mendation it is hoped that the team will be
abie t? resume investigations before long.
II. The P.A.V.N. High Command had
lodged a complaint with the Commission
that on February 25, 1956, the represent-
atives of the French High Command In
contravention of article 7 permitted 150 per-
sons amongst whom were 5 military officers
to enter the demilitarised zone and attend
a flag salutation ceremony on the demarca-
tion line, An investjgation conducted by
the commission revealed. that, even though
the representatives of the P.A.V.N. delega-
tion had refused concurrence to the e4try
of these 150 persons into the demilitarised
zone, the French High Command permitted
their entry without authorisation, The corn-
with the emphasis placed in this acanmuni-
-cation on the importance of the work of the
joint?cairimission, was in agreement that as
a Matter Of urgency steps should be taken
to ineure that the tasks of the joint cornrn
mission" continued to be Performed. The
commission is of the view that the joint
'commission is an essential part of the ma-
chinery for the implementation of the cease-
fire agreement, and that its nonfunctioning
adversely affects the execution Of the agree-
ment, particularly in respect of the adminis-
tration of the demarcation line and the de-
militarized zones. The commission is, there-
fore, of the view that the joint commission
and its agencies should resume their normal
working.
CHAPTER III?DEMOCR,AT1C FREEDOMS?ARTICLES
. 14(C) AND (d)
Article. 14(c).
16. The supervision of the implementation
by the parties of the provisions of article
14(c) continues to be one of the major
problems of the Commission. Under this
article, the parties have undertaken to re-
frain from any reprisals or discrimination
against persons or organizations on account
Of their activities during the hostilities and
to guarantee their democratic liberties. Dur-
ing the period under review, the commission
received from the P.A.V.N.' High Command
102 complaints alleging 281 incidents con-
cerning violations of article 14(c) in South
Vietnam. The Commission' has also received
through its petition boxes, through its fixed
and mobile teams, and through the P.A.V.N.
High Command a large number of petitions
alleging reprisals in the south. These com-
plaints and petitions contain allegations of
a nithiber of cases of arrest, detention, mur-
der, massacre, and mass concentration of
families of former resistance workers cora-
l/fitted-by the authorities of the south. Dur-
ing the period under review, the Commis-
sion received from the French High Com-
mand five complaints involving 18 incidents,
Including one alleged case of murder, alleg-
ing that the authorities of the north had
committed reprisals against the former sup-
porters of the French High Command con-
cerning violation of article 14(c) .
17. The Commission, as In the past, has
forwarded the majority of these complaints
and some of the petitions to the high com-
mand? concerned fox, comments and reports
of ?remedial action taken if the allegations
were found to be true, The Commission is
still seized with, 143 complaints against 'the
French High Command and 5 complaints
against the P.A.V.N. High Command con-
cerning alleged reprisals under article 14(c).
During the period under review, the Commis-
sion decided to send out three mobile teams
to make on the spot investigations into
complaints of alleged violation of article 14
(c) in the south, under the terms of article
37 of the agreement. The following are the
complaints along with the dates on which
the concurrence of the party was asked for:
Number of the team, date when concurrence
- faked for, and task of the team
103. March 15, 1956, to investigate alleged
-violation of article 14(c) in the Province of
Quang Nam (Duy Xuyen).
194. March 15, 1956, to investigate the mas-
sacre of three families at Gia Rai (Bac Lieu
Province).
105. March 15, 1956, to investigate the al-
leged concentration of former resistance
workers and their families in Thua Thiem
Province.
, In addition to these three cases, the Com-
mission had decided to send out three other
mobile teams during the period covered by
the Fifth Interim Report. The following are
the complaints and the dates on which the
concurrence of the Tarty was asked for:
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Number of the team, date when concurrence the Commission declared that there was a bile team. Concurrence for this Mobile Team
asked for, and task of the team violation at article 14(c) In 15 cases and 105 baa been received. It has come to the
85. August 27, 1955, to investigate alleged has recommended the immediate release Commission's notice that former resistance
violation of article 14(c) in the Province of of the affected persons. In the other workers are being held in detention under
Chau Doc, South Vietnam. eight cases, the Commission was of the Ordinance No. 6 although the ordinance was
87. September 8, 1955, to investigate alleged view that no violation of article 14(c) promulgated sometime after the arrests took
violation of article 14(c) in demilitarized had been established. Out of these eight place. The Commission has asked the French
zones (north and south). cases, in one case, the Commission de- High Command for a clarification of how
cided that no further action was necessary retrospective effect Is 'being given to the
93. October 4, 1955, to investigate alleged
violation of article 14(c) in Huong Hos, and in the remaining seven cases, the French ordinance. A reply is awaited.
High Command was requested to arrange 22. It was pointed out in the Fifth Interim
South Vietnam.
In addition to the above six cases where with the authorities concerned to proceed Report that the inability of the Commission
the commission has asked for the concur-
immediately with their judicial processes and to send out mobile teams for investigatingrence of the high command concerned, the
submit the dossiers to the Commission when alleged violations of article 14(c) was cans-
Commission has also ordered a mobile team
completed, on receipt of which the Commis- Mg serious concern to the Commission. Dur-
investigatiOn into two complaints from the Mon would review these seven cases to see ing the period under review the Commission
P.A.V.N. High Command alleging murder whether the provisions of article 14(c) were was unable to send out any investigating
and arrest in the Province of Quang Nam violated or not. These findings and recom- teams to South Vietnam. As has been
but the decision to send out this team has mendations were communicated to the pointed out in paragraph 16 complaints and
not yet been taken. In one other case, the French High Command on June 7, 1956. The allegations regarding violation of article
Commission has directed one of its fixed recommendations of the Commission have 14(c) have been very numerous and in some
teams in the south to undertake inquiries not yet been implemented. In another case, cases of a very serious nature. The Commis-
into an alleged murder. that of a former resistance member of Hhanh Mon is not in a position to state whether these
18. The decision to send these teams was Hos Province named Tran Chau who had complaints are true or not as it has not
taken at various times by the Commission been arrested. the Commission decided that been permitted to certify them through the
and the concurrence of the French High the case was covered by article 14(c) and machinery laid down in the agreement. The
Command has asked for under the provisions recommended on June 26, 1956, to the question of the degree of cooperation ex-
of article 85. During the period under re- French High Command that the person tended by the party concerned to enable the
view, the Commission was not able to carry should be released forthwith. The Commis- International Commission to carry out in-
out these investigations as it was awaiting Mon has not received any reply from the vestigations will be discussed in fuller detail
concurrence from the French High Cora- French High Command indicating that the in paragraph 69 of this report.
mend. Concurrence for While Teams 93, recommendation has been implemented. Article 14(4)
103, and 105 has been received in the month The French High Command was also asked 23. In paragraph 12 of the Fifth Interim
of July 1956, Mobile Team 103 concluded its to show cause why a finding of violation of
Report, the Commission had informed the co-
preliminary inquiry on July 28, 1956, at Hanoi article 14(c) should not be given for the chairmen that it was pursuing the question
In the presence De liaison officers of both the arrest and detention of a person who had
of residual cases under article 14(4) with
. parties and had not yet commenced its in- taken part in the hostilities. The Commis-
Vestigation in South Vietnam during the sion has not received any reply to tali . show- the two parties. On October 22, 1955, the
Commission had made suggestions regarding
period under review. The Commission hopes cause notice although the prescribed time follow-up action on the residual categories,
that it will not meet with further difficulties of 2 weeks has elapsed. outlined in paragraph 33 of the Fourth In-
and the teams will be able to-carry out the 21. In February 1956, the International terim Report. The Freedoms Committee was
investigations soon. The position as regards Commission received a communication from charged with the task of holding discussions
Mobile Team 87 has been explained in pare- the Commander in Chief of the People's with the representatives of the two high
graph 10. Army of Vietnam bringing to the Commis- commands with a view to arriving at a satis-
19. During the period covered by the Fifth sion's notice the existence of an ordinance factory settlement of this problem. Between
Interim Report, the Commission had decided in South Vletnam?(3eneral Order No. 6 of January 7 and March 12, 1956, the committee
to undertake a mobile team investigation January II, 1956, Issued by the President of held five meetings with the representatives
on a complaint from the PA.V.N. High Corn- the Republic of Vietnam?and complaining of the parties. During the course of discus-
mand of alleged violation of article 14(c) in that this ordinance was in violation of arti- Mons, both parties accepted in principle the
South Vietnam. The team (Mobile Team ole 14(c). The ordinance gave special powers suggestions made by the Commission in its
90), however, was not deplored in view of to the Government to take extraordinary letter of October 22, 1955. No agreement has
the reply received from the French High measures for detention or deportation for been reached, however, regarding the imple-
Command on the P.A.V.N. High Command's reasons of public security, The Commission mentation in practice of the suggestions.
complaint that the persons concerned had examined the complaint of the P.A.V.N. High During the course of the discussions, the
been released. On December 12, 1955, the Command and on March 5. 1956, commu- representative of the P.A.V.N. High Command
P.A.V.N. High Command complained that the nicated to the French High Command its proposed that the best solution of the prob-
persons involved in its first complaint had view that no law, regulation or order in lam of article 14(4) would be to have cons-
been rearrested and asked for the despatch either of the two zones could, in any way, plate freedom of movement between the two
of the mobile team. This fresh complaint supersede the obligations which the two- zones. The representative of the French
was forwarded to the French High Command parties have undertaken under the provi- High Command was not in favor of this
on December 2, 1955, for its comments and dons of article 14(c) of the agreement on proposal as, in his view, it went beyond the
in April the commission drew the attention the cessation of hostilities in Vietnam. The scope of the cease-fire agreement. Both
of the high command to its earlier decision French High Command was further informed parties were, however, willing to continue
to have a mobile team investigation. The that the Commission expected that any ac- discussion of residual cases. In view of the
Commission will take a fine; decision on re- tion taken under General Order No. 5 would developments in the South and the with-
cetpt of a reply from the French High Corn- be taken With due regard to the provisions draws] of the French High Command from
mand which is awaited. of article 14(c) and if complaints were South Vietnam, the discussions with the two
20. The commission has taken a final brought to the notice of the Commission parties have been for the present held up.
decision, and made recolnmendattons to the regarding the application of this decree or Thus, the Commission has not so far been
French High Command in one nage which any tither law, regulation or order in either able to resolve the question of residual cases
had been pending since April last year. In of the two zones, alleging the violation of mentioned in paragraph 33 of the Fourth
the month of April 1955. when Mobile Team article 14(c). the Commission would take Interim Report.
47 was conducting an inquiry in the Chi Hort steps to satisfy itself that there had been no, 24. The question of investigating the cora-
prison into alleged violations of article 21 reprisals or discrimination against persons plaint made by the French High Command
by the French High Command. It came aCTOM on account of their activities during the hos- in April 1955, that the seminarists of Xe
25 cases of prisoners arrested after the cease- Unties and that their democratic liberties Doal were not being permitted to move
fire who claimed that they were former had not been infringed in violation of artf- south was referred to in paragraph 15 of the
resistance workers who had been detained cle 14(c). A copy of this communication was Fifth Interim Report. Mobile Team F-44
for no reasons after ceasefire. The P.A.V.N. forwarded to the Commander in Chief of which was sent to the seminary at Xa foal
High Command subsequently sponsored 23 the People's Army of Vietnam pointing out was not able to interview the seminarists
out of thise 25 cases and alleged that they that the Commission was always ready to concerned as the religious authorities on
were violations of article 14(c) by the French deal with specific complaints regarding vio- religious grounds did not allow the team to
High Command. The statements of these 23 'idiom' of the provisions of the cease-fire enter the seminary and hold investigations
prisoners were obtained by Mobile Team 47 agreement. Subsequently the Commission there. The team had to return with the
and the Commission also obtained from the has received a few specific complaints of ac- task unaccomplished. The P.A.V.N. High
South Vietnam authorities dossiers in each than under General Order No. 6 which, in Command informed the commission that
case. These dossiers and the statements the opinion of the P.A.V.N. High Command, the religious authorities were, however,
made by the prisoners were carefully ex- amount to violation of article 14(c). These agreeable to allow the seminarists to be in-
amined by the Freedoms Committee and the cases are being pursued with the French terviewed outside the premises. The corn-
Legal Committee of the Commission. After High Command and in one ease the Cora- mission in March 1956 informed the P.A.V.N.
careful scrutiny of the committees' reports, mission has ordered investigation by a mo- High Command that in its view the seminary
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would have been the most satisfactory place
for conducting investigations but in view
of the delay and the need to interrogate the
sernin.arists immediately the investigations
need not take place at the seminary grounds
but the seminarists staidd be produced be-
fore the commission's team at Vinh.
reply the P.A.V.N. High Command informed
the commission that the seminarists had
stated that they did not wish to be inter-
viewed by the cOmMission and that those
who wanted to go south had been alithorized
to do so before July 20, 1955. The commis-
sion ,did not accept these arguments and
made a recommendation in June 1956 to
the p.A.V.N. High Command that arrange-
`merits should be made to produce seminar-
ists before, the team at Vinh as soon as pos-
sible. In July 1956 the commission asked
the? P.A.V.N. High Command to 'inform the
commission whether or not it was prepared
to produce the seminarists at Vinh within
15 days. The high command in reply in-
_ formed the commission that the seminarists
would be returning from their holidays at
the end of August and that the local au-
thorities had been directed to make arrange-
Inents with the seminarists On their return.
The investigation by Mobile Team F-44 has
not yet taken place.
25. The P.A.V.N. High Command had in
November 1955 alleged that a serious inci-
dent took place in Thu Dau Mot Province
In South Vietnam where plantation \workers
approached the authorities for permits to go
north, The P.A.V.N. High Command alleged
that the authorities opened fire and killed
one person and seriously wounded three. It
also alleged that 40 persons were arrested
and put in jail. The French High Command
Whose comments were invited admitted the
Occurrence of the incident but stated that
there was no question of denial of facilities
Under article 14(d). It enclosed a letter
from the SoUth Vietnam authorities in which
it was stated that the workers had demon-
strated and that the police had fired in self-
defense and to maintain order, and that
the arrests were subsequently made for corn-
Mon law offenses and acts against the State.
The commission. has decided to send a mobile
team to investigate on the spot: The con-
currence of the French High Command is
awaited.
CHAPTER TV?PRTSONERS OF wAtt AND CIVIL/AN
INTERNEES
26. As stated in paragraph 10 of the Fourth
Interim Report and paragraph 20 of the Fifth
Interim Report, the parties continued to
make claims against each other in respect
of prisoners of war and civilian _internees,
particularly in cases where the replies re-
ceived by them from the other party in the
joint commission were not considered satis-
factory. During the period under report 330
such claims were received from the French
High Command and 834 from the P.A.V.N.
High Command.
27. In its efforts to get the parties to clear
their claims and counterclaims concerning
prisoners of war, the commission has been
Continually urging them to make further and
more thorough investigations in invidual
cases and thereby help the other party in
knowing the ultimate fate of the prisoners
concerned. Under a procedure introduced
in July 1955, the parties have also been ex-
changing regularly, through the medium of
the commission, fortnightly reports of prog-
ress made on search requests of prisoners of
war received from the other side in the joint
commission.
? 28. In paragraphs 21 and 22 of the Fifth
Interim Report, mention was made of the
cased of 141 Vietnamese officers alleged to
have been kept in detention in prisoner-Of-
war camps in North Vietnam after the cease-
fire and it Was stated that the commission,
on the basis of investigation carried out by
Mobile Team 80, had come to the conclusion
that the allegation of detention in prisoner-
of-war camps after the cease-fire had not
?
been proved, but as it felt that these 141
ex-prisoners of war, who worked in construc-
tion yards after their release, might not
have been able to exercise their choice of zone
of residence, it decided that their cases would
be treated as residual cases remaining to be
disposed of under article 14(d) of the
agreement.
29. On receipt of further representations
from the French High Command, concern-
ing theSe persons, the matter was further
examined by the commission and it was sug-
gested to the P.A.V.N. High Command in
March 1956, that 89 of them should be
informed by individual letters that facili-
ties would be granted to them and to their
wives and children dependent on them to
proceed south in exercise of their right to
choose their zone of residence if they so
desired. The P.A.V.N. High Command replied
on June 12, 1956, that it did not accept the
?commission's findings that these persons had
been under some restrictions. They further
stated that these persons had been enjoy-
ing the same rights as any other citizen and
had been working on their own free will in
construction yards in North Vietnam. In
view of this, the suggested procedure was
not acceptable to the P.A.V.N. High Com-
mand. The P.A.V.N. High Command also
wondered why the commission had been in-
duced to put up the request contained in
its letter of March 10, 1956. The matter was
again considered by the commission in the
third week' of June and the P.A.V.N. High
Command was again asked to adopt the
procedure suggested by the commission in
March and report compliance, failing which
the commission would consider converting
the suggested procedure into a recommenda-
tion. The P.A.V.N. High Command's reply
has now been received and is being considered
by the commission.
30. During the period under review, the
P.A.V.N. High Command informed the com-
mission that 57 German and Hungarian
"rallies" were being repatriated through
China. One of the commission's teams on
the Vietnam-China border was instructed to
ask the following questions to these persons:
"Do you consider yoursel; a prisoner of war?"
and "Are you being repatpated of your own
free will?". The team was also Instructed
to obtain a list of all persons being re-
patriated. The team was satisfied from the
replies to the two questions mentioned above
that the persons concerned did not claim to
be prisoners of war and that they were being
repatriated of their free will. But the team
was unable to obtain the names of these
persons. The commission asked the P.A.V.N.
High Command to supPly a list of their
names, but the P.A.V.N. High Command re-
fused to do so on the ground that their
cases did not come under the Geneva Agree-
ment and at the time of their repatriation,
as had been stated by the team, these per-
sons had informed the team that they did
not want their narnes to be revealed.
31. The commission has before it the cases
of 26 deserters, who made applications either
to the French High Command or to the
commission for transfer to the French Union
forces for repatriation to their country of
origin. Some of these cases have been pend-
ing for a long time. The P.A.V.N. High Com-
mand has stated that these persons 'have
changed their Mind and are no longer de-
sirous of being handed over to the French
Union forces. The commission has, therefore,
suggested to the P.A.V.N. High Command
that they be produced before the Freedoms
Committee of the commission so that he
commission might satisfy itself that they
have in fact changed their mind. In reply,
the P.A.V.N. High Command informed the
commission that one "rallie" handed over
to the French Union forces in February 1955
had been sentenced to death and another
"raffle" repatriated in March 1955 had been
sentenced ,to 12 years' hard labour and 20
years of solitary confinement. The P.A.V.N.
High Command, further, stated that in view
8741
of this attitude of the French High Com-
mand, it Would not agree to the repatriation
of any "rallie" through the French Union
forces until such time as the assurance which
had been previously asked for from the
French High Command that no deserter
handed over by the P.A.V.N. High Command
would be punished for desertion, was given.
The French High Command has been asked
to offer specific comments on the two cases
quoted 'by the P.A.V.N. High Command and
its attention has also been drawn to the
fact that these persons are entitled to the
benefit of article 14(c) and should not be
punished for acts connected with desertion.
32. It has, however, been made clear to the
parties that the commission does not deal
with deserters under the agreement, but the
commission has expressed a hope that the
procedure laid down as a result of discussion
between the parties and the commisison for
the repatriation of "rallies," which was based
on humanitarian grounds, would be con-
tinued and that the commisison was ever
willing to offer its good offices in this regard.
33. In one case, however, that of ex-legion-
ary Johann Vreckar, the commission received
several petitions from him of a conflicting na-
ture and his wishes were not clear. The
commission, therefore, decided on February 9,
1956, that a mobile team (100) should inter-
view Vreckar with the limited task of ascer-
taiMng whether he desired to be handed over
to the French Union forces or not. No in-
vestigation into his status was to be under-
taken. The P.A.V.N. High Command ex-
pressed its unwillingness to produce Vreckar
before the commission's team on the ground
that he was a "rallie" and had clearly ex-
pressed his wish to be repatriated to the Ger-
man Democratic Republic. The commission
reiterated its demand on several occasions
that Vreckar should be produced before the
mobile team. In July the commission con-
verted its request into a recommendation and
asked that Vreckar should be produced before
the team by July 13, 1956. The P.A.V.N. High
Command, however, did not produce him
within the time limit. On July 14, 1956, ex-
legionary Johann Vreckar on his own came to
the commission's secretariat and was inter-
viewed by the three Deputy Secretaries-Gen-
eral of the Commission. On being questioned
about his wishes he stated that he did not
want to be handled over to the French Union.
forces. The commisison has closed this case.
34. Regarding civilian internees the latest
position is as follows:
FUF
PAVN
1. Number released up to July 31, 1956
(excluding 03 mentioned in the
3d interim report, 67 mentioned
in the 4th interim report and 79
mentioned in the 5th interim
report), by
2. Number of recommendations for
release made by the Commission
during the period under report
under art. 21 to
I. Number of cases in which recom-
mendations for release made by
? the Commission under art. 2
,, (with dates of recommendation
have not so far been implemented
by
4. Number of cases under considera-
tion oh complaints against
5. Number of cases in which Commis-
sion has declared that release was'
inconsistent with art. 21 of the
Geneva Agreement, against
6. .Number of cases in which Commis-
sion has held violation of art. 21
and decided to take action under
? - art. 43 of the Geneva Agreement,
? against
14
2
2 13
86
111
12
2
6
1 Regarding one identity has been questioned, and it
is being considered whether this release was under
art. 21 or 14(c).
Aug. 29, 1955. "
8 Dec. 9, 1965.
35. As mentioned in aerial No. 5 above,
there have been 12 cases where the French
High Command released civilian internees
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without handing them over to the PA.V.N.
High Command The Commission has in-
formed the French High Command that inch
releases are inconsistent with the provisions
of article 21.
36. In the cases of 19 civilian internees
(13 plus 6) referred to at serial No. 3 above,
the Government of the Republic of Vietnam
contended that their cases were not covered
by article 21(b) AS they were former metnbere
of the National Armed Forces and had been
detained or punished under the military law
applicable to them and could not, therefore.
be considered as civilian Internees. The Com-
mission examined the legal aspect of the
matter and after very careful consideration
came to the conclusion, with the Canadian
delegation dissenting, that, when it was clear
that a person had been arrested and con-
victed because he had contributed to the
political and armed struggle between the
two parties in Vietnam. his case was cov-
ered by article 21, no matter under what
law he was so convicted and no matter what
his status was at the time of arrest and
conviction. The benefit of article 21 could
not be denied to a person if the reason for
his arrest and conviction was that he had
contributed to the political and armed strug-
gle in Vietnam. and the fact that he was a
former member of the armed forces of one
party and had been arrested and convicted
under military law of that party, could not
exclude him from the definition of a civilian
Internee.
87. This decision was communicated to the
French High Command but the Republic of
Vietnam adhered to its own interpretation of
article 21 (b) . The Commission has. in a let-
ter dated June 6, 1956, reiterated its stand
and requested the French Lliason Mission to
urge the Government of the Republic of
Vietnam to implement the recommendations
made by the Commission and to release the
persons concerned immediately, particularly
In view of the appeal made to the parties by
the cochairmen to give effective cooperation
to the commission. The French Liaison Mis-
sion has also been informed that If the
Commission's recommendations are not im-
plemented by the authorities concerned the
Commission would consider -taking action
under article 43 of the agreement. The rec-
ommendations have not been implemented.
The difficulties encountered by Mobile Team
47 which has been charged with examining
complaints of violations at article 21 in South
Vietnam, will be dealt with in paragraph '70
of this report.
98. The Commission would like to draw the
attention of the co-chairmen to two cases
coming under article 21?the case of Tran
Quy Minh alias lasznaidei Francois and the
case of Nguyen Throng Sinh alias Tangave-
lou, which havebeen pending with the Com-
mission since June and July 1965 respectively.
In both these cases the Commission, atter
careful examination, arrived at the finding
that they were civilian Internees. On
February 17 and 27, 1956, respectively,
the Cornmisalon communicated to the
French High Command these decisions
and directed the French High. Command to
produce these two persons who were stated
to be in custody in Prance, at Saigon so that
their choice of zone in which they would
like to go and live might be ascertained.
In spite of protracted correspondence with
the French High Command, the recommen-
dations of the international Commission in
these two cases were not implemented_ In
both the cases the French High Command
claimed that as Hamaide Francais and Tan-
gavelou were of French nationality their
cases were not covered by article 21, The
Commission, after examination informed the
French High Command that article 21 applies
to all civilian internees irrespective of na-
tionality. The French High Command has
informed the Commission on July 14, 1956,
that Hamaide Francois was released in France
on September 11, 1955?. after a grant of free
pardon. In the case of Tangavelou, the
French High Command has informed that
he has been released on probation in France
and that he has submitted a petition for a
reprieve which Is being considered. In both
these cases, therefore, the French High Com-
mand has rejected the considered findings
and recommendations of the Comm 'salon.
The Commission has recorded violation of
article 21 in both these cases and has in-
bribed the French High Command that the
Commission will take action under article
43 of the agreement.
39. The Commission views with cancern
cases of this nature where a party refuses
to implement the recommendations of the
?Commission due to difference of interpreta-
tion of the agreement. If the Commission
is to fulfill lie tasks of supervision and con-
trol adequately, it is essential that the Com-
mission's authority on interpretation must
be accepted by the parties as final.
40. The case of Father Nguyen Quang Vinh,
a Trappist monk of the monastery of Chau-
Son, which was mentioned in paragraph 14
of the Fifth Interim Report, has been pend-
ing with the commission since May 1955.
The French High Command had alleged that
Father Vinh was detained as a civilian in-
ternee by the PA.V.N. authorities. The
commission has obtained from the P.A.V.N.
High Command a complete dossier of the case
In order to ascertain whether his case is cov-
ered by article 21. Father Vinh has been
sentenced to penal servitude for life on al-
legedly common law charges. The commis-
sion decided in April 1956 that the legal
committee, acting as a team, should interview
Father Vinh and also examine the dossier of
his case. Father Vinh was, however, not pro-
duced before the commission's team by the
P.A.V.N. High Command. The commission
was informed on July 3, 1956, by the PA.V.N.
High Command that Father Vinh escaped
from custody in the month of January 1956.
The commission has asked the legal com-
mittee to examine the dossier of the case and
and on the basis of the documents available
to submit a report whether there had been
a violation of any article of the Geneva Agree-
ment.
CH AFTER V?RAN ON THE INTRODUCTION OF
FRENCH TROOPS, MILITARY PERSONNEL, ARMS
AND MUNITION ?MILITARY Dams IN warner/
41. Arrangements made for the supervision
and control of the execution by the parties of
the provisions of articles 16 to 20 of the
agreement and additional measures taken by
the commission to discharge its special re-
sponsibility under article 36(d) have been
referred to in the first five interim reports.
42. The mobile team arrangements made
for the continuous control of Introduction
of war material and military personnel on
the Vietnam-Cambodian border at Loc Ninh
continued throughout the period under re-
port, but Mobile Team 88. located at Phuc
Hoa on the Vietnamese-Chinese border had
to be withdrawn on January 25. 1956, due to
the insistence of the P.A.V.N. High Command
that further extension of the tenure of the
team could not be given and that logistic
support was to he discontinued. Another
team with a new number 99 was established
at Phuc Hos on February 8, .1956. This
team also had to be withdrawn on May 18,
1956, after the refusal of the P.A.V.N. High
Command to implement the recommenda-
tions of the commission. During the ab-
sence of the above mobile teams from Phuc
Holt, the mobile element of the Lang Son
Fixed Team was given the additional task
of controlling the area from Dong Deng.
The mobile element visited Phuc Hoe on
seven occasions.
43. However, the commission has been of
the view that continuous control by a mo-
bile team at Phuc Hoe is essential, since the
mobile element of the fixed team at. Lang
Son cannot assure the necessary supervision
of m.oet of the important lines of communi-
cation near the border between North Viet-
nam and China. The stand of the P.A.V.N.
High Command has been that the mainte-
nance of a mobile team for an undeter-
mined period changes its character to that of
a fixed team and that this is contrary to
She provisions of article 35. The commission
after giving full consideration to the views
of the PA..V.N. High Command, has held,
with the Polish delegation dissenting, that it
has full authority under article 35 to keep
mobile teams in operation in the zones of
action for such periods as it considers neces-
sary and that such mobile teams will not
become fixed teams irrekpective of the length
of time they are kept in operation. The
above decision of the commission was com-
municated to the P.A.V.N. High Commands
before withdrawing Mobile Team 88 and Mo-
bile Team 99. The commission has made it
clear that the decisions to withdraw the
teams were forced on the commission be-
cause of the refusal of the P.A.V.N. High
Command to implement the recommenda-
tions of the commission and to extend the
necessary cooperation to the teams. At the
insistence of the commission the P.A.V.N.
High Command, though it has not accepted
the commission's interpretation of article
35, has, on July 19, 1956, agreed to the de-
ployment of a new mobile team at Phuc Hoa.
The commission has, therefore, decided to
send a new team to Phuc Hoa at the earliest
date possible. The P.A.V.N. High Command
has informed the commission that the ten-
ure of the team will be discussed later.
44. In addition to the airfields within the
zones of action of the fixed teams which
were being controlled, the commission de-
cided to carry out the reconnaissance of the
Important and uncontrolled airfields in Viet-
nam which could be used for introducing
military personnel and war material. Dur-
ing the period under review, in the north
the P.A.V.N. High Command gave concur-
rence to three controls and four out of five
reconnaissances requested by the commission
and seven teams completed the tasks en-
trusted to them. Concurrence for the fifth
reconnaissance was not received during the
period under report. In the south, the
Government of the Republic of Vietnam
gave concurrence in 4 out of 10 cases where
concurrence was requested. The four teams
concerned completed their tasks. The re-
connaissance of the remaining five airfields
and the second reconnaissance of another
airfield could not be carried out as the Gov-
ernment of South Vietnam did not give con-
currence. In three cases where the com-
mission decided after reconnaissance to in-
stitute control, no control could be exer-
cised. The Government of the Republic of
Vietnam in connexion with both reconnais-
series and control referred to above, took the
stand that there should be parity between
the north and the south. The commission
did not accept the argument of parity and
requested the authorities of South Vietnam
to make immediate arrangements for the
reconnaissance or control of the airfields
concerned as the case may be. Compliance
Is awaited_ During the period under re-
view, tire commission completed four recon-
naissances and three controls covering five
airfields in the north and four reconnais-
sances covering four airfields in the south.
Further reference is made in paragraph 73
below. During this period the commission
also carried out periodic reconnaissances of
roads In North Vietnam. Six such recon-
naissances were completed with the con-
currence of the PA.V.N. High Command.
The seventh could not be completed' dire to
bad weather conditions when the team was
actually deployed.
45. Mention was made in paragraphs 31
to 85 of the Fifth Interim Report of the
problems of control of shipping In the Me-
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196.4'
kong River. The legal committee of the
commission has studied the question of the
rights of shipping on rivers open to interna-
tional navigation and their compatibility
with the obl*ations of the parties under ar-
'tides 16 and 17 and has come to the con-
clusion that the commission has the right
to stop ships? for control purposes by its
teams. The French High Command has been
informed of this decision.
46. In order that the fixed teams might
devote special attention to such places on
the coast where there was possibility of war
material and military personnel being " land-
ed, the Commission has, from time to time,
carried out reconnaissance of the coast of
Vietnam. The task has been completed with
the following exceptions:?
(a) Coastal area between Ha-Tien and
Rach-Gia in South Vietnam. This could not
be done due to the alleged conditions of in-
security prevailing in this area.
(b) The coast from Haiphong to Tien-Yen
in North Vietnam. This could not be carried
out due to the nonprovision of suitable sea
transport.
47. The Commission, during the period un-
der report, ordered reconnaissance of all off-
shore Islands both in North and South Viet-
nam in view of complaints made by the
parties about lightening of ships and in view
of a case which came to the notice of the
Commission. The French High Command in
a letter to the Commission on Piecember 16,
1955, alleged that there were a great num-
ber of places in the area of Haiphong, where
lightening of ships could be effected. In
January 1956 the Haiphong fixed team
brought to the notice of the Commission an
instance where a ship was lightened in the
Bale D'Along before entering Haiphong. The
captain of the ship freely gave the informa-
tion to the team that his ship had anchored
In the Bale D'Alang for some time for off-
loading into barges approximately 1,000 tons
of cargo there in order that the ship might
be sufficiently light to.enter Haiphong Har-
bor. The team checked the cargo of the
ship and the lightened material in Haiphong
port and found them to be general merchan-
dise. On February 4, 1956, the PAVN High
Command alleged in a letter to the Commis-
sion that numerous ships were anchoring
off the Mekong estuary at nighttime and un-
loading war material into barges which
brought them to the shore.
48. As a result of the allegations of the
French High Command and the instance of
lightening mentioned above, the Commis-
sion directed its teams, early in February
1956 to carry out a reconnaissance of the off-
shore islands and submit the following in-
formation:
(a) Islands which are suitable for lighten-
ing of war material/military personnel.
(b) Their recommendations regarding the
frequency of control.
The parties were also requested to indi-
cate the places along the coast of North and
South Vietnam where lightening could take
place. In May 1956 the commission also di-
rected its naval advisers on the recommende-
d?, of the operations committee to recon-
noiter Cap St. Jacques area in view of the
P.A.V.N. High Command's complaint in order
to determine the places where lightening
could take place. The reconnaissance is un-
derway. The commission decided in June
1956 on similar reconnaissance of the Hai-
phong area by its naval advisers. Concur-
rence of the P.A.V.N. High Command for the
proposed reconnaissance is awaited.
49. However, the COMihiSSSiOreS teams have
not so far been able to carry out any re-
connaiSsance of the offshore Aslands in North
Vietnam. The eoMmission has been pressing
the P.A.V.N, High Command since March 1956
to provide necessary transport to the teams
concerned, but the high command has not
done so. The commission hopes that the
teams- along the coast of North Vietnam will
be able to begin this reconnaissance soon, In
South Vietnam this task of reconnaissance
was partially done. However, further recon-
naissance was held up as the Government of
the Republic of Vietnam in reply to the com-
mission's request to provide suitable sea
transport to the teams concerned informed
the commission that it would not oppose the
continuance of the reconnaissance of the
coastal islands south of the 17th parallel pro-
vided similar reconnaissance was carried out
of all the islands north of the 17th parallel.
The commission refused to accept such con-
ditional cooperation and informed the French
High Command that it took decisions in each
zone on merits. It was also informed that
the P.A.V.N. High Command had been,' re-
quested to make available suitable transport
to carry out reconnaissance of the offshore
islands in the north. The Government of the
Republic of Vietnam has now given its con-
currence for the continuance of the recon-
naissance of the offshore islands and the
reconnaissance has been resumed.
50. The commission's teams both in South
and North Vietnam have been encountering
difficulties in the performance of their nor-
mal duties. The difficulties faced by the
Commission's teams in South Vietnam are
mentioned in paragraphs 51 to 56 and those
in regard to North Vietnam in paragraph
64.
61. The difficulties in respect of South Viet-
nam are: (a) time notice restrictions on
team movements to certain areas and de-
lays in certain cases in the provision of
necessary sea and air transport; (b) lack of
notifications due under articles 16(f) and
17(e) of the agreement: (c) restrictions on
the exercise of spot-checks on ships and air-
craft and failure in certain cases to make
.available the required documents. In para-
graph 45 of the Fifth Interim Report the
Commission had referred to the question of
time notice restrictions. According to the
instructions to the fixed teams and their
mobile elements prescribed by the commis-
sion, the fixed teams are required to give half
an hour's notice before moving to any part
of their zones of action and their mobile
elements to give 2 hours' notice. Though
this has been accepted by the two high
commands, the Government of the Republic
of Vietnam has been demanding on grounds
of insecurity and other reasons 24 hours'
notice and in some cases even 48 hours' thus
restricting the movements of the majority
of teams. The senior military advisers of
the commission discussed the situation with
the representatives of the French High Com-
mand and on the basis of their report, the
commission rejected the various arguments
advanced by the Government of the Repub-
lic of Vietnam and insisted that the teams
should be taken out on control duties on
giving notice as prescribed in the Instruc-
tions to fixed teams and their mobile ele-
ments. With regard to Fixed Team Tan
Chau, in which case the commission had
made an exception before, the operations
committees after studying the problem came
to the conclusion that it would appear that
the security situation in the team's zone and
sphere of acion was normal and that it con-
sidered that the team should now be able
to carry out its duties effectively in ac-
cordance with the instructions laid down by
thg commission. The French High Com-
mand has been informed accordingly and
has been requested to provide the neces-
sary facilities for the team to function fully.
The French High Command has communi-
cated to the commission a letter from the
President of the Republic of Vietnam dated
July 12, 1956, which instructs the author-
ities in South Vietnam that the advance
notices by the commission's team could be
reduced to 2 hours unless a visit to a region
under the control of another province should
require' longer notice. But the restrictions
8743
on the movements of the teams still con-
tinue.
52. From 3 to 7 days advance notice has
also been demanded before providing neces-
sary sea or air transport to Fixed Team Cap
St. Jacques for the purpose of carrying out
its prescribed control duties. Sea and air
transport have not been made available for
weeks together in spite of requisition with
the result that the team has not been able
to carry out the control of the Camau Penin-
sula in South Vietnam for months. Longer
notice than what is prescribed in instruc-
tions has also been demanded in the case
of two other teams.
53. The second 'problem faced by some of
the Commission's teams in South Vietnam is
with regard to notifications to be given under
article 16(f) and 17(e) before the introduc-
tion of military personnel and war material.
Under article 15, military personnel can be
introduced into Vietnam only by way of
rotation, notification for which is required
to be given to the Joint Commission and to
the International Commission at least 2 days
in advance of the arrivals or departures ,a
such personnel. Under Protocol 23 signed by
the two high commands, within 72 hours of
arrivals or departures of military personnel
a report is to be submitted to the joint com-
mission and to the International Commission.
A reference was made in paragraph 28 of the
Fifth Interim Report to the visits of military
aircraft including U.S. Navy planes to Saigon,
without advance notification of these move-
ments to the Commission's team. The Com-
mission had informed the French High Com-
mand that advance notifications must be
given in respect of all civil and military air-
craft carrying military personnel and war
material in accordance with the provisions of
articles 16(f) and 17(e). However, accord-
ing to the reports received from some of the
teams, especially the Saigon Fixed Team, U.S.
Naval and Military planes continued to enter
and leave Vietnam without notification dur-
ing the period under review. In a number
of these cases these planes were seen bring-
ing in and taking out United States and
Vietnamese military personnel. In reply to
the Commission's inquiry, the French High
Command has stated that the U.S. personnel
are either in transit or replacements for the
MAAG (Military Aid Advisory Group) and
that Vietnamese personnel are returning
after attending training courses outside the
country. In most cases notifications under
articles 16(f) and 17(e) were not given. As
regards the military transport aircraft as
distinguished from their cargoes, the Com-
mission decided on July 26, 1956, that these
aircraft in themselves constituted war ma-
terial in terms of article 17(a) and Protocol
23. The Commission has communicated the
above decision to the French High Command
and has informed it that the Commission
will require advance notifications about the
arrivals and departures of these planes in
order to insure that they do not remain in
the country and that they do not unload any
war material. The Commission has indi-
cated that it was preparing detailed modali-
ties for the control of transit operations. In
the last 6 weeks there has been an improve-
ment in respect of notifications and in the
majority of cases such notifications are being
received by the team concerned.
54. In paragraph 35 of the fifth interim re-
port, mention was made of the difficulties
encountered by the commission's fixed team
at Saigon with regard to the control of
Saigon airport and of the suggestions made
by the Commission to the French High Com-
mand in this connection. As the situation
did not show any improvement, the Commis-
sion reviewed the position and made certain
recommendations to the party in April 1956.
In spite of this, the team continues to en-
counter difficulties in the exercise of its
control duties. It has not been permitted to
go to the loading and unloading area and
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in a number of cases, in spite of the team's
request, foreign incoming aircraft were not
brought to the parking area for the pur-
pose of spot checking of their cargo. These
aircraft taxied directly to the military sec-
tion of the airport to which the team is not
given access.
55. Manifests and other relevant docu-
ments of the aircraft were also not made
available to the Saigon fixed team on nu-
merous occasions on the ground that the
local customs and other authorities had not
received instructions to show them to the
team.
58. In the harbor, the Saigon fixed team
noticed instances where war material was
brought in without notification; neither
were manifests made available. There were
also instances where tear material was
shipped out and notification was given
either after the loading or after the depar-
ture of the ship. The team could not check
the cargo. The team was also not allowed
In some cases to carry out spot checks on
ships in the harbor. The liaison officer told
the team that the ships over which the
team wanted to exercise control did not carzy
any war material and that there was there-
fore no nerd for the team to do its spot
checking and that its request for manifests
would be communicated to the higher au-
thorities. As a moult, In these cases the
Commission could not satisfy itself that the
Incoming shipment did not contain war ma-
terial. The French High Command has noti-
fied the Commission from time to time of
war material introduced into South Vietnam
during the period under report. However.
prior approval of the Commission for such
Introduction was not obtained as required
by protocol 23.
57. During the last 8 weeks there has been
an improvement in the matter of production
of manifests and other documents to the
team both in the airport and in the harbor
at Saigon,
68. Both the parties have centended that
Internal movements of war materials are not
&Object to control by the commission. The
commission has considered this argument
and, in order to satisfy itself that the move-
? meats are really internal, has suggested a
method of control in the zones of action of
the teams. The Government of the Republic
of Vietnam has agreed to this suggestion sub-
ject to a reservation. The, comments of the
P.A.V.N. High Command are awaited.
59. In paragraph 27 of the Fifth Interim
Report reference was made to complaints re-
ceived from the P.A.V.N. High Command re-
garding alleged violations of articles 16 and
17 of the Geneva Agreement. The commis-
sion has not been able to carry out its in-
vestigation mentioned in that paragraph re-
garding the alleged construction of a new air-
field at Nha Ban in South Vietnam, the rea-
sons being alleged insecurity conditions in
the area and the stand of the Government of
the Republic of Vietnam, mentioned In para-
graph 44 above. The P.A.V.N. High Com-
mand has also alleged the construction of
two other airfields in South Vietnam. This
is under investigation.
60. During the period under report, the
conamisaion has received a total of 24 com-
plaints alleging 76 specific instances of vio-
lations of articles 16 and 17 in South Viet-
nam. In two cases where United States and
Vietnamese military personnel were intro-
duced into South Vietnam without any noti-
fication under article ler(f), the operations
committee of the commission came to the
conclusion that there had been a violation of
article 16. In one case where a US. military
plane brought to Saigon a corthignment *of
aircraft wheel tires the committee concluded
that there had been a technical violation of
article 17. In the first two cases, mentioned
above, the commission asked the French High
Command to show cause why a finding of
violation of article le should not be given,
and in the third case why a finding of vio-
lation of article 17 should not be given. The
French Liaison Mission in its reply dated
July 21 has not denied the facts but has
stated that due to lack of coordination be-
tween the various Vietnamese services, noti-
fications were not given. The matter is
under the consideration of the commission.
In another case the commission decided that
there had been no violation as on the date
mentioned by the P.A.V.N. High Command
in Its complaint, no U.S. plane had landed
at Tourane and, in one more case, that the
allegation had not been proved. In two cases
the commission declined to undertake any
Investigation as the allegations were too gen-
eral. For the same reason the commission
just noted two complaints from the PA.V.N.
High Command. The other complaints are
under inquiry. In some cases it luta been
found that team reports bear out the allega-
tions made by the P.A.V.N. High Command
of violations of articles 16 and 17, In such
cases the party has been asked to explaeri why
notifications as required under the agreement
have not been given and why the procedifre
laid down in protocol 23 for the introduction
of war material and military personrel has
not been followed.
61. During the period under review the
Commission considered the question of in-
troduction into South Vietnam of a number
of landing ships (tank) mentioned in the
team reports. The. Commission decided that
LST's were war material. It has asked the
French Liaison Mission to explain why they
were introduced without notification imder
article 17 and without following the pro-
cedure under protocol 23.
62. With reference to paragraph 30 of the
Fifth Interim Report regarding necessary no-
tification under articles 16(f) and 17(e) to.
the Central Joint Comrnleaton. the situation
remains unchanged. The French High
Command has not implemented the recom-
mendations. In fact, the position has be-
come more complicated due to the nonfunc-
tioning of the Central Joint Commission
after the disappearance of the French High
Command on April 28, 1958.
63. One major case of a foreign military
mission in South Vietnam came up during
the period under report. On April 25, 1956,
the commiaaion received a request from the
French Liaison Mission and the Republic of
Vietnam for grant of permission for the en-
try of 350 military personnel of the U.S.
Army Service Corps into South Vietnam. It
was stated that theme persona would con-
stitute a mission called "TERM"?Temporary
Equipment Recovery Mission?whose duties
would be to examine war material and mili-
tary equipment lying in South Vietnam
which was the property of the U.S. Govern-
ment for the purpose of selecting material
to be exported from Vietnam and to protect
and preeerve this material. The Commission
was informed that the members of "TERM"
would start entering South Vietnam by the
last week of May 1956. The Commission in-
formed the French Liaison Mission that the
matter was under consideration and that
pending the decision of the Commission no
entry should be effected. In spite of this, 290
U.S. military personnel belonging eo the
"TERM" have been introduced into South
Vietnam, thus facing the Commission with
a fait accompli. The Commission takes ex-
ception to this method of procedure adopted
by the Firench Liaison Mission and the Gov-
ernment of the Republic of Vietnam. The
Commission gave due consideration to the
request of the Republic of Vietnam and com-
municated its decision on May 29 1956.
In this letter the Commission asked for as-
surances that the functions of "TERM"
would be solely the selection of material for
export from the country and that it would
not be used for any other purpose. The
Commission further asked for details regard-
ing the minion, number, and names of per-
Bonne, their postings in the country and the
tasks assigned to each one of them. Lastly,
the Commission proposed certain conditions
on acceptance of which the Commission
would be prepared to agree to the entry
of the "TERM" personnel. These conditions
Include submission of fortnightly progress
reports on the work of "TERM," submission
of notifications regarding entry and exit
of "TERM" personnel, right of the commis-
sion and its fixed teams to control entry
and exit, and the right of the Commission
to conduct spot checks at any place where
"TERM" personnel were functioning. The
matter is being pursued with the authorities
of the Republic of Vietnam, whose final ac-
ceptance of the Commisfion's conditions has
not yet been received. The Commission has
also received complaints from the P.A.V.N.
High Command regarding alleged activities
of certain U.S. military missions in South
Vietnam as constituting violations of ar-
ticles 16, 17, 18, and 19 of the agreement.
The matter is under the consideration of the
Commission which is awaiting the comments
of the French High Command.
84. The difficulty that is being experienced
by the commission's teams in the north is
with regard to obtaining suitable and modern
means of sea or air transport for control pur-
poses. Since June 1955 the comnelsison has
been making efforts to get the PAVN High
Command to provide a suitable sea-worthy
boat for Fixed Team Haiphong for controlling
the coast between Do Son and Sam Son. It
had informed the high command that in its
view control could best be exercised by means
of an amphibian aircraft. The high com-
mand Informed the commission, in reply,
that a naval craft could serve the purpose
equally well and that it was negotiating with
the French for obtaining two LCT's. How-
ever, when the French High Command in-
formed the PAVN High Command that it was
willing to send four boats to Haiphong Har-
bor in one of its naval vessels, the latter did
not accept the offer on the ground that it
could not allow the French vessel to enter its
waters. The French High Command, in a
letter to the commission dated December 16,
1955, to which reference was made in para-
graph 47 above, requested the commission's
assurance that there was really effective con-
trol lathe areas of Haiphong, Hong Gay, Cam
Pha port and Pho Cac Be. particularly with
reference to the means of transport avail-
able to the team. This was examined by the
operations committee of the commission, and
on Its recommendation the commission in-
formed the French High Command that up to
that time the control in the area in ques-
tion had been Its effective as possible with the
transport facilities available to the team.
The facilities consisted of vehicles only. The
Fixed Team Haiphong did not have a boat
to control part of its zone of action along the
coast from Do Son to Sam Son once a week
as prescribed by the commission. Except for
this, the control of the other areas within
the zone of action of the team has been car-
ried out by road as prescribed by the com-
mission In the instructions to Axed teams and
their mobile elements. In the last week of
July, Fixed Team Haiphong was provided
with a boat and did two short trips within
fts zone of action. But the team has re-
ported that in its opinion the boat does not
fulfill all the requirements of the team for
the purpose of its control duties. The matter
launder the consideration of the commission.
The Teen Yen and Vinh teams have not been
provided with the required sea transport.
65. The commission's fixed teams both in
North and South Vietnam have experienced
difficulties from time to time In the course
of their day-to-day working. These difficul-
ties were often due to narrow interpretations
placed by the liaison officers on the teams'
Instructions and to the differences of opinion
which thereby resulted between the teams
and the liaison officers. Such difficulties were
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settled or are being settled by the teams
themselves or by the operations committee
of the commission.
CHAPTER VI?COOPERATION OF THE PARTIES TO
THE AGREEMENT
66. In chapter VIII of the Fourth Interim
Report and in chapter VI of the Fifth In-
terim Report, the commission recorded the
degree of cooperation which it was receiving
from the two parties, the extent to which
they were fulfilling their obligations under
the agreement and the difficulties which the
commission itself was experiencing in carry-
ing out its tasks of supervision and control.
These difficulties were brought to the spe-
cific notice of the cochairman, as the com-
mission felt that unless they were resolved
and unless the parties were prepared to exe-
cute the provisions of articles 25 and 35, the
commission would not be able to discharge
its responsibilities under the agreement. The
commission regrets to state that during the
period under review, most of the difficulties
which were described in earlier reports still
confront the commission.
67. The difficulties which the commission,
has been experiencing concern either cases
"where the commission's activities are being
hindered" or cases "where one of the parties
refuses to put into effect the recommenda-
tions of the commission." This distinction
has been made in article 43 of the agreement
itself.
Difficulties in South Vietnam?Cases where
the commission's activities arc being
hindered
CB. The main difficulties in this category
experienced in South Vietnam are those con-
nected with the operation of the commis-
sion's fixed and mobile teams and the im-
plementation of articles 16 and 17 of the
agreement.
69. The Commission decided during the pe-
riod under review to send four mobile teams
to conduct investigations under articles 14(c)
and 14(d) in South Vietnam, in addition to
the two teams which it had decided to dis-
patch during the period covered by the Fifth
Interim Report. The Commission has not
been able to obtain the concurrence of the
French High Command for the conduct of
these investigations, except in three cases
referred to in paragraph 18. In one case, it
has been stated by the Government of the
Republic of Vietnam that for security rea-
sons, no investigation is possible. The in-
ternational Commission took up the matter
with the French High Command as in its
view the security conditions in the area ap-
peared to be normal. Nevertheless, the con-
currence has not been received. The Com-
mission is pursuing these cases. As men-
tioned in previous reports, the Commission
had to withdraw its mobile Teams 24 and 61
as the Government of the Republic of Viet-
nam had stated that the investigations could
not be carried out on grounds of security and
laid down conditions which were not accept-
able to the Commission. The Commission
has so far been unable to resume the activ-
ities of these teams. The Commission is of
the view that unless the party concerned co-
operates with it in the conduct of on-the-
spot investigations and unless the Commis-
sion is in a position to carry out inquiries
through its inspection teams as visualized
under article 37 of the agreement, it will not
be in a position to fulfill satisfactorily the
tasks of supervision and control under the
agreement.
70. The activities of mobile Team 47 which
was investigating complaints of alleged vio-
lations of article 21 have come to a standstill
because of the nonproduction by the Govern-
ment of the Republic of Vietnam of dossiers
and papers concerning the prisoners and in
some cases of the prisoners themselves whom
the Commission had decided to interview
In spite of protracted correspondence the
authorities have produced neither the per-
sons nor their dossiers. There are over a hun-
dred such cases which remain to be settled.
Amongst these are the cases of 16 alleged
prisoners of war/civilian internees detained
in Poulo Condore prison. The Commission
informed the French High Command on
June 5, 1956, that the concurrence of the au-
thorities of the Republic of Vietnam should
be obtained within 3 weeks failing which the
Commission would decide what action it
should take for nonimplementation of the
recommendations of the Commission. No
reply has been received to this demand. The
Commission has, on June 6, 1959, made a
final demand to the French High Command
for the product ion of dossiers concerning the
other cases stating that if they were not
received within 3 weeks the Commission
would declare the detainees as prisoners of
war/civilian internees. No reply has been
received so far.
71. Another major difficulty is the time
notice restrictions placed by the authorities
in South Vietnam on the Commission's fixed
teams. These have been described in detail
in paragraph 51. The Commission had made
It clear that the existence of such time no-
tices makes it impossible for its teams to
carry out all their duties effectively. In
spite of the repeated efforts of the Commis-
sion, during the period under review, move-
ments of the teams continued to be
restricted.
72. The provisions of articles 16 and 17
and protocol No. 23 have not been fully im-
plemented by the French High Command.
The notifications which the parties have un-
dertaken to give under the provisions of these
articles were not received regularly by the
commission. Thirty-six cases have been
recorded where no notifications have been
received by the commission's team in Saigon
and on 14 occasions the team actually saw
military personnel deplaning at Saigon air-
field. The commission has repeatedly taken
serious objection to the failure of the French
High Command to give the required notifi-
cations under articles 16 and 17. On April
25, 1956, the French High Command informed
the commission that the Government of the
Republic of Vietnam had indicated its con-
sent to give the required notifications. As
indicated in paragraph 53 above, notifications
are being received in the majority of cases,
since the last 6 weeks. However, there have
been cases where no notifications were re-
ceived. The difficulties of the team in ex-
ercising control in Saigon airfield have been
dealt with in paragraph 54 above.
73. The commission has been unable to
conduct reconnaissance and control of the
airfields in South Vietnam mentioned in par-
agraph 44. The details of the difficulties
which arose in this connexion have been de-
scribed in that paragraph. The commission
has asked that immediate arrangements
should be made for the reconnaissance and
control of the airfields as the case may be.
Because of this lack of cooperation, the com-
mission has not been able to supervise all
airfields in the discharge of its statutory
duties under article 36(d) . The commission
has also not been able to complete the re-
connaissance of part of the coast of South
Vietnam as the particular means of trans-
port required by the commission was not
supplied.
74. Arrangements have not been made for
accommodating the mobile element of the
fixed team at Tan Chau, decided upon by the
commission.
75. Apart from the cases which have been
specified above, there are numerous other
cases which are pending settlement for a
long time as satisfactory replies have not
been received from the French High Com-
mand. Correspondence is conducted for
months together and the commission is un-
able to settle cases because of lack of ade-
quate replies.
Cases of nonimplementation of recommenda-
tions of the commission
76. Apart from the hindrances in South
Vietnam mentioned above, there are cases
where specific recommendations of the Com-
8745
mission have not been implemented by the
French High Command or where implemen-
tation has been delayed. The majority of
cases concern recommendations made by the
Commission regarding release of civilian in-
ternees from prisons in South Vietnam. De-
tails of these cases have been mentioned in
paragraphs 36, 37, and 38. In spite of re-
peated requests, 21 recommendations regard-
ing release of civilian internees have not been
implemented. In 19 cases, the authorities of
the Republic of Vietnam have rejected the
Commission's recommendations on the
ground that the persons concerned were for-
mer members of the armed forces. Details
of two other cases of nonimplernentation
have been mentioned in paragraph 38 above.
As pointed out in chapter IV, the Commis-
sion gave very careful consideration to the
legal aspect of the matter and confirmed its
recommendations. In spite of this, the rec-
ommendations have not been implemented.
The Commission veiws with great concern
cases where the parties refuse to implement
Its recommendations on the ground that
they interpret the provisions of the agree-
ment in a different manner.
77. The Commission conveyed on February
24, 1956, its recommendations that notifica-
tions of import of war material and intro-
duction of Military personnel should be given
in writing to the Central Joint Commission
as laid down in articles 16 and 17 and for this
purpose a Central Secretariat should be sent
up. The French High Command has not ac-
cepted these recommendations.
78. Apart from the cases specified above,
there are several other cases of nontmple-
mentation and partial implementation of
recommendations some of which are consid-
erably old, such as, the recommendations
made by the Commission a year ago as a
result of investigations conducted by Mobile
Teams 57, F-16, and 24.
Difficulties in North Vietnam?Cases where
the commission's activities are being
hindered
79. There also exist cases in North Vietnam
where the Commission's activities are being
hindered. The case of Mobile Team F-44 has
been mentioned in paragraph 24 above. This
case, where the Commission has been ex-
periencing a major difficulty, has been pend-
ing with the Commission since April 1955,
and the Commission's repeated efforts to com-
plete the investigation have not been sucess-
ful so far. Various reasons have been given
by the P.A.V.N. High Command for not ar-
ranging for the interview of the seminarists,
Including the reason of the reluctance of the
religious authorities to allow the team to in-
terview the seminarists inside the seminary.
As already mentioned in paragraph 24, with
a view to expediting the matter, the Com-
mission has decided to interview the persons
concerned at Vinh and has made a recom-
mendation to that effect. This recommenda-
tion has not been implemented.
80. The Commission has not yet been able
to complete the reconnaissance of part of the
coast of North Vietnam as the P.A.V.N. High
Command has not supplied suitable means
of sea transport. The question of providing
suitable sea transport to the teams at Vinh,
Tien Yen and Haiphong was taken up with
the P.A.V.N. High Command as early as June
1955. The teams at Vinh and Tien Yen have
been without suitable means of sea trans-
port. As stated in paragraph 61 above, a
boat was given to the Haiphong Fixed Team
in the last week of July 1956, but its ade-
quacy is yet to be determined.
81. On January 1, 1956, the P.A.V.N. High
Command took over the air services in North
Vietnam which connect the Commission with
its teams in the north, assuring the Commis-
sion that the services would continue to be
as satisfactory as before. Since that date,
however, the Commission has been experi-
encing difficulties in the maintenance of its
team at Lao Kay as the air service between
Hanoi and Lao Kay has been functioning un-
satisfactorily. The service to the teams at
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Tien Yen, Langson and Vinh has not met all
the Commission's requirements. Under in-
structions from the commission, the senior
military advisers have examined how far the
air services provided by the P.A.V.N. High
Command fall short of the requiremente of
the Commission and have made proposals for
the improvement of the maintenance of the
teams by air in North Vietnam. The mat-
ter is under the consideration of the Commis-
sion. The difficulties mentioned in this
paragraph relate to the maintenance of the
teams in the north and do not concern their
control duties.
82. Apart from the above cases, there are
a few cases where satisfactory replies have
not been received from the P.A.V.N. High
Commend as a result of which the commis-
sion has not been able to settle some out-
standing cases.
Cases of ncrnimplementation of recommenda-
tion of the commission
83. One difficulty of a serious nature where
the commission's recommendation has not
been implemented has been the withdrawal
of the commission's mobile team from Phuc
Hoa. This has been described in paragraphs
42 and 43. In this case the P.A.V.N. High
Command has refused to implement the rec-
ommendations of the commission on the
ground that it does not agree with the com-
mission's interpretation of article 35. As a
result, the P.A.V.N. High Command refused
to provide the necessary logistic and other
support for the continued existence of Mo-
bile Team 99. The team had to be with-
drawn. In the meantime, the mobile ele-
ment of the Lang Son team visited the area
on seven occasions for control purposes. The
commission, however, Is of the view that a
team at Phuc Hos on continuous duty is
essential to control the area. At the in-
sistence of the commission the P.A.V.N. High
Command has agreed to the deployment of
a new team at Phuc Hon; but it has not
accepted the commission's interpretation of
article 35. As stated in paragraph 78, the
commission views with great concern cases
where parties refuse to implement the rec-
ommendations of the commission on the
ground that they interpret the provisions of
the agreement differently.
84. Under the cease-fire agreement the
parties have, apart from the obligation to
implement all the articles fully, accepted the
obligation to afford full protection and all
possible assistance and cooperation to the
international commission and its inspection
teams in the performance of functions and
tasks assigned to them by the agreement.
Neither party has fulfilled In their entirety
these obligations. As has been revealed in
the preceding paragraphs, the degree of co-
operation given to the commission by the
two parties has not been the same. While
the commission has experienced difficulties
in North Vietnam, the major part of its
diffi-
culties has arisen in South Vietnam.
CHAPTER VII?CONCLUSIONS
85. The previous chapters of this report,
and in particular chapter VI, have outlined
the progress made in the implementation of
the cease-fire agreement in Vietnam, the
degree of cooperation received from the two
parties and the difficulties which the Interna-
tional Commission is experiencing in carry-
ing out its tasks of supervision and control,
86. Apart from these difficulties, develop-
ments of a serious nature have taken place
In South Vietnam. The Commission had
already pointed out in previous reports that
the transfer of power from the French au-
thorities in the South to the authorities of
the Republic of Vietnam had created difficul-
ties in the implementation of the agreement
in South Vietnam, particularly in view of
the fact that the Government of the Re-
public of Vietnam did not consider itself
as bound by the Geneva Agreement, stating
that it was not a signatory to that agree-
ment. On April 5, 1958, the Commission re-
ceived a letter from the High Commissioner
for France in Saigon dated April 3, 1956,
giving notice that the French High Command
would withdraw completely from South Viet-
nam on April 28, 1956. The commission
thereupon decided to inform the cochair-
men of this serious, development and ask for
directions as to the future working of the
Commission. In their reply dated April 19,
1958, the cochairmen informed the Commis-
sion that they were considering the situation
in Vietnam and that pending their final de-
cision the Commission should continue In
existence and carry on its normal activities.
87. The Commission interpreted the co-
chairmen's directive to mean that, pending
a final solution of the problem, it should
continue to deal with the French authorities
In Saigon as hitherto, and that the entire
machinery for the proper implementation of
the cease-fire agreement would be main-
tained. As a result of the talks held with
the French authorities regarding the interim
arrangements, the Commission decided that
the attention of the cochairmen should be
drawn to the nature of these arrangements
and to the fact that after April 28. 1956, the
joint Commission machinery would not be
functioning due to the withdrawal of the
French High Command. Accordingly, a spe-
cial message was sent to the cochairmen on
May 2, 1956, with a separate note by the
Canadian member, and instructions were
sought as to the future working of the Com-
mission. In this communication the Com-
mission also informed the cochairmen that
it would remain in being and subject to the
difficulties mentioned by it maintain its ma-
chinery for supervision and control. It re-
quested the cochairmen to take steps to
resolve the difficulties to enable the Commis-
sion to carry on normal activities.
88. The cochairmen of the Geneva Con-
ference discussed the matter during their
talks in London and on May 8, 1958, issued
messages to the International Commission,
to the Government of the French Republic,
and a joint message to the Governments of
the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and
the Republic of Vietnam. They strongly
urged both the Governments in Vietnam to
make every effort to implement the Geneva
Agreements to prevent any future violation
of the military provisions of the agreement
and to insure the implementation Cl the
political provisions and principles of the
final declaration of the Geneva Conference.
They further asked the parties to give the
International Commission all possible as-
sistance and cooperation in future in the
exercise of its functions. So far as the politi-
cal settlement Is concerned, the cochairmen
requested the two Governments to tranianit
their views about the time required for the
opening of consultations on the organization
of elections and the time required for hold-
ing of elections to unify Vietnam. They rec-
ognized that the dissolution of the French
Union High Command had increased the
difficulties of the International Supervisory
Commission in Vietnam in carrying out the
functions specified in the Geneva Agree-
ments which are the basis for the Commis-
sion's activities and that these difficulties
must be overcome. In their message to the
French Government, the cochairmen invited
the French authorities to discuss the ques-
tion with the South Vietnam authorities in
order to reach an arrangement to facilitate
the work of the International Commission
and the Joint Commission in Vietnam. Until
these new arrangements were put into effect,
the French Government was requested to
preserve the statue quo. In their message
to the International Commission, the co-
chairmen appealed to the Commission to per-
severe in its efforts to maintain and
strengthen peace In Vietnam on the basis of
the fulfillment of the Geneva Agreements
with a view to the reunification of the coun-
try through the holding of elections under
the supervision of an International Commis-
sion.
89. The Commission examined very care-
fully the three messages which the co-
chairmen had sent and on May 27, 1958,
communicated to the cochairman its re-
sponse to the appeal addressd to it. The
Commission will, as stated in its message of
May 27. 1958, persevere in its efforts to main-
tain and strengthen peace in Vietnam on the
basis of the fulfilment of the Geneva Agree-
ment. It will continue to deal with the
parties concerned on the basis of the status
quo until arrangemetns that will facilitate
the work of the International Supervisory
Commission and of the Joint Commission in
Vietnam envisaged in the cochairmen's
message to the French Government "are put
Into effect." Discussions between the High
Commissioner for France and the authorities
of the Republic of Vietnam on the question
of the future working of the cease-fire agree-
ment and the relationship of the authorities
of the Republic of Vietnam with the Inter-
national Commission have just been con-
cluded in Saigon.
90, In spite of the difficulties which it 13 _
experiencing, the Commission will, as di- ?
rected by the cochairmen of the Geneva
Conference, persevere in its efforts to main-
tain and strengthen peace in Vietnam on the
basis of the fulfilment of the Geneva Agree-
ments on Vietnam with a view to the reuni-
fication of the country through the holding
of free nationwide elections in Vietnam
under the suprevision of an International
Commission.
G. PARTHASARATHI,
B. M. WILLIAMS,
Canada.
J. GOLDBLAT,
Poland.
Hanoi. September 9, 1956.
EXHIBIT 2
EXCERPTS FROM ARTICLE ENTITLED: "SUBVER-
SIVE INTERVENTION" BY QUINCY WEIGHT,
AMERICAN JOURNAL Or INTERNATIONAL LAW,
1980
Aggression means any use of, or threat to
use armed force in international relations
in violation of an international obligation.
This offense Is referred to in three articles
of the United Nations Charter providing:
All members shall refrain in their inter-
national relations from the threat or use
of force against the territorial integrity or
political independence of any state, or in any
other manner inconsistent with the Purposes
of the United Nations (art. 2, par. 4).
The Security Council shall determine the
existence of any threat to the peace, breach
of the peace, or act of aggression and shall
make recommendations, or decide what
measures shall be taken in accordance with
articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore
international peace and security (art. 39).
Nothing in the present charter shall im-
pair the inherent right of individual or col-
lective self-defense if an armed attack oc-
curs against a member of the United Nations,
until the Security Council has taken the
measures necessary to maintain interna-
tional peace and security (art. 51).
These articles prohibit "the threat or use
of force," "aggression," and "armed attack"
(which all seem to mean the same thing)
for which a government de facto or de jure
is responsible because of act or negligence.
They imply that "threat to the peace or
breach of the peace" becomes "aggression"
when the responsible state has been identi-
fied. It is clear that they prohibit only the
threat or use of armed force or an armed
attack. They cannot be construed to include
other hostile acts such as propaganda, in-
filtration or subversion. The latter, insofar
as prohibited by international law, come
within the category of "subversive interven-
tion." The distinction is important because
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cTittsSIONAL. RECORD ? SENATE 8747
there has been persistent effort to include
subversive intervention in the concept of
aggression by calling it "indirect aggression"
and thus to justify military action by states
or by the United Nations to stop it. It
seems clear that such an interpretation would
be contrary to the primary _purposes of the
United Nations to prevent "the scourge of
war" and "to suppress acts of aggression or
other breaches of the peace."
The chaster makes it clear that any use
of armed force by a state in international
relations, whicli includes attacks against
public ships on the high seas and across
armistice lines, as well as across established
boundaries, is forbidden unless necessary for
defense against an "armed attack"; unless
authorized by the United Nations when faced
by a "threat to the peace, breach of the
peace or act of aggression"; or unless in-
vited by a state. The recognition in the
charter of the "sovereign equality" of states
clearly permits a state to use armed force
In the territory of another state on the
invitation of the latter, but this permission
Is subject to the conditions that the invi-
tation, even if based on a preexisting treaty,
Is made freely- by the government of the
Inviting state at the time the force is sent
in, that the inviting government is in uncon-
tested control of the state when the invita-
tion is given, and that the forces are used
only within the territory of the state issuing
the invitation, unless that state IS the victim
of am "armed attack" from another state
? justifying "collective self-defense." Inter-
Mtian.al law does not permit the use of force
in the territory of another state on invitation
either of the recognized or the insurgent
government in times of rebellion, insurrec-
tion or civil war. Since international law
recognizes the right of revolution, it can-
not permit other states to intervene to pre-
vent it. The United Nations itself cannot
intervene to stop civil strife, unless it con-
cludes that such strife threatens interna-
tional peace and security or violates an
internationally recognized cease-fire line,.
- Mr. MOR$E. I suggest the absence
of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk called the roll,
and the following Senators answered to
their names:
Aiken
Allott
Anderson
Bartlett
Beall
Bennett
Boggs
Brewster
Carlson
Case
Church
Cotton
Curtis
Dirltsen
Dodd
Douglas
Mender
Fong
[No. 167 Leg.]
Gore Morse
Hickenlooper Mundt
Holland Muskie
liruska Nelson
Humphrey Neuberger
Inouye Pastore
Jackson Pell
Johnston Prouty
Jordan, Idaho Proxmire
Kuchel Ribicoff
Magnuson Saltonstall
Mansfield Smith
McCarthy Stennis
McGee Tower
McGovern Walters
McNamara Williams, Del.
Metcalf Young, N. Dale.
Monroney Young Ohio
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Mus- r e
IE in the chair) . A quorum is present. b
nation in federally assisted programs, t
establish a Commission on Equal Em
ployment Opportunity, and for othe
purposes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Th
pending question is on agreeing to th
modified amendment offered by th
Senator from Montana [Mr. MANSFIELD
on behalf of himself and the Senato
from Illinois [Mr. DIRK5EN1, as a sub
stitute for the amendment relative t
jury trials, offered by the junior Senato
from Georgia [Mr. TAL1VIADGE], On behal
of himself and other Senators.
During the delivery of Mr. MORSE'
speech on South Vietnam,
Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, will th
Senator from ?Oregon yield?
Mr. MORSE. I yield to the distin
guished minority leader with the under
standing that the interruption will aP
pear elsewhere in the RECORD, and with
out losing my rights to the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Withou
objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, in in-
troducing the Mansfield-Dirksen amend-
ment this morning, there was a techni-
cal mistake made as to line and page. In
order to make it an exact substitute, I ask
unanimous consent that it be corrected
in that respect.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there
objection? The Chair hears none, and it
is so ordered.
The amendment as modified was or-
dered to be printed as follows:
AN AMENDMENT IN THE NATURE OF A SUBSTI-
TUTE FOR THE AMENDMENT No. 513 OF MR.
TALMADGE
In lieu of the language of the amend-
ment substitute the following:
"SEC. 1191. CRIMINAL CONTEMPT PROCEED-
INGS; PENALTIES; TRIAL BY JURY.?Ill all cases
of criminal contempt arising under the pro-
visions of this Act, the accused, upon con-
viction, shall be punished by fine or impri-
sonment or both: Provided however, That in
case the accused is a natural person the fine
to be paid shall not exceed the sum of $1,000,
nor shall imprisonment exceed the term of
six months: Provided further, That in any
such proceeding for criminal contempt, at
the discretion of the judge, the accused may
be tried with or without a jury: Provided
further, however, That in the event such
proceeding for criminal contempt be tried be-
fore a judge without a jury the aggregate
fine shall not exceed the sum of $300 nor any
cumulative imprisonment exceed 30 days.
If the trial is by a jury, the procedure shall
conform as near as may be to that in other
criminal cases,
"Sze. 1102. Section 151 of the Civil Rights
Act of 1957 (41 Stat. 638) is amended by
striking out the third proviso to the first
paragraph thereof, and inserting in lieu
thereof the following:
"'Provided further,- however, That .in the
vent such proceeding for criminal centempt
e tried before a judge without a jury the
aggregate fine shall not exceed the sum of
WO nor any cumulative imprisonment ex-
ceed 30 days. If the trial is by a jury, the
procedure shall conform as near as may be to
that in other criminal cases,'"
Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, on
this question, I ask for the yeas and nays.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, the
trial by jury concept is a cherished and
revered institutional process in our so-
ciety. Its history and heritage, recently
reviewed in this Chamber, are well known
to all. Equally cherished and revered,
o equally adorned by the vine of fiistory
- and . heritage, equally essential to any
8748
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD?
by hard work and faith. Because of this constitutional right to vote, to confer
Dallas, and indeed all of Texas, has come jurisdiction upon the district courts of
under attack from those who think a the United States to provide Injunctive
managed, well ordered society is the relief against discrimination in public
answer to the ills of the moment. By accommodations, to authorize the Attor-
ignoring the fact that the assassin of our ney General to institute suits to protect
former President was an avowed, dedi- constitutional rights in public facilities
cated, and itinerant Marxist., and by con- and public education, to extend the
stantly seeking to perpetrate the hoax Commission on Civil Rights, to prevent
that Texas and Dallas are hotbeds of discrimination in federally assisted pro-
hatred, the spreaders of this false story grams, to establish a Commission on
seek to reap political benefit. It is my Equal Employment Opportunity, and
hope that America will not be deceived, for other purposes.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
=mars rrpc
sent to place the letter in the RECORD. Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, I have
There being no objection, the letter stated on many occasions that the fair
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, employment practice title of this bill is
as follows:
GREAT FALLS, MONT. Particularly objectionable to me for a
EDITOR, DALLAS MORNING NRWS, number of reasons.
Dallas, Tex. I feel that it is unconstitutional for the
? DEAR Sac It is with growing dismay that Federal Government to invade this field
I read and hear of the continuing attacks on of legislative activity, which the Con-
the people of Dallas carried in the press and stitution reserves to the States and the
on TV and radio throughout the country. people.
These attacks supposedly stem from the trag-
edy which occurred on November 22 and the I also have pointed out that enf orce-
aftermath of that event in Dallas. There are ment of this FEPC provision Would be
so many distortions of these events and their Virtually Impossible outside of a police
causes in the news media that one must state in Which the Federal Government
wonder if he can even rely on the accuracY took charge of all the hiring, firing, pro-
of the news today or if the news media are motion, and demotion policies and activ-
only tools of thos9 wishing to promote?or ities of the formerly free business system
destroy?a cause. of this Nation.
The fact that these events occurred th
Dallas has made your city the object of the And I have pointed out the extreme
most vicious and unwarranted attacks I have difficulties this proposed FEPC would
ever seen. That these same events could place upon private business?whether or
have occurred in my town?or any other not the individual business had a good
town?seems to escape even so-called level-
headed thinkers. It has been said that the
fact that an American President could be
assassinated in this day and age is a sad
commentary on our country and our people.
In my opinion the fact that a city such as
yours?made up of all kinds of people just
like mine?could be crucified for this
dastardly event is an even sadder commentary
on the American people.
It seems quite obvious that the people of
Dallas are being used as the brunt by those
who wish to destroy the element in this
country that disagrees with our trend toward
socialism and all-powerful Federal Govern-
ment. That the technique of slandering a
complete city in order to accomplish an ob-
jective can be used by these people indicates
their lack of even common scruples in accom-
plishing their purposes. That this technique
can receive such widespread acceptance by
our news media and by so many people who
accept the news as fact, should be a cause of
great concern to every American.
My purpose in writing you is to assure
you?and through you, the people of Dallas?
that there are many of us who realize the
reasons for the vicious attacks on your line
city and who admire your courage In facing
these attacks. It took me a long time to
write this letter because I thought these at-
tacks were only postassassination hysteria.
I couldn't believe they would continue?that
the rest of us would let them continue. How-
ever, it is now apparent that Dallas is being
used in an attempt to impugn the motives
of every one of us who favors government by
the Constitution. This in face of the fact
that e. Communist shot the President.
Be assured that you have the support of a
record of equal employment.
Proponents of this radical title have
told me that I overstate the case.
I do not believe I overstate the case. I
think what has been said here and the-
colloquies that have been engaged in
indicate that the case has hardly been
overstated at all. The proponents feel
that FEPC legislation would not require
the private business to keep unnecessary
voluminous records. They say there
would be no additional heavy expendi-
tures by free business in an effort to pro-
tect itself against abuses under an
FEPC
Mr. President, I do not think that I
overstate the FEPC case. I feel that the
regulations, lawsuits, and Federal pres-
sures placed upon private business by
this title are utterly unacceptable in a
free economy, particularly since these
pressures can be placed upon any firm
at any time in presuming the firm guilty
until it proves itself innocent.
Therefore, I have sought out an ex-
ample of what free business can expect
from an .ter-VC law, and I would like to
now discuss in some detail the situation
Involving the State of Illinois rx.PC
commission and the Motorola Co.
May I point out that in citing this sit-
uation I make absolutely no attempt to
judge the merits of the position of either
side in this case. I present only a num-
ber of doc
uments and newspaper
brief, yet complete, summary of the sit-
uation.
The article is headlined "Dispute on
FEPC Arises in Illinois--Decision by Ne-
gro Attacked in Motorola Case."
CHICAGO, March 21.?Political, business.
and civil rights circles in Illinois are being
jarred almost daily by repercussions over
a finding in the ease of a Negro who con-
tends that he was denied a job because of
his race.
National importance has been given to the
decision by the Illinois Fair EmployMent
Practices Commission, which has been cited
as an example of the dictatorial power the
proposed Federal civil rights bill could give
Government in telling a private employer
whom he may hire.
The subject has been made an issue in the
Minois gubernatorial campaign, with Re-
publican candidates stressing the matter and
Gov. Otto Kerner. a Democrat, who is seek-
ing reelection, trying to allay criticism.
The controversy was touched off by a re-
port by Robert E. Bryant, a Negro exam-
iner for the FEPC, upholding the charge
of a Negro applicant, Leon Myart, that Mo-
torola, Inc., the radio and television com-
pany, had violated the State's Fair Employ-
ment Practices Act by refusing to hire him
because of his race.
The examiner recommended in a rul-
ing that requires confirmation by the
employment commission, that Motorola
cease giving applicants a standard abil-
ity test, devised by a professor at the
Ifif-
nois Institute of Technology and used
since 1949. The examiner considered
the test to be unfair to "culturally de-
prived and disadvantaged groups."
MOTOROLA APPEALS RULING
Motorola denied discrimination and
appealed the ruling to the full commis-
sion. The company's legal counsel said
the appeal would be taken to the Su-
preme Court, if, necessary. The order
was also challenged by the Employers
Association of Chicago, representing
1.400 companies in the area.
Now, I should like to read an editorial
from the Chicago Tribune of March 7,
1964, which sets forth that newspaper's
view of the Motorola-Illinois leta-,C case.
The editorial is entitled?"The State
Will Do Your Hiring":
A foretaste of what employers may expect
if the equal employment opportunity provi-
sions of the Federal civil rights bill become
law has been provided here in Illinois under
the State Fair Employment Practices Act.
An agent for the Commission enforcing the
act has just told Motorola, Inc., that the
State hereafter assumes to direct its hiring
practices.
Motorola has been giving job applicants a
general ability test devised by a professor at
Illinois Institute of Technology and used
by at least one other large Chicago employer.
A Negro applicant charged that he was de-
nied employment because of his race. The
corporation said he failed the test. The
claimant said he passed it. Be did pass it
on reexamination in the FEPC office, and the
company was ordered to hire him. But the
question of fact concerning the results of
the original teat is less germane than the ex-
clip- cursions of the examiner beyond that point.
large segment of the people of this country. pings concerning the case to illustrate This official, Robert E. Bryant, decreed that
We only wish We could do more to share the Motorola must abondan ability tests for job
burden unjustly forced upon you by some
the type of dispute business can find it- applicants for three reasons: (1) that the
unscrupulous vocal people and groups--and self in under an FEPC law and the enor- test was unfair to "culturally deprived and
so well served by the news media. mous difficulties facing any bureaucracY disadvantaged groups"; (2) that the ques-
and judiciary in attempting to enforce none did not take into account "inequalities
an e'EPC law. and differences in environment"; and (3)
CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1963want to read an article from that the standards for passing were based
First, I on those of "advantaged groups."
The Senate resumed the consideration the New York Times of March 22, 1964, This may be reduced to the absurdity that
of the bill (HR. 7152) to enforce the because it sets the stage by providing a any test acceptable to the FEPC would be one
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