SOUTH VIETNAM: LAST CHANCE FOR FREEDOM IN ASIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP66B00403R000200130008-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 24, 2005
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: January 1, 1964
• Content Type: OPEN

1964
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE 413'
plan by the American people. We know
to our mortification the final ransom
paid for the prisoners with chemicals
and drugs dragooned from the Ameri-
can companies by U.S. officials of this ad-
ministration. We know, to our bewilderment,
the dispersal of the refugees; the orders
prohibiting Cuban exiles from use of any
of our shoreline for attacks on the Castro-
ites and the persistent denial during 1962
by the U.S. Government of the clear evi-
dence that Cuba was being made a major
Communist arsenal in this hemisphere. We
remember with soaring pride the sudden,
dramatic, and courageous recognition of the
direct threat to our country posed by a mis-
sile armed 'Cuba; the unequivocal demand
on Russia that all surface-to-surface mis-
siles and long-range aircraft be removed
from Cuba; that her territory be open to on-
the-spot inspection by neutral teams or Red
Cross inspectors. We remember the initial
success of this program with the announced
withdrawal of missiles and aircraft, and
with a sinking heart we recognized that the
inspections were to be dropped as high U.S.
officials stated that Mr. Khrushchev must
not be pushed too far. We have seen the
building of Cuba as a front line, first-class
arsenal and training camp for militant com-
munism; and the arrogant contempt with
which they supported the Panamanian
riots and then contemptuously cut off our
water supply at Guantahamo while we said
and did nothing of substance,
After 4 years of Democratic foreign policy,-
Cuba has been transformed Into an island
firmly in Communist control; with the sec-
ond largest arsenal of military weapons in
the hemisphere; with around-the-clock
Communist propaganda pouring into Cen-
tral and South America; exporting arms and
trained saboteurs to Central and South
American countries; convicted by the Orga-
nization of American States` as guilty of ex-
porting aggression to other countries in this
hemisphere; and a training camp for Com-
munist provocateurs active from Venezuela
to Ghana, to Gabon, to Zanzibar, to Burma.
A record no citizen of this country, regard-
less of party, can view with pride or satis-
faction. The vacillating, wavering incon-
clusive policy of this administration with
respect. to Cuba must be changed.
The second plank of that 1960 campaign
was devoted to the low prestige of the United.
States in Europe and in other portions of
the world and the need to regain leadership
and direction of the free world struggle.
This plank was repeated endlessly during the
1960 campaign; and as purported evidence,
statements were made that the NATO coun-
tries had not accepted U.S. programs for
strengthening the Alliance; that the Com-
munists continued to advance in South Viet-
nam; that the solution to German reunifi-
cation had not been reached; and that U.S.
sanction of U-2 flights over Russia had lost
us respect in all countries.
Shortly after inauguration in 1981, the
President stated in a worldwide television
news conference that we would come to the
aid of Laos, a small but strategic country in
southeast Asia under attack by the Com-
munists.
Shortly thereafter, we retracted this stated
position, advocated a cease fire, actively
solicited a coalition government, and forced
this upon that defenseless country, with the
Communists given the key posts of Ministry
of Defense and Ministry of Interior. These
are the two governmental posts historically
used by Communists to take over control of
a country. Thereafter, the Cuban Bay of
Pigs fiasco occurred. Then the President
met with Mr. Khrushchev in Vienna and
upon his return to this country stated that
Mr. Khrushchev had made no new demands
upon him. A short 10 days later, Mr. Khru-
shchev published a written memorandum
of points and demands submitted at that
conference. In August 1981, in violation of
all agreements and all decency, the Commu-
nists constructed the Berlin wall. A major
city and the families in it were divided, and
the flood of refugees from Communistic East
Germany and East Berlin subsided to a slow
trickle. The only reaction from the United
States was a verbal protest and a speech
stating that we would support the remain-
ing half of the city. Nuclear test ban dis-
cussions had been continuing and the
United States had preserved a moratorium
on testing, when suddenly the Soviets under-
took a new program of testing, unprece-
dented in scope and in size of blasts. The
United States did nothing. Communist at-
tacks in South Vietnam increased substan-
tially and civil disorders broke out. Despite
warnings, the United States took no action
to discourage a coup against the Nhu gov-
ernment and the apparent murder of Diem
and his brother. Since then, the first gov-
ernment has been overthrown, a military
dictator replaced it, and the process of de-
fending against Communist attacks grows
weaker. The United States supported the
unprepared African nations against our
traditional allies, jeopardized the faith of
our allies, and released in the United Nations
and on the world scene many countries
wholly unprepared for self-government,
We supported Sukarno, the militant dic-
tator of Indonesia, in seizing Dutch-held
property in West New Guinea. We casti-
gated Portugal for holding Angola and said
nothing about India's armed invasion and
seizure of Goa from Portugal. We refused
to share nuclear competence with France as
we have with Great Britain. We reneged on
our agreement to supply Great Britain with
nuclear air-to-ground missiles, and have re-
cently tried to placate the rapacious Su-
karno, who is slavering over newly created
Malaysia Panama is now physically as well
as verbally attacking U.S. military personnel,
Venezuelan bandits have raided U.S. military
quarters, stripped U.S. offices, despoiled the
U.S. flag, and even kidnaped a U.S. colonel.
Communists led by Cubans in Zanzibar, at-
tacked the U.S. consulate, imprisoned con-
sulate officials, ransacked the premises, and
as punishment get recognized by our Demo-
crat regime. A prominent German has
summed. up our foreign policy activity by
the following:
"American foreign policy seems to be hos-
tile to her friends, friendly to the neutrals,
and neutral to her enemies."
As the National magazine has said:
"America today is going from defeat to
defeat in almost every corner of the world."
For 4 years Democrat foreign policy has
been based on the principles that commu-
nism will evolve into something with which
we can live if we do nothing to disturb its
leaders; that Khrushchev is the most mod-
erate of Communists and cannot be forced
into a corner lest we get someone worse; and
that communism thrives amongst the poor
and uneducated and hence can be overcome
by scattering Yankee dollars. Each of these
planks have been demonstrated failures of
self-delusions. After 4 years of these poli-
cies the free world is in disarray, the NATO
Alliance is shattered at the political level,
the last strongholds of freedom in Asia are
tottering, and communism is on the march
in Africa and South America.
Our prestige about which we were so
concerned in 1960 is now non-existent and
every pip-squeak nation in the world is
taking turns first kicking us around and
then demanding foreign aid.
It would se pm that the worst must be
over. To the contrary, the worst was and
is still to come. The floodgates of cyni-
cism were opened when the United States,
long the leading exponent of trade and aid
barriers with Communist countries, wholly
-,lost it's direction. The wheat sales to Rus-
sia, negotiated, directed and demanded by
the Democrat administration,' sales. which
are subsidized by the American taxpayers
and with Communist credit guaranteed by
the American taxpayers, have loosened the
floodgates and successfully undercut any
and all efforts to cut off trade with our
enemies. Against our protests, Great Brit-
ain has sold 400 buses to Cuba with an-
other 600 on order; four British airliners
are being reconditioned for delivery and
negotiations are almost complete for de-
livery to Castro of $1.4 million heavy road
building machinery. France is negotiating
for the sale to Castro of $10 million worth
of trucks. Spain is completing plans for the
sale of 100 fishing, boats and two freighters.
Italy is negotiating for an increase in sales
and Prime Minister Ishibashi, a leading
Japanese advocate of trade with Red China,
has not only -been given a basis for the
renewed trade negotiations between these
two countries, but publicly hailed the wheat
deal as the "'big turning point" in trade
with Communist countries. But the most
serious reaction was France's opening of
trade relations and almost immediate recog-
nition of Red China-Red China, the most
aggressive of all Communist nations; the
butcher of 18 million of its own citizens,
as well as the raper of Tibet; Red China,
the power behind the Korean war and re-
sponsible for the deaths of so many Ameri-
can and free world soldiers; Red China, the
activating agent in the Communist takeover
of southeast Asia; Red China, the attacker
of India, Quemoy, Matsu, Formosa, and the
despoiler of Outer Mongolia; Red China, still
branded as an aggressor by the United Na-
tions; still preaching war and terror as
national policies; still castigating the lead-
er of the free world; and still preaching
universal communism spread by force, rev-
olution and aggression.
It seems apparent that after the last 4
years, American prestige is not merely low, it
has totally disappeared; that new policies
musj be developed and new programs in-
stituted if we are to regain even self-respect;
and that future problems must be foreseen
and plans developed now. For 4 years those
in charge of this administration have been
chanting the defects in our system. These
defects are now predominant in the minds
of many people who do not know our country
and our heritage.
For 4 years, recognition of the dangers
faced by the free world have been studiously
avoided. For 4 years the steady downhill
progress of freedom has been overlooked by
use of oratory instead of organization; pal-
liatives instead of plans; and forensics in-
stead of foresight. Action is needed now if
we are to regain self-respect, stability in for-
eign fields, opportunity to resist Communist
encroachments, and success in future prob-
lems.
This fall we will be faced with a fight over
admission of Red China to the United Na-
tions. French recognition will add great
weight to this annual exercise and there is
a very great chance that Red China will be
admitted unless the United States takes def-
inite steps: now to offset this threat. Cer-
tainly admission of Red China to the United
Nations would constitute a cynical disregard
of the ideal and purpose of the organization
and would make membership an award for
aggression. Just recently, I was informed by
"authoritative sources" in the State Depart-
ment that the United States will continue its
objection to Red China's admission, but that
no plans had been made as to our course of
action if our objections should be unsuc-
cessful,
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE March 11
A mere outline of the situation we now
face after the last 4 years of bumbling.
vacillating, inefficient foreign policies Indi-
cates clearly that a crossroad is directly
ahead. Either we change direction or we
continue stumbling and weaving down the
dusty road to oblivion.
Positive programs are needed and they are
needed now. Many have been made and
more will be made, but I would group the
overall need for a change under the title
"The Will To Live."
1. Announce a new Western Hemisphere
doctrine specifically excluding from govern-
mental power in this hemisphere commu-
nism or Marxism, whether Imposed from
without or infiltrated from within.
2. Form as rapidly as possible an English-
speaking military and political alliance with
announced goals in opposition to Commu-
nist aggressions In the world.
3. Start negotiations to create a common
market with Canada and announce policies
designed to encourage Latin and South
American common markets.
4. Create governmentally sponsored train-
ing courses In this country for all U.S. per-
sonnel desiring to go into governmental for-
eign service, emphasizing in the process the
history, background and culture of the
United States and the tactics of the Com-
munist conspiracy, as well as the language,
culture, and credo of the country to which
each may be assigned. The principal in-
stitution under this program should com-
bine the concept of a Foreign Service Acad-
emy and the need for a Freedom Academy.
5. Eliminateall U.S, aid and trade to Com-
munist governments and extend trade or
aid to the people of those countries only
where it is managed, distributed, and or-
ganized under direct U.S. supervision,
6. Announce our positive intent to retain
Guantanamo Bay and the Panama Canal
and the will to use such force as may be
necessary for such purpose.
7. Institute a quarantine of Cuba as a
health and military menace to the world.
8. Actively encourage the millions of free-
dom loving people in Europe, Asia, Africa,
and the Americas to resist communism.
9. Recognize that the economy of this
country is the first and strongest bulwark
against communism and Institute trade pro-
grams and policies which will enhance that
economy Instead of injuring domestic In-
dustries.
10. Stop apologizing for the very factors
which have made this country the greatest
Nation on earth and make It known that we
intend to take such steps as may be necessary
to give people existing under Communist
terror the hope of living under freedom's
banner.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there
further morning business? If not, morn-
ing business is closed.
CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
question is on agreeing to the motion of
the Senator from Montana [Mr. MANs-
FIELD] that the Senate proceed to con-
sider the bill (H.R. 7152) to enforce the
constitutional right to vote, to confer
jurisdiction upon the district courts of
the United States to provide injunctive
relief against discrimination in public
accommodations, to authorize the At-
torney General to institute suits to pro-
tect constitutional rights in public facil-
ities and public education, to extend the
Commission on Civil Rights, to prevent
discrimination in federally assisted pro-
grams, to establish a Commission on
Equal Employment Opportunity, and for
other purposes.
ORDER OF BUSINESS
Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, I
have consulted with some of my col-
leagues with reference to the address
which is about to be delivered by the
Senator from Connecticut [Mr. DODD].
I ask unanimous consent, despite the rule
of germaneness, that the Senator from
Connecticut may be permitted to speak
for not to exceed 45 minutes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there
objection? The Chair hears none, and
I t is so ordered.
Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I am
grateful to the distinguished Senator
from Minnesota for his assistance.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senator from Connecticut Is recognized.
SOUTH VIETNAM: LAST C ANCE
FOR FREEDOM IN ASIA
Mr. DODD. Mr. President, if the
American people could see 9,000 miles
toward the Orient with the eyes of his-
tory, they could discern a dark, funnel-
shaped cloud spinning on the far hori-
zon and beginning to twist across south-
east Asia. Like a natural tornado which
leaves in its wake ravaged terrain, shat-
tered buildings, and twisted wreckage, so
this political and military tornado men-
aces the continent of Asia with ravaged
nations, shattered peoples, and twisted
patterns of history.
TODAY WE ART LOSING
The struggle to preserve South Viet-
nam, the key to the independence of
southeast. Asia, is at a critical peril
point.
Two South Vietnamese governments
have gone down in 4 months; a third is
suffering repeated hammer blows at the
hands of subversion and intrigue at
home, and counsels of despair and sur-
render from abroad.
This unhappy nation, in the midst of
a mortal combat for survival, has had
to suffer the traumatic shock of a com-
plete turnover in leadership all the way
from the smallest village compounds up
to the presidential palace.
The Communist Vietcong guerrillas,
following the toppling of the Diem re-
gime last October, have scored a series
of impressive military and psychological
gains. They now control one-half of the
Mekong Delta, the most crucial prize.
France has made an ignominious bid
to return to Asia as an influential force,
first by recognizing Red China and then
by counseling the free world to throw
in the towel in South Vietnam, thus
adding appeasement to a French legacy
in Asia which historically has been char-
acterized by exploitation in peace, capit-
ulation in war. and abandonment of re-
sponsibility at the surrender table.
Some prominent American newspapers
support France's plea for neutralization
and distinguished U.S. Senators are sym-
pathetic to this proposal and publicly
question the continuation of military
and economic assistance there.
Even our Defense Department added
to the flood of contradictory official
statements and unofficial news leaks by
announcing a substantial withdrawal of
American forces from South Vietnam by
1965, notwithstanding the worsening mil-
nary situation there and despite the in-
ternal disintegration for which we bear
a measure of responsibility.
The situation, therefore, is critically
grave. We must assume that at this
moment, we are losing. Only a supreme
effort by the South Vietnamese and an
increased effort by the United States
will turn back the Communist tide.
INDIFFERENCE AND DEFEATISM
Yet, forces are at work within the free
world whose effect is to nap our will to
win this crucial struggle.
A significant number of Americans,
highly placed in private and in Gov-
ernment circles, look upon what is hap-
pening in South Vietnam as something
of marginal concern to us.
For a long time they engaged in the
now familiar luxury of becoming all
lathered up over the mote in the eye of
an embattled ally while remaining se-
renely indifferent to the beam in the
eye of its aggressor.
They chose for their crusade, not the
cause of turning back Communist ag-
gression. but the cause of destroying the
Diem regime, which, whatever its
faults-and they were vastly exagger-
ated-was energetically leading the anti-
Communist war in South Vietnam.
They had their way. Diem was over-
thrown and murdered; and the result
was a complete catastrophe, a catastro-
phe that can be measured in terms of
political chaos, military defeat, and
psychological defeatism. The heralded
attempt to liberalize and democratize the
South Vietnam Government resulted, as
was easily and often predicted, in gun
barrel rule by a succession of military
juntas, lacking even a fascade of legiti-
macy.
And so the anti-Diem crusaders in this
country and elsewhere, apparently
shamed by the sorry consequences of
their effort, but unwilling to admit their
error, have decided that the situation is
hopeless and that the only reasonable
alternative left is to pull out of Vietnam
altogether, or to make a shabby deal to
turn this area over to the Communists
piecemeal, a process which they call
"neutralization."
So I take the floor of the Senate be-
cause I feel it is the duty of everyone
who believes that South Vietnam must
be preserved to counter, each in his own
way, the attitudes of indifference and
defeatism which threaten to paralyze our
national policy.
First of all then, I say that we must
preserve the independence and freedom
of South Vietnam for exactly the same
reason that we must preserve the inde-
pendence and freedom of West Berlin-
because the cause of freedom everywhere
in the world, and the efficacy of the
United States as the leader of that cause,
is squarely on the line in the Mekong
Delta.
Let us not join the querulous, faint-
hearted chorus of those who always ask
the price of victory.
Let us ask, "What is the price of de-
feat?"
And having soberly assessed the price
of defeat, let us determine upon victory,
and then we shall find the ways to
achieve it.
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE 4815
THE MORTAL STAKES
What is the price of defeat? - -
What. is primarily at stake is the
capacity of the free world to deal with a
particular method of aggression that is
peculiarly suitable to the Communists.
In Korea, whatever else we failed to
accomplish, we did prove that we -could
.effectively deal with open, traditional
military aggression; and we have had no
major confrontation of that type since
Korea.
The Communists are now testing us
with a different method, guerrilla war-
fare, with its accompanying complex of
military, psychological, and propaganda
tactics. Through this method, they in-
tend to subjugate Asia, and if we prove
unable to overcome it in Vietnam, all
Asia is within their grasp.
Guerrilla warfare is made to order for
the Communists because it enables them
to turn their weaknesses into strengths,
while it transforms into weaknesses the
strengths of its victims. -
it puts a premium upon a small in-
vestment of men and material, upon
stealth, terror, upon limitless patience,
upon the avoidance of head-on con-
frontation with basically stronger foes.
It does not require the armament, the
logistics and the economic support nec-
essary for other types of combat. And,
so long- as we submit to its rules, it effec-
tively prevents the forces of freedom
from making use of their massive su-
periority in traditional military power,
in air and sea might, and in economic
strength.
It takes 20 South Vietnamese soldiers
to deal with 1 Vietcong guerrilla. This
is no reflection on the South Vietnam-
ese; it is inherent in the type of warfare,
as proved true in previous guerrilla con-
flicts in the Philippines and in Malaya.
And - so the North Vietnamese and
their Red Chinese backers, stricken with
poverty, hunger, economic collapse, and
demoralization at home, through the
relatively inexpensive device of field-
ing 20,000 or 30,000 guerrilla soldiers,
lightly equipped and able to live off the
land, can successfully maintain a war of
deadly attrition against a nation su-
perior in every respect and backed by
the wealth and power and training of
the United States.
They can tie down an army of 400,000
South Vietnamese, half regular soldiers
and half militia. They can engage in
this riskless warfare indefinitely with-
out jeopardizing their own home base
because, up to now, free nations have
not treated guerrilla invasion as a kind
of war which merits retaliation on the
homeland of the aggressor.
Guerrilla warfare enables the Com-
munists, through prolonged terror to
gradually destroy the will to resist of the
peoples it invades.
it has enabled them to assassinate
1,000 local South Vietnamese officials
each month for sustained periods of
time.
It has destroyed communications and
transportation in large areas of the
country.
It has forced a whole population to
live in thousands of barbed wire en-
tangled encampments, in constant fear.
It places terrible pressures upon any
government, and upon the very conduct
of civilized life and thus, if unchecked,
threatens with inevitable demoraliza-
tion the whole fabric of the attacked
society.
If the United States cannot deal with
this method of aggression in South Viet-
nam, where we have invested so much
in terms of aid and training, where we
have developed and equipped an indi-
genous army with great possibilities and
where, therefore, our entire credibility
is.at stake; if we cannot successfully as-
sist the South Vietnamese to turn back a
relatively puny enemy weakened by
famine, discontent, and economic col-
lapse, is there apy reason to hope that
we can succeed in the other countries of
Asia?
On the contrary, if South Vietnam
falls to guerrilla warfare as North Viet-
nam did, it is inescapable that the pre-
dictions of President Eisenhower and
President Kennedy will be borne out and
that the nations of Asia will fall to
communism like a string of dominoes.
There are those who scoff at what is
called the domino theory. I do not
think it is anything to be scoffed at.
This theory was one of the strong ideas
behind the NATO Alliance. We recog-
nized that if one European country fell
at a time, they would fall in just that
fashion, like dominoes. I think it is even
more true in Asia.
If South Vietnam is yielded to the
Communists, Laos and Cambodia, al-
ready with one foot in the grave, are
automatically doomed. -
Thailand, comparatively helpless, with
its 1,000 miles of frontier adjoining Laos
and Cambodia, will then be immediately
imperiled.
If 'Thailand goes down, nothing can
save Malaya and Singapore. When
Malaya has been subjugated, Indonesia,
with its huge Communist movement, will
be a pushover.
With communism thus solidly en-
trenched in the Pacific all the way from
the Arctic Circle to Indonesia, the de-
fense of Australia and New Zealand, even
with Anglo-American -naval assistance,
would become hazardous and extremely
difficult.
Inevitably the Philippines, South
Korea, Japan, and Formosa will be swept
into the maelstrom and the whole Pacific
will indeed become a Red ocean.
And this is only part of the cost of
defeat in South Vietnam. The freedom
of half the world is dependent upon al-
liances which are based upon confidence
in the capacity of the United States to
stand up effectively to Communist ag-
gression, What would be the posture of
the United States if we permit ourselves
to preside impotently over such catastro-
phes?
Three Presidents of the United States
have committed us to the defense and
assistance of South Vietnam. If we do
not have the will and the capacity to
carry out that relatively modest commit-
ment, why should anyone have confi-
dence in us? And why should we have
confidence in ourselves?
More than two decades ago, immedi-
ately following the Japanese attack upon
the United States and Great Britain,
Winston Churchill said to the Congress
of the United States:
What kind of a people do they think we
are? Is it possible that they do not under-
stand that we shall never, cease to persevere
against them until they have been taught a
lesson which they and the world shall never
forget?
The Congress rose in a mighty ovation
to those words, representing the unani-
mous determination of the American
people.
Surely we are today opposed by a
threat in Asia which, if less spectacular,
is equally grave. And surely, once we
understand this, our determination will
be equal to whatever we are called upon
to risk and endure.
NEUTRALIZATION
There are those who agree openly that
the consequences of a Communist vic-
tory in South Vietnam would be disas-
trous, but maintain that the solution is
"neutralization" of the contested area.
Even in its most charitable interpreta-
tion, neutralization is a philosophic mon-
strosity.
Heretofore, our concept of collective
security has been that if an independent
nation were attacked by- the Commu-
nists, the concert of free nations would
assist that nation to defend itself. Now
it is contended that the nation which is
attacked must be disarmed, must have
some sort of coalition government im-
posed upon it from without, and must
have its future existence entrusted to
some sort of international supervisory
body, over which its enemies exercise a
veto power. What is to be done with the
aggressor state which attacked the non-
aggressor nation has never been made
clear.
The only practical experience we have
had with this strange concept is in Laos,
where the Communists have used it as
a cover under which they have contin-
ued their piecemeal subjugation. The
protective devices that were supposed to
maintain peace in this area have proven,
as was-predicted, absolute nullities.
However, there is another variety of
neutralization with which we do have
long practical experience. When there
is an internal struggle going on within
a nation between the forces of commu-
nism and liberty, the neutralization
concept is applied in the form of a coali-
tion government in which both Commu-
nists and non-Communists divide the
cabinet posts. We have assisted or
acquiesced in the establishment of many
such governments, With uniformly
tragic results: Through this Rumania,
Poland, Bulgaria, Hungary, Czechoslo-
vakia, and Yugoslavia have been totally
enslaved by the Communists. -
China was lost in part because during
the- very period when the Nationalist
Government could have taken firm con-
trol of China it was immobilized and
demoralized for a protracted period of
time while we sought to impose upon
mainland China a- neutralized coalition
government made up of Communists
and non-Communists. -
Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, will
the Senator from Connecticut yield?
Mr. DODD. I yield.
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE Mar64 11
Mr. HUMPHREY. I wish to empha-
size the point the Senator from Con-
necticut has made in regard to so-called
coalition governments, in which Com-
munist representatives are included,
supposedly in an effort to ease them off,
so to speak, from their campaign of sub-
version and terror. Certainly that does
not work; the Senator from Connecticut
is absolutely correct. We have learned
from the cruel facts of history that
either the Communists or the Fascists
will turn any cabinet in which they are a
part to their own use, and ultimately to
the destruction of democratic institu-
tions. That was the record of Hitler in
Germany, and it has been the record of
every so-called Socialist-Democrat re-
gime which included Communist repre-
sentatives, and including the experience
in Czechoslovakia. If Communists are
placed in a cabinet, the Communists in-
sist on having the posts at the head of
the ministry of interior, the ministry of
labor. or the ministry of transport.
Mr. DODD. Or the ministry of in-
formation.
Mr. HUMPHREY. Yes; and that
means that if they hold those posts. they
can control the secret police and the
communications and the labor move-
ment. When the Communists obtain
control, as a result of having control of
those three posts, the record shows that
they take over.
Regardless of one's views on South
Vietnam or on any other part of the
world, it is a fact that there is no safety
in a coalition government; it means slow
death, and nothing else.
I thank the Senator from Connecticut
for emphasizing this point.
Mr. DODD. I thank the Senator from
Minnesota. His words of approval give
me great comfort and encouragement.
It is difficult to discuss neutralization
in the context of southeast Asia, because
of the vagueness with which the proposi-
tion is advanced; but let us try to do so,
nonetheless.
If neutralization of the currqnt con-
flict means that both North Vietnam and
South Vietnam should be disarmed and
placed under some kind of international
supervision which effectively removes
both from the cold war, then it is futile
and absurb even to discuss it.
It is futile and absurb, because the
Communists reject it utterly, openly,
and contemptuously, both as an abstract
concept and as a practical solution to
any conflict in which they are involved.
They have specifically and violently
condemned it as a solution to the cur-
rent conflict in Vietnam.
True neutralization can thus be dis-
missed; it has never been a possibility.
Only false neutralization has any chance
of being considered.
Under false neutralization, South
Vietnam would be disarmed, given a half-
Communist government probably, and
placed under the so-called protection of
some international body which has no
substance, and exists only on paper.
The victim of aggression, not the_ag-
gressor, is to be neutralized; and this
neutralization serves only to delay for a
short time complete Communist enslave-
ment.
So let us be candid about neutraliza-
tion. If we use the term, let us define
what we mean by it.
If we mean that both the Communist
aggressor and its victim are to neutral-
ized-and even this would be an injustice
on the face of 4t, since it treats equally
the aggressor and the victim-let us
immediately dismiss it until we receive
some indication that the Communists
have totally abandoned their philosophy
and their tactics and are willing to enter-
tain a suggestion so contrary to their
doctrine and their history.
The above situation would be similar
to that of a quarrel between two men,
in which one of them was entirely inno-
cent and had not been doing any wrong;
if, when he was attacked by a hoodlum,
the police rushed up and said, "We are
going to punish both of you"-obviously
an injustice.
And if we mean by neutralization that
only the victim of aggression is to be
neutralized, let us call this term what it
is--a dishonest substitute for uncondi-
tional surrender.
Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President,
will the Senator from Connecticut yield
briefly to me?
Mr. DODD. I yield.
Mr. SALTONSTALL. I appreciate
very much the senator's comment. It
is so important that I believe it should
be repeated; and, with the permission of
the Senator from Connecticut, I shall do
so now:
And if we mean by neutralization that
only the victim of aggression is to be neu-
tralized, let ps call this term what it is-a
dishonest substitute for unconditional sur-
render.
That is what neutralization in South
Vietnam would do at the present time,
would it not?
Mr. DODD. It, most certainly would.
I am happy that the distinguished Sen-
ator from Massachusetts has risen to
call our attention to that point.
Mr. ERVIN. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield for a question?
Mr. DODD. I am happy to yield to
the distinguished Senator from North
Carolina.
Mr. ERVIN. Many years ago I read
a statement to the effect that even the
best of men cannot have peace unless
their wicked neighbors are willing to
permit them to do so. Is it not true that
up to the present moment the neutraliza-
tion of a country has resulted, in a
sense, in denying that country the power
to defend itself, making it subject to the
will of its wicked neighbors?
Mr. DODD. In every case. There has
been no exception. The most recent has
been the case of Laos. That has been
the rule in so-called neutralization.
Secretary Rusk recently made an ex-
cellent statement on neutralization
which put it in its proper perspective.
I applaud, also, the repeated rejec-
tions of neutralization by both Presi-
dent Kennedy and President Johnson.
The only ends served by treating neu-
tralization as a possibility are to hearten
our enemies and dismay and demoralize
our friends.
THE KEY TO VICTORY
Over and over again we hear it said
that the key to victory is the morale of
the South Vietnamese people; their be-
lief in their way of life; their willingness
to stand up and fight for ii.
This is a vast oversimplification. Ob-
viously, the morale of a people under
attack is a very important element. But
in this war, in which South Vietnam is.
actually a battleground between the
Communist world and the free world, the
morale of the people should not be the
key to victory or defeat.
The real key is our capacity to respond
effectively to the methoc: of guerrilla
warfare, supplied and directed from the
privileged sanctuary of North Vietnam.
Were it not for this onesided methodof
warfare which gives all the initiative to
the enemy, which permits hardened
guerrilla soldiers to terrorize an entire
people for years on end, to turn a whole
nation into a series of barbed wire en-
campments-were it not for all this, the
durability of the South Vietnamese
would not even be in question.
Armies exist for the purpose of saving
civilian populations from l: aving to fight.
it is the failure to deal effectively with
the military threat that makes the mor-
ale and courage of the people a vital ele-
ment in the war.
Let us be frank. Let us ask ourselves
how our own people would stand up in
such a contest if they were subjected to
ceaseless attack year in and year out,
from which their own army seemed pow-
erless to protect them.
Does anyone suppose that under the
same conditions the people of North Viet-
nam would fight to protect their status?
Of course not. But that does not pre-
vent their enslavers from successfully
carrying forward aggression against
their neighbors.
Our task is to change the nature of
this conflict.
if we continue to perirdt the war in
South Vietnam to be, in considerable
measure, a contest between professional
guerrillas against helpless civilians, most
certainly we are in grave danger of los-
ing. But what a monumental abdica-
tion of responsibility it would be to at-
tribute our defeat, if we suffer such, not
to our own unwillingness to change the
terms of battle, but to the morale of
the people whom we are asking to live
in constant danger by day and by night
for a period that is apparently to have
no end.
Those who are entrusted with the re-
sponsibility for the defense of South
Vietnam can reverse this situation al-
most overnight by carrying the struggle
to its source: North Vietnam.
The key to victory in South Vietnam
is the effective carrying of the war into
North Vietnam until the forces of Ho
Chi Minh have sustainer; such terrible
attrition that they cease their aggres-
sion against the South. How can it be
done?
A PROGRAM FOR vx. 'rORY
I fully recognize here the limitations
of Members of the Senate; I do not
present myself as a military tactician.
Yet, those who believe that we should
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE 4817
push on in Vietnam-as I do-have as
much information at our disposal and
as much occasion for speaking up as
those who believe we should pull out.
One does not have to be an architect
to know that a house is falling down,
and one does not have to be a military
expert or a foreign service officer to
know that our military and political ef-
fort in South Vietnam is going badly
and that the course of our efforts must
be changed if we are to succeed.
Our first task is to stabilize the rapid-
ly deteriorating political situation in
South Vietnam. There are a number of
ways in which we can help to bring this
about and I shall cite only three:
First, we must make clear our irrevo-
cable determination to see this struggle
through to victory, as long as the South
Vietnamese carry their part of the bur-
den.
President Johnson's statement of Feb-
ruary 21, and subsequent statements
contained just such a commitment and
have helped a great deal to stem the
confusion and demoralization resulting
from statements by other Americans.
Secretary McNamara's clear assertions
have had a good effect.
On the radio this morning I heard a
report of a speech by Secretary McNa-
mara in which he told the people in Viet-
nam that we would render whatever aid
was necessary for as long as it was nec-
essary. I say, good for him.
There must be other statements by the
President and by other top American
leaders.
There should be statements in the
Congress, perhaps congressional resolu-
tions.
There should be pledges by leaders of
both parties, until our posture with re-
spect to South Vietnam is as clear as our
posture concerning West Berlin.
Second, we should help the present
Government of south Vietnam, under
General Khanh, to ride out its present
difficulties. We have no choice but to
support this Government as it is, with
its strengths and its weaknesses.
In doing so, we must seek to help it
overcome its shortcomings, through per-
suasion and example, not only for the
immediate purpose of strengthening its
,resistance to communism, but so that it
may ultimately become a beacon of jus-
tice and progress for all the peoples of
southeast Asia.
General Khanh is probably as good a
man as can be found in the Vietnamese
armed forces, and we may count our-
selves fortunate that the second coup
was not instigated by a man of less stat-
ure. He has a reputation as a capable
and aggressive commander and as a care-
ful planner.
According to all the reports I have
heard, he is also a man of integrity and
strong personal loyalty. He has dis-
played sound political instinct in re-
taining the popular Gen. Duong Van
Minh as Chief of State and in bringing
certain prominent political leaders and
intellectuals into his Cabinet; while his
energetic visiting to villages and to sol-
diers at the front suggests that Vietnam
may at last have found the benevolent
strong man it so sorely needs. His ini-
tial pronouncements, moreover, suggest
that he recognizes the imperative need
for constructive village programs if the
people's loyalty is to be won and re-
tained.
Instead of standing on the sidelines,
waiting to see how General Khanh will
shape up, we must do everything in our
power to help the government of General
Khanh stabilize itself and to help the
general himself develop the popular im-
age that is essential to effective national
government.
We must make it unmistakably clear
to the other officers in the Vietnamese
Army that we are opposed to any more
coups and that we shall support the Gov-
ernment against any attempted coup.
This is mandatory because another coup
or two and even the Marines will be un-
able to save South Vietnam. Secretary
McNamara has performed admirably in
this regard during his visit.
Third, we must use our influence and
our aid to assist the new Vietnam Gov-
ernment to build upon a beginning that
has already been made in encouraging
the development of village democracy;
in improving agriculture, education, and
public health; and in giving the Viet-
namese people the feeling that they have
something to fight for and something
worth daily risking their lives for. The
plan announced by General Khanh last
Saturday, if properly implemented
through our aid, will mark a significant
step forward.
We must help turn the war against
North Vietnam.
We must explain to our own people, to
our allies, and to the world the reasons
which impel us to carry the fighting to
the home base of the aggressor.
One method of doing this would be
the publication of a white paper on
North Vietnamese and Red Chinese ag-
gression in South Vietnam, setting forth
in detail all the massive information
that has been accumulated about guer-
rilla infiltration and the smuggling of
arms from the North, the evidence that
the war is in fact directed from the
North, and the evidence of Red Chinese
involvement.
We have the truth; and we have the
means to disseminate the truth to all
who are disposed to believe it. Having
made this attempt to solicit favorable
world opinion, we must go forward and
do what the facts of the situation re-
quire of us.
We now come to the critical point of
our policy. What should be the nature
of our attempt to take the offensive in
this war which has been forced upon
South Vietnam from the North?
It is, of course, for our military lead-
ers to decide upon the tactics and for
our diplomatic leaders to assess the pos-
sible repercussions.
But it is the direction of our efforts,
not the details, that is my principal
concern.
As a minimum, I believe we must per-
mit, train, and assist South Vietnamese
guerrilla forces to begin hit-and-run
raids along the coast of North Vietnam,
directed against targets like marshaling
yards, harbor facilities, refineries, fac-
tories, bridges, dams, and so on. As ex-
perience and confidence are gained, it
should be our goal to assist the South
Vietnamese to open up sustained guer-
rilla operations in North Vietnam and
give the Communists a full taste of their
own medicine.
Every day that this war continues, the
Red regime in Hanoi should be hurt in
a very material way. And every day
that we allow them to ravage South Viet-
nam with complete impunity to their
home base, we give them an advantage
which they should not have and which
could be decisive in the war.
That is the minimum.
The maximum operation against
North Vietnam would be to build up
South Vietnamese air and sea forces so
that they could launch air strikes
against industrial and military targets
and conduct naval blockades against
commerce.
We have all read that this alternative
is under serious consideration by the
administration. We know that action
of this kind would be a very bold step
and that there are many reasons why
any administration would be reluctant
to undertake it. But if it is necessary
it should be done, and I believe that the
Congress and the American people will
support this action if .our best advice
tells us that it is the quickest and most
effective way to end the agony of South
Vietnam and redeem our commitments
in southeast Asia.
Three years ago, upon my return from
Laos and South Vietnam, I urged that we
,not continue a purely defensive war but
that we enable the forces of freedom to
go over to the offensive. I stated the
objectives of such an approach in words
which I should like to repeat now:
The best way for us to stop communist
guerrilla action in Laos and in South Viet-
nam is to send guerrillas in force into North
Vietnam, to equip and supply those patriots
already in the field; to make every CoTn-
munist official fear the just retribution of
an outraged humanity; to make every Com-
munist arsenal, government building, com-
munications center and transportation fa-
cility a target for sabotage; to provide a
rallying point for the great masses of op-
pressed people who hate communism because
they have known it.
Only when we give the Communists more
trouble than they can handle at home, will
they cease their aggression against the out-
posts of freedom.
I think these words are even more
applicable today than they were when I
first spoke them 3 years ago.
Finally, I believe that we should make
an effort to involve the other nations of
the area in the task of keeping South
Vietnam free.
As late as April of 1961, the SEATO
nations in the immediate area, the Phil-
ippines, Thailand, Australia, New Zea-
land, and Pakistan, all favored common
action against the Communist menace in
Laos. But the British and French were
opposed to such action, and we ourselves
set on the fence; and the result was that
nothing was done.
In the absence of American leadership,
SEATO has inevitably become an orga-
nization of questionable effectiveness.
When I was in the Philippines in May of
1961, Foreign Minister Serano made a
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statement to me which I shall never for-
get. "We are prepared to fight and die
with you if necessary," he said, "but we
cannot fight without American leader-
ship." Our failure to react to the chal-
lenge in Laos is one of the chief reasons
for Pakistan's loss of confidence and her
consequent erratic behavior.
Given American leadership and given
the evidence of our determination to de-
fend southeast Asia, it is not too much
to hope that SEATO can be reactivated.
Certainly it would be salutary and help-
ful to have other Asians fighting along-
side the South Vietnamese and Laotians,
in defense of their common freedom.
Conceivably, France might object to the
reactivation of SEATO, now that De
Gaulle seems bent on the appeasement
of Mao Tse-Tung. But if France should
take this stand, then in my opinion she
no longer belongs in SEATO. and we
should ask for her withdrawal.
THE CONTINUING CRISIS
In South Vietnam, as at so many other
pressure points around the globe, the
American people are being tested as nev-
er before, and as no other people have
been tested.
In the past our Nation, like other na-
tions, has risen to direct challenges which
brought us under open attack and which
clearly imperiled our survival.
In such conflicts our danger was ob-
vious, our objective was clear, and our
people could throw themselves into a
total national effort with confidence that
our sacrifices were only temporary and
that total victory was attainable and
foreseeable.
Such have been the challenges of the
past. But the current crisis Is not a
clear military challenge emanating from
definite sources. combatable by tradi-
tional means, and subject to total
retaliation.
We are challenged on every continent,
in every country, by every means, but
not directly, not overtly. It is always
some other nation that is under direct
attack, and the attack comes disguised
in many forms, subversion, infiltration,
revolution, espionage, propaganda, psy-
chological warfare, economic warfare,
guerrilla warfare, and on and on-war
without form, war without limitation,
war without end.
It has fallen to us to lead the defense
of freedom against this omnipresent but
illusory onslaught. And we have under-
taken to do so, for our own sake, and for
the larger cause of humanity. That we
have often failed in individual instances
is to be grievously regretted; that we
have tried, that we have attempted to
mount a many dimensioned global de-
fense equal to the challenge, is to our
eternal credit.
Our sons at this hour are stationed in
military bases in the farthest and most
remote corners of the earth. Our aid
missions and Peace Corps units and tech-
nical assistance teams are functioning in
fourscore nations and more. Our in-
formation programs seeking to combat
falsehood with truth are operating
around the globe. In outer space, in the
air, on the land, on the sea, and under
the sea we have mounted a tireless de-
fense against the ultimate enemy attack.
a defense for ourselves and for all people.
The struggle in South Vietnam Is a
crucial part of this larger struggle; per-
haps the most vital part at the moment
because it is the most challenged at the
moment.
In the normal course of my duties as
a Senator. I have had the privilege of
visiting and talking with our American
soldiers in South Vietnam just as I have
had similarly rewarding experiences in
meeting the young men who man our
Polaris fleet, and those who go out into
outer space in an attempt to insure our
predominance even In that remote
sphere.
It is hl pondering the sacrifices and
achievements of these men and in con-
fronting the challenges which have
caused them to undertake these tasks
that we begin to grasp something of the
meaning of being an American In this
sixth decade of the twentieth century.
In the early years of our Nation Ben-
jamin Franklin and Thomas Paine had
an exchange which prophetically out-
lined the course of our history and ex-
plained our present posture in the world
today. Franklin said, "Wherever free-
dom is, that is my country." Paine re-
sponded, "Wherever freedom is not, that
is my country."
This seeming contradiction has been
harmonized by the development of our
history. There is no free nation which
has not had the active and continuing
assistance of the United States in the
effort to fulfill and defend Its liberty.
There is no free nation under attack
today whose survival is not dependent
upon this American involvement. There
is no enslaved nation whose hope for
ultimate freedom does not rest with us.
Americans of our day realize more
completely even than did Franklin and
Paine the indivisibility of freedom. To
preserve our own freedom we must see to
it that the South Vietnamese preserve
theirs. That is why we are there. That
is why we must continue there until vic-
tory is assured.
And that is why Americans of this
decade, like their predecessors, are earn-
ing a place in history which, In Lincoln's
words, "the world will forever applaud
and God will forever bless."
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent to insert at this point in the RECORD
a statement I prepared early in Febru-
ary for the February 17 issue of the
Washington Report of the American Se-
curity Council.
There being no objection, the state-
ment was ordered to be printed in the
RECORD, as follows:
[From Washington Report, Feb. 17, 19641
FORMULA FOR VICTORY IN VIETNAM
We are rapidly approaching the moment
of truth in southeast Asia. The events of
the coming year will, In all probability, de-
cide whether freedom has any future In this
strategically vital area, or whether the few
free flags that stilt wave there will all be
replaced by the hammer and sickle.
If we minimize the gravity of the situa-
tion, if we continue to engage in half-meas-
ures, if we permit the Communists to oper-
ate from privileged sanctuaries, if we again
permit ourselves to become involved in plots
against our allies, then scutheast Asia is
doomed.
I believe southeast Asia can be saved. But
it can be saved only if we are prepared to face
up to the facts in all their gravity and ugli-
ness and act with the utm)st resoluteness.
There are those who say that the United
States Is overextended, that. we cannot de-
fend Asia as well as Europe, ghat we must re-
duce our commitments in southeast Asia,
even though this might result in a Commu-
nist takeover. I find this proposal as lacking
In logic as it is In morality.
For better or for worse. our own fate is
intertwined with that of southeast Asia. In-
deed, the Communist conquest of the area
would produce so serious a shift in the world
balance of power. that our very ability to
survive would be called into question. More-
over, our prestige is so heavily committed
In South Vietnam that if we accept defeat
there, or if we accept defeat, on the install-
ment plan under the name of neutraliza-
tion, no nation could In the future place any
confidence in America's commitment to its
defense.
The gravity of the situation in southeast
Asia and the continuing downward spiral of
our fortunes there simply do not jibe with
the optimistic reassurances of the Depart-
ment of State.
In Laos, the hard-pressed royalists, now
supported by the neutralist. forces of Gen.
Kong Le. have been forced back from one
position after another by a aeries of limited
but carefully calculated offensive actions,
initiated by the Pathet Lao forces of Prince
Souphannavong. The coalition government
triumphantly put together by Mr. Harriman,
for all practical purposes does not exist.
The Americans have withdrawn from Laos,
the North Vietnamese have not. The tripar-
tite supervisory committee has been able to
operate In the non-Communist portions of
the country; but it has not been able to in-
spect those areas under Communist control,
sometimes because of the obstruction of the
Polish member of the committee, more fre-
quently simply because they have been de-
nied access by the Pathet Lao.
In Cambodia, Prince Norodom Sihanouk,
himself an anti-Communist, has sadly ac-
cepted the inevitability of Communist rule
throughout Asia, and has severed relations
with Britain and America and terminated
their assistance programs. He has been re-
markably frank In stating that his only pur-
pose In doing so is to buy it bit more time
for himself and his people. There is mount-
ing evidence that the Vietcong has been us-
ing his territory for hit-and-run attacks on
South Vietnam.
In Vietnam, the war has been going dis-
astrously for our side ever since the over-
throw of the Diem government last Novem-
ber 1. The military junta which overthrew
President Diem has, In tern, been over-
thrown, and no one can tell where the dam-
age done to the political stability of the
country will end.
Internationally, our position has been un-
dermined by the decision of President De
Gaulle to recognize Red China. Perhaps the
most single serious consequence of De
Gaulle's action is that it may induce a
weakening of U.S. policy by emboldening
these elements in the Department of State
who have always believed that the way out
of the southeast Asia crisis lies via coalition
governments and neutralization and disen-
gagement. Already some of our pundits and
editors are saying that If a brave and stanch
anti-Communist like De Ga'alle accepts the
inevitability of the recognition of Red China
and the neutralization of southeast Asia, we
might do well to heed his example. Almost
without exception, these pundits are opposed
to all those things De Gaulle has stood for
In Europe. But they do not hesitate to
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE 4819
invoke the authority of his name in pressing
for appeasement in southeast Asia.
We shall hear more such opinions and
witnesses more such pressures over the. com-
ing months.
Against this otherwise bleak background,
there is at least one faintly hopeful ray.
The new government of General Khanh, al-
though it has still not been able to repair
the damage done to the apparatus of admin-
istration and command by the overthrow of
Diem, appears to be a definite improvement
over the first junta. General Khanh has a
reputation as a resourceful and courageous
commander; and as a careful planner; and it
was impossible not to be impressed by the
swiftness and smoothness with which he
executed his coup. All the news indicates
that he has taken power firmly into his own
hands and that he is shaping up as the wise
and benevolent strong man his country so
desperately needs. General Khanh's reputa-
tion forVersonal loyalty should be a definite
asset, in his relations with his fellow officers
and in his relations with us.
He has shown his political astuteness in
retaining the popular Gen. Duong Van Minh
as head of state. Although the generals
guilty of plotting with the French have been
imprisoned, there has been none of the
wholesale dismissals and reshuffling of com-
mands that characterized the military junta.
And whereas the junta had been foolish
enough to give all key posts to the so-called
southerners, General Khanh, himself a
northerner, has wisely distributed his posts
between people coming from the north,
south, and center.
To add to all this, Khanh seems to have
the political instinct and gregariousness of
an American. presidential candidate, and an
ability to move from one point to another
on the fighting fronts that reminds one of
the way Mayor La Guardia played the role
of inspector-general in New York. In short,
everything about Khanh looks good. In him
Vietnam may well have found a man capable
of unifying and leading its diverse peoples.
Let us hope that we will give him our un-
stinting support, that we will do our utmost
to help him develop the national image es-
sential to the task of leadership, that we
will let it be known that we stand by this
government, and that we will use all our
influence to discourage any new plots or
coups. For the fact is that Vietnam cannot
afford more coups.. Another two or three
coups and even the American marines would
not be able to save South Vietnam.
The firming up of the Khanh government
is the first task in any formula for saving
southeast Asia. In helping to firm it up, I
hope we will not insist on a dilution of au-
thority, in the name of democracy, because
no civil war can be successfully prosecuted
without a strong government.
Second, it is essential that we let the world
know in unequivocal terms that we will not
abandon southeast Asia, that there will be
no neutralization of Vietnam, and that we
will have no part of a conference to neutral-
ize Cambodia.
Third, by way of preparing the ground for
a political and military counteroffensive, the
Government of South Vietnam should be en-
couraged to bring out a white paper incor-
porating all the massive evidence that the
Vietcong guerrilla war is not of indigenous
origin, but has beery planned, armed, orga-
nized, and led. by the agents of Ho Chi Minh,
Similary, the anti-Communist elements in
the Laotian coalition shoul4l be encouraged
to prepare a white paper detailing the re-
peated violations of the cease-fire and of the
terms of the Geneva Treaty by the Pathet
Lao and the evidence of the continuing pres-
ence of North Vietnamese forces in Laos.
Fourth, having given these facts to world
opinion, we should then unleash the South
Vietnamese and put an end to the one-
sided set of rules under which the war in
South Vietnam has heretofore been con-
ducted. Up until now, the war' has been
fought entirely on the territory of South
Vietnam. The South Vietnamese Army has
had to spread its. forces thin to protect
bridges and railways and powerplants and
other installations against territory attacks.
The North Vietnamese have operated under
no such penalty. Not a week goes by with-
out the murder of several hundred South
Vietnamese village leaders and local of-
ficials by the Vietcong. But the political
commissars in the North have been able to
carry out their work of political control and
repression in absolute safety.
The situation in Vietnam, indeed, pro-
vides a classic example of our tacit accept-
ante of the Communist ground rule that
the cold war and hot wars, both, must always
be fought on the territory of the free world
and never on the territory of the Communist
world.
We must put an end to this imbalanced
situation. Ho Chi Minh must be made to
pay a penalty for his aggression in the south.
Sustained guerrilla warfare may be difficult
to conduct in a country under the iron con-
trol of the Communists. But North Viet-
naiv, because of its long coastline, is exceed-
ingly vulnerable to hit-and-run raids from
the sea. The minute the South Vietnamese
are given the green light to mount such
raids, the minute they start blowing up
bridges, and dams and generators and fac-
tories in the north and ambushing patrols
and political commissars, it will have an
immediate impact on the conduct of the war
in the south.
Fifth, He Chi Minh conducts his activities
in the south under the ostensible auspices
of a front for the liberation of South Viet-
nam, which maintains representatives in 15
countries. There are capable and deter-
mined men among the refugees and defec-
tors from the north who would like nothing
better than to be granted permission to set
up a front for the liberation of North Viet-
nam from the tyranny of communism. We
must encourage, not inhibit, the creation
of such a front, committed to a program of
liberation and social reform and we must
provide it with the necessary propaganda
facilities..
Sixth, it can be taken for granted that the
Communists will again attack in Laos. We
must respond to the next attack by an-
nouncing that we consider the Geneva agree-
ment to be abrogated, by encouraging Gen-
eral Phoumi and Gen. Kong Le to coun-
terattack, and by giving them the necessary
support. We should make it our strategic
objective to assist the anti-Communist
forces in securing at least the southern half
of the country, including the Laotian pan-
handle through which the He Chi Minh is
infilterating men and supplies into South
Vietnam. No measure we could take would
do more to take the pressure off South Viet-
nam or would have greater psychological
impact throughout Southeast Asia than the
liberation of Tchepone, the chief Communist
base in the panhandle.
Senator TriONuAS J. Donn,
Guest Editor.
Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President,
will the Senator yield?
Mr. DODD. I yield.
Mr. SALTONSTALL. I am grateful to
the Senator for making so clear our re-
sponsibilities in the cause of ' freedom.
We have a -real cause today for which to
work and to fight, in assisting the South
Vietnamese in the Far East.
Yesterday, we listened to a speech on
the floor of the Senate by another dis-
tinguished Senator, who took a contrary
position to the one the Senator from
Connecticut has taken today.
Mr. DODD. Yes.
Mr. SALTONSTALL. I personally be-
lieve that we should help them in every
way we can so long as we are advancing
the cause of freedom by doing so.
While the Senator feels at the present
time that we have this cause, and that
we should go forward with it, ultimately
we must make decisions that may have to
be changed because the situation changes
and new factors of the different facts in-
volved are introduced. Our role in South
Vietnam is related, not only to our rela-
tionships with the South Vietnamese
but also with other countries in the Far
East and in the world, where our pres-
tige may be involved. Does the Senator
feel that that is a correct interpretation
of the remarks he has made?
Mr. DODD. Exactly so
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time
of the Senator from Connecticut has ex-
pired.
Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, I
ask unanimous consent that the Senator
from Connecticut may proceed for an
additional 15 minutes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
ator from Connecticut is recognized for
15 additional minutes.
Mr. DODD. I believe we are faced
with a situation in which we have no al-
ternative. My view Is that if we should
back out, or give up in South Vietnam,
all of Asia ultimately would be lost; and
I do not believe that fateful day would
be too far away. That Is, of course, of
the gravest importance.
But besides that, I believe the rest of
the world would lose confidence in us.
Whether we like it or not, we are the
leaders of the free world. I believe it is
true, as I have tried to say that there is
not a free country in the world that we
have not helped. There is not an en-
slaved country in the world whose hope
for freedom does not rest with us. We
have friends and we have allies who help
us; nevertheless, it rests with us. If
we pull out, if we take the advice of those
whom I call "the fainthearted ones," I
believe one disaster after another will
attend us, and we shall face a time and
an hour when we shall be alone. There
will be no allies to help us and we. shall
face the accumulated might of a foe
the like of which has never been seen-on
earth.
I know it is much easier to say, "Let us
get out."
All of us are conscious of the sacrifices
of American boys there.
I have four sons, and all of them are
of military age. Two are in the Army
Reserve. I do not want my boys in a war
any more than I want the boys of others
to be in a war. But I believe the surest
way to be certain that my sons and the
sons of others will not be involved in a
war is to do what is required of us, and
to do it now. If we do not, our sons will
be in that war, and what will be worse,
the chances of their surviving it will be
greatly reduced.
Mr. SALTONSTALL. What we must
do, if the Senator will permit me to com-
ment, is to accomplish our objective of
furthering the cause of freedom. We
must use methods which we believe will
be most helpful In attaining that ob-
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE -7a~-c i. 11
jective. That is what we are doing today
in many places.
Mr. DODD. The Senator is correct.
Mr. SALTONSTALL. So long as we
maintain our prestige, so long as the op-
portunity of achieving our objective
exists we should go forward. Does the
Senator from Connecticut believe that to
be a fair statement?
Mr. DODD. Yes; I believe the Senator
from Massachusetts is absolutely cor-
rect.
Mr. SALTONSTALL. I thank the
Senator.
Mr. DODD.
his comment.
Mr. ERVIN. Mr. President, will the
Senator from Connecticut yield for an
observation?
Mr. DODD. I am glad to yield.
Mr. ERVIN. I commend the able and
distinguished senior Senator from Con-
necticut for making a most illuminating
speech. The speech should receive the
consideration of the public, as well as the
consideration of those who make our
military and diplomatic policy in south-
east Asia.
I believe the Senator has expounded in
most eloquent fashion what Kipling said
in a beautiful poem he wrote at the be-
ginning of the First World War, the sub-
stance of which was that free men can
keel) their freedom in this precarious
world only by keeping their hearts in
courage and in patience and by lifting
up their hands in strength.
The Senator's able address has been a
fine exposition of the same thought.
Mr. DODD. I am very grateful to the
Senator.
Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President,
will the Senator yield so that I may make
an observation on what the Senator from
North Carolina has said?
Mr. DODD. I yield.
Mr. SALTONSTALL. If we were to
agree to neutralization in South Vietnam
today, as the Senator from Connecticut
has said, we would be agreeing to neutral-
ization by only one side, with no com-
mitment by the other side. That would
really lead to defeat.
Mr. DODD. I believe that is correct.
Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. President, I
commend the Senator from Connecticut
for what he has brought before the Sen-
ate today. We must remain strong and
do everything that we possibly can to
help South Vietnam at this time. If we
do not remain firm, our allies will become
weaker and weaker. If that were to
happen, of course, it would be harder
and harder for us to remain there. We
must stay there under all the circum-
stances at the present time. If we do
not, it will appear to the world that we
are a very weak nation.
Mr. DODD. I believe the Senator has
stated the reality of the situation. I
am grateful for his comments.
Mr. HUMPHREY, Mr. President, I
commend the Senator for his forthright
statement. This kind of debate is al-
ways helpful. Neutralization, as has
been indicated, cannot be very helpful;
it could be detrimental, unless it were
applied to the entire peninsula. I shall
not go not go into a detailed discussion
of the Senator's address. I claim no
expert knowledge In this area. How-
ever, these debates are helpful, and I
am sure the administration welcomes
such discussions. We must have a na-
tional consensus on this subject if our
policy is to succeed.
Mr. DODD. I agree with the Sen-
ator. That Is one of the reasons for my
remarks today.
Mr. DAVITS, Mr. President, I am
pleased that the Senator from Connecti-
cut has discussed our problems in Viet-
nam on the basis that he has in the
course of his distinguished speech to the
Senate.
I do not necessarily agree with every
aspect of the matter, as he discussed it.
However, the fundamental thrust of his
remarks demonstrates two things:
First, a need to expose the situation
to the view of the American people. In
that regard, the Senator from Alaska
[Mr. GRUENING)-who has discussed this
matter with the Senator from Connecti-
cut and with me and with other Sen-
ators-also Is rendering a service in pre-
senting his point of view. Certainly the
people should know the points on both
sides; and, as Members of the Senate, it
is our duty to make that analysis avail-
able to the people.
Second, although I do not necessarily
agree with all the points the Senator
from Connecticut has made in the course
of his speech, certainly its fundamental
thrust is that our people should under-
stand that the great stake we have in
South Vietnam-namely, to keep that
country from going over to cominu-
nism-ii fundamental. The casualties
which already have occurred there are
tragic; but it is clear that our choice now
is between those casualties and perhaps
much greater casualties later on-in-
eluding the possible casualty of the loss
of freedom there.
In that respect, Mr. President, the
speech of the Senator from Connecticut
is most valuable; and I am grateful to
him.
Mr. DODD. I thank the distinguished
senior Senator from New York.
Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, is
there any time remaining under the
unanimous-consent agreement?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Ten
minutes remain.
THE PRESIDENTIAL INAUGURATION
IN VENEZUELA
Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, to-
day is an important day for those in
this hemisphere who believe that politi-
cal liberty, social progress, and economic
development go together. Today is an
important day for those who wish to see
a successful example of the Alliance for
Progress at work. For today in Vene-
zuela a new President will be Inaugu-
rated, the first constitutional President
In Venezuelan history to succeed another
constitutional President. Today Presi-
dent-elect Raul Leon! will succeed
Romulo Betancourt as President of
Venezuela. President Leoni was chosen
in a free election In December, an elec-
tion held despite continuous violent har-
assment by Communist and Castrolte
groups. His victory, together with the
i
impressive showing of COPEI, the part-
ner of Action Democratic, in the Betan-
court coalition, is assurance that Vene-
zuela will continue the same en-
lightened progressive domestic policy and
pro-Western foreign policy that char-
acterized the Betancourt government.
The successful peaceful transition
from.one freely chosen government to
another is a triumph fo:r the principles
underlying the Alliance for Progress, a
triumph for the Kennedy policy in Latin
America. And no one would have been
more pleased today to witness this
triumph of Venezuelan democracy tharf
our late President John F. Kennedy.
The election which brought President
Leoni to the Presidency showed that the
people of a wealthy, rapidly developing
country like Venezuela support the poli-
tical parties whose objectives and pro-
grams are virtually identical to the aims
of the Alliance for Progiess. But if the
new Venezuelan Government is to have
a chance to continue the work of the
Alliance for Progress in Venezuela, it
must have the firm support of its allies
in this hemisphere. It must have-and
I believe it will have-the firm support
of the United States under President
Johnson, just as President Betancourt
enjoyed the full suppo:'t of President
Kennedy. As a new government, it
should merit special consideration from
other republics in this hemisphere for
protection against Communist subver-
sion directed and financed from Cuba.
The report issued last month by the
OAS makes it indisputably clear that
Cuba has smuggled arms to terrorists in
Venezuela. It has presented photo-
graphic evidence of the plan and the
plot to subvert the Bet=court govern-
ment at the time of the election in De-
cember 1963.
I wish my position on this subject to
be crystal clear. Our national policy
should be one of clear, unequivocal sup-
port for taking the necessary steps to
cut off arms shipments from Cuba to
Venezuela. We can no longer condone
Cuba being an arsenal for terrorism,
revolution, and chaos. It is about time,
instead of merely worrying about gov-
ernments of friendly countries being able
to stay in power and resist violence, that
we choke off the source of that violence.
We have stated before that we will
not permit the Castro regime to subvert
the democratic governments of its neigh-
bors through armed aggression, whether
covert or open. We have repeatedly
stated this as our policy. Today we have
a clear, carefully documented case of
arms shipments into Venezuela. The
Venezuelan Government has presented
convincing photographic evidence of the
smuggled arms shipments. The OAS re-
port has confirmed the accuracy of the
Government's allegations.
What is our response to the situation?
I believe we should mean what we have
been saying. We should take all steps
necessary to prevent further arms ship-
ments from Cuba into Venezuela. And
I mean all steps-whate-rer steps are re-
quired in terms of navr:l operations, or
any form of activity to stop these arms
from crossing over into the Caribbean
areas and Latin America.
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