CHINESE-INDIAN RELATIONS; 1972-1975

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00608R000600170014-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 25, 2004
• Sequence Number: 14
• Publication Date: September 1, 1975
• Content Type: RS

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Top Secret
Research Study
Chinese-Indian Relations. 1972-1975
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NSA review completed
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OPR 206 25X
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 Approved Fo
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
September 1975
CHINESE-INDIAN RELATIONS: 1972-1975
Top Secret
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The sti I, and its conclusions rest ^n an extensive body of data, which
is availa''`,:, in a detailed annex. This annex will be provided to
interested persons on request to the author, 25X1
also welcomes comments on the study.
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CONTENTS
Page
PRINCIPAL JUDGMENTS ........................................... 1
DISCUSSION ....................................................... 5
1. SETTING ............................................... ....... 5
II. CHINA'S POST-WAR TACTICS ................................... 6
III. THE LONG ROAD TO DETENTE ................................ 8
IV. THE INDIAN NUCLEAR EXPLOSION AND THE
ANNEXATION OF SIKKIM ..................................... 9
V. THE RENEWED DRIVE FOR SINO-INDIAN DETENTE ............ 10
VI. PROSPECTS ..................................................... 11
FIGURES
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Frontispiece South Asia (map) .............................. facing page 1
Disputed Areas Along the China-India Border (map) ...................... 12
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PRINCIPAL JUDGMENTS
In Peking's strategic view, South Asia and the adjacent Indian
Ocean comprise an area in which Soviet politica! and military penetra-
tion might significantly endanger China'-, nat-oral security interests.
The Chinese in recent years have tried to impede this penetration, main-
ly by seeking a detente with New Delhi, but India, China's chief
political champion in the 1950s, is now a major opponent and the in-
cumbent Prime Minister is unwilling to change that position. Peking's
ability to influence events in the area depends primarily on the state of
its relations with New Delhi, and, as those relations have deteriorated, so
has Peking's influence.
Peking's decline in influence has taken place in stages ever since
New Delhi's genuine goodwill was converted to fear and hostility by the
Chinese attack on Indian forces in 1962. Subsequent Chinese support of
Pakistan against India has further alienated India. The tJSSR has been
able to exploit India's hostility to Peking (as well as to Pakistan), and the
Chinese are now playing a weak hand in an area where India is the
paramount power.
The Chinese apparently have misjudged the strength of aversion to
China in Mrs. Gandhi's thinking. Their high-profile and almost
pathetic initiatives designed to court her goodwill in early 1975 were
rebuffed. The rebuff seems to have been the result of Mrs. Gandhi's
calculations that:
-New Delhi's security interests are well served by China's
number one enemy, the Soviet Union-while the Chinese
have nothing much to offer India.
-She cannot afford to annoy the USSR, India's main source of
military aid and political support in international affairs.
-If the Chinese really desire detente, they will begin by return-
ing the Aksai Chin area of India's northwest which they oc-
cupied in the 1950s.
While desiring detente, the Chinese are trapped by Mao's in-
sistence that any government hopeful of improving relations with China
must be the first to send its ambassador. Mrs. Gandhi almost certainly
will not accept this demeaning demand, an(' the Chinese almost cer-
tainly will not withdraw their demand while Mao live;;. Thus neither the
Indians nor the Chinese will make the key symbouc gesture necessary to
show that a slight improvement in relations has cccurred.:'he stalemate
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The Sino-Indian border dispute is a part of the larger clash of
interests along the Himalayas, where each side fears an extension of the
influence of its adversary:
-Following China's attack on Indian forces in 1962, its more
recent efforts to improve its strategic position in Tibet by
building a pipeline, resurfacing of a major road, and
conducting surveys for a prospective railroad apparently have
added to New Delhi's concern about a threat from the north.
-New Delhi, for its part, has increased Peking's concern about
ultimate Indian intentions by its explosion of a nuclear device
and annexation of Sikkim.
In the Himalayas, Indian-Chinese rivalry is likely to center on Nepal in
the near future. The Chinese undoubtedly will sustain their political
and economic support of Kathmandu, unwilling to regard Indian policy
toward Nepal as permanently benign. The Indians, however, do not
seem to be motivated by any desire to move militarily acrainst Nensli
inis restraint s wu o unless and until that mountain kingdom is
about to be dominated by China.
Peking is unlikely in the near future to take direct military action to
aid any South Asian nation, including Pakistan, against an Indian
attack. The Chinese probably will continue to operate on the principle,
as they operated during India's clashes with Pakistan and its annexation
of Sikkim, to avoid direct military engagements in situations where
Chinese national security interests are not directly involved. I
Mrs. Gandhi's recent imposition of a harsh authoritarian regime
has created no new opportunities for the Chinese. Although they
initially were delighted by her self-incriminating action, which
"proved" that Peking had been right to publicly criticize her, they now
are confronted with the problem of trying to determine the long-range
implications of her new political position. The behavior of the Chinese
suggests that:
-They probably will keep their support of anti-government
insurgents (mainly Nagas) at a low level of intensity.
-And they are unlikely to support her major political opponents
materially.
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-They probably will not give up entirely on Mrs. Gand;ii and
may hope that, having, suppressed her opponents, she will
desire a limited improvement of Sino-Indian relations. Such a
hope would be fueled by any dispute which might arise with
Moscow over Soviet military and economic aid to India,
-They probably will keep the Sino-Indian border quiet, in the
hope that India will eventually accept the status quo as
permanent.
The Chinese probably have mixed feelings about a possible
breakup of India. On the one hand, the Chinese might welcome the
balkanization of a major unfriendly power on its southern border. On
the other hand, the disintegration of India as a single political state
probably would afford the Soviets an opportunity to negotiate with one
or more of the weaker, fragmented states and, conceivably, to attain base
rights. On b:..dance, the Chinese probably hope that India will remain
united-wit}, a government more responsive to Chinese overtures and
less wedded to alliance with the USSR, regardless of whether the regime
is to be more or less authoritarian, rightist or leftist.
For the near future, the Chinese strategy probably will be centered
on the following:
-Sustaining good relations with Nepal and Sri Lanka, while
exploiting, as much as possible, their fear of domination by
India.
-Sustaining efforts to reduce tension between Afghanistan and
Pakistan (as an indirect way of combating the increase of
Soviet influence in the former).
-Sustaining a working relationship with Pakistan, but avoiding
a closer relationship. The Islamabad tie has liabilities as well
as benefits for Peking. However, the Chinese probably would
react quickly with assurances of increased support if
Islamabad were to respond to Moscow's suggestions that
Pakistan accept Soviet military equipment.
Thus Chinese strategy will be centered on impeding the spread of
Soviet influence in South Asia. Peking almost certainly will continue to
encourage, privately, any sign of increased US interest in South Asia and
the Indian Ocean area. Quiet support for the US decision to lift the arms
embargo in Pakistan and to expand the base at Diego Garcia almost
certainly will be sustained.
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Peking's policy will rest on a hope that some turn of events in
Indian domestic politics or a downturn of Indian-Soviet relations will
open the way to Indian-Chinese detente, But the Chinese hand will
remain weak, and, no matter how well Peking plays it, will probably be
a losing one.
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DISCUSSION
1. SETTING
The importance of South Asia to China is great, if
only because the area contains the only large, pop-
ulous, non-Communist states directly bordering on the
People's Republic. Adding to this importance is South
A''ia's location next door to Tibet, a province in which
most of the population is non-Chinese and where there
was an anti-Chinese rebellion in 1958-60. Although
Indian Prime Minister Nehru in 1954 renounced the
special consular rights in Tibet which his government
had inherited from the British, the Chinese have
remained suspicious about Indian intentions there.
Chinese attitudes toward developments in South
Asia have passed through several stages since the Com-
munist triumph in 1949.
From 1949 to 1953 Sino-Indian relations were
generally cordial, although periodically spoiled by
Peking's actions in Tibet. Nehru's renunciation of In-
dian privileges in Tibet, apparently reso!ved this issue,
however, and 1954 proved to be a banner year for
Sino-Indian cordiality. In June Premier Chou En-
lai visited New Delhi and reaffirmed China's accept-
ance of the "Five Principles of Peaceful Co-
Existence''-one of Nehru's favorite international
themes. Later in 1954 Nehru visited Peking. By the
time of the Afro-Asian Conference at Bandung in April
1955, China's post-Korean war policy of peaceful co-
existence was in full swing and good Sino-Indian
relations were in full bloom.
This period of goodwill, however, was destined for
an early decline. Events in Tibet, and Nehru's increas-
ing interest in improving Indian relations with the
USSR, laid the ground-work for the deterioration.
Despite Chou En-tai's repeated assurances to Nehru
that China would respect the autonomy of Tibet and
the position of the Dalai Lama, Peking was tightening
its grip on the province. Tribal revolts against Chinese
rule sprang up, culminating in the uprising of 1959,
which the Chinese harshly repressed. India's grant of
asylum to the fleeing Dalai Lama added to the
worsening atmosphere of Sino-Indian relations.
Conflicting territorial claims in the Himalayas
between China and India were transformed from a
back-burner issue into military hostilities; this tranfor-
rnation put in end to Nehru's hopeful policy of good
relations with China. Nehru's disillusion with the
leadership in Peking was complete and bitter. In later
years his daughter was to allege to an Indian journalist
that China's "treachery" was responsible for her
father's death.
Increased hostility in Sino-Indian relations
coincided with the deepening of China's hostility to
the USSR, and these developments soon became
intertwined. As the USSR replaced the US as Peking's
main enemy, China's policy in South Asia became
increasingly oriented toward combating the spread of
Soviet influence. China's victory over India, however,
guaranteed that Peking would be forced to deal with
events in Sot:th Asia at a great initial disadvantage.
Peking's evolution into the major ally of
Pakistan-India's traditional enemy-while useful to
Peking, could not repair the damage done by making
an enemy of the largest, most powerful state on the
subcontinent.
New Delhi sought support against China from out-
side South Asia, first from both superpowers, but in
later years increasingly from the USSR. In August
1971, India gave more formal shape to its special
relationship with the USSR by concluding a Treaty of
Friendship and Cooperation with Moscow. In later
years Prime Minister Indira Gandhi was to explain this
development by remarking that if the Chinese per-
ceived India to be in we lap of the USSR, the
Chinese should rern~mber that it was they who had
put India there.
The conclusion of the Indian-Soviet treaty,
however, did not read the Chinese to abandon all hope
of early improvement in relations with India. In point
of fact, Peking and New Delhi began talks looking to
the restoration of ambassadorial relations in mid-to-
late August 1971, after the conclusion of the Indian-
Soviet treaty.* The serious deterioration of Indian-
Pakistani relations was perceived by the Chinese as
*Sino-Indian relations have remained at charge d'affaires level
since 1962. Their restoration to the ambassadorial level has con-
siderable symbolic importance as a public manifestation of Sino-
Indian detente. The level of interest on either side In an exchange of
ambassadors serves as a rough index of the desire to seek detente at
any particular moment.
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opening the way to a major influx of Soviet military
aid to India-a development Peking was determined
to slow down, Peking may also have hoped that the
prospect of better relations might induce the Indians to
exercise restraint in their dealings with Pakistan, For Its
part, New Delhi hoped that improved Sino-Indian
relations might reduce the likelihood of Chinese in-
tervention in case of an Indian-Pakistani war over East
Pakistan,
This is not to say that the Chinese accepted the
Indo-Soviet Treaty with equanimity. They viewed it as
essentially a politico-military agreement aimed at
China fully as much as at Pakistan-to reinsure
against eventual Chinese military intervention in
behalf of Pakistan.
Any chance for quick improvement in Sino-Indian
relations was lost in the Indian-Pakistani war of
December 1971. India's invasion of East Pakistan oc-
casioned the harshest Chinese public criticism of India
in* nearly two years. Reaching into recent history for
comparison, the Chinese press accused India of seeking
to create a Manchukuo-like puppet state in East
Pakistan. But caustic verbal attacks on India and the
USSR and the provision of political support, par-
ticularly in the UN, marked the limit of China's aid for
Pakistan in December 1971.
In fact, the Chinese did much less for Pakistan in
1971 than they had done during the Indian-Pakistani
war of 1965, This time the Chinese avoided diver-
sionary actions on the Indian-Chinese border. In con-
trast to 1965, they kept their border patrolling down,
avoided moving bombers into Tibet, and made only
pro forma protests of alleged Indian violations well
after the event. In this way, the Chinese reduced any
Indian concern about Chinese intervention-concern
which, the Chinese reasoned, might induce New Delhi
to allow the Soviets an enlarged role in South Asia.
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Pakistan's defeat and dismemberment by India left
Peking in an even weaker position in South Asia than It
held prior to December 1971, India had emerged from
the war the predominant power in South Asia. This
setback to China's policy, however, did not basically
alter the decision reached in 1970 to seek improvement
in relations with India. The path to effective political
influence in South Asia lay through New Delhi, not
Islamabad. But China's weak hand in the area did not
bode well for an easy improvement. Aside from a
settlement of the border issue-an unlikely
possibility-Peking had little to offer to any Indian
government and to an Indira Gandhi emotionally
hostile to China and in the full-flush of self-confidence
brought by victory.
II. CHINA'S POST-WAR TACTICS 25X1 25X1
After Pakistan's defeat by India, Peking's first prior-
ity in South Asia was to bolster Pakistan's weak
negotiating position and to recoup what it could from
the setback to Chinese interests. In doing so Peking
evolved a cluster of tactics designed to aid
Pakistan-still its major ally in the region-without
closing the door on eventually improving relations
with India. Implicit in the whole Chinese effort was
Peking's concern with what it saw as conti'aued Soviet
efforts to build a loose cordon saniiaire around China.
pie Chinese made clear that they in-
tended to maintain their support for Pakistan in roughly
the same proportions and on the same level as previously.
Chinese support would continue to include diplomatic
and limited economic and military aid, but not an all-
out commitment to defend Pakistan militarily, nor
markedly to upgrade Pakistan's military capabilities.
In part this carefully calculated suppcrt sprung from
Peking's inability to supply the military equipment
and economic aid necessary to make Pakistan a match
for India. A further reason, however, was a desire to
avoid further embroiling Chinese-Indian relations by
sharply increasing China's commitment to Pakistan.
After helping to replace equipment lost in the 1971
war, Peking limited itself to supplying relatively
moderate amounts of the same type of equipment it
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supplied previously-ammunition, artillery, naval
patrol craft, and medium tanks. Nothing in the post.
1971 aid package could drastically alter the military
balance in South Asia.
The Chinese also agreed to Pakistan's request for ad-
ditional aid in building the Karakorum highway
between Sinkiang and Pakistani Kashmir, By 1975,
about 80,000 Chinese engineering troops were pushing
the highway south toward the Indus River. The
military usefulness of the highway is limited, however,
by problems of terrain and climate. From China's
point of view, its value may be that it allows continua-
tion of a Chinese presence in a sensitive, although
remote, area.
As China slowly made good on its military aid com-
mitments, after 1972 the focus of Peking's program
appeared to switch to supporting Pakistan's efforts to
build its own defense industry. So far, however,
China's pledge, given in January 1973, to provide all
possible assistance to Pakistan's effort to become more
self-sufficient in military production, has proven to be
mainly talk.
The economic aid advanced during the Bhutto visit
25X1 was even more form than substance, consisting of relief
from repayment of previous loans rather than new
credit. The joint communique summing up Bhutto's
visit supported Pakistan, but also put China on record
as favoring eventual good relations with India.
Having made the necessary gestures of support for
Pakistan, the Chinese quickly pursued a second
element in their strat^gy-playing off India's other
neighbors against it. During 1972, the Chinese took
advantage of state visits by high-ranking officials from
Afghanistan, Sri Lanka and Nepal to amplify this
campaign.
The visit of Afghan Foreign Minister Shafiq to Pek
ing in April 1972 was particularly impor'ant to Peking.
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The Chinese were eager to sound out Afghan inten-
tions concerning Kabul's nationality dispute with
Pakistan. Whatever assurance Shafiq may have given
the Chinese, the leadership in Peking remained uneasy
over the potentially troublesome issue of Afghan-
Pakistr4ni relations. This concern proved to be well
founded-the coup in Kabul in July 1973 which
returned former Prime Minister Daud to power was
quickly followed by heightened tension between
Afghanistan and Pakistan over the status of the
Pushtuns and Baluchis within Pakistan, As the Chinese
feared, this turn of events led to c!oser Afghan relations
with th., USSR, already a major foreign influence in
Kabul.
Peking's renewed interest in contacts with the
government of Bhutan after the autumn of 1971
carried a double meaning. Not only was it meant to ex-
plore the possible benefits to China of increasing
Bhutanese restlessness under Indian tutelage, but also
to demonstrate, albeit in a low-key way, China's in-
terest in preserving the status of Bhutan as a buffer
between China and India. All three sides. -China, In-
dia, and Bhutan--acted with restraint in dealing with
the attendance of a Chinese diplomat at the corona-
tion of the King of Bhutan in June 1974. The Chinese
press briefly publicized the event and made its point
by praising the new ruler for adapting the goals of
sovereignty and self-reliance. The Bhutanese, in no
position to alienate their Indian big brother, played
their new Chinese connection very lightly. The In-
dians, while disgruntled at the Bhutanese invitation to
the Chinese, apparently believed that their hold on the
small mountain kingdom-which includes respon-
sibility for defense-was secure enough to let the inci-
dent pass.
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A third major element in Peking's political strategy
toward South Asia was the attempt to use the US to
counter-balance Moscow's improved position i
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III. THE LONG ROAD TO DETENTE
I laving svitlvd oo the haste II Heals of Its postwar
strar:'gy In South Asia, China procl(dP(I to combine
Ilvin in order to achivvv Its IrnmP(Ifat(' ohjec-
tive-Intlrnati(rmtl stability In the mgion, A major
prerriluisitl for stability-nand for creating an at-
mosphPrP hospitable to iruprov(rncnt In Sino-In(I,iui
relations-was the settlement of outstanding Issues
b('twl'('rl In(IIa and Pakistan. Although Peking's ability
to inllIPr-c( (I;w( lopments III South Asia was quite
limited, II (li(1 what It could to change the still highly
charged atmosphere there by encouraging Pakistan to
hold direct talks with India to settle major (lifferenccs.
(aver Peking's principal goal in South Asia-the
limitation of Soviet Influence through development of
it stable regional order-it is not suprising that China
w(Icomc(I the results of the Sinila Conference of lid.
1972 hehvc(n President Bhutto and I'rinu Minister
Gandhi. 'I'hroughoot the ensuing slow process of mrr-
tnalizatlon of Indian-Pakistani relations, China
greeted Pack step with approval.
Innprovennrrit III Indian-Pakistani relations allowed
Peking to make it number of small gestures of
friendship toward India, such as sending it higher-
ratrking charge' to head the Chinese embassy. Most
significantly, Peking reacted with restraint toward In-
dia's takeover of the administration in Sikkim in April
1973.
The urgency at this time of Peking's desire further to
improve relations with India probably originated in
Chinese concern over what it regarded as Soviet gains
in Afghanistan. The coup there which brought Daud
to power in July 1973 raised the spectre of the further
disintegration of Pakistan. By mid-October 1973 Chou
ApTnrnvpd Fri
hu Inl was telling it visiting foreign dignitary That the
USSR Irltlillh'(I to oolh - the Baluchi areas of I'nltistnti,
Afghanistan, and Iran Io form no In(IPpeu vul slate
amenable Io Soviet influence, which ulllnuitely wonl(i
provide the USSIt with access Io the Indian Ocean,
China's suspicions regarding the Increusiug Soviet
naval presence III the Indian Ocean had been growing
for some thee, Soviet pollllcal gains fit South Asia after
1970, followed by the oil crisis which accompaniP(I the
Arab-Israeli war of 1973, added to Peking's concern
over the t1SS11's growing power in the Indian Ocean.
The Arabs' use of the "oil weapon," while later endors-
ed by Peking, Pntphasi'.ed the vulnerability of Western
Europe and Japan to disruption of fuel supplier, from
the Middle East. In addition to fear of "Soviet en-
circlement," the Chinese became concerned that the
USSR was attempting to Increase its military presence
in and around the Indian Ocean in order to increase its
potential to pal pressure on the US, Japan, and Europe
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As Chinese propagan(15 criticized superpower
rivalry in the Indian Ocean as a contest for Ii(gernony,
Chinese comments took on an Increasingly anti-Soviet
slant, In early January 1974, it Chinese Communist
newspaper official in 11ong Kong described US plans
for the expansion of military facilities on the island of
Diego Garcia as it wise move, necessary to counter the
USSR.
In starting a process of detente with India, however,
Peking still faced the obstacle of India's retention of
90,000 Pakistani prisoners of war, some of whom were
wanted by the new government of Bangladesh for war
crimes trials. Peking, therefore, welcomed the agree-
ment reached on 28 August 1973 by India, Pakistan,
and Br.:igladesh for the release of the POWs, even
thour ?, ; 'ie agreement did riot settle the fate of the 195
POt anted for war dimes trials.
The POW issue also played an important role in
Peking's decision not to recognize the new regime in
Bangladesh. China had justified its veto of Dacca's
application for membership in the UN on precisely this
issue and threatened to repeat the veto until all Inc
prisoners, including the 195 "war criminals," were
returned to Pakistan.
China's reluctant attitude toward Bangladesh,
however, was conditioned by broader considerations
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11,111, sol)port for Pakistan. I4-king was perlorbed by the
ovicessarily close Iles of liangladesh to Inulln and the
IISSII. Moreover, till' seevuingly intractable economic
problems facing Mujih suggested that his government
might not he long-lived. I'eking nuay have been
waiting to see if he would be replaced by as government
less friendly to India and the IISSII. 'I'liat Dacca's close
mlrrtiorrs with India and the IISSII was the main ob-
stacle (hampering (;Irinn's relations with Bangladesh Is
suggested by Peking's recognition of till- government of
('resident Khardahar Mrrslrta(iue Ahmed--reputedly
less pro-Indian and less pro-Soviet-only two week!:
rafter 11 was- placed in power by it military coup.
liecognition was not accompanied, however, by an
agreen-rnrt to exchange ambassadors, 'I'h;s continued
caution may be inspired by uncertainty over the pros-
pects of the new regInne. If the Alined government
proves to have some staying power, and more impor-
tant, can loosen Dacca's ties with New Delhi and Mos-
cow, Peking probably will establish diplomatic relations.
Any future relationship between China and Bangladesh
is likely to rest on mutual political Interests, however,
and not primarily on all economic or aid basis. China
probably does not wish to become deeply involved In
an aid relationship wits; the economic morass that is
Bangladesh.
IV. THE INDIAN NUCLEAR EXPLOSION AND
THE ANNEXATION OF SIKKIM
A series of events in the first hail( of 1974 illustrated
Peking's continued desire for improved relations with
India and the difficulties remaining in achieving that
goal. Front the Chinese point of view, Pakistan's
recognition of Bangladesh in April 1974 and the t:gree-
mertt on the repatriation of the remaining 195
Pakistani POWs without subjecting there to war
crimes trials improved the atmosphere of Sino-Indian
relations and opened the way fora conciliatory gesture
toward Bangladesh. In a speech welcoming Prime
Minister Bhutto to Peking on 11 May, Vice Premier
25X1 Teng tlsiao-ping announced China's readiness to
develop good neighborly relations with the countries of
South Asia on the basis of the "five principles of
peaceful co-existence."
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Prospects for improvement in Sino- Indian) relit! -is
remained bright despite India's explosion of it nuclear
(device on 18 May 1974. Peking responded to an In-
dian suggestion nude In early 1974 that Sino-Indian
relations be Improved by accepting it "people-to-
people" visit from to pro-Chinese front organization.
Included in (It(- visiting delegation was it member of
parliament who repcrtr(Ily, was as confidant of Prime
Minister Gandhi, ', he Chinese gave the delegation
high-level attenti'm, including a meeting with CCI'
Vice Chairman Yeh Chien-ying, who attempted to
(leterrnine Indian receptivity to an exchange of am-
bassadors.
If India's demonstration of cn (nnbryonic nuclear
capaabilit)' (]ill not affect China's short-terns nuclear
superiority, nor deter the search for detente with India,
it did raise short-term complications ;in(] long-term
problems for the leadership in Peking. In the short run,
the Chinese were presented with the problem of
appearing to support Pakistan while avoiding making
any major defense commitment to Islam-(natl. Peking
adopted it policy of nllinim al public reaction while
privately seeking to calm Pakistani nerves. In August
1974 11 Chinese official bluntly stated that China was
against nuclear blackmail, but would not act as the
guarantor of the security of any state aeainct a n ir'lr...r
threat.
Possession of a nuclear capability may, in the long
run, however, make India harder for Peking to deal
with in any effort to achieve a detente or border
settlement. The Chinese saw India's nuclear achieve-
ment as a manifestation of a claim to pre-eminence in
South Asia-a claim China is loath to accept. What
disquieted the Chinese was, in the words of Foreign
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Minister (rhino Kuan-hua, ".. , not the fact, but the
policy of expansionism behind it. ..."
In contrast to Its low I,ey reaction to the Indian
nuclear explosion, China's reaction to the series of In-
dian moves Inaugurated In June 1974 which
culminated in the complete annexation of the
Ilinurlnyan kingdom of Sikkim In April 1975 was
sharply critical. The annexation of Sikkim raised
Chinese suspicions about Indian Intentions In Nepal
and Bhutan, two countries which China hoped would
remain as buffers along the troublesome Slim-Indian
border. The announcement in New Delhi of the trans-
formation of Sikkim Into an associate state within
India prompted China to announce officially that it
did not recognize the annexation Peking officially
pledged its support to the "Sikkiniese people's struggl--
for national independence." 'l'ine Chinese backed lip
this verbal show of displeasure with limited but un-
mistakable military gestures. Peking also moved to
strengthen its strategic position in 'T'ibet by stepping up
programs for highway improvement and the construc-
tion of a pipeline, and eventually a -ailroad, into the
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The Chinese also publicized their continued interest
in the indcpxndena' of Nepal. In February 1975, Peking
airg-:,ented its propaganda and political support for
the royal government there by extending a $80-90
million loan for a large road building project. It will be
the largest single foreign at(' project in the country and
probably will make China at least temporarily Nepal's
biggest aid donor. Nevertheless. Peking was unwilling
to extend any kind of defense commitment to Nepal.
SINO-INDIAN DETENTE
India's moves in Sikkim, however. did not alter
China's interest in improved relations with India as a
device for eventually undermining New Delhi's un-
comfortably close relationship with the USSR.
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By December 1974, China had put into operation it
plan to use its good offices to ameliorate Afghan-
Pakistani relations and to pursue detente with India.
Acting on a suggestion made to the Pakistanis in
August 1974, the Chinese moved to improve their Owl
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relations with Afghanistan and to December 1974 ex
tended to the Daud regime it new $55 million loan.
By Inc end of January 1975 Peking was clearly
;;igna!ing its desire for Improved relations with India.
The anti-Indian campaign in the Chinese press
tapered off and China gave extensive favorable
publicity to the visit of a Chinese table tennis team to
India for an international tournament. Chinese
propagandists resurrected the long unused slogan of
"Hindi-Chilli bhai bhai" ("Indians and Chinese are
brothers" ),
In late February and early
March 1975 China capped its campaign for detente
with stopovers in Calcutta by a Politburo member and
Deputy Premier, General Chen Ilsi-lien. Chen, the
highest-ranking Chinese official to visit India for over
it decade, announced that China was ready for talks, if
India wanted them, for the normalization of relations.
Peking's eagerness for detente was evident in Chen's
public statement that India's close relations with
Moscow did "not necessarily" stand in the way of im-
proved Sino-Indian relations. New Delhi, however,
failed to respond. Prime Minister Gandhi appeared
reluctant to jeopardize India's beneficial relationship
with the USSR by pursuing detente with China. For
example, in a newspaper interview on 6 February
1975, Mrs. Gandhi lauded Moscow's support for India
by stating: "Haven't they (the USSR) stood by us
whenever we have needed any help? When we wanted
to first industrialize, they were the first people to help
its with heavy industry. Whenever there was any war
we have not asked for their military help, but they
have stood by its."
Momtrver, Mrs. Gandhi in the first half of 14'i75 laced
mounting opposition at home. Detente with China
which produced no more than a symhnlic exchange of
ambassadors but which failed to include progress on
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basic Issues, such its the Sino-Indian border quarrel,
would give her opposition more ammunition in their
campaign to bring her down, Mrs. Gandhi publicly
made clear her position that China must do more than
send friendly signals if Sino-Indian detente was to oc-
cur, Remarks by Indian officials in Hong Kong al:;()
suggested that India wanted substantive issues sorted
out before an exchange of ambassadors between New
Delhi and Peking. This attitude was contrary to that of
the Chinese, who wanted to start the process of detente
by the restoration of ambassadorial relations, and only
then to discuss outstanding issues, such as the Indian-
Chinese border. Peking almost certainly realized that it
could not offer it border settlement which Mrs. Gandhi
could accept. Discussion of the border problem first
would probably stop detente and the ambassadorial
exchange in their tracks.
the Pakistanis to continue to seek normalization of
relations with India, Li Ilsien-nien expounded the
view that inherent contradictions in Indian-Soviet
relations were becoming more apparent and that India
would inevitably follow the example of Egypt in
reversing its orientation toward the USSR, Presumably
the political crisis which erupted in June In India has
shaken this optimistic analysis.
India's recent plunge into authoritarian rule raises
disturbing questions for Peking about the future of
Sino-Indian relations, Peking's main concern in South
Asia has been the increase in Soviet influence in the
area. This concern obviously lay behind the remarks of
it Chinese diplomat, made in late June 1975, that Mrs.
Gandhi's move would greatly increase Soviet influence
in India. The Chinese also were apprehensive that
Mrs. Gandhi might attempt to divert attention away
from her authoritarian rule by creating an incident in
Nepal.
VI. PROSPECTS
The rebuff to its efforts of early 1975 to begin the
process of detente with India, coupled with the later
plunge toward authoritarian government there, has
left China at best roughly where it was in January
1972. At worst, its position in South Asia has
deteriorated, if one accepts the thesis that Prime
Minister Gandhi will be driven to seek closer relations
with the USSR and to rely more heavily than in the
past on political support from the Indian Communist
Party as a result of her swing to authoritarian rule. It is
the opportunity afforded the USSR to advance its in-
fluence in India that has most disturbed Peking. This is
The completion by India in April 1975 of the annex-
ation of Sikkim ended Peking's latest attempt to im-
prove relations with India. The Chinese once again
vented their outrage in harsh propaganda attacks
against Indian expansionism and against Prime
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Peking still did not close the door to eventual
relations with all the countries of South Asia. In urging
late April 1975 reiterated China's wish to develop good
detente with India. Deputy Premier Li Hsien-rien in
Appr4
not to say that Peking ever had unrealistic expectations
that it could successfully effect a deep split in Indian-
Soviet relations. Nevertheless, the Chinese were
hopeful of eventually undermining Moscow's in-
fluence.
That India still feels the need for a powerful ally to
weigh in the balance against China is reflected in the
public and private statements of Indian officials from
the level of Indira Gandhi down to minor diplomats.
As one Indian official has said, New Delhi cannot be
expected to sacrifice its ties with Moscow for the sake
of improving Sino-Indian relations any more than Pe-
king can be expected to sacrifice its Pakistani ties for
the sake of better relations with India.
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Given India's ambitions for South Asian leadership
and fear of China, the Chinese have little to offer New
Delhi, China cannot duplicate the political, economic,
or military support available to India from the USSR.
Nevertheless, Peking appears to realize that the only
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way to strengthen its weak hand in South Asia is to im-
prove relations with India, even if this means initially
accepting an uncomfortably close relationship
between India and the Soviet Union. Peking appears
to be relying on the hope that in the long run Indian
and Soviets interests will increasingly diverge and
provide an opening for Chinese dlplornacy.
The principal Chinese concern about Indira
Gandhi's drive toward personal rule is that it will work
to the benefit of the USSR, The Chinese thus will con-
tinue to watch carefully for signs that may portend
even closer Indian-Soviet ties, such as an acceptance
by India of Moscow's scheme for an Asian Security
fact or the granting by India of naval bases to the
USSR.
A large measure of the antagonism between India
and China stems from their conflicting border claims,
Disputed Areas Along the China-India Border
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Boundary shown on Chinese
Communist maps
Disputed area
*Lhasa
International boundary
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and this issue probably will be further downplayed by
the Chinese, Peking has occupied the territory it wants
oil the border and no doubt would he willing to accept
it settlement which would leave it in possession of the
western disputed areas while renouncing claim to the
eastern areas it does not occupy, It is even possible that
China would accept small adjustments in India's favor
in those areas occupied by China. The Indians,
however, would regard such it settlement as being ten
heavily in China's favor. It would entail it loss of
territory for India that any Indian leader, including
Mrs. Gandhi, would find impossible to accept.
Whereas in early 1974 Mrs. Gandhi appeared to be
in favor of setting the unresolved border issue aside, by
February 1975 slue had apparently come to believe
that increasing domestic criticism of her government
and awareness of China's role as the party seeking
better relations called for raising the border issue; she
appeared to be linking substantive progress on the
border problem to any decision to enter into talks on
normalization of relations, New Delhi probably will
persist in its current position that a resumption of am-
bassadorial relations that does not lead anywhere
further will serve little purpose for either side,
The bilateral problem of the border is only part,
although in important one, of the large issue of
clashing Sino-Indian interests in the I Iimalayas. China
almost certainly views India's actions in Sikkim as a
move to strengthen New Delhi's position on the border
of 'T'ibet. India, however, is likely to remain extremely
sensitive to any disorder in the mountain kingdoms
which might be exploited by the Chinese to advance
their influence south of the Iiirnalayas. This mutual
sensitivity based on security interests underlies both
China's sharp reaction to the annexation of Sikkim
and India's serious view of Peking's official refusal to
recognize it as a legal annexation.
With Sikkim securely in India's grasp, Sino-Indian
rivalry in the Himalayas is likely to center on Nepal.
Peking will seek to maintain the kingdom as a neutral
buffer while remaining suspicious that Mrs. Gandhi
will use or provoke in incident there to divert Indian
popular attention from troubles at home. As long as
India remains unified, with growing military strength,
however, China is unlikely to use force to pursue its in-
terests in the Himalayas.
Political developments in India constitute another
source of possible future friction between Peking and
New Delhi. Peking may be forced to consider what at-
litude to take toward underground opposition groups
there or regional opposition to the central government
in New Delhi. Peking's attitude toward civil war in Ili-
dill is uncl'?ar. Chinese experience with Indian Maoist
radicals nos been unproductive from Peking's point of
view, In the event of anti-central government in-
surgency in India, China is unlikely to rush in with
more than moral support. M ore likely would br it deci-
sion to follow events closely and attempt to gauge the
likelihood of success-based on organization,
leadership, and proven ability in the field-of any un-
derground or insurgent movement,
Peking's attitude toward an eventual breakup of In-
dia also is unclear, Certainly such it cont. ,ency would
present Peking difficult problems and choices. On one
hand, Peking might welcome the balkanization of a
major, unfriendly power on its borders. On the other
hand, a process of Indian political disintegration
almost certainly would invite strong Soviet efforts to
safeguard the USSR's political, economic, and military
investments there. On balance, Peking probably hopes
that India will remain unified and that the govern-
ment of Indira Gandhi eventually will give way to one
more willing to seek Sino-Indian detente. In Chinese
eyes it would matter little if such a new regime were,
for example, a radical left-wing or a military right-
wing government. What would matter would be the
new government's attitude toward the USSR and
China.
Anti-Indian feeling among the aging Chinese
leadership is probably only a minor factor in China's
formulation of its policy. Certainly past Chinese
approaches to New Delhi suggest that Milo and his
lieutenants are able to overcome their personal an-
tipathies in the interest of preventing it closer Indian-
Soviet alignment. Of greater moment is the effect of
Mrs, Gandhi's personal animus toward China and the
continued widespread anti-Chinese feeling among the
majority of India's governing elite, Although Mrs.
Gandhi has shown flexibility at times in her attitude
toward China, her personal antipathy to the leadership
in Peking is deep and will probably persist.
While the special relationship with Pakistan is still
useful, Peking is under no illusions about the existing
balance of power of South Asia. It recognizes that In-
dia is far stronger than any of its neighbors there. It
sees little chance that even improved relations with
smaller states would strengthen its weak position.
Thus, lacking leverage in South Asia, Peking will con-
tinue to look to the US as a counterweight to Moscow.
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Peking will remain alert to any development that
might presage Indian interest in Sino-Indian detente.
Certainly the prospects for such it development now
appear bleak, but the situation which has developed in
South Asia since December 1971 contains the same
basic elements which led China to seek detente in 1971
and which led it to try again in early 1975. As long as
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these elements remain-Soviet influence in South Asia
and presence in the Indian Occun, Indian fear of
Pakistan and China, and New Delhi's dreams of
dominating the region-China appears constrained to
hope for some turn of events in India that will once
again open the way to Sino-Indian detente.
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