NATIONALISM IN SOVIET UKRAINE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00608R000600170005-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 64
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 2004
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: August 1, 1975
• Content Type: RS

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Research Study
Nationalism in Soviet Ukraine
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Top Secret
Top Secret
OPR in
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August 1975
NSA review completed
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Approved F
I
III
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION
II. THE PLACE OF THE UKRAINE IN THE SOVIET SYSTEM
2
A. The Ukrainian Nation
2
13. The Ukraine's Status Visqi-vis the Union
4
III. RUSSIFICATION AND ITS FRUITS
7
A. The Brezhnev Years: Toward a Unitary State . . ............
7
13. Linguistic and Demographic Trends
10
C. Modernization and Russification
14
IV. NATIONALIST DISSENT IN THE UKRAINE
14
A. Geographical and Sociological Breakdown
15
13. Grievances of the Disaffected
16
C. "Establishment" Intelligentsia and Nationalism
20
D. Contacts with Eastern Europe and the West
21
E. Relations with Russian, Jewish, and Christian Dissent ..
2.3
V. THE POLITICS OF NATIONALISM IN THE UKRAINE .
26
A. Factionalism and Nationalism
26
13. The Case of Shelest: A Vassal Who Loved His Fief
27
C. The Case of Shcherbitsky: As Royalist as the King
33
VI. THE UKRAINE IN THE YEARS AHEAD
38
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FIGURES
I. Ukrainian S.S.R. (map) .....
iv
2. Ukrainian Representation in the Ukrainian Communist Party (chart) .
5
3. Russian Language Use in the Ukraine (chart)
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
OFFICE OF POLITICAL RESEARCH
August 1975
NATIONALISM IN SOVIET UKRAINE
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In the preparation of this study, the Office of Political Reseorch consulted other offices
of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of State. Their comments and
suggestions were appreciated and used, but no attempt at formal coordination was
undertaken. Further comments will be welcomed by the author
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Nationalism in Soviet Ukraine
August 1975
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The Soviet Uninn is a multi-national state in an age of
nationalism. Of the three great European land empires of the
nineteenth century -the Austrian, Turkish, and Russian -- only
the Russian is still intact. Although the -Tital signs of the
Soviet empire remain strong, many of its national rinorities
-- which number over 100, and make up almost half of the Soviet
population -- continue to resist the "melting pot" process,
and some of them are becoming more rather than less assertive.
Accordingly, the nationalities problem is one of the most per-
sistent and vexing domestic problems confronting Soviet author-
ities today. This paper, a distillation of a research study,
"Nationalism in Soviet Ukraine," examines nationalist tendencies
among the largest and most influential Soviet national minority.
It estimates the extent to which centrifugal and destabilizing
forces are at work in the Ukraine, and evaluates Moscow's
efforts to contain them.
Forces of Integration and Forces of Separation
'141 Many factors contribute to the vitality of Ukrainian
SID
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national feeling and tend to stiffen Ukrainian resistance to
Russification:
-- They have a rich cultural heritage and retain
a degree of pride that they are more "European"
than the Russians.
-- They occupy an area of great economic significance,
which ser.,:s both as a granary and as a major
mineral producer of the Soviet Union.
-- The sheer weight of their numbers (Ukrainians make up
17 percent of the Soviet population) adds to their
strength.
Yet, these centrifugal tendencies may be diluted by other forces:
-- Ethnically and linguistically the Ukrainians have
considerable affinity to the Russians, who are also
members of the East Slav family.
-- The eastern part of the Ukraine -- which contains
most of the republic's population, resources, and
industry -- has belonged to the Russian or Soviet
empire during most of the modern period. East
Ukrainians are close to the Russians in cultural
and religious background.
-- Soviet authorities tend to accept Ukrainians,
fellow on an almost equal footing with
Russians in elite recruitment.
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-- Under Khrushchev and Brezhnev, both of whom rose
through the Ukrainian Communist Party, the
Ukrainian Party has enjoyed a privileged position.
The Ukrainians are more completely integrated into the Soviet
system than most other Soviet national minorities, and the system
has been relatively good to them. Their similarity to the
Russians may give central authorities some grounds for hope that
assimilation may ultimately solve the Ukrainian problem.
Russification in the Ukraine
A survey of linguistic and demographic trends suggests
that time may indeed be on the side of the forces of assimilation
in East Ukraine. The process is slow, but the Russian element in
the cities of East Ukraine is growing, through assimilation of
Ukrainians and migration of Russians. Linguistic Russification
there is proceeding steadily. In the urban areas of East Ukraine
today the number of ethnic Russians and linguistically Russified
Ukrainians (those who claim Russian as their native tongue)
roughly equals the number of unassimilated Ukrainians.
In West Ukraine the statistics tell a somewhat different
story. West Ukraine has more than held its own against Russian
encroachments. This fact points to an important dimension of
the Ukrainian problem. While East Ukraine shares much of its
long history with Russia, the Soviet annexation of West Ukraine,
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occurring only during World War II, introduced into the Soviet
system an alien and generally hostile population which can be
Russified, if at all, only through a massive and prolonged
effort.
While assimilation is gradually taking place in East
Ukraine, this does not preclude the possibility that Ukrainian
opposition to Russian rule may be increasing, partly because
of the West Ukrainian infection. The two tendencies would not
necessarily be incompatible. The very forces of urbanization,
social mobilization, and mass education, which work to efface
national differences in the long run, may simultaneously
heighten consciousness of those differences in the short run.
The typical Ukrainian dissident is an urban intellectual of
peasant stock, the person most aware both of the Ukrainian
identity and of the forces working to weaken this identity.
The protests of Ukrainian nationalists in the cities are in
part provoked by the very success of Russification, by the
gradual assimilation of Ukrainians, the demeaning of the
indigenous culture, and the competition for jobs between
Russians and Ukrainians.
Nationalist Dissent in the Ukraine
Nationalim in the Ukraine does appear to be growing, or
at least becoming more vocal. During the last several decades
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Ukrainian dissent has undergone an evolution -- from the armed,
anti-Soviet resistance of World War II, to the formation of
conspiratorial groups in the 1950s, to the flourishing of open
protest in the 1960s. The period of the late 1960s witnessed
the emergence of a new type of dissent, avowedly Macxist in
orientation, which appealed to new Soviet elites for whom
traditional Ukrainian nationalism seemed outdated. Dissidents
since then have been less organized and more fragmented, less
clandestine and more overt, less single-minded in their quest
for national sovereignty and more variegated, less militant
but perhaps more geographically widespread. Overt dissent
probably reached its peak between 1968 and 1970, in the wake
if the invasion. of Czechoslovakia and during the period when
Petr Shelest, then First Secretary of the Ukrainian Party, was
permitting dissident writers a measure of latitude. Since
Shelest's removal in 1972, his successor's campaign for ideological
conformity has put the dissidents on the defensive, but they have
not been completely silenced and the reintroduction of more
draconian measures may have radicalized them.
A geographical and sociological breakdown of dissidents
reveals that dissent is not completely confined to an isolated
intelligentsia or to one section of thn Ukraine.
-- While nationalism has always been stronger
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in West Ukraine, in the late 1960s and early 1970s
dissent seems to have been on the rise in the cities
of East Ukraine as well.
-- Larger portions of the educated classes have been
involved in protests since the 1960s. In addition
to the few intellectuals who have cast their lot
with open dissent, large numbers of the "establishment"
intelligentsia sympathize with nationalist views in
greater or lesser degree.
-- Ukrainian nationalism probably has a stronger
popular base than Russian liberal dissent, embracing
both urban elements and, again especially in the case
of West Ukraine, the peasantry.
Popular support of Ukrainian intellectual dissent, however,
is largely latent.
-- If nationalist disturbances involving the peasantry
have occurred in recent years, we do not know about
them. Overt nationalism today is essentially an
urban phenomenon.
-- Even in the cities cooperation between workers and
intellectuals is probably impeded by the general
failure of the nationalist intelligeltsia to articulate
lower class grievances concerning living standards
and material welfare.
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The case of the Ukrainian dissidents is strengthened
somewhat by support from other dissatisfied elements in Soviet
society.
-- Mutual distrust prevented an alliance between
Jews and Ukrainians in the past, but Ukrainian
dissidents today make clear their distaste for
anti-Semitism, and they are receiving some
cautious backing from Jews in the Ukraine.
-- Russian liberal dissidents, traditionally luke-
warm or hostile toward Ukrainian separatist
sentiments, are showing more sympathy toward
Ukrainian aspirations, while the Ukrainians are
defining their crusade more broadly and stress-
ing its connection with the common struggle
for civil liberties in the Soviet Union.
-- Christian dissent continues to reinforce
Ukrainian nationalism. The Uniate Church,
which adheres to the Orthodox rite but recog-
nizes the authority of the Pope in Rome, has
traditionally been a bearer of Ukrainian national
feeling in West Ukraine. The Uniate Church was
officially dissolved by Moscow in 1947, but there
were indications that Uniate believers in the
Ukraine became restive during the 1960s.
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External support for the Ukrainian nationalists may in
some cases encourage Ukrainian dissidents to engage in bolder
acts of defiance.
-- As the regime detente policies make it
increasingl,, vulnerable to criticism "from the
other shore," and open up channels of communication
between the Soviet Union and the West, organized
protest of Ukrainian emigres in the US and Canada
becomes a potential shield for Ukrainian dissidents.
The PRC in recent years has stepped up its efforts
to exploit the Ukrainian nationality problem via
propaganda and contactf., with Ukrainian emigre
groups. A long drawn out and debilitating Sino-
Soviet war might stimulate Ukrainian fractionalism,
but it is unlikely that Ukrainian nationalists
would side with the Chinese regime, which they
probably dislike more than the Soviet one.
-- The Ukraine is much more susceptible to East
European influence, due to the historical
association of West Ukraine with bordering
East European countries, and the polyglot
character of the affected populations on both
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sides. Nationalist movements in Eastern Europe
could spark repercussions in the Ukraine, as
happened on a limited scale during the Czecho-
slovak crisis of 1968.
Although nationalism in the Ukraine appears to be waxing
rather than waning, a serious separatist effort is not in
sight. Even if the Ukrainians resented Russian domination
as greatly as do the East Europeans, at least two major
factors make the Ukrainian situation different from that of
Poland or Czechoslovakia.
The Ukraine has no national military units of
its own. The various Soviet nationalities are
thoroughly and deliberately integrated in the
Soviet military; troops stationed in the Ukraine
probably do not contain a higher than proportionate
percentage of Ukrainians.
-- Although the Ukrainian Party and government are
in the hands of native Ukrainians, which is not
the case with many Soviet republics, if put to
the test, the indigenous elite would probably by and
large cast its lot with the regime. The leaders of
the Ukrainian Party are more loyal to Moscow than
were their counterparts in Czechoslovakia. The
central regime has accorded Ukrainian Party
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opparolchik:; career advantages perhaps sufficient
to prevent them from nurturing significant grievances.
Nationalist Tendencies in the Ukrainiaoparty
Yet the Ukrainian Party itself has not been completely
free of nationalist tendencies. While a Ukrainian Conlunist
Party leader's primary loyalty is to the Party, few Ukrainian
officials are no rigidly loyal to the center as to place the
Interests of the all-union Party always above those of tlw
Ukraine, or so opportunistic an to be totally insensitive
to the needs and desires of the people among whom thy live.
In varying degrees they are responsive to those desires,
at times because of the practical difficulties encountered
in administering unpopular central policies, at times because
popular desires vomotimec coincide with the Communist official's
desire to win economic concessions for "his" region. Moreover,
a Ukrainian leader may attempt to manipulate nationalism as a
lever for increasing his political influence in Moscow.
The case of Petr Shelest, First Secretary of the Ukrainian
Party from 1963 to May 1972, provides an example of a Ukrainian
leader who displayed attitudes which could be labelled "nationalist,"
in the broadest sense of the word. His identification with and
toleration of Ukrainian national sentiment played a major -- if
not the major -- role in paving the way for his removal.
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:;hp 41[114 ST; "flat lonotirm" was manifested in sr.7veral ways:
-- WI was guilty Of f7C0n0MiC "mocaligm," n17,P11
in his hold defense of the hiterrnts of the
Ukrainian coal-mining industry.
-- lie appeared =will ino to throw his full
weight behind c.impa ions to repress nat ional ist
-- lie encouraged the use of the ilkrainian
1an(J0,-vie in education.
-- lie pr.L,rmitted literary expressions of ukrainian
national pride, and hirrz.?714 wrote a tx)ok which
glorified aspects of Ukraini-in history in
irriol ItiIc fashion.
Shelest's "nationalism" may haVe (lone no deeper than
the desire of. a regional leader to strf..7.notlsen his pcylecr
and to gain support in his personal vendetta with tirezhnev.
Whatever frig notivation, he did act in ways which associat,Ni
him with Ukrainian national feeling.
Since it in unlikely that Shelest would h.wr_, taken the
stands he did without the support of inr,x)rtant segn?rnts of the
Ukrainian Party, it in prollable that naticnalit.,t tendencies
are Still prerent in the unper echelons of the Ukrainian
Party. At present acherbitsky, Shelest's replacelaent an
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r it F:t y, Pr-0,F; f 0 haw'
lIkrainion Part y in hand.
hla plitged thoP47 wilt) draqq,1 thrir foot in
thn e1ttivii,11)
for idrological purity, and many of thono ho hnd cloar
connoct ionn with :lhr:lost. Aliw.to all, hr has ()ono ou1. of hin
way to (?;nr(hanizo that tho Illtrainii-m Party lookn to Mcmcou
for I In marching ordorn. Yot in tIiC Khrushrhoy ora :Thchrthitnky
rpiwqtily nhcw,0 gonc, 7rt.t1,7 in hip Oralings with central
autooritien. !IP fr... o clopt7ly iflentified with Ittr7Lnv that
lem c",iff fruit for him to do a voltt,face on national it ion
pol icy 1.01 z 1 r !Irer_hhey re-:rains in of f iCt7# 1}9t. i Ia micross ion
brihris a thar'ilr in t? )r' litical climato h might f ind it
exrd-dient If
in the tIkraine.
accfrrrrIlafion with nat ionalint r.1-_nrnts
;:o?-?iot Na! irnal it y_Pol i(-? in !'?o
rn Ahr
trwi"rI1ri7,7T;0ro.. leatierr,hi hap. tai,,en
1 !lard line
againnt a11 for,-::in of Vicrainian hat liii
to tmt ot nat ion;,1 ir Ito iird t In for I (-.,ng nor 1.(-wln,
it inc" t hey run the
dary7r-r the nrolder5 they
urre intended to solvo. And the vico (4 -1(x-.-klin.-? can lie
rXilr!Ctr:-) to t
ar its hr-1 orriodically. 7 re.gional
wl:atovr.r h r natinaliLy.in resrrnsihir for the r.crn(v,-ic
rrr.fornancr of his (mint, rqublic. naturally lo(l-birs for
its intorentn in thr_ I ic.cation of r(=?rxrurors.
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attrintitn to tratinform thr minor it ion ohjoctivoly and pny:TholtylicnIly
into Ittinniann. Itrrr connidrrationn of itik arr oroltaltly
paramount -- it in thr donirri for mon, pot it {cal control ovrr
thr minor which loadn cratral ant hor it for; to nt r I Vr?
N-adication or nat. Iona 1 di f f fir tincer?
It in rivrn ponniblr that Soy it 1 ender M motif
for thr
I t hrr
in t hi dirrction, toward a radical rrdtict ton of thr authority
of t.1),-, union rrixitil trrhanv, rrnoltingi in the, fourrol atw.il it ion
of thr cv Ict Fr*fle7rat ion, and orrn .1O0(' til. ion of thr Corrr-inirl.t
117"finir* with t rad t ional i mat Iona' i n. Thrrr in I It. I Ir'
indicntion that the"prrnrnt leldrt n air t;rrat Pin; 1.-in
ch4-)o..finint7. con.ntrrird with an ;11-..it Iona] drnirr to ?onvrrt ti I
trTIOritirin7.;.? DIA raettr, of thrm trwily flirt with Pkrifit) n-it ion.1
trc.-1,47.-47 of itr;, ;V: a poi rrcal 1 In;
fact that , (12r i1) Wor Id War II, :;t al in di r;cardod 'atv;
f?-ivi-ir tint irntit irt nneT; With ritoater (r.-r)t. 3flfltiiai 1.:-Irs a 1
With t..11c, wan inul of i4e,r3.1037 an a for,.: ca.:--)Ati:r of rrit ivat in';
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itt)tr, r (-it at iVe t?rit fcr t r
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ir cfrz-.1 p. 7); irv-q- taint ?o than thre' 'Ara ';e i t et
the" crntrr
nor the. 1,roviro,--17 are, 4-1-;if in thr-ir
7irr5rnt
relat ion;:hip
and in cirir w?vi or i.er thin I rxI to clia?-vir in 1.,.-orninso y-carr..
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