STAFF NOTES: SOVIET UNION EASTERN EUROPE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00608R000400110015-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 24, 2000
• Sequence Number: 15
• Publication Date: November 21, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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Secret
K
9 ^
O
Soviet Union
Eastern Europe
State Dept. declassification & release instructions on file
Secret
November 21, 1975
No. 0776/75
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Warning Notice
,gnsitive Intelligence Sourc.ls and Methods Involved
(WNINTEL)
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
DISSEMINATION CONTROL ABBREVIATIONS
NOFORN- Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals
NOCONTRACT- Not Releasable to Contractors or
Contractor/Consultants
PROPIN- Caution-Proprietary Information Involved
USIBONLY- USIB Departments Only
ORCON- Dissemination and Extraction of Information
Controlled by Originator
REL... - This Information has been Authorized for
Release to ...
Classified by 010725
Exempt from general declass fkat$on.cheoule
of E.O. 11554, exemption category:
0ISa(1), (2), and (3)
Automatically declaselfled on:
Date Impossible to Determine
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 SE C11
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This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington com-
munity by the USSR - Eastorn Europe Division, Office of Current Intel,
ligonco, with occasional contributions from other offices within the
Directorate of Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome, They should
be directed to the authors of the Individual articles.
COI; TENT'S
November 21, 1975
USSR-Angola: Press Coverage Con',inues Heavy. . . 1
Aid for Hanoi But No Base for Moscow. . . . . . . 3
CEMA Summit in Mid-December?. . . . . . . . . . . 5
Yugoslavs C- fend Their Role
in the Latest Postponement
of the European. Communist Conference. . . . . . 7
Yugoslavia-USSR 9
Yugoslavs Sensitive to Changes in Albania . . . . 11
PUBLICATION OF INTEREST . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
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USSR-Angola: Preso Coverage Continues Ilea
Soviet press coverage of the civil war in
Angola remains extremely heavy. Pravda, I;sveotiya
and the Soviet news agency Tass are hammering away
at the alleged intervention by outside forces--
Chinese, South African, Zairian, former Portuguese
"fascists," and "American mercenaries"--on behalf
of the Popular Movement's rivalo.
Moscow has reserved some of its heaviest
brickbats for the Chinese. The Soviet central press
recently blasted Peking for its criticism of Moscow's
"expansion" and "interference" in Angola. Reflecting
Soviet st.msitivity to these charges, the uo:tumentary
railed against Peking's own military, financial,
and training support for anti-MPLA forces as well
ac its collusion with "Portuguese fascists, South
Afri,.,an racists, and international monopolies."
Anti-Soviet vitriol has been a standard feature
of Chinese commentary on the Angolan conflict for
some time. The effort to embarrass Moscow for its
involvement with the Popular Moviient for the
Liberation of Angola has gained momentum, however,
since Peking lowered the visibility of its own
involvement by withdrawing Chinese advisers from
Zairian training programs for the Nacional Front
late last month. Since then, PeopZa's Daily has
carried two commentator articles lambasting Soviet
meddling in Angola, and the traditional independence
day editorial gave heavy play to the same theme.
NCNA has also carried several lengthy repor-:.s
focusing on the Soviet. role in Angola, and its
daily broadcasts have been saturated with replays
of anti-Soviet articles and statements from a
number of African capitals. Chinese propagandists
have had a field day rehashing the generally nega-
tive African react..on to Moscow's recognition of
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the Popular Movement in contravention of the OAU's
call for neutrality in the Angolan dispute, In
contrast, Peking has prominently identified itself
as a strong supporter of OAU policies. A recent
Peop"Ze'u Daily editorial said the OAU's call for
extension of recognition to all three Angolan liber-
ation groups and for the rival organizations to
unite was both "explicit and correct."
Pravda o,i November. 17 carried Moscow's indig-
nation over Chinese criticism one step further by
claiming that "in the course of recent contacts in
Peking," the Chinese mace an approach to the US
suggesting "paralleled or joint efforts" against
the Popular Movement. In addition to raising the
spectre of Chinese-US collusion in Angola, Pravda
replayed a British press report that "American
mercenaries"--"former veterans of Vietnam--were
serving with the movement's adversaries. The
latter charge, while not new, had been absent from
Soviet commentary for some time. (CONFIDENTIAL)
November 21, 1975
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 SECRET
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25X1X
25X1X
Aid for. Hanoi But
No Base for Moscow
the Soviet union will
give Vietnam "very considerable" economic assistance
for the restoration and further development of its
national economy. As usual, neither side has
divulged the value of the aid package. 25X1X
the Soviets would install a metal-
lurgical center and a petroleum refinery should pre-
liminary explorations prove that enough ore and oil
exist to make the projects worthwhile. Western com-
panies discovered. three oil deposits off shore in
South Vietnamese waters last spring, but their com-
mercial value was never determined. did not 25X1X
comment on the new look in Hanoi's CEMA connection,
although it is certainly another important facet
of Moscow's effort to strengthen its economic ties
with Vietnam.
denied that the Soviets are trying to
obtain naval bases in Vietnam, but did acknowledge
they are interested in the occasional use of Viet-
namese ports for refueling and repair, particularly
of "exploration" ships. this 25X1X
would involve nothing more than the arrangement
Moscow has with Singapore
must be well aware that the routine appearance in
tried to give the impression that only
civilian ships would use Vietnamese ports, but
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Vietnamese ports of any Soviet ships for repairs and
the like would be open to a quite different inter-
pretation, particularly by Peking.
There is some evidence that Moscow may have
been pushing Hanoi a bit harder on facilii.tes 25X1X
25X1X the Soviets had asked for,
and Hanoi had vetoed, the stationing of a "few" of
their people in Cam Ranh bay to aid in the servicing
of Soviet ships. 25X1X
25X1X almost certainly was trying to impress 25X1X
25X1X with Moscow's concern and willingness to
counter the Chinese "threat" to Southeast Asia.
(SECRET NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/ORCON)
November 21, 1975
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CE-14A Summit in Mid-December?
Embassy sources in Moscow and Bucharest are un-
certain when the CEMA summit will be held, although
most are guessing it will be some time after mid-
December.
Leaders of the CEMA countries are facing a
crowded schedule over the next few weeks. Bulgarian
leader Zhivkov is slated to visit West Germany No-
vember 24-28. Ceausescu is traveling in the Middle
East November 24-December 1. Czechoslovak party
chief Husak will go to Moscow before the end of No-
vember. The Soviets have scheduled important Cen-
tral Committee and Supreme Soviet meetings for De-
cember 1 and 2, respectively. In recent years the
Supreme Soviet session has lasted 3 days. That
leaves open only the weekend of December 5-7 before
the Polish party congress (opening December 8) or
some time later in December, before or after the
Cuban party congress.
If the CEMA summit is to be nothing more than
a symbolic gathering, the timing is not all that im-
portant, but Moscow apparently does want the summit
to make some important decisions.
the summit will take "particularly im-
portant" decisions on cooperation in raw material
exploitation and agricultural production. The more
comprehensive these proposals are, the more trouble
the Soviets will have in balancing national economic
interests. The summit will also discuss the trouble-
some issues of CEMA-EC relations and possible insti-
tutional changes within CEHA.
The Romanians, who have publicly dissented on
the CEMA-EC issue and are wary of institutional
changes, have engaged in procedural and other delay-
ing tactics. Bucharest probably wants to clear up
bilateral economic issues with the Soviets before any
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CEMA summit. The Romanians may also calculate that
a delayed summit will give any other East Europeans
who may ob4ect to elements of Soviet economic co-
operation proposals time to firm up their owii na-
tional economic plans and negotiating position before
the summit. (CONFIDENTIAL)
Phone: [phone]
November 21, 1975
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Yugoslavs Defend Their Role in the Latest
Postponement of the European Communist coFT-erence
The Yugoslav party, although sticking to its
conditions for participation in the proposed Euro-
pean Communist Conference, appears worried that the
Soviets are becoming irritated by the protracted
debates.
On Wednesday, as the latest preparatory phase
in East Berlin was breaking up without agreement,
Vecerne Novosti--a major Yugoslav daily--roundly
denounced Western press speculation that Belgrade
was acting from ulterior motives. The article
flatly denied, for example, that there was any link-
age between the internal drive against pro-Soviet
cominformists in Yugoslavia and the Yugoslav party's
independent tack in the Berlin preparatory meetings.
Upon returning from the GDR, the chief of the
Yugoslav deleyatiux, Aieksandr Grlickov, said that
the continuing discussions involved points of prin-
ciple that were of "basic significance" to the in-
dividual parties. Grlickov admitted the prepara-
tions were "somewhat long" :out argued that the size
of the task undertaken is the cause. Lest his posi-
tion be read as a sign of Yugoslav willingness to
back down, he reviewed his party's positions and
re-emphasized that all thematic work must be com-
pleted before any conference can convene.
Yesterday, Milika Sundic--the foreign affairs
correspondent for Radio Zagreb--expressed his con-
fidence that "unless something unforeseen happens,"
the next preparatory meeting is "likely" to "com-
pletely overcome" existing difft%rences. Sundic's
note of optimism, however, was followed by a long
review of the independent-minded parties demands of
Moscow. He said that since no date has yet been
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set, there is still time for more talk. In conclu-
sion, Sundic specifically denied that the Yugoslav
party has any motives other than its clearly stated
goals.
it is not yet clear if the defensive tone is a
response to specific criticism of Belgrade at the
meeting in East Berlin or if it is simply an in-
stinctive Yugoslav reaction. In either case, the
Yugoslavs will be watching the Soviets closely for
a reading on how the Soviet leadership deals with
the latest postponement. (CONFIDENTIAL)
November 21, 1975
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Yugoslavia-USSR
'Another senior Yugoslav party official has
openly expressed reservations about the Soviet
Union's intentions toward Yugoslavia.
Vladimir Bakaric, speaking to a Croat party
plenum on Thursday, reviewed the "machinations" of
all anti-Titoist emigre and domestic subversive
groups, but hit particularly hard at pro-Stalinists.
He said that although the Tito regime had repeatedly
asked foreign governments whether they supported
anti-Titoist subversion, it had received only
verbal reassurances about which "we can be sus-
picious." He specifically said that Yugoslav
desire for good relations with the "Eastern parties"
rests on mutual acceptance of the right to have
different foreign policies.
Bakaric attacked the pro-Soviet faction within
Yugoslavia for intentionally spreading doubts about
the country's stability in the post-Tito era. Ile
said this was a tactic designed to undermine confi-
dence abroad in Yugoslavia and to attract foreign
support, without which the small and unpopular
Stalinist faction cannot hope to challenge the
system.
The Bakaric speech can be read as an appeal
to the Soviets to take more forthright steps to
disassociate themselves from the Stalinist faction.
There is also an implied threat of a disruption in
Yugoslav relations with the East and, perhaps, a
more aggressive Yugoslav posture regarding divisions
with the Soviet alliance system. Bakaric reasserted
Yugoslavia's desire for good relations with all
countries in the Soviet orbit, but his speech places
the blame for the present chill in relations with
the East squarely on the Cominformists and on the
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failure of the Soviet camp to wholeheartedly back
the Titoist system.
Anger over the Soviets' bland denials of; re-
sponsibility for the comiformists' activity has
been simmering ever since the first major subversive
group was arrested in April 1974. 25X1C
Edvard Kardelj, one of Tito's
closet lieutenants, said privetly after a trip to
Moscow last fall that the Soviets were like "vultures."
Whatever the views of Kardelj and Bakaric, the
ultimate decision on how hard to press the Soviets
remains in Tito's hands. Tito has so far refrained
personally from direct expressions of anger at the
Soviets, but his determination to keep the anti-
Cominformist campaign on a purely internal plane
may be flaggint?. (SECRET NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/ORCON)
November 21, 1975
SECRET
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Yugoslavs Sensitive to Changes in Albania
A prominent Yugoslav news commentator has com-
plained that a recent Albanian press attack on Yugo-
slav "revisionism" serves the interests of foreign
powers--read, Moscow--which want the two Balkan coun-
tries divided.
riilika Sundic, the foreign affairs commentator
for Radio Zagreb, on Tuesday denounced an editorial
in Tirana's Zeri i Popuiiit for its unwarranted
revi'al of polemics against Yugoslavia. Sundic's
criticism centered on the theme that well-known
aeological and political differences should not
obscure the common interest of Belgrade and Tirana
in building a working relationship based on a mutual
desire to preserve independence.
According to a version cf the Zeri i Popullit
editorial broadcast by Radio Tirana on Sunday, only
one paragraph--in a nine-page editorial--speci?ically
mentioned Yugoslavia. The rest of the article was
a strong denunciation of Khrushchev's revisionist
policies in terms that could also be read as anti-
Yugoslav.
That Suridic shou'.d reply to this sally at all
suggests concern in Belgrade about the rumored polit-
ical changes at work in Tirana. A year ago, the
Hoxha regime was emphasizing common Balkan interests
in fending off Soviet influence in the region. The
Yugoslavs welcomed this trend, and they would view
a reversal in Albania's relations with its neighbors
as a tactical gain for Moscow. Belgrade is also
fully aware of the problems it would face if Tirana
reverted to its former practice of exacerbating na-
tionalist tension among Yugoslavia's Albanian mi-
nority. (CONFIDENTIAL)
Phone: [phone]
November 21, 1975
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PUBLICATION OF INTEIIHS'T
November 21, 1975
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