STAFF NOTES: MIDDLE EAST AFRICA SOUTH ASIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00608R000400010040-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 18, 2001
• Sequence Number: 40
• Publication Date: February 27, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

 Approved For Release 2001/09/04: CIA-RDP86T00608R000400010040-4
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SECRET
This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington com-
munity by the Middle East - Africa Division, Office of Current Intelligence,
with occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of
Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to
the authors of the individual articles.
South Yemen: Unsuccessful Efforts to Establish
Relations in Persian- Gulf ? .. . . . . . . . . . 1
Zaire-Angola: Mobutu May Cutback Assistance
to FNLA . . . . . - . . . . . . .. . ? : . . . . 3
Africa: Franco-African Summit Set for Next
Week in Bangui 4
South Asia: Afghans Join Indians in Criticizing
US Arms Policy 5
Feb 27, 1975
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South Yemen
Unsuccessful Efforto to Establish Relations
in Persian GuZf
South Yemen appears to have had little success
in its efforts to gain diplomatic recognition from
the Arab states of the Persian Gulf.
South Yemeni Foreign Minister Muhammad Muti's
most recent visit to the area took him to Bahrain
and Qatar in mid-February.
acre the question of diplomatic recognition under
the Bahrain government told Muti it would
consideration,,but it has no intention of doing so,
at least until such a move is approved by Saudi King
Faysal.
R W Qatar s response was more negative. Qatar!
Sheikh Khalifa reportedly told Muti bluntly
that South Yemen must first settle its relations with
Saudi Arabia before Qatar will consider the question
of diplomatic ties.
The South Yemenis have claimed that Foreign
Minister Muti was to have visited the United Arab
Emirates (UAE) last month to establish relations,,
but the visit has been postponed, and there are 'r
indications when such a trip will actually occur,
According to the US embassy in Abu Dhabi, capite,'. of
the UAE, there presently is little chance that i:ala-
tions will be established between Aden and Abu 1';habi.
The South Yemenis have had their only diplomatic
success with Kuwait. Although the conservative
Kuwaitis disapprove of the'leftist South.Yemeni regime,
they have dealt with Aden in the belief that the way
to bring about a change in its policies is by offer-
ing economic assistance and then imposing political
conditions for the continuation of the assistance.
Nonetheless, the South Yemenis have still had some
bad moments with the Kuwaitis. When Muti visited
Kuwait late last year, he was sharply criticized by
Emir al-Sabah and told that Kuwait will make no
.further diplomatic efforts on behalf of Aden in the
Gulf until the South Yemenis have proved they are
willing to change their Marxist policies.
(Continued)
Feb 27, 1975 1
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South Yemen's motivation in seeking ties with
the Persian Gulf states is 'twofold. Aden, which is
hard pressed economically, has combined its negotia-
tions for diplomatic relations with requests for large
amounts of financial assistance. The South Yemeni
move reportedly is also in response to pressure from
the Soviet Union, its major benefactor, which also
hopes to establish diplomatic ties with the Gulf
states.
Except for relatively independent-minded Kuwait,
the Arab states in the Gulf will probably continue to
look to Saudi Arabia for guidance on their policy
toward South Yemen. The Saudis, who are conducting
their own joint effort with Egypt to moderate South
Yemen's Marxist regime, do not appear to be in a hurry
to establish ties with Aden. Therefore, Aden will
probably continue to be without diplomatic ties to
the Gulf states for some time. (SECRET NO FOREIGN
DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM)
(143-7228)
Feb 27, 1975 2
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Zaire-Angola
Mobutu May Cutback Aooiatance to FNLA
Zairian Presi-
den recently informed-Holden Roberto,
leader of the National Front for the Liberation of
Angola, that Zaire may be unable to continue its
support for the National Front beyond this month
because of severe economic problems. The Zairian
government has been the National Front's most
important backer for the past decade.
Any curtailment of assistance at this tier,
particularly of funds for food-and logistical
support, could seriously undercut the National
Front's political activities. The Front has been
establishing itself as a major political force in
northern Angola. it also has ambitious plans to
resettle in Angola close to half a-million Angolan
refugees currently living in Zaire,in'time to vote
for National Front candidates in the elections for
a constituent assembly to be held sometime before
independence next November.
Mobutu probably will continue some assistance
to the Front, although it may be significantly less
than in the past. The Zairian leader distrusts the
leftist Popular Movement for the Liberation of
Angola--the Front's chief rival in Angola's transi-
tional government. Mobutu's support for Roberto's
group is motivated in part by his desire to ensure
continued Zairian access to Angolan rail and port
facilities.
Roberto may be able partially to offset a cutback by
Mobutu with increased Chinese assistance, although
not immediately. Roberto told Mobutu that he is
planning to visit Peking in late March to discuss
Chinese aid. Roberto obtained modest Chinese
support-mainly small arms and training-as a result
of a visit to Peking last year. (SECRET NO FOREIGN
DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM)
(143-4380)
Feb 27, 1975
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Africa
Franco-African Summit Set for Next Week in Bangui
The Central African Republic plays host next
week to a Franco-African summit conference that will
discuss 'France's'.ties with its former colonies in black
Africa. A French "dialogue" mission led by Minister
of Cooperation Pierre Abelin recently visited French-
speaking Africa in preparation for the meeting.
French President Giscard d'Estaing and eight to
ten African chiefs of state are expected to attend.
However, several African leaders who have had dif-
ferences with Paris in recent years--including Presi-
dents Ahidjo of Cameroon and Ould Daddah of Mauri-
,tania--do not plan to participate.
The last Franco-African summit was held in Paris
in November. 1973 by the late president Pompidou.
During his last two years, Pompidou presided over
major modifications in Franco-African relations, in-
cluding the revision of the rules of the franc zone
and the renegotiation of the basic cooperation
accords signed at independence. In loosening the
traditionally close ties that bound France to its
former colonies, Pompidou was reacting to African
pressures for greater national control.
in Bangui, leaders of the poorer Francophone
countries will want assurances of France's continued
interest. They are uneasy over the direction of
French cooperation policy under Giscard. His Prag-
matic African policy gives emphasis to expanding
French influence in non-French speaking Africa where
scarce raw materials and lucrative commercial oppor-
tunities are available. Although Giscard also
seeks to remain close to French-speaking African
countries where French economic and cultural
interests are most important, i.he poorer Francophone
countries realize that French aid is being reoriented
to countries of priority interest. (CONFIDENTIAL)
(143-4380)
Feb 27, 1975
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South Asia
Afghans Join Indians in Criticizing US Arms Policy
Afghanistan has joined India in registering a
relatively restrained protest against the recent
US decision to lift the ban on arnis sales to Pakis-
tan. In a statement issued on February 25, the
Afghan government said the US decision has caused
"anxiety and uneasiness" in Afghanistan at a time
when "the Pakistani military are acting against the
Pushtun and Baluch peoples"--the inhabitants of
Pakistan's frontier provinces near the Afghan border.
The Afghan statement comes as no surprise.
Kabul has long been squabbling with Islamabad over
the status of Pakistan's frontier provinces and, in
the process, has drawn closer to New Delhi. The US
embassy in Kabul describes the Afghan statement as
"relatively tame" given the further deterioration this
month in Afghanistan's relations with Pakistan,
brought on by Pakistani Prime Minister Bhutto's new
crackdown against his Afghan-supported opponents in
the frontier region.
The Afghans seem unlikely to criticize the US
very strongly for the decision on arms. Despite their
dependence on Soviet military and economic assistance,
they value good relations with the US. President
Daoud is anxious to continue receiving US economic
aid and to maintain his credentials as an Afghan
nationalist not under total Soviet domination. 25X1C
In India, where most official statements on the
US decision have been fairly moderate so far
Prime
minister Gan ii is not inclined to support an anti-US
campaign over the arms issue. Mrs. 25X1C
Gandhi does not want to jeopar ize n is s chances for
possible US investment and is even contemplating
relaxing some of the restrictions that have discouraged
Western investors in the past. (SECRET NO FOREIGN
DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM)
(143-6062)
Feb 27, 1975
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