MOROCCAN PLANS TO INVADE SPANISH SAHARA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00608R000300030002-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 27, 1999
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: October 3, 1975
• Content Type: MEMO

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CCNTRAL INTELLIGENCf+: AGENCY
WASH1NfiTON, ~,C, 20505
MEMUIiAIJDUM FOR: The Honorable Henry A. Kissinger
Assistant to the President (National
Security Af:airs)
25X1X6
SUBJECT Moroccan Pland to Invade Spanish Sahara
2. With the Spanish military still in the Sahara, a serious
conflict could develop. If Morocco loses this gamble, it could
ultimately lead to the downfall of the present government in Rabat.
On the other side, prolonged fighting and heavy Spanish casualties
could provoke a political crisis in Madrid. There is also potential
for drawing Algeria into the conflict. Mauritania, which also has claims
to Spanish Sahara, is likely to avoid any military involvement.
3. The attached Intelligence Alert Memorandum examines this
situation and its implications in greater depth. Ic has been discussed
at the working level with CIA, DIA, State/INR and NSA. The collection
and analytical element-~ of the Intelligence Community have been alerted
acid will report further developments though normal channels or in further
Alert Memoranda, as appropriate.
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SUBJECT: Moroccan Invasion of Spanish Sahara
25X1X6
2. King Hassan has pursued a high-risk policy on Spanish Sahara
for Fome time. Last August, he reiterated his int%ntion to acquire Spanish
Saha~ a before the end of the year, with force if necessary. :~lthoug',i he
promised then to await an advisory opinion from the International Court
of Justice on Moroccan-Mauritanian claims to tha territory, he may now
have decided to act to a moment of what he perceives as Spanish weakness.
Thera is also increasing anxiety in Rabat that the Court's decision may be
ambif,uous or unfavorable to Morocco and that the report of a fact-finding
mission of tha UN Committee nn Deco lonizatiorc will favor independence for
the Territory. Finally, it_ is possible that Hassan has concluded that
armec intervention will provoke favorable international mediation. To
date most Moroccans have supported Hassan's position on Spanish Sahara,
bur if a mili~ary gamble fails he could be in serious trouble and
vulnerable to a coup.
3. Rabat expects effective rasi.stance only from some 5,000
Spanish legionnaires in the Sahar,s and Spanish air force units stationed
in t}~e Canary Islands and possibly from Algerian ground fore`s. The
Moroccans are skeptical that Algeria will intervene militarily, but
Morocco reportedly is arranging for a token presence in Rabat of troops
from Syria, Egypt, the PLO, and possibly Saudi Arabia ,3s a psychological
deterrent to an Algerian mi] i+_ary reaction. We have n ~ evidence, ~tiowe~~e~ ,
that other Arab troops are arriving in Morroco, although small contingents
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could arrive quickly by air without being detected. We doubt that most
aastern Arabs would involve themselves in a potential Inter-Arab conflict
except in a mediating role, although the PLO may be an exception.
4. Morocco has kept appro~simately one fourth of its more than
55,000-man army in southern Morocco since mid -1974, despite considerable
supply problems, and low troop morale because of the primitive conditions.
We estimate that most of the 12,000 to 15,000 Moroccan troops in the
southern zone have been tactical infantry, with some armor, artillery, and
air defense units. Although the army has established a command-and-support
structure in the south, the Moroccans would nonethelec~s face considerable
obstacles in launching and sustaining a mayor offensive against either
Spanish or Algerian forces.
5. Madrid could muster sufficient strength from its own forces
to defeat a Moroccan Invasion. The Spanish have some 16,000 army and air.
force personnel in the Sahara, with an additional 20,000 locaCed nearby
in the Canary Islands. The. Spa~iish have 5.l medium tanks and 35 armored
cars that could provide immediate armored support. Spanish forces are
well-equipped and trained, compared tc- the Morocca~~ army. In terms of
air power, Madrid has more than 50 sub-sonic fighter-bombers immediately
available; two squadrons of P-S tacti~.al fighter-bombers and a total of
four squadrons of air defense command Mirage I]:I and F-4C Interceptors are
in reserve in Spain.
6. If he has decided in favor of war, we believe King Hassan has
seriously misjudged the likely Spanish. response to an invasion. Although
Madrid does not want to remain in Spanish Sahara or fight a colonial war,
Spanish troops in the Sahara would resist a forcible eviction. At the
same time Madrid would call on the UN to restore peace dad ask Washington
for its support. The US response to this request would strongly influence
Spair's attitude toward accommodating the US position in the current base
negotiations. The Spanish government would expect that longstanding US-
Spanish defense cooperation should justify at least US diplomatic support,
particularly if the Moroccans, contrary to early assurances, employed US-
made weapons in any attack. The Moroccans, on the other hand, will also
look to us for a.*_ least dialomatic support and read strongly eo anything
we do that might be interpreted as favoring Spain. A position of strict
neutralism is probably about the most that King Hassa:Y will tolerate with-
out serious strain -in our bilateral relations.
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7. Initially, an armed conflict with Morocco would unite most
Spaniards and help the regime divert the public's attention away from
internal problems. If the fighting dragged on, however, the war could
becorie another issue tha t would divide Spaniards. Divisiveness would
also appear in the military -- heretofore the moat stable element in
Spanish society -- who eventually would disagree over the merits of
f ighring a war for a territory the government has already announced it
is p~?~pared to give up.
8. Algeria, which favors indepP:~dence for Spanish Sahara will
prob~ibly stop short of d irect military intervention. It would, however,
create as many problems for Mor~~cco Pe possible. We would expect Algiers
to support the POLISARIO Front ~ pro-independence Saharan group, in
waging a sustained insurgency effort. Algiers might also move troops to
Morocco's northern border to exert pressure on King Hassan and renew its
support of Moroccan dissidents. The Algerians would almost certainly
mount an intensive international diplomatic effort to denounce Moroccan
aggression.
9. In the less likely event that Algiers did intervene with direct
military force, the Moroccans might achieve some initial success because
they outnumber the 4,000 to 6,000 troops estimated to be in southwestern
Algeria. The Algerian air force of some 200 coml:at aircraft could, however,
turn the tide against Morocco's 40 combat aircraft, and play a decisive role
in support of Algeria's ground forces, which are about the same size as
Morocco's, but better trained and equipped.
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