EUROPEAN BRIEF 169-75.4

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00608R000300010071-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 28
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 22, 2001
• Sequence Number: 71
• Publication Date: November 3, 1975
• Content Type: CABLE

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1. SPAIN: THE SPANISH COMMUNIST PARTY HAS APPARENTLY MADE
SIGNIFICANT CONCESSIONS IN ITS BIB) TO CREATE A FACADE OF UNITY BETWEEN
THE TWO LOOSE COALITIONS OF THE LEFT-Y
THE JOINT COMMUNIQUE ISSUED SATURDAY BY THE COMMUNIST-DOMINATED
DEMOCRATIC JUNTA AND THE MORE MODERATELY LEFTIST DEMOCRATIC PLATFORM
OF CONVERG-`NCE WOULD NOT CONDEMN PRINCE JUAN CARLOS WITHOUT A
TRIAL. THE COMMUNIQUE WAS CAREFULLY VAGUE ON THE CRUCIAL POINT OF
COMMUNIST DEMANDS FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT
AND THE CALLING OF A NATIONAL REFERENDUM TO CHOOSE BETWEEN MONARCHY
AND REPUBLIC. THE STATEI1ENT ISSUED THIS WEEKEND CALLED FOR A
"DEMOCRATIC BREAK" WITH FRANCOISM AND REFERRED GENERALLY TO A
"CONSTITUENT PERIOD" WHICH WOULD LEAD TO A REFERENDUM. NO
DEADLINE WAS SET FOR THE REFERENDUM.Y
THE OTHER THREE MAIN "OBJECTIVES" LISTED IN THE COMMUNIQUE WERE:
AMNESTY FOR POLITICAL PRISONERS; FREEDOM FOR LABOR UNIONS AND
POLITICAL PARTIES AND GUARANTEES OF HUMAN RIGHTS; AND FULL POLITICAL
R-GHTS AND FREEDOMS FOR REGIONS SUCH AS CATALONIA AND THE BASQUE
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COUNTRY. THESE ARE ALL ISSUES ON WHICH THERE IS BROAD AGREEMENT IN
THE SPANISH OPPOSITION. SIGNIFICANTLY, THE COMMUNIQUE CLOSED WITH
THE STATEMENT THAT THE TWO COALITIONS, WHILE REMAINING IN CONTACT AND
COOPERATING FROM TIME TO TIME, WILL CONTINUE TO SEARCH FOR THEIR OWN
PARTICULAR OBJECTIVES-Y
THE COMMfJNISTS' IMMEDIATE AIM PROBABLY IS TO HEAD OFF ANY
ATTEMPT BY PRINCE JUAN CARLOS AND HIS NEW GOVERNMENT TO ISOLATE
THEM FROM THE NON-COMMUNIST LEFT. JUAN CARLOS MIfrIT SEEK, FOR EXAMPLE,
TO LEGALIZE THE LEFT-OF-CENTER CHRISTIAN DES %)%-#%TIC AND SOCIALIST
PARTIES, WHICH MAKE UP THE BULK OF THE DEMOCRATIC PLATFORM.
LEGALIZATION OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY IS HIGHLY UNLIKELY IN THE NEAR
FUTURE, BUT IT MAY BECOME A CENTRAL ISSUE DURING THE TRANSITION
PERIOD.- Y
MANY OF THE ILLEGAL OPPOSI'TIONIST PARTIES CONTINUE TO DISTRUST
THE COMMUNISTS. THEY CANNOT AFFORD TO OPPOSE LEGALIZATION OF THE
PARTY, HOWEVER, FOR TO DO'i SO WOULD OPEN THEM TO CHARGES THAT THEY
HAD SOLD OUT TO THE P.E all It . THEY ,LSO FEEL THAT THE STATUS OF
ILLEGALITY FAVORS THE COMMUNISrS, AND THAT THE PARTY'S WEAKNESSES CAN
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BE EXPOSED ONLY IF IT IS BROUGHT INTO THE OPEN POLITICAL ARENA-
{SECRET}Y
2. PORTUGAL: LEFTIST FORCES IN PORTUGAL ARE CITING THE ARREST BU
LAST WEEKEND OF TWO SUPPORTERS OF FORMER PRESIDENT SPINOLA TO
JUSTIFY THEIR CLAIMS THAT A RIGHT-WING COUP IS IMIt?,.EN ENT.Y
THE TWO FORMER MILITARY OFFICERS, WHO REPORTEDLY LEFT THE
COUNTRY WITH SPINOLA FOLLOWING TH!E ABORTIVE COUP OF MARCH 11,
WERE PICKED UP BY SECURITY TROOPS AT A CAMP FOR ANGOLAN REFUGEES
IN NORTHERN PORTUGAL. THEY WERE SAID TO HAVE ENTERED PORTUGAL
SECRETLY FROM SPAIN. SEVERAL INDIVIDUALS WITH TIES TO THE FiH?61HDma2BUR
CONSEPVATIVE PORTUGUESE LIBERATION ARMY MAY ALSO HAVE BEEN DETAINED-Y
ANTI-COMMUNIST MILITARY LEADERS, INCLUDING PRIME MINISTER
AZEVEDO, ARE APPEALING FOR CALM AND UNITY TO COOL THE UNREST
STIRRED BY ANTICIPATION OF ANGOLAN INDEPENDENCE NEXT WEEK. AN
ARMY SPOKESMAN ON SUNDAY DENIED LEFTIST-INSPIRED REPORTS THAT
LIVE-FIRE MANEUVERS ARE SCHEDULED FOR THIS WEEK. HE LABELED
THE STORY "ALARMIST" AND SAID SUCH DRILLS COULD ONLY LEAD TO
A COUP ATTEMPT FROM THE RIGHT-Y
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GENERAL CHARAIS, COMMA1DER OF THE CENTRAL MILITARY REGION.,
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WARNED THE LEFT IN AN INTERVIEW LAST WEEK THAT ANY ATTEMPT ON
ITS PART TO OVERTHROW THE AZEVEDO GOVERNMENT AND TURN ANGOLA
OVER TO THE SOVIET-BACKED POPULAR MOVEMENT FOR THE LIBERATION
OF ANGOLA WOULD SPAWN A RIGHT-WING POWER PLAY. CHARAIS
BELIEVES THAT THE LEFT HAS ALIENTATED A SUBSTANTIAL PORTION OF
THE POPULAT1ON, CREATING THE CONDITIONS FOR A SUCCESSFUL RESURGENCE
BY THE RI SHT.Y
THE LEFT HAS BEEN AGITATING TO ABANDON LISBON'S DECLARED POLICY
OF IMPARTIALITY AMONG THE THREE ANGOLA LIBERATION MOVEMENTS AND
'r SUPPORT THE POPULAN' MOVEMENT, BUT THE AZEVEDO GOVERNMENT DOES
NOT APPEAR LIKELY TO CHANGE ITS NLHTRAL POSTURE AND FURTHER
ANTAGONIZE EITHER THE LEFT OR THE RI'HT . IN ADDITION TO INTERNAL
PRESSURES FROM LEFT-WING POLITICAL PARTIES, THE PRESS ORGANS THEY
CONTROL, AND SYMPATHETIC RADICAL MILITARY OFFICERS, POPULAR 11OVEME NT
ACTIVISTS ARE ARRIVING IN LISBON ON REFUGEE FLIGHTS TC TAKE PART IN
RALLIES SUPPORTING THE POPULAR MOVEMENT. THE FIRST IS SCHEDULED FOR
MONDAY NIGHTS'
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AS THE AIRLIFT OF REFUGEES FROM ANGOLA COMES TO AN END,
CONSERVATIVE REFUGEE GROUPS ARE CERTAIN TO BECOME BOLDER IN REGISTERII
THEIR DISCONTENT WITH LEFT-WING SUPPORT OR THE POPULAR MOVEMENT AS
WELL AS INSUFFICIENT RESETTLEMENT ASSISTANCE FROM THE LISBON
GOVERNMENT. THE BOMBING AND SACKING LATE LAST MONTH OF AN ANGOLAN
CULTURAL CENTEP CONTROLLED BY THE POPULAR MOVEMENT SUGCFSTS THAT
THE RETURNEES DO NOT INTEND TO SHY AWAY FROM VIOLENCE. TO COUNTER THE
LEFT-WING EFFORTS, THEY HAVE PLANNED A DEMONSTRATION AGAINST THE
POPULAR MOVEMENT FOR LATER IN THE WEEK-Y
DESPITE THE POLITICAL TURMOIL, THE 19-MAN REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL
IS ATTEMPTING TO CARRY OUT BUSINESS AS USUAL. THE COUNCIL DID NOT,
AS RUMORED, TAKE ACTION! AGAINST ARMY CHIEF FABIAO OR SECURITY HEAD
CARVALHO AT ITS SESSION LAST WEEKEND- IT DID, HOWEVER, APPROVE THE
LONG-AWAITED LEGAL FP MEWORK FOR THE INVESTIGATION AND TRIAL OF
NEARLY 1,300 MEMBERS CF THE FORMER REGIME-S SECURITY POLICE, WHO HAVE
BEEN DETAINED WITHOUT CHARGES SINCE THE APRIL 1974 COUP. THE COUNCIL
ALSO SET UP A TRIBUNAL TO DEAL WITH PERSONS IMPLICATED IN THE MARCH
11 COUP ATTEMPT AND ANNOUNCED ITS INTENTION TO ARREST CIVILIANS
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POSSESSING MILITARY ARMS-M
THE ANTI-COMMUNIST MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL MAY HAVE DECIDED TO
DELAY PLANS AGAINST FABIAO AND CARVALHO BECAUSE OF HE CONCERTED
CAMPAIGN BY LEFT-WING MILITARY AND CIVILIAN GROUPS TO EQUATE THEIR
REMnVAL WITH RIGHTIST PLOTS TO TAKE OVER THE GOVERNMENT. ANOTHER
LIKELY OBSTACLE TO THE ANTI-COMMUNISTS IS PRESIDENT COSTA GOMES, WH)
HAS SERVED AS THE MAJOR STUMBLING BLOCK IN F..EVIOUS ATTEMPTS TO OUSE'
RADICAL OFFICERS FROM HIGH POSITIONS. {SECRET}Y
3. ROMAINA: ROMANIAN PRESIDENT CEAUSESCU CLEARLY USED HIS
FOUR-DAY OFFICI-L VISIT TO LISBON TO SHOW BUCHAREST'S DETERMINATION
TO PURSUE ITS OWN INTERPRETATION OF COMMUNIST DOCTRINE.'
CEAUSESCU PRESSED FOR CLOSER ROMANIAN-PORTUGUESE TIES BOTH TO
INCREASE HIS INTERNATIONAL PRESTIGE AND TO TRY TO HEAD OFF A RADICAL
SWING TO THE LEFT THAT COULD BRING PORTUGAL UNDER CONSIDERABLE
SOVIET INFLUENCE?Y
LITTLE OF WHAT CEAUSESCU SAID IN LISBON WILL SIT WELL WITH
THE KREMLIN. HIS COMMENTS TO HIS PORTUGUESE HOSTS, PARTICULARLY
REGARDING THE COOPERATION OF ALL POLITICAL PARTIES--COMMUNIST,
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^ IP FILET WORKERS PARTIES THE OPPORTUNITY "TO RID THEMSELVES
OF THE PAST WITH REGARD TO THEIR MUTUAL RELATIONS."
HE ALSO SAID THAT EACH PARTY MUST BE FREE TO DRAW
ITS OWN CONCLUSIONS FROM THE VARIETY OF OPINIONS
THE E!iROPEAN PARTY LEADERS WILL OFFER IN THEIR
SPEECHES. GRILCKOV STRESSED THAT THE LEADERS OF EACH
PARTY MUST APPROVE THE DRAFT OF THE FINAL DOCUMENT
BEFORE THE CONFERENCE IS HELD AND THAT ALTERATIONS
MUST NOT BE MADE AT THE CONFERENCE IT'~ELF?Y
THE YUGOSLAVS HAVE AVOIDED TAKING THE LEAD IN
COUNTERING EASTERN PROPAGANDA PRAISING THE PROGRESS
ACHIEVED AT THE LAST DRAFTING SESSION. THIS IS
BELGRADE'S FIRST OFFICIAL COMMENTARY ON THE'PRE-
PARATORY MEETING, WHICH ADJOURNED ON OCTOBER LO. IT
CLOSELY PARALLELS A RECENT PRESS STATEMENT FROM THE
INDEPENDENT ITALIAN COMMUNISTS. {CONFIDENTIAL}Y
6.ROMAINA: CEAUSESCU'S OPENING SPEECH TO THE CONGRESS OF
THE UNION OF COMMUNIST YOUTH NEXT MONDAY WILL ALMOST
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CERTA1":LY REAFFIRM HIS UNSWERVING COMMITMENT TO IN-
TERNAL ORTHODOXY AND TO A STRONGLY NATIONAL COMMUNIST
PATH IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS.
THIS IS THE FIRST YOUTH CONGRESS SINCE CEAU-
SESCU'S SCATHING CRITICISM OF THE YOUTH ORGANIZATION
FOR ITS "'INTELLECTUALISM-," "BUREAUCRATISM ," AND
"NEGLECT OF WORKING YOUTH" IN JULY 1971. AT THAT
TIME, CEAUSESCU STRESSED A CAMPAIGN CALLING FOR IDEO-
LOGICAL,ORTHODOXY IN AN EFFORT TO REASSURE MOSCOW OF
BUCHAREST'S LOYALTY. HIS VISIT TO PEKING HAD LED
THE SOVIETS AND THEIR LOYALIST ALLIES TO CHARGE THAT
AN ANTI-SOVIET, PRO-PEKING AXIS EXISTED IN THE BALKANS.Y
ION STEVANESCU, WHO BECAME FIRST SECRETARY OF
THE YOUTH ORGANIZATION IN L972, RESPONDED TO CEAU-
SESCU'S L97L CRITICISM BY EMPHASIZING THE INCREASED
EMPHASIS THE ORGANIZATION WAS PLACING ON IDEOLOGY
AND PARTY POLICY. MEMBERS OF THE UNION NOW PARTICI-
PATE IN REGULAR ANNUAL "STUDY COURSES" AND HAVE PRESSED
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SOCIALIST, AND EVEN "THOSE SECTIONS OF THE BOURGEOISIE THAT WISH
TO SERVE THE HOMELAND"--ARE DOCTRINAL HERESY OF THE FIRST ORDER.
MOREOVER, THEY CLASH DIRECTLY WITH THE RECENT ZARODOV ARTICLE IN
PRAVDA CONDEMNING THOSE COMMUNIST LEADERS WHO DILUTE REVOLUTIONARY
ZEAL BY COOPERATING WITH NON-COMMUNISTS. CEAUSESCU ALSO REAFFIRMED
ROMANIAM'S STRONG DEVOTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF INDEPENDENCE AND
OPPOSITION TO EVERY FORM OF INTERFERENCE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF
OTHERS-9
ADDITIONALLY, IN HIS TOAST TO PRIME MINISTER AZEVEDO,
CEAUSESCU PRAISED THE ROMANIAN-PORTUGUESE FRIENDSHIP TREATY OF
LAST JUNE, THE FIRST BETWEEN NATO AND WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES, AND
DREW A PARALLEL BETWEEN LISBON'S PROBLEMS AND THOSE THAT ONCE
rONFRONTED BUCHAREST- ROMANIA, HE SAID, SOLVED THESE DIFFICULTIES
SOLELY IN CONFORMITY WITH ITS OWN CONDITIONS-11Y
CEAUSESCU'S VISIT AND THE ARRAY OF POWERFUL LEADERS TRAVELING
WITH HIM SUGGEST THAT HE FACES NO SERIOUS PROBLEMS AT HOME, AS
SOME RUMORS HAVE CLAIMED. MEMBERS OF THE DELEGATION INCLUDE STEFAN
ANDREI, PARTY SECRETARY FOR FOREIGN RELATIONS; FOREIGN MINISTER
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MACOVESCU; NICOLAI DORCARU, PRESIDENTIAL ADVISER ON SECURITY
AFFAIRS; DEPUTY PREMIER DRAGANESCU; AND ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF
COLONEL-GENERAL ION COMAN. {SECRET}Y
1112 4. USSR-VIETNAM: THE COMMUNIQUE ISSUED ON FRIDAY AT THE END
OF NORTH VIETNAMESE PARTY CHIEF LE DI;A.'!'S OFFICIAL VISIT TO MOSCOW
INDICATES THAT HANOI HAS RECEIVED SOME OF THE ECONNOMIC AID IT WAS
SEEKING AND THAT MOSCOW OBTAINED A NORTH VIETNAMESE ENDORSEMAN T OF
SOME OF THE USSR'S MAJOR FOREIGN POLICY THEMES.'
LE DUAN, FOR EXAMPLE, PROVED WILLING TO ENDORSE SOVIET DETENTE
POLICIES MORE EXPLICITLY THAN HANOI HAS BEFORE. THE SOVIETS FIND THIS
ESPECIALLY WELCOME IN LIGHT OF PEKING'S EFFORTS DURING LE DUAN'S
VISIT TO CHINA LAST MONTH TO PERSUADE HIM OF THE DANGERS OF DETENTE.Y
THE NORTH VIETNAMESE PARTY CHIEF PRAISED THE RESULTS OF THE
EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE AND EXPRESSED SUPPORT FOR THE KREMLIN'S
LINE TOWARD THE MIDDLE EAST, PORTUGAL, AND CHILE, ALL OF WHICH ARE
POINTS OF CONTENTION IN THE SINO-SOVIET RIVALRY.Y
IN THE DECLARATION, HANOI AND MOSCOW WERE RELATIVELY NONCOMMIT-
TAL TOWARD PHNOM PENH, WHERE THE CHINESE INFLUENCE IS PREDOMINANT.
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THIS STANCE CONTRASTED SHARPLY WITH PLEDGES OF AID AND SUPPORT
FOR THE PRO-HANOI h_GIME IN LAOS.Y
LIKE THE CHINESE, THE SOVIETS WILL PROVIDE CREDIT ON EASY TERMS
INDICATING THAT THE DAYS OF GRANT AID FOR HANOI ARE OVER. MOSCOW
WENT A STEP FURTHER THAN PEKING, HOL?IEVER, BY PROMISING TO DISCUSS
SUPPORT FOR NORTH VIETNAM'S SECOND FIVE-YEAR PLANLY
IN ANOTHER GESTURE-MOSCOW WILL FIND TO ITS LIKING, HANOI AGREED
TO 21 DEVELOP ECONOMIC TIES "WITEHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE MULTI-
LATUERAL COOPERATION OF SOCIALIST COUNTRIES." AL ;*000H THIS MAY
FORESHADOW A CLOSER NORTH VIETNAMESE RELATIONSHIP WITH CEMA, THE
VAGUE FORMULATION EMPLOYED ALLOWS FOR CONSIDERABLE FLEXIBILITY.
{CONFIDENTIAL}9
5. EUROPEAN COMMUNIST CONFERENCE. IN A SPEECH ON THURSDAY,
ALEKSANDR GRLICKOV, THE TOP YUGOSLAV NEGOTIATOR AT THE MEETING OF
DELEGATES FROM 27 EUROPEAN PAR PIES IN EAST BERLIN
EARLIER THIS MONTH, DESCRIBED THE PRELIMINARY DRAFT
NOW UNDER COSIDERATION AS A "POSSIBLE AND ACCEPTABLE
BASIS FOR FURTHER WORK" THAT "COULD ENVOLVE" INTO
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ADDED HOWEVER, THAT ALMOST ALL PARTICIPANTS OFFERED
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IN THE NEXT STAGE OF THE DRAFTING EFFORT. HE HINTED
THAT THE REVISIONS DI'rERED WIDELY AND SAID THAT
"NEW JOINT EFFORTS BY ALL PARTIES ARE NEEDED" IN
ORDER TO PRODUCE THE FINAL DOCUMENT.'
GRLICKOV THEN LISTED DEMANDS THAT PRESUMABLY
REPRESENT BELGRADE'S OWN POSITION ON THE EXISTING
DRAFT. HE SAID THE CONFERENCE DOCUMENT MUST CREATE
THE BROADEST POSSIBLE OPPORTUNITIES FOR COMMUNISTS
TO COOPERATE WITH THE OTHER DEMOCRATIC AND PROGRESSIVE
MOVEMENTS IN EUROPE. IT SHOULD COVER ONLY WHAT THE
COMMUNIST AND WORKERS PARTIES HAVE IN COMMON, AND
NOT ARTIFICALLY STRIVE TO RECONCILE DIFFERENCES.'1'
GRILCKi 7 ADDED-IN AN APPARENT REFERENCE TO THE
SOVIET'S PRETENSIONS TO LEADERSHIP IN THE MOVE-
MENT-THAT THE CONFERENCE OFFERS COMMUNIST AND
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TPTO SERVICE TO COMBAT THE SPREAD OF "MYSTICISM"
{RELIGION}. STEFANESCU HAS ALSO .HAMPIONED CEAU-
SESCU'S HARD-DRIVING ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM BY
ORGANIZING "VOLUNTEER" PATRIOTIC WORK PROGRAMS IN
? AGRICULTURE AND CONSTRUCTION, TO WHICH STUDENTS SAY
THEY HAVE CONTRIBUTED ALMOST ONE MILLION WORK-DAYS
SINCE 1972?) DESPITE STEFANESCU'S EFFORTS, THE LEADER-
SHIP IS APPARENTLY STILL DISSATISFIED WITH THE EXTENT
OF POLITICAL MOBILIZATION, AND STEFANESCU HAS RE-
CENTLY CALLED FOR nVADICAL IMPROVEMENT-912"'Y
ON BALANCE, THE REGIME HAS LITTLE REASON TO CON-
SIDER YOUTH A THREAT TO ROMANIA'S INTERNAL STABILITY
AND SEEMS SATISFIED WITH STEFANESCU'S STEWARDSHIP.
HIS AMBITIOUS PROGRAM HAS, HOWEVER, SPARKED RUMBLINGS
OF DISSATISFACTION FROM WITHIN THE ORGANIZATION.
LAST YEAR, UNIVERSITY STUDENTS REPORTEDLY CIRCULATED
A PETITION CALLIIJG FOR LESS "CENTRALISM" AND MORE
"DEMOCRACY" IN THE GROUP'S ACTIVITIES?Y
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CEAUSESCU WILL NEVERTHELESS PROBABLY CALL FOR
INCREASED DISCIPLINE AND COMMITMENT, THUS USING THE
OCCASION TO DEMONSTRATE ONCE AGAIN TO MOSCOW HIS
COMMITMENT TO ,A RIGID INTERNAL ORTHODOXY. NO MAJOR
PERSONNEL SHIFTS ARE EXPECTED, BUT IT IS RUMORED
THAT CEAUSESCU'S SON, NICU, MAY BE SHIFTED TO Tilt
YOUTH GROUP'S SECRETARIAT TO REPLACE VASILE NICOLCIOU,
WHO HAS HANDLED INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS FOR SOME LO
YEARS. {CONFIDENTIAL} E-2, IMPDET.d
DATE:
NOVEMBER 3,
1975
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MIDDLE EAST AFRICA BRIEF 169-75.Y
:L? SPANISH SAHARA: SPAIN'S NEW SEARCH FOR A UN SOLUTION TO
THE SAHARAN PROBLEM WAS BROUGHT ABOUT BY ALGERIA'S STRONG OPPOSITION
TO MADRID'S BARGAINING DIRECTLY WITH MOROCCO AND MAURITANIA ON THE
IS;,;UE AND BY MOROCCO'S UNWILLINGNESS TO CALL OFF ITS PLANNED MASS
MARCH INTO THE TERRITORY?Y
PRINCE JUAN CARLOS' SURPRISE ONE-DAY VISIT TO SPANISH SAHARA
ON SUNDAY HAS NOW COMMITTED THE NEW LEADER'S PRESTIGE TO SUPPORT OF
UN EFFORTS. MOROCCAN KING HASSAN REMAINS EQUALLY COMMITTED TO GAINING
RECOGNITION OF MOROCCO'S TERRITORIAL CLAIMS?Y
MADRID PRESUMABLY DECIDED IT HAD LITTLE ALTERNATIVE TO GOING
ALONG WITH FURTHER EFFORTS UNDER UN AUSPICES, IN VIEW OF ALGERIA'S
DETERMINATION TO RESIST A BILATERAL DEAL BETWEEN SPAIN AND MOROCCO.
SUCH A COURSE WOULD, MOREOVER, PROVIDE INTERNATIONAL LEGITIMIZATION
FOR A DEMONSTRATION OF RESOLUTENESS BY JUAN CARLOS TO UPHOLD SPAIN'S
OBLIGATIONS TOWARD SPANISH SAHARA. THE PRINCE'S TRIP TO THE TERRITORY
ALSO DEMONSTRATED HIS SOLIDARITY.WITH THE ARMY, WHOSE BACKING HE
REALIZES IS ESSENTIAI.?Y
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THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION PASSED ON SUNDAY CALLS ON
SECRETARY GENERAL WALDHEIM TO RESUME CONSULTATIONS WITH THE CONCERNED
PARTIES- IT OMITS ANY REFERENCE TO THE UN TRUSTEESHIP ARRANGEMENT
THAT WALDHEIM HAS DISCUSSED WITH SPAIN AND THE NORTH AFRICAN STATES
INVOLVED. THE PROPOSAL APPARENTLY CALLED FOR SPANISH WITHDRAWAL
EARLY NEXT YEAR AND TEMPORARY UN ADMINISTRATION OF THE TERRITORY-Y
IT IS NOT READILY APPARENT WHAT FURTHER INDUCEMENTS WALDHEIM
CAN OFFER THE PARTIES TO THE DISPUTE TO HEAD OFF A CONFRONTATION
BETWEEN MOROCCO, SPAIN, AND ALGERIA- THE SECRETARY GENERAL REPORTEDLY
HAD EARLIER THOUGHT THAT MOROCCO WOULD ACQUIESCE IN HIS PROPOSAL
PROVIDED THE UN TRUSTEESHIP WERE "MANIPULATED" SO THAT THE TERRITORY
WOULD SOON BE TURNED OVER TO RABAT AND NOUAKCHOTT. HASSAN, HOWEVER-,
MAY FEAR THAT ANY REFERENDUM WOULD REVEAL OVERWHELMING SAHARAN
SENTIMENT FOR INDEPENDENCE-Y
SPAIN'S ACCEPTANCE OF A UN ROLE LEAVES HASSAN LITTLE CHOICE BUT
TO PROCEED WITH THE MARCH. LAST WEEK THE KING SAID THAT THE MARCH
WOULD BEGIN AS EARLY AS TOMORROW. HE HAS INVESTED TOO MUCH PERSONAL
PRESTIGE TO BACK DOWN EMPTY-HANDED AND IS LIKELY TO BEGIN THE MARCH
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TION_BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED
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WITHIN A FEW DAYS.//HASSAN'S FAILURE TO ACHIEVE SOME SATISFACTION
ON SPANISH SAHARA WOULD SERIOUSLY UNDERMINE HIS ABILITY TO STAY IN
POWER.//Y
MOROCCO WILL PROBABLY CLAIM THAT MADRID'S DETERMINATION TO
STOP THE MARCH BY FORCE IF NECESSARY, RATHER THAN MOROCCO'S OWN
ACTIONS, IS CONTRARY TO SUNDAY'S SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION. ONCE
MARCHERS CROSS THE BORDER, HOWEVER, THERE WILL ALMOST CERTAINLY BE
CLASHES WITH SPANISH FORCES OR ARMED PARTISANS OF THE POLISARIO
FRONT, A PRO-INDEPENDENCE SAHARAN GROUP SUPPORTED BY ALGERIA.
MOROCCAN TROOPS DEPL Y'ED IN THE SOUTH ARE LIKELY TO INTERVENE IN
THAT EVENT.Y
MOROCCO HAS "CATEGORICALLY DENIED" PRESS REPORTS THAT ITS
FORCES.CROSSED THE BORDER INTO SPANISH SAHARA ON MONDAY AND CLASHED
WITH THE POLISARIO FRONT. THE MOROCCAN INFORMATION MINISTER SAID,
HOWEVER, THAT HE COULD NOT EXCLUDE THE POSSIBILITY THAT PRO-MOROCCAN
RESIDENTS OF THE TERRITORY MIGHT HAVE "RAISED THE MOROCCAN FLAG" IN
SOME AREAS. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT MOROCCAN IRREGULARS POSING AS SAHARAN,
CROSSED THE BORDER TO ESTABLISH A SYMBOLIC PRESENCE AND CLASHED WITH
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A POLISARIO FORCE.Y
ALGERIA WILL SUPPORT THE SECURITY COUNCIL'S CALL FOR RESTRAINT.
IT WANTS TO RETURN THE SAHARAN PROBLEM TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, WHICH
IN THE PAST HAS STRONGLY BACKED SELF-DETERMINATION. THE NEW
SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION IN FACT POINTEDLY REFERS TO THE GENERAL
ASSEMBLY'S ROLE IN THE SAHARAN QUESTION. {CONFIDENTIAL} E-2 IMPDET?rl
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WQSTEIiri H;:J"UISPHERE BRIEF 166.75.Y
.'.? ARc NTINA: A;;GE'JTXhJE PRESIDr?4T fSARIA CSTELA PCi'Oil ;AS
HOSPIT,AIIZED ON INOVE-12ER PJITi$ GALL JLADIRL"R PRO*3LE1,'iS? THE Pttf'711--
DC14TIAL PRESS OFFICE '$AS ISSUED A C019MUNIQJE ::.4.YSfiG THAT Pi:RON' IS
IN A PRIVATE CLINIC FOR OBSERVATION, A`lD THAT 14ER CO'NDITI,1'4II' NOT
SERIOUS. {JN.LASSIFIED}Y
2.//BRAZIL" T`IE RRAZZLIAN GOVERNMENT IS COt1IUC UNDC,' GF:O4:.I: G
PRESSURE FROM A VARIETY OF FORCES.//Y
/.SECURITY OFFICIALS AND (MILITARY CONSCF VATIVE.S RAVE REEN
LEA?1D4G ON PRESIDENT GEISEL FOR SOf1E TI1E TO !ND THE LIVE' ALIZING
TREND BEGUN SHORTLY AFTER :JE TOOK OFFICE. TH' Y WCRC NOT APPEASED
3RAZL?
G Y AIS STATEMENT ON AUG'1iT I AT ill DID 'SOT INTEND TO RETURN,
TO DC110CRATIC RULE.//Y
//THEY 4AVE:, HOWEVER, SEIZED ON HIN CALL FOR VI,,ILANCE AGAZ7NST
SUBVERSION AS AN EXCUSE TO MOVE AGAI JST OT14C4'' CRITICS OF THE REGIME-
LAST b6ECK, TjiE !MINISTRY OF JUSTICE ORDERED STATE GOVL'RF1Of%S TO PR-1-
VENT :1EETINGS THAT COULD PROVE DISRUPTIVE. THE DIRECTIVE DOES NOT
SUBSTANTIALLY ADD TO THE GOVERNMENT'S PO'JERS, BUT IT DOES GIVE STATE
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OFFICIALS COISI ERA' LE LATITUDE IN THEIR ACTIO;iS.//~?
25X1 C
//SEVERAL MEMBERS OF THE LEGAL OPPOSITIoii HAVE AZt E$TED
AS PART OF A DRIVE: AGAINST CO?if"UNI'.I.
SECU:'ITY OFFICIALS !-IOPZ THE ARRESTS" AND THE THREAT OF OTHE.