GAPS IN EGYPT'S MILITATRY INVENTORY AND THE EFFECTS ON ITS WARTIME CAPABILITIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00608R000200190001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 30, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 6, 1975
• Content Type: IM

C1ANI = IAM 7,)(03ao
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Secret
No Foreign Dlssom
fhferagency,,~
Arj;-ellige7co
Gaps in Egypt's Military Inventory and the
Effects on its Wartime Capabilities
DIA Declassification/Release Instructions on File
Secret
DCI/NIO 493-75
6 March 1975
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NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
Classified Sy 014322
Exempt from General Declasslficatlon Schedule
of E.O. 11657 exemption categoryi
?5B(1(4), and (3)
Automatically ddeclasdifled onm
date Impossible to determine
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Gaps in Egypt's Military Inventory
And the Effects on its Wartime Capabilities
This memorandum was developed to provide
judgments on Egypt's present and prospective capa-
city for engaging in another round of hostilities
with Israel. These judgments will be reviewed and
updated in the broader context of the Arab-Israeli
conflict and published in NIAM 35/36-2-75 ("Arab-
Israeli Military Capabilities") in May 1975.
The most serious information deficiencies en-
countered in this study were:
-- Quantities and types of major items of
military equipment provided to Egypt
since October 1973.
-- Quantities and types of spare parts and
ammunition provided to Egypt since
October 1973.
The estimates of Egyptian units and major weap-
ons inventories were prepared by DIA and, except
as explained in the footnote on Table I, were accepted
by the representatives of other elements of the
Intelligence Comm?inity as reasonable estimates of
the upper limits Egyptian inventories.
This memorandum was drafted in CIA and the
judgments were developed in consultation with repre-
sentatives of the Defense Intelligence Agency, the
Central Intelligence Agency, the Bureau of Intel-
ligence and Research of the State Department, and
the National Security Agency.
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SUMMARY OF MAJOR CONCLUSIONS
-- The Egyptian armed forces have shortages
of certain major military equipment, par
ticularly aircraft, in comparison to their
pre-October 1973 inventory.
Egypt's overall military capabilities are
somewhat less than prior to the October
war, although the Egyptian army is nearly
up to its prewar armored strength. Vis-
a-vis Israel, however, Egyptian armed
forces are weaker than in October 1973
due to the increase in IDF inventories
and capabilities.
The Egyptian armed forces currently are
estimated to be capable of a strong defense
against an Israeli attack or of mounting
a major offensive of a few days' duration
in the Sinai. Although there is little
information on Egyptian stockpiles of am-
munition and spare parts, it is doubtful
that Egypt could support sustained major
military action without further Soviet
resupply.
-- Egypt would probably have to rely on joint
military action with Syria to a greater
degree than in the last conflict, pri-
marily because Israel's military strength
and capabilities have been significantly
increased over what they were at the be-
ginning of the October War.
-- The recent deliveries of Soviet aircraft and
other military equipment (believed to be
under prewar contracts) have not been suf-
ficient to restore Egypt's war losses.
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-- The prospects for a full-scale resumption
of Soviet military aid to Egypt to fully
restore war losses and further modernize
the Egyptian armed forces are uncertain,
but Sadat will feel less need for such aid
if he can get a satisfactory new disengage-
ment agreement with Israel.
-- Purchases of Western arms as an alterna-
tive to Soviet military aid will improve
Egypt's capabilities only over a period of
several years, not in the near term.
-- In the interim, Egypt will be dependent on
a continued Soviet and East. European supply
of spare parts and ammunition to maintain
its current level of combat readiness.
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Tntroduction.
1. On numerous occasions beginning in April 1974,
Egyptian President Anwar Sadat has complained that
the Soviet Union has failed to replace Egypt's Octo-
ber 1973 war losses, and that as a result Egypt is
considerably weakened militarily vis-a-vis the Israelis.
Analysis of available evidence indicates that there
is some truth in Sadat's statements, as there are
gaps in the Egyptian inventory of major weapons. This"
is particularly evident in the Egyptian air force,
which is about 30 percent below its prewar inventory
of combat aircraft. The Egyptian army also is slightly
below its prewar armored strength, although the in-
ventory has been upgraded with more modern weapons.
The air defense SAM force appears to have an increased
number of missile launchers. The Egyptian navy has
received no replacements from the USSR for its
wartime losses.
Major Weapons Shortages
2. The Egyptian Air Force. The current aircraft
strength of Egyptian air force combat units is about
70 percent of the prewar level (see table, page 10).
The 13 MIG-21 squadrons now average only about 13
aircraft per unit compared to over 20 before the war.
The ground attack fighter force also has been re-
duced in aircraft per unit, and the number of MIG-17
and SU-7/20 squadrons cut from 8 to 7. The two
squadrons of Libyan Mirages placed at Egypt's disposal
prior to the October War were withdrawn in mid-1974.
Cairo has recently begun to receive aircraft from
France, and Egypt is now forming a new Mirage squadron.
The Egyptian TU-16 bomber force also has been reduced
from 26 to 23 aircraft since the war.
3. In addition to these reductions in air force
combat units, the Egyptian helicopter force has been
cut from 10 to 7 squadrons since the war, and the
number of fixed-wing transport squadrons has been
reduced by one squadron to a current level of five.
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There may be a shortage of spare parts in the
Egyptian air force as well, although aircraft
operational levels have remained relatively con--
stant compared to prewar levels. Egyptian fighter
units have about 80 percent of their assigned air-
craft operational.
4. The Egyptian Army. The Egyptian army has
fared somewhat better than the air force in replacing
its major equipment losses. Of its five infantry,
three mechanized, and two armored divisions, only
one mechanized division apparently has not had its
major weapons inventory almost completely restored
to prewar levels. Overall, the current inventory
of tanks and APCs in Egypt is estimated to be about
90 percent the prewar level. The armored inventory
has been upgraded, however, with increasing numbers
of T-62 tanks and BMP armored personnel carriers.
5. There is no accurate information available
to compare prewar and current inventories of other
Egyptian army equipment, but several reports of
Egyptian attempts to obtain spare parts, ammunition,
and antitank missiles from the Soviet Union suggest
some shortages or insufficient reserves of these
items.
6. The Egyptian SAM Force. Egypt's air defense
SAM force appears to have been completely restored
since the October war and is even somewhat larger.
The number of occupied SA-2, SA-3, and SA-6 sites
is slightly higher than prewar levels (150 vs. 140
SAM battalions in 1973), partially as the result
of the presence of a third SA-6 brigade in Egypt.
The force may be short of its prewar inventory
of missiles, however, since the Egyptians re-
portedly have been asking Moscow for additional
supplies and there is evidence of reduced SAM
training exercises.
7. The Egyptian Navy. The Egyptian navy has
not received from the USSR any replacements for the
substantial part of its missile boat force lost or
damaged in the October War. Except for its blockade
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of the Bab-al-Mandeb at the entrance to the Red Sea,
the navy played a relatively minor role in the con-
flict.
Current Military Capabilities
8. Egypt's overall military capabilities are
somewhat less than they were prior to the October
War, although the army is nearly up to its prewar
armored strength. Vis-a-vis Israel, however, Egyptian
armed forces are weaker than in October 1973 due to
the increase in Israeli inventories and capabilities.
The Egyptian armed forces presently are estimated to
be capable of strong defense against an Israel:. at-
tack or of mounting a major offensive action of
short duration to achieve limited objectives .n the
Sinai. Although there is little information on
Egyptian stockpiles of ammunition and spare parts,
it is doubtful that Egypt could support sustained
major military action without further Soviet re-
supply.
9. Cairo is well award that Israel's military
strength and capabi.J.ities have been significantly
increased over what they were at the beginning of
the October War. Consequently, Egyptian leaders
undoubtedly would have to be assured of full parti-
cipation by the better-equipped Syrian forces be-
fore initiating any offensive military ac,J.on against
Israel. They would also want other Arab states to
add to Egypt's inventories of Soviet and Western
arms and equipment in the event of new hostilities.
10. Prior to late 1974, Cairo's military
planning primarily envisioned a defensive role for
Egyptian armed forces, with counterattacks launched
only after successful def 2nsive action against
Israel. A recent report indicates that the Egyptians
have begun joint military planning with Syria for
offensive operations, based on the contingency that
peaceful negotiations may fail to bring further
Israeli withdrawals.
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Efforts to Obtain Soviet Resupply
11. The current shortages of major weapons in
the Egyptian armed forces and their almost total
dependence on Soviet equipment have forced Sadat
to continue to seek Soviet and Eastern European
aid to maintain a credible military capability.
Despite the resumption of Soviet seaborne arms
shipments to Egypt in August 1974, no major weap-
ons systems such as aircraft, tanks, or missiles
were identified in deliveries through the end of
last year. Soviet deliveries consisted only of
spare parts, ammunition, and ground support equip-
ment ordered before 1974.
12. At the time of the visit of the Egyptian
Foreign and War Ministers to Moscow in late December,
there were indications that the Soviet Union was
prepared to provide several squadrons of aircraft
to Egypt under prewar contracts, along with anti-
tank missile launchers and ammunition. The air-
craft include about 24 MIG-21s, 18 SU-20s, and
26 MIG-23s, but they would not be sufficient to
make up for war losses. Only the MIG-23s, about
10 of which were offloaded at Alexandria in early
February, are new to the Egyptian inventory. They
will provide some improvement in air force ground
attack and air defense capabilities. At least. 4
SU-20 attack aircraft also were delivered in late
February. The deliveries may well have been spurred
by Soviet concern over an impending Egyntian-
French arms deal during Sadat's January visit to
France. Nevertheless, the new shipments will hold
out the promise of larger deliveries to fully
restore Egyptian war losses and modernize the arms
inventory, and thus help Moscow's bargaining posi-
tion in Cairo.
13. A full-scale resumption of Soviet military
aid to Egypt presumably is dependent on Cairo's
willingness to improve the complete spectrum of its
relationship with Moscow, including support for an
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1Vooreg
n
early reconvening of the Geneva conference on the
Middle East and possibly the return of some Soviet
advisers. Sadat is unlikely to consider a move in
that direction until after he can determine whether
Secretary Kissinger's current efforts have pro-
duced major progress toward a new disengagement
agreement in the Sinai. in the event some progress
in improving relations is achieved as a result of
the recent Gromyko visit and the ongoing dialogue
between Sadat and Brezhnev, Moscow may be willing
to step up military deliveries.
Efforts to Obtain Western Arms
14. Faced with continued Soviet limitations
and conditions for resumption of full-scale mili-
tary aid and desiring to reduce future dependence
on Soviet arms supplies, Cairo has turned to Western
sources for new weapons. Saudi Arabia, in parti-
cular, has supported this shift and has agreed to
help finance various arms purchases. At the
Rabat Conferer:ce last October, the Arab oil states
reportedly promised to contribute $1 billion to
aid Egypt, with Saudi Ardhia and Kuwait each pledging
$400 million. Although the Saudis may not have
attached specific conditions on all their aid,
they undoubtedly would prefer that Egypt lessen
its dependence on Soviet military essistan.ce.
15. With the financial support of the Arab
oil states, Egypt has been aggressively seeking arms
deals with the West. The Egyptians already have
received the first nine of some 36 French Mirage
5 fighters paid for by the Saudis, and purchase
of another 36 Mirage IIIs or F-ls reportedly is
being financed by Abu Dhabi and Kuwait. During
Sadat's trip to Paris this January, he sought
additional modern aircraft, naval ships, missiles,
armor, and other military equipment. An agree-
ment for an additional 50 Mirage fighters, proba-
bly a mix of Mirage IIIs and F-1s, apparently was
negotiated, and further arms deals are likely to
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be announced in the near future. The Egyptians
Especially want to obtain Western antiship mis-
siles to arm their patrol craft.
16. The Egyptians have also been negotiating
with the British. They want Swingfire antitank
missiles, Lynx attack helicopters, and Hawk strike-
trainer aircraft along with naval patrol craft.
Cairo is especially interested in developing its
own capability to produce major weapon systems,
and may have concluded a contract to build the
helicopters in Egypt under British license. They
also are interested in licensed production of the
trainer aircraft. Although there is reportedly
some disagreement over the terms of the various
agreements, particularly for offensive weapons, the
Egyptian Arms Prospects and Military Capabilities
17. The major problem that the Egyptians face
with seeking Western arms is that they can provide
few "quick fixes" to current major weapon shortages
and the resulting military weaknesses. Western arms
suppliers do not generally have the capability to
produce and deliver large quantities of new equip-
ment in a short time, although older weapons can
sometimes be taken out of inventory. The remaining
new Mirage 5s on order from France, for example,
will not be-delivered until the end of the year,
and the Mirage F-1 contract will take several more
years to fill. Replacing the Soviet Union with
Western arms suppliers thus is a long term, rather
than a short term, project. The Egyptian War Min-
ister, General Gamasy, reportedly has told Sadat
that it would take five to seven years to re-
equip and train the Egyptian armed forces with
Western arms.
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18. In the interim, the Egyptian armed forces
are dependent on a continued Soviet and East
European supply of spare parts and ammunition
to maintain their curl:ent levels of combat readi-
ness. The Egyptians are expected to press for
Soviet assurance of renewed supply in the event
of a resumption of fighting with Israel.
19. A full-scale resumption of Soviet military
aid to restore equipment war losses and further
modernize and upgrade the armed forces would improve
current Egyptian offensive and defensive capabilities.
Wezpon systems of the types already in the Egyptian
inventory could be relatively easily assimilated,
although it would take longer to effectively utilize
new and more sophisticated weapons and aircraft.
The prospects for such renewed deliveries still are
uncertain, but Sadat undoubtedly will feel less need
and pressure for significant military aid from
Moscow if he can get a satisfactory new Sinai
disengagement agreement from the Israelis.
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ESTIMATED EGYPTIAN COMBAT STRENGTH AND MAJOR
WEAPONS INVENTORIES
(As of 28 February 1975)
Prewar
Current
Air Force Squadrons
Aircraft
S uac,rons Aircraft
MIG-23
MIG-21 14
SU- 4
SU-17/20 1
MIG-15/17 3
Mirage 5 2
TU-16 3
326a
100b
20c
155d
33e
26
1 10
13 216a
4 65b
1 27C
2 93d
1 9
2 23
27
Army
657
Prewar
24 443
Current
Infantry Divisions
5
5
Mechanized Divisions
3
3
Armored Divisions
2
2
Ind. Armored Brig.
3
6
Ind. Infantry Brig.
3
3
Equipment
Tanks
2,100
2,000
APC
1,500-2,300f
1,400-2,15of
FROG Launcher
12
12
SCUD Launcher
0
18-24
Air Defense
SA-2 Battalions
70
75
SA-3 Battalions
60
60
SA-6 Battalions
10
15
Totals
140
Navy
Destroyers
5
5
Submarines
12
129
Missile Boats
17
14h
Footnotes on foZZowing page.
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Includes about 40 in the fighter conversion brigade.
bIncludes about 20 in the fighter conversion brigade.
cFifteen SU-17s are in storage.
dIncludes 50 in the fightrr conversion brigade.
eThese were on loan from Libya. They returned in
the summrsr of 1974.
The higher estimate is based on an extrapola-
tion from tables of organization and equipment
(TO&E) of identified units. DIA representatives
prefer the higher figure, but the National
Intelligence Officer notes his own and other
representatives' reservations concerning the
methodology and suggests that the lower figure
may be a reasonable estimate.
9Includes two undergoing a long-term overhaul.
hlncZudes two produced in Egypt since the war.
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