TRENDS IN COMMUNIST MEDIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00608R000200160018-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 33
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 19, 1999
• Sequence Number: 18
• Publication Date: October 22, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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FBIS
FOREIGN BROADCAST
INFORMATION SERVICE
Trends in Communist Media
~6e~eiide+titiaL
22 OCTOBER 1975
(VOL. XXVI, NO. 42)
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This report is based c:.clusivoly on foreign m^dla
materials and is published by FBIS without coordination
with other U.S. Government components.
NATIONAL Sl:: URITP INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure F able,,! to Criminal Sanctions
CIo tic d by 3
Aut oma6wlly declassified
six months from daln of issue
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CONTENTS
Appro
"Friendly" Meeting With Mao Highlights Peking Visit . . . . . . .
. 1
Moscow Notes Secretary's Visit, PRC Attacks on Detente . . . . .
. 2
DRV Reports Arrival in PRC, Criticizes U.S. Policy in Asia . . .
. 3
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM
PRAVDA Recalls 1905 General Strike, Says Tactic Valid Today . . .
. 4
WORLD ECONOMY
Moscow Wary of West's Approach to Paris Economic Talks . . . . .
. 6
USSR-EGYPT
Moscow Cites Sadat on U.S. Ties, Arms "Escalation" to Israel . .
. 8
PORTUGAL
Moscow Replays PGP Complaints About Moves Against Left . . . . .
. i1
VIETNAM
PRG To Allow Repatriation of Americans Still in South Vietnam . .
. 13
PRG Media Charge U.S. "Henchmen" Among Returning Refugees . . . .
? 14
DPRK Maintains Negative Stance on North-South Reldtions . . . . .
. 1.5
Moscow Cool on KWP Anniversary, Peking Treatment Standard . . . .
. 16
Leaders' Speeches in Gdansk Reflect Concern Over Public Unrest .
. 18
Belgrade Leadership Renews Campaign Against "Coninformists" . .
. 19
USSR
Soviet Media Criticize Sakharov, Nobel Award . . . . . . . . . .
. 21
Feud Between Mathematical Economists, Gosplan Revived . . . . . .
. 22
Agricultural Confer:nce Ends, Sets Farm Mechanization Goals . . .
. 24
Peking Commemorates 40th Anniversary of the "Long March" . . . .
. 25
NOTE
Soviet Media on U.S. Grain Deal
28
APPENDIX
Moscow, Peking Broadcast Statistics
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KISSINGER IN PRC
"FRIENDLY" MEETING WITH MAO HIGHLIGHTS PEKING VISIT
Peking treatment of Secretary Kissinger during his visit to the PRC,
begun on 19 October, has been highlighted by a "friendly" meeting
with Mao Tse-tung on the 21st. Prior to the meeting with Mao, the
Kissinger party's visit had ocr.asioned correct Chinese protocol
treatment, though Foreign Minister Chiao Kuan-hua's remarks at the
usual welcoming banquet contained some less than cordial overtones.
The secretary, as in the past, was welcomed at the airport by a
Chinese delegation led by Chiao Kuan-hua, and Vice Premier Teng
Hsiao-ping attended the welcoming banquet on 19 October. NCNA
reported that Teng and Chiao held talks with Kissinger on the 20th
rind 21st. The NCNA report of the meeting with Mao duplicated the
agency's report of Kissinger's last session with Mao on 12 November
1973 in noting the "friendly" atmosphere and pointing out that the
chairman asked Kissinger "to convey his regards" to the U.S.
President. Kissinger had not been received by Mao during his most
recent China visit in November 1974. Kissinger thus far has not
met with the ailing Premier Chou En-lai, who has made no public
appearances in recent weeks.
Chiao Kuan-hua's toast at the welcoming banquet, as transmitted by
NCNA, departed from past practice in omitting introductory words of
welcome for the secretary. Chiao instead launched into a standard
Chinese warning--not seen before during a Kissinger visit--that
detente was an "illusion" that should not blind the world to hegemonism-?-
a code word for Soviet expansionism.
Chiao's toast was similar to Chinese welcoming remarks in the past
when it observed that "on the whole, Sino-U.S. relations have moved
forward in the last few years," and that. while there are bilateral
differences, the two sides "have common points as well." Chiao
recalled that "a new page" was turned in relations between the two
countries with President Nixon's 1972 visit to China and the issuance
of the Shanghai communique. But Chiao made no mention at all of
President Ford, although in a similar toast during Kissinger's visit
last November, the Chinese foreign minister had noted "with
appreciation" President Ford's commitment to the principles outlined
in the Shanghai communique.*
* Kissinger and other U.S. officials have said that preparations for
President Ford's visit to China next month were the prime reason for the
secretary's current visit. However, Chinese media have not in recent
months independently mentioned a visit by the President, a visit which
had been agreed on for 1975, according to the communique on Kissinger's
Peking trip last November.
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Chiao also showed a degree of concern regarding U.S. adherence to
the principles of the Shanghai communique. Last November he had
expressed confidence that Kissinger's visit would "contribute to
the further Implementation" of the principles, But now stressing
China's sincerity, he said that relations would improve if "our
two sides" observed the principles in practice. Chiao's remarks
came a week after Peking had accused the United States--in a
1 October statement by a spokesman for the PRC Foreign Ministry's
information department---of violating the Shanghai communique
"principles" by refusing to stop activities by nationalist
Tibetan groups in the United States.
NCNA as usual reported Secretary Kissinger's reply toast, though it
did not refer to his speaking a Chinese sentence in the toast, as
reported by the Western press.
MOSCOW NOTES SECRETARY'S VISIT, PRC ATTACKS ON DETENTE
As with Kissinger's past Peking visits, Soviet media have covered
the current trip discreetly, primarily through brief pickups of
Western reports. Moscow's Mandarin broadcasts to China on the 18th
and the 20th noted that the main topics of the talks would be
President Ford's planned November visit to Peking and the alleged
Chinese concern that the United States maintain its military
presence in Asia. A TASS account of Kissinger's meeting with Mao
on 21. October, based on Western sources, noted Mao's reported
criticism of the Soviet Union as an "aggressive power" and Peking's
use of the visit for "public attacks on detente."
During the secretary's past visits to Peking, Moscow has often
highlighted evidence of a cozy Sino-U.S. relationship. Thus,
during his November 1973 visit, the Moscow domestic radio noted a
REUTER report that Chairman Mao had received no other foreign
statesman as often as he had Kissinger. In contrast, some strains
were indicated currently when the 22 October TASS report on
meetings with Mao and Teng Hsiao-ping cited "officials in Henry
Kissinger's party" as saying that "the Chinese side shows no
understanding of the significance of the final act which was signed
in Helsinki." At the same time, a 21 October PRAVDA article,
available only in a TASS summary, asserted that China was using
Secretary Kissinger's visit for "a new wave of anti-Sovietism and
attacks on the policy of detente."
Recent Soviet comment has described a certain stagnation in the process
of. normalizing Sino-U.S. relations and has seemed to reflect a
greater confidence in Moscow that there are inherent limits upon
Sino-U.S. cooperation that would minimize its potential harm to
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Sc''iet interests. The 17 September LITERARY GAZETTE observed that
"the voices of realistic observers" were being heard increasingly
often in Western discussions of China, after an initial period of
discovery when life there was portrayed in "idyllic tones."
IZVESTIYA observer Aleksandr Bovin had assured Moscow TV viewers
last July that "realistic" politicians in the West understood that
China's ability to upset Soviet detente policy was "fairly limited."
DRV REPORTS ARRIVAL IN PRC, CRITICIZES U.S. POLICY IN ASIA
Following the pattern established during Secretary Kissinger's last
two trips to the PRC, North Vietnamese media acknowledged his
arrival in Peking in a brief Vietnamese-language radio report on
20 October which noted that he would be in China for four days.
An earlier Hanoi radio broadcast in English on the 18th had taken
note of the secretary's "Asian tour" without mentioning his
scheduled China visit. Explaining that Kissinger was reviewing U.S.
policies in the area, the broadcast had warned that despite the
phasing out of SEATO, U.S. "scheming" was continuing and Washington
still hoped to maintain military bases in Thailand and was sending
weapons to South Korea and tightening its alliance with Japan.
DRV media were first noted to have acknowledged a Kissinger visit to
China in November 1973, when Hanoi radio similarly reported his
Peking arrival and, after he left, cited his talks with Chinese
officials and reception by Chairman Mao.* The secretary's subsequent
trip to China in November 1974 prompted less-detailed acknowledgment
in Hanoi media. Prior to November 1973 the Hanoi media had maintained
a disapproving silence on Kissinger's Peking contacts as well as
President Nixon's 1972 trip to China, and had indirectly criticized
the Sino-U.S. rapprochement in polemical comment warning against
U.S. duplicity.
* Kissinger's November 1973 trip to Peking is discussed in the TRENDS
of 21 November 1973, page 23.
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INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM
PRAVDA RECALLS 1905 GENERAL STRIKE, SAYS TACTIC VALID TODAY
An endorsement of mass political strikes as an appropriate form
of class struggle for communist parties in the West is the
apparent message of an article b?T N. Cherepenin in the 19 October
issue of PRAVDA.* Keyed to the observance of the 70th anniversary
of the general strike in Russia in 1905, the article averred in
its concluding paragraphs that the use of strikes for political
purposes has become "one of the proven means of working class
struggle." This implied recommendation of militant tactics to
Western communist parties recalls the 6 August Zarodov article in
PRAVDA which also challenged the validity of moderate tactics,
presumably with reference to varied reactions among West European
communist parties to the Portuguese situation. Although the present
article contains no clear references to such current situations,
it seems intended to lend support to a generally aggressive
approach to the selection of tactics for communist party activities
in the West.
The clearest indication of this militant tendency came in the
concluding passages of the article, where the author offered some
general observations on the relevance of the 1905 experience to
the present day. After asserting that "Marxist-Leninist parties"
are now supporting mass strike movements in various capitalist
countries, the author quoted Brezhnev as having urged communist
p;1rties to "be prepared for any changes in the situation and to
use any forms of struggle." The quote is taken from Brezhnev's
address on L:~nin's centennial which was celebrated on 21 April
1970, It is particularly appropriate as supporting documentation
for the current article, since Brezhnev's argument in the relevant
passage of his centennial address was that communists should not
be satisfied with limited "democratic" goals but should push for
full-scale "socialist" revolutions. An argument that the "democratic"
and "socialist" stages of the "anti-monopolist struggle" could be
merged was one of the key theses advanced by Zarodov.
Another indication that the article represents the more militant
approach to communist tactics is the fact that it contains several
critical references to moderate political forces which were also
targets of Zarodov's denigrations. The author remarked, for example,
* No biographic information is available on Cherepenin and he is
not known to have written for publication previously.
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after noting the success of the strike movement in Russia, that
it was rejected by the "opportunist leaders of Western Social
Democracy." M.Pewhere, he pointed out that Lenin's development of
the strike tactic had been carried out against the opposition
of the "opportunists, who strove at all times to confine the
struggle to economic tasks."
These apparently polemical aspects of the article are thrown into
sharper relief by the blandness of the complementary article on
the 1905 general strike carried in IZVESTIYA on 18 October. Written
by candidate of historical sciences V. Kirillov, the article was
entirely devoted to an inspirational account of the 1905 events
with no didactic conclusions drawn regarding current communist
tactics.
A review of past issues of PRAVDA covering, the period around the
60th anniversary of the general strike it, 1965--the current
calendar lists 20 October as the anniversary of the event--turned
up no commemorative articles.
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WORLD ECONOMY
MOSCOW WARY OF WEST ?S APPROACH TO PARIS ECONOMIC TALKS
Moscow has treated circumspectly the agreement between Western
industrial and developing countries, reached at a 13-15 October
meeting in Paris, to hold a 27-nation ministerial-level Confer-
ence on International Economic Cooperation. Consistent with
previous comment, Soviet media noted approvingly that the
conference, scheduled to begin in Paris on 1.6 December, will deal.
not only with the question of oil supplies and prices, as
originally proposed by the West, but also with other raw materials
and problems of development, as demanded by the Third World
countries. At the same time, comment has voiced skepticism that
the West will be forthcoming in responding to the developing
countries' needs.
WESTERN CONCESSION Typifying Moscow's traditional support
for the oil-producing and other developing
countries vis-a-vis the West, an. Arabic-language commentary on
the 18th asserted that the agreement to hold the conference along
the lines proposed by the developing countries proved the "fair-
ness" of their demand that a dialog with the West must include
a comprehensive disussion of trade and economic relations.
Similarly, TASS economics commentator Boris Rachkov on the 14th
stressed that the previous preparatory meeting in Paris last April
had failed because the West "egotistically" sought to limit the
conference to solving its own energy problems while ignoring the
needs of most of the Third World countries.* Both commentaries
portrayed the West's willingness to accept an expanded conference
agenda as a reluctant concession in the face of firm Third World
resoluteness, as characterized by the oil producers' latest
decision to hike prices by 10 percent. The Arabic-language radio
commentary, for example, asserted that it took the West six months
to yield to the developing countries'iust demand after all
Western attempts at "pressure, intimidation and coercion" had
failed.
Moscow comment, however, has voiced doubt that the West's will-
ingness to accept an expanded conference agenda means tha': it has
* For details on Soviet comment on the April preparatory conference,
see the Supplementary Article "Energy: USSR Plays on Disputes,
Warns of U.S. Pressures" in the 18 June 1974 TRENDS.
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abandoned its uncooperative stance relating to the developing
countries. Yuriy Kharlanov's "International Review" in the
19 October PRAVDA, for example, acknowledged that U.S. repre-
sentatives at the preparatory meeting had "softened their tone
somewhat and adopted, at least verbally, more conciliatory positions"
but added: "Nonetheless, American circles linked with the Xnter-
national monopolies are continuing their demands for table-thumping."
Similarly, Rachkov, after referring to the recent OPEC oil price
increase, asserted that a "certain 'softening"' of the West's
position "does not mean that imperialism is not seeking revenge."
COMMISSION FORMAT Underscoring the contention that the West will
attempt to avoid responding to Third World
needs, Kharlanov pointed to Western unwillingness to accept a
proposal of the developing countries that the December conference
be held in several stages to deal consecutively with the problems
of energy, raw materials, industrial development and financial
problems. According to current guidelines, each of these subjects
is to be discussed by an individual commission--a format originally
suggested by Secretary Kissinger last May. Several commentaries
have suggested that the commission format is designed to enable
the West to sidestep those issues of greatest concern to the Third
World. TASS correspondent Yevgeniy Korzhev on the 13th, for example,
asserted that Western "maneuvering" would become evident when the
two sides attempt to define the specific tasks of the commissions.
More specifically, IZVESTIYA's V. Borisov on th 15th contended
that the West hoped to avoid discussing the subject of raw materials
by relegating it to one of the commissions.
SOVIET ROLE Although Moscow comment has uniformly refrained
from discussing direct Soviet interest in the
continuing dialog between the West and the developing countries,
a D. Volskiy article in the 3 October Russian-language edition of
NEW TIMES acknowledged Western comment ca the issue. It dismissed
as "feebleminded anti-Sovietism" the assertion of an article in
the British daily GUARDIAN that a successful conference would put
Moscow in an "awkward position." Volskiy countered that "progressive
people could only welcome it, if the capitalist West were actually
to elaborate a constructive approach"--a contingency which he described
as a "long way off." As a possible counter to Western initiatives,
however, the Soviet front organization World Peace Council, according
to a brief 10 September TASS report released at the conclusion of
the UNGA special session on economic cooperation, announced plans
for a "world conference on the problems-of developing countries"
in October 1976.
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USSR-EGYPT
MOSCOW CITES SADAT ON U.S. TIES, ARMS "ESCALATION" TO ISRAEL
Soviet media thus far have avoided direct comment on President
as-Sadat's forthcoming official visit to the United States but
have conveyed Moscow's displeasure with as-Sadat's foreign and
domestic policies. Implying Egyptian gullibility, Moscow has
stressed the incongruity of Egypt's efforts to seek closer ties
with the United States at a time when the traditional U.S. protective
commitment to Israel has been strengthened.
This message has been implicit for weeks in Moscow's continued
attention to the "secret" U.S. assurances to Israel on defense,
energy and economic requirements, including Israel's request
for advanced weapons, set forth in conjunction with the Sinai II
accord. To underline the point, TASS and Moscow's "unofficial"
Radio Peace and Progress highlighted passages from as-Sadat's
18 October speech in which he referred to the issue of further
U.S. military aid for Israel. TASS' account marked the first
time in months that Moscow had accorded remarks by as-Sadat any
more than brief, passing attention.* The TASS dispatch on the
19th quoted as-Sadat as expressing "concern and protest against
any escalation of American military deliveries to Israel and,
particularly, the delivery of new types of weapons" and cited his
warning that Egypt would meet "escalation on one side by an
escalation on our side."
The TASS account also associated as*-Sadat directly with policies
that have caused persistent discord in Soviet-Egyptian relations.
TASS cited as-Sadat's reference to Egypt's pursuit of "balanced
relations of friendship" with both the United States and the USSR,
"without distinguishing between them because of the fact that one
of them has a socialist regime and the other a capitalist one."
Similarly, TASS reported as-Sadat's reaffirmation of Egypt's
economic "open?-door policy" for all countries, with its consequent
rejection of "imported socialism" and development of "Egyptian Arab
socialism."
Since the beginning of this year Moscow has taken note of perhaps
no more than half a dozen of as-Sadat's many speeches and interviews.
Most recently, two-paragraph TASS reports disposed of a Lebanese press
interview in June and his 23 July anniversary speech, and PRAVDA late
in July made a passing reference to his Khartoum press conference.
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TASS 'gnored as-Sadat's remarks on the Sinai II accord, in which he
reaffirmed that Egypt remained committed to the retrieval of all
Arab lands occupied by Israel and to the restoration of Palestinian
rights, adding that Egypt also believed in recovering whatever land
was possible at a given historical moment: "Every reasonable person
knows that complete liberation will not be achieved all at once.
Nor did TASS mention his reference to U.S,, assurances to him that
it would work for a further disengagement accord between Syria and
Israel and for recognition of Palestinian rights.
Moscow has been negative in its. limited references to prospects for
Syrian-Israeli disengagement talks. Reporting a 21 October shooting
episode between Israeli and Syrian patrols on the Golan Heights,
for example, TASS cited Syrian newspapers on Israel's alleged buildup
of tension in the area "as an attempt by Israel and the United States
to pressure Syria to make concessions within the framework of a
partial settlement." On a more general level, Moscow has clearly
expressed its disapproval of Syrian-Israeli talks through its
continued criticism of "partial accords" and advocacy of an overall
political settlement at a reconvened Geneva conference.
VISIT TO U.S. Moscow presumably seeks to minimize the potential
importance of as-Sadat's upcoming visit to the
United States. TASS first took notice of the visit in a one-sentence
dispatch from Washington on 10 October citing a White House announcement
that the visit would begin on 26 October. The only other available
mention of the visit came in a 14 October PRAVDA report on Secretary
Kissinger's remarks on U.S. military aid for Egypt, made- two days
earlier on U.S. television. PRAVDA cited the Secretary as saying
that the subject of U.S. military aid to Egypt would be dis.ussed
during as-Sadat's visit, but only on a general level, and that the
United States would not give "specific pledges" or discuss a
"specific list of purchases." Moscow has otherwise ignored U.S.
and Arab media speculation on what as-Sadat seeks to accomplish
during the visit.
As-Sadat himself--according to the Kuwaiti foreign minister, a;;
reported in the 19 October issue of Kuwait's AL-WATAN--said that
he wculd press the United States for another disengagement on the
Syrian front and for acceptance of the Palestine Liberation
Organization (PLO) at any conference on a Mideast settlement.
As-Sadat also indicated he would discuss the matter of U.S. arms
for Israel with President Ford and the Palestinian issue with
the U.S. Congress and public. Cairo's MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY
(MENA) on the 17th had earli.:r cited as-Sadat as having told a
visiting U.S. Congressman that he would request the sale to Egypt
of U.S. defensive weapons, "including planes, electronic equipment,
and anti-aircraft missiles."
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U.S. ARMS Soviet media over the past weeks have continued to
TO ISRAEL report and comment on the issue of further U.S. armv
for Israel. Much of the Soviet attention has been
reactive to U.S. media publicity and to U.S. Congressional hearings
on the accord's provision that U.S. technicians be sent to the
Sinai. Moscow had, as in the past, replayed remarks by U.S.
politicians and media sources critical of a projected deeper U.S.
involvement in the Middle East and of Israel's requests for
highly advanced U.S. weapons, such as the F-16 aircraft and the
Pershing and Lance missiles. Remarks on Moscow radio's 19 October
roundtable were typical, recalling the "secret" U.S.-Israeli under-
standings--first published in U.S. newspapers on 16-17 September--on
U.S. responsiveness to Israel's defense needs and stressing that
these iacreased U.S. commitments to Israel, added to the issue of
sending U.S. technicians to the Sinai, were of increasing concern to
Americans as well as Arabs and could exert potentially harmful
effects on efforts to achieve a comprehensive Mideast settlement.
One commentator on the program, reviving a point made on 2 September
by TASS Deputy General Director S. Losev, suggested that the issue
of U.S. arms to Israel could be viewed in the context of the
incompatibility of a country's simultaneously pursuing detente a,.,'
"fanning the arms race."
A major point Moscow has been trying to convey in its continued
comment on U.S. military aid to Israel is that Egypt's agreement
to the Sinai II accor-i has helped Israel militarily. A Radio Peace
and Progress commentary in Arabic on the 20th, for example, noting
as-Sadat's 18 October remarks on "escalation" of U.S. military aid
to Israel, used his warning L,s a peg for criticism of the Sinai II
accord. The commentary also suggested that "Israel and its protectors"
had u.:ed the "imzginary concessions" under the Sinai II accord to
justify an increased military buildup of Israeli forces. Similarly,
a Moscow radio Arabic-language commentary on the 16th, alleging a
concentration of Israeli armed forces on the Golan front and Israeli
overflights of Syrian territory, linked the activity to Israel's
encouragement from the Sinai II accord and from "talks being held in
Washington on Israel's demands for huge deliveries of U.S. offensive
we;ipons and military equipment this year and in years to come."
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POR1 UGAL
MOSCOW REPLAYS PCP COMPL'A NTS ABOUT MOVES AGAINST LEFT
Moscow has Indicated displeasure with Portuguese frame Minister
Azevedo's att''mpt to decrease preponderant lef.ti.st Influence in
public affairs by highlighting the Portuguese Communist Party's
warning that what Is needed is "an immediate struggle against
counterrevolutionary forces--not against. progressive forces."
although not directly critical. of Azevedo, Moscow has reported
the i'CP'r_ insistence that the centrist Popular Democrats be
"expelled from the goverumz_nt" and has noted the Communist Party's
more tempered criticism of the Portuguese socialists. At the
same time, Soviet media conti.nue to emphasize the now standard
theme of the importance of "unity of progressive forces" and
has repeated the PCP's call for a meeting wf.th "other .icftwLng
revolutionary part:Les, as well as the Portuguese Socialist Party"
in an attempt to resolve the country's chronic political problems.
While Soviet media wcre still replaying favorable reports of
Portuguese President Costa Gomes' visit to the Soviet Union,
TZVESTiYA correspondent L. Agapov on 8 October praiscJ Lisbon's
dissident "Ralis" regiment, dismissing as "fantastic" the rumors
of Rc.lis involvement in coup plotting. IZVESTIYA said that the
regiment's supporters had "demanded" that the ruling Revolutionary
Council restore ousted leftists to their former positions on the
Council and in the Armed Forces Movement. And--in a possible
effort to dissociate President Costa Domes from the present admin-
istration's policies--IZVESTIYA noted that the president earlier
had said that "reactionary forces are trying to destroy the Armed
Forces Movement."
Another Agapov IZVESTIYA article on 11 October continued this line
by placing blame for the recent violence in Oporto on the region's
military commander, who "not only did not stop ultrarightists'
provocations but even tried to disband military units lc;yal to the
revolution." Also indicating dissatisfaction with the crackdown
on leftists, PRAVDA on 9 October discussed a PCP statement to the
effect that Portugal's problems could not be solved "by a swing to
the right in government policy." And on the 34th both PW.'.'DA--in
a dispatch by correspondent Kotov--and IZVESTIYA reported a PCP-led
mass meeting to protest efforts by "reactionary circles" to "move
the policy of Portugal'?; present government to the right."
While emphasizing the PCP's opposition to the government's move
against leftists, the Soviet media seem anxious to portray the
party as a reasonable political force. not involved in violent activity.
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Thus, PRAVDA on'.the 9th noted that the PCP "resolutely opposes
chaos and anarchy," "advocates a political solution" and also
"supports military and public discipline." PRAVDA also noted
the party's renewed call for a meeting of the socialists, the
PCP and other leftist parties, together with "representatives of
all trends in the MFA" for a discussion on ',lays to solve the
country's "acute problems."
The "unity" 1n.ibrel],a does not extend to cover the despised
People's Democratic Party (PPD), however, which is now openly
attacked both by the PCP and the Soviet media. For example,
PRAVDA correspondent Kotov on the 10th blamed PPD "raiders" for
setting off violence in Oporto, and IZVESTIYA's Agapov on the
llth attributed the Oporto clash to "gangs of fascist cutthroats
supported by irresponsible elements in the People's Democratic
Party."
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PRG TO ALLOW REPATRIATION OF /1MU1 ICAWS STILL I N SOU-111 VIETNAM
Vietn:umcse connnunlot media annouru,ed on 20 ()ctsober that. Lhe I'IW has
agreed to allow American:; and other foreigners :;L1.11. In South
Vietnam to leave Lhe country If they wish. No explanation for the
Limtni, of the decision was Endicated, and no connection was made
with the Vietnamese refugee:; Bailing back to South Vietnam from Guam.
The announcement--Lran:;mltCcd by Ilanol's Vietnam New:; Agency, which
cited 1.i beralion Press Agency (I.I'A) as Lhe soured--de:x.rlbecl the
forcilners as "mostly nilosl.ou:ur1.e:;" who were unable to .Leave prior
to the communl.sL takeover on 30 April. because of the flghLing. 'flue
announcement :aid Lhe. LIN IIIgh Commissioner for Refugees had agreed
to ass.1st In the repatriation and that this would be effected ''in
late October or early November."
SLnce the Apt-La. takeover of South Vietnam, moni.tored PRG and URV
broadcasts have rarely alluded to the fate of Americans who
remained in the country. The issue was addressed, however, In a
13 September PRG Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement which
denied charges that Americans were being held hostage and declared
that the I'RG was protecting all foreigners residing in outh Vietnam.
Prior to the communist takeover, Liberation Radio reported in mid-Mar-11
that a spokesman of the PRG delegaticn to i.he Joint Military
Commission in Saigon had noted at a press conference there that
"foreigners, including honest Americans, will be well treated and
released if they are captured." The spokesman went on to warn,
however, that this treatment would not be accorded "U.S. military
advisers," since they were "special cases because they had violated
the Paris agreement."*
On the related issue of U.S. military personnel still missing in
action in Vietnam, Vietnamese communist comment has repeatedly linked
Vietnamese cooperation in providing information on the missing with
the demand that the United States fulfill its obligation under the
Paris agreement to assist in postwar reconstruction "in both zones of
Vietnam," which in turn would facilitate normalization of relations
between the United States and the DRV. Neither U.S. reconstruction
aid nor the possibility of improved relations was cited in the latest
announcement on repatriation of Americans still in Vietnam.
* The PRG delegation's press conference at Tan Son Nhut is discussed
in the TRENDS of 19 March 1975, pages 8-10.
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PRG MEDIA CHARGE U.S. "HENCHMEN" AMONG RETURNING REFUGEES
There has been no new official Vietnamese communist: public statement
on the 1,600 refugees returning to South Vietnam by ship from Guam
since a 15 October DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement
endorsed an earlier PRG protest of the repatriation effort.*
Vietnamese media comment has continued to echo the earlier official
statements, criticizing the unauthorized return of the refugees
but still not stating directly that they would be forbidden entry
once they arrive. Propaganda in the past week has injected the
additional communist concern that undesirable elements might be
included among the returnees, as well as the inference that
refugees remaining in the United States may soon follow the current
group of repatriates.
An LPA commentary broadcast 17 October by Saigon radio, after leveling
the now standard charge that unilateral repatriation of the refugees
constitutes a "violat:Lon" of the sovereignty of Vietnam, accused the
United States of attempting "to wend back a number of its henchmen
with a view zo . . . creating disturbances." It is clear from the
context of the accusation, however, that the commentary did not
include the majority of the refugees making the return voyage in this
category. Instead, most are depicted as dupes of the United States
"who were deceived and forced into emigrating."
A 21 October commentary in the Saigon newspaper GIAI PRONG, broadcast
by Saigon radio, portrayed the Vietnamese refugees as now living
"parasitic, wretched lives" and claimed the United States was
"cynically taking advantage" of their requests to be sent home.
Charging that the United States was "evading its responsibility" to
tt'e refugees by "recklessly" letting them sail for Vietnam, the
commentary implied that this might be a precursor to subsequent U.S.
attempts to deal with refugee problems. Thus, the commentary asserted,
"in the future, tens of thousands of other Vietnamese will be left to
their fate In the same manner."
* Earlier Vietnamese protests of the refugee return are discussed
in the TRENDS of 8 October 1975, pages 5-6, and of 16 October 1975,
pages 11-12.
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K0REA
DPRK MAINTAINS NEGATIVE STANCE ON NORTH-SOUTH RELATIONS
Recent authoritative Pyongyang comment, including Kim I1-song
speeches on 9 and 10 October marking the 30th anniversary of
the Korean Workers Party,* have maintained the North's intransigence
on improving relations with the South. Pyongyang underscored its
negative stance with a 17 October telephone message from the DPRK
cochairman of the North-So""th Coordination Committee (NSCC)
rejecting an ROK offer to resume North-South contacts. Contacts
between the NSCC vice chairman have been suspended since the North
postponed the 11th meeting, originally scheduled for. 30 May. The
current message gave the South "another month" to respond to
DPRK conditions for resuming the dialog set forth last July.
While Pyongyang has made no specific threats, its conditions
are such that the current ultimatum may be laying the groundwork
for formally breaking off the NSCC talks. The conditions include
demands that the South cease "war provocation maneuvers," renounce
the "two Koreas plot" and stop "fascist repression" in the South.
The telephone message and a NODONG SINMUN commentary on the 19th
complained that the South had not yet responded to these conditions,
though it had previously suggested in August that Seoul's bid to
Join the United Nations represented a negative reply.
Kim II-song, speaking at the 9 October anniversary rally, made no
mention of the moribund North-South dialog. However, he harked
back to the formulation he had first used in August 1971--that the
North was "ready to hold negotiations at any time with all political
parties, including the Democratic Republican Party," the ruling party
in the South--and which was a prelude to the Red Cross talks and
the formation of the NSCC. He not only ignored the past official
dialog, but stressed that the "people" of the North and South
should form a "national united front."
At the rally, Kim declared that "some progress" toward reunification
had been made in recent years. And later in the speech he observed
that the South Korean people were fighting for "resignatioLt of the
traiL,:rous, reactionary government." The North-South stalemate was
further reflected in Kim's remarks at the anniversary banquet on the
* Other aspects of Pyongyang's commemeration of the KWP's 30th
anniversary are discussed in the TRENDS of 16 October 1975,
pages 15-16.
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10th. lie said that to reunify the country "we will have to fight
the U.S. imperialists," and that "we will have to go through
hardships and must be ready to sacrifice ourselves," Ile also
suggested that the South Korean people were "waiting for our
helping hand," but did not go beyond the standard call for the
North to "actively support and encourage" the struggle in the South.
MOSCOW COOL ON KVJP ANNIVERSARY. PEKING TREATMENT STANDARD
Moscow's low-key treatment of the KW;.' anniversary was obviously
not calculated to reverse the ever chillier atmosphere characterizing
Soviet-DPRK relations. No CPSU politburo member attended the DPRK
ambassador's anniversary reception in Moscow; the Soviet leadership
turnout was led by Central Committee Secretary Katushev. Both
Moscow and Pyongyang media merely noted the reception. Teng
lisiao-ping led a Peking leadership turnout on tl7c anniversary, and
Peking commec.t ,ffered standard support.
The CPSU's anniversary greetings to the KWP credited the DPRK's
success to its use of the experiences of other socialist countries--
a claim Moscow has not included in past anniversary messages and,
something Pyongyang is sure to resent since it contradicts Kim
Il-song's claim that the DPRK has been successful precisely because
it has not relied on the experience of others. A 10 October dispatch
from PRAVDA's Pyongyang correspondent, the only comment on the
anniversary monitored in authoritative Moscow media, was mostly
devoted to reviewing the North's economic successes. It, too,
attributed that success to Pyongyang's "utilizing the socialist
countries' experience and expanding cooperation with them." Moscow
radio briefly reported Kim I1-song's 9 October rally speech,
highlighting his remarks on the DPRK's efforts to develop the
international communist movement and strengthen friendship with
socialist countries.
Perhaps further reflecting a chill in DPRK relations with the
USSR and its allies, Kim I1-song did not meet with a delegation
from Hungary, although he did meet with delegations from the other
two communist countries which sent delegations to the Korean
anniversary--Romanian and Cuba.
Peking honored the KWP's anniversary with a PEOPLE'S DAILY
editorial, and a CCP leadership turnout at the DPRK charge's
10 October anniversary reception was led by five politburo
members, including Teng Hsiao-ping, Chang Chun-chiao, who spoke
at the reception, and Yao Wen-yuan.
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Peking's comment on the anniversary offered standard support for
the DPRK. The 10 Oct.?,ber editorial demanded dissolution of
the UN Command and withdrawal of U.S. troops, and pledged support
for the "just struggle of the South Korean people." It also
noted KWP opposition to "imperialism and modern revisionism"
as well as the party's support for "anti-hegemonistic struggles."
The CCP's anniversary greetings to the KWP offered support for
the Korean people's struggle against the '!U.S. imperialists'
occupation" of South Korea, and noted KWP opposition to
"imperialism, colonialism, and hegemonism."
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EASTERN EUROPE
LEADERS' SPEECHES IN GDANSI< REFLECT CONCERN OVER PUBLIC UNREST
The Polish regime's concern about popular. 1It.0nte.nt over inflation,
the meat shortage, and party pressure for stepped-up worker
productivity was reflected in the attendance by Gieresk and
Jaroszewicz at a Gdansk meet.irtg on 1.3 rlctuhur, where workers'
grievances were aired and the two leacer.s gave frank, defensive
speeches.* Apparently prepared to take the risk of negative
worker reaction, the present regime has wide improved worker
performance--combating absenteeism and poor productivity--the
central theme of the seventh PZPR congress in December. There was
some hesitancy in publicizing tltc: detui.ls of the two leaders'
speeches: Only brief, bland summaries were curried in the
14 October TRYBUNA LLIDU, with details sucb as Gierek's strong plea
for trust and Jaroszewicz's attack on rumors appearing subsequently
in a Warsaw radio "recording" on the 17th and in "abridged"
versions of the two speeches in the 18-19 October weekend issue of
TRYBUNA LLIDU.
GIEREK Party leader Edward Gierek's speech betrayed his awareness
of diminished rapport between the regime and the people.
The PZPR First Secretary frankly appealed to his audience to "learn
to trust the leadership, to trust the Politburo, to trust the
government." He went on to insist that during the past five years of
his stewardship "we gave many proofs of our honesty" and "adequate
proof that we can be trusted," claiming that his regime "tried to
consult" with the rank-and-file even in making unpopular decisions.
Implicitly appealing for the same degree of trust that was accorded
him after he took office five years ago, Gierek recalled that while
his initial visit to Gdansk as party leader in January 1971 had
taken place in an atmosphere of "disbelief and reservations." he had
won the confidence of the coastal wor.cers and his subsequent
leadership showed that he had not failed them.
On the issue of work discipline, Gierek reminded his audience in
characteristically restrained term's of the inseparability of living
standards and work performance and, without mentioning ab'sgnteeism
directly, denounced a prevalent "flippant" attitude toward Poland's
economic development. Appealing to patriotism, he prr.dicted that if
Poland stood still in economic deb-elopment 4t would be overtaken by
other countries, lose foreign markets, and "remain somewhere on the
fringe of the world."
* See tiie TRENDS of 1 October 1975, pages 27-28.
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JAROSZEWICZ The speech by Premier Jaroszewicz at tl,e sjme
Gdansk meeting spelled out in detail the regime's
concern over popular discontent. Thus Jaroszewicz ridiculed alleged
rumors to the effect that there was a wave of savings withdrawals,
that there would be a currency exchange, and that "all" prices
and wages would be increased. The most important thing, lie added,
was to ask, "How do you know?" and to track down the source of
"slogans which demobilize society and obstruct progress."
The Polish premier claimed that there had been a 40-percent increase
in real wages during the past five-year period, despite the fact
that the sizeable proportion of raw materials which Poland imports
from capitalist countries had risen "several hundred percent" in
price. While insisting that these import price increases had only
an insignificant impact on the domestic market, he pointed out
in effect that there was no such thing as an economy without price
changes. In this connection, he underscored the regime's concern
to "safeguard" the 40-percent increase in real incomes, urged
the party aktiv to publicize this concern, and added defensively
that "we have no reason to damp down or correct anything" in this
respect.
Regarding work discipline, Jaroszewicz was more explicit than
Gierek in demanding "improved labor productivity by,the maritime
economy and the shipyard industry" in the Gdansk region.
BELGRADE LEADERSHIP RENEWS CAMPAIGN AGAINST "COMINFORMISTS"
In a series of recent high-level pronouncements, Belgrade has
indicated'plans to take harsh measures against unidentified
dissidents, whom it labels as "Cominformists" and "Stalinists."
An editorial in the 13 October party weekly KOMUNIST and speeches
by senior party officials Stane Dolanc and Vladimir Bakaric on
17 and 21 October, respectively, have lashed out at alleged
domestic opponents of Yugoslavia's self-management system and
nonalined foreign policy. Underscoring the party's concern, an
LCY Central Committee Presidium session chaired by Tito on the
15th discussed the political situation in the country and "certain
aspects of hostile activities" against the party and state,
according to TANJUG. Similarly, a Serbian party Central Committee
Presidium session two days later dealt with "suppression of hostile,
illegal and other harmful activities."
Although the significance of the current campaign is unclear, it
comes in the wake of rumors in the Western press that Belgrade
has arrested a group of pro-Soviet conspirators. The campaign
thus suggests last year's Cominformist affair, in which 32 persons
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were arrested and sentenced for "hostile activity" against the
state, including plans to form their own political party.* Since
that time Belgrade has reported the prosecution of other "Comin-
formists," and Dolanc revealed Belgrade's growing concern in
a speech last June in which he asserted that those who favor
"dogmatism" are "more dangerous" than those favoring a return
to capitalist relations.
Some features of the current campaign suggest that the party
leadership wants to carefully spell out to the rank and file a
stiffening policy aginst disloyal elements. Accordingly, the
Central Committee Presidium session, reported by TANJUG, concluded
that it would "inform" party members about its "assessments."
In addition, the KOr1JNIST editorial carefully distinguished the
party's positions on different kinds of "dogmatism." Thus the
editorial stressed the need to educate those who are dogmatists
out of ignorance, but it called for severe punishment of those
who preach "dogmatic, Stalinist understanding of socialism" in
order to promote their own "private interests." Equating the
latter with the Cominformists of 1948, KOMUNIST called for their
strict and swift punishment as "deserved by those who follow the
road of national betrayal and counterrevolution."
An equally hard line was taken by Dolanc at the conclusion of a
long speech in Novi Sad on Yugoslavia's efforts to overcome its
current economic difficulties. Defending the regime's policies
of &alf-management, decentralization and nonalinement against
persons who offer "pseudo-Marxist demagogy" or "Stalinist slogans
about the omnipotence of the centralist bureaucratic system," he
labeled them "traitors" who will be punished accordingly.
Neither the KOMUNIST editorial nor Dolanc referred specifically
to foreign elements. Bakaric, however, was somewhat less restrained.
According to a TANJUG report of his speech in Zagreb, he warned
against "foreign influences" on the Yugoslav party, asserting that
the Cominformists wanted to "create socialism on the basis of state
ownership and join in all organizations ranging from the Warsaw
Pact to CEMA." In addition, a 16 October speech by Branko Mikulic,
party leader'of Bosnia-Hercegovina, and a 20 October commentary by
Zagreb radio's outspoken Milika Sundic both attacked unidentified
"foreign masters" of the Cominformists.
* For a discussion of the 1974 Cominformist affair, see the TRENDS
of 18 September 1974, pages 9-10, 25 September 1974, pagr.s 7-8., and
2 October, pages 16-17.
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SOVIET MEDIA CRITICIZE SAKHAROV. NOBEL AWARD
Soviet media have responded to Andrey Sakharov's reception of the
1975 Nobel Peace Prize with personal attacks on him and charges
that the Nobel committee's choice was a "political gesture"
designed to impede detente.
Moscow responded initially through a TASS commentary and several
radio reports on 10 October which criticized the award, accused
Sakharov of opposing the easing of international tension, and
attempted to link him with such Soviet nemeses as Chile's Pinochet
and U.S. Senator Jackson.
The harshest attack on Sakharov so far came in a 15 October
LITERARY GAZETTE article by A. Viktorov. Viktorov accused
Sakharov of "hating" Soviet society, "which so indulgently
ignores his anti-social position."
The main central newspapers have picked up TASS reports of criti-
cism of the award from such Western sources as the French
communist paper L'HUMANITE but have not yet weighed in with their
own commentary.
To date the attacks cn Sakharov fall well short in scope and
intensity of the 1973 press campaign launched against both
Sakharov and Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn. The 1973 campaign had
featured the publication of letters from irate Soviet citizens,
presumably to encourage the appearance of wide public support
for the regime's position. Soviet media have not yet carried
the broad hints dropped at that time--just before Solzhenitsyn's
expulsion--that the author of Gulag Archipelago was free to leave
the country. The attacks on Sakharov could still intensify
further, however. The 1973 campaign was months in the making.
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FEUD BETWEEN MATHEMATICAL ECONOMISTS, GOSPLAN REVIVED
The mid-October award of the Nobel Prize to Soviet mathematician
L.V. Iantorovich for his contributions to planning theory seems
likely to aggravate the chronic debate between Soviet mathematical
economists and the more traditional economists grouped around
Gosplan. Kantorovich, one of the founders of Soviet mathematical
economics, has strongly endorbed optimal planning methods
denounced by Gosplan and has been involved in name-calling with
traditional economists. Even before the announcement of the award,
the dispute had flared up again as the September issue of Gosplan's
journal PLANNED ECONOMY assailed the mathematical economists in
three separate articles, while Gosplan rejected a new program
presented by this group.
Although the dispute in recent years has centered mainly around the
optimal planning methods of the Central Economic MatLamatics Institute
(TsEMI) and its innovative director N.P. Fedorenko, Kantorovich has
been attacked in PLANNED ECONOMY for promoting these methods also.*
He participates in the work of the Academy of Sciences' economics
division, even though he is a member of the mathematics division. His
support has given liberal economists Fedorenko, A.M. Rumyantsev and
N.N. Inozemtsev the decisive margin among the six full members of the
division. Like Fedorenko, Kantorovich is anathema to conservatives, but
appears to have considerable high-level party support.
RENEWED DISPUTE The new flare-up of name-calling appears to have
been occasioned by Fedorenko's proposal of a new
"System of Complex Planning" (SKP), presented as a preliminary stage
in his controversial "System of Optimal Functioning of the Economy"
(SOFE). Fedorenko had described SKP at length in a 1974 book
entitled "Complex National Economic Planning," and in a November 1974
KOMMUNIST article. Like SOFE, it aims at providing a methodology
for matching planning goals with available resources (the "program-goal
principle"). It deemphasizes the branch and territorial principles of
planning and the directive nature of the plan--although Fedorenko denies
that his proposals would undermine these long-established principles.
The conilict appears to focus on the longterm 1976-90 plan, on which
TsEMI and Gosplan's computer center are working jointly. Fedorenko
in his KOMMUNIST article contended that scientific forecasting,
goal-setting and the complex approach play an even greater role in
longterm plans than in five year plans.
* For background on. earlier controversies between the Fedorenko
and Gosplan during 1972-73, see the TRENDS of 31 October 1973, group
pages 27-30.
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Gosplan officials (notably chairman N.K. Baybako\ deputy chairman
and computer center head N.P, Lebedinskiy, and PLANNED ECONOMY
chief editor V.S. Glagolev) bitterly resent Fedorenko's criticisms
of their present methods and attack Fedorenko's proposed new
methods. They stand by Gosplan's "Automated System of Planning
Calculations" (ASPR), which seeks to link all computer systems into
a national information-gathering system to cope with the increasingly
complicated tasks of planning. Glagolev reviewed the 1974 Fedorenko
book in the September 1974 PLANNED ECONOMY and complained that the
book wrongly claimed that the SKP methodology was compatible with
the ASPR system. He cited a September 1973 PLANNED ECONOMY article
by Lebedinskiy which flatly declared SOFE and ASPR "incompatible"
and "mutually exclusive."
Although relatively restrained since 1973, PLANNED ECONOMY carried
three items attacking Fedorenko's ideas in its September 1975
issue. One was a second review of Fedorenko's 1974 book, another
was a report of a Gosplan meeting which rejected SKP, and the third
article was chief editor Glagolev's attack on an English economist's
book which praised SOFE. The review of Fedorenko's book, by
Academy of Social Sciences Professor M.Z. Bor, a longtime critic,
and S. Logvinov, attacked SKP and described SOFE as based on
"concepts of bourgeois theories" and "market socialism." The report
on the Gosplan conference indicated that Fedorenko defended his
program, but that foes assailed its concepts of adjustable five year
plans and goal-setting and defended the "directive character of plans."
Computer center chief Lebedinskiy summed up by declaring that SKP
in its present form "cannot be used" in ASPR and that development of
ASPR had already proceeded too far to include any such new vague
theories as SKP. Gosplan's sensitivity was also evident in Glagolev's
review of Michael Ellman's 1973 book "Planning Problems in the USSR,"
which allegedly lauded SOFE and TsEMI and "belittled" the work of
Gosplan. Glagolev praised ASPR and cited (osplan Chairman Baybakov's
statement (published in the March 1974 PLANNED ECONOMY) that mathematical
economic methods, "no matter how important," are only one of many means
of planning.
KANTOROVICH AWARD Kantorovich's Nobel Prize for contributions to the
"theory of optimal use of resources" was belatedly
reported in PRAVDA on 18 October, and on 21 October TASS broadcast a
statement by Kantorovich denying "West-ern" allegations that optimal
planning is connected with "market socialism." The statement was part
of an interview to appear in the next day's LITERARY GAZETTE. Answering
the interviewer's leading question as to why a capitalist scholarly
organization would present such an award to a Soviet economist,
Kantorovich defensively argued that his work "is to a considerable degree"
applicable to any economically developed country, although "most valuable
and most appropriate for the socialist economic system where scientific
planning plays an immeasurably greater role."
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CHINA
AGRICULTURAL. CONFERENCE ENDS, SETS FARM MECHANIZATION GOALS
Peking marked the end of the national conference on learning from
Tachai in agriculture---which had opened in Tachai on 15 September
and closed in Peking on 19 October--by publicizing selected major
speeches and a 21 October PEOPLE'S DAILY edi.torial.* The editorial
stated that the conference "set the seal. on btsically achieving farm
mechanization by 1980" and that it was expected to have a "far-
reaching" influence in "accelerating the pace of our country's
agricultural development, effecting a still bigger rise in the
national economy." The editorial instructed county party committees
throughout the country to lead communes and production brigades in
learning from Tachai, in strengthening "stability and unity," and in
"boosting the national economy."
Throughout the conference Peking has stressed the need to build
Tachai-type count:-es, which are advanced both in ideology and production,
and to basicall mecnanize agriculture by 1980. Speaking at the closing
session of the conference, long-time Tachai leader Chen Yung-kuei, as
reported by NCNA on 20 October, stated that a "new upsurge" in
building Tachai-type counties is expected. The precise quota for
forming Tachai-type counties was set forth in a 20 October NCNA
account of a speech given by V.'_-e Premier Hua Kuo-feng on the 15th.
Hua stated that at leant "100 new T-,chai-type counties" should be
established in the country each year for the next five years. This
rate would bring the total number of Tachai counties to 800,
approximately 40 percent of all counties in China. Peking apparently
will keep close watch on local efforts to establish Tachai-type
counties. Hua declared that "every t'.;ae a Tachai-type county is
built, it must be seriously checked by the province and reported to
the central authorities." Hua characterized the setting up of
Ta.:aai-type counties as an "urgent task in pushing the national
economy forward" so that China will be abie to advance to the "front
ranks of the world before the end of this century"--an objective
announced by Chou En-lai at the Fourth National People's Congress
last January. Hua specifically called for speeding the rate of farm
mechanization in order to increase agricultural yields, thus paving
the way for the "modernization of industry, national defense and
science and technolcgy."
* For earlier discussions of this conference, see the TRENDS of
17 September 1975, pages 23-24, of 1 October 1975, pages 30-32, and
of 16 October 1975, page 29.
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TECHNICIAN SHORTAGE The pressing need for larger numbers of skilled
workers required to mechanize agriculture in
the next five years appears to have prompted a decision to allow
limited incentives to technical workers and to insure that their
technical knowledge is utilized. For example, an article by Shanghai
shipyard workers entitled "Bring the Positive Role of Technical
Personnel into Play," published in RED FLAG (No. 10) and broadcast by
Peking radio on 15 October, revealed that "most of the technical
personnel" who were sent down to the shipyard "to do manual work
have been given technical jobs." The shipyard's party committee
was lauded for i2eing to it that technical personnel "are not used
only is a labor force" and for paying attention "to bringing their
specialities into full play." A genera]. upgrading of worker skills
also appears underway at the shipyard, as the article noted that
workers "short in theoretical knowledge and in technical work" are
"being trained to enhance their skills while practicing production."
The article was careful to warn that it would be ideologically wrong
to go too far and "study technology while ignoring the study of
politics," but it made clear that "efforts must be made to encourage
the technicians to study technology" and to fellow the path of "red
and expert." Sir,Llarly, a new effort to increase the supply of
skilled workers was also indicated in a 17 October NCNA report which
argued that "it is necessary to build" an "agriculture technical
force with high awareness for socialism and technical skills" in
order to achieve the farm mechanization goals set at the conference
on learning from Tachai in agriculture.
A second RED FLAG article, broadcast on 17 October by Nanking radio,
t'iscussed industrialization in a Kiangsu county and indicated that
technical personnel could receive incentives. The article stressed
that income of workers in commune industries should be decided by the
masses, belt it noted that "it is necessary to provide a necessary
subsidy to those with fairly good skills," though "the amount of the
subsidy should not be too h?.gh."
PEKING COMMEMORATES 40TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE "LONG MARCH"
Peking marked the 40th anniversary of the end of the Long March on
19 October with a joint PEOPLE'S DAILY-LIBERATION ARMY DAILY editorial.
Both papers also reprinted a full-page article written by Mar.,hal Liu
Po-cheng in 1959 reviewing the significance of the Long March in the
history of the Chinese revolution. Peking is not known to have marked
the anniversary previously, though a number of military reminiscences
of the Long March were published in the late 1950's and early 1960's.
Comment on the. occasion has focused on the current ideological themes
calling for unity under Mao's revolutionary line it ipposing
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r:viiiI.onism and cap itulationium. The Long Marc :ondnemoratlon may
be an attempt to Imbue present campaigns with tht revolutionary
up:brit and ent:huulnum of the Long March por,Iod. 7L u.l.:.o nerves
to r. ,habilitate the linage of the I'LA, tarnished since the fall of
Lin 1'iao.
The 19 October joint edt:.oria.l linked the principal Lessons of the
Long March experience directly to the current campaign-: to consolidate
unity and stability under the dictatorship u:' the proletariat and to
criticize capitulationitim in the novel "Writer Margin." Branding
both the "left opportunist line" of Wang; Ming, a "running dog of.
Soviet revisionist social-Imperialism," and the "right opportunist
line" of the "ignominious renegade" Chang Kuo-tao uH "revisionism,"
the editorial noted that. Liu Shuo-chi and Lin 1'iao had "follo,acd the
same path" as Wang and Chiang. it urged persistence in the struggle
against "revisionism and capitulatiunistn" and warned that the struggle
between Marxism and revisionism in China will. continue "in the next
50 or 100 years and even 10,000 years from now." The editorial
counseled that only strict adherence to Chairman Mao's revolutionary
line as exemplified by the "very vivid and rich teaching material"
of the Long March experience would ensure victory in the future.
The joint editorial also noted that "whether to practice unity or
splLttism" was an important question during the Long March. Hailing
Chairman Mao's advocacy of "unity for a common revolutionary
objective," the editorial stressed the current necessity of applying
the "Red Army's glorious tradition of uniting; for struggle" to the
present work of implementing Chairman Mao's instructions to study
theory to combat revisionism, to promote stability and unity, and to
push socialist construction forward.
PROVINCIAL CELEBRATIONS All PRC province's marked the Long March
anniversary, and most held "grand meetings"
on the 18th, usually presided over by a military district deputy
commander or political commissar. Canton Military Region Commander
Hsu Shih-yu ani Roachow Military Region Commander Pi Ting-chun wert.
the only military region condnanders known to attend an event marking
the date, appearing respeeti,iely at a 19 October Canton rally and an
18 October meeting in Fbothow. Many provinces were xepotted to have
initiated activities to ptopagate the spirit of the Long March
several days before the anniversary, including discussion Meetings
and the dispatch of teams of Long March veterans to inspire PLA
units by recounting their experiences.
Coverage of the 18 October meeting in Kiangsi, the site of the base
area abandoned at the beginning of the Long March, was the most
extensive of the provincial celebrations. In his speech at the
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27-
Kiangsi meeting, provincial party secretary Pai Tung-tsai called
for celebration of the anniversary "in close connection with
current struggles" and for efforts to "arouse the masses to the
fullest extent to fight a people's war of encircling and
annihilating Bourgeois factionalism," the "major obstacle to
the imr'_~-mentation of Chairman Mao's revolutionary line and policies."
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NOTE
SOVIET 'MEDIA ON U'.S.GRA?IN DEAL: Consistent with their general
silence on the issue,,Soviet media have not reported the long-
term -U.S.-Soviet accord on grain saled reached by negotiators
in Moscow. The media had also maintained silence on the nego-
tiations leading up to the agr,ee.,;cnt. A single broadcast 'to
North America in August, however,, did rebut assertions in the
United States that last summer's grain sales to'the Soviet Union
'had fueled inflation. Moscow continues to underscore the impor-
tance it places on the whole spectrum of bilateral trade..
Brezhnev's message to a recent session of the joint U.S.-Soviet
Trade and Economic Council, as reported by TABS on 8 October.,
noted that bilateral trade was increasing "slowly but surely"
and expressed gratification that "elements of a long-term
character" were appearing in the trade relationship.
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2' O 1 is t ..'
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APPEilD I X
MOSCOW, PEKING BROADCAST STATISTICS 13 - 19 OCTOBER 1975
Moscow (2533 items)
Peking (970 items)
French President
(--)
14%
UNGA 30th Session
(15%)
7%
Giscard d'Estaing
Long March 40th Anni-
(--)
6%
in USSR
[Brezhnev Speech
(--)
4%]
versary
Japan
(1%)
5%
International Young
(--)
11%
Lao Independence 30th
(4%)
5%
Women's Congress,
Moscow
Anniversary
USSR
(1%)
3%
[Brezhnev Greetings (--) 5%]
Yugoslav Premier
(14%)
3%
China (4%) 6%
GDR 26th Anniversary (15%) 3%
Bijedic in PRC
These statistics are based on the volcecast commentary output of the Moscow and
Peking domestic and f.raernational radio services. The term "commentary" is used
to denote the lengthy iteia-radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, govern-
ment or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are
counted as commentaries.
Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always
discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues:
in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.
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