TRENDS IN COMMUNIST MEDIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00608R000200160017-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 38
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 19, 1999
• Sequence Number: 17
• Publication Date: October 16, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

16 Oct 75'
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FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST
ikFORMATION SERVICE
Trends in Co~muni5t Media
~e+~4ielee4ie~
16 OCTOBER 1975
VOL. XXVI, N0. 41~
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This report is based exclusively on toreifln media
materials and Is published by FBI without coon+inatfon
with other US. Government components.
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unaulhrrl:od Disclosure Subject to Crhninol Sanctions
l.lassilied by 000073
Automellcr:lly declassilled
six months from date of issue.
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16 OCTODER 1975
coNr~r~Ts
SING-U.S. RELATIONS
PRC Says U.S. Violrtte6 "Principles" of Shanghai Communique
1
U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS
Soviet Editor Defends Detente, Sees Administration Conflict
3
SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS
RED FLAG Demonstrates Increased PRC Intransigence to USSR .
5
MIDDLE EAST
USSR ilncommunicative on Syrian President Asad's Moscow Visit
7
VIETNAM
DRV Joins PRG j.n Attacking U.S. Refuges Repatriation Plan
11
LAOS
Kayp~n Speech Highlights Lao 30th Anniversary Celebrations
13
KOREA
DPRK Celebrates 3f1th Anniversary of Korean Workers Party
15
COMMUNIST RELATIONS
Novamb~er Completion Set for European CF Conference Document
17
Belgrade Media Y,3i1 Bi~Edic PRC Visit, Play Do~~n Differences
19
SFAIN
Moscow Links Bass Agreement to U.S. Attituae on Executions
21
USSR
October Anniversary Slogans Reflect Foreign Policy Continuity
2:3
Moscow Ignores Anniversary of 1955 Economic Reform
24
Economic Articles SL;gest Tilt Toward Heavy Industry
25
NOTES
PRG Price Controls Rescinded; Liberation. Radio From Saigon;
PRC Provincial Leadership; PRC Agricultural Conference;
PRC Instructions to Province; PRC-Portuguese Timor .~
2B
Moscow, Peking Broadcast Statist:lcs
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SINO-U, S, RELATIONS
PRC SAYS U,S, VIOIATES "PRINCIPLES" OF SHANGHA,1: COMMUNIGIUE
Peking's current charges of alleged U.S. "com,'lvance" with "Tibet
traitors" in Tibet independence activities in th,e United States
were made at a somewhat higher level o.f authority than other
Peking complaints related to bilateral relatJ.ons since the
Shanghai communique, signed during President. Nixon's rebru~:ry 1972
visit to China. Moreover, Peking's timing .;if the release of the
13 October statement by the spoicesre.an for t'l~.~a Chinese roreign
Ministry's Information Department--only sips days before Secretary
Kis:~j.nger's scheduled arrival in China for talks with its leaders--
seems to serve notice that Peking intends i:o maintain a firm
stance on disputed bilateral issues. They;?e is no media evidence
suggesting any major change in Peking's gr.iYeral attitude toward
the United States: Concurrent Peking treritment of U.S.-related
issues has maintained its normally discreet handling of the United
States, and top Chinese leaders, including Teng Hsiao-ping, have
met with two ii.S. groups touring Ctiina.
rollowing the 1972 Nixon visit, Peking had made no public anti-U.S.
statements devoted to bilateral issues until this year. Both
previous cases in 1975 were less authoritative than the current
statement nd were in response to publicly reported U.S. actions.
In April Peking noted the U.S. cancellation of a PRC dance troupe
tour, and in September it reported the. cancellation of a China
tour by a U.,". mayors' delegation bec~iuse of PRC objections to
r~ceiving the mayor of San Juan, Puerto Rico.*
The 13 October NCNA report of the cu~:rent statement detailed a
series of private Chinese complaints to the U.S; over Tibetan
activities in this country. It stated that on 30 July 1974 the
FRC Liaison Office in Washington had privately complained to the
State Department about the actions of a so-called "office of Tibet"
in New York City which aliegediy circulated news bulletins
spreading anti-PRC "slanders." The Liaison Office is said to have
restated its position to the State Department on 8 August 1975,
and added that the United States should also act to stop the U.S.
tour, beginning this October, of a Tibetan song and dance troupe.
According to the statement, on 8 October the Chinese once again
reiterated their position. Peking alleged that the State
Department repeatedly refused to take action, on the "pretext"
that the Tibetan actions were in accord with the U.S. Constitution
and laws, and it chaiged that b.y having "obstinately clung to its
* The past Chinese complaints are discussed respectively in the TRENDS
of 2 April 1975, pages 17-18, and of 17 September 1975, pages 10-11.
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unreasonable posit:lon" the UniL-ed States had shown L-hal- it "openly
connive~~ at acid supports" "Clie treasonable activitie of the
TibeL-an Lraator.s in the United States." The statement affirmed
that L-lie U.S, stance represents "an undisguised interference in
China's internal affairs" and a "flagrant violation of- the
principles of the ~hangliai communique."
COMPAk1SON WITH The current statement is more aul-horiL-aLive
PAST COMPLAINTS than those issued following the previous two
incidents this year. Pelting reported the
dance troupe incident- in a 2 April 1975 NCNA "interview" with the
Chinese People's Association for rriendship with P'or.eign Countries
and the spokesman of L?he information department of the foreign
ministry. 'Phe canceJ.lztion of the mayors' visit was discussed in
a 16 Se; tember 1975 NCNA report- of. "observat:ions" made by the
Chinese People's Institute oi' roreign Affairs. The earlier.
Chinese charges were also leas harsh. They had complained that
the U.5. actions were contrary to "the spirit" (thing sllen 4737 4377)
of the Sh~~nghai communique, but the current statement for the first
time said that the U.S. position was a "flagrant violation" of
"the principles" (yuan tse 0626 0463) of the 1972 communique.
Past authoritative Pelting charges of alleged foreign interference
in 7.'ibet 1-~ave usually focused on Indian involvement, but the
Chinese once before--since the signing of the Shanghai. communique--
publicly complained of U. S. interference in this Chinese "internal
affair." NCNA reported on 28 July 1972 remarks by PRC representa-
tive Wang Jun-sheng at the 27 July session in Geneva of the UNPCOSOC,
in which Wang took a passing swipe at U.S, actions in the United
Nations over the Tibet question. He charged that "in the past few
years, at the instigation of the United States, the Chiang I:ai-shek
clique aid India, the United Nations on several occasions discussed
and adopted illegal resolutions on tl~e so-cal].~d 'quest3.ons of
Tibet' thus leaving behind dishonorable records."
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U, S,-SOVIET RELATIONS
SOVIET EDITOR DEFENDS DETENTE, SEES ADMINISTRATION CONFLICT
V.M. Berezhkov, chief editor of the ;ournal U5A, has asserted in
its most recent issue that statements by Defense Secretary
Schlesinger regarding a possible U.S. first use of nuclear weapons
against the Soviet- Union "probably reflect a struggle about detente
underway in U.S. ruling circles." Complaining--as tiave other USA
Institute members recently--abo~.t such indications of increased
opposition to improved U.S.-Soviet relations i.n Washington,
Berezhkov underscored his own support for a Soviet policy of
further cultivating the U.S. connection by stressing the critical
importance of U.S.-Soviet- relations in resolving world problems
in general. Previous Soviet analyses of the alleged new "campaign"
against detente in the United St~~.tes have avoided a direct implica-
tion that there was disagreement within the Administration itself,
and have in fact cited approvingly--as did Berezhkov once again--
statements by Administration officials rebutting those who have
argued that only the USSR stands to gain from detente.
Berezhkov devoted the bulk of his article to an assessment of the
prospects for U.S.-Soviet detente. Like virtually every other
Scviet assessment, his concluded that the prospects were bright
in the long run despite current problems. Berezhkov observed--
echoing earlier attempts at clarification made by U.S. officials--
that part of the resistance to detente had been encouraged by
confusion over the meaning of the trench word itself. He empha-
sized that "detente" in Soviet policy meant first ar_d foremost a
movement away from confrontation and international tension and had
nothing in common with the broader concept of "entente."
Repeating the arguments of earlier Soviet rejoinders to Schlesinger,
Berezhkov said that in talking openly about the use of nuclear
weapons against the USSR, the defense secretary was acting counter
to the understand.~.ng reached between the two countries regarding
the prevention of +iuciear war. According to uerezhkov, "relapses"
such as the first-use discussion "are particularly dangerous
because the return of our countries to the conditions of confronta-
tion would sharply worsen the whole international situ2tion."
Berezhkov maintained that despite such difficulties U.S.-Soviet
relations were 'lieveloping steadily," and tie looked forward to a
new summit and SALT agreement to restore momentum to the process
of normalization.
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Berezhkov made clear his own moderate views on defense and foreign
policy issues by touring the benefits of p.lrity in U.S.-Soviet
military relations and by challenginb the applicability to present-
day conditions of Cl.ausewitz' familiar dictum on war. as a continua-
tion of politics. Positions on L?his tenet have come to serve as
touchstones to distinguish military hardliners from pro-detente
advocates in L-ite Soviet Union. According to Berezhkov, "universal
war. can no longer be regarded as a means of policy because of. the
destructiveness of Lhe weapons which each of the sides possesses."
This posiL-ion has also been taken by USA Institute members Arbatov
and Bovin in the past in a pattern of advocacy which has clearly
been intended to express a pro-detente view.
Berezhkov also voiced agreement with Brezhnev's relaxed view of. the
current military threat to the USSR by quoting his 13 Ju:ie 1975
election speech assertion that "now the leaders of the bourgeois
world cannot seriously expect to decide the historical argument
between capitalism and socialism by force of aYms." This has
become another disputed formula. in the detente issue. A contrasting
point of view was presented by Defense Minister Grechko in a speech
two weeks before Brezhnev's. In a 29 May appearance before an all-
Army conference, Grechko had said that !'he forces of reaction and
aggression still "have not abandoned their plans to resolve the
dispute between capitalism and socialism by force of arms."
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SIP!0-SOVIET RELI',TIONS
RED FLAG DEMONSTRATES INCREASED PRC INTRANSIGENCE TU USSR
Against tl~e background of recently heightened polemics against the
USSR, a lengthy artic]_e in RED 1LAC (No. 10) under the authoritative
byline Liang Hsiao leas strongly implied that China cannot have
normal State relations with the "social imperialists" until the
entire Sov3.et political-economic system is changed.* The article,
carried by 1'elcing radio on 14 October, detailed Soviet "hegemonism"
in its relations with other countries, highlighting the Chinese
thesis that the USSR's system makes it the more dangerous and
aggressive of the two superpowers. The author asserted flatly
that real change in Soviet aggressive policies will require a
fundamental change in the Soviet economic and political system, not
merely Moscow leadership or policy shifts. Past Chinese comment had
stated chat despite ideologl.cal differences, the PRC could have normal
state relations with the USSR,a theme missing in recent Chinese
pronouncements.
Liang described Moscow as a "latecomer" to the world imperialists'
"fesst" eager to make up for lost time and stated that the Soviet
system of "si:ate monopoly capitalism" made it the more formidable
enemy. According to Liang, the Soviet system is "more monopolistic,
more concentrated, and more tightly controlled" and therefore the
Soviets are "more brutal in their aggression and expansion abroad."
While acknowledging Soviet economic and technological inferiority to
the United States, Liang stated that the L'SSR's ability to squeeze
out surplus wealth to militarize the Soviet czonomy made it equally
formidable militarily.
The article concluded with a discussion of Soviet internal ani world
forces opposed to Moscow's ambitions, noting especially that the
Third World--"th.e main force combatting imperialism"--has come
to see more clearly the "true colors of the Soviet social-imperialists"
and is "increasingly directing its struggle against this deadly
enemy." It also cited evidence of "riew advances" by the developed
Second World countries against Moscow`s policies, concluding that
Soviet social imperialism, though outwardly fierce, is weak
internally and a true "r~.per tiger."
* Peking media recently have stressed the alleged danger of roar
stemming from the USSR, including the danger of a Soviet "surprise
attack"against Chins. See the TRENDS of 1 October 1975, pages
7-10, and 8 October 1915, pages 1-2.
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TENG HSIi~U-RING REMARKS According to Western press re~.orts, Vice
Premier Teng Hsiao-ping took a li,.~e
similar to the RI;D FLAG article during an 18 September conversation
with Weat German conservative leader Strauss. He reportedly
dismissed rumors that China was ready to normalize relations with
Moscow, noting that a precondition for improved relations would
be a riascoca change in its "political orientation." A Moscow radio
broadcast in Mandarin beamed to Southeast Asia on 6 October took
issue with Teng's alleged statement,. contrasting it with Pelcing's
heretofore standard public position that ideological differences
with Moscow should not preclude normalization of state relations..
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16 OC7.'JBER 19 75
P~9IDDLF EAST
USSR !JNCOMMUNICATIVE ON SYRIAN PRESIDENT ASAD'S MOSCOW VISIT
The scanty media treatment of President al-Asad's 9-10 October
"friendly" visit to Moscow--with no advance announcement--was a
far cry from the ruffles and flourishes ;~rith which he was welcomed
on his "friendly official" visit in April 1974.* Even though the
recent visit was not official, it is unusual for Moscow reportage
on the activities of a visiting head of state to be virtually
nonexistent, comment scanty, and the communique uncommunicative
to the extent of revealing merely that discussions were held on
unspecified Mideast issues. ~~Thile various theories could be
advanced for the paucity of coverage, the most plausible explana-
tion would seem to lie in a coolness resulting from differences
over aspects of the Mideast problem and Syrian military aid
requests. Moscow in .the past, however, has papered over Soviet-
Arab frictions with more finesse and appropriate protocol gestures
than were displayed on this occasion.
MIDEAST, MILITARY ISSUES Differences appeared to emerge five
days after al-Asad's visit, in a dis-
tinctly cool announcement broadcast by Moscow's domestic service
on the 15th which revealed for the first time that the Syrian
foreign and defense ministers had remained in Moscow for talks
after al-Asad went home. Until this announcement Moscow had not
acknowledged that the ministers stayed behind; the Damascus paper
TISHRIN had reported, according to Beirut radio on the 12th, that
they had stayed "to conclude the discussion of subjects raised"
during ai-Asad's visit.
Moscow radio said that Soviet foreign and defense ministers Gromyko
and Grechko had met with their Syrian counterparts, Khaddam and
Talas, and "exchanged views" on "questions concerning the further
developmec~t of cooperation between the Soviet Union and the Syrian
Arab Republic, as well as on the problems of the Middle East settle-
ment." The item, reporting that the Syrians had left for home that
day, noted that the talks were conducted in a "friendly and business-
like" atmosphere. This is in contrast to the warmer characterization
* The April 1974 visit--which featured live radio TV coverage of air-
port ceremonies, an al-Arad speec~l.over Moscow television, and a signed
joint statement--is discussed in the TRENDS of 17 April 1974, pages
? 8-ll. Al-Asad had preciously visited Moscow in February 1971 and
July 1972, and stopped for a talk with Brezhnev en route to the DPRK
in September 1974. He paid at least one "private" visit to Moscow, in
October 1972, which was announced by Damascus--but not b~~? his hosts--
after his return.
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an Lhe communique on a1.-Asad's visit-, which described the atmosphere
~f his talks as one of "friendship, cordiality, and complete mutual
understanding," LDesl~ite the ceremonial ~luurishes, as-Asad's
April 1974 visit produced only a "thorough and constructive excharbe
of opinions" 1.n an atmosphere of "frankness and mutual understanding,")
-1- Mideast Tssues: Underlining the narrow focus of the talks, L?he
communiq,t~c stated simply that the two sides "discussed L-he situation
in the Middle Last and its effects on the international situation as
a whole." It added a watered-down version of Moscow's usual call
fox~'Lsraeli withdrawal from all occupied territories and for support
of Palestinian rights, ia.cluding their right to their own state:
The sides "stressed their determination to do ev~.rything in their
power to have the legitimate rights of the Arab states and the Arab
people, including the Arab people of Palestine, restored and insured."
'Chere was uo mention of the Genova conference, which Gromyko recently
advocated in h.is UN Ger_eral Assembly speech last month. Damascus
had gone along with Moscow in calling for renewal of'the Geneva
talks in the last three high-level Soviet-Syrian discussions--
Gromyko's visits in rebruary and April 1975 and a1-Asad's September
1974 stopover in Moscow.
Two presumably prime topics of discussion, the Sinai II accord and
the Lebanese situation, were touched on i.n comment pegged to the
visit. In PRAVDA's weekly international review on the 12th,
Korionov indirectly placed the Syrian visit against the background
of Sinai II, which al-Asad has called on as-Sadat to abrogate and
which Moscow derogates in~muted fashion. Tntroduc~'ng innocuous
comment on the Soviet-Syrian talks drawn from the language of the
communique, Korionov observed that the Soviet Union supports "a
real and not illusory settlement" of the Mideast problem--Moscow's
cryptic way o# referring to an overall solution versus the U.S,-
sponsored "partial steps." A Moscow commentary in Ar~~bic on the
11th nailing the "deep mutual trust" in Soviet-Syrian relations
went on to discuss Lebar_on, charging that "provocative acts" against
that country were designed to divert attention from "partial solu-
tions" in ti>,~ Mideast.
~- Military Cssues: While the presence of the defense ministers at
the talks during al-Asad's visit and the later talks reported by
Moscow radio on the ISth pointed to a discussion of military topics,
Moscow made no mention of military aid in material surrounding the
visit. Moscow's Arabic-language commentary on the 11th did refer
co Arab concern over U.S. "secret commitments" to Israel stipulating
that the United States would continue to arts Israel. But in another
instance, :Moscow seemed to make a studied effort to avoid the
subject of military aid. Thus TASS on the 13th, reviewing Syrian
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media coverage of al-Asad's visit, ignored allusions to U.S. mili-
tary aid to Israel in the Damascus paper TISHRIN. According to
the SYRIAN ARAB NEWS AGENCY on the 12th, TISHRIN had implied that
the Moscow talks concerned increased Soviet military aid to Syria
to correct "the imbalance in power in favor of the Zionist enemy,"
and, ix~ implicit criticism of Egypt, stress~:d that Syria was seek-?
ing to create a unitr;d Arab policy and "an Arab deterrent force"
which would be able "to distinguish between friends and enemies."
While the brevity of the communique might explain the absence of
any re~erenc~ to Soviet assistance in Syr1a's defense, this con-
trasts with the last four communiques and reports on high-level
Syrian talks since pril 1974. In September 1974, for example,
the USSR pledged "readiness" to "ccntribute further to strengthen-
ing the economic and defense capacity" of Syria. And communiques
in February and ~'lprii this year, on Gromyko's visit to Syria and
his counterpart's visit to Moscow, referred to "the importance of
strengthening the defense potential" of Syria under conditions of
"continued Israeli aggression."
TREATMENT Reportage on al-Asad's visit was confined to the
OF VISIT announcement of his arrival and the communique
released on the 11th, both of which werz featured
in the central press. Normally Moscow would also, at a minimum,
report the holding of talks, the ritual luncheon or dinner, perhaps
a reciprocal function by the guest, and departure ceremonies,
However, these routine events were merely acknowledged in the
communique.* Thus the document listed, as is customary, those
participating in the talks; it mentioned a luncheon at which
Brezhnev and al-Asad exchanged "friendly toasts"; and it reported
those present for al-Asad's departure.
The communique gave no indication of any discussion of bilateral
relations other than to refer to she leaders' "determination to
continue to strengthen friendship between the two states." The
document additionally stressed that "no one will be allowed to
s;iake this friendship, to damage it"??~-a common sentiment in Moscow's
comment on Soviet-Arab relations in general and an echo of Gromyko's
September UNGA address in which he referred to the "deep roots" of
Soviet-Arab .friendship and added that "we do not think anyone will
succeed in undermining it."
* The communique was so identified by TASS English and in foreign-
language broadcasts; PRA.VDA, however, called it a "report" on the
visit.
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16 oc~rotl>;it 1975
Meager followup comment has been generally confined to the language
of the communique. A TASS dispatch from Damascus on the 13th,
summing up Syrian media comment, provided generalities along the
line that the vis?lt was "successful" and important for strengthening
Soviet-Syrian relations anti establishing a dust and durable peace.
Comment in Arabic from the unofficial Radio Peace and Progress and
from Moscow radio on the 10th and llth stressed the "good tradition"
in Soviet-Syrian relations of holding "regular consultations and
personal contacts" and regularly exchanging visits. Such "regular"
exchanges have been one-side3: Other th+~n a series of Gromyko
visits in the first part of 1974 and 1975 related to Secretary
ICissittger's disengagement negotiations, no top Soviet leader has
visited Damascus since Podgornyy's brief call less than a month
after the June 1967 war.
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1G OC'1'Oll1.R 1975
V I ETNI~P~
DP.V JOINS PRG IN ATTACKING l.~rSr REFUGEE REPA'TRIATIpN PLAN
The U.S. p]Fn to allow Vietnamese refugees who want to return
home to du so aboard a ship leaving from Guam continues to draw
low-level Vietnamese communist protests. The latest comment still
avoids making any flat statements that the rc:fugeea would be
turned away, while stressing that the U.S. plan would impinge on
? Vietnamese sovereignty. North Vi.etna~n's first official reaction
canr:? in a 1S October DRV Farw:Lgn Ministry spokesman's Htatement
which supported the condemtaation of the U.S. repatriation effort
contained in the PRG For~aign Minir~lry spokesman's statement of the
4th.* Cttendant media comment- has placed the burden of blame fox
tlxe "sinister scheme" on tlx: "ixotheads in Washington" and, in one
instance, seemed *_o absolve the prosper_tive repatriates themselves
of any wrongdoing
Taking the same tack as the P,1G, tixe DRV Foreign Minist,.; spokesman's
statement warned the United States it could not "dodge its
responsibility" by declaring that repatriation was a "matter
concerning the evacuees themselves" or by stating that it "has
nothing to do with it." The DRV spokesman's statement, said tlxat
this "irresponsible and adventurous act" of the U.S. Government
"violates tlxe sovereignty of Vietnam and misle2,ds public opinion."
The earlier PRG Foreign Ministry spokesman's st~.tetient had appealed
directly to the refugees, warning them to be aware of an "enemy
plot" and assuring them that repatriation would be considered on
an individual basis in conformity with the sovereign rights of
Vietnam. The DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's did not repeat such
an appeal to the refugees but instead addressed ''demands" to the
United States that it respect Vietnamese sovereignty and.
"immediately stop this act."
An 11 October QUL~N ll0I NHAN DAN commentary and II Liberation Radio
commentary aired. on the 13th-?-both pegged to the PRG spokesman's
statement of the 4tlt--provided detailed information on the U.S.
repatriation plan itself but did not depart from the essential
arguments set forth in either of the statements. The VNA version
of the QUAN DOI NHAN LAN commentary declared that the PRG
"resolutely will not perrxit the Ford Administratio~i to send
the vessel Thuong Tin carryir_R 1,600 refugees to S~~utlx ~lietnam,"
but characteristically avoided any mention of the reception the
* The PRG Foreign Ministry spokesman's state??cnL- is d:tscussed in
the TRENDS of 8 October 1975, pages 5-6.
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lb OCTOIiLR 1975
refugees might receive once they reached South Vietnam. Implying
shut the refugees wore innocent? victims of the U.S. actione~ an
unattributed Nt1AN DAN article of t:he 16th. described the
repatriation operation as "the forcible shipping back to Soutli
Vietnam of people previously taken by farce therefrom."
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1G OCTUISER 1.975
LAOS
KAYSON SPEECH HIGHLIGfiTS LAO 30TH ANNIVERSARY CELEBRATIONS
Laos observed the 12 October 30th anniversary of the proclamation
of independence from French colonial rule with commemorative
ceremoni.ea at both L?l~e PuL?het Lao headquarters in Viengsay and
at the capi~al of Vientiane. Lao Patriotic Front (LT?F) Chairman
Souphanouvong delivered a brief opening speech at the traditional
anniversary rally in Viengsay; however, the mayor address--billed
by the media as an "important speech"--was delivered by LPF Vice
Chairman Kayson Phomvihan. Although Kayson was not identified by
the media in his position as secretary general of the Lao communist
party--the Lao People's Revolutionary Party (LPRP)--his assumption
of the keynote role, which has been exercised by Souplia.nouvong in
the past, served to reinforce the party's shift since July toward
open acknowledgment of its control of tl~e Lao Front.*
The theme of Indochinese solidarity was underlined with the
unprecedented turnout for the Viengsay celebrations of high-level
delegations from North and South Vietnam and Cambodia. The
Norte, Vietnamese party-government delegation was led by Vietnam
Workers Party (VWPj Politburo member and National Assembly
Standing Committee Chairman Truong Chinh, the DRV's highest
ranking party official following Firs L- Secretary Le Duan, who is
on a *_our of Eastern Europe. The delegation from South Vietnam,
billed as re~,resE~iting the PRG, NFLS7, and the South Vietnam
Committee of the VWP, was led by PRG Presi3ent i-Iuynli Tan Phat and
included Defense Minister Tran Nam Trung, a member of the VWP
Central. Committee. The Cambodian Front and government were
represented by a delegation headed by Ieng teary, deputy prime
minister responsible for foreign affairs. As in past years, the
media also noted the presence of lower level foreigners, including
"specialists" from China and the Soviet Union.
KAvS;1N ADDRESS While not identifying Kayson Phomvihan as a
party official, the PATHET LAO NEWS AGENCY
noted that he delivered his anniversary speech on behalf of the
central committees of both the LPRP and the LPF. He is last
known to have made a public statement on the anniversary in 1970,
when Pathet Lao media carried a lengthy article by him which was
notable for its explicit discussion of the historical role of the
* For background on media treatment of the LPRP, see the TRENDS
of 20 August 1975, pages 24-26.
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Lao communist- L~arty and it-s .forerunner, the Indochinese Communist
I'iirty.* There have been few public statements by ICayson in the
intervening; years, although Pathet Lao media aid publicize his
speech al- the 24th Cl'SU Congress in April 197].. More recently,
the official party paper. SIANC i?ASASUN, which began nationwide
diatr.ibuL-ion In Laos in mid-August, puoliahed in serial dorm n
lengthy article by Kayson shut is not: yet available in translation.
The bugle o'f ICayson's speech consi:rted of a lr:l.storica.l review
}.racing the Lao revoliiLion over. the pas L- 30 years; it also touched
upon Lao relations with oilier countries. In voicing thanks for
past international support-, ICayson singled out North Vietnam for
particular attention, expressing "everlasting f;ratitude to the
DRV--o>>r brother and intimate comrade who has stood side by side
and shared wen]. and woe with us since ancient tames" for its
"great and invaluable assistance." Kayson professed "deep
gratitude" to the PRC, L-lre Soviet Union, and other fraternal
socialist countries for "selflessly and effectively rendering
material and moral support and assistance." He stressed tha
importance of the policy of "fraternal, comradely combat
coordination." between t-he three Indochinese countries and the
LIP.P's "correct international line of independence and self-mastery"
and "spirit of relying on themselves."
Kayson reiterated the standard Pathet Lao position on the United
States, noting that Laos had decided to "maintain" diplomatic
relations with the United States on the basis that Washington
"sincerely respect the sovereignty and independence of Laos, must
not interfere in the internal affairs of Laos, must cease its
support of the ultrarightist reactionaries, and must keep its
promise to help heal tl~e wounds of war in Laos."
Kayson also noted that Laos had agreed to "maintain fraternal and
neighboring relations" with Thailand, but he warned Thailand
in standard terms that the Tt-ai "powerholders" would be held
responsible for "all serious consequences" if they did not cease
supporting exiled Lao "traitors" and instigating provocations
along the Lao-Thai border. Kayson repeated the Pathet Lao's
stock demands that Thailand return Lao property removed by fleeing
rightists and "drive out and repatriate" the "reactionary
chieftains" still hiding in Thailand.
* The 1970 ICayson artiole is discussed in the TRENDS of 7 October
1970, pages 11-12.
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1G UC7.'OI3LR ].975
KOREA
DPRI< CELEBRATES 3oTM ANNIVERSARY OF I
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ICosygin's well-established prerogatives by addressing file Council
of Ministers on economic policy; in mid-1.975 he became an economic
authority in his o-m right: witl~- the publication of a collection
of hie speechee on the economy, matching Kosygin'o published
collection of speeches, mast of which concentrate on economic
matters. The moat recent indications of this trend have been
,several Central Committee decrees seemingly reflecting the
assumption by the Central Committee of a role normally exercised
by the Council of Min?1sLera.
The decrees in question were rollowups to a 2 March 1973 point
Central Committee-Council. of Ministers decree which had ordered
ministries to switch to a production association structure and
submit schemes for such reorgunizztion to the Council of ministers
for, approval. According t~ Brezhnev's assistant,, K.U. Chernenko,
hes~d of the Central Committee's General Section, in the August
QUESTIONS Or CPSU HISTORY, the Central Committee in May 1975 had
issued decrees approving schemes prepared by three ministries.
This is the firF". report o` Ce~~tral Committee decrees on this
subject; previously, ministerial schemes were always reporte2.ly
approved by the Council of Ministers. IZVESTIYA on 6 September
1975 reported that the Council of Ministers had recently approved
the schemes for the three ministries, presumably ::ollowing the
Central Committee action. This procedure appears to reflect an
unusual intervention by the party leadership into the normal
government chain of command; it vio?.ated not only the normal
division of party acid government functions but also the procedure
specifically called for in the original, 2 March X973 decree.
ECONOMIC ARTICLcS SUGGEST TT!'f TOWARD HEAVY If~USTRY
The subject of economic priorities, rarely discussed in Soviet:
media this year despite current preparation o? the 1976-1980
five-year plan, has been raised by recent articles in KOMrUNIST
and PLANNED ECONOMY. Both Guggest that the tilt toward heavy
~!~dustry adopted at the December 1974 CPSU plen~im continues to
characterize official policy and current planning.. The September
KOMMUNIST article strongly argued for further increasing the
priority for machinE~. buildi.g, and the August PLANNED ECONOMY
article provided data showing that the growth rate of consumer
goods production is declining even more sharply than before. The
endorsement for machine building recalls Kirilenko's insistence
earlier this year that there was a shortage of machinery and that
the Central Committee had authorized increased investment in the
machine building Zdustry.*
* See the TRFIvDS of 25 June 1975, pages 19-21.
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The September 1COMMUNIST ar.t?icle on the future of the machine
building industry was authored by Academician A.I. Taelikov,
longtime director of? an Institute for design of metallurgical
machinery. TsRiilrov wrote that despite machine building's
"somewhat preferential growth rate compared with many other
branches," its growth "still cannot fullq satisfy us" and should
be accelerated. He argued that Soviet machine buil.ding'e share
of industrial production is still lower than that in some
economically developed capitalist countries, that shortage of
capacity still prevents the machine bu~.ldiag industry from f1111ng
all orders for equipment, that much Soviet machinery is obsolescent
and must Le replaced, and, worst of all, that technological progress
is being slowed because the "extremely overloaded" machine building
industry cannot rapidly start mass producing newly developed types
of machinery. rurther, he argued that machines are "the moat
profitable items to export," but unfortunately these exports
cannot be expanded "because of lack of sufficient capacity in
machine building."
Taelikov carried his advocacy of heavy industrial priority to the
point of questioning the policy of encouraging heavy industrial
enterprises to produce consumer goods--a policy strongly advocated
by Brezhnev himself in 1970-71. Taelikov complained that ouch
production was scattered among a huge number of enterprises,"
resulting in inefficient, unmcchanized small-scale production.
He asked: "Should one be surprised by the fact that at many
enterprises consumer goods are manufactured with wide use of
manual labor without even a production line?"
The subiect of priorities was also raised by an article in the
August issue of Gosplan's ~ourn.al PLANNED ECONOMY, which provided
data on the current growth zates in heavy industry and consumer
goods production. The article, by G.M. Sorc~kin, director of the
Institute of Economics of the World Socialist System, showed that
the consumer goods' share of industrial production is actually
less now than it was before the consumer prheavy induatry)ewould
1971. His figures indicated that ?roup A
fall only slightly short of its five-year plan goals (45.5 percent
actual increase versus 46.3 percent planned increase), but hat
group B (consumer goods) would fail by a wide margin: 37 percent
actual growth versus 48.6 percent planned growth. Sorokin's
figures indicated that group A fulfilleB fulfilledeitsrplannedery
year except 1972 and 1975, while group
growth only in 1971. The data show that the shortfall in group B
was even greater this year than in 1972 and 1973, when the
agricultural disaster was blamed for the shortfall.
Although acknowledging the failure to fulfill the promise of
preferential growth for group B, Sorokin did not call for more
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investment in B, but rather reasserted heavy industry's priori~y
and attacked "some economists" Tor "turning consumption into nn
absolute."
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NOTCS
PRG PRICC CONTROLS RESCINDEn: Commodity price controls announced
1.n two PRG rcgulatio: s claL?cd 22 Scpt'ember apparently liavc been
rescinded and the Saigon Military Plnnagement Committee has "accepted
responsibi7.ity for the shortcomings" in ?i~nplementing the new pricing
poli~:y, according to the G October issue of: the Saigon newspaper
TIEv SAN (Morning News) . The paper stated t?1)ut? th~~ :hems involved
were to revert to the prices aeL? prior to the 22d, when South Vietne.m
exchanged its old GVN currency for new bar:lcnotes issued by the
communist authorities. SAIGON GIAI PRONG of: 7 October said tho
repeal of: r_he price regulations came in a Military Management
Committee commLnique which also contained a "publl.r., self-criticism"
of its shortcomings. Praising the committee for its frankness,
SAIGON GIAI PRONG went on to warn that the committee "must reso-
lutely oppose all manifestations of bureaucracy, arrogance, and
irresponsibiliL?y...."
LIBERATION RADIO FROM SAIGON: Liberation Radio, the officLal radio
of the PRG, has apparently followed L?he example set by LIBERATION
PRESS AGENCY on 16 June and moved ita transmitting site from the
Eianoi area to Saigon. Since 15 October Liberation Radio has been
broadcasting on the same shortwave frequencies formerly used by
Saigon radio, and monitorable programs now come on the air with the
announcement This is Liberation Radio broadcasting from Ho Chi Minh
City [Sail;on].'" In the past Liberation Radio had not designated a
place of origin. Conversa,ly, Saigon radio has not been heard to
broadcast on any of its listed frequencies since the 15th. In late
June Saigon radio had eliminated regularly scheduled shortwave
broadcasts for general audiences, although these same frequencies
at rimes were put back into use to broadcast news of special interest
s~:ch as the launching of the "anti-comprador bourgeoisie" campaign
,~~nd the currency exchange program. Saigon Radio may still b e airing
programs. of municipal in~~ereat on low-powered transmitters, but their
inaud.ibil3..ty outside of Vietnam precludes technical confirmation.
PRC PROVINCIAL LEA~cRSHIP: NCNA on 8 October announced the death
in Peking on the 3d of Yunnan province chief Chou Hsing. The
memorial )neeting for Chou was highlighted by wreaths from the CCP's
top three leaders--Mao, Chou En-tai and Wang Hung-wen--as well. as
by a central leadership turnout headed by Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping.
To fill Chou's post.,, Peking has once again rehabilitated a former
victim of the cultural revolution. The NCNA report announced that
Chia Chi?-yun,. the former first secretary of the Kweichow provincial
party committee who slipped from public view in .1966, has been named
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