ARE MISSILES STILL IN CUBA? PART II

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP66B00403R000200170020-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 3, 2005
• Sequence Number: 20
• Publication Date: August 14, 1964
• Content Type: OPEN

1964
Approved For RQNGRESSI /(ANAL :RECORD66BQa4033.00200170020-8
lished companies away. now can indus-
tries and firms reasonably be expected to
pay taxes which are used by the Govern-
ment to finance a competitive organiza-
tion so that in effect the taxpayers own
money is being used literally to "cut their
throats." I trust that the administra-
tion immediately takes note of this prac-
tice which I have mentioned, investigates
and does something about it before an-
other industry in our country is elimi-
nated from the business world and our
national economy.
p (Mr. MOORE (at the request of Mr.
SCHWEIKER) was granted permission to
extend his remarks at this point in the
RECORD and to include extraneous mat-
ter.)
[Mt. MOORE'S remarks will appear
hereafter in the Appendix.]
(Mr. TAFT (at the request of Mr.
ScHWEIEEYI) was granted permission to
extend his remarks at this point in the
RECORD and to include extraneous mat-
ter.)
[Mr. TATS remarks will appear here-
ARE MISSIT.,ES STILL ]'N-. UBA?
PART II
(Mr. CRAMER (at the request of Mr.
SCHWEIKER) was granted permission to
extend his remarks at this point in the
RECORD and to include extraneous mat-
.ter.)
Mr..CRAMER. Mr. Speaker, both the
AP and the UPI carried news stories yes-
terday of the reported sightings of mis-
siles in Cuba, which I discussed in the
RECORD yesterday. This report took on
the added significance in light of the re-
port of the Stennis Preparedness Sub-
committee of May 9, 1963, which ex-
pressed alarm over recurring reports of
remaining missiles in Cuba and which
stated as a finding of the committee that
the only way to disprove these reports
was with onsite inspections.
There are apparently those among us
who find comfort in believing that these
reports should be placed in the category
of "false rumors." After carefully study-
ing these reports, however, I find no such
comfort. On the contrary, the alarm ex-
pressed by the Stennis committee is well
founded.
As I mentioned on the floor-yesterday,
the Citizens Committee for a Free Cuba
made these latest revelations public.
Naturally, the authenticity and reliabil-
ity of the Citizens Committee for a Free
base located in that province, according
to the committee's report. This evident-
ly necessitated removing a score of mis-
siles to a Russian base located a short
distance from the provincial capital of
Pinar del Rio. Only partially covered
with tarpaulins, the missiles were visible
to onlookers who were quickly dispersed
by Cuban militia.
An example of the painstaking effort
the Citizens Committee for a Free Cuba
took in assessing this report is indicated
by the fact that, before releasing this in-
formation, they checked this report for
11/2 months before making it public.
Naturally, they have underground
sources in Cuba and on the basis of the
past accuracy of certain members of the
underground, they can assess these facts.
I have been informed by the commit-
tee that the underground reports used
by them are the same as those which
revealed on August 7, 1962, the missiles
in Cuba at that time. At that time, the
administration took these reports with a
"grain of salt."
As we all well know, their reports
turned out to be accurate-witness the
1962 Cuban crisis.
Likewise, over the past year, this com-
mittee reported the introduction of sur-
face-to-air missiles in Cuba which has
since proven accurate.
This committee also revealed details
of the Cuban plan to subvert Venezuela
with the introduction of arms and muni-
tions. This was also proven to be accu-
rate.
Mr. Speaker, the record of careful
analysis and credibility of this organiza-
tion made up of responsible-and con-
cerned-people has been established.
This latest report by this organization
is by no means isolated, but is the latest
in a series of continuing reports they
have been making of the missile poten-
tial in Cuba.
In view of past performance of this
organization, the Russians and the ad-
ministration, I can come to only one log-
ical conclusion. The presumption in
my mind is that missiles can still be in
Cuba. It can be rebutted only by con-
clusive proof to the contrary, such as
can be procured for instance by onsite
inspections and I renew my request that
the United States take the leadership in
urging the OAS to make such onsite in-
spections possible.
I also feel that as all nations con-
cerned are members of the United Na-
tions, an effort should be made through
that organization as well. Such an ac-
complishment would go a long way in
quelling the legitimate criticism directed
toward that organization. After all, all
Cuba takes on great importance so that we're after is a fulfillment of the prom-
we can evaluate their reports in proper ises of onsite inspection made to this
perspective. Government by the Soviet Union at the
I have'been in close contact with the time of the missile crisis.
Citizens Committee for a Free Cuba since In view of these reports, onsite in-
its formation and have always found spection is not only reasonable but it, or
their information to be carefully screened some equally reliable source of informa-
before being released to the public. The tion, is essential.
latest report to which the committee re- At this point I am including, in the capee from Matanzas Province, states that
fers came 'a,a result of 12 explosions on RECORD, the article from the August 10, IRBM's continue to come into Cuba. The
March 20, 1964 in Pinar del Rio Province. 1964, issue of the Free Cuba News which end of the first week of June, said Dr. Mendi-
The explosions followed a fire which discusses the recent reports of missile ola, a convoy of Russian truck trailers bear-
broke out at the La Guatana military sightings in Cuba: lug missiles passed his clinic in the city of
19097
INTERMEDIATE-RANGE MISSILES IN CUBA,
STATES INTELLIGENCE REPORT
Missiles, ranging in. length from 40 to 120
feet, are located at the La Guatana military
base in Pinar del Rio Province. This is the
judgment of an intelligence report received
from the underground resistance in Cuba.
The exact number of missiles in La Guatana
is not precisely known, but the Cuban Stu-
dent Directorate (DRE) claims that 85 of
these missiles were installed at the base in
late 1961 and early 1960. Only 55 were re-
moved at the time of the missile crisis of
1962, according to the DRE report.
Other sources add to the missile picture
in Cuba. They state that more missiles were
introduced into the island last June, and
that they are now installed underground in
the Yumuri Valley of Matanzas Province, ap-
proximately 100 miles east of Havana.
According to the detailed four-page re-
port submitted to Free Cuba News by the
DRE, conclusive evidence of the presence of
"IRBM's came to light in a spectacular man-
ner the 20th of March of this year. DRE in-
telligence sources in Cuba have been check-
ing out the details since that time, and only
recently arrived at the judgment that
IRBM's are in fact still in Cuba. Here is the
gist of the report:
At exactly 9:10 p.m. on March 20 of this
year, a fire broke out at La Guatana Base.
It was followed an hour later by a series of
12 giant explosions which sent debris flying
to a height of 3,000 feet, covering an area of
several miles. The fireworks themselves were
visible for 15 miles, creating a state of panic
throughout the Province.
The balance of the night, and the day
following, great Russian truck-trailers moved
a score of missiles from La Guatana to a
Russian base located at the Granja Escuela
Ludovico S. Noda, a short distance from the
provincial capital of Pinar del Rio. Only
partially covered with tarpaulins, the mis-
siles were visible to on-lookers who were
quickly dispersed by Cuban militia.
The report also puts the number of Rus-
sian soldiers at the La Guatana base alone
at slightly more than 1,500. The Soviets
had 2,500 soldiers at La Guatana during the
missile crisis, according to the DRE report.
One hundred of the Soviets were badly
burned by the blaze on March 20, and were
evacuated to the Asilo de Ancianos hospital,
a hospital devoted exclusively to the care of
the Soviets, and to selected militia and their
families.
Other sources, among them the former
proprietor of a finca (farm) located next to
La Guatana, provided more information. Sr.
Cuco Vines stated that, according to his
sources, the tremendous explosions were
caused by leakage of liquid oxygen, the pro-
pellant used for missiles. The "Pay-loads-
for the missiles are, according to St. Cuco
Vnnas, stored in another base, known as the
finca Cafetal.
The importance attached to the explosions
at the missile base is attested by the fact
that both Fidel Castro and the Russian Am-
bassador to Havana rushed to the scene of
the catastrophe at 11 p.m. Castro tried to
take charge, but was rebuffed by Soviet offi-
cers.
The following day, heavy-duty cranes were
dispatched to nearby fincas where they re-
moved parts of missiles and missile equip-
ment which had been hurled there by the
force of the explosions. The cranes were ac-
companied by Russian officers and several
companies of Cuban militia whose com-
manders warned the peasants to say nothing
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 IA,
19098 Approved For Release 2005/01/27 : CIA-RDP66B0003R000200170020-8
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE August 14
aua4aa3GpD. IIa aguac ui cue convoy anu tine missiles and bombers have been removed
extraordinary security precautions surround- from Cuba. However, they readily admit
Ing its movement In the following words: that, In terms of absolutes, it is quite poe-
"The convoy passed through the city in Bible that offensive weapons remain on the
complete darkness. The authorities cut off Island concealed in caves or otherwise, They
all electric current in the city until the con- also admitted that absolute assurance on this
voy was gone. This is exactly the type of question can come only from penetrating and
security precaution Castro and the Soviets continuing on-site inspection by reliable
took in the summer and fall of 1962 when observers and that, based on skepticism, if
missiles were sent into Cuba." nothing more there is reason for grave con-
Because of the great length of the mis- cern about the matter.
siles, the convoy was forced to traverse the S. There are literally thousands of caves
wide thoroughfares of the city. Their diam- and underground caverns in the Island of
eter was estimated at between 6 and 8 feet Cuba and many of these are suitable for the
by eyewitnesses. Said Dr. Mendlola: storage and concealment of strategic mis-
"Police cars were placed at all the entrances siles and other offensive weapons. Refugee
to the main thoroughfares, and dispersed and exile reports continue to insist that they
traffic and the curious onlookers who were are being so utilized. Military-connected ac-
attracted to the scene by the cutoff of elec- tivities have been noted with reference to
tricity and the noise made by the convoy. I a. number of them but It is the view of the
could easily tell that the cargoes were mis- intelligence analysts that the military usage
siles, since the convoy passed directly In of the caves is for the storage of those weap-
front of my clinic. The trucks came down ons which we know are now in Cuba and
the Via Blanca highway from the direction not for the storage of offensive weapon sys-
of-Havana and went to the Yumurl Valley. tams. Admittedly, however, this view is
near the city of Matanzas. The Russians based to a substantial degree on the nega-
have been working hard at excavations in tive proposition that there 1s no hard evi-
that area, and the entrance roads to the deuce confirming the presence of strategic
valley are sealed off to all but military traffic." missiles in Cuba at this time.
Russian construction continues in Pinar 9. Even though the intelligence commu-
del Rio Province, as well. Refugees from the nity believes that all have been withdrawn,
area of La Guatana say that the base has It Is of the greatest urgency to determine
been rebuilt, and another constructed at a whether or not strategic missiles are now
nearby finca called El Inciso. The DRE re- concealed in Cuba. The criticality of this
port supplies more details to the eyewitness is Illustrated by the fact that. assuming max-
testimony. The two bases, states the DRE, Imurn readiness at preselected sites, with all
are now "hardened" in extensive concrete equipment prelocated, the Soviet mobile
abutments. medium range (1,100 miles) missiles could
I am also including in the RECORD some
of the pertinent material In the Interim
Report of the Preparedness Investigating
Subcommittee known as the Stennis
Subcommittee of the Armed Services
Committee of the U.S. Senate, filed
May 9, 1963, which certainly lends
strong support to my position on this
matter, and to the fact that it is quite
possible that missiles still remain in
Cuba and that on-site Inspections are
the only way of gaining "full and abso-
lute assurance on the question."
INTERIM REPORT ON CUBAN Mn,ITARY BUILDUP
(EXCERPTS FROM STENNIS SUBCOMMITTEE
REPORT, MAY 9, 1963 )
II. SUMMARY OF MAJOR FINDINGS
s
3. ? While a reasonably competent job was
done In acquiring and collecting intelligence
information and data, in retrospect It ap-
pears that several substantial errors were
made by the intelligence agencies In the
evaluation of the Information and data
which was accumulated.
4. Faulty evaluation and the predisposi-
tion of the Intelligence community to the
philosophical conviction that it would be in-
compatible with Soviet policy to introduce
strategic missiles into Cuba resulted In in-
telligence judgments and evaluations which
later proved to be erroneous. Among these
were:
(C) It was not until the photographic evi-
dence was obtained on October 14 that the
intelligence community concluded that stra-
tegic missiles had been introduced Into Cuba.
In reaching their pre-October 14 negative
judgment the intelligence analysts were
strongly influenced by their judgment as to
Soviet policy and indications that strategic
missiles were being Installed were not given
proper weight by the intelligence commun-
ity. A contributing factor to this was the
tendency on the part of the Intelligence
people to discredit and downgrade the re-
ports of Cuban refugees and exiles.
7. To a man the Intelligence chiefs stated
that It is their opinion that all strategic
be made operational in a matter of hours.
S ? . . .
Par. 14. The evidence is overwhelming that
Castro is supporting, spurring, aiding and
abetting Communist revolutionary and sub-
versive movements throughout the Western
Hemisphere and that such activities present
a grave and ominous threat to the peace and
security of the Americas.
?
Page 11. It has also been noted that the
Intelligence community did not estimate that
strategic missiles would be Introduced into
Cuba until photographic confirmation was
obtained on October 14. It appears that, on
this point. the analysts were strongly Influ-
enced by their philosophical judgment that
It would be contrary to Soviet policy to in-
troduce strategic missiles into Cuba. In
retrospect, it appears that the indicators to
the contrary were not given proper weight.
Among other things the discovery of the
surface-to-air missile complex In the San
Cristobal area on August 29 could logically
have led to the assumption that they were
being constructed to protect a strategic mis-
sile installation since it was clear that these
SA-2'a were not being emplaced for the pur-
pose of protecting any existing or known
military installation.
Page 15. Based upon their judgment that
all strategic missiles and offensive weapon
systems have been removed, the Intelligence
community does not believe that Cuba now
presents any major direct military threat to
the United States or Latin America In an
offensive or aggressive sense. Strategic weap-
ons may or may not be now In Cuba. We
can reach no conclusion on this because of
lack of conclusive evidence.
3. Reports of concealed strategic -weapons
In Cuba. Reports from refugees, exile, and
other human sources insist that the strategic
missiles and bombers were not removed from
Cuba but are concealed In caves and other-
wise. The intelligence community, although
aware of these reports, have been unable to
confirm them and adhere to the position that
all strategic weapons are withdrawn. The
current Intelligence estimate that they are
not present Is based largely on the negative
evidence that there is no affirmative proof to
the contrary. This, of course, was precisely
the status of the matter prior to last Octo-
ber 14.
There is no doubt that there are literally
thousands of caves and caverns in Cuba and
that It is feasible to use many of these for
the storage and concealment of strategic
missiles and other offensive weapons, it is
also true that military activity has been
observed In connection with these caves.
Our intelligence people are of the opinion
that some of the caves are in fact utilized
for the storage of military items and equip-
ment other than strategic missiles, such as
ammunition, explosives, etc.
The importance of making every effort to
ascertain the truth with respect to this
matter cannot be overemphasized. The
criticality of it can best be illustrated by
the fact that the testimony established that,
upon the assumption that all missiles and
associated equipment and the necessary per-
sonnel were readily available near pre-
selected sites in a state of complete readi-
ness, mobile medium-range missiles could
be made operational in a matter of hours.
Thus, if these missiles and their associated
equipment remain In Cuba, the danger is
clear and obvious.
STATE DEPARTMENT AGAIN FAILS
AMERICAN INVESTORS IN VENE-
ZUELA
(Mr. BECKER (at the request of Mr.
Scsiwsixna) was granted permission to
extend his remarks at this point in the
RECORD and to include extraneous mat-
ter.)
Mr. BECKER. Mr. Speaker, once
again I take the floor to call attention
to the seizure of the properties of the
Venezuelan Sulphur Corp. - This corpora-
tion is entirely owner by U.S. citizens as
stockholders, as well as taxpayers.
In the light of the seizure of this multi-
million-dollar investment, it is tragic that
the Government of the United States has
given to Venezuela aid totaling almost
$190 million, Loans have been granted
to Venezuela by the United States with
interest rates of three-quarters of 1 per-
cent. This means that the U.S. Govern-
ment is borrowing this money and charg-
ing its taxpayers 4 percent interest rates,
while loaning the money to Venezuela at
three-quarters of 1 percent. This three-
quarters of 1 percent hardly pays the
equivalent of the service charges. De-
spite the great amount of aid that the
United States has been and is giving to
Venezuela-financial and other-wise-the
Government of Venezuela still refuses to
make any settlement with the Vene-
zuelan Sulphur Corp. for the seizure of
their property.
It is hardly any wonder that our State
Department has been inept, to say the
least, in interceding for the U.S. investors
when Dean Acheson and his law Arm are
the legal counsel for Venezuela in the
United States, while at the same time
Dean Acheson is a consultant to the State
Department and is serving the State De-
partment in other capacities, even
though he may be doing this without
direct compensation.
Mr. Speaker, the Venezuelan Sulphur
Corp. has been forced to go into the U.S.
courts. The court has asked that the
State Department and Venezuela settle
this matter in an equitable manner.
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