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• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP66B00403R000200160056-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 29, 2004
• Sequence Number: 56
• Publication Date: August 6, 1964
• Content Type: OPEN

1964
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE 17815
ments of the Senate to the bill (H.R.
8611) to facilitate the performance of
medical research and development
within the Veterans' Administration, by
providing for the indemnification of
contractors.
MAINTENANCE OF INTERNIONAL
PEACE AND SECURITY IN SOUTH-
EAST ASIA
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
ask that the Vietnam resolution be laid
before the Senate. It has been cleared
with the chairmen of the Committee on
Foreign Relations and the Committee on
Armed Services, with the ranking mem-
bers of those committees, with the dis-
tinguished minority leader [Mr. DIRK-
, and with the distinguished senior
Senator from Oregon [Mr. Moan], who
is interested in the subject.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there
objection?
There being no objection, the Senate
proceeded to consider the joint resolution
(S.J. Res. 189) to promote the mainte-
nance of international peace and secu-
rity in southeast Asia.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, a
parliamentary inquiry.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senator will state it.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, is
It agreed that a vote on the treaty with
Belgium will be had at 2 o'clock?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senator is correct.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, a
further parliamentary inquiry.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senator will state it.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, is
It further understood that it is the in-
tention to call up the so-called Vietnam
resolution following the vote on the
treaty?
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
wish to make a few remarks on the Viet-
nam resolution.
The President has acted against re-
peated Communist provocations in the
Tonkin Gulf. He has acted in the hope
of preventing an expansion of the con-
flict in Asia, in the hope of minimizing
the American involvement on that
continent.
He has weighted the degree of military
response to the degree of military provo-
cation. He has taken military steps for
legitimate defense and, at the same time,
he has brought the matter to the con-
ference tables of theT United Nations, as
a matter of urgency in connection with
the maintenance of world peace.
He has counseled with the congres-
sional leadership, the relevant commit-
tee chairmen and ranking minority
members and the Republican candidate
for President. Two nights ago he in-
formed the entire Nation of his action.
The President, in short, has acted with
a cool head and a steady hand in a most
critical situation. He has acted as the
leader of a great free nation, fully aware
of a great nation's responsibilities to it-
self, to freedom, and to the peace of the
world. ,
Let no man make light of what has
been done in the past 72 hours. What
has been done is no automatic or certain
solution to the difficulties. A reasoned
approach to this situation on our part is
no assurance that others will have the
same capacity. Our own restraint is no
guarantee of the restraint of others. Our
wish for peace is not necessarily the wish
of others.
But the President has acted in the
hope of restraining the dogs of war. It
remains to be seen, now, whether others
will act in the same fashion. Escalators
go up as well as down and, in this in-
stance, our hand is not the only hand on
the control. We hope for the best. But
let us also be prepared for the worst
The situation may well become more
critical?far more critical?before its
resolution becomes visible.
One would hope that those who have
acted with provocation will now cease so
to act. One would hope that the United
Nations will be helpful. One would hope
that those nations deeply concerned bud
not directly involved in Indochina will
redouble their efforts to find a peaceful
solution to all of the difficulties which
have beset the peninsula for almost two
decades and ourselves for 10 years.
But those are matters which are not in
our own hands alone. For us, it is suf.
flcient at this time to know that the
President has set a course for the best
interests of the Nation, for Democrats
and Republicans alike, for the Govern-
ment and people of the United States
He asks for and he will have, in this en-
deavor, the support of the Congress and
the people of the United States. Let
there be no doubt of that in any nation
in Asia or in any part of the world
What needs to be done to defend our-
selves will be done. What can be done
by us to give human freedom a chance
in southeast Asia will be done. It will
be done not alone by the President. It
will be done not alone by the armed
services which he commands. It will be
done not alone by Democrats or by Re-
publicans. It will be done by an entire
Nation united in their trust and in their
support of the President of the United
States.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I
ask unanimous consent to correct the
text of the resolution. There was a tech-
nical mistake, an omission on line 10,
page 2, as follows, following the worth
"consonant with the Constitution," the
words "of the United States" were inad-
vertently left out. It is perfectly obvious
that it was the Constitution of the United
States that was being referred to. I ask
unanimous consent that it be corrected
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, the amendment is agreed to
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President
pursuant to the order of the Senate on
yesterday, the Committee on Armed
Forces, headed by the distinguished Sen-
ator from Georgia [Mr. RUSSELL], and
the Committee on Foreign Relations met
jointly this morning to take testimony
on Senate Joint Resolution 189.
Mr. President, I recommend the
prompt and overwhelming endorsement
of the resolution now before the Senate.
The resolution, which has been approved
by the Committees on Foreign Relations
senting vote, endorses the wise and nec-
essary action of President Johnson in
ordering the 7th fleet and its air units
to take appropriate measures in response
ot the unprovoked attacks on American
naval vessels by North Vietnamese tor-
pedo boats. The resolution further ex-
presses the approval and support of the
Congress for the determination of the
President to take such action as may be
necessary, now and in the future, to re-
strain or repel Communist aggression in
southeast Asia.
The action taken by the United States
in retaliation for the North Vietnamese
torpedo boat attacks must be understood
both in terms of the immediate situation
and in terms of the broader pattern of
Communist military and subversive ac-
tivities in southeast Asia over the past
10 years. On both levels the North Viet-
namese regime is patently guilty of mili-
tary aggression and demonstrably in con-
tempt of international law.
As stated in the report of the joint
committee on the resolution:
The North Vietnamese campaign against
the South has increased in scope and tempo.
It has added a new dimension to traditional
concepts of warfare and aggression?the di-
mension of subversion and terror on a
planned, centrally directed, and coordinated
basis. This new kind of aggression is not
symbolized by armies marching across fron-
tiers with bands playing and flags waving.
But it is no less outrageous international
behavior.
The facts of the immediate situation
are clear. On August 2 the U.S. de-
stroyer Maddox was attacked without
provocation by North Vietnamese torpedo
boats in international waters in the Gulf
of Tonkin. The American vessel, with
the support of aircraft from the U.S.S.
Ticonderoga, fired back in self-defense
and drove off the attackers. The United
States thereupon warned the Hanoi re-
gime of "grave consequences" in the event
of further military attacks on American
forces. On August 4 the Maddox and
another destroyer, the C. Turner Joy,
were again attacked by North Vietnam-
ese torpedo boats in international waters.
The attack, which lasted for over 2 hours,
was without any doubt a calculated act
of military aggression. The United
States thereupon responded with air
strikes against North Vietnamese torpedo
boats and their supporting facilities at
various points on the coast of North
Vietnam.
The American action was limited and
measured in proportion to the provoca-
tion which gave rise to it. It was an act
of self-defense wholly consistent with
article 51 of the United Nations Charter
and an act of limited retaliation wholly
consistent with the international law of
reprisal. The single, most notable fact
about the American action was its great
restraint as an act of retaliation taken
by a great power in response to the prov-
ocation of a small power.
The action taken by the United States
was appropriate as policy as well as jus-
tified in law. An act of unambiguous
aggression cannot be tolerated or ignored
without inviting further provocations,
especially when the act is committed by
and Armed Services with only one dis- a regime which has been engaged in con-
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17816 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE August 6
sistent and repeated aggression against
Its neighbor states.
Has the attacks on the Maddox and
the C. Turner Joy been isolated occur-
rences it might have been appropriate
to respond by a lesser act of force than
that employed, or even by measures short
of force. This, however, is not the case.
The North Vietnamese regime has made
an international career of aggression al-
most since its inception in 1954. Cer-
tainly supported and quite possibly in-
cited by Communist China, North Viet-
nam has persistently engaged in sub-
version and more direct hostilities
against the duly constituted govern-
ments of both Laos and South Vietnam.
It has done these things in gross viola-
tion of the Geneva Agreement of 1954
and of the Geneva Agreement of 1962
pertaining to Laos. It has done these
things in violation of international law,
In contempt of the United Nations
Charter, in malice toward its neighbors,
and in reckless disregard of the require-
ments of peace in southeast Asia.
Under these circumstances, it was in-
cumbent upon the United States to act,
as it did, in a manner proportionate to
the provocation. Viewed in the context
of the immediate provocation, the re-
taliatory measures taken by the United
States were necessary and justified.
Viewed in the context of a decade of
reckless and irresponsible behavior on
the part of the North Vietnamese re-
gime, the action taken by the United
States was the minimum consistent with
its own vital interests and with its obli-
gations to its allies and partners in
southeast Asia.
The situation in southeast Asia illus-
trates an extremely important principle
of foreign policy?that the challenges
which confront us in the world are
widely varying in character and inten-
sity and must be dealt with accordingly
by a wide variety of instruments and
policies. Just as it is a mistake to assert
that force is the only proper response
to every challenge of Communist power,
it is no less a mistake to assert that mili-
tary action is never a necessary instru-
ment of policy. Whatever the outcome
of the present crisis in southeast Asia, it
is important for us to refrain from mak-
ing sweeping generalizations as to both
the provocation and our response to it.
Special combinations of circumstances
suggest special patterns of response,
which may or may not be valid in differ-
ent situations.
The point which I wish to make is that
while we must be consistent in the ob-
jectives of our foreign policy, we must be
flexible in the instruments we use to at-
tain them. We must bear in mind that
military force is not an end but an in-
strument, a dangerous and repugnant
one which is never desirable but some-
times essential. It is equally unwise to
assume that force must never be used
and to assume that its successful use in
one instance warrants its use in any or
all others.
The current crisis in southeast Asia,
I believe, is one in which the use of
limited American force has been neces-
sary and may be necessary again. It is
essential, however, that we evaluate this
crisis in its global context,. That con-
text is one in which hopeful tendencies
toward peace are on the rise despite
events in crisis areas such as Vietnam.
It would be a great mistake to allow our
optimism about promising developments
in our relations with the Soviet Union
and Eastern Europe to lead us to any
illusions about the aggressive designs of
North Vietnam and its Chinese Commu-
nist sponsor. It would be no less a mis-
take to allow our concern with baleful
events in southeast Asia to drive us to
actions and attitudes which would un-
dermine current progress toward the re-
laxation of tensions with the Soviet
Union and the European Communist
regimes. At all times, but especially at
this moment of crisis, we must be ex-
tremely clear about the different policies
pursued by different Communist regimes,
about the different challenges which they
pose and the different responses which
they warrant. We must have the wis-
dom and the discrimination to be able,
when necessary, to engage simultane-
ously in the local prosecution of hostili-
ties and the global pursuit of world
peace.
In southeast Asia itself, we must leave
no doubt in the minds of both adversaries
and friends as to what our objectives are
and what they are not. It should be
clear to all concerned that our purpose is
to uphold and strengthen the Geneva'
Agreements of 1954 and 1962?that is to
say, to establish viable, independent
states in Indochina and elsewhere in
southeast Asia, states which will be free
of and secure from the domination of
Communist China and Communist North
Vietnam. It should be emphasized that
we wish the nations of southeast Asia to
be free of and secure from domination by
Peiping and Hanoi, but not necessarily
hostile to these regimes. It should be
further emphasized to all concerned that
our objective is not to establish our own
military power in Indochina or in any
way to bring the nations of Indochina
under our own domination or even to
bring them into an American "sphere of
influence."
It should be made clear to the Com-
munist powers of Asia, If it is not yet
sufficiently clear, that they can enjoy
peace and security as long?but only as
long as they confine their ambitions
within their own frontiers. It should
also be made clear that whenever the
Communist powers show a willingness
to settle the problems of southeast Asia
by peaceful and lawful means, these
problems can then be placed largely or
entirely under the jurisdiction of the
United Nations. It should be made
equally clear to these regimes, if it is not
yet sufficiently clear, that their aggres-
sive and expansionist ambitions, wher-
ever advanced, will meet precisely that
degree of American opposition which is
necessary to frustrate them. The resolu-
tion now before the Senate is designed to
shatter whatever illusions our adver-
saries may harbor about the determina-
tion of the United States to act promptly
and vigorously against aggression. For
this reason, Mr. President, I urge its
prompt and overwhelming adoption by
the Senate.
Mr. President, in addition to the
strong support of the Congress, there
have been expressions of widespread
support for the President's action in the
country and in the press. I ask unani-
mous consent that there be inserted in
the RECORD at this point a number of
newspaper editorials which are illustra-
tive of the general support for President
Johnson's actions in southeast Asia.
There being no objection, the editori-
als were ordered to be printed in the
RECORD, as follows:
1From the Philadelphia Inquirer, Aug. 6,
19641
A NATION UNITED
In this grim, dark hour?when the issue
of peace or war hangs precariously in the
balance?President Johnson has called upon
the American people to meet the test of
courage and determination that has been
thrust suddenly and irrevocably upon us all
by a treacherous foe.
The Nation must stand fu-ra and united in
unwavering support of the President at this
crucial juncture in the history of mankind.
We are confident that Americans, irrespec-
tive of political party, shall do so?in keep-
ing with the highest traditions of this coun-
try in times of crisis.
In his solemn address to the world on
Wednesday, at Syracuse, Mr, Johnson re-
iterated and expanded upon points he made
late Tuesday night in his report on the
swift succession of ominous events In south-
east Asia.
The President is right, beyond any ques-
tion, in making it clear to the leaders of
Communist North Vietnam, and to any
other government bent on unprovoked ag-
gression, that America's earnest desire for
peace is not to be misconstrued as weakness.
Delivering one of the finest addresses of
his long career in public service, Mr. John-
son summed up the situation succinctly at
Syracuse in these terse phrases: "The at-
tacks were deliberate. The attacks were un-
provoked. The attacks have been answered."
After the North Vietnamese torpedo boats
had opened fire against U.S. naval craft In
International waters, for the second time in
3 days, it was unmistakably clear that the
American reply, in action as well as words,
needed to be prompt and appropriately
forceful?commensurate with the serious-
ness of the North Vietnamese challenge and
the flagrant disregard they showed for the
rights of our vessels to sail the seas with-
out interference.
These rights have been hard won, over
many years. by valiant Americans. Freedom
of movement on the oceans must be de-
fended.
Retaliatory US. air strikes against North
Vietnamese torpedo boat bases and other
installations, as reported by Defense Secre-
tary McNamara, unfortunately have resulted
in the loss of American planes and, pos-
sibly. American lives. This sorrowful and
tragic development underlines not only the
perils that must be faced in the battle zone
but the sacrifices that all of us must be pre-
pared to accept.
"Aggression unchallenged is aggression un-
leashed," the President said at Syracuse.
This is undeniable truth. To retreat from,
or even to tolerate, armed attack against ves-
sels of the U.S. Navy would be to invite
steadily bolder assaults that would lead us
surely and inevitably down the path of war.
Mr. Johnson's notation of broken promises
made by the North Vietnamese Govern-
ment, in pacts signed by them in 1954 and
1982, is a timely reminder of the demon-
strated untrustworthiness of the Red
regime in Hanoi. It is fitting also that the
President, while reaffirming this country's
commitments to allies, has reminded those
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1964 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
allies that the fight for freedoni ought not
to be the sole burden of any one nation but
should be a collective responsibility. Our
allies?in NATO,' in the Par East, and else-
where?can help the cause of peace by giv-
ing unqualified endorsement to U.S. action
against North Vietnam.
Freedom and peace remain our goals?but
let those forces of enslavement and armed
aggression abroad who have unleashed their
fire against us give pause. They will do well
to show a healthy respect for America's re-
solve to defend, by whatever means neces-
sary, our rights on the high seas and to
carry out, by whatever action required, our
obligations abroad in the struggle against
Communist aggression.
[From the Washington-Post. Aug. 6, 1964]
STERN CRISIS
President Johnson has earned the grati-
tude of the free world as well as of the Na-
tion for his careful and effective handling of
the Vietnam crisis. The paramount need was
to show the North Vietnamese aggressors
their self-defeating folly in ignoring an un-
equivocal American warning and again at-
tacking the American Navy on the high seas.
This Mr. Johnson did by means? of a severe
but measured response deftly fitted to the
aggression: retaliation against the boats and
bases used in the attack.
The air strikes did not merely decimate
Hanoi's fleet, leaving it unable to defend its
?WA coast, and demonstrate North Vietnam's
vulnerability to American power. The coun-
terattack smashed the "paper tiger" myth,
proving the U.S. readiness to ?use whatever
means necessary to stand up for its interests
in the Far a.s't and underlining the reliabil-
ity of its commitment to its friends there.
Most immediately, the reprisal rendered
obsolete the old terms of the debate on
whether to carry the guerrilla war in South
Vietnam back to the aggressors in the North.
Long reluctant to do this itself on the
ground, or to have Saigon forces do it, the
United States has now acted alone, by sea
and air. Whatever restraint had previously
been exercised through lack of precedent or
provocation has been removed by the events
in the Tonkin Gulf. No one can tell at this
point the precise form which the Vietnam
wat will take, but it is bound to be a new
ferin, and the newness would seem inevitably
to be on the side of more direct American
participation and more direct action against
the North.
To a capital and a world sensitive to the
uses of power by an American President, the
crisis?the first major foreign-policy crisis
faced by President Johnson?has found him
not wanting in toughness or in nuance. But
the crisis has also pointed up the office of the
Presidency as the single center of control
and responsibility for American power. It is
worth remarking that this respect for the
Presidency has been conveyed even by those
who believe that, for instance, local military
commanders should be given discretion for
important decisions in the field.
Military measures were only a part of Pres-
ident Johnson's response. He coordinated
them with the other constituencies and coux:-
munities of which he is the leader, He asked
and got from Senator GOLDWATER a promise
of nonpartisanship. The Senator, like the
patriot he is, instantly forsook politics and
stood by his side. He also went, calmly, to
the people, both American and foreign, offer-
ing information and reassurance in appro-
priate degrees.
The President went to Congress too for a
resolution of national unity and support, and
to the United Nation, for international back-
ing. The request to Congress, like his ap-
proach to Senator GOLDWATER, may later af-
fect the election campaign, but the serious-
ness of the situation warrants these expres-
sions of confidence and cooperation. The
U.N. plea forces the Soviet Union to a cli-
mactic choice between its conflicting in-
terests in the Communist and Western
worlds. But regardless of the Security
Council's stance on the torpedo attacks, a
condign response has already been meted
out to Hanoi.
The impressive orchestration of American
policies contrasts revealingly with the frag-
mented and tardy reactions of the different
Communist states. This broken pattern, in-
cluding the fact that Premier Khrushcheir
was out in the Soviet hinterlands, suggests
how unexpected Hanoi's attacks were to some
Communists and how unexpected Washing-
ton's reprisals were to others. There is still
no convincing explanation of why Hanoi
would challenge the United States under
conditions so patently unfavorable to it. One
notes, however, that there is in Hanoi a war
weariness conducive to desperate heroics:
that Hanoi has seemed to share Peiping's dis-
torted vision of the American "paper tiger";
and that the Tuesday attack fell on the an-
niversary of the test ban, a Soviet-American
agreement based on the fact that the "paper
tiger" has nuclear teeth.
This element of uncertainty in Hanoi's
intentions is what makes the crisis poten-
tially dangerous. The fear is, of course, that
Hanoi's harassments may be a prelude to
escalation of the war in Vietnam, perhaps
drawing in Peiping. It was the President's
awareness of these ominous possibilities that
made his management of the crisis so sig-
nificant and correct.
[From the New York Herald Tribune, Aug. 6,
1964]
THE RIGHT RESPONSE
President Johnson spoke clearly and acted
with prompt decision in reply to the second
torpedo boat attack on American ships in the
Tonkin Gulf. The reasons behind the wanton
North Vietnamese provocations are still mys-
terious, but there is nothing obscure about
Mr. Johnson's firm statement that "there can
be no peace by aggression and no immunity
from reply"?especially against the back-
ground of the sharp and effective American
air assault on the North Vietnamese naval
bases.
The United States has a chain of sentries
around the world; lonely men in Korean
trenches, lonely planes over the Arctic wastes,
lonely ships in distant seas. They keep watch
over an -Uncertain Peace. But their vigil
would have no meaning if it were not that
power stands leashed behind them; power
ready to be used swiftly and with vigor for
peace. That power, and the equally essen-
tial will to use it, found expression in the
action ordered by President Johnson against
North Vietnam.
The power was still on leash. The air
action against the aggressor's bases was a lim-
ited action. And in that fact, no less than
in the speed and efficiency of the response,
lies much of the effectiveness of the policy
put into effect by the President. As he said,
the overall Strength of the United States is
"vast and awesome." But it is not a mono-
lithic mass, like the European armies before
World War I, impossible to guide or check
by diplomacy once the initial impetus is
given. It is not just "the button," whose
rejoinder must be nuclear war or supineness.
It can be used to pinpoint and punish the
immediate offenders?in this case, the North
Vietnamese mosquito fleet.
Thus, whoever planned the torpedo-boat
attacks, for whatever purpose, stand warned.
If they were probing the intentions of the
United States, of Red China, of the Soviet
Union, they at least know that the United
States will resist aggression, and that it has
the capability of doing so.
At the same time, the rest of the world
knows that this capability will be used with
restraint; that force will be used in proper-
17817
tion to the need. The United States can, as
Mr. Johnson said, welcome and invite the
scrutiny of all men who seek peace, "for
peace is the only purpose of the course we
pursue."
The controlled force of the American
counterblow has clearly made its impact on
the world. From its friends, this country
has received such congratulations as that
of Japan (very directly concerned with the
problem of Communist expansion in Asia)
and such encouragement as that of Britain
in the Security Council. From the Soviet
Union has come denunciation?but it is
oddly perfunctory. In asking that North
Vietnam come to the United Nations, even
the Soviet delegate on the Security Council
seemed to be trying, in some earnestness, to
find out what has been going on in the Ton-
kin Gulf.
The United States, too, is puzzled by much
of what has been happening in southeast
Asia. But it stands as one behind the Presi-
dent's action. The hearteningly prompt
support given Mr. Johnson's course by Sen-
ator GOLDWATER is only the most striking
of many evidences of the unity of Americans
in the face of this strange kind of terrorism-
on the high seas.
[From the New York Times, Aug. 6, 19641
WIDER WAR
On July 24, President Johnson said that
"the United States seeks no wider war" in
Vietnam, but he warned that "provocation
could force a response." That provocation?
twice repeated?now has brought a response
that has been, in the President's words,
"limited and fitting." Whether this ends
the incident now is up to North Vietnam
and to Communist China. The United States
plans no further military strikes if there
are no further Communist attacks. Presi-
dent Johnson has made it clear that "we
still want no wider war."
Whether or not the confrontation stops
there, the crisis in southeast Asia has been
altered in fundamental ways?all involving
great uncertainties and even greater dangers.
The United States has become a direct
combatant on a significant scale, even if
only briefly. The sword, once drawn in anger,
will tend to be unsheathed more easily in
the future.
congressional authority for future mili-
tary action will, in effect, be delegated to
the President by the joint resolution sched-
uled to be voted today. The President has
rightly asked that the resolution express a
determination that "all necessary measures"
be taken.
The concept of a Communist "privileged
sanctuary," heeded hitherto both in Korea
and Indochina, has been breached. The cir-
cumstances under which North Vietnam may
be struck again remain undefined. But the
rules of the war have undergone a basic
change?a change that applies to Commu-
nist China as well as to Hanoi. President
Johnson was clearly addressing Peiping when
he warned "any who may be tempted to
support?or to widen?the present aggres-
sion" that "there can be no peace by aggres-
sion and no immunity from reply."
Hanoi's sea patrol fleet largely has been
wiped out and, lacking an air force, North
Vietnam has been shown to be virtually open
to hostile air attack. Hanoi's willing allies
in Peiping are now under pressure to provide
new means for sea and air protection?and
even, perhaps, to intervene directly. Hanoi's
reluctant allies in Moscow are under pres-
sure, as yesterday's Soviet statement showed
to demonstrate their backing for North Viet-
nam before world Communist opinion.
Ranks have been closed in the United
States with Senator GOLDWATER'S open sup-
port for administration action. If Hanoi's
attacks were an attempt to exploit political
and racial division in the thiited States, the
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17818 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE August 6
American reaction has proved this futile.
Vietnam, in fact, has been taken out of the
presidential campaign for the moment. The
attempt to keep it out, by retaining Repub-
lican support, means that President Johnson
henceforth will find firmness politically
easier to emphasize than restraint.
American reluctance to go to an Indochina
peace conference, as urged by President de
Gaulle, is strongly reinforced. If Hanoi's
purpose was to force such a conference, it
could not have been more poorly advised.
These are some of the political and mili-
tary realities after the Tonkin Gulf exchange.
The lines have hardened. A highly danger-
ous period has opened. It is a time that
calls for coolness, as well as determination,
for restraint as well as firmness.
We still have no real idea of what prompted
the North Vietnamese to launch their po-
tentially suicidal adventure. The Nation's
united confidence. in its Chief Executive is
vital. No one else can play the hand. That
confidence will be best maintained by a con-
tinued adherence to the principles the Presi-
dent himself has enunciated of firmness but
a firmness that will always be measured?a
firmness whose mission is peace.
[Prom the Baltimore Sun, Aug. 6, 19641
PEACE THE PURPOSE
At Syracuse University yesterday, while the
world waited for further developments in
southeast Asia, President Johnson set forth
the central concern of this Nation for all to
see. "We welcome?and we invite?the scru-
tiny of all men who seek peace, for peace is
the only purpose of the course we pursue."
Only hours before, after a second Communist
attack on American naval vessels, the Presi-
dent had ordered an air strike against the
torpedo-boat bases along the coast of North
Vietnam. The attack had been carried out.
and the bases lay in ruins. Two American
airmen had been lost. In its promise to
repulse aggressors the United States had not
been bluffing. Of that there could no longer
be any doubt.
It is not an easy thing to loose even a small
fraction of the military power available to
the Commander in Chief, but in this cue
there was no choice. "Aggression unchal-
lenged," the President said, "is aggression
unleashed." In striking back at a time of
grave provocation, the United States hoped
not to spread the fighting but to pinch it off
before it got out of hand. To reasonable
governments the message should be clear,
but American forces are being .deployed in
such a way as to respond appropriately if
somewhere there is a misreading. That, too,
is a statement of American purpose.
If there has been a suspicion abroad that
the American people are dangerously dis-
united, this episode is proof to the contrary.
Crisis always draws Americans together, and
on this issue support for President Johnson
is without reservation. Senator GOLDWATER
set the pattern for his party, and congres-
sional leaders, briefed early at the White
House, have responded with the traditional
closing of ranks. When the Nation is under
the gun, politics loses all coloration. The
quick rush of support from America's allies
also has been gratifying.
None can foretell the perils that lie ahead.
North Vietnam is an annoyance, but it is
not the major consideration. The key to
peace in Asia is hidden in Communist China,
in the course it may essay alone, or with the
encouragement of Moscow. Yesterday's con-
voking of a United Nations session was in-
tended not only as a report to the nations
but as an assessment of the intentions of
the Soviet bloc. Whatever the dangers, the
United States will face them with the cour-
age possessed only by those who are both free
and strong.
Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, will
the Senator from Arkansas yield?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield.
Mr. McGOVERN. Without in any way
casting any doubt on the wisdom of the
resolution, there are a few brief ques-
tions that I should like to address to
the Senator from his comments, if he
would be willing to comment.
All of us have been puszled, if not
baffled, as to why a little State such as
North Vietnam should seek a deliberate
naval conflict with the United States
with the overwhelming naval and air
power that we have in that area. In an
effort possibly to throw some possible
light on that question, Mr. Murrey
Marder, in his column in the Washing-
ton Post yesterday, made the following
statement in the closing paragraph of
his column:
North Vietnam on Sunday charged that the
United States and South Vietnam had sent
warships "to shell the Hon Me and Hon Ngu
islands in the territorial waters" of North
Vietnam. Those islands are near the area
where the Maddox was attacked Sunday.
Hon Me is used as a naval base. American
sources said, and Communist PT boats have
been seen in the area.
The United States has denied that any of
its warships shelled the islands of Hon Me
and Hon Ngu. However, despite some reports
published yesterday, the State Department
denial did not equally exculpate South Viet-
nam. It only denied American participation.
SPECULATION ON ATTACK
There are some indications, however, that
the South Vietnamese may in fact have at-
tacked the two islands American officials have
declined to discuss that, although U.S. war-
ships on occasion reportedly have escorted
South Vietnam vessels part way to their tar-
gets.
I wonder if the Senator from Arkansas
could shed any light on the possible ex-
planation for the North Vietnamese at-
tack.
Mr. FULBRIGHT, In dealing with
warfare, which essentially is an irra-
tional business, it is dangerous to specu-
late as to the motives of one's enemies
or adversaries. However, in this case,
first, the Secretary of Defense himself
stated, after the first attack on the Mad-
dox, that he did not expect a repetition
of the attack. He made that statement
Publicly. That showed how wrong he
was. He said he could see no motive
for it, and none of us at the first meeting
we had on the question? could explain
why that kind of attack by a few torpedo
boats against the elements of the 7th
Fleet should take place, whether it was
an isolated action or an impulsive action
by the local commander.
But after the action was repeated, it
was shown to be clearly calculated. It is
my understanding, as best I can inter-
pret what actually happened, that there
were some South Vietnamese raids, if
they might be so called?coastal raids?
by South Vietnamese junks or naval ves-
sels?the only kind of naval vessels they
have. My information is that they have
relatively small PT boats, comparable
to those of North Vietnam, plus what are
called motorized junks, and those from
time to time have engaged in what are
called hit-and-run raids, none of them
of a major nature, by South Vietnamese
boats with South Vietnamese crews.
Our own naval vessels, such as the
Maddox and other associated vessels,
have never engaged in any attacks on
those islands or anywhere else in North
Vietnam.
The best information that I have from
high officials in our Government in this
field is to the effect that our boats did not
convoy or support or backup any South
Vietnamese naval vessels that were en-
gaged in such attacks.
Mr. McGOVERN. The Senator would
say the implication of the article is
probably in error?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. It has been as-
serted by others that the Maddox was
backing up or convoying the smaller ves-
sels of the Vietnamese.
The testimony I am familiar with
shows that this is not a fact.
I am reminded also that it was asked
whether or not the junks of the South
Vietnamese had American personnel in
the nature of advisers or otherwise. We
were advised they did not, that they
were manned by non-Americans in all
cases. In other words, the patrol duty by
such ships as the C. Turner Joy and the
Maddox was an operation for patrol, to
keep our own forces informed about the
activities in this very critical area, and
was entirely unconnected or unassociat-
ed with any coastal forays the South
Vietnamese themselves may have con-
ducted.
Mr. McGOVERN. I should like to put
one other question to the Senator. Over
the past few days, possibly the past 2
or 3 weeks, there have been statements
In the press quoting General Khanh, the
South Vietnamese leader, as saying that
the war had to be won by carrying it to
North Vietnam. Almost simultaneously
our administration leaders have been
quoted as saying that the only way the
war can be won is by taking on the guer-
rillas in South Vietnam, and that our
policy is not one of extending the war
to the north; quite to the contrary, that
the victory must be had in the south and
that we will take all reasonable steps to
confine the war to South Vietnam.
Does the Senator think there is any
danger in this resolution that we may
be surrendering to General Khanh's po-
sition our attitude as to where the war
should be fought?
Mr. F1TLBRIGHT. I do not think
there is any danger of that. There is, of
course, a danger in this whole area, and
there has been for 10 years. It is dan-
gerous. The policy of our Government
not to expand the war still holds. That
is not inconsistent with any response to
attacks on our vessels on the high seas
where they have a right to be.
Mr. McGOVERN. I agree.
Mr. FULBFtIGHT. I do not think the
policy that the war be confined to South
Vietnam has changed. I think it is still
the policy. I think it is the correct one.
What causes difficulty is the fact that
this is a new type of war. It is not a war
in the orthodox sense. This is subver-
sion, inspired and conducted through in-
filtration of supplies and men by a
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1964 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
neighboring country without a declara-
tion of war. It does not fit the pattern
of the traditional way we think of war.
It is, nevertheless, aggression?a mod-
ernized, specialized kind of aggression,
brought to a high degree of perfection by
the leader of the Chinese Communists,
Mao Tse7tung, who established the basic
theory of how to conduct this type Of
warfare. ,
It is diffieult to adjust our concepts
to warfare of 'U451011(1, iril itis just
as savage and as muchin violation of in-
ternational good behavior and law as is
an overt, invasion by troops. I tried to
make this point in my remarks. North
Vietnam has been an aggressor against
South Vietnam; and I do net think so
Merely because of the testimony in the
Past 2 or 3 days. Over several years, we
have received testimony about what the
North Vietnamese were doing in Laos
and to a much higher degree in South
Vietnam,
They had two major ways of approach-
ing South Vietnam, one by sea, and one
by ground. The sea approach was the
easiest way to supply the Mekong delta.
So we helped the South Vietnam Gov-
ernment try to interrupt the transfer of
men, and supplies to the Mekong delta.
junks were built up for that purpose.
The boats that may have strucic at the
coastal areas of North Vietriain. MaY have
been supplied by us. We have been help-
ing South.Vietnam arm itself. I do not
know about the specific boats.
I personally think this is a perfectly
legitimate?and,proper way to defend one-
self from the kind of aggression South
Vietnam has been subjected to for many
Mr. ,McGOVERI, I am inclined to
agree with, the Senator. did not want
my' remarks to be interpreted as preju-
dicing the case for aid?
, Mr. FULBRIGHT. I Arn glad to try
to_plarify _the situation. It is difRenit
-AAA confusing.
In McC+OVERN. There have been
referenees, in the press to the effect that
General 101mb wa?in Political trouble
and that one way, he thought he could
get out of it was to civert, attePtion from
failure in the conduct cif the war in the
sciuth to some kind of strike in the north,
presumably largely underwritten by the
United States It was because of my con-
cern with that possibility that I raised
these questions.
I,,thanic the, Senator for yielding.
Mr. VIAAPIWER. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. KI-1,40134.0.1jT, j yield.
Mr. ELIANDERr Tic Senator has
stated that in Abe last 2 or 3, days the
committee has had game hearings. Can
he tell us how long these ships of ours
have been in that area?
Mr. FOLBRIG,IIT. On patrol?
Mr. rl? fikl\g)ER On patrol, yes and
at Whose reouest?
`Mr. FULPRIGHT. We have had pa-
trols in the Tonkin Gulf for about 18
months.
Mr. ELLENDER. At whose request
were these natrols made?
MY. FUI-aRT9HT. -T.lieSe are inter-
national waters. Our assistance to
south Vietnam is at the request of the
South Vietnamese Government. The
particular measures we may take in con-
nection with that request are our own
responsibility. The particular ships on
this particular patrol are there at our
own decision.
Mr. ELLENDER. Are they part of the
7th Fleet, which protects Formosa?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Yes.
Mr. ELLENDER. The Senator says
our ships have been in that area for a
year and a half.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Yes.
Mr. ELLENDER. In the Gulf of
Tonkin?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. In the Gulf of
Tonkin. I can be corrected on this by
the distinguished chairman of the
Armed Services Committee. My recol-
lection is that they have been in that
particular area a year and a half.
Mr. RUSSELL. Mr. President, ele-
ments of our fleet have been in this gulf
periodically for about 11/2 years.
Mr. ELLENDER, Why?
Mr. RUSSELL. These waters are the
high seas. If in our general patrolling
throughout the world and in the move-
ments of our fleet on the high seas every-
where we saw fit to send our ships there.
Certainly no foreign nation has a right
to challenge our use of the high seas.
We have a right to be there.
Mr. ELLENDER. Was any action
taken by any of our ships to prevent
the carrying of war materiel to the
Mekong Delta?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Does the Senator
mean ships flying our flag and manned
by our personnel?
Mr. ELLENDER. Yes.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. It is my under-
standing that that operation was con-
ducted entirely by Vietnamese ships and
personnel.
Mr. ELLENDER. Were we there to
protect them?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. No; what hap-
pened here happened on patrol duty. As
the Senator from Georgia has said, these
ships were there in accordance with our
responsibility and our rights in this gen-
eral area. The ships were not assigned
to protect anyone. They were conduct-
ing patrol duty. That question was
asked specifically of the highest au-
thority, the Secretary of Defense and
the Secretary of State.
They stated without equivocation that
these ships, the Maddox and the C.
Turner Joy, were not on convoy duty.
They had no connection whatever with
any Vietnamese ships that might have
been operating in the same general
area.
Mr. ELLENDER. Was their presence
in the delta area at the request or sug-
gestion of the South Vietnamese Govern-
ment?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. They were not in
the delta area. Does the Senator mean
in the Gulf of Tonkin area?
Mr. ELLENDER. I understood that
this?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. The delta area is
north of the gulf area.
Mr. ELLENDER. I am trying to dis-
cover if our forces could have done any-
thing which might have provoked these
attacks. You say the ships were not
17819
engaged in any activity near the Mekong
Delta?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. No; where they
were is hundreds of miles north of the
delta area. '
Mr. ELLENDER. The ships that were
attacked?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Yes.
Mr. ELLENDER. The patrols carried
out in the delta area were to give pro-
tection or confidence to the junks and
patrol boats that were there to prevent
the North Vietnamese from carrying
materials of war to the South Vietna-
mese from carrying materials of war to
the South Vietnamese. Is that correct?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. That was not the
duty of the Maddox or the C. Turner Joy.
They were on patrol duty in the Gulf
of Tonkin?not near the Mekong Delta.
They had nothing to do with the inter-
ruption of such traffic as may be carried
on between North Vietnam and the delta.
This duty was assigned to a fleet of junks
and small craft of the South Vietnamese
navy. That is still their function. They
stop and examine thousands of people in
order to identify them and see what they
are up to. They have found a good many
North Vietnamese who were coming
down to carry on guerrilla warfare.
Mr. ELLENDER. Is the Senator sat-
isfied from the evidence presented to
the committee that our Armed Forces,
that is, our naval forces, did nothing to
invite the attack that was made in the
last few days?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Nothing that they
are not entitled to do. Their very pres-
ence in the Gulf. of Tonkin could be said
by someone to invite an attack, but they
had every right to be there, and they were
not shelling the coast or intervening in
any of the legitimate operations of the
Government of North Vietnam. In an
area in which there is tension and in
which there has been this very bloody
kind of guerrilla warfare or irregular
warfare, one might say, broadly speak-
ing, that their presence could be a prov-
ocation. I do not think so. I do not
believe that can be rightfully said. They
had every legitimate right to be there.
Mr. ELLENDER. I do not question
that fact at all. My question was di-
rected to whether or not the evidence
showed any act on our part which might
have provoked this attack.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I would say cate-
gorically that that was not shown.
Whatever provocation there may have
been arose, if it did arise, from the ac-
tivity of the North Vietnamese ships.
Mr. BREWSTER. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield.
Mr. BREWSTER. I had the oppor-
tunity to see warfare not so very far
from this area, and it was very mean.
I would look with great dismay on a sit-
uation involving the landing of large
land armies on the continent of Asia.
So my question is whether there is any-
thing in the resolution which would au-
thorize or recommend or approve the
landing of large American armies in Viet-
nam or in China.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. There is nothing
in the resolution, as I read it, that con-
templates it. I agree with the Senator
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17820 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD SENATE August 6
that that is the last thing we would want
to do. However, the language of the
resolution would not prevent it. It
would authorize whatever the Com-
mander in Chief feels is necessary. It
does not restrain the Executive from
doing it. Whether or not that should
ever be done is a Matter of wisdom under
the circumstances that exist at the par-
ticular time it is contemplated. This
kind of question should more properly
be addressed to the chairman of the
Armed Services Committee. Speaking
for my own committee, everyone I have
heard has said that the last thing we
want to do is to become involved in a
land war in Asia; that our pciwer is sea
and air, and that this is what we hope
will deter the Chinese Communists and
the North Vietnamese from spreading
the war. That is what is contemplated.
The resolution does not prohibit that, or
any other kind of activity.
Mr. BREWSTER. I thank the distin-
guished chairman.
Mr. MORTON. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield.
Mr. MORTON. Mr. President, first I
say to the distinguished Senator from
Arkansas that I approve the action that
has been taken, and I approve this reso-
lution. On the matter which was the
subject of the colloquy between the
chairman of the Foreign Relations Com-
mittee and the distinguished Senator
from Louisiana, can we not associate our
presence in the Gulf of Tonkin to a de-
gree with our own interpretation of our
obligations under the SEATO Treaty?
Mr. PIMBRIGHT. Yes. I made
mention of it. That is a further re-
sponsibility that we undertook in alin-
ing ourselves with other countries in try-
ing to bring peace and stability into this
area. That was another obligation
which we undertook. It fortifies our
right or responsibility for being in the
Gulf of Tonkin.
Mr. MORTON. I believe the action
taken by the President helps to avoid
any Miscalculation on the part of either
the North Vietnamese Or the Chinese
Communists. I believe the joint reso-
lution gives that policy further strength.
In my opinion, the three major wars in
which we have been involved in this
century have come about by miscalcu-
lation on the part of the aggressor.
I believe Congress should speak loud
and clear and make it plain to any
would-be aggressor that we intend to
stand here. If we make that clear, we
will avoid war, and not have to land vast
land armies on the shores of Asia. In
that connection I share the appre-
hension of my friend the Senator from
Maryland [Mr. BREWSTER).
Mr. FULI3RIGHT. The Senator has
put it very clearly. I interpret the joint
resolution in the same way. This action
is limited, but very sharp. It is the best
action that I can think of to deter an
escalation or enlargement of the war.
If we did not take such action, it might
spread further. If we went further, and
ruthlessly bombed Hanoi and other
places, we would be guilty of bad Judg-
ment, both on humanitarian grounds
and on policy grounds, because then we
would certainly inspire further retali-
ation.
This situation has been handled in the
best way possible under the circum-
stances, so as to calm the situation, and
not escalate It into a major war.
Mr. MORTON. I thank the Senator
from Arkansas.
Mr. FULBRIGliT. I yield to the Sen-
ator from Ohio.
Mr. LAUE3CHE. I should like to add
something to the answer that was given
to the Senator from Louisiana (Mr.
ELLENDER 1. In my opinion, the evidence
Is very clear that our Government did
not design or manipulate a situation
which would precipitate violence. The
proof shows clearly that the commander
of the Maddox, when the patrol boats
were following it, called the commander
of the Ticonderoga and informed him
that the North Vietnamese patrol boats
were following him and were indicating
all the purposes of violence. It was not
until the patrol boats fired upon the
Maddox that the Maddox took any
action. We waited; and no action was
taken by our Government until the
torpedoes were set into motion. Our
ship turned seaward.
Second, the Island of Hainan is in the
gulf. Chinese aircraft and military
bases are on that island. Our ships were
patrolling the gulf, surveying the ac-
tivities that were going on in the gulf.
My answer is that not to have been there
would have been a disservice to our
country. We were where we had a right
to be. We did nothing to precipitate
this unwarranted action. The action of
violence was not on the part of our Gov-
ernment, but on the part of the North
Vietnamese against us.
What were we to do? Were we to allow
them to fire at us and take no action?
The commander of the Maddox, when
he contacted the commander of the Ti-
conderoga, acted with complete restraint
and indicated no purpose of engaging in
violence. Not until we were fired upon
did we fire back.
Furthermore, to conclude that we de-
veloped a design to precipitate this vio-
lence is not supported by any testimony
whatsoever. To make the pronounce-
ment that we manipulated the situation,
that we designed a set of circumstances
that would give us an excuse to fire, is
wholly unwarranted. Not one syllable
of testimony supports that conclusion.
Mr. FULBRIGIIT. Will the Senator
from Ohio allow me to answer questions?
Then he may speak on his own time.
Mr. LAUSCHE. Just half a second
more.
Mr. PULIIRIGHT. I thought the Sen-
ator wished to ask a question. But I
have no objection to his concluding his
statement.
Mr. LAUSCria. I wanted to give my
understanding of this very important,
crucial aspect of the dispute. I repeat:
There is not a single bit of testimony
warranting the conclusion that we
manipulated or designed the situation.
Mr. ELLENDER. Mr. President, I was
questioning the Senator from Arkansas
merely to seek assurance that the evi-
dence shows there was no possibility that
our forces took any action, even acci-
dentally, which might have provoked an
attack. Certainly I did not intend to
Intimate that the commanders of our
ships were at fault, or that we were look-
ing for an excuse to attack North Viet-
nam.
Mr. LAUSCHE. I understand, Mr.
President. I .merely wanted to make
plain that our forces were not at fault
In any way; that our ships had a perfect
right to be in those waters, and that
there is absolutely no evidence of any
design or manipulation involved in the
chain of events which took place. I did
not wish to allow that impression to
stand in the RECORD.
Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield? I wish to ask a question.
Mr; FULBRIGHT. I should like to
yield the floor.
Mr. JAVITS. I wish to ask a question,
and a rather serious one.
I shall support the resolution, because
I think we must defend freedom in that
area, or else see the balance of a large
segment of the population of the world
tipped against freedom. The degree of
our resistance under the action that may
be taken in southeast Asia, under the
resolution, will determine not only future
events in Vietnam, but also the freedom
of Malaysia, India, Pakistan, and Indo-
nesia, and perhaps even Australia and
New Zealand.
My question is this: To the extent that
the Senator may know?and be permit-
ted to disclose?are we not Implementing
the Southeast Asia Collective Defense
Treaty? This treaty has eight countries
who are parties to it including the United
States?three in the area, the rest in
Europe, Australia, and New Zealand, and
ourselves. The inclusion of Cambodia,
Laos, and Vietnam is by protocol. That
Is, the protection of the treaty is ex-
tended to them, though they are not
parties to it.
The question I address to the Senator
Is this: Are we to assume that the action
which the President has taken with re-
spect to reacting to the attack on Ameri-
can vessels is the result of a consultation
with our allies who are parties to the
Southeast Asia Collective Defense
Treaty? If it is, what are we to assume
with respect to the future progress of the
action which we authorize under the res-
olution, which is admittedly a broad ac-
tion? Is it that the President may take
all necessary steps, including the use of
Armed Forces, to assist any member or
protocol state, which would include Laos,
Cambodia, and Vietnam, in the South-
east Asia Collective Defense Treaty,
that may request assistance in defense of
its freedom?
What I wish to know from the Senator
Is, first: Have we consulted with our al-
lies? Second, what are we to look to
from our allies in the way of assistance,
aid, comfort, partnership, and the future
implementation of the resolution? It is
one thing to stand alone; it is another
thing to stand with seven other coun-
tries, three of them in the area, imple-
menting a solemn commitment, which is
just as binding on them as it is on us.
I am sometimes inclined to agree with
those who say that we cannot be the
policeman or guardian of the whole
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1964 mdfArgiblqAciftiltrizAftenoN
world.* We cannot -lead it by the hand. Mr. JAVITS: I should like 16 ask one
We oan. be the linch pin; hilt what are followup question of the Senator from
we to ,a,OdePt from the others? Arkansas.
Mr.-TITLEEIGHT,. -That is quite a Mr. PULER/GHT. I am ready to
qadstion.: ./t" several facets', all of Yield the floor so that the distinguished
thein Or pertinent interest. Senator from Georgia [Mr. RUSSELL]
TVEt, this pialienlar_ aCtiOn was not can give the Senate much more light on
taken in consulta.tion-Witlithe other sig- the situation, but I am glad to yield to
natories Of the Southeast Asia Treaty. the Senator from New York.
It Was an aer for-Which we took the re- Mr. JAVITS. I believe that the Sen-
sponSibilitY. It had nothing to do with ator will agree that We are dealing with
the trefiky. :the fact that we are present pretty substantial matters.
in the area Ere* t t
Approved For
s, a least in part, out of Mr. FULBRIGHT. They are very
our obligations under the treaty. That important. I consider this situation to
is one of the reasolii-Why we are in the be a facet of the most important matter
area, arid have been for a number of now before the country.
years. But we would have the right to Mr. JAVITS. I agree with the Sen-
be there Without the treaty. ator. Let me ask one further question:
As to the con ribution of the protocol May a Senator voting for the resolution
states?there are three, as the Senator assume that the United States, with all
from /slew York has said. Under the Lao- its means, diplomatic and otherwise, will
tiari Agreement of 1662, Laos is out of continue, first, to keep the SEATO
the treaty. Cambodia has renounced Treaty in effect by continuing consulta-
any-desire to be protected by the United tions even if for the moment it does not
States. So actually this is a technical get enough assistance from our part-
way of saying that we are assisting South mers; second, it will continue to press for
Vietnani, because that country is all that maximum contributions compatible with
Is left, rlftf phrase means South Viet- their own capabilities and their own na-
?riam. tonal security from their other part-
As to contrikutions_ by other members ners; third, that it will continue to uti-
Of SE8T'0, they have been too little.
There has been consultation in the past which are mentioned here, including the
On nUrner0Us betasio-ns- in an effort to
countries to bear a
? Pgr6eaSuteartieshtahree of theburden The ques-
tion has been eSlied: `Wha. are the others
.doing"? We were `Informedo as late as
this morning, ,and on other occasions in
the t
lize all the organs for international peace
, Pas several days, that they are not
doing iierY ranch. Pakistan is preoc-
OPieek*141. its Own problems with India,
sO. I p ,pkt )iejleve Pakistan is doing
anything.
The:French aridOing rood deal in
the way of Investment. -"France has a
.traditi9nal..4,e1atiOnship there.Prance
? supPlies some_persOrinel but themajor
_ Part of her contribution is in the form
Of inyetioi. ?
Anst,fal, c'ontributiOn has been
Australia isbuilding up her
contributiOnof ?
pry and military
personnel and seine cOntribution of tech-
". i%Pw al .same is true of
0 ''h Thai, of course, are
there in th an
e,area el they are, I am sure,
anxiollf to do?What they can. Who else
Is there?
' Mr. JAVITS. Tlie,Fhihp-' pines and the
- Unitectit Philip
, gida e
lir m 1-rpines
-
r. 10-1-11'
_ contribution. The
Unite XinEgle e
m has': been more than
odeOpted Wlts feSponsibilities in Ma-
laysia made no contribution.
-Mrr:JAvrr8'. ? Th-4- iSAri, the, right
Mr. :10,.010t.7An indirect con7.
tribution, yes; but ft is in Malaysia. The
greater pa-rt Of the burden has been borne
. by this country. Unfortunately, we find
this to, ke,fine in other areas as well,
? Until recently, within the past several.
"Years, tre tverttlie_Only major free coun-
try capable of doing .it. Now: the other
conntries that' are-becorn.ing more capa-
ble have ,not. yet assumed what I con-
sider to be.theltproper part of an overall
effort todefend free, countries.
_ - ?
No. 152-20
p200160056-0 17821
Foreign Relations Committee, because I
really agree with this philosophy, 1 am
not looking for an expansion or war.
I am looking, in any way that I can, to
bring in with us both our allies and the
United Nations, when and if conditions
can be created that that would be a
feasible procedure to follow. I believe
that this particular action is well de-
signed to help stabilize the entire area.
Mr. JAVITS. I agree with the Sena-
tor, provided we would have some feel-
ing in our heart that there will be a
really manful followthrough, which we
have sometimes lacked before.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. The Senator did
not ask me this precisely, but I must say
that the Secretary of State has per-
formed extremely well.
Mr. JAVITS. I agree with the Sena-
tor.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. The Secretary of
State is an indefatigable worker. He
has consulted with the members of
SEATO on numerous occasions. The
Senator has read about it in the past.
I do not know how he stands up under
the constant schedule of visits and con-
sultations that he has endured during
the past 3 years. I believe that he is
committed to the proposition the Sena-
tor has stated. I certainly am. ? I hope
United Nations, in order to secure free- that we can work this problem out. I
dom in that area. And because the believe that we have had some success
President gets the resolution, we are not in the past. We tend to forget every
going to vote on that one proposal and instance of success in working with
mgke everything else perfunctory, countries on situations somewhat like
Mr. FULBRIGHT. We have had posi- this one?perhaps not quite so threaten-
tive assurance from the Secretary of ing, but we have had some ba,d ones, and
State about the very matter the Senator they have faded into the past.
Is discussing. I approve of that policy. Mr. JAVTTS. The Senator is correct.
Much has been said about bringing the Mr. FULBRIGHT. The combined
United Nations into it. I am sympathetic judgment of the military and the civilian
to that. One of the Members of this branches of the Government has worked
body has had a great deal to say about extremely well in this instance. They
that. I approve of it, with this reserva-
tion, or this qualification, that it is not
timely, when one is in dire straits, to
turn over a situation such as. this to a
body which is not equipped to assert
the kind of power I believe to be neces-
sary to stabilize the area.
At the present time, this is not a
all seem to be in agreement. The Chair-
man of the Joint Chiefs testified that
they were unanimous in their recom-
mendation, There seems to be no di-
vision within the highest circles of our
Government. I thought it was very
encouraginn%
Mr. JAVITS. I shall detain the Sena-
quarrel In which a "yes" or "no" to the tor no longer. I shall vote with the
United Nations would bring them in to Senator from Arkansas on this basis.
control and direct this effort. Having Mr. MILL7R. Mr. President, will the
assumed this burden, and the situation Senator from Arkansas yield?
having deteriorated as it has, I believe
that we have to establish some sort Qf Mr. FULBRIGHT. I am glad to yield
to the Senator from Iowa.
stability before we can say to the United
Nations, "You take it."
Mr. MTLLER. I also support the reso-
I look forward to the time When this lution. However, there is some phrase-
can be done. I believe that if we could ology in the resolution which troubles me
ever stabilize the situation and there somewhat. I should like to ask a ques-
were some reasonable assurance that tion about it. On page 2 of the resolu-
North Vietnam and the Chinese would tion, there is a clause which reads:
T
leave these people alone, we could take That the Congress approves and supports
it to the United Nations with sotne as- the determination of the President * * *
to prevent further aggression.
surance that it would work.
Mr. JAVITS. With the thoughts and I was wondering whether there was
the principles I have laid out, can the any particular design in the wording of
Senator commit himself, as chairman that clause, or if we intend to not only
of the Foreign Relations Committee, to talk about further aggression, but also
bring our "sentinel," to follow through the President's determination to put an
on these matters, after the joint reso- end to present aggression?
lution is passed. Mr, FtTLBRIGHT. That whole phrase
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I shall do every- reads?
thing I can, within the limits of my ca- * * ? to take all necessary measures to
pacity and my position on the Senate repel any armed attack?
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17822 Approved bmitoiffiggefilapitit6ritylaIntfflea03R000200160056-?August 6
That is one we have just had?
a ? * against the forces of the United
States and to prevent further aggression.
I am sure that we took action calcu-
lated to prevent further aggression, be-
cause it was a very good, positive, and
affirmative action.
Mr. MILLER. It is left open. It does
not say aggression against whom. It is
broad enough so that it could mean ag-
gression against the United States, or
aggression against the South Vietnamese '
Government, which I would suggest cer-
tainly fits in with the President's deter-
mination?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I believe that both
are included in that phrase.
Mr. MILLER, I would hope so.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I would so take it.
Mr. MILLER. If that is so, then we
are talking about further aggression
against the South Vietnamese, but it
seems to me that we should be talking
, about present aggressive action. We
should be talking about the President's
determination to put an end to present
aggression as well as further aggression.
I am sure that this is his determination,
but I do not believe that we have said it.
I merely call this to the attention of the
Senator from Arkansas, because I
thought it was perhaps?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I do not believe
that the Senator should look solely at
that part. Section 2 is important and is
related to this question.
Mr, MILLER. Section 2?it covers it
very Well. My own regret is that we do
not also cover it in the first part of the
resolution,
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Would that not be
unduly repetitive and make the resolu-
tion longer than necessary? The orig-
inal resolution proposed to certain mem-
bers of bath committees was quite long
and involved. On the advice of mem-
bers of the committee, the Department
cooperated in reducing the resolution to
what we thought would be its bare essen-
tials, both as to its "whereas" clauses
and to the resolution itself. We thought
It would be much clearer and more posi-
tive to make it as concise and limited as
possible. If there is fault to be found
with the resolution because it is too lim-
ited, I believe that I, along with some
of my colleagues, must bear a part of
that responsibility.
Mr. MILLER I know that it is dif-
ficult to draft a resolution of this kind
to satisfy everyone and keep it concise.
I know that conciseness is a virtue, but
all I should like to do is to point out what
I have done and, also, to inquire whether
there will be any change in the resolu-
tion. I leave that up to the distin-
guished chairman of the committee. I
affirm the opinion of the Senator from
Arkansas that we are supporting the
President's determination not Only to
prevent further aggression, but also to
put an end to present aggression. I
would appreciate his expression on that
policy.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Section 1 deals, in
general, with the attacks on U.S. forces
and the aggression against us. Section
2 deals with the attacks on SEATO, of
which we are a part. We have a dual
role. We are a sovereign power. Our
forces are in the Gulf of Tonkin, and the
aggression there is one thing. We are
also part of SEATO. This is not spelled
out, but that is the general idea, I be-
lieve, that is expressed in the two sec-
tions.
Mr. MILLER. But there Is no inten-
tion expressed other than to prevent fur-
ther aggression and stop the present ag-
gression in southeast Asia.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. That is correct.
Mr. MILLER. I did not think there
was. But I wanted to make that crystal
clear.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. The Senator is cor-
rect.
Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I would be glad to
Yield. But I am embarrassed not to turn
the Boor over to the Senator from Geor-
gia (Mr. RUSSELL).
Mr. RUSSELL. The Senator need not
be embarrassed. He can handle the
situation.
Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. President, if
either of the two questions that I shall
ask concerns matters that the distin-
guished Senator from Arkansas [Mr.
Puranticar] thinks the Senator from
Georgia [Mr. Russztt] should answer, I
shall be glad to refer them to the Senator
from Georgia.
My first question is. Based upon the
knowledge that we all have, that Malay-
sia has a long frontier with Indonesia
and Burma with Red China, am I correct
In my understanding that neither Ma-
laysia nor Burma is a party to or a proto-
col state of the Southeast Asia Collective
Defense Treaty?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. That is correct.
In the report, on page 3, there is a state-
ment with regard to the SEATO and
protocol members. A statement was
made about the protocol members.
Mr. HOLLAND. I heard the state-
ment. I want the record to be very clear
that Congress is not being asked by the
joint resolution to make any advance
commitment relative to these two states.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. The Senator is
absolutely correct in his statement. In
the preliminary meeting which was con-
cerned with the drafting of the resolu-
tion, this very point was brought up.
This language does not cover either
Malaysia or Burma.
Mr. HOLLAND. I thank the Senator.
I have one more question. I note in
section 3, with interest and with ap-
proval, if I correctly understand it, the
provision that, in effect, Congress re-
serves the right to terminate any ad-
vance expression or commitment in this
field by the passage of a concurrent reso-
lution upon which the President would
not have to pass. Am I correct in that
understanding?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. That is correct.
This whole joint resolution can be term-
inated at any time by a concurrent reso-
lution of the Congress. That is taken
verbatim, I believe, from the Mideast
resolution.
Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. President, I
thank the Senator. I believe that is a
very proper matter to be included here.
It shows clearly that while Congress is
giving various assurances and approval
of certain acts, if necessary, by the Presi-
dent in the fields covered by the resolu-
tion, it delimits those fields clearly. Then
it futher reserves to itself the right to
terminate, for any cause sufficient to it-
self, this advance expression or commit-
ment.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. , The Senator is
correct. That was put there for that
purpose.
Mr. NELSON. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield.
Mr. NELSON. I could not hear all
the colloquy between the Senator from
Arkansas [Mr. FULBRIGHT] and the Sen-
ator from Iowa [Mr. MILLER). I heard a
part of it.
As I understand, the mission of the
United States in South Vietnam for the
past 10 years?stating it in the negative
?has not been to take over the Govern-
ment of South Vietnam, and has not
been to provide military forces to do
battle in place of South Vietnamese
forces. To state it in the positive sense,
our mission has been to supply a military
cadre for training personnel, and advis-
ory military personnel as well as equip-
ment and materiel?our objective being
to help in the establishment of an in-
dependent stable regime. And, if my
memory is right, we had about 1,000
troops there the first 5 or 6 years, up
to 1960. There are now approximately
16,000 troops there. In addition, it is
now proposed that this number be ex-
panded to, I believe, 21,000.
Looking at sentence 6 of the resolution,
I understood it to be the position of the
Senator from Iowa [Mr. MILLER] that
Congress is saying to the President that
we would approve the use of any might
necessary in order to prevent further
aggression. Am I to understand that it
is the sense of Congress that we are
saying to the executive branch: "If it be-
comes necessary to prevent further ag-
gression, we agree now, in advance, that
you may land as many divisions as
deemed necessary, and engage in a di-
rect military assault on North Vietnam if
it becomes the judgment of the Execu-
tive, the Commander in Chief, that this
is the only way to prevent further aggres-
sion"?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. As I stated, sec-
tion 1 is intended to deal primarily with
aggression against our forces. "That the
Congress approves and supports the de-
termination of the President, as Com-
mander in Chief, to take all necessary
measures to repel any armed attack
against the forces of the United States
and to prevent further aggression."
This means to me that it is with regard
to our own forces. I believe section 2
deals with the SEATO area, which we
are committed to protect under our
treaties, particularly when they ask for
our assistance.
If the situation should deteriorate to
such an extent that the only way to save
It from going completely under to the
Communists would be action such as the
Senator suggests, then that would be a
grave decision on the part of our country
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1964 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE 17823
as to Whether we ?honld POrifirie our ac- Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, it expect that. And I do not now rise here
tivitieS to very limited personnel on laud seems to me that the joint? resolution to criticize the original decision.
and the extensive)4?P.0: naVal and air would be consistent with what we have But I am concerned about the Congress
power, or Whether we ahoold go further been doing. We have been assisting the appearing to tell the executive branch
and use more,manpower,_ countries in southeast Asia in pursuance and the public that we would endorse a
I personally feel it would be very un- of the treaty. But in all frankness I complete change in our mission. That
wise Under any circumstances to put a cannot say to the Senator that I think would concern me.
large land Army on the Asian Continent, the joint resolution would in any way Mr. FULBRIGHT. I do not interpret
It has been a, sort of article of faith be a deterrent, a prohibition, a limita- the joint resolution in that way at all.
eVer since I have been in the Senate, that tion, or an expansion on the President's It strikes me, as I understand it, that the
we should neyer_he hogged down. We Power to use the Armed Forces in a dif- joint resolution is quite consistent with
particularly stated, that after Korea. We ferent way or more extensively than he our existing mission and our understand-
are Mobile, we are powerful on the land is now using them. In a broad sense, ing of what we have been doing in South
and on the sea. But when we try to con- the joint resolution states that we ap- Vietnam for the last 10 years.
fine ,ourselves and say that this resolu- prove of the action taken with regard to Mr. NELSON. Did I correctly under-
tion either prohibits or authorizes such the attack on our own ships, and that stand the Senator from Arkansas to say
aetion by the Commander in Chief in de- we also approve of our country's effort a while ago that the language of the
fense of this country, I believe that is to maintain the independence of South resolution is aimed at the problem of fur-
carrYing it a little further than I would Vietnam. ther aggression against our ships and
, _ - .
care to go. , The Senator from Wisconsin prompts our naval facilities?
I do not know what the limits are. I me to make a remark which perhaps I Mr. FULBRIGHT. I think that is the
do' not think this resolution, can be de- should not make. He has said that we logical way to interpret the language.
terminative of thatfa ct. I think it would might be mistaken in our action. If any It makes reference to the armed attack
Indicate that hp; would take reasonable mistake has been made?and I do not against the forces of the United States
means 'first t? Prevent any further ag- assert that it has been?the only ques-
which has just taken place, and to pre-
g esSion, or repel, further aggression tionable area is whether or not we should vention of further aggression against
against' our own forces, and that he will ever have become involved. That ques- our forces. Then the joint resolution
live up to our obligations under the tion goes back to the beginning of action passes on to our obligations under the
SEATO, treaty and With regard to the in this area, and I do not believe it is treaty, which involves other countries.
protocolstates.
_ particularly pertinent or proper to the I believe also that it is implicit, if not
I do not know how to answer the Sena- debate, because in fact we have become explicit, in the next section that the in-
tor's q
question and give him an absolute involved. However, the Senator has tent is to prevent the continuing aggres-
-asstiraqpe that ?large numbers of troops mentioned it. As an academic matter, sion that now exists against South Viet-
would not be put ashore: I would deplore the question might be raised. But hay- nam. ,
It. And I hope the conditions do not jus- ing gone as far as we have in 10 years, Mr. NELSON. If the Senator would
tify it now. it seems to me that the question now is, permit, I should like to ask a few brief
Mr. IciELS011. We may very well not How are we to control the situation in additional questions. I could not hear
be able to nor attempt to control the dis- th best interest of our own security and the colloquy between the Senator from
cretion that is vested in the Commander that did
our allies? . I believe that what Arkansas and the Senator from Louisi-
in Met But the joint resolution is be- we did was appropriate The joint reso- ana. In relation to international bound-
fore the Senate, sent to us, I assume, at 1 t? ? '
the request of the executive branch. u ion is appropriate, because it would ary waters, can the Senator tell me what
fortify e strength of the Executive distance offshore we recognize in resPect
Mr. FULBRIC+Wr. The Senator is and the Government. It would put the to North Vietnam and Red China?
correct._, Congress on record?and we are the Mr. FULBRIGHT. Three miles is the
Ur; NTLSON, - It Was sent to the Con- most representative body that we have established principle that we recognize.
gress in order to ascertain the sense of under our system?as supporting the.
There is some difference among coun-
the Congress on the question. I intend action. If anything will deter aggression tries. Some countries try to assert a dis-
to support the joint resolution. I do not on the part of the North Vietnamese and
- - tance greater than that. Some assert a
think,? however, that Congress should the Chinese, I believe it would be the greater distance for reasons such as the
leave the impression that it consents to a action taken together with the joint ownership of minerals, for example, but
radical change, in our minion or objec- resolution supporting the action. That do not assert it for political reasons, such
tive in South Vietnam. That mission is the best I can do about justification of as control of the surface of waters. They
there for 10 years, as I have understood the resolution. In frankness, I do not agree that another country has the right
It, has been to aid in the establishment believe the joint resolution would sub-
of a Viable, independent regime which stantially alter the President's power to to be there.
can manage its own a:itairs, so that ulti- use whatever means seemed appropriate Recently an effort has been made to di-
mately we can withdraw from South under the circumstances. Our recourse vide the North Sea for purposes of ploration for oil. It is not being divided
ex-
Vietnam, in Congress would be that if the action in the sense that we would be excluded
Mr. President, we have been at the were too inappropriate, we could termi-
task for 10 years. I am not criticizing nate the joint resolution, by a concur-
from crossing the North Sea. It is still
, the original decision to go into South rent resolution, and that would precipi-
the high seas.
Vietnam, I do not know how, long that tate a great controversy between the But we recognize the 3-mile limit for
commitment should be_kept in the event Executive and the Congress. As a prac-
political purposes. We might recognize
we are linable to,appoinplish our mis- tical question, that could be done, a boundary a greater distance from a
sion. And I would not wish to make a Mr. NELSON. I have a couple of addi- country if that country wished to drill for
judgment on that _question now. But I tional questions. But first I wish to say oil. We have done so in other places.
Would be nloSt concerned if the Congress that I did not suggest that by the use of One of the reasons given for sending
should saY that, we intend by the joint hindsight I would now conclude that the the Maddox in closer than 12 miles from
resolution to authorize a complete intervention in 1954 was wrong. I do not the shore was that in doing so the ac-
change in tig miaaion,which we have had know. I understand the necessity for the tion would demonstrate that we do not
in South,Vietnaln -fel' the Past 10 years, United States, since it is the leader of the recognize the 12-mile limit.
and which wehave repeatedly stated was free world, to do all it can in furtherance Mr. NELSON. That was to be my next
not a commitment to engage in a direct of the protection of the idea of freedom question. Does the Senator 'know how
land confrontation with our Army as a and independence, and that, to do so, we close to the North Vietnam coast or the
substitute for the South Vietnam Army must make gambles. We shall lose some; Red China coast our ships were patrol-
or as a substantially reinforced U.S. we shall win some. I believe the public lIng?
Army to be joined with the South Viet- is slow to recognize that we have vast re- Mr. FULBRIGHT. It was testified
min Army in a war against North Viet- sponsibilities, and they expect us to win that they went in at least 11 miles in
? nam and possibly China, every gamble that we take. I do not order to show that we do not recognize
,
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17824 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE August 6
a 12-mile limit, which I believe North
Vietnam had asserted.
Mr. NELSON. The patrolling was for
the purpose of demonstrating to the
North Vietnamese that we did not rec-
ognize a 12-mile limit?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. That was one rea-
son given for going in to a point 11 miles
from the coast. The patrolling as such
was not for that putpoSe. That action
was in execution of our mission and our
responsibility in that area under the
SEATO treaty. As I said a moment ago,
we have a right to go where we like
on the high seas. The reason we are
In this particular area is that we have
assumed responsibilities under the treaty
as well as bilaterally with South Viet-
nam.
Mr. NELSON. Recognizing, as we all
do, the great sensitivity of all countries,
especially enemies, or those hostile to
each other to what purpose in the pro-
motion of our mission in South Viet-
nam is served by having our ships go
within 11 miles of the North Vietnam
coast?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. This strikes me as
a question that raises a difficult problem,
with which I tried to deal in describing
modern war. The Senator refers to the
sensitivities of the North Vietnamese.
What about the fact that the North Viet-
namese have for years been sending in
trained personnel, material, guns, and
ammunition, to attack their neighbor?
Why should the United States be so care-
ful about the sensitivities of North Viet-
nam? Of course, we were there for the
purpose of observation of what went on
in that area, because our people felt it
necessary as a part of our activities in
protecting and helping to protect South
Vietnam.
The problem is difficult. Who is the
aggreSsor in this area? It has been as-
serted on the floor, and elsewhere, that
the United States is the provocateur, the
aggressor, and that we ought to be
ashamed of ourselves. I do not subscribe
to that view. I know it is difficult to go
into a person's motives. There is a rule
about doing so on the Senate floor. So
far as I know of this situation, we have
been trying, in good faith, to help these
countries establish their own independ-
ence.
I have no doubt in my own mind that
the moving party in this matter has been
North Vietnam, supported by Red China.
They feel this is an area over which they
should have domination. It is an area
over which many centuries ago they did.
I have no doubt that in the long run it
Is an area where they will have great in-
fluence. We do not profess or expect to
dominate that country or annex it or
control it in any way.
We have_ adopted the principle that we
shall do what we can to enable the people
there to have an independent life and
control their own affairs. We have tried,
In good faith, to do it in this area. We
have been interfered with, in a most
material and vicious and savage way.
The program of terror has been almost
unprecedented. I suppose there has
been some precedent for it, but it has
been long continued, violent, and vicious.
We have tried our best to control this
.situation. We have supported the Gov-
ernment of South Vietnam. We had
every right to have patrols in the Gulf of
Tonkin to see what was going on and to
be informed about any movements?the
usual function of patrol in a critical area.
I do not see why we should be so respon-
sive to the sensitivities of the North Viet-
namese. I am sure that the presence of
our ships there is bothersome and irri-
tating to them, but they brought it on
themselves. For my part, I do not apolo-
gize for it at all. I do not believe they are
in any position to question our right to be
in the Gulf of Tonkin, or in any position
to question our right to assist South Viet-
nam, however irritating it may be to
Ho Chi Minh.
Mr. NELSON. Let me repeat that I
presently intend to support the joint res-
olution. I do not think we should give
up recognized international rights. I do
not suggest that we need to apologize to
anybody. I do suggest?and this is
what I do not understand?if patrolling
that close has no necessary bearing upon
the mission we have insisted we have in
South Vietnam, it would seem to me that
perhaps it is not the exercise of our best
judgment to do it.
Let me put the question another way.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I apologize to the
Senator. I was diverted for just a mo-
ment. I did not hear what he said.
Mr. NELSON. What I said was that,
recognizing what we assert to be our
rights, I am suggesting that if patrolling
that close does not have a direct, neces-
sary bearing upon the accomplishment of
our mission, I am wondering whether we
should be taking the risk of the sinking
of our ships.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. That is a legiti-
mate question. All I can say is that,
from the best information I have, it most
certainly has an important relevance to
our mission in the observation of the
traffic that goes through the area.
Whenever there is a state of tension
such as exists between us and South
Vietnam on the one hand, and North
Vietnam, on the other. I think it is tradi-
tional that the activities of the adversary
be observed as closely as possible. This
is one of the principal sea routes for the
supplying of North Vietnam. The in-
formation we would normally find there
is important.
do not see how the Senator could
believe that this was not relevant to our
efforts to assist South Vietnam, or, to put
it another way, to restrain the activities
of North Vietnam, and especially to be
forewarned if there were a possibility of
a major blow.
Mr. RUSSELL. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield.
Mr. RUSSELL. May I say to the dis-
tinguished Senator from Arkansas that
it is extremely irritating to me, and I
believe to millions of American citizens,
that Soviet Russian ships should patrol
the waters and sail in the waters off our
coast, 3 miles from our shores, near some
of the most sensitive installations we
possess. It irritates me no end, but I
have not advocated, and very few Ameri-
cans have advocated, violating interna-
tional law by moving out and making at-
tacks on those Russian ships because they
are in highly sensitive areas for us. This
kind of activity is carried out by all na-
tions of the world that have any navy
worthy of the name. If it is not done by
warships, it is done by ships in other
guise, to try to get information. The
mere fact that to have a ship of a nation
one does not like, within international
waters, off that country's shores, is irri-
tating, seems to me to be scanty excuse
for the attacks in these two cases. It so
happens that in the second attack, as I
understand it, the ship was 60 miles off-
shore.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I
would like to yield the floor.
Mr. scorr. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield to me before he yields the
floor?
Mr. NELSON. Mr. President, I simply
am asking questions to be sure I am
adequately informed.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I understand. I do
not quarrel with the Senator at all. He
is perfectly within his rights to ask for
information.
Mr. NELSON. I would conclude by
saying that no two situations are com-
parable, but it would be mighty risky, if
Cuban PT boats were firing on Florida,
for Russian armed ships or destroyers to
be patrolling between us and Cuba, 11
miles out. It would be a grave risk for
her to be testing our viewpoint about her
patrolling that close when Cuban boats
were firing on Florida. So the question
was whether the patrolling that close was
really necessary to the accomplishment
of our mission. We are after all, dealing
with the possibility of incinerating the
whole world.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. As the Senator
from Georgia pointed out, Russian ships
come within 4 or 5 miles, although not
within 3 miles, of our shores.
Mr. NELSON. I referred to the as-
sumption of Cuban boats firing on Flor-
ida.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. We are not firing
on Cuba, nor they on us. I do not see
how the case is analogous. There is a
new state of modern warfare that is not
orthodox. It is subversion and guerilla
warfare. These people are, for all prac-
tical purposes, engaged in a war, without
a declaration of war, that is going on be-
tween South and North Vietnam.
Mr. NELSON. I have taken enough
time. I merely wish to add that it is
not quite correct to say that we are not
firing on North Vietnam.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. We are not firing
on Cuba, I said.
Mr. NELSON. I said assume a situa-
tion in which Cuba was firing on the
coast of Florida with PT boats. It would
be a risky thing for Russia to be out
there testing our viewpoint about their
patrols within 11 miles of our coast.
Mr. 'FULBRIGHT. I do not deny that
it is risky. The whole operation is risky.
It is full of risks.
Mr. NELSON. I hope we do not take
risks that are unnecessary for the
achievement of an objective that we have
asserted to be ours for the past 10 years.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I hope so.
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1964
Mr. SCOTT. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield.
Mr. SCOTT. I support the resolution.
I was glad to hear the chairman say that
there is nothing in the resolution which
limits the right of the President to repel
any attack or prevent further aggression
within the areas described in the resolu-
tion.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. That is correct.
Mr. SCOTT. That is one of the rea-
sons I support the resolution. As I un-
derstand it, the question of so-called
privilege sanctuaries has always been
a question of how long such sanctuaries
remain privileged if the security of the
United States is menaced by vessels op-
erating out of such privileged sanctu-
aries. I believe the President has quite
properly and rightly announced that the
United States is authorized and seeks
approval of Congress to continue to act
to defend the United States, even if it
be against a so-called or hitherto de-
scribed privileged sanctuary. Is that
not correct?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I think that is
correct. The retaliatory action- taken
against the bases from which these ships
came fits that description.
Mr. SCOTT'. I do not have the ex-
perience that the distinguished Senator
from Arkansas has. However, I have
heard the President, in off-the-record
discussions, refer to the pros and cons
of privileged sanctuaries generally, with-
out reference to a specific country.
I understand he is doing now what he
was at any time 'Prepared to do if in his
judgment it was necessary to do it.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. It was wise and
proper to do it. It fs difficult to gen-
eralize about these matters. I believe
that under the circumstances which ex-
isted in this situation he was wise. The
action was well calculated and designed
to achieve his purpose. I hesitate to
generalize too far, because the condi-
tions under which these things are done
must be understood. We should not
ruthlessly attack a country under dif-
ferent circumstances, perhaps, than
these. I have reference to the Greek
rebellion. Senators will remember that
we had forces there seeking to maintain
the independence of Greece. The Com-
munists had a sanctuary across the
border. By persistence we finally brought
the affair to a successful conclusion.
When that border was closed, the rebel-
lion stopped, and Greece Went on its way
quite successfully as an independent
country. That is what we hope to bring
about here.
Mr. SCOTT. I believe we all have con-
fidence that the President was right
under international law to do what he
did, whether it be called hot pursuit or
anything else, in order to protect this
country.
Is it not a fact that our naval planes,
in the course of reconnaisance along the
Chinese mainland, have received?and
this is not classified informatiOn, and it
has been published in the newspapers?
numerous warnings and, in fact, a series
of warnings, for having proceeded within
the 12-mile zone, which, of course, we
CO
*KESS
ta3P-f8RH/1&thifitipPgfia40 17825
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do not recognize, but these warnings
were based on our penetrating what the
Communists call a 12-mile zone. That
is nothing new. There have been a whole
series of similar objections. However,
we have been engaged in this process for
the purpose of protecting the 7th Fleet
and protecting our lines of communica-
tion and protecting our roles and mis-
sions and protecting the security of the
United States.
Our vessels had every right to be
where they were within the 12-mile limit
and without the 3-mile limit. That is
what I understood the Senator to have
said.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I said it so hap-
pens?I say this to keep the record
straight?that the actual attack, accord-
ing to my information, took place far
beyond the limit. The first at-
tack was approximately 25 miles out, and
the second was about 60 miles.
Mr. RUSSELL. I believe it was 30
and 60 miles.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Yes.
Mr. RUSSELL. I might add that our
vessels has turned away from the South
Vietnam shore and were making for the
middle of the gulf, where there could
be no question, at the time they were
attacked.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. At the time of the
first attack they were steaming away
from the shoreline. The second attack
came at night. The first one was in the
daytime. Our ships were not within the
12-mile limit, so called, at the time of
the attack. I have stated that from time
to time we did go deliberately within
the 12-mile limit simply to emphasize
our nonrecognition of the 12-mile limit,
or, to put it another way, to establish
and reaffirm our right to go there.
Mr. SCOTT. That clarifies the situ-
ation. I am glad the President has
acted. The action was very much indi-
cated. I believe it helps to make our
Nation more secure. I intend to sup-
port the resolution.
Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield for two questions?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Yes.
Mr. COOPER. I know the Senator has
been on his feet for a long time.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. It is not that. The
Senator from Georgia would like to say
something.
Mr. RUSSELL. My remarks will be very
brief.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I am perfectly will-
ing to continue. I believe the Senator
from Georgia should have ar_ opportunity
to say something.
Mr. COOPER. I thank the Senator.
I ask these questions for two reasons:
One is to get the opinion of the chairman
of the Foreign Relations Committee and
Of the chairman of the Armed Services
Committee as to the extent of the powers
that are given to the President under the
resolution. The second is to distinguish
between a situation in which we act in
defense of our own forces, in which with-
out question we would risk war, and the
commitment to defend South Vietnam.
My first question goes to the first sec-
tion of the resolution?the operative part
which, as the chairman has said, applies
to any armed attack or any aggression
directed against the forces of the United
States.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. That is correct.
Mr. COOPER. In that case, of course,
we confirm the power that the President
now has to defend our forces against an
immediate attack.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. The Senator is a
very distinguished lawyer, and I there-
fore hesitate to engage in a discussion
with him on the separation of powers and
the powers of the President. We are not
giving to the President any powers he has
under the Constitution as Commander
in Chief. We are in effect approving of
his use of the powers that he has, That
is the way I feel about it.
Mr. COOPER. I understand that, too.
In the first section we are confirming the
powers.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. We are approving
them. I do not know that we give him
anything that he does not already have.
Perhaps we are quibbling over words.
Mr. COOPER. We support and ap-
prove his judgment.
Mr. RUSSELL. Approve and support.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Approve and sup-
port the iiqe he hes made of his powers:
Mr. COOPER. The second section of
the resolution gdes, as the Senator said,
to steps the President might take con-
cerning the parties to the Southeast Asia
Collective Defense Treaty and the coun-
tries under the protocol?which are, of
course. Laos. Cambodia, and South Viet-
nam. The Senator will remember that
the SEATO Treaty, in article IV, pro-
vides that in the event an armed attack
is made upon a party to the Southeast
Asia Collective Defense Treaty, or upon
one of the protocol states such as .South
Vietnam, the parties to the treaty, one of
whom is the United States, would then
take such action as might be appropriate,
after resorting to their constitutional
processes. I assume that would mean,
in the case of the United States, that
Congress would be asked to grant the
authority to act.
Does the Senator consider that in en-
acting this resolution we are satisfying
that requirement of article IV of the
Southeast Asia Collective Defense
Treaty? In other words, are we now giv-
ing the President advance authority to
take whatever action he may deem neces-
sary respecting South Vietnam and its
defense, or with respect to the defense of
any other country included in the
treaty?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I think that is
correct.
Mr. COOPER. Then, looking ahead, if
the President decided that it was neces-
sary to use such force as could lead into
war, we will give that authority by this
resolution?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. That is the way I
would interpret it. If a situation later
developed in which we thought the ap-
proval should be withdrawn, it could be
withdrawn by concurrent resolution.
That is the reason for the third section.
Mr. COOPER. I ask these ques-
tions?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. The Senator is
properly asking these questions.
??'
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Mr. COOPER. I ask these questions
because it is well for the country and all
of us to know what is being undertaken.
Following up the question I have just
asked and the Senator's answer, / _pre-
sent two situations ,that might arise.
Under the first section of the joint
resolution, the President is supported and
approved in action he may take "to repel
any armed attack against the forces of
the United States and to prevent fur-
ther aggression."
It has been reported that we have al-
ready sent our planes against certain
ports in North Vietnam. I am sure that
the reason is "to repel armed attack and
to prevent further aggression" against
U.S. forces,
Under section 2, are we now providing
the President, if he determines it neces-
sary, the authority to attack cities and
Ports in North Vietnam, not primarily
to prevent an attack upon our forces but,
as he might see fit, to prevent any fur-
ther aggression against South Vietnam?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. One of the reasons
for the procedure provided in this joint
resolution, and also in the Formosa and
Middle East instances, is in response,
let us say, to the new developments in
the field of warfare. In the old days,
when war usually resulted from a formal
declaration of war--and that is what
the Founding Fathers contemplated
when they included that provision in the
Constitution?there was time in which to
act. Things moved slowly, and things
could be seen developing. Congress could
participate in that way.
Under modern conditions of warfare?
and I have tried to describe them, ins-
eluding the way the Second World War
developed?it is necessary to anticipate
what may occur. Things move so rapidly
that this is the way in which we must
respofid to the new developments. That
is why this ,provision is necessary or im-
portant. Does the Senator agree with me
that this is so?
Mr. coopui. Yes, warfare today is
different. Time is of the essence. But
the power provided the President in sec-
tion 2 is great.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. This provision is
intended to give clearance to the Presi-
dent to use his discretion. We all hope
and believe that the President will not
use this discretion arbitrarily or irre-
sponsibly. We know that he is ac-
customed to consulting with the Joint
Chiefs of Staff and with congres-
sional leaders. But he does not have to
do that.
Mr. COOPER. I understand, and be-
lieve that the President will use this vast
power with judgment.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. He intends to do it,
and he has done it.
Mr. COOPER. I do not wish to take
more time now, because the distinguished
Senator from Georgia wishes to speak,
and I want to hear him.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I have no doubt
that the President will consult with Con-
gress in case a major change in present
policy becomes necessary.
Mr. COOPER, I will speak further
later in the day. I wish to say this now:
I know it is understood and agreed that
In the defense of our own ships and
forces any action we might take to repel
attacks could lead to war, if the Vietna-
...mese or the Chinese Communists con-
tinued to engage in attacks against our
forces. I hope they will be deterred by
the prompt action of the President.
We accept this first duty of security
and honor. But I would feel untrue to
my own convictions if I did not say that
a different situation obtains with re-
spect to South Vietnam. I know that
a progression of events for 10 years has
carried us to this crisis. Ten years have
passed and perhaps the events are in-
evitable now, no one can tell. But as
long as there is hope and the possibility
of avoiding with honor a war in south-
east Asia?a conflagration which, I must
say, could lead into war with Commu-
nist China, and perhaps to a third world
war with consequences one can scarcely
contemplate today?I hope the President
will use this power wisely with respect to
our commitments in South Vietnam, and
that he will use all other honorable
means which may be available, such as
consultations in the United Nations, and
even with the Geneva powers.
We have confidence in the President
and in his good judgment. But I believe
we have the obligation of understanding
fully that there is a distinction between
defending our own forces, and taking
offensive measures in South Vietnam
which could lead progressively to a third
world war.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. The question con-
cerns the kind of actions taken in this
instance. I think the President took ac-
tion that is designed to accomplish the
objective the Senator from Kentucky
has stated. That is what I have tried
to make clear. I join in the Senator's
hope that all-out war can be avoided.
Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield for one question?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I shall yield for
one question then I shall yield the floor.
Mr. McGOVERN. The Senator may
recall that about 10 years ago, on De-
cember 2, 1954, the United States signed
with the Nationalist Chinese Govern-
ment a mutual defense treaty. In effect,
we committed ourselves to joint defense
for security interests in ,the western
Pacific.
Shortly after that agreement was
signed, there was a considerable amount
of anxiety expressed in the United States
that perhaps we in effect had surrendered
control of our foreign policy in that part
of the world to the Nationalist Chinese.
Partly to offset that anxiety, there was
an exchange of notes between Secretary
Dulles and the Nationalist Chinese Min-
ister of Foreign Affairs, in which the two
gentlemen agreed in effect that if there
were to be any action by military forces
on the part of either the Nationalist
Chinese Government or ourselves in the
western Pacific, the two countries would
consult with each other, and that any
such action would be taken only after
mutual agreement.
I am wondering whether there is any
similar protection written into the se-
curity arrangements that we have with
reference to South Vietnam. Is that kind
of protection, for example, written Into
the SEATO agreement, or in any of the
August 6
notes which have been exchanged be-
tween our Governments, so that we would
not, in effect, be surrendering control of
our actions in southeast Asia to the Gov-
ernment of South Vietnam?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I do not believe we
are surrendering control to them. Un-
der the SEATO Treaty, as I recall it, we
take our own actions according to our
constitutional processes. I do not believe
that we have surrendered control of our
actions. However, as a practical matter
our influence upon the Government of
South Vietnam is a matter of relations
between our Ambassador and General
'Khania We consult daily, I believe, with
regard to the conduct of our mutual af-
fairs in that area. To give a short an-
swer, I know of no exchange of notes, or
anything of that kind. I do not recall
any testimony on the precise point the
Senator has brought up.
Mr. McGOVERN. What I am getting
at is, suppose the Government of South
Vietnam, for whatever reason, should de-
cide to launch a major military attack on
North Vietnam, would we be obligated
in any kind of arrangement we have with
South Vietnam?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. No. We have no
obligation to follow through with a situ-
ation which we believe to be unwise,
stupid, or silly. We could disavow it and
withdraw and have nothing to do with it.
We have no treaty agreement or any
other agreement that I know of that
binds us to follow through with that.
Mr. LAUSCHE. The southeast Asia
treaty provides specifically that it is ap-
plicable only when aggressions are com-
mitted against members of the treaty,
and is not applicable should members
of the treaty commit aggressions against
countries other than those who are mem-
bers of the treaty. That is written into
the treaty.
Mr, FULBRIGHT. I believe that it
also applies only to aggression from
Communist countries.
Mr. MORSE. It covers the protocol
countries.
Mr. McGOVERN. I was not a Mem-
ber of the Senate at the time, and I
know that the Senator from Arkansas
knows infinitely more about it than I do,
but when the Formosa resolution was ap-
proved by Congress early in 1955, I be-
lieve that the approval for that resolu-
tion was secured partly because of the
exchange of notes which had taken
place months before, in which both Na-
tionalist China and the United States
agreed that neither country would un-
dertake any kind of military action in
the Pacific without making it a joint
action. It is on the basis of that assur-
ance that the Formosa resolution was
approved. So that is why I rose to ask
my question.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I know of no such
exchanges in this case.
Mr. McGOVERN. I thank the Sena-
tor.
Mr, FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I
yield the floor.
Mr. RUSSELL. Mr. President, I shall
be very brief in my comments in sup-
port of this resolution.
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before us. What is involved is our right
as an independent state to operate our
vessels upon international waters that
have been recognized as free to all states
for many centuries. Involved also is our
national honor. Our national honor is
at stake. We cannot and we will not
shrink from defending it. No sovereign
nation would be entitled to the respect
of other nations, or, indeed, could main-
tain its self respect, if it accepted the
acts that have been committed against
us without under taking to make some
response.
Our Armed Forces are capable of a
broad range of reaction. In the instant
case, the President selected one so
limited that no reasonable and objective
observer could assume a desire on our
part to escalate the war or to broaden
its scope. I shall say, however, that if
future events demand a more vigorous
response, this Nation has the power, and
I believe our people have the will, to use
that power. The portents of this reso-
lution are great. No action whatever
can be taken in the field of international
relations in today's troubled world that
does not involve some danger. But I
submit to this body the view that I
firmly believe there is much more danger
in ignoring aggressive acts than there is
in pursuing a course of calculated re-
taliation that shows we are prepared to
defend our rights.
Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President,
will the Senator yield?
Mr. RUSSELL. I yield.
Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President,
unfortunately I have been at a legisla-
tive appropriation conference. I have
not heard all of the discussion. But I
know that the chairman of the Commit-
tee on Foreign Relations and the chair-
man of the Committee on Armed Serv-
ices have gone into the broad aspects of
this problem very thoroughly. I join
the Senator from Iowa and with the two
committee chairmen in sponsoring this
resolution. I believe it is of fundamen-
tal importance to our prestige in the
world today and to the prestige of our
armed services.
Mr. President, from the beginning of
our Nation, Massachusetts men have al-
ways gone down to the sea in ships. We
are proud of our Navy. We know its
strength and effectiveness in preserving
our country and our defenses.
Its prestige and the prestige of our
country in the eyes of the world is at
stake.
It is the responsibility of the President
to take immediate action to defend our
country when he believes that it is under
attack in one way or another.
As the representative of all our people,
he now asks Congress to support him in
the position he has taken in this instance
where our Navy has been fired upon.
He made the decision to retaliate for
the attack.
The resolution before us today lends
support to the President's decision to
defend our Navy and to build up and to
maintain its prestige in the eys of the
world.
I support it wholeheartedly and hope
that the Senate will adopt it by an over-
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Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, would
the Senator from Georgia wish to sug-
gest the absence of a quorum?
Mr. RUSSM,L. I do not think so. I
thank the senator, however, for his
thoughtfulness.
Mr. President, this resolution has prec-
edents in those that were adopted at
the time of the crisis in Formosa, at the
time of the crisis in the Middle East,
and also in connection with Cuba.
These other resolutions will be remem-
bered by many Members of the Senate.
Some reservation has been expressed
about the grant of power?which is
broad power?to the President. The
language that grants this power to the
present President of the United States
Is almost identical with the language
used in granting similar power to Presi-
dent Dwight D. Eisenhower in the case
of Formosa, and Matsu and Quemoy?
the two islands just of! the Chinese
mainland held by Chiang Kai-shek
against the wishes of Red China. The
Red Chinese had been shelling those
Islands intermittently and there was
great apprehension that they were about
to launch an attack to capture them.
Congress granted President Eisen-
hower almost the identical power that
would be granted in section 2 of this res-
olution, to enable him to protect those
Islands, in the event that he concluded
they were important and vital to the
maintenance of international peace and
security, and the vital interests of the
United States.
What became of that power?
It is in existence at this very moment.
Senators refer to the new power which
Is being granted today. But the power
granted to President EiseniloWer existed
during the tenure in office of John Fitz-
gerald Kennedy, and resides at this very
moment in Lyndon Baines. Johnson at
the White House?power which is very
similar, except for the geographic area
Involved, to that which we propose to
grant today in the case of North Viet-
nam.
The same is true with respect to the
Middle East resolution. We granted
certain power to President Eisenhower
in March of 1957, in connection with the
situation in the Middle East, by approv-
ing a resolution that reads:
The President is authorized to undertake
In the general area of the Middle East mili-
tary assistance programs with any nation
or group of nations in that area desiring
such assistance. Furthermore, the United
States regards as vital to the national inter-
est and world peace the preservation of the
Independence and integrity of the nations
of the Middle gast. To this end, if the Presi-
dent determines the necessity thereof, the
United States is prepared to use Armed Forces
to assist any such nation or group of nations
requesting assistance against armed aggres-
sion from any country controlled by inter-
national communism.
What became of that power?
It is in existence today. It has never
been terminated or annulled by the
means set forth in the resolution. The
same situation is true in the case of the
Cuban resolution. The power that was
originally granted to President Kennedy,
the assurance of support from the Con-
,
gress, is in existence today and resides
In the Chief Executive.
Unless some steps should be taken to
cancel it, the power granted in this res-
olution with respect to the vast difficul-
ties in Vietnam?and I do not underesti-
mate them, neither do I undertake to
underrate them?will continue for who-
ever is elected President in November.
Mr. President, the spirit of crisis and
Impending danger that hung over this
Chamber when we were considering the
Formosa resolution was far greater than
It is at this very hour. But in that in-
stance, and when we approved the other
similar resolutions, our national solidar-
ity and our steadfastness in the face of
crisis prevented much more serious and
much broader military action.
I am sure that all of us who intend to
vote for the joint resolution pray that
the adoption of the resolution, and the
action that may be taken pursuant to it,
will achieve the same purpose and avoid
any broadening of war, or any escalation
of danger.
This resolution does not alter the con-
stitutional separation of responsibility
for the conduct of foreign relations for
the command of our Armed Forces and
for the establishment and maintenance
of our Armed Forces. Instead, the reso-
lution is intended to demonstrate that
Congress approves the retaliatory action
that has been taken in defense of our
flag and our Armed Forces, and that
Congress shares in the determination
that this country will do everything nec-
essary to defend our national interests,
wherever they may be endangered.
The events that bring the resolution
before us are too well known to require
detailed repetition. Suffice it to say that
U.S. naval vessels have been attacked
while in international waters. The
President has authorized a response.
That response was, in a way, commen-
surate with the attacks up to this point.
If there is further unprovoked military
action against our forces, response under
this resolution will undoubtedly be tai-
lored to fit the facts and needs of that
situation.
There is, of course, the hope that the
outrageous attack which gave rise to this
resolution is only a spontaneous, irre-
sponsible action by the North Vietnamese
without the direction and approval of
any of their Communist associates. The
rulers of North Vietnam must know that
any further belligerency toward us or our
forces can lead to their destruction. If
they prove to be so irresponsible as to
continue these unprovoked attacks, they
will be inviting consequences of the direst
sort.
In the present circumstances, it will
serve no useful purpose to debate the
wisdom of our original decision to go
into Vietnam. It is unnecessary for me
to state that I had grave doubts about
the wisdom of that decision. It would
certainly do no good to dwell on those
doubts here today. Indeed, second
guesses about our foreign policy, and
what it should be in that area, or
whether our support to South Vietnam
has been too much, or has been too little,
are not involved directly in the question
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whelming vote. Because I believe in the
sentiments and principles set forth in the
resolution, I joined in sponsoring it.
I believe it is one of the most funda-
mental propositions to come before the
Senate since I have been a Member of
this body and hope there will be little
'opposition to it.
Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President,
will the Senator yield?
Mr. RUSSPJJ,. I am glad to yield to
the Senator from Missouri, who happens
to be the only Member who serves on both
committees that met jointly to consider
the resolution today.
Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, I
have listened with great interest to the
remarks of the distinguished senior Sen-
ator from Georgia, the leading civilian
military authority in this town today. I
would associate myself with his remarks,
as well as with those of the distinguished
chairman of the Committee on Foreign
Relations, one of the truly great scholars
of those matters having to do with for-
eign affairs.
It seems to me this is a relatively sim-
ple matter we are discussing this
afternoon.
would agree that it is not as serious
as other recent crises and most certainly
it is not as serious as the Cuban con-
frontation, where a possible aggressor
had nuclear weapons.
The matter for decision is whether the
United States accepts an attack on one
of its ships 65 miles offshore or should de-
fend itself against this clearly planned
aggression.
If we allow these attacks to proceed
without any response, the poslion, the
prestige of the United States abroad that
part of the world, very possibly in all
other parts of the world, would suffer a
serious loss of respect. The free world
Continues free today because of the phys-
ical, economic, and above all spiritual
strength of the United States, although
we welcome any and all support from our
allies. It is a privilege to be on the
floor of the Senate and hear my chair-
man once again express his pride and
confidence in the future of America. It
Is also a privilege to associate myself
with his remarks.
Mr. RUSSELL. I thank the distin-
guished Senator for his very kind words.
Mr. ELLENDER. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Presi-
dent, will the Senator yield?
Mr. RUSSELL. I shall yield first to
the Senator from Louisiana. and then
I shall be glad to yield to the Senator
from Iowa, who is a member of the For-
eign Relations Committee.
Mr. ELLENDER. Mr. President, I am
in thorough agreement with the views
expressed by my friend the senior Sen-
ator from Georgia [Mr. RUSSELL 3.
I should like to ask whether or not
the Senator knows if any effort has been
made by us in the last few days or in the
past to get our allies to join us in our
effort, and whether any insistence has
been made by his committee in order to
effectuate that endeavor.
Mr. RUSSELL. Mr. President, that
question is not primarily within the pur-
view and jurisdiction of the Armed Serv-
ices Committee, but I may say to my
distinguished friend that no one feels
more deeply than I do?about the fact
that when the United States intervenes,
many others who have equal responsi-
bility have tended to say. "Let Uncle Sam
do it." I will say that I have been as-
sured by both the Secretary of State and
the Secretary of Defense that they have
endeavored to get assistance. The Sen-
ator is familiar, of course, with the pecu-
liar conditions that exist with respect to
France at the present time.
France is a nation that had more fa-
miliarity with this area of the old colo-
nial days than any of the other nations
of the Western World. Great Britain is
a tried and trusted friend. But they are
engaged at the present time in the Ma-
laysian operations. Their armed forces
are not as large as I should like them
to be. But their military strength is on
a standby status under the threats that
have been issued by Sukarno against the
new state of Malaysia.
Australia has increased its assistance
in Vietnam within the past 6 or 8
months. They actually have personnel
in the field now as advisers with military
units, Just as American military person-
nel serve with those units.
I do not make any of those statements
to indicate that I think our associates
are doing as much as they can or as
much as they should. But there has
been some increase at least, and I hope
and earnestly pray that this will be a
harbinger of willingness to assume a
fairer share of the great responsibility
of protecting the free world from domi-
nation by international communism.
Mr. ELLENDER. Does not the Sen-
ator think that it is incumbent upon us
as members of the SEATO organization
to make every effort to get assistance
from the members of SEATO? As I un-
derstand, France. the United Kingdom,
Pakistan. New Zealand, Australia, the
United States, the Philippines, and Thai-
land, are members of SEATO. Is it not
incumbent upon us to have a meeting of
SEATO before we go too far? The rea-
son I make that statement is that I fear
that we shall once again be left holding
the bag, alone, unless we do something
along those lines.
Mr. RUSSELL. I share the Senator's
feeling. The Senator knows that SEATO
meets at regular intervals. We have been
assured that our representatives have
urged increasing assistance. The ques-
tion is important, not only from a mili-
tary standpoint, but also from a psy-
chological standpoint. It is important
that all countries associated in SEATO
make a more substantial contribution to
this deplorable condition that exists in
Vietnam.
As I said at the outset, the question is
one which is more within the jurisdic-
tion of the Foreign Relations Committee
than that of the Armed Service Commit-
tee, but I have been concerned about it.
I have done what I could to encourage
our representatives to insist upon greater
participation.
Mr. ELLENDER. I express the hope
that action will be taken soon, and that
we ehall not have a repetition of what
happened in South Korea. As the Sen-
ator knows, we carried most of the
burden there?in fact, over 90 percent
of it?and in excess of 90 percent of the
soldiers who died in South Korea, other
than South Koreans, were American.
Mr. RUSSFJJ,. We carried more than
90 percent of the financial and logistical
cost.
Mr. ELLENDER. Yes, indeed, we did.
Unless we take action now to try to get
our allies to assist, the chances are that
the burden will fall upon us.
Mr. RUSSPLL. I thank the Senator.
I now yield to the distinguished Senator
from Iowa.
Mr. HICKENLOOPER? Mr. Presi-
dent, I thank the distinguished Senator
from Georgia. I shall not repeat the
philosophical and political arguments
that have taken place on the floor of the
Senate in support of the resolution.
They have been amply presented by the
Senator from Georgia, the chairman of
the Armed Services Committee, and by
the Senator from Arkansas, the chair-
man of the Foreign Relations Commit-
tee. As one of the cosponsors of the
joint resolution, I merely wish to approve
the basic arguments underlying the sub-
mission of the joint resolution and its
Purposes, its necessity, and its justifica-
tion.
We are in a serious situation. Any
time a question of this kind comes up
it is of the utmost seriousness. I shall
not go far enough to say that it is a
question of extreme situation. I do not
know whether I dare use that word or
not. But it is of the greatest seriousness.
I will say that. Therefore we must act,
not only in defense of the national
honor and the prestige of the United
States, but also in defense of the basic
principles which we will either defend
or see destroyed and eroded away by our
inaction.
I have always felt that it was a little
bit silly, if a fire started in one of the
main buildings of a town or in some-
one's house, to call a meeting of the town
council to determine whether the fire
department should be called. Mean-
while, the fire is burning down the build-
ing. Someone must get a bucket or a
hose and put out the fire.
We are up against much the same sit-
uation here on the question with which
we are confronted. As the Senator from
Georgia has pointed out, the proposed
action is not without precedent. In my
experience, which has encompassed the
various resolutions to which the Senator
has referred in his argument, we have
joined with the President on various
occasions in certain defined areas of the
world for the purpose of protecting the
interests of the United States and the
protection of freedom. On certain prin-
ciples involved in Presidential action, in-
volving force, I am not in full agreement
with all of my colleagues; Tam in agree-
ment with some and in disagreement
with others as to the inherent power of
the President or the extent of such
power.
In this case there is not the slightest
question in my mind that the President
not only has full authority, but has a
responsibility, to protect American in-
stitutions and interests when they are
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.attaCked, without haVing to donito the
congress for that authority.
'At 'future-date- the question of use
of American force may give rise to some
perguaSive argUthents, perhaPs on both
sides of the qtistfon Towever, a reso-
lution of this kind forecloses that arku-
went_ :and' YoiriS the 'congress with the
BresiAnt,of the vow- States in unity
?
in saking that When our forces are at-
tacked, when we are endangered, we are
,
Unelfed, not onIST'hi rej5elli?g, but, if nec-
essary, in attacking the source of that
infection or fliffie1111Y that is threatening
US.. That is virlir I say it is our respon-
gibility. That is Wlet hiVe joined as a
cospentor 'of the _resolution.
r, a:8:r an the eVeiy Member of the
'Senate, regrefS that we Must take this
aetion?, but, We intiSt let not only our
enernies:ha:Ar -friends- in the world
know that there is a line' beyond which
the United States writinot tolerate de-
atrution or endangering of freedom.
If We arit,O"StirviVe_in a world of free-
dpm?g Ag,:t1k,is be- our objective?we
will icoep_our_c_oriniiitmerits and hold our
we always have, and de-
rend or liberties arid ribts.
luSifeT enn-ld become emo-
tional, I hope We are approaching it with
' considerable calthnesa and objectivity. I
an: sure theoverwhelining majority of
the; Meinbers of this body are approach-
ing it With objectivity and calmness, but
sincere, cleteymination and unity on any
issue must 1e Shoivii net only to our
enernies, but to Or rien. s.
-- t 'Oin the Senlier- 'from LouiSia,ne, in
the earnest hp:Pe' and de-sire that our
allies And associates will come in with
us. That is very true. But again, if
spine:4'0S 'drowning and another, has
the paWerIO he does not say,
"I won't juirip_in,and_get4ou out unless
you and YOU and you aLso jump in with
me and help me get -the person out of
durance vile apcia state Of extremus."
When somethini like that happens, we
have kre?ponsibilitY tb Ourselves, to our
q1vlliztion, an to_the-catiee of freedom,
to dp,soniethirig about think that is
theway we are approadhing the issue
_ _
here.,
We 1111,14.itliith'ill:d:iii-6 all freedom-
'loving nations to pin with us, if pos-
sible, "Outa_clangerouS situation exists
now. Thal is why the reselutiOn is ur-
g.Pnt-and esenti? It is wh I "nr'nrt
It. _ As the president pu'ined out siruilnr
Authority exists In Other areas, and it will
only enlarge those nowers for this seetion
6f the 'world',,,:iinder the circumstances
which haattheie,
:t conkrafililate the Senator from
-Georgia ferr,t1-1,0 clarity of the statement
lie has made.
_ tharAc the Senator
-from_ wa. ,IT,AdVe. been privileged to
Oente_ Callan-1 for many years. He an-
pri)aches 'these problems withoTt the
' slWiteif liinf of ,partisanship. He is a
greet ,Patriot and Senator. No more
loyal or dedicated patriot has ever served
in the Sena, , ,.. ?
? 1./r,413,1XXING. Nr.,Pres,ident, it is
always difficult not to accede_to a, re-
cfneSt from the President of the.. Unitedl
Stateg,espeeially one which is couched in
terms of high principle and national in-
, ,
1$2---21
terest. r have no doubt that the Presi-
dent fervently believes that the course he
Is pursuing in southeast Asia is in the
best interests of the Nation.
By long established practice, the
Executive conducts the Nation's foreign
policy. But the Congress and partic-
ularly, by constitutional mandate, the
Senate has a right and duty in these
premises to "advise and consent.' Espe-
cially is this true when it is specifically
called upon by the Executive, as is the
case now, for its participation in mo-
mentous decisions of foreign policy.
Therefore we in the Senate would be
derelict in our duty if we did not in-
dividually express our views if those
views embody doubt or dissent, and
where a vote is called for, to cast that
vote as our conscience directs.
As early as March 10, nearly 5 months
go,I took the floor and in an address of
considerable length urged that the
United States get out of South Vietnam,
at least to the extent of patricipation by
our soldiery. Since that time, I have
discussed U.S. participation in this area
of the world repeatedly. I have stated
and restated my view that this was not
our war; that we were wholly misguided
in picking up the burden abandoned by
France 10 years ago after the French had
suffered staggering losses running into
tens of thousands of French young lives
and vast sums of money to which the
United States contributed heavily, and
thereupon entering upon a policy which
would be bound to result, as it has re-
sulted, in the sacrificing of the lives of
our young Americans in an area, and in
a cause that in my reasoned judgment
poses no threat to our national security.
I have repeatedly called attention to
the pertinent fact that we, the United
States, are going it all alone; that our
SEATO allies, the United Kingdom,
France, Australia, New Zealand, the
Philippines, Pakistan, and Thailand, are
not taking part, despite our earnest -
pleas for them to do so, which pleas may,
in recent days, have resulted in a few
slight taken gestures which are wholly _
insignificant. I have called attention to
the fact, and do again, that whereas
American boys are dying in combat, al-
though presumably they are there as ad-
visors, no British boys are on the firing
line; no French boys are any longer at
the front, they appear to have learned
their lesson; no Australian youths are
being killed; no New Zealand youngsters
are being sacrificed; no Philippine casu-
alties are being incurred; and the same
may be said for the Pakistanis, despite
the fact that we have given them close to
a billion dollars in military aid.
In any event, I am convinced that
peace will not be established by rnilitary
means. Sooner or later the issue is
bound to be settled at the _conference
table., Eventually, why not, now.
While I am deeply convinced that
American security is not involved, the
allegation that we are supporting free-
dom in South Vietnam lias a hollow
sound. We have been supporting cor-
rupt and unpopular puppet dictator-
ships which owe their temporary sojourn
in power to our massive support. They
have scant support from their own peo-
17829
pie, Who have shown little disposition to
fight. He,nce our steadily increasing in-
volvement. Yet we have persistently
alleged that the war cannot be won ex-
cept by the South Vietnamese. It is not
happening, nor will it.
Some weeks ago I urged on the floor
of the 'Senate that the United States
take the lead in seeking a cease-fire, and
that this be accompanied and imple-
mented by a United Nations police force,
as has been done in the Congo and is
being done in the formerly troublesome
border between Israel and Egypt. It
has worked there. It has largely put an
end to border strife and killing. Why
not try it in South Vietnam, where the
cost in lives has already proved infinitely
greater?
But the United States has not pursued
peace as it has pursued and carried out
armed intervention on an ever-increas-
ing scale.
The latest episode?the attack by
North Vietnam vessels?on U.S. naval
vessels, I consider an inevitable de-
velopment of the U.S. steady escala-
tion of our own military activities in
southeast Asia in recent weeks. I do not
justify or condone that attack on our
ships. It was both stupid and outra-
geous. I do not at all disagree with the
administration's policy of countering this
attack and of not merely repelling the
attackers but destroying them and giving
them the same medicine which they seek
to inflict on our vessels.
But that does not mean that I can
approve the whole U.S. policy of active,
unilateral military intervention in south-
east Asia, and I have expressed myself
reneatedly to that effect in the Senate.
I repeat now that I do not consider
this our war and that I feel that all Viet-
nam is not worth the life of a single
American boy. We inherited this putrid
mess from past administrations, and we
should have made, and should now make,
every effort to disengage ourselves. We
have lost altogether too many American
lives already. Unless we reverse our
policy, their number will steadily
increase.
_I regret, and consider it a pity, that
both our political parties appear now to
- be committed to a, policy of war in south-
east Asia. Yet American public opinion,
judged by my mail, is overwhelmingly
committed to a Alf ere_nt policy?a policy
of peace. It apparently at this time has
no spokesman in the high councils of
either major political party. My mail
pours in with virtual unanimity on this
subject. It comes from all over the coun-
try. It comes from a truly representative
cross section of the American people.
It includes bishops, deans of schools and
Colleges, university professors, business
executives, teachers, retired Army of-
ficers and it comes from every State of
the Union.
The case against the pending proposal
to endorse our southeast Asian policy of
steadily increasingly escalation, which
despite the President's expressed desire
not to extend the war, has taken place
and will take place inevitably, the case
against this pending resolution, was ad-
mirably, and in my view?wholly con-
vincingly?set forth in great detail yes-
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liugust 6
terday by the distinguished senior Sena-
tor from Oregon, WAYNE MORSE.
I would hope that every Member of
this body would have read his compre-
hensive analysis of how the situation has
reached its present tragic involvement
before each casts his vote. No one, in
the Senate or elsewhere, can consider
himself fully informed to pass judgment
on the momentous decision we are asked
to make and its involvement of our coun-
try without hearing both sides of the
argument. The press has given very
little of this other side.
Senator MORSE has presented the case
for not voting approval of the admin-
istration's course. I have long supported
a similar view. I do support en-
thusiastically the taking of the latest
episode; namely, the attack by North
Vietnamese vessels on U.S. naval vessels,
and our reprisal, to the United Nations.
But not merely this serious incident
which is a part of the undeclared war in
? southeast Asia, should be considered.
The United Nations should not be limited
to consideration of that incident by it-
self. I do not see how it can logically do
so. Let us hope?and I do hope?that
out of this may come a complete inves-
tigation by the United Nations of the
whole southeast Asian situation, and
that from this may emerge a referral of
that situation to the council table.
The joint resolution, Senate Joint
Resolution 189, which we are considering
in section 2, bases its case in part on the
charter of the United Nations. The
drafters of this ,resolution seem to have
disregarded several other provisions of
the United Nations Charter, which seem
to me highly pertinent, indeed far more
pertinent.
Article 33 provides:
The parties to any dispute, the continu-
ance of which is likely to endanger the main-
tenance of International peace and security.
shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotia-
tion, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbi-
tration, judicial settlement, resort to re-
gional agencies or arrangements, or other
peaceful means of their own choice.
I submit, Mr. President, that the
United States, as well as North and South
Vietnam, have totally ignored this spe-
cific mandate. Have any of these three
parties to this dispute, as this article
requires, sought "a solution by negotia-
tion, inquiry, mediation, conciliation,
arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to
regional agencies or arrangements, or
other peaceful means of their own
choice"?
Mr. President, I ask this question:
Has the United States, has South
Vietnam, has North Vietnam, obviously
parties to the long-standing dispute, or
have any of our SEATO presumed allies,
following the clear prescription of article
33 of the United Nations Charter, sought
"first of all"?let me note that the
charter says "first of all"?a solution by
negotiation?
Have they sought a solution by in-
quiry?
Have they sought a solution by media-
tion?
Have they sought a solution by con-
ciliation?
Have they sought a solution by arbi-
tration?
Have they sought a solution by judi-
cial settlement?
Have they sought a solution by "re-
sort to regional agencies or arrange-
ments"?
Have they sought a solution by resort
to "other peaceful means of their own
choice"?
Obviously, they have not. Obviously,
none of the parties to the dispute, "the
continuance of which" -Is certainly
"likely to endanger the maintenance of
International peace and security,"
sought any one of the eight means which
the United Nations Charter spells out so
clearly.
The United States has not only not
done so. It has not even attempted to
do so.
South Vietnam, whose policies and
very existence the U.S. controls, has not
done so.
North Vietnam has not done so.
Obviously, the United States, far from
being, as Senate Joint Resolution 189
asserts in section 2, "consonant with the
Charter of the United Nations," has
flagrantly disregarded it.
But to have done otherwise, to have
resorted to these peaceful means,
namely, "first of all" to "seek a solution
by negotiation, inquiry, mediation, con-
ciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement,
resort to regional agencies or arrange-
ments, or other peaceful means." would
have been precisely the policy which I
deeply believe we should have followed.
At the very least we should have tried.
But, instead, we have become more
and more enmeshed in the folly of an
inherited policy, with steady enlarge-
ment of the area of conflict, a steady in-
crease in American participation, and a
mounting loss of American lives.
Despite the President's declared
worthy Purpose not to expand the con-
flict, the conflict has been and is being
steadily expanded. We are adding more
advisers, and we are increasing our par-
ticipation by all three branches of the
service?Air Force, Navy, and Army.
And with these increases, there will be
inevitably an increasing loss of American
lives.
It is a difficult and painful decision for
me to make, but in good conscience I
cannot do other than to vote "no" on the
pending resolution.
Mr. KUCIIEL. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the text of Sen-
ate Joint Resolution 189 be printed in
the RECORD at this point in my remarks.
There being no objection, the joint res-
olution was ordered to be printed in the
RECORD, as follows:
Whereas naval units of the Communist re-
gime in Vietnam. In violation of the prin-
ciples of the Charter of the United Nations
and of international law, have deliberately
and repeatedly attacked United States naval
vessels lawfully present in international wa-
ters, and have thereby created a serious
threat to international peace; and
Whereas these attacks are part of a de-
liberate and systematic campaign of aggres-
sion that the Communist regime in North
Vietnam has been waging against its neigh-
bors and the nations joined with them in the
collective defense of their freedom; and
Whereas the United States is assisting the
peoples of southeast Asia to protect their
freedom and has no territorial, military, or
political ambitions in that area, but desires
only that these peoples should be left in
peace to work out their own destinies in their
own way: Now, therefore, be it
Resolved by the Senate and Hc-use of Rep-
resentatives of the United States of America
In Congress assembled, That the Congress
approves and supports the determination of
the President, as Commander in Chief, to
take all necessary measures to repel any
armed attack against the forces of the United
States and to prevent further aggression.
Sac. 2. The United States regards as vital
to its national interest and to world peace
the maintenance of international peace and
security in southeast Asia. Consonant with
the Constitution and the Charter of the
United Nations and in accordance with its
obligations under the Southeast Asia Col-
lective Defense Treaty, the United States is,
therefore, prepared, as the President deter-
mines, to take all necessary steps, including
the use of armed force, to assist any member
or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Col-
lective Defense Treaty requesting assistance
in defense of its freedom.
Sat. 3. This resolution shall expire when
the President shall determine that the peace
and security of the area is reasonably assured
by international conditions created by ac-
tion of the United Nations or otherwise, ex-
cept that it may be terminated earlier by
concurrent resolution of the Congress.
Mr. KUCHEL. By way of emphasis I
wish to read section 2 of the resolution,
as follows:
sac. 2. The United States regards as vital
to Its national interest and to world peace
the maintenance of international peace and-
security in southeast Asia. Consonant with
the Constitution and the Charter of the
United Nations and in accordance with its
obligations under the Southeast Asia Collec-
tive Defense Treaty, the United States is,
therefore, prepared, as the President deter-
mines, to take all necessary steps, including
the use of armed force, to assist any member
or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Col-
lective Defense Treaty requesting assistance
in defense of its freedom.
Mr. President, this is not the first time
that the legislative branch of our Gov-
ernment has been called upon to recog-
nize and to confirm in the President the
authority, the duty, and the responsibil-
ity resting in him to take such steps as he
deems appropriate under our Constitu-
tion, to defend our country and our peo-
ple, and to discharge America's solemn
obligations as they may arise through our
agreements for collective security with
like-minded free nations all around the
globe.
I remember the Middle East resolution.
I remember the Formosa resolution.
Both came to Congress from President
Eisenhower. Both were requested so
that all might know that the people's
representatives in this branch of the
Government agreed with the Chief Ex-
ecutive of the United States with respect
to the authority he possessed and the
circumstances under which he would be
compelled to utilize his power.
Those two resolutions demonstrated to
all the world the unity, dedication, and
solidarity of purpose not only among the
representatives of the people in Congress
and the President, but among the peo-
ple of our country as well. ?
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Once ,again a'storm is gathering over
a long tormented area of this weary
world. 'Ominous and Ugly are the threat
and thrust of ccmununism in southeast
Asia. The storm May yet be dissipated,
but only if the Red regime unmistakably
understands That the 'United States will
honor its pledge and assist her SEATO
allies intime of peril.
That is the plain intent of the joint
resolution- new aTiont- to be passed by
Congress. Let friend and foe alike un-
derstand that we?America?shall keep
the faith.' Our country stands together
In the face Of danger. That is the clear
Meaning of our Message. If Communist
Asia, mien at this Iate time, carefully
asseSsee, the high cost of her contem-
plated inaraiiding' aggressions, peace can
return ,to the lands of her peaceloving
neighbors, and the sun will shine again.
0111:70CII obtained the floor.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, will the
Senatoryieldl-
'Mr. CHURCH. Mr: President, with-
out losing My right' to the floor, I yield
to the distinguished Senator from Mis-
sissippi.
1fr. STETS. I thank the Senator
for yielding.
Few Persons have had more concern
than I during the last-1.0-years 'about the
growininienace and threat by the Com-
munists to freedom inVietnam. I have
recently taken -sworn testimony, classi-
fied, from some 6T Our pilots who have
been eii" duty in Vietnam during the last
2 years. i` can say with solemnity, but
with certainty, that a grave and serious
situation already exists on the mainland
of Vietnam. We are involved to an ap-
preciable degree.
Someone has suggested that the con-
ditions necessitating this joint resolution
are not nearly so serious as those which
confronted us When the Formosa joint
resolution was before Congress. On the
whole, I suppose I would- agree. Still,
I believe we would make a great mistake
if we minimized in any degre& the grave-
ness andseriousness Of the Situation con-
fronting us now.
I do not believe thesArnerican people
have been sufficiently warned and in-
formed about the grailtir of -conditions
there.
? I remember that when the Formosa
resolution was bef_ore the Senate for con-
sideration a few years ago, a Member of
this body, who is no longer with us, said
he believed that ,if the resolution were
passed, the United states would be at
war In 90 days. That 'Prediction proved
to be erroneous. on ti-ie contrary, I be-
lieve the Formosa resoltipn helped us to
avoid war, I believe this one will, too.
That is one of the major reasons why it
deserves support. _
Today we have no choice. Our flag has
been attacked, and our country has been
challenged in international waters?on
the high seas?where we had a right to
be. Our -flag and our men have been
fired upon. Many hundreds, if not
thousands, of our naval personnel could
have lost their, lives haol the torpedoes
been moreaccurately aimed and hit one
or more 6! the destroyers.
We properly gave the aggressors fair
warning after the first shot. Then they
hit us again. Very properly, we then
struck back.
The matter has now been referred to
Congress, to see what we will do;
whether or not we believe the action
taken was right; whether we shall stand
on that realistic policy in the future;
and whether we are united. Either we
must stand our ground or run away.
That may be oversimplicity; but if we
do not send such a message as that, we
are in reality inviting another attack
from any nation, large or small, who
might wish to push us around.
We have already struck the aggressors
a severe blow. Section 1 of the resolu-
tion merely expresses the attitude of
Congress that we will stand by it and
will strike again, if necessary. I believe
this firm course, if we take it, may be
our last or only chance to avoid what
could quickly develop into full-scale war.
The joint resolution shows our unity as
well as our determination. It also shows
that no one dares to attack us without
paying a heavy price therefor.
I emphasize that the situation is seri-
ous; but it will become far worse if we
show the slightest weakness or hesita-
tion. If we must have a showdown, it
is far better that it comes before Red
China obtains nuclear weapons. Our
honor, our safety, and our security are
at stake.
For these reasons, I shall vote for and
support the resolution. None of us are
happy about the situation in Vietnam
and about our position there. But that
bridge has long since been crossed. We
are already there. We dare not run
away, certainly not while we are under
attack. I am sure the people will sup-
port this position. They will be given
the opportunity to understand more
about what is happening in Vietnam.
I commend the Senator from Arkan-
sas [Mr. FULBRIGHT1, the Senator from
Georgia [Mr. RUSSELL], the Senator
from California [Mr. KUCHEL 1, and
other Senators for their remarks and
their position on this grave matter and
endorse their position.
Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, the
ominous events that have taken place in
the Gulf of Tonkin merely serve to em-
phasize how close we are living to the
fuse of war. Whether those events have
lighted that fuse remains for the future
to disclose.
None of us has any doubt about why
this joint resolution is before the Senate.
It results directly from the Communist
attack on the American destroyers.
Those ships, when attacked, were on the
high seas, where they had a legal right
to be. Those ships, from all that we have
been told, were not engaged in my ag-
gressive action directed against the
shores of North Vietnam.
Our reply to the first attack upon the
Madaox was confined to the immediate
defensive needs of the destroyer. When
a second, clearly premeditated attack
followed, the President chose not to con-
fine over counteraction to the immediate
defenses of the ships involved, but to
retaliate in kind, Having twice been
stung by bees, he chose to strike back
at the hive itself. Still, the retaliation
was limited to the PT bases on the North
? Vietnamese coast, and to the petroleum
tanks that fueled the PT boats them-
selves.
The President is to be commended for
the restraint, as well as for the prompt-
ness and effectiveness of the American
retaliation.
In the narrowest sense, the joint reso-
lution could be supported on grounds of
ratifying the action already taken, our
right to free access to the seas, and our
duty to defend ourselves, in appropriate
ways, against attacks upon us.
Mr. President (Mr. SALINGER in the
char) , I believe that on such ground
alone Congress would be justified in its
support of the joint resolution, upon the
principle that the punishment was fitted
to the crime.
The President has emphasized?and I
believe properly so?that in the retalia-
tory actiln we have taken, there is not
to be read any change of purpose on the
part of the United States. He has stated
that it is not our policy or our purpose
to expand the war. If that expansion
occurs, then it will be the choice of
others?not our own. I am in whole-
hearted agreement with the emphasis he
has given to the peaceful goals we hope
to serve, and to the fact that it is not
the policy of the United States to extend
the war in southeast Asia.
But, Mr. President, it would not be
either candid nor correct to consider this
resolution on such narrow grounds.
It is necessary to recognize that our
situation today must be viewed within
the context of American policy in the
Far East; otherwise, our ships would not
be in the Gulf of Tonkin, and the serious
events of the past few days would not
have occurred.
I have had doubts about American
policy in southeast Asia. I have ex-
pressed those doubts from time to time,
in this Chamber, in interviews for pub-
lication in newspapers, and in magazine
articles I have written. My doubts have
not been eradicated by the attacks made
upon American destroyers in the Gulf of
Tonkin. My misgivings have not been
dissipated by the ominous events of the
past few days. Rather, they have been
intensified. Because who can say that
these events are not the natural conse-
quence of the hazards we have assumed
by the policy we have adopted in this
part of the world?
We had every reason to expect that
some such incident might occur. It is
a risk we assumed, necessarily, when we
chose to intervene, following the defeat
of the French, in that great peninsula
which was once French Indochina?
when we assumed an American responsi-
bility for the future of this remote region
of the world.
I have entertained and continue to en-
tertain, serious misgivings about the cor-
rectness of American policy in southeast
Asia. It seems to me that this policy is
more the product of our own addiction
to an ideological view of world affairs?
an affliction which affects us as well as
the Communists?rather than a policy
based upon a detached and pragmatic
view of our real national interests.
However, my dissent, to the extent that
I hold it, and to the degree that I have
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17832 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE August 6
been able to define it, is not appropriate
for this occasion. This is not a time to
decry the policy. A country must live
with the policy it adopts, whether it be
wise or foolish.
We have adopted the policy. It was
initiated under the Eisenhower admin-
istration, when the original decision was
made for the United States to intervene
actively in South Vietnam. It has been
inherited and upheld by the Kennedy
administration, and by the Johnson ad-
ministration, in the years which have
followed.
Congress shares its responsibility for
that policy. If we have not formulated
It, we have funded it, from year to year,
with our votes. Who is there to say that
we have not acquiesced in it down
through the years?
So, Mr. President, we must accept
the consequences of our own actions.
We must now face the fact that the dif-
ficulties in which we find ourselves are
our responsibility, in having chosen to
pursue a course of action which exposed
us to such hazards.
It is in this spirit that I approach
the pending joint resolution. Under the
circumstances, we must unite behind the
President.
The attack upon us cannot be justi-
fied. It was an act of aggression. When
this country, or its ships, or its military
personnel are made targets of attack,
then Congress will uphold whatever ac-
tion the President takes in defense of
American interests and American lives.
I shall vote for the joint resolution in
the belief that President Johnson will
wisely use the authority conferred by the
resolution, and that he will have the
same attitude toward it that he has dis-
played in other crises; namely, an atti-
tude of reason, responsibility, and
restraint.
I believe that President Johnson is a
man of peace. I believe that he is sin-
cerely interested in doing everything pos-
sible to keep the war from spreading, in
this seething and dangerous area of the
world.
At the same time, I believe that he will
uphold the honor and the good name of
the United States against any nation
that would make itself our enemy.
Mr. President, it is with a heavy heart,
with a genuine concern about the fu-
ture of American policy in Asia, and with
a zealous desire that we might examine
all of its tenets in the days ahead, that
I shall vote for the joint resolution, con-
fident that in a time of crisis the Presi-
dent's hand must be upheld, and that
the lives and interests of the U.S. citizens
must be protected against all her
enemies.
Mr. GORE. Mr. President, will the
Senator from Idaho yield?
Mr. CHURCH. I yield.
Mr. GORE. I wish to congratulate the
Senator upon an able, candid, coura-
geous, and eloquent address.
With him, I have attended many
executive sessions of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee for the past few
years in which the subject of U.S. policy
and action in the Indo-chinese Peninsula
was under discussion.
The able Senator has lucidly put for-
ward his reservations and doubts. Al-
though I have not publicly voiced my
doubts, as has the Senator from Idaho,
nevertheless, in the performance of the
duty of a Senator to advise and consent.
I have, in the executive sessions -of the
committee, expressed deep concern and
I have raised critical questions as the
Senator from Idaho will recall, about
U.S. policy in Vietnam.
Perhaps I was remiss in not giving pub-
lic expression to these views. But every
Member of this body performs his duty
as he sees it. It had been my view that
I could perform best and most respon-
sively in executive sessions of the com-
mittee.
Now, however, when U.S. forces have
been attacked repeatedly upon the high
seas, as I said immediatey upon the con-
vening of the Senate after the second at-
tack, whatever doubts one may have
entertained are water over the dam.
Freedom of the seas must be preserved.
Aggression against our forces must be
repulsed.
I compliment the Senator and associ-
ate myself with almost all the sentiments
he has expressed.
To go further back, I was one of those
who did not think it wise for the United
States to undertake this burden after the
fall of Dienbienphu. That, too, is his-
tory. We must act today in light of facts
today.
I join the Senator in the conclusion he
reaches in support of the joint resolu-
tion. I join him, too, in confidence that
President Johnson will act with prudence,
caution, and wisdom, and with the cour-
age necessary for the eventualities that
may come.
Mr. CHURCH. I thank the Senator
very much for his remarks. I appreciate
them more than I can say.
CHAR i FOR NATIONAL TROPICAL
BOTANICAL GARDENS
The PRESIDING OFFICER laid be-
fore the Senate the amendments of the
House of Representatives to the bill (S.
1991) to charter by Act of Congress the
National Tropical Botanical Garden,
which were, on page 1, line 8, strike out
"associates and"; on page 1, line 10,
strike out "national" and insert "Pacif-
ic"; on page 2, line 8, after "bylaws,"
Insert "not inconsistent with this Act,";
on page 2, line 11, before "purposes" in-
sert "objects and"; on page 2, line 12,
strike out "Purposes and objects" and
Insert "objects and purposes"; on page 2,
line 24, strike out "sciences" and insert
"sciences;" on page 2, strike out line 25;
on page 3, strike out line 13; on page 3,
line 14, strike out "(b)" and insert "(a) ";
on page 3. line 16, strike out "(c)" and
Insert "(b)"; on page 3, line 17, strike
out "(d)" and insert "(c)"; on page 3,
line 20, strike out "(e)" and insert "(d) " ;
on page 3. line 25, strike out "(f)" and
Insert "(e)"; on page 4, strike out lines 1
through 8, inclusive; on page 4, after
line 8, insert:
(i) to take and hold by lease, gift. pur-
chase, grant, devise, or bequest, or by any
other method, any property, real, personal, or
mixed, necessary or proper for attaining the
objects and carrying into effect the purposes
of the corporation, subject, however, to ap-
plicable provisions of law of any State or the
District of Columbia (1) governing the
amount or kind of such property which may
be held by, or (2) otherwise limiting or con-
trolling the ownership of any such property
by a corporation operating in such State or
the District of Columbia;
' On page 4, line 9, strike out "(h)" and
Insert "(g)"; on page 4, line 12, strike
out "(i)" and insert "(h) "; on page 4,
line 18, strike out "(j)" and insert "(i)";
on page 5, line 12, after "Ssc. 6."
Insert "(a) "; on page 5, line 16, be-
fore "The" insert "(b)"; on page 8.
line 8, after "trustees." insert "The Cor-
poration shall also keep at its principal
office a record of the names and ad-
dresses of its members entitled to vote.":
on page 8, strike out line 15; on page 8,
strike out lines 16 through 23, inclusive,
and insert:
USE OF INCOME; LOANS TO OFFICERS, TRUSTEES,
? OR EMPLOYEES
8rc. 13.(a) No part of the income or as-
sets of the corporation shall inure to any
member, officer, or trustee, or be distributable
to any such person during the life of the cor-
poration or upon dissolution or final liquida-
tion. Nothing in this subsection, however,
shall be construed to prevent the payment of
reasonable compensation to officers of the
corporation in amounts approved by the
board of trustees of the corporation.
(b) The corporation shall not make loans
to its officers, trustees, or employees. Any
trustee who votes for or assents to the mak-
ing of a loan to an officer, trustee, or em-
ployee of the corporation, and any officer
who participates In the making of such loan,
shall be jointly and severally liable to the
corporation for the amount of such loan
until the repayment thereof.
On page 9, strike out lines 1 through 3,
inclusive; on page 9, strike out line 4; on
page 9, strike out lines 5 through 8, in-
clusive; on page 9, after line 8, insert:
USE OF ASSETS ON DISSOLTITION OR LIQUIDATION
On page 9, line 9, before "Upon" in-
sert "Ssc. 14."; on page 9, line 13, strike
out "through the National Park Serv-
ice"; on page 9, line 17, after "trustees"
insert ". consistent with the purposes of
the corporation,"; on page 10, lines 3
and 4, strike out "National" and insert
"Pacific", and to amend the title so as to
read: "An Act to charter by Act of Con-
gress the Pacific Tropical Botanical
Garden."
Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, S. 1991
passed the Senate July 23, 1964, and on
August 3, 1964, the House passed the bill
with amendments. The principal effect
was changing the name to the Pacific
Tropical Botanical Garden, so as not to
give the organization preference over
other tropical botanical gardens, both
public and private.
The sponsor of the Senate bill has ad-
vised the Committee on the Judiciary
that he desires the Senate to concur in
the amendments of the House.
On behalf of the Committee on the
Judiciary. I, therefore, move that the
Senate concur in the House amendments
to S. 1991.
The PRESIDING OrviCER. The
question is on agreeing to the motion of
the Senator from Illinois.
The motion was agreed to.
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F?rCattqff195Rfil ?Iiat9P--6-effi?13ER? 17833
COMMEMORATION ,OF FORMER
PRESIDENT HOOVER'S 90TH
BIRTHDAY
Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that an attested copy
of Senate Joint Resolution 184, for the
comMetneration of the Honorable Her-
bert Hoover's 90th birthday, August 10,
1964, approved by the President of the
United States on August 6, 1964, may be
prepared and printed in such appropri-
ate format and binding as the Joint
Committee en Printing may direct, and
that it be transmitted to the former
President by the Secretary of the Senate.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Withnopt
objection, it is so ordered.
NI IV
MAINTENANCE "OF INTERNATIONAL
PEACE AND SECURITY IN SOUTH-
EAST ASIA
The Senate resumed the consideration
of the joint resolution (S.J. Res. 189) to
promote the maintenance of interna-
tional peace and security in southeast
Asia.
VICTORY AND PEACE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
Mr. SIMPSON. Mr. President, what-
ever the reasons may be for some Sena-
tors opposing either the language or the
purpose of the resolution before the Sen-
ate, I am sure that there can be no disa-
greement on one point?that party lines
cease to exist on issues affecting the na-
tional security of the United States and of
the free world. I rise to lend my whole-
hearted support to this resolution. I was
heartened by the decision to strike
against the naval bases from which the
unprovoked attacks on our naval ships
were launched. At long last perhaps
here is the beginning of the initiative
that has been totally lacking in our
southeast Asian effort, for it is our pur-
pose not only to "assist in defense," as
the resolution states, but to assist in
achieving victory against an avaricious
enemy bent upon the total conquest of all
of southeast Asia.
Mr. President, I support this resolution
because in Vietnam there is a crisis in
which politics has no part. But, let me
say that I sincerely hope that the next
time Soviet, missiles are implanted in
Cuba or the next time Cuban exiles at-
tempt to exercise their rightful preroga-
tives in fighting for the freedom of what
was once known as the, Pearl of the An-
tilles the United States will act with
spontaneity, enthusiasm, and force com-
parable to what we have done in Viet-
nam.
It is tragic that a response as dramatic
as our destruction of naval bases upon
the territory of a sovereign Asian state
was not executed in our own hemisphere
In October of 1962 or even earlier?in
April of 1961, Had we responded then
with arms as well as metaphors, we could
have struck a significant blow for free-
dom and independence in our own hem-
isphere.
I-support wholeheartedly the military
action of this Government against the
North Vietnamese naval, bases, and I
support this resolution in sincere and
reverent hope that it indicates an end
of our policies of indecision, vacillation,
1
and compromise, and heralds the begin-
ning of that measure of commitment
which will forge victory from the Com-
munist-fomented chaos of southeast
Asia.
Mr. PELL. Mr. President, I support
the pending resolution.
Not only is it important to stand be-
hind our President in this time of ten-
sion, when unity is above partisan de-
bate, but I have confidence in President
Johnson's prudence and in his determi-
nation to avoid any unnecessary widen-
ing or escalation of military clashes.
I have full confidence that the Presi-
dent with his wide experience and his
intimate knowledge today of the facts
of this situation will even further
strengthen our efforts toward peace as
he seeks to avoid any weakening of our
position and purpose.
Still, let us think ahead as we sup-
port this resolution. Ho Chi Minh's ac-
tion cannot have been by error or acci-
dent. Therefore, let us practice pru-
dence and play our hand with reason
and calmness. If we over-respond, we
can, by destroying installations consid-
ered vital by Communist China to her
national interest, induce an outpouring
of Red Chinese soldiers as happened in
Korea.
In the days and weeks ahead, this cur-
rent crisis may?and probably will?
worsen. Let us act?and wisely. And,
let us resolve here and now, today, in
wisdom, and for the sake of our people
and Nation, to keep this issue removed
from the arena of political conflict and
ambition. Rather, let us support this
issue in the reasoning place of men's
minds which we have helped establish
for this purpose?the United Nations.
I would hope, too, that other freedom-
loving Asian nations, particularly Paki-
stan, the Philippines, and Japan, might
help us carry some of the burdens for
keeping the peace in the Far East. It is
also their responsibility to participate in
this endeavor, which is vital to their
safety and security as well. It is my
hope that such a sharing of the load may
also emerge from the United Nations Se-
curity Council.
This country's policy cannot, and must
not, be pummeled for the sake of polit-
ical gain. As an American, I urge lead-
ers of both political parties to exert every
effort to keep Vietnam out of this cam-
paign.
I trust the people and press of the
world will be aware that as the world's
strongest nation and defender of free-
dom, we will not stand for unprovoked
attack or aggression, but at the same
time be aware we do not seek material or
territorial gain. We only desire free-
dom, for ourselves, and for peoples of
other nations.
Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I suggest
the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Will
the Senator withdraw that request?
Mr. MORSE. I shall withdraw, it on
the condition that the Senator from
Kentucky [Mr. COOPER] asks for a
quorum call at the close of his remarks,
unless I am back on the floor.
Mr. COOPER. That is agreeable.
Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I with-
draw the request for a quorum call.
Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, I appre-
ciate the courtesy of the Senator from
Oregon.
A few moments ago I directed several
questions to the chairman of the Foreign
Relations Committee, and I spoke briefly
on the joint resolution. I wish now to
raise some considerations which I know
have addressed themselves to the Presi-
dent of the United States, but which we
have the duty, in this debate, to convey
to the President of the United States.
I intend to vote for the joint resolu-
tion. I shall vote for it not merely be-
cause we are required to do so because of
recent events. I shall vote for it be-
cause it expresses the unity of one pur-
pose to defend our country.
The first section of the resolution sup-
ports the President and approves his de-
termination to take all necessary meas-
ures to repel any armed attack against
the forces of the United States and to
prevent furthet aggression. That is his
right and authority. If we have any
Power to confirm it, we do confirm it.
We support him in his power to protect
the security of our country and its honor.
I join other Senators wholeheartedly in
asserting our support of the President.
Earlier, I raised questions about the
second section of the joint resolution, al-
though I know it is practically impossible
to separate the objectives of the first sec-
tion from those of the second section.
In response to my questions, the distin-
guished chairman of the Foreign Rela-
tions Committee, the Senator from Ar-
kansas [Mr. Fulanuoirrl , and I believe,
the chairman of the Armed Services
Committee, the Senator from Georgia
fMr. RussELLI, confirmed my viewpoint
that in passing this joint resolution
we would satisfy the conditions of
the SEATO treaty, and would exercise
our constitutional function to give the
President of the United States authority
to do what he determines may be proper
and necessary with respect to any situa-
tion which affects our security in South
Vietnam.
I believe that is the essence of the sec-
ond section. At least that was the mean-
ing and interpretation given to it by the
chairman of the Foreign Relations Com-
mittee.
There is no choice so far as the first
section of the joint resolution is con-
cerned. If there is any attack upon our
troops, our vessels, or our installations,
we have the duty, for our security and
our honor, to defend our own forces.
Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. COOPER. I am glad to yield.
Mr. MORSE. I am not sure I under-
stand the meaning of the Senator's com-
ment on the SEATO treaty. Is the Sen-
ator arguing that the SEATO treaty gives
us the authority to do what we have done
in South Vietnam?
Mr. COOPER. No. What I said is
that article IV of the SEATO treaty pro-
vides that in the event of an armed at-
tack upon one of the parties to the
SEATO treaty, or upon the countries
such as South Vietnam included in the
protocol, the United States, or any party
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au-gust a
to the treaty, could take action after
resorting to its constitutional processes?
which I would assume would mean Com-
ing to the Congress for authority.
Earlier today I asked the chairman
of the Foreign Relations Committee and
the chairman of the Armed Services
Committee whether they considered that,
by enacting the resolution, the Congress
would be exercising its constitutional
process, providing to the President power
to take such action as he determined
proper in South Vietnam in the future?
Mr. MORSE. I shall not interrupt
the Senator further. I shall discuss the
point in detail later. I only wish the
Senator to know that, in my opinion,
we have violated the United Nations
Charter time and time again in South
Vietnam, and that we cannot Justify it
on the basis of carrying out the SEATO
treaty.
Mr. COOPER. A few minutes ago, the
Senator from Mississippi [Mr. Simons]
said that the situation is not simple.
We are in a crisis.
I hope that this joint resolution, con-
nected with the resolute action the
President has taken, will have effect in
bringing the North Vietnamese and the
Communist Chinese to their senses, and
that they will know that to continue to
take aggressive measures could lead to
consequences which can hardly be con-
templated. And we must know for our-
selves the extent of the determinations
we are making. Whether we dislike say-
ing it?and there is a tendency to dislike
making the statement?it must be said
that there is great danger in the situa-
tion. The two attacks upon our destroy-
ers Indicate a system in the action of
North Vietnam or the Communist Chin-
nese.
We remember that, during the early
days of the Korean war, the threats of
Communist China were not believed?but
they were carried out. We must con-
template, hoping that it will not be true,
the possibility of an expanded war. And
With an expanded war, which again we
hope will not occur, there is the possibil-
ity of a great war.
I make this statement because the
President has, with respect to our action
In South Vietnam, a certain maneuvera-
bility, and avenues of negotiation which
should be assiduously used, however
they may be received.
I have confidence in President John-
son. I know that he is a man of good
judgment. I know that he speaks truly
when he says it is not our intention to
expand the war except as it would be in
our own defense. And I know that he
is a man of peace. But I hope very much
that he will continue to make every ef-
fort to find, if it is possible, Some solu-
tion for the situation in South Vietnam,
without the choice of war.
I may not be joined by others in the
statement I am about to make, but I
have not believed that southeast Asia is
the chief area of interest to the United
States. We are committed in Europe and
believe our chief interest is in the West-
ern Hemisphere and Europe. In the
Pacific we are committed to the defense
of Formosa, Korea, Japan, and the Phil-
ippines. I do not know how widely we
can spread our resources and our men
In the military forces. It may be argued
that this decision has been made, be-
cause for 10 years we have been on the
present course, in South Vietnam. But
I shall still emphasize my hope that the
President of the United States will, use
all of the great powers of his office and
of our country to find some peaceful and
just solution in South Vietnam, slender
as the chance may be.
The Senator from Oregon has argued
the subject for months; I have spoken
on it. There is still the passibility of
reference to the United Nations. There
Is still the possibility of action through
the Geneva powers; and these courses
must not be overlooked.
Like many other Senators, I have had
some experience in war, an experience
which I value above all others. Anyone
who has had such experience knows,
awesome as it is, that it does not make
one less afraid or less courageous. It
makes one determined to protect the se-
curity and honor of his country. But it
makes one also more determined and
more thoughtful about seeking out every
honorable and just course to avoid the
possibility of a great war, and the awful
eventuality of a nuclear war with all the
sorrow and disaster it would bring to
our country and humanity.
I am hopeful that the joint resolution
and the President's action will bring rea-
son to the North Vietnamese and the
Communist Chinese, and that they will
cease their aggressions. But I state my
conviction that the President and the
Congress have the responsibility to con-
tinue to work for ways, consonant with
our honor and security, to avoid the
great catastrophe of war. If we cannot
do so, we stand together to defend, at
whatever cost, our country and freedom.
Mr. JAVITt3. Mr. President. I should
like to support the position just enunci-
ated, with his usual heart and human-
ity, as well as wisdom, by my colleague
from Kentucky. I rise not necessarily
because he needs any support. His word
Is strong enough in this Chamber and in
the, world. I rise only because the dis-
cussion ties in so closely with the ques-
tioning of the Senator from Arkansas on
the real meaning and Implication of the
Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty.
We who support the joint resolution do
so with full knowledge of its seriousness
and with the understanding that we are
voting a resolution which means life or
the loss of It for who knows how many
hundreds or thousands? Who knows
what destruction and despair this action
may bring in the name of freedom? I
hope we shall be very sober in our judg-
ment, as befits the great historic tradi-
tion of this body.
We have a right to expect from the
President of the United States, who will
receive this great grant of confidence,
which I am sure the Senate will give by
an overwhelming vote, and from the For-
eign Relations Committee, which has di-
rect charge of these matters in this body,
as vigorous a diplomatic effort as we are
authorizing in the other field. We have
every right to believe that the nations
In the SEATO treaty have interests in
this region as great as ours. They may
not be able to muster the military pow-
er we can, but they certainly can muster
some help which will give them a sense
of participation. We know they can
muster great moral strength. There is a
great population in that area. Pakistan
has a population of more than 100 mil-
lion. India, though in dire trouble, is
still the counterweight to Communist
China. She has a profound interest in
what happens in that area. Indonesia,
Malaysia, and Thailand have consider-
able influence. All those strengths must
be mustered, in a physical and moral
sense. The same is true of France, Great
Britain, and others.
I thoroughly agree with the Senator
from Oregon [Mr. Moms] as to the
moral strength?although I do not agree
with him as to what we have to do in
this situation?that must be mustered
by the United States, constantly and con-
tinuously, to appeal to the conscience of
the world, in order to give the world an
opportunity to bring about a sense of
justice and morality, and an opportu-
nity to act in its own freedom.
In fundamental aspect, the prize that
the Chinese Communists are seeking is
the possession of the great arsenal of
production in Asia, including Japan.
The aim of Communist China in respect
of Japan is parallel to that which the
Soviet Union, in its worst Stalinist days,
had toward Germany. They seek a
ready-made arsenal in order to develop it
Quickly
Mr. LAUSCHE. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield? Will he repeat what
he just said? I think it is important.
Mr. JAVITS. I thank the Senator.
The objective of the Chinese Commu-
nists is the great arsenal cf production
which is Japan, just as the objective of
the Soviet Union in its Stalinist days?
and probably still is?was the great ar-
senal of production which was Germany.
They are the main bases which the Com-
munists are seeking to capture.
We must understand the deep feeling
of every American and every American
family on this question. I have already
received in my office, as I am sure all
other Senators have, numerous tele-
grams since yesterday on this subject.
I was awakened three times between 12
o'clock and 3 in the morning?and I do
not complain; I understand the feelings
of the families involved?by people in
New York telling me how deeply con-
cerned they were and with what prayer
and devotion I must determine how to
act on the joint resolution.
For those people we have a pledge to
use every instrument of diplomacy, as
we are willing to use every element of
force, necessary to preserve freedom.
We have also another pledge. The
Senator from Kentucky [Mr. COOPER]
said it was expected that these means
should be used with the greatest modera-
tion and understanding of the vital issue
with which we are dealing.
Also, and finally, we have the sad duty
which generals have in war, of compar-
ing the number of casualties we are will-
ing to endure in order to achieve an ob-
jective which will save even greater
casualties. Does anyone think that
President Truman had an easy decision
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