TRUE STORY OF THE WAR IN VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP66B00403R000200140033-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 2, 2005
• Sequence Number: 33
• Publication Date: May 12, 1964
• Content Type: OPEN

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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ' APPENDIX
desire indepent enee in those countries Ir rge and `diverse country, and one Comm s-
into revolt against the nterriational elri- Mon in Washington cannot effectively check
Aire of Soviet;_lEussia" We'are gratified the hiring practices of every company. The
- probability is that the greatest effect of a
that Laos is able to celebrate its inde-
new Federal fair employment statute would
pendence dad this Ma--ft ii het us,Tiope lie in the mere fact of its passage by Con-
that many more May 11`s will come and gress: A standard would thereby be set for
go in Laos Wit l'fre2dbm and happy cele- the great majority of management and
orations. union leaders who want to do Justice and
On 1VYay 11 the people of the United obey the law.
States honor Eaos, a gallant nation,. and What is important is that the enforcement
sexad our word6Of? Ope for freedom and method provided be strong and clear enough
to constitute a meaningful warning.
peaceful resolutionOf Conflicts In the The millennium will not arrive if title 7 is
words of the Master 13ucldhaSakyamuni enacted., But there must be a beginning;
spoken 2,500 years ago: and it is surely time for a Federal undertak-
The jxiiddle course is the course in which 'ing to end an injustice that is damaging
eyes tVilI be 'opened and intelligence enligllt- the American economy and, more important,
tined. Yt leads, to peace, lucidity and seren imposing misery and frustration on Amer.
TE TaICSN OF REMAII,I S
OF
H4N.. WILLIAM F RYAN '
F' Y tl$ _
IN THl; HOUSE OF`RE Ars-t1WTATIOES`
Civil Rights Bifl-Titles .VII-TXI
1Uir. ItYAN of New York. Mr. Speak-
er,, I wish to bring to the attention of
those of my colleagues who might have
Fork
iriissetl them, the last two New
Times editorials regarding the civil rights
bill. These editorial`'s were pulished on
May 8 and, 9. I believe that- the New
York Times deserves commendation for
the thoughtful and incisive series of edi-
torials on the, individual titles of the bill.
This series is' a much needed contribu-
tion to the debate on the civil rights bill.
[From the TTew Ltorfc Times May $, i964]
CIVILRIGHTS ILL V.
The disadvantage suffered by the average
Negro in this country because of the color of
his skin is nowhere more burdensome than'
in the area of job opportunity. The unem-
ployment rate is twice as high among
'Negroes as among whites;' median family in-
come Is-about half as much.
Thisis a national, not a southern, prob-
lem Coiuonly in the North `as in the
South,.~legroes are confined to inenlal "fobs.
Throughout the country, large locals of some
major unions that control access to skilled
employment will not admit Negroes. We
-need look- no further than the di graceful
behavior .of a plumbers' local in New York
for an example.
Title 7of the civil rights bill now before
the Senate Is an ainbitipu.,s,proposal for 'a
,national attack on discrimination iii em-
ployment. It prohibits racial or reli_gious
dis rimin, tipi y companies with 25 or more
employees and unions with 25,or more mem-
bers, after a 4 year transitional.,period.
To enforce its provisions this title creates
an Equal Employment Opportunity Com
mission, which"would investigate complaints
of sliscr}} ns ipxj_aiid..couldsue.i_n tiie keci-__
erai courta_if persuasion failed. The mis-
representations by opponents of the civil
rights legislation are at their wildest in dis-
eussion of thi..; 4tle, It .would not, as has
1 -1 11
been suggested, require anyone to establish
racial quotas" to the contrary, such quotas
would Joe fArbidden_ as a - racial test...,The
bill dogs aot,xequire employers or unions to
drop any standard for hiring or promotion
or menlbrsiiip-except the discriminatory
standard of race , or religion.
It must be candidly recognized that title 7
would not ovgrnlgli`t wipe out inequality of
job opportunities for Negroes. This is a
yet another disturbing story about the
conduct of the war in South Vietnam.
This firsthand report places much of
the blame for the failure to destroy the
Vietcong to an attitude prevalent pre-
sumably among many of the Vietnamese
military officers who apparently prefer to
enjoy! the blessings of the $2 million a
day flow of American aid to fighting the
Vietcong, and who are, therefore, less
than enthusiastic about eliminating the
Communist menace which stimulates
such aid. Consequently, the question is
raised as to whether the American in-
vestment in South Vietnam is being so
handled as to discourage the South Viet-
namese from effectively responding to
Communist aggression and subversion.
mil r -disg feting reports Nava been
The last four titles of the pending civil tary personnel have been supplied with
`ri'ghts bill, whose other major provisions we defective and wornout equipment. Cer-
have already discussed in this, series of edi- -tainly, regardless of what policy the Gov-round errnment airoleY in protecting e ua ity under r n.
g q lity under isrnment adopts to meet the Communist
p
law, .aggression in South Vietnam, in view of
Title. 8 is designed
in area whe to provide inforlnation the steadily growing fist of American
Is curiously inadequate, casualties, I, as a member of the Armed
the statistics of re istration and voting. The
g Services Committee, find ft is most diffi-
e sus,Burea would,b, directed to de,ter- cult to understand why our country has
mine"the numbers of persons eligible to vote, not provided our American personnel
by race, in States designated by the Civil with effective fighting equipment.
be the e Rights handful ndful of Commission.
of States Those in will the Deep undoubtedly South The deepening concern of many Amer-
where where intimidation and gross defiance of law icans over the situation there has
.now keep citizens from the polls because of reached the point, I believe, that the re-
their, color, It,,1s-plain that the country peated trips of Secretary McNamara and
should have accurate information on the ex- ...General Taylor to Saigon, because of the
tent of such denials o the franchise,
lack of substantial results, are no longer
Title 9 addresses itself to the sadly com- a sign of encouragement, but of embar-
mon situation of State criminal trials in rassment.
which defendants have reason to fear they
will be denied justice because of their race. The time is long overdue for the Amer-
Federal law has long allowed defendants to ican people to be given a full accounting
remove their cases to the ,Federal, courts oLTJ.S,_policy in South Vietnam, for it is
where they can make a showing of jeopardy, clear that if we do not vigorously and
to their civil rights in State tribunals. But decisively defeat Communist aggression
lower Federal judges often send the cases in South Vietnam and rally the south-
back to the State courts, and these decisions
to remand have been held unappealable. east Asian peoples' confidence and
Title 9 allows defendants to appeal such respect for the free world, the Commu-
orders. nist Chinese will be greatly encouraged
Conciliation is the noncontroversiai,obtec and we will be faced with a much greater
tive of title 10, which would set up a new military threat in that area. It is now
Community Relations Service in the Com- abundantly clear that success in South
inerce Department to mediate racial disputes. Vietnam and southeast Asia cannot be
The one mystery is why the service would be achieved through a never-ending series
limited to seven permanent employees, This of halfway measures. Either we are
remove. r a ceiling that the Senate would do well to~.committed to defeat Communist aggres-
The final section, title 11, makes sure that lion or we are not. Only an all-out effort
the measure would not repeal existing Fed-
eral or State, law against racial discrimina-
tion. And it contains the usual clause- to
protect the act's constitutionality-as to
which we entertain no doubts. Nor are we
in doubt about the desirability of speedy
passage of the entire bill.
True Story of the War in Vietnam
=TENSION OF REMARKS
.._-.- . OF
namese will be effective. It would be
better that we were not there at all than
to be there and to fail in our mission.
The article follows:
TRUE STORY OF WAR IN VIETNAM
(NOTE.-Go out to the frontlines, in the
jungles of South Vietnam, and you get a view
of the war that Secretary McNamara and
other high Washington officials do not see.
One American writer did that, Robert L.
Moore, Jr., lived 4 months with United States
and Vietnamese soldiers, went on combat
missions with them. What this writer saw
raises important questions about the way
HON. CHARLES E. CHAMBERLAIN that war is being fought. He found incom-
OF MICHIGAN petence, cowardice, graft-and no will to
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES win-among many of the Vietnamese officers
and public officials directing war operations.
Tuesday, May 12, 1964 In this report, he tells why he thinks the war
Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. Mr Speaker, not be won until the United States takes
I over control.)
Wish to call the attention of the Members SAIGON, SOUTH VIETNAM.--"In his trips to
of this House to the May 19 issue of the South Vietnam, Secretary of Defense Robert
U.S. News & Worl&,Reportywh_ich carries McNamara was never exposed to the hard,
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - APPENDIX May 12
unpleasant facts facing those Americans who
are actually fighting the war against the
Communist Vietcong."
These words were written by an American
who has spent 4 months living in the field
with the United States and Vietnamese fight-
ing forces-actually going with them into
combat.
From firsthand experience, this on-the-
spot American observer has reached these
conclusions:
"The basic problem that America faces in
Vietnam is not that of defeating the Vietcong
Communists. That could be done In a year
or less.
"Our problem is to be allowed to win-to
be permitted by our Vietnamese allies to
prosecute this war aggressively and end It.
This does not necessarily have to involve
bringing U.S. battle groups Into Vietnam to
fight the war. Vietnam has the soldiers and
equipment to win.
'But, as U.S. advisers in the field say pri-
vately: The war can't be won under the
present ground rules because of the inability
of most Vietnamese military leaders to lead."
The American who wrote these conclusions
Is Robert L. Moore, Jr., from Boston, Mass.
He was an Air Pbrce nose gunner in World
War II. After graduation from Harvard in
1949, he worked In television and in public
relations and then turned to writing. His
output includes two books.
Last year Mr. Moore got the consent of the
Department of the Army to live among the
U.S. Special Forces In South Vietnam to
gather material for a book about them. In
preparation, he took parachute training at
Fort Kenning, Ga., went through Special
Warfare School at Fort Braggy N.C.
Now, after 4 months 1n Vietnam, Mr. Moore
Is returning to write at length about what
he has observed there. But he feels that
some of his findings are so Important and so
timely that they should be published quickly.
So he has given U.S. News & World Report
permission to quote from the first draft of
one article that he Is preparing.
The story that Mr. Moore tells is a story of
a war that Secretary McNamara has not seen.
Mr. Moore says:
"Many U.S. fighting men expressed disap-
pointment that the Secretary did not visit
American units in daily combat with the
Vietcong and find out at first hand from his
soldiers what their problems are.
'The U.S. high command in Saigon does
Rot encourage Its. men to pass their problems
along to the Pentagon Chief"
Following, from Mr. Moore's report, are
some of those problems that Americans face
in Vietnam.
LACKING: A WILL TO WIN
One major problem is the at?itude of the
Vietnamese. Mr. Moore says:
"The will to fight, endure privations and
win Is just not In the majority of the Viet-
namese military officers."
Mr. Moore questions whether some of the
high officials and military officers of that
country really want to see the war end.
Why? He writes this:
"Never before have so many Vietnamese
officers and public officials lived so well In
such a booming economy-injected as It Is
with a daily dose of almost $2 million of
American money.
"It is obvious to the Vietnamese who are
benefiting from this dole that when the war
Is over this massive aid will cease, or at least
be drastically modified."
ADVISERS IN COtMAT
The official role of U.S. Army Special Forces
In Vietnam is that of advisers to Vietnamese
combat forces. But Mr. Moore reports that
these so-called "advisers" have suffered more
than half the U.S. combat casualties, al-
though they make up only about 6 percent
of the total U.S. force in Vietnam.
Here, from Mr. Moore's account, Is how the
.U.S. Special Forces actually operate:
'"The basic Special Forces combat unit-
'Uchnically referred to as an 'advisory' unit-
Is a 12-man team known as an A team.
There are 42 such units, directed and sup-
ported by four B teams, located in the four
military-corps areas of South Vietnam, with
a headquarters unit known as the Special
Forces Operating Base in Saigon.
"Each A team is strategically situated in
an area dominated by the Communists.
Anywhere from 300 to 600 Vietnamese civil-
ians-trained by the Special Forces--are
quartered in an A-team camp and are used
to reconnoiter Vietcong positions and raid
their concentrations.
"Also in each camp there is a Vietnamese
Special Forces A team which, in theory,
parallels the American team in capabilities,
composition, and organization-that is: two
officers and 10 enlisted men.
Actually, however, Mr. Moore finds a great
difference between the United States and
Vietnamese "Special Forces."
OITICERS PICKED BY POLITICS
Mr. Moore gives this description of the
Vietnamese Special Forces-and of how they
are selected: "The Vietnamese Special
Forces--or Luc-Luong Dac-Biet, to use the
Vietnamese designation-were primarily a
unit of political troops organized under the
regime of the late President, Ngo Dinh Diem.
to serve as the President's private police and
riot squad.
"Coveted positions in this elite group were
given out as political favors to the sons of
friends and supporters of President Diem and
his family. To give the group status and
equip It with the finest U.S. military hard-
ware, Diem alined his Special Forces with
U.S. Special Forces-thus saddling the
Americans with Vietnamese teams made up
of youths who had no taste for combat and
whose only training was as palace guards.
"To make things worse, instead of the
Vietnamese going out to learn from their
highly trained American counterparts, the
Vietnamese team captain was made camp
commander over the experienced American,
who can only advise.
"Despite the two recent coups, each sup-
posedly dedicated to a more aggressive war
effort, the character of the Vietnamese Spe-
cial Forces seems to be changing all too
slowly. Vietnamese officers move into and
out of jail as power changes hands. but their
overall quality still stands at a dismally low
level."
LURUIY IN MIDST OP WAR
You get this description of how officers of
the Vietnamese Special Forces live in the
midst of a war:
"Most of the officers have a batman to
serve them tea In bed In the mornings. Fre-
quently they refuse to see their American
counterpart, particularly if they think he is
going to goad them into a combat opera-
tion. When they do go out on operations,
the officers make their men carry all their
equipment. Americans carry their own gear.
"Many 35 or 40-year-old lieutenants and
captains-whose lack of political connections
accounts for their lack of promotions--are
sent to some of the most dangerous areas
where the majority of Vietnamese officers re-
fused to be posted,
"With increasing effort by the Vietnamese
Government to make the Army more effec-
tive, it is usually possible now for a U.S. Spe-
cial Forces A-team captain to have his Viet-
namese counterpart relieved from command.
Unfortunately, such officers are merely trans-
ferred as camp commander to another Spe-
cial Forces team in another corps area to
begin anew the same cycle of embezzlement
of U.S.-supplied funds and deterioration of
fighting efficiency."
COWARDICE AND LAZINffia
Mr. Moore tells of the difficulties often en-
countered in trying to get Vietnamese officers
to go out and fight the enemy: "I partici-
pated in six combat operations throughout
the four corps areas and the pattern never
deviated. As soon as it was ascertained that
a Vietnamese patrol was closing In on a
Vietcong concentration, antinoise discipline
disintegrated. Shots were accidentally fired
and canteens rattled to let the enemy know
that, he was being pursued.
"When, In spite of these precautions, the
Vietcong appeared ready to dig in and
fight, the Vietnamese commander Inevitably
came up with some excuse for pulling back.
"One excuse for turning from the enemy
particularly sticks in my mind. It was
uttered by a Vietnamese officer in Tay Ninh
Province. We had to ford a river to get at
what we judged to be a platoon of Vietcong
on the other side. We had a full company.
The two American advisers were exuberant at
the opportunity of engaging a Vietcong unit.
But the Vietnamese officer turned to the
Americana and said his men could not cross
the river because there were too many alli-
gators in it.
"There are, of course, exceptions to the
general rule of cowardice and laziness in the
Vietnamese Special Forces.
"I spent some time in the camp of a U.S.
Special Forces officer who had nothing but
praise for his former counterpart, a Viet-
namese lieutenant in his early thirties. This
Vietnamese officer was an aggressive fighting
man, able to Inspire great courage and
loyalty among the civilian defense troops.
"The American officer wrote a letter of
commendation for the Vietnamese officer, rec-
oarmending that he be given a promotion to
captain. Two weeks later the lieutenant was
transferred to Saigon and replaced by a more
typical Vietnamese officer--a 22-year-old
anti-American captain who has failed to go
out on a single operation to date.
"U.S. Special Forces men can hardly be
blamed for their bitterness toward the Viet-
namese officers who make a diffigult job
almost impossible."
GRATr AND CORRUPTION
Among the things that make American
soldiers angry are the graft and corruption
that are widespread In Vietnam-even in
combat areas. Mr. Moore cites a few ex-
amples. Here is one:
"In April r visited several camps where
Vietnamese camp commanders had under
them 200 or 300 Montagnard troops.
Montagnards are mountain tribesmen who
are the best fighting men in the Vietnamese
Army. But the Vietnamese despise the
darker-skinned and coarser-featured Mon-
tagnards. These Vietnamese camp com-
manders made the lives of their Montagnard
men so miserable by degrading punishment
and cutting down on their food that deser-
tions soared.
"The camp commanders failed to report
the dessertere until after payday. They col-
lected from the Americans the pay for the
entire camp roster, indicating on the payroll
that all the deserters had been paid while
in actuality the commanders kept the de-
serters' pay for themselves.
"Yet If Americans object too strenuously
to such things they are severely reprimanded
for not being cooperative with their Viet-
namese counterparts."
Another example:
"On patrols, one Vietnamese commander
made his Montagnards hunt deer instead of
Vietcong. The commander drove out on the
patrols in a weapons carrier. After several
days during which he ate heartily while re-
fusing to give the troops any of the meat
they provided, the commander drove his load
of deer carcasses into town and sold them.
This same camp commander had just tried
to jail the interpreter who had told the
American captain that the commander had
pocketed the pay of almost 100 deserters.
"Such stories are so common that Ameri-
cans begin to take it for granted that they
are expected to put up with Vietnamese graft
and cowardice as part of their job.
"One U.S. sergeant told me riefully: 'They
took $1.700 out of my pay for taxes last year,
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and I have to keep my mouth shut and see ing to pick up the wounded that I decided States to take operational control of the war
it wasted over, hereto go along on an all Vietnamese evacuation away from the luxury-loving, coup d'etat-
'Mr. Moore- reports There is little confi- flight. minded, casualty-fearing Vietnamese officer
dente among Americans working at the tom- For 16 minutes the chopper pilots circled corps until such time as they can develop the
bat level that Corruption will be significantly the clearing. Finally the chopper in which leadership necessary to win the war. If we do 11 aiminishsd y~~ the announcement of Maj. I was riding descended almost into the clear- not take operational control, we merely waste
Gen. Nguyen Khans Elie new South Vietnam ing. Then it popped up Into the air like a 1 lives and money in a hopeless stalemate."
-1coAnr +l,a} i,u niil' Ali-u hno~i pro of , ,, }n nrir rriiaacwi t nricr ma~c.? Thn n nhief
Y 9 64 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD --APPENDIX A2429
RkDTAI' AND DMAif ` . ,, drop inagain. Lower and lower we hovered, As grave Men Die
$1,000 and shoot anyone who steals morethan examined the fuselage for bullet holes.
tney realized tnat their own pilots were
afraid to come down in Vietcong-invested
jungles to pick up the wounded. The ground
troops automatically gave up hope when they
saw the yellow streak on the choppers h gh
above."
a "jungle 'area.: Cietnamese rangers Were parently frightened the Vietnamese pilot off, OF TEXAS
I asked to fain the ground search. although he later told me he was afraid the IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Mr. Moore says "The biggest single fault I saw a wounded man, smiling, being helped
in the ;Vietnamese mtl(tary system is its toward the helicopter. Then suddenly the
ohygnle.inability to react quickly.` He cites helicopter began to rise again. The last
F ,a heard rea ing example thing I saw was a sudden hopeless expres-
Orl March 2,,two, American were reported slap wipe out the game smile on the wounded
overdue,and presumed down on a flight over man's face. Vietcong ground fire had ap-
the d1stri0t a4d.provincial political chiefs less than a foot from the ground:' Mr. ALGER. Mr. Speaker, as the
Ranger officers then refused" to move until "Over
rs over again,"
the Mr.
terrible Moore
faliYs' n House meets today in all probability an
they gat reserves to stand by in their ab- U.S. advisers reported American boy a'ana i n,,,,,i of Aoia- _.,+i...v,o morale amone the Vietnamese troops when y will die in South Vietnam.
it took,2days just to get permission-first clearing was too small and the rotor blades
from a Vietnamese general and then from would hit the trees-this after he was already Tuesday, May 12, 1964
Qn April 1," the rangers finally were flown
to, a camp from which they were to start a
search, Then came word that xlew Vietna-
11 1 _A,
Wie a con}man`d lyO arrIylrig the next day
for an.inspection-and the mangers had_to
provide an honor guard.
it was,.lipril 3-8 days after the plane went
down, ~wen the search finally got underway.
HOW TO HANDLE SNIPES,5 WITslDRAW."
11creis an example, cited by Mr. Moore, of
hgw Vietnamese can turn U.S. military tac-
tics. intq..t{actIGr> yf retreat "If tiles Secretary
of Defense really wants to see at firsthand
00tkie off, the reasons we cannot wfn_ this_ war
in Vietnam Witjlout some policy changes, he
should. spend a week at one of the Special
Forces B teams. They are truly microcosms
of the entire war, Most. o. our bs,sic frustra-
tions and quandaries are reflected in. a B
team's daily incidents.
"At one $ team ,I fouAd the operations
officer laughing wryly over the translation of
a recent directive. Vietcong snipers picking
off a few men were routing Whole companies
and battalions, U.S. advisers, showed the
Vietnamese how to dispatch squads to kill or
drive off the snipers. The.Ainerican6 were
pleased when a,directive on theirmethods of
dealing with snipers went out from- corps
headquarters.
" "A few weeks later, however, the tactical
genius of the Vietnamese. military mind came
forth in a new communique. It instructed
Units co ing under Vietcong sniper fire to
Withdrav leaving ambushes in case the
sniper charged."
U$. EQUIPJeENT. WASTED
Here iS another problem reported by Mr.
Moore, from his. own observations,
"Secretary McNamara talks about sending
more supplies and equipment to help the
Vietnamese win their-war against commu-
nism, This is fine, except that by and large
the Vietnamese, have .no concept of main-
tenance,, much teaspreventive.maintenance.
Unless:Ai1}erlpan arpmai tainlrig the equip-
ment , here it quickly deteriorates from sheer
lack of Care and, ,then "the Vietnamese ask
for more." ,
RESCITE-OR,FLIG,IlT?
Vietnamese pilots- were taught to fly U.S.
helicopters, then eight helicopters were
turnefI . , over to theni,._ The , Vietnamese
painted,pa
1 11 rts of the lie]~copters yellow-the
color of their flag.: Then the Vie"tnamese. took
over the flying of rescue flights to evacuate
Vietnatness wounded from jungle combat
~u?y ~???? ?e++.iiriy uy uay or Dy night, even -. naue auiea nim.
Mr. Moore tells how this workcti.out -if outnumbered, the war against communism Here we are, the most powerful nation on
"Y had
.heard, so many stories about the in Vietnam will not be won-no matter if we earth, boasting every day of our superiority
-Vietnamese pilots' flying over the evacuation pour in $3 or $4 or $5 million a day in aid. in modern arms, and we send our young men
site at 5,000 feet, well out of range of ground "The only realistic solution that most out to fight a ruthless, determined foe with
fire. and then fivi- h-t- -'+h-- ---- a..-. __ . - __. . _
WHY VILLAGERS DESERT
Vietnamese strategy is to clear an area of
Vietcong Communist forces-and then try
to'hold that area while clearing other areas.
But Mr. Moore reports :
"So far, holding operations by the Viet-
namese alone have not been successful."
One instance is cited where Americans
trained thousands of mountain tribesmen,
cleared the area. Then the camp was turned
over to the Vietnamese. Result: "Less than
2 months after the Americans pulled out, the
Vietcong attacked, drove the Vietnamese out
of the fort and destroyed it." Another ex-
ample :
"In a program to get the Montagnards away
from the Vietcong-preventing them from
feeding the Communists or joining them,
either willingly or by impressment-the
tribesmen were taken from their villages in
the mountains and brought into new villages
built around forts garrisoned by Vietnamese
troops. But the Vietnamese troops refuse
to leave their forts after dark. So the-Viet-
cong come into the villages at about 6 p.m.
and stay the night, giving political orienta-
tions, eating, imposing taxes, and punishing
villagers suspected of cooperating with the
Government. In the morning, the Vietcong
leave and the Vietnamese troops take over
until evening.
"Until the Vietnamese muster the courage
to go out at night and patrol the areas they
are, supposed to be securing, the entire 'clear
and hold' concept is a joke.
"With no protection at night, the villagers
know that death and torture will be their
lot if they cooperate with the Government.
Hundreds of tribesmen are moving back into
the hills. As long as they are going to be
dominated by the Vietcong anyway, they pre-
It is likely he will be plunged to death
in a piece of obsolete equipment fighting
a war that is not a war. In those last
agonizing moments he may wonder why
he is fighting in South Vietnam and why
he is dying.
For all those brave young Americans
who have already died there, we in Con-
gress must find the answers. We must
demand to know why our boys are being
sent into battle with old and wornout
equipment. We must demand of the ad-
ministration that we win the war there or
get out. To pursue our present policy
is to condemn ? to death more young
Americans.
In the Washington Daily News of Mon-
day, May 11, there is a story of the
tragedy in South Vietnam written by 'a
correspondent on the ground there, Jim
G. Lucas. The News also had an edi-
torial on the Lucas article, "Brave Men
Betrayed." I would like to include both
these items as a part of these remarks.
I would also like to ask at this time, in
the name of the families of Capt. Jerry
Shank, Robert N. Brumet, and all the
others who have been killed in this Com-
munist inspired war, Mr. President, do we
want to win the war in South Vietnam?
Why haven't our fighting men been
given proper equipment? Is this a polit-
ical war, Mr. President, that will be called
off after the election next November?
The people have a right to know and they
haven't been told the facts about South
Vietnam. What is your answer to the
Lucas article, Mr. President?
The two items from the News follow:
JIM G. LUCAS TELLS How OBSOLETE AIRCRAFT,
fer to be in their own home mountains. And (The accompanying story from South Viet-
then, of course, they are turned Into hardcore nam by Jim G. Lucas was submitted in ad-
Communists when the Vietnamese Air Force vance of publication to U.S. Air Force head-
bombs, and strafes theirvillages because they quarters here. It was read but official com-
cleserted their Government hamlets to go ment was declined.)
back to Vietcong territory."
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. BRUCE ALGER
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - APPENDIX May 12
Jerry Shank and Robert N. Brumet died
because they were ordered to fly planes that
might better have been consigned to the
scrap heap.
TRaurERs
They were T-28's. The "T" stands for
"trainer," and that's all it was intended to be.
It was outmoded in 1953. It is practically
the last two-seated propeller-driven craft in
the Air Force's Inventory.
Yet out here we've loaded this antiquated
trainer's wings with 500-pound bombs and
napalm so that if one is flown long enough
it's Inevitable that its wings will drop off.
The men who fly them know that.
Politically, of course, the T-28 has its
points. No one, including the Reds, could
seriously object to it.
By using it, we're respecting the armistice
terms of the 1954 Geneva Convention, in that
we're not introducing new equipment into
Vietnam.
BODY TOE PROor
Also, we can put a Vietnamese In the rear
seat, contending be's a student pilot.
Actually, few of them even speak English
and instruction to nonexistent.
But if a T-28 crashes, there will be a Viet-
namese body In the wreckage, and apparently
that's important in this game of hide-and-
seek we're playing here.
I'm glad I don't have it on my conscience.
As for Terry Shank and Bob Brumet-every
time they put their planes Into a dive they
must have wondered If they would coma out.
On April 9, Capt. Robert Brumet, 36, put
We craft into a dive and it didn't come out.
His buddies, flying nearby, saw the wings
fall off and watched in horror as the plane
plowed into the paddles.
They called over their radios for the chop-
pers to come in and pick up what was left.
The choppers didn't get there soon enough.
The Vietcong got there first.
I hope Bob was dead when they found
him, because these are the same people who
ceremoniously broke the arms and legs of
a district leader's wife at Kien Long recent-
ly and then killed her. That's the kind of
enemy we face.
We need equipment we can count on to
keep us out of their hands.
Captain Brumet was Tull of love of living
and as fine a fighter pilot and a man as
you could want.
.
?NOTfi * ONE plane on March 24. On April 9 it happened
On March 24, Jerry Shank put his ship Into to the T-28 piloted by Capt. Robert Brumet.
a dive between Soc Trang and Back Lieu Nor Is the T-28 the whole story of cour-
and its wing separated from the fuselage. ageous young American pilots being betrayed
Jerry was Capt. Edwin G. Shank. 27. from by war-weary, obsolescent aircraft. The
Wlnamac, Ind. When they shipped his body B-26, a World War II attack bomber, was out-
back, every shop and office in his hometown moded on V-J Day. Until recently it was
closed for the day. flying combat sorties in Vietnam and. as
Jerry was liked by everybody, and most Jerry Shank's letters have made brutally
everybody felt the same way about him. He explicit, still killing American copter men. done
left a wife and four children. H-21 ("PlyIng MATS PLOT yeoman duty in Vietnam, but it is old and
Before he came to Vietnam, be was a slow and is by no means the Nation's best
combat-lift chopper. It. too, imposes un-
MATS transport pilot. He graduated from
Notre Dame in 1959 with a degree In archi-
tectural engineering.
He did his stint in the Air Force Reserve.
liked it and decided to make flying his
career.
Jerry had one consuming ambition: He
dreamed of being the first American to land
on the moon. Maybe he could have done It.
He had all the qualifications.
It makes you wonder what kind of official
thinking justifies taking the lives of two
such young men-and there have been at
least two others--and you make up your
ill find out when you get home.
- mind you w
Such decisions may be may to come by of young Americans dying in the naming operations at the existing facilities ........
In Washington, where men are statistics and wreckage of obsolete airplanes gives a tragic somewhat ease present conditions and seems
casualty rates are a wavering line on a weekly insight Into one of the reasons we are losing. to be a move which would most quickly start
chart, Our men deserve better from those of us the flow of additional coins to the commer-
But they're harder to take when you know who remain safe back home. cial banks.
the brave men who honestly fear their
planes-because they can't trust the craft
to do the job they're asked to do in their
country's name.
sirl,scE MZNT
The Pentagon says We replacing the T-28
with a Navy carrier plane, the AD-G, more
adaptable to dive bombing. And that's good.
But why wait until now?
Moreover, the Pentagon didn't say when
this would be done. And every day brave
fighting men take off from Soc Trang In
their T-28's, hoping the wings will stay glued
until those new jobs get here.
BRAVE MEN BETRAYED
Air Force Capt. Jerry Shank Is I of 131
American fighting men who have lost their
lives in combat since the United States be-
gan its program of massive assistance to
South Vietnam in December 1961. In com-
mon with the rest of these brave men, Jerry
Shank left a legacy of heartbreak, of a
widow's empty, endless loneliness, of little
children for whom a smiling photograph
must forever be the inadequate substitute
for a father's strong arms and loving counsel.
But Jerry Shank left something more than
that. He was an articulate, angry man, and
he left behind a poignant recital of how
courageous young Americans are being be-
trayed by ancient equipment that is no
longer equal to the demands of modern
aerial combat.
Jim O. Lucas, a combat correspondent
who has shared danger and despair with
American troops in three wars, tells Captain
Shank's story that no reader will soon for-
get. t on that In wholly Justifed with Lcold etters iwrlt-
ten to his wife by Captain Shank have been
published in Life magazine and in US. News
& World Report. With Jim's story, written
from the Soc Trang airstrip In the steaming
guerrilla-Infested Mekong Delta, they give a
shocking account of American men whose
courage and devotion Is being made a grisly
mockery by obsolescent equipment.
Captain Shank died In a T-28, an aging,
propeller-driven trainer that was never de-
signed for combat. Loaded with 500-pound
bombs and napalm tanks, it cannot indefi-
nitely endure the stresses of repeated dive-
bombing runs. Eventually the wings come
That happened to Captain Shanks' air-
off
Attempts to obtain an explanation of why number of coin collectors, dealers, and in-
we are asking our men to fight with Inferior vestors; and basically, of course, the general
equipment have elicited no coherent reply. growth In population. Also, any fearon the
Some sources habitually insist the T-28 is part of the business community that suffi-
ideal for antiguerrilla warfare because It Is cient coin may not be available as needed
slower than modern aircraft. But no one tends to retard the flow of excess coin back
would suggest that its habit of shedding to Federal Reserve banks for redistribution,
wings fits It for anything other than a dying The Bureau of the Mint has asked Congress
coffin. for additional appropriations to build a new
The loss of Captain Shank and Captain mint in Philadelphia and to permit overtime
Brumet emphasizes much that Is wrong with operations at the existing mints in Philadel-
our wax in southeast Asia. The prevalling phis and Denver. While relief from the new
opinion of the men who are fighting It Is that Philadelphia Mint Is at best 2 or 3 years away.
_. - ____ _-
_
full
m of overtime
t
it
p
Coin Shortage Must Be Solved
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
or
HON. BOB CASEY
OF TEXAS
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Tuesday, May 12, 1964
Mr. CASEY. Mr. Speaker, I have to-
day introduced a bill to authorize the
Secretary of the Treasury to contract
with private industry for the minting of
coins of the United States.
I was motivated to introduce this bill
upon learning on one of my recent visits
home of the tremendous shortage of coins
in the Houston area and finding that
this was not a localized condition but
that the shortage is acute throughout the
Nation.
Unless we turn to private industry for
relief, I foresee no particular relief for
several years. In fact, it may even grow
more acute.
Mr. Speaker, Mr. William McC. Mar-
tin, Jr., Chairman of the Board of Gov-
ernors of the Federal Reserve System,
sent me a letter which backs up my pre-
diction. He also estimates that no re-
lief will come for several years.
I sincerely hope, Mr. Speaker, that
early action will be taken upon this meas-
ure to give the business community of
the 'United States early relief in this
crisis.
The following is the letter I received
from Mr. Martin, which I think should
be ample proof of the need of this legis-
lation:
BOARD Or GOVERNORS OF THE
FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM,
Washington, D.C? May 11, 1964.
Hon. BOB CASEY,
House of Representatives,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR Ma. CASEY: This refers to your letter
of May 5, in which you ask about the serious-
ness of the shortage of coin, suspected causes,
and possible remedies, and also request that
additional supplies of coin be sent to the
Houston, Tex., area.
The coin shortage is nationwide, as you
mention you have read. The basic problem
stems from the fact that production by the
mint has not been able to keep pace with the
rapid increase in the use of coin. Expansion
in the demand for coin has been caused by
a number of factors. Including greater use
of vending machines, parking meters, coin
telephones, coin-operated laundry and dry
cleaning machines, and toll roads; extension
of school hot lunch programs and of the
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