U.S. POLICY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP66B00403R000200140016-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 2, 2005
• Sequence Number: 16
• Publication Date: May 21, 1964
• Content Type: OPEN

/964 ApproVed For Fte*Gei&O?geRlei: RW8litltpkElgil4A
and defeated officeholders. While
enioiiing public sinecures they do little
Wept talk vaguely 'abaft- survival, plan
alerts to annoy their neighbors and 'dis-
tribute countless rearm of literature.
, - , .
Daily, I?and I am sure all of my col-
leagues likewise?receive phone calls and
letters froin,mayors and other municipal
officialesequeSAng assistance in-having
their applic_atiana war PtihTie -Work' P.-rej-
ects- expedited. lotindS for the acceler-
ated public Works program, which Is
operated on a matching basis, have been
virtually depleted. At the same time the
Federal Goiter/n*1A 11 encouraging
these officialep spend: 060 fib million
for Salida no to mention addi-
tional millions required, for civil defense
employees. If we cut Off the head Of the
bureaucratic octopus in Washington; its
wasteful satellites in states and cities
will soon wither away.
MX. Vi,esitient, the amount requested
for civil _defense Ii abail half that re-
quested by the President for the War on
poverty. It is more than three times the
arnottnt requested for the Peace Corps.
Wherever and whenever possible our
President_ and we: in the congress are
trying to effect economy In Government
without curtailing Vital programs both
foreign and domestic, _ In geed. Con-
science We pannett ,apprepriate anywhere
near the huge sum requested for civil
defense purposes. To do so would be to
make a shain of efforts toward More
economy in Government, to encourage
waste of' taxpayers' imoney at all levels
of Government and a slap in the face
to taxpayers.
.Mr. President, when t ffrat began my
fight against Wasteful -Civil defense
spending paii$, in 190- T was virtually
alone in the_pongress: Today I know
that many of my_ colleagnes_ share My
views as. evidenced by - rale-an -VOUS at
.various lnies on, eao:tt,5 reaUCE, such
spending (MOW the recent action Of the
Armed ervices8tibcOnniiittieiOn. Which
haVe -0- The remit
,f% 6.1.1 tS,P9,0
tha*:iii 016611 war Coupled With greatly
advanced nuClesx 'tecilnoto4y: has raised
t14.o sp.ieStion Of Whether wa,shoniCI Con-
tinue onr 6bia, defense program, such as
It is. At any rate these events have made
It Imperative that the entire program?
its objectives and its structure?need
drastic redefinition and revision.
it4Urtherrnore the Ainerican people and
the American press have become in-
creasingly disgusted With this waste of
mon0; time, and effort. One newspaper
' that has or many years called for a halt
to such *este and .tor the adoption of a
realistic civil defense program?if such
a thing_ is possible?is_ the Cleveland
Press, One of Giiie's0*t newspapers
arid one :of the great neWsPapers of the
Nation. In, an excellent PaitOrial en-
titled "The Mess in Ciyil,Pefense" pub-
lished on May 16, 1964, this newspaper
cOrielsely and clearli stated the case
agairiet civil defense_ as now_ operated.
I cominendthis.,0 my Colleagues and ask
,
manimseosenttit it he _printed in
' the Bzoolio at ,thlp point as a part of my
reinarks-
- 7-4ere being no objection, the editorial
WU -ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
THE MESS IN CIVIL DEFENSE
The Office of Civil Defense wants oongrees
to appropriate $358 million for next year.
For what?
The recent thaw in the cold war has
brought about a deterioration of civil de-
fense's functions. This entire program?its
objectivesd its structure needs drastic
redefinition.
Several communities In Greater Cleveland
have either pulled out of civil defense or are
threatening to_ pull out. They understand-
ably do not want to drop their money down
a reinforced concrete rathole.
The atrophy in Cleveland has reached the
point where the county's civil defense chief,
John Pokorny, was shifted to workhouse su-
perintendent last month without anyone yet
being named to replace him.
Only Washington can stop the civil defense
drift by coming up with a realistic, meaning-
ful program?if one is possible.
Meanwhile, the national CD office wants
$358 million new money, a fraction of which
is, to pay half the salaries of 6,769 persons
hired by local CD agencies. Without useful
services for these people to perform, CD is
In severe danger of becoming a vast boon-
doggle?if it not already 15 50.
As long as an economy-conscious (with
other departments' money) Congress is avail-
able, with civil defense's chief critic, Senator
SrEvE YOUNS, on the job, the administration
may yet face up to the floundeqntg Office of
Civil Defense,
U.S. POLICY IN SOUTH ST ASIA
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr, President, as
a Senator from Montana, I wish to.speak
on the situation in southeast Asia, _
ef o r e do_ so, it may be recalled that
several years ago I made a speech on the
poor of the Seriete in which _ac_lvoeated
that consideration be given to the unifi-
11175
papers of a proposal by President de
Gaulle to reconvene the Geneva Confer-
ence on the situation in Laos. The
Geneva Conference to which he refers
was, of course, the one held' in 1962,
when an agreement was made by 14 na-
tions to guarantee Laotian neutrality.
This would appear to be an extension of
the urgent suggestion of Prime Minis-
ter Souvanna Phourna and is in accord
With the diplomacy which the United
States has been pursuing for the last
several days. All of these efforts point
toward the same end. They are designed
to prevent a final collapse of the tottering
situation in Laos and, in reality, through-
out the Indochinese Peninsula.
I have said it on a previous occasion
and I repeat it now: the diplomatic
initiatives of General de Gaulle in south-
east Asia ought not to be dismissed
lightly. They are designed to preserve a
measure of peace, stability, and national
sovereignty in southeast Asia, where all
three are on the brink of collapse in the
gathering chaos. In my judgment, these
Initiatives now, as in the past, are con-
sistent in every respect with the interests
of the United States in that part of the
world.
To be sure, neutralism in Laos, an un-
certain affair for several years, is not all
that we might desire. But that does not
mean that it is not desirable to exert
ourselves, and to welcome from others
every effort to save it. We might well
ask ourselves what would have hap-
pened in Laos in the past 3 years with-
out this truce, however shaky. The an-
swer is clear: either Laos would now be
incerporated into the expanding orbit of
North 'Vietnam and Asia communism or
cation of both East Berlin and West thousands of American soldiers would be
Berlin into a united whole. At that time engaged in that remote country. The
the reaction was somewhat critical. Th
--g harrowing conflict in Vietnam, which in-
interpretation of my speech was to the volves Americans only indirectly, does
effect that I was advocating the inter- not begin to compare with what would
natienallzatIOn Of West Berlin -alone, have been our situation in Laos in the
rather than the, unification of the two
Berlins, and thereby furthering the diffi-
culties which were inherent in the Ger-
man question at that time.
Subsequent to that speech, the pos-
sihility of the unification of the two
Berlins, both East and West, has gone
out the window, and the result of not
taking any action has been the erection
of a wall which has made a detnite_clivl-
sion between those two pities, one now a
part of -East Germany. East Berlin is, in
fact, the capital of East Germany. The
other, West Berlin is a member of the
Federal Republic?at least, in a certain
sense. So instead Of unity, there is
division; and that division has been
further emphasized through the erection
of the wall, which has made a bad situa-
tion worse.
In February of this year, I made a
speech about Vietnam. At that time I
suggested that the United States give
some attention to the proposals then be-
ing advanced by President de Gaulle, of
France, who was seeking to bring about
neutrality for all of what formerly was
known as Indochina. Following that
speech, there was, again, some critical
reaction, But now I believe the situa-
tion calls for a further examination of
the developments in that portion of Asia.
I refer to reports in this morning's news-
absence of the Geneva agreement of
1962.
May I say, further, that in my judg-
ment there is no inconsistency between
President Johnson's efforts to shore up
the situation in South Vietnam and Gen-
eral de Gaulle's proposal for a con-
ference on Laos. Indeed, there can be no
peace in Indochina, except a Commu-
nist-dictated peace, unless an improve--
ment is brought about in the situation in
South Vietnam such as the President is
striving to achieve. But, conversely,
there is little likelihood that the situa-
tion in Vietnam can be improved with-
out an understanding in Laos along the
lines which General de Gaulle is appar-
ently hopeful of achieving.
It is true that the conference which he
proposes could conceivably expand into a
general discussion of the Cambodian and
Vietnamese situation. But is that some-
thing to be feared? Are we afraid of
words of criticism from China or the
Vietnamese Communists at an interna-
tional conference? That would hardly
be a new experience. We have been
raved and ranted at before and have al-
ways managed to survive.
So long as our purposes remain clear
in Vietnam, so long as we coptinue to
recognize that questions of propaganda
and prestige, of "face." East or West, are
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secondary to both the questions of the
peace, well-being, and freedom of the
people of southeast Asia and the achieve-
ment of our own basic but limited na-
tional objectives in Indochina, we have
nothing to fear from such a conference.
On the contrary, we might indeed wel-
come not only the conference proposed
by General de Gaulle but even its expin-
sion into the general question of stability
In Indochina and southeast Asia.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
time of the Senator from Montana has
expired.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that I may proceed
for an additional 4 minutes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, the
conference proposed might well be the
place to lay all the cards on the table
with respect to Indochina and to deter-
- mine how the peace and freedom of that
region is best to be secured. As a na-
tion which is no longer directly involved
but whose contacts and cultural in-
fluences in Indochina are still extensive.
France is clearly in a position to initiate
, such a conference in all good faith.
. As the late President Kennedy said:
We must not negotiate from fear, but
neither should we fear to negotiate.
In accordance with that wise counsel,
we must continue our economic and mili-
tary assistance to Vietnam, but we should
also consider most carefully the con-
ference proposed by President de Gaulle.
It may well be the last train out for
peace in southeast Asia.
It should be noted; furthermore, that
the question of raids into Cambodia is
now pending before the United Nations
In this connection. This Morning, the
U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations
made a speech, a part of which I should
like to quote for incorporation in the
RECORD. It is contained in Associated
Press bulletin No. 66 and reads as fol-
lows':
UNIT= NATIONS .?Stevenson declared there
is a very simple way to restore order in
southeast Asia and to bring about the end
of the U.S. military aid to South Vietnam.
"Let all foreign troops withdraw from
Laos," he said.
"Let all states in that area make the simple
decision to leave their neighbors alone. Stop
the secret subversion of other people's inde-
pendence. Stop the clandestine and illegal
transit of national frontiers. Stop the ex-
port of revolution and the doctrine of vio-
lence. Stop the violations of the political
agreements reached at Geneva for the future
of southeast Asia.
"The people of Laos want to be left alone.
"The people of Vietnam want to be left
alone.
"The people of Cambodia want to be left
alone.
"When their neighbors decide to leave them
alone?as they must?there will be no fight-
ing in southeast Asia and no need for Ameri-
can advisers to leave their homes to help
these people resist aggression. Any time that
decision can be put in enfbrcible terms, my
Government will be only too happy to put
down the burden that we have been sharing
with those determined to preserve their in-
dependence. Until such arr urances are
forthcoming, we shall rtand for the inde-
pendence of free peoples In southeast Asia as
we have elsewhere.
Two significant articles were also pub-
lished in today's press, one of which, in
the New York Times, indicates that there
Is an interconnection between the situa-
tion in Laos and the Cambodia charge in
the United Nations and the situation in
South Vietnam.
quote the following from the edi-
torial?referring to Secretary Mc-
Namara:
He has also said that "we have no objection
in principle to neutrality in the sense of
nonalinement." And Secretaries McNamara
and Husk both have Indicated that the
United States is 'prepared to abide by the
Geneva accords of 1954. which neutralized
all the Indochina States, Including Commu-
nist North Vietnam. As a result of these ac-
cords, French troops and 120,000 Commtudst
guerrillas were withdrawn from South Viet-
nam. While neutralization can hardly be
said to have been a roaring success In Laos,
the story might be different if neutralization
could ultimately be applied to all of what
was formerly French Indochina.
Also the following:
To suggest this does not mean that we can
afford, in the meanwhile, to lessen our mili-
tary effort in South Vietni.m. Quite the
contrary?we must make it clear to the world
that we are willing and able to Wage war as
well as to negotiate for peace.
And further in the editorial:
We must make clear our willingness at the
proper moment to seek a political settle-
ment based, of course, on a non-Communist
South Vietnam. independent, neutral?free
of Corqraunist guerrillas as well as of foreign
troops and bases?and guaranteed by the
Great Powers, W. must make it clear that
we are fighting to get out of, not to stay in,
South Vietnam. The aim should be a return
to the Geneva settlement of 1954. an objec-
tive that might even be supported by the
French. In a little noticed statement a few
weeks ago. Foreign Minister Couve de Mur*,
rifle indicated that this is really what Presi-
dent de Gaulle has in mind.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under
the morning hour limitation, the time
available to the Senator from Montana
has expired.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
ask that I may proceed for 3 additional
minutes.
? The PRESIDING OFFICellt. With-
out objection, it is so order&
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President., I
quote now from an article written by
Walter Lippmann, and published this
morning in the Washington Post:
On the contrary, the main objective of
French policy is to save southeast Asia from
conquest by China and to avert a disaster
which would affect the whole Western
World in its dealings with Asia. Let us not
blind ourselves by a prejudiced refusal to
take seriously the French intervention in
Asia.
Further on in the article, Mr. Lipp-
mann states:
If we analyze the situation fully, we shall
conclude, I believe, that French policy and
American are not competitive In Asia but
are in fact complementary. This is to say
that what De Gaulle Is trying to accomplish
is the only conceivable solution of what is
certainly an otherwise Interminable military
conflict. But It is to say also that what the
what the United States is continuing to do,
which is to sustain the resistance of the
Saigon government. is necessary to the
success of the French action.
? * ? ? ?
It is in this sense that the two policies
are complementary. They would become
fused into one policy if the administration
adopted as its slogan a modification of
Churchill's remark "We arm to parley" and
said that "in Vietnam we fight to parley."
Mr. President, I was one of those who
felt that the assassination of Ngo Dinh
Diem, the only civilian ruler South Viet-
nam ever had, was a serious mistake.
He was the one man who could have
held that country together. When I
speak of Ngo Dinh Diem, I am speaking
only of Ngo Dinh Diem, a man who
would be considered, in a sense, the
founder of modern, free Vietnam, a man
who devoted his life to that country, and
still had much to contribute to it, reports
to the contrary notwithstanding, at the
time when he was gunned down.
Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, will the
Senator from Montana yield?
Mr. MANSFIELD I yield.
Mr. JAVITS. I have listened with
close attention to the remarks of the
Senator from Montana. If he means es-
sentially the policy which he has laid
out for our Government?and without
relying upon General de Gaulle's activi-
ties but at the same time being willing
to recognize and accept him as an ally
as long as he performs a useful function
as outlined in these ideas and the edi-
torial and the article?I join the Sena-
tor from Montana in approving this pol-
icy as a political objective for the United
States.
Heretofore, I have in a most friendly
way differed with the Senator from Mon-
tana on ideas to neutralize this area, and
also with respect to the situation in Ber-
lin. But I believe the Senator from Mon-
tana now has put his finger upon a con-
sistent outline of policy. It is most use-
ful that he is the majority leader.
I believe the criticism that has been
made; namely, that our forces are in
South Vietnam at so much danger and
cost, but without an objective?is an-
swered by this kind of coordinated pol-
icy; and I hope very much the distin- ,
gashed Senator will make clear to the
country that this is a consistent line of
policy, and is not for a repetition of any
previous situation: that we are not fight-
ing blindly, but that we are working to
preserve the essential conditions under
which this area may have a chance.
The situation is very difficult, and we
are all broken-hearted at the losses; but
what we are doing is the constructive
road to peace, and it must be accepted.
I believe the Senator from Montana has
sounded exactly the right note on Amer-
ica's political objectives. I consider it an
honor to join him in subscribing to that
view.
Mr. MANSFIELD. I thank the Sena-
tor from New York. However, at the out-
set I made clear that in making these
remarks, I spoke only as a Senator from
Montana.
Mr. JAVITS. However, I express the
hope that this will be the coordinated
line of policy the President will pursue,
although I am aware that the Senator
from Montana is always very careful in
stating that he is expressing only his own
view.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Yes: it is one man's
view.
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? 11177
,
[From the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, Feb. 19
1964]
Mk. SALTONSTA1,14, ur,, President,
will., the Senator from , Montana, yield
hrielly tome?
,mr.AI yield.,_
:041.0170,1T4a. Senator
*frein M9ntang,has.,5tated,that, ourforces
should stay in South Vietnam, to give
the South Vietnamese confldence that
ig411., OCHall110, to support them and
will take, Whatever ?part WC need to take
fb _keep that country free. At the same
time, as he suggests, no question of
Weakness will be,involyed Ji firlY agree-
ment to, confer, as President _de Gaulle
has suggested, on the problem of LaQS
and gumbo:11a ,and the other, areas of
that part_ of the world. In other, words,
we Slialt,be eiglibiting, not a sign of
Weakness, but a sign of strength, by stay-
ing in Vietnam and at the same time
agreeing to try to confer, in an effort to
solve this problem on,? a, political level.
That is what the Senator from Montana
has said, is it riot?
'Mr. MANS,FItLID Yes, in general.
Su far,as theArst Part of the Senator's
, - _ references
to
is concerned?his references
to staying, in--we have no choice. So
far as the second part of his statement
is concerned, I believe it is the better part
of wisdom to negotiate. As our late
President said, we should never fear ne-
gotiations or fear to negotiate, because
?I think wesan hold our own at any con-
feren0e table. That is not a sign of
' Weakness or appeasement. It could per-
haps be looked _upon as aiming UP to
reality, 90 to speak.
Mr._:BA.LTONSTALL, I thank the
_Senator from Montana.
Mr. PELL. Mr. President, will the
Senator from Montana yield briefly to
nie?
Mr. twonELD. I ?yield.
Mr nx,,L, I, Apngratulate the very
Wise and thoughtful Senator from Mon-
tana on the thoughts he has just
ex-
pressed. They are thoughts that have
not heretofore been stated, but they
- ;needed tube stated.
"11aidng Accompanied him on his trip to
this area, and knowing him to be the best
informed Member of our body on that
part of theworld, I only hope that al-
though he has_ spoken as a Senator from
Montana, the policies his words represent
-May, before too long, be those of the
' administration,
Mr. imicantr4D, I.. thank the Sen-
ator Frox Rhq,de Wand, who has con-
tributed so Much to,a better understand-
ing of southeast 4sja.
Mr. President, I as Unanimous con-
? sent to have printed at this point in
- the Ricopo excerpts from a speech I
made -011.14e Senate floor on February
19, 194, on theSietnamesc situation and
General de Gaulle'sproposals. I also ask
unaiiimous C036Ht to have printed in the
Rxcoss excerpts from a report in Janu-
ary 1063, in which I was joined by the
distinguished. Senator from Rhode Is- I
land Mr. PEia,l, the then Senator Ben-
jamin Smith, of Massachusetts, and the
distinguished _Senator from Delaware r
Lr.Bocop). _ ,
-There being no objection, the excerpts a
from. the Speech and the report were or- p
dered to be printed in the RECORD, as 5
follows: , , _ _ a
It seems to Me that President de Gaull
has done well to speak out on southeas
Asia. He has again demonstrated a sense ow
history and statesmanship in seeking ne
ways for dealing with the continuing in
stability and insecurity which prevails in
Vietnam and much of southeast Asia. Presi
dent Johnson, in pointing to the difference
of view, between ourselves and France, mos
appropriately noted in comment on Presiden
de Gaulle's remarks that, "If we could have
neutralization of both North Vietnam and
South Vietnam, I am sure that would be con-
sidered sympathetically." The President was
in my opinion?and today I am speaking only
personally?referring to true neutraliza-
tion?a status based on guarantees and not
on words or promises or continued infiltra-
tion from the north.
, [Excerpts from report in January 1963]
? CONCLUDING COMMENTS ON VIETNAM
Those who bear responsibility for directing
-t operations under the new strategy are op-
timistic over the prospects for success. In-
deed, success was predicted to the group
" almost without exception by responsible
Americans and Vietnamese, in terms of a
year or two hence? The word "success" is
B not easy to define in a situation such as
t exists in South .Vietnam.1 It would mean, at
t the least, reduction of the guerrillas to the
point where they would no longer be a
serious threat to the stability of the Repub-
lic. If that point is reached, road and rail
communications would once again become
reasonably safe. Local officials would no
longer live in constant fear of assassination.
Rice and other major comniodities would
again move in volume to the cities. Develop-
ment throughout the nation would 'be
feasible. In short, the situation in South
Vietnam would become roughly similar to
that which eventually emerged in Malaya,
and it is significant that a good deal of the
present planning in South Vietnam is based
upon the Malayan experience.
While such a situation would fall far
short of the development of a "bastion" in
South Vietnam, as the objective has been
described on occasion, it would, nevertheless,
,be adequate to the survival of free Vietnam.
It would not necessarily permit any great re-
duction. in U.S. aid to the Vietnamese Gov-
ernment for some years but it would, at least,
allow for a substantial reduction in the di-
rect support which American forces are now
providing to Vietnamese defense.
Great weight must be given to the views
of those who have direct responsibility in
the conduct of the new strategy. But even
if success is envisioned in the limited sense
described above, experience in Vietnam go-
ing back at least a decade recommends cau-
tion in predicting its rapid achievement.
The new strategy is not entirely new. Ele-
ments of it have appeared over the past
decade or more in various unsuccessful plans
for resolving the guerrilla problem in Viet-
nam. What makes it new, perhaps, is that
these elements have been interwoven, along
with certain Malayan counterguerrilla tac-
tics into a cohesive pattern which is Sup-
ported more heavily than ever by the United
States.
At this time, experience under the plan
does not appear adequate for drawing the
kind of optimistic conclusions with respect
to it which have been drawn. The reported
number of Vietcong casualties has gone up
but, so too, has the estimated total of active
Vietcong guerrillas. There are indications
of improvements in the security of travel
and in the movement of rice and other com-
modities through the countryside, but they
are not yet conclusive. The newly strength-
ened armed services of the Republic, sup-
ported by U.S. forces, have scored some strik-
ing victories, but the Vietcong have recently
shown a capacity to devise new tactics to
counter the increased mobility and firepower
of the Government's forces. Most frequently
pointed to has been the success in winning
over the montagnards to the Government.
This could be an achievement of great im-
portance in terms of its effect on Vietcong
supply lines from north to south through
the western mountains, but -there are other
supply lines by land and by sea. Moreover,
the winning over of these scattered and quite
primitive tribal peoples who, incidentally,
were also won over in Laos, is not to be
The possibilities of such a neutralization
may be extremely difficult to realize, but they
ought not to be dismissed out of hand.
There are the possibilities of the interna-
tional patrol and control of borders in which
U.S. forces in Vietnam and those of other
nations prepared to do so could make a sig-
nificant contribution. Indeed, Cambodia has
indicated that it would welcome and do
everything possible to accommodate such an
international patrol. And it would seem to
me that the Government of Laos under
Prince Souvanna Phouma would have much
to gain from a similar arrangement and, in-
deed, so would Thailand.
In that kind of a situation, there would
most certainly be a role for Prance. We
may or may not agree with President de
Gaulle's approach in whole or part. That
Is our right and responsibility, even as the
French have the right and responsibility to
speak and act as they see fit even though I
thoroughly disagree with De Gaulle's recog-
nition of Communist China and, along with
the Senator from Connecticut [Mr. Donn],
the Senator from Minnesota [Mr. HUM-
PHREY], the Senator from Ohio [Mr.
LAuscuz], and others, consider it a tragic
mistake.
But whatever our differences, it seems to
me most glib to make light of the admit-
tedly unsatisfactory situation in Laos or the
unhappy state of our relations with Cambodia
as a basis for any offhand rejection of De
Gaulle's essay at a new approach to Indo-
china and southeast Asia. Indeed, we might
well ask ourselves: Do we ourselves, in terms
of our national interests as seen in juxtaposi-
tion to the cost in American lives and re-
sources, prefer what exists in South Vietnam
to what exists in Laos or in Cambodia? Do
we prefer another Vietnamese type of Ameri-
can involvement or perhaps a Korean-type
involvement in these other countries and
elsewhere in southeast Asia? Are we eager
for expenditure of the great additions of for-
eign aid which they would entail? Are we
to regard lightly the American casualties
which would certainly be involved?
These questions, Mr. President, are very
much to the point of the serious situation
in southeast Asia, particularly in the Indo-
chinese region, and of President de Gaulle's
approach to it. If we face these questions
fully and in all candor, if we do not seek to
achieve lightly with words what can only
be accomplished with blood and other sacri-
fices on the part of the people of this Nation,
t seems to me that we will welcome a con-
tribution of thought and effort from France
to the possible solution of the problems of
'hat troubled region. We will not deplore
idicule, discourage, or denounce a French
ontribution. Rather, we will hope that, in
pith of our doubts and certain of our ex-
eriences, the contributions will prove con-
tructive, and we will do whatever we are
ble to do to bring the hope to fruition.
1 More recent estimates as, for example,
that of Adm. Harry Felt on Jan. 30, 1963,
speak in terms of 3 years.
1 Admiral Felt defines victory as govern-
ment control of at least 90 percent of the
ulation.
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ApprovedareagssfranOnbiep3RIMM403R000200140016-6May 21
confused with the winning over of the Viet- could become of greater concern and greater
names? peasants. The attitudes of the 15 responsibility to the United States than it
million of Vietnamese in city and country- is to the Government and people of South
Side, not those of the relatively small group Vietnam. In present circumstances, pursuit
of montagnards, will ultimately determine of that course could involve an expenditure
the future of the Republic and its Govern- of American lives and resources on a scale
ment. which would bear little relationship to the
It is with the Vietnamese peasant of interests of the United States or, indeed, to
course, that the "strategic hamlet" concept the interests of the people of Vietnam.
In primarily concerned. The concept is If we are to avoid that course it must be
based on the assumptions that the Vietcong clear to ourselves as well as to the Vietnamese
are sustained by the rural popUlace primer- where the primary responsibility lies in this
fly out of fear, and in part, because the situation. It must rest, as it has rested,
peasants are not aware of the superior social. with the Vietnamese Government and people.
economic, and political advantages which What further effort may be needed for the
are Offered by support of the Government survival of the Republic of Vietnam in plus-
and participation in its processes. Assure- out circumstances must come from that
Ing the accuracy of the assumptions sac- source. If it is not fortheonaing, the United
easeful military action within the dimen- States can reduce its commitment or abort-
elms of the present effort Is conceivable don it entirely, but there is no interest of
within the foreseeable future. But even to the United States in Vietnam which would
give an initial military victory meaning will justify, in present circumstances, the convex-
require a maseive job of social engineering. Edon of the war in that country primarily into
In the best of circumstances, outside aid in an American war, to be fought primarily with
Very substantial size will be necessary for American lives. It is the frequent conten-
Many years. However large such aid may be, tion of Communist propaganda that such is
It will not suffice without a great mobilize- already the case. It should remain the fact
tion of selfless Vietnamese leadership in all that the war in Vietnam is not an American
parts of the country and at all levels, was in present circumstances. The watals,
, It is In this area that criticism and doubt "in present circumstances.' are reiterated lest
of the new strategy finds most persistent ex- they be overlooked by those who may assume
pression. And it is not a service to the that there are no circumstances in which
people of Vietnam or to this Nation to ignore American interests might require even
or to make light of the existence of this greater efforts in southeast Asia than those
criticism and doubt. The fact must be faced which we are now making
that the practices of political organization LAOS
which have been relied upon most heavily
to date in South Vietnam are, in many re- Background
agents, authoritarian. While the plans for In contrast to Vietnam, policies since 1961
the strategic hamlets are cast in a demo- have involved a lightening of commitment in
Cratic mold, it is by no means certain at this Laos. M in Vietnam. the United States be-
point how they shall evolve in practice. tan to supply aid to Laos about a decade ago.
The evolution of the practices of the Central In the early years, this burden was shared
Government, to date, are not reassuring in with the French. The aid went to a govern-
this connection. ment headed by the then Prime Minister
There are, to be sure, extenuating circum- Souvanna Phouma whose internal policy sue-
Stances in Vietnam which counsel great needed to bringing about partial integration
patience. The situation which was inherited of the dissident Pathet Lao political faction
by the Republic in 1955 was one of great headed by his half brother Prince Soupha-
corruption, repression, and divisiveness. nouvong. Various U.S. aid and other activi-
Apart from the relatively peaceful period ties increased in the kingdom. At the same
1955-58, moreover, there bade been continu- time the French role declined. Once again,
one guerrilla pressures designed to weaken an Internal political divisiveness appeared.
the Government and bring about its collapse. BOUVanna Phouma was compelled to with-
in spite of the difficulties some significant draw from the Government. There followed
political, economic, and social reforms have the coups and countercoups of 1959-60 which
been essayed over the years. Indeed, the ended with an anti-Communist military
basic political form of the central Govern- government in control in the administrative
ment is democratic. capital of Vientiane. Its position. however,
When that has been said, however, it is was challenged by two other factions, the
also necessary to note that present political Pathet Lao looking to the Vietminh of North
practices in Vietnam do not appear to be Vietnam for support and by a group under a
Mobilizing the potential capacities for able U.S. trained military officer, Kong to, which
and self-sacrificing leadership on a substan- advocated the return of Souvanna Phouma
tial scale. Yet, such a mobilization is easel- to the Government. By that time, U.S.
tial for the success of the new strategy and, agencies had assumed almost total respansi-
hence, the survival of South Vietnam and at Wity for outside assistance to the military
freedom within Vietnam. government in power in Vientiane.
It is most disturbing to find that after 7 The U.S. involvement
years of the Republic, South Vietnam appears The growth in U.S. personnel in Laos
less, not more, stable than It was at the out- and the overall cost of military and other
set, that it appears more removed from, aid to that country is indicative of the rapid
rather than closer to, the achievement of engrossment of the United States in internal
popularly responsible and responsive gov- Laotian affairs. From a total of two Ameri-
ernment The pressures of the Vietcong can officials permanently stationed in all of
guerrillas do not entirely explain this situa- Laos in 1953.s the number of u.s. personnel
tion. In retrospect, the Government of rose to 850 at its height In 1961, a total
Vietnam and our policies, particularly in the which has now declined to 250. Through
design and administration of aid, must bear the years 1955-82, the United States pro-
am.
than anywhere else in the world. Laos has
only 2.5 million inhabitants, most of whom
live in scattered and primitive villages. The
land is located in one of the most remote
regions of Asia and is largely covered with
inaccessible jungle. A decade ago, political
leadership on a national scale was nonexis-
tent. Politics centered on the small group
of intellectuals in the administrative capital
of Vientiane, with ramifications reaching to
the Royal Court in Luang Prabang. In 1953,
the Laotian Army had two battalions in
process of formation, less than a thousand
men in all. There were also several hundred
Pathet Lao dissidents under arms in the
northeast. Outside its immediate neighbors
and France, the existence of the Kingdom
of Laos as a political entity was almost
totally unknown abroad.
Yet scarcely a decade later, 100,000 Lao-
tians were bearing arms. There were three
major military factions engaged in conflict.
The peaceful little Buddhist kingdom had
become both a mirror reflecting the principal
ideological stresses of our times and a bloody
setting for international competition and
intrigue on a massive scale. The transition
had gone so far by the spring of 1961 that
this Nation was compelled to consider seri-
ously the possibility of a major and direct
military involvement of U.S. forces in Laos,
with overtones not unlike those of the
Korean conflict.
There were, however, different characteris-
tics in the Laotian situation which held
some promise that a satisfactory solution
to the problem could be achieved through
negotiations. An international conference
of 14 nations was convened in Geneva on the
Laotian question in an effort to find a peace-
ful solution along lines which had long been
advocated by Cambodia. Fourteen months
later on July 23, 1962, an agreement was
signed by the participating nations and a
measure of peace returned to the embattled
kingdom.
The current situation
The signatories of the Geneval accord of
1962 pledged themselves to respect the neu-
trality of Laos and not to interfere In its
Internal affairs. In addition, they promised
to withdraw such military forces as they had
in Laos and not to use the territory of Laos
for interference in the internal affairs of
other countries.
Concomitant with the Geneva agreement.
the leaders of the three principal Laotian
political factions agreed to establish a uni-
fied government and administration under
the king. The key figures in the latter set-
tlement were Prince Souvanna Phouma who,
having served as the first Prime Minister of
an independent Laos, became Prime Minister
once again in the provisional government.
He was joined in the new government by
Prince Souphanouvong. his half brother and
the leader of the northern dissidents and by
Gen. Mourn! Nosavan, leader of a southern
faction who had had close ties with Thailand
and U.S. executive agencies.
It is too soon to judge the efficacy of the
international and Laotian accords which
have been introduced into the situation. In-
sofar as the larger powers are concerned, U.S.
forces have been withdrawn in keeping with
the agreement. On the basis of available in-
formation, there are neither Soviet Russian
nor Chinese forces in Laos in violation of
the agreement. But there is every likelhood
a substantial a very substantial, share of aided over 8450 million in aid of all
that Vietminh forces are still present among
the responsibility. to Laos. the Pathet Lao, and there are allegations that
We are novi reshaping the aid programs in In relation to the size and nature of the foreign elements are also active in other
la fashion which those responsible believe country this aid effort has been more intense military factions'
will make them of maximum utility.Responsibility. for determining that all
have intensified our support of the Viet-
namese armed forces in ways which those
responsible believe will produce greater ef-
fectiveness in military operations. This in-
tensification, however, inevitably has carried
us to the start of the road which leads to
the point at which the conflict in Vietnam
'In that year. the U.S. mission in Saigon
was accredited for all three Indochinese
states?Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos?and
the VB. Minister in Saigon paid only oc-
casional visits to what was then a small
legation in Vientiane.
foreignforces have been withdrawn from
Laos rests with an International Control
Commission. But this group of Indians,
Canadians, and Poles has yet to carry out
the responsibility, largely because of disa-
greement among the factions within the pro-
visional government.
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11179
- -
s is but one example of the difficulties time, ideological and predatory forces from east Asia. Apart from difficulties on its
besetting- the government of Prime Minister without have historically tended to press in, borders with Thailand and Vietnam, the
Souvanna Phourna, which operates on the as wedges, upon the region in which the little kingdom enjoys complete peace and has
principle of Unanimity of the Three /actions kingdom is located. To these obvious registered a remarkable degree of economic
on Matters of significance. There are many culties must be added lingering personal and social progress in a decade. The leader-
others. Pi.,particufar, there is the problem suspicions among " the principal Lantian ship of Prince Sihanouk has been a key factor
of military demobilization. An agreement in leaders, growing out of the experiences of in this achievement. Abdicating the throne
principle has been reached to reduce the total the past. in order to participate actively in political
of more than 100,000 men under arms in Laos What the outcome of the attempted solu- affairs, the Prince has led the kingdom with
to a national force of 30,000 and a police force tion will be is still very uncertain. Much an understanding of his people, with per-
of 6,000 drawn equally from the three major hinges on the perserverance of Prince Sou- sohal dedication, and with immense energy.
factions. As of the time of our visit, how- vane Phouma, who as Prime Minister, has He has maintained cooperative relations with
ever, the agreement Was still awaiting action.' undertaken the principal responsibility. France on the new basis of full national in-
There have also been sporadic violations of Alone among the present leaders he enjoys dependence and equality and the French,
the cease fire directed especially at Meo tribes a stature which is larger than any faction, today, continue to play a major part in the
? people in Pathet Lao controlled territory. Much depends, too, on the willingness of
And American planes have even been shot France to play a significant part in providing
down while carrying relief supplies to iso- disinterested assistance along with other out-
lated troops at the request of the Prime side nations. The tenuous peace, moreover
Minister,
can be jeopardized if there is continued use
Present U.S. policies of the facility which Laos offers for the trans-
It is the policy of the United States, as shipment of supplies from North Vietnam to
expressed bythe President, to support -fully the guerrillas in the south.
At this point, half year after the conclusion
beth -the Geneva agreement Of `19M. and the'
efforts of Prime minister souveri-oe to estap_ of the agreement, it must be counted an
. ?lish a unified government in Laos. In 'keep: achievement that the military conflict re-
tug with the Geneva accords, the Matted mains substantially in abeyance. There
State has already, withdrawn its military have been, as noted, sporadic and isolated
s
aid mission personnel of 650 as well as 400 outbreaks of hostility. In general, however,
?
contract technicians, the cease fire has held. Moreover, major
outside powers?notably the United States
. At the, same_ time, and at the request of
and the Soviet Union?have been giving sub-
supplyingthePrieninkinisisntcetishes-tHs,Liteti,li
hSteaet:c1 ? stantial constructive aid to the provisional
forces under the control DX,O,PAgal110nial government of Prime Minister Souvanna
and those respondive' to" Souvanna' Phouma Phouma.
On the other hand until the removal of all
and has offered tO "assist the ord.erly de= -
foreign forces from Laos is ascertained, un-
f
InObilization of the military when it becomes
til the authority of the unified government is easible. The 'gated States is also,continu-
generally accepted throughout the country,
, economic help to the Laotian Govern-
until the military forces are reduced and uni-
Mene, but the program is ehifting from aid"
fled, the situation is bound to continue to
designed to permit the economy to sustain
hang in precarious balance. Attempts by
large military burdens to aid designed essen-
either an outside nation or a faction within
tinily to help in reconstruction and develop-
Laos to take advantage of the delicate transi-
ment; with stress on edudition.-
In effect, U.S. Laotian policy is now acting tion could readily upset the situation, and
to extricate this nation iman_ord might well bring about the abandonment of
from
fashion the effort at unification by Souvanna
from_tim position of virtually sole outside
Aim:soft Of "thabOiliiiirielit 6f Iaos A sub- Phouma.
stantiaLreductIcai,?.in the....2wt ..91 1.4atiari From the point of view of the United
&Slay has already been achieved by the States, the situation is improved over that
, Withdrawal of the military aid mission. Aid which prevailed when the Geneva Confer-
ence convened in 1961. At that time it was
Confer-
going to Laos, _moreover, has been reduced
from a pialc -annual level -Of 872 MilliOn in evident that only military intervention by
196249 the present level of about 840 Million. SEATO, and primarily by U.S. military forces
, While this reduction heg JNe.?n taxi in considerable strength, in a war of uncer-
place, bothFrance and Britain have M _agreed tam depth and duration, offered the hope
tn., Share in neW,programs of economic recon-
of preventing further deterioration in the
structinnAndsreveljvment. So far, however, position of the Vietiane Government.8 The
Geneva Conference interposed a cease-fire at
the French. have been reln,ctautfoeseume
any increase in reeporal*lities for military that point, and the accords to which it led
aid althiugh 'France is the only power helped to forestall a deepening of U.S. in-
perniitted- by the Geneva accords to maintain volvement. At least the prospect now exists
Military personnel in Laos. for a peaceful solution and that alone has
49. 139;40 ta also,providing_ eco-
already permitted a reduction in both aid
nomic assistance to ti provisiOnal .govern-
costs and numbers of U.S. personnel in Laos.
_ e
Ment, largely throu a new commercial
_ _OTHER SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
payments agreement. Russians. have out;side Laos and Vietnam, the 'Unitedi
also given Laos 10 aircraft for transport pur- States has commitments of varying depth
poses. They have offered-to build a hospital with respect to the other countries of south-
and a radio station' and to proviti,e credit for east Asia. The ties range from those of in-
the construction of a large hydroelectric timate alliance with the Philippines and to process. We should seek to meet this desire
statioip, , , lesser extent with Thailand to what Might in an orderly fashion. At the same time, far
- .OgnCluding 'continents' be termed friendly but essentially routine 'greater emphasis should be placed on ex-
- - ? - ?_ 'relations with Malaya and Burma Rela-
? ?
Solution to the Laotian problem along ' pancling more mutual relationships. tions with Cambodia are in an intermediate
. _
the lines of international neutralization and
Educa-
tional and other exchanges and the promo-
stage, in which U.S. aid is still a factor but
.national unification would be _immensely tion of tourism, for example, can be of great
development of the country. Cambodia's
contacts with the rest of the world have
been greatly expanded and now encompass
all of the major powers, Communist and
non-Communist. In international circles,
Cambodia has come to occupy an influential
role among the smaller nations and was a
prime mover in the convening of the Ge-
neva Conference on Laos.
Outside assistance has been supplied to
Cambodia by many countries, including So-
viet Russia and Communist China. The
United States has provided over $300- million
in assistance from 1955 to 1982. But the
level has been declining, with Cambodian en-
couragement and concurrence?
In spite of this assistance, however, Cam-
bodian-United States relationships have en-
countered repeated difficulties from the out-
set. In retrospect, many of these difficulties
appear superficial and avoidable. Whatever
the difficulties, there is not and can hardly
be any legitimate basis for a direct conflict
with this remote Asian kingdom. There are,
on the other hand, possibilities for deepening
cultural and economic contacts of mutual
benefit. Indeed, Cambodia's inner progress
and declining dependence on United States-
grant aid points to a foreseeable termination
of these programs, not in chaos but in a tran-
sition to an enduring relationship of mutual
respect and mutual advantage. Finally,
Cambodia's existence as an independent na-
tion at peace with all of the great powers is
of exemplary value if there is ever to be a
durable and peaceful solution to the basic
problems of southeast Asia.
It would appear very much in order for
the United States to make every effort to
understand the position of the Cambodians
and to use its good offices in every practicable
way to encourage settlement of the border
difficulties with Thailand and Vietnam. Our
military aid to these countries is undoubt-
edly a factor in exacerbating Cambodian
fears and, hence, has intensified the difficul-
ties which have characterized United States-
Cambodian relations. However they may ap-
pear to us, these fears are very real to the
Cambodians and exert a powerful influence
on the course of its policies which of late
have tended toward an extreme neutralism.
As noted, there has already been a decline
in the level of one-sided United States aid to
Cambodia and apparently, the Government of
that country desires a continuance of this
i
i
s
one of declining gnfica
difficult to achieve in the best of cirm.
cu- nce.e . value M this connection. The possibilities
stances. Geographic and cultural factors? Cantbodta of stimulating investment and enlarged trade
in the situation Are such as to encourage Cambodia has developed into one of the
, , should also be fully explored. It would ap-
internal political fragmentation, and the most stable and progressive nations in south- pear greatly in our interest to make every
sense of Laotian nationality is not widely
developed among the populace. At the same
4 Other bloc countries and ? Communist
China haye also indicated ilateKest in sup-
plying aid. Gen. Phourai Nosey= has visited
Moscow, and Peiping on an economic aid
mission, and a- state visit by the King to
the Soviet Union, he United _States, and
other Geneva participants is in, progress.
Indications, at the time, were that only
Thailand was prepared to use troops in sig-
nificant numbers. The Philippines and other
non-Asian members also offered small con-
tingents. The forces of both Thailand and
the Philippines, in any event, are heavily de-
pendent on U.S. aid.
? Indonesia was not visited during the
course of the mission.
reasonable effort to encourage a transition
from what has been a stormy and one-sided
aid relationship to a new relationship of
greater understanding and mutuality.
Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I should
like to have the attention of the Senator
Several months ago, Prince Sihanouk
stated that he was prepared for the com-
plete termination of military aid.
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tfil+
11180 Approvettff
from Montana while I speak briefly in
my own time.
I join the Senator from Rhode Island
in congratulating the Senator from Mon-
tana on his proposal that favorable eon-
sideration be given to De Gaulle's pro-
posal for a conference in regard to the
southeast Asia problem. Not only should
It not be limited to Laos, and not only
should it involve Cambodia and North
Vietnam, but it should also include South
Vietnam.
As the Senator from Montana has said,
we should not fear to negotiate. The
sad fact remains that our Ambassador
to the United Nations this morning rath-
er threw cold water on the suggestion of
proceedings to negotiate.
I ask the Senator from Montana if he
believes that, within the framework of
the suggestion that we not fear to nego-
tiate, we should not fear, either, to have
the United Nations take jurisdiction over
the whole southeast problem.
,Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, if
the Senator will yield for an answer?
Mr. MORSE. I yield.
Mr. MANSFIELD. I do not believe
that I would go that far at the present
moment, but I point out, as the Senator
well knows, that a Cambodian charge is
now pending in the United Nations. I
would not be at all surprised to see the
allegations being made by that particular
country, which I think has, in view of the
circumstances, performed quite well in
maintaining its freedom, extend to other
areas that used to be known as French
Indochina?Vietnam and Laos.
Mr. MORSE. Does the Senator from
Montana question the right of the United
Nations to take jurisdiction over the con-
duct of any country in southeast Asia, in-
cluding the United States, under a charge
that such conduct threatens the peace of
that part of the world?
Mr. MANSFIELD I would doubt at
the moment that the United Nations had
that right, although that question could
be brought up. I do not think that it
would be wise at the moment to take in
all of southeast Asia in that respect, but
out of the Cambodian allegations some-
thing of the sort could develop.
Mr. MORSE. Does the Senator from
Montana question the authority of the
United Nations to investigate whether
or not the Geneva accords are being
violated by any country, including the
United States?
Mr. MANSFIELD. I do, at least on the
first instance, because, as I reeall, the
Geneva agreements of 1954, which split
North and South Vietnam into 2 coun-
tries, and the Geneva agreements of 1962.
In which 14 nations participated?arid
I could be wrong about that?were ar-
rived at apart from the United Nations
and on the initiative of those sovereign
powers.
Mr. MORSE. Does the Senator from
Montana question the fact that when-
ever there is a threat to the peace of the
world, anywhere in the world, under the
United Nations Charter, every signatory
to the charter comes within the Juris-
diction of the United Nations to take
what steps it can within the terms of the
charter to enforce the peace?
apiestsrakt/WitbfitkagM3p2403R000200140016-6May- 21
Mr. MANSFIELD. If I understand
the Senator correctly, / point out that
South Vietnam itself is not a member of
the United Nations. I believe that it has
an observer in the United Nations. Laos
and Cambodia are members. I daresay
that any member of the United Nations
Is at liberty to bring up any question at
any time, the validity of that question to
be determined by the membership.
Mr. MORSE. Is the position of the
Senator from Montana that the jurisdic-
tion of the United Nations to maintain
peace in the world is limited only to il-
legal conduct of member nations, and
that the United Nations has no authority
to proceed to maintain peace in the
world, no matter who the violator is?
Mr. MANSFIELD No?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
time of the Senator from Oregon has
expired.
Mr. 'MORSE. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that I may proceed
for 3 additional minutes.
The PRESIDING OFFItaat. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. MANSFIELD. I would not deny
that statement. But it is a matter which
I believe would have to be considered on
an individual basis.
Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, later I
shall discuss in some detail the speech
of our Ambassador to the United Nations
this morning, which in many parts I be-
lieve was a most unfortunate speech, and
one that will do great harm to our coun-
try in worldwide opinion. But I wish
to say now that we should never hesitate
to go to the conference table at any time
on any question involving the foreign
policy of the United States. 'This morn-
ing, in my judgment, the U.S. Ambassa-
dor to the United Nations ducked and
hedged that clear obligation of the
United States in respect to the question
of negotiating. Of course, we ought to
embrace with open arms the proposal of
France or any other country to seek to
go to the conference table for the purpose
of promoting peace and ending war, and
for the purpose of seeing what can be
done to get the United States out of the
Indefensible position it now occupies in
South Vietnam, where the United States
Is making war.
Think of it. The United States is
making war in 1964 in South Vietnam,
and we hear the U.S. ambassador in the
United Nations hedging on whether or
not we should welcome negotiations with
countries that want to sit down and see
what can be done to promote peace in
southeast Asia. That includes North
Vietnam, which I believe is clearly in
violation of the Geneva accords?and we
have so charged?but unfortunately we
have tried to justify our illegal course
of action in South Vietnam on the
basis of North Vietnam's violation of
the Geneva accords, which we never
signed. We have a clear obligation to
take our charge to the United_ Nations
and to prove it And we can prove it.
We have never had a stronger case to
=hold the rule of law than we have
against North Vietnam, and, I happen
to think, Red China, too. But instead of
that we adopt the Same tactics.
We can never justify the "end justify
the means" program that the United
States is following in South Vietnam, be-
cause article 37 of the U.N. Charter re-
quires parties to any dispute to refer it
to the Security Council if they cannot
settle it by pacific means. I shall have
something to say within the rules and of
my own right under the doctrine of
secrecy about the position of the Secre-
tary of State in regard to his attitude
concerning negotiating within the United
Nations to bring to an end the war in
South Vietnam. The United States
ought to welcome an opportunity to have
the United Nations take a look at the
facts, instead of giving the impression
around the world that in this case we
think American military might can make
right. Of course, military might has
never made right, and we are not mak-
ing right by the exercise of American
military might in South Vietnam.
Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President,
will the Senator yield for the interjection
of a question?
Mr. MORSE. I am delighted to yield.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
time of the Senator from Oregon has
expired.
Mr. MORSE. The Senator can speak
on his own time.
Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, I
ask unanimous consent that L may pro-
ceed for 1 minute.
The PRESIDING OFFICeat. The
Senator is allowed 3 minutes.
Mr. SALTONSTALL I should like to
ask the Senator from Montana a ques-
tion which would follow the line of ques-
tions which the Senator from Oregon
asked. In the opinion of the Senator
from Montana would it be practical for
the United Nations to take a greater re-
sponsibility in the South Vietnam, Cam-
bodian, and Laos situation at the present
time? Is it practical, aside from any
question of illegality or anything else?
Mr. MANSFIELD. I could not answer
the question in its broad application, but
I will say that the United Nations is now
taking up the allegations made by the
Kingdom of Cambodia on the question
of violations of its borders with South
Vietnam. If it is applicable to one coun-
try in that respect. I assume it would be
applicable to other countries in that area
as well.
Mr. SALTONSTALL. As I interpreted
the statement of the Senator from Ore-
gon, he would go a little further and pos-
sibly bring in the United Nations as a
body with responsibilities for keeping
peace in that section of the world and
maintaining peace. My question was
whether it would be impractical.
Mr. MORSE. What would be imprac-
tical about it?
Mr. SALTONSTALL. It would be im-
practical for the United Nations to
gather a force from other countries of
the world to place there to keep the peace
of the world.
Mr. MORSE. Why does the Senator
make that statement, in view of the as-
sistance that has been rendered by the
United Nations to the Congo, the Middle
East, and Cyprus? Does the Senator
mean that it is impractical because the
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1664 Approved For RelteliaNCIRMIRMAlcilltal0M
. ?
United States is inyolvecl, and there must
be no reflection upon the -United StsteS;
but that if some, otheminitry is violat-
ing, the Charter 9i_ the Tiiiii,teinlatiena
el se* h. ereii the woild- ins practical for
the -United Natipnsto go In? in? That is
pure -nonsense.
Mr.OALTON8T41-1. most reSpect-
fully disagree 'With the Senator" from
_ r_
Mr. IvrOgSZ-1 ,kriPW ient?r is
respectful about it, but that does not
Make It logical.
"PACEM INItitn10" OEICE.
Mr. TELL. ?Mr. V;e4ident, in recent
days a most important conference has
been held to Plan a major International
convocation on the fast encyclical Of Pope
John man, "Pacem in Terris"7-"Peace
on Earth." I have taken a, deep interest
in these plans since their Inception.
The sessions were conthicted by the
.Centerjor the Aucly of emocratic In-
stitutiops t ,Wingspread, the Johnson
Foundation conference headquarters in
Racine, Wis. The foundation acted as,
host to the center.
As an indication of the wide scope of
thik conference and its equally_ broad
representation Of major religions and
Political COrninunitieS toughout the
wold, the conferees included; Ambassa-
dor S. 0. Adebo, of the Nigerian Mission
to the United Nations; -Father John F.
Cronin, p.s., assistant director, social ac-
tion department, National Catholic Wel-
fare Conference' the Honorable Xavier
Denim rapporteur, 'Foreign Again Com-
Mittee French National Assembly* Dr.
garlari DobrOsiels14, Counselor of the
Polish Embassy in Washington; Dr.
Nel-
son Glueck, president, Hebrew Union
College, Jewish Institute of Religion; the
Honorable Brooks Hays, Eagleton Insti-
tutOof _Politics, Rutgers University, con-
Oita:hi to President Johnson; Dr. Hud-
son Hoagland, president, American
AeadenaY of Arts and,..SCIehces; Dr.
J.,p,septh E. Johnson, president, Carnegie
Endowment for International -Peace; Mr.
Georgi Kornienko, Minister Counselor of
the .Soyiet, Embassy in Washington;
1\1-80.,Luigi Lfglittf, P.Prnallent _Observer
of the holy See to FAG, Vatican ,city:
pot: gans J?moxgenthau, of the Center
for the Study of American Foreign Poli-
cy, the T.Iniversity of Chicago; the Hon-
orable C V...Tarasimhen, Executive Office
of the Secretary-General of the United
Nations; Dr, Josip Presburger, Couriselor
of the_Yugoslav Embassy in Washington;
Dr. uene Aabipowitch, editor of the
14141.1eWn.ca.Atomie?Seientists; his Excel-
lency ,13ashicLel _Rashid, Ambassador to
the t,,Tni,edl\TAtJons,Xr.oro._Kuwait and his
deputy, Ahmad 4i7Naki_h; Mr. Andrew
Shonfie41, director of studies, the Royal
Institute of ,International Affairs, Eng-
land; Mr John Tomlinson director of
..4 _
.?,n11?sP,19,PPIA world seryice. liaison for the
isiationai conne_11,ef Marches; and Sir
UnhaPun4.0,4a4Ulla Khan. Judge of the
InternationalCqir.,
Our own body was represented by two
Most able and distinguished Senators:
Senator GAyi,orto Nzi..aon, of Wisconsin,
- ,
'Np. 102
and Senator GEORGE McGoiman, of South
Dakota, Although I was unfortunatel
unable to attend the conference hi, per-
son, I was represented by my special
assistant, Livingston piddle.
Discussions at the conference were ex-
tremely frank and unusually free from
the acerbity which so frequently accom-
panies debate on divisive international
Issues.
The conferees pursued their delibera-
tions in accord with the mood of the en-
cyclical which is addressed to "all men
of good will," and in accord With WO
encyclical's fundamental premise that
"all men are equal in human dignity."
Participants spoke not necessarily as of-
ficial representatives of their, govern-
ments or of their organizations but as
Individuals belonging to the whole hu
man family. Thus the discussions were
given maximum opportunity for honest
exchange.
During the conference it was pointed
out that,rnankind does not need to accept
the theological reasoning through which
Pope John in part reached his conclu-
sions in order to accept the conclusions
themselves. Thus the encyclical was dis-
cussed in a unique frame of reference?
not primarily as representing a particu-
lar theology, although it does with ex-
traordinary eloquence?but as Setting
forth guidelines to international conduct
and those moral imperatives which coin-
cide with thepractical self-interest oLall
men and all nations, regardless of their
separate beliefs or ideologies.
It is my own conviction that the prin-
ciples involved in, "Pacem in Terris" are
universally applicable. I further believe
that the International Convocation?t9
be held in 'New York City next February
with participating leading statesmen and
scholars from all over the world?can
well become one of the most meaningful
assemblages of our times.
Mr. President, in order to illustrate the
scholarly research and reasoning which
helped make the preliminary conference
such a success, I ask unanimous consent
that the schemata of the conference
and three working papers, prepared by
staff contributors of the Center for the
Study of Democratic Institutions, be in-
serted in the RECORD at the end of my
remarks.
These papers are addressed to the
principal themes of the conference.
I recommend them to my colleagues
for their consideration. We may not
agree with these documents in all re-
spects, but in substance they are im-
mensely thoughtful in providing a basis
for free discussion.
There being no objection, the material
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
SCHEMATA ADOPTED BY "PACEM /N TERRIS"
CONFERENCE CONDUCTED BY CENTER FOR
STUDY OF DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS, MAY
1961
The conferees agreed on these topics for
the convocation:
1. How to obtain universal acceptance of
the idea of coexistence of nations of differ-
ing ideological and social systems.
2. How to achieve sufficient flexibility so
that all international conflicts can, be get-
200140016-6 11181
tied by negotiation, and how to devise mech-
anisms for peaceful social and political
change.
3. How to obtain recognition of the urgent
need for rapid progress toward nuclear and
conventional disarmament.
4. How to take actions and develop un-
derstanding to create mutual trust among
the nations.
5. How to achieve the elimination of rac-
Ism in all countries.
6. Prow to achieve international coopera-
tion in assisting the developing countries
in the interests of the prosperity of the
world, and how to make full use of science
and technology for developing cooperation
among nations.
7. How to encourage further development
of the United Nations so that its means and
structure may become equal to the mag-
nitude of its tasks.
THE ENCYCLICAL AS A GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL
CONDUCT
(By Fred Warner Neal)
The basic problem of international politics
in the modern world is how individual, legally
sovereign nations can serve their own in-
terests without jeopardizing the common in-
terest of which their own interest is a part.
The problem was there in the prethermonu-
clear age, but it was not so crucial, nor was
it so clear that there did, in fact, exist a
common interest. The settlement of na-
tional disputes by violence could often be
justified on practical grounds and sometimes
even on grounds of justice. Today, with
human existence hanging in a delicate
thermonuclear balance, what was once
utopian?the avoidance of war?has become
a practical matter of life and death both for
individual states and nor the world com-
munity?for humanity?as a whole.
What "Pacen in Terris" does is to set forth
a guide to international conduct in these pre-
carious circumstances. It does so by identi-
fying principles to which all statesmen truly
devoted to the interests of their own peoples
can subscribe. They do not need to accept
,the theological reasoning through which Pope
John in part reached his conclusions in order
to accept the conclusions themselves. In-
deed, many of the same conclusions have
been arrived at independently by those of
different theological persuasion and by those
Who reject theology of any kind as a basis
for dealing,with world affairs. For the Pope's
conclusions are based as much on secular
reason and logic as on theology and altruism.
Thus the encyclical is truly ecumenical,
and not only in a religious sense. It is clear
that the Pope intended it this way. He ad-
dressed his encyclical not only to Roman
Catholics, or even just to Christians, but
"to all men of godd will." And he empha-
sized that "meetings and agreements * * *
between believers and those who do not
believe * * * can be occasions for discover-
ing truth and paying homage to it."
Although the papacy is perhaps the most
thoroughly Western-based institution, Pope
John, in "Pacem in Terris," rises above in-
ternational sectionalism as above national-
ism, while recognizing the fact of both The
principles enunciated are elementary and
universal. Indeed, they are so simple that
they are often ignored in formulations of
foreign policy, and this may be one of the
major reasons why so frequently the best-
intentioned foreign policies fail to serve the
interests either of their originators or of
the world community.
International conduct, according to
"Pacem in Terris," is based on 'these ideas
and principles:
1. The world is organized into separate,
individual nation-states and into differing
ideological systems. The nation-states are
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legally sovereign. They are individual and
unique. They have particular interests
which they seek to enhance, but they also
have a common, human interest. Each
nation-state is of equal "natural dignity."
In all of them there is both good and evil;
none is superior or inferior by nature.
2. The separate interests of the various
nation-states are often in conflict.
The law of change applies to all finite
things, including nation-states and relations
between them.
4. Conflicts among nations can be solved
either by force and violence; i.e., war, or by
negotiation and compromise; there is no
other way. But negotiation must involve a
sincere desire to seek equitable compromise.
based on objective appraisal of the facts.
5. The development of thermonuclear
weapons means that solution of conflicts by
war is no longer tenable. War can no longer
serve the interests of individual nations or
the common interest. Nor is the old distinc-
tion between just and unjust wars any longer
tenable. "It is hardly possible to imagine
that in the atomic era war would be used
as an instrument of justice."
6. The existence of thermonuclear weapons
is in itself a danger, even though there is
no intention to use them, since "it cannot
be denied that the conflagration may be set
off by some unexpected and obscure event."
7. But under existing conditions, this dan-
ger inevitably increases. "If one country
increases its armaments, others feel the
need to do the same; and if one country is
equipped with nuclear weapons, other coun-
tries must produce their own, equally de-
structive."
8. "Justice, then, right reason and human-
ity urgently demand" disarmament.
For the preservation of peace among na-
' tions, the encyclical emphasis, "political
communities are reciprocally subject of
rights and duties." And "this means that
their relationships also must be harmonized
in truth, in justice, in a working solidarity, in
liberty." Here we have "moral imperatives"
which coincide with practical self-interest.
Conflicts of interest between nations do
occur. No nation, however, can serve its in-
terest today by trying to settle these disa-
greements by violence. They must, there-
fore, be settled by "a mutual assessment of
the reasons on both sides of the dispute, by
a mature and objective investigation of the
situation, and by an equitable reconciliation
of differences of opinion."
To this end, conflicts of interest must be
minimized and avoided where possible. To
violate the rights of national self-determina-
tion or interfere in internal affairs of other
states, to treat some political communities
as by nature superior or inferior to others,
to misinform oneself about the facts regard-
ing others, to mistreat national minorities
(or for minorities to claim undue measure),
for richer nations to fail to aid poorer na-
tions or to aid them "with strings at-
tached"?all such actions create serious con-
flicts and, therefore, are both morally wrong
and are against the self-interest of all states.
But even if states act according to such
high precepts of conduct, the thermonu-
clear armaments rate itself jeopardizes
peace and "people live in constant fear lest
the storm that every moment threatens
should break upon them with dreadful vio-
lence." And since nations do not always
conform to the precepts for international
conduct that the encyclical sets forth, the
danger is all the greater.
For this reason, disarmament has top pri-
ority in the Pope's prescriptions, and he sets
forth the order in which it may be achieved.
"Justice, right reason, and humanity," says
the encyclical, "urgently demand that the
arms race should cease; that the stockpiles
which exist in various countries should be
reduced equally and simultaneously by the
parties concerned; that nuclear weapons
should be banned; and that a general agree-
ment should eventually be reached about
progressive disarmement and an effective
method of control."
Disarmament, in the Pope's view, cannot
be achieved by half measures. "All must
realize." says the encyclical. "that there is no
hope of putting an end to the building up
of armaments, nor of reducing the present
stockpiles. nor, still less, of abolishing them
altogether, unless the process is complete
and thorough and unless it proceeds from
inner conviction."
But this involves the whole nature of in-
ternational politics. "If this is to come
about, the fundamental principle on which
our present peace depends must be replaced
by another, which declares that the true
and solid peace of nations consists not in
equality of arms but in mutual trust alone."
Such a state, the Pope believed, "can be
brought to pass" and moreover that "it is
something which reason requires, that it is
eminently desirable in itself and this it will
prove to be the source of many benefits."
In terms of immediate international af-
fairs, what is the practical significance of
"Pacem in Terris?" One can hear many,
perhaps all, statesmen saying: "We accept
the Pope's principles and his precepts, but
they don't." In short. "We alone are in
step." The fact is that most nations are in
step and out of step at the same time. Few
nations indeed always conduct their affairs
in consonance with all the principles and
precepts of the encyclical; but also most,
perhaps all, think they observe most of them
most of the time. The concept of raison
d'etat covers the sin of self-deception as well
as others.
The obvious focus of the Pope's prescrip-
tions for relations among states is on dis-
armament. But the encyclical further pre-
scribes "mutual trust" as a prerequisite for
disarmament. How can mutual trust be
achieved'? Almost certainly there is not
meant here the kind of mutual trust that
would, for instance, permit general and com-
plete disarmament?or perhaps disarmament
of any kind?without inspection. But it
means the kind of mutual trust necessary to
start the disarmament process in motion.
Since this involves principally the major
powers, it is hard to see how such trust can
be acheived without a general understand-
ing, a detente, among them and particularly
between the United States and the Soviet
Union. For this two things are necessary:
first, an awareness on each side that the
other genuinely sees its own interest served
by making progress toward disarmamert;
and second, the settlement by negotiations
of disputes between them.
For the first, the distinction made in the
encyclical between ideology, and social sys-
tems is essential. Philosophies may remain
the same, but systems cannot avoid change.
Disagreement about philosophical truth is
no necessary barrier to agreement on honor-
able and useful political ends. This together
with the statement that no political com-
munities are by nature superior or inferior
or wholly good or wholly evil, amounts to a
theory of "coexistence," which is a pre-
requisite for everything else.
In this connection, the Pope's exhorta-
tions about information are also pertinent.
"Truth," the encyclical states, "demands
that the various media of social communi-
cations made available by modern, progress
which enable the nations to know each other
better, be used with serene objectivity.
That need not, of course, rule out any legi-
timate emphasis on the positive aspects of
their way of life. But methods of informa-
tion which fall short of the truth, and by
the same token impair the reputation of
this people or that, must be discarded."
This point in the encyclical should not be
interpreted as applying only to news media.
It applies equally to diplomatic reporting
and official cotnmuniques and pronounce-
ments. And it also applies to officially
erected barriers to information and to travel.
No society is altogether "closed" and no
society is altogether "open." But there
needs to be a recognition of the principle
that the more open the better. At the same
time, of course, the degree of openness de-
pends, at least in part, on the degree of mu-
tual trust and the extent to which there is
mutual acceptance of one state by another,
i.e.. coexistence.
The matter of disputes is In some ways
more complex and in some ways less. The
only major specific dispute between the
United States and the Soviet Union at the
time of this writing, for example, concerns
Germany. Unresolved, this dispute blocks
progress toward disarmament not only by
preventing achievement of mutual trust but
also by barring the most likely next steps
in the disarmament process. i.e., the freezing
of nuclear weapon strength in Central Eu-
rope and then, perhaps establishing a nu-
clear free zone there. Here the chances for
settlement would surely be improved if both
sides would heed the Pope's injunction to
seek equitable compromise based on objec-
tive appraisal of the facts.
Of course, there are other pressing inter-
national disputes besides that between the
United States and the Soviet Union in cen-
tral Europe, and, according to the encyclical,
all of them should be truly negotiated. It
should be noted in this connection that the
encyclical's prescription for true negotiation
involves not only meeting and talking but
meeting and talking with the sincere purpose
of reaching an equitable compromise, based
on an objective appraisal of the facts, that
is to say, some mutual giving in in the
interest of both sides.
Admittedly, this may be a difficult process.
But initial failure to reach accord must not
deflect either effort or intent. Noting that
systems and political situations are subject
to constant change, sometimes of a profound
nature. the Pope points out that agreements
"formerly deemed inopportune or unpro-
ductive might now or in the future be con-
sidered opportune and useful." But he does
not attempt to recommend specific solutions.
These must be decided by the proper authori-
ties and be reached "with the virtue of
prudence."
The message of the encyclical is clear, how-
ever: the thermonuclear era requires changes
in all things, and above all, "because of the
dynamic course of events." flexibility and the
readiness to adapt. The failure to do so
violates both reason and moral precepts and
risks mutual destruction.
The question of settling disputes, of reach-
ing understanding between nations, involves
more than specific geopolitical issues. Here
the matter of intervention, so roundly con-
demned by the encyclical, arises. Where
simple, direct military intervention is in-
volved, the issue is usually clear enough. But
there is intervention and intervention. One
reality of International politics is that major
states have "core interests" outside their na-
tional boundaries, i.e., "spheres of influence"
of one sort or another, which they regard as
vital to their security. This does not neces-
sarily involve hegemonistic policies, but
states invariably consider a challenge to their
core interests by outside powers as a chal-
lenge to their very existence.
Two problems apparent in contemporary
International politics arise here. One is the
tendency of major states to challenge each
other's core interests, not only by interven-
ing or establishing military power on their
periphery but also by propaganda and sub-
version. The other problem is the tendency
of major states to extend their core interests
to areas far distant from their homelands.
It is indicative of the complexity of the
matter that here both the United States and
the Soviet Union will see each other as be-
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