THE SOVIETS AND THE ARAB OIL WEAPON

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01495R000500030003-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: January 4, 2017
• Document Release Date: July 7, 2005
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: December 12, 1973
• Content Type: MEMO

SECRET
Approved For ReleUp 2005/07/22 : CIA-RDP80B01495R0Q0500030003-4
VAr
12 December 1973
SUBJECT: The Soviets and the Arab Oil Weapon
Moscow had little or no control over the Arab de-
cision to curtail the oil flow to the West and there is
no good evidence that the Soviets had any hand in planning
or implementing the oil cutbacks. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait,
both states with conservative, strongly anti-Communist
governments, initiated and are leading the Arab action.
It is noteworthy that Iraq, the Arab oil producer with
whom the Soviets have the strongest influence has not
joined the boycott.
The Soviets have long encouraged the Arabs, however,
to employ the oil weapon in their struggle against Israel.
Soviet propaganda broadcasts to the Arab world before the
war, for example, hailed Arab interest in curtailing oil
production as an effective tool in the fight against
Israel and "its imperialist protectors." The broadcasts
urged both nationalization and reduced sales as appro-
priate tactics.
The Soviets undoubtedly see substantial benefits to
themselves in the Arab oil boycott. They welcome the
weakening of Western economies and the split that has
developed between the United States and its European and
Japanese allies over the issue.
Moscow has also been using the energy crisis to hint
at the prospective advantage to the West of commercial
arrangements to exploit Soviet oil resources. A recent
Soviet broadcast to the US, for example, quoted a Russian
scientist's prediction that "cold Siberia will light and
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heat New York." The Soviets cannot
energetically, however, lest they intpush ensify1Arabecriticism
that Moscow's oil sales undercut the boycott. Finally,
the Soviets can also expect higher prices for their own
oil exports.
The picture is not all roses for the Soviets, however.
Delivery of Arab oil to Eastern Europe has been cut back,
obligating the Soviets to divert small amounts of the oil
they would have exported to Western Europe. If these
diversions become extensive, they could have a serious
political impact on Soviet relations with Western Europe
and could harm Moscow's reputation as a trading partner.
Moscow's sensitivity on this score is apparent in its
testy denials of Western press speculation that Russia is
behind the oil shortages.
The Soviets are undoubtedly concerned that the oil
weapon could backfire and have an adverse effect on
U.S.-Soviet detente. Just a few days ago a Soviet Foreign
Ministry official responsible for Middle Eastern affairs
denied to the U.S. charge that the Soviets are playing a
role in the boycott and stressed that Saudi's King Faisal
is someone whom the Soviets cannot influence.
Because of the possibility of an adverse Western
reaction, the Soviets have not been publicly the Western predicament. The Soviet media, while endorsing
the Arab boycott, have given only moderate attention to it.
We have no evidence of Soviet diplomatic activity aimed at
deliberately prolonging the oil crisis. Instead, the Soviets
have been generally cooperative in using their influence
among the Arabs to get peace talks started.
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