UNCLASSIFIED STUDY OF SOVIET CIVIL DEFENSE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81M00980R000900040029-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 9, 2004
• Sequence Number: 29
• Publication Date: January 4, 1978
• Content Type: MF

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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE ....
National Intelligence Officers
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
FROM:. Director, National Foreign Assessment Center
SUBJECT: Unclassified Study of Soviet Civil Defense
1. Action Requested: That you decide on whether to release the
attached unclas s f d study of Soviet civil defense and on the method of
making public the study or its contents.
2. Background,: .
;SCJRET
a. requested a sanitized version of the Key
Findings and summary an Conclusions of the recent Interagency Intell i-
gence Memorandum on Soviet civil defense to determine the feasibility
of preparing an unclassified paper on the subject. His recommendation
in favor of release is attached (Attachment 1).
b. We have taken another look at the substance and style of the
unclassified study and have included some further changes. We have
modified some sentences which might convey a much different meaning
than intended if quoted out of context by those trying purposely to
distort the findings of the paper. We have determined that the public
release of our proposed draft (Attachment 2) would not reveal sensitive
sources or methods. We also propose that an unclassified bibliography
be released as part'of the study. The bibliography will help protect
sources and methods and provide an unclassified data base for those
interested.
c. If the attached paper were released it would be the first
unclassified DCI publication on a subject specifically related to
Soviet capabilities for strategic nuclear conflict. Since the release
would set a precedent we recommend that you consider the pros and cons
of whether to release the paper and the means of release.
N1996_0.3 3-7f
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SUBJECT: Unclassified Study of Soviet Civil Defense
d. Release of the unclassified study.
Pros
--Would be an official and professional contribution to an
issue on which discussion has tended to become polemical.
--Issuance of our own judgments, including necessary caveats
might preclude or offset the effect of biased releases of portions
of the IIM by others. (Information drawn from the classified IIM
on Soviet civil defense or interpretations and comments about its
conclusions are likely to find their way into the news media,
shortly after the document is disseminated.)
--Might reduce incentives to leak parts of the classified IIM,
thus reducing the risks of compromising sources and methods. _
--Would be responsive to some Congressional requests. (Se Bator
John C. Culver (D., Iowa), Chairman, Subcommittee on General
Legislation, Senate Armed Services Committee, has a deep interest
in Soviet civil defense and has asked on a number of.occasions if
we could declassify our Soviet civil defense study.)
--Possibility of distortion of intelligence findings in spite
of caveats, by what the press picks out as headline material (e.g.,
2 billion dollars annually and 20 million casualties).
--Possibility of distortion because civil defense treated out
of context with overall strategic balance.
--Need to put civil defense in context or perhaps the prece-
dent of release itself, could have snowballing effect of demand on
the DCI for more and more comprehensive and sensitive assessments
on, say, the overall strategic balance.
--Could inject the DCI into a public debate about an issue
rather than through policymaking officials of the Administration
or Congressional officials. The DCI could be seen as (1) an
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SUBJECT: Unclassified Study of Soviet Civil Defense
independent source of public release on foreign developments
requiring policy reactions by the Administration, or (2) a
:source of public release on foreign developments supporting
Administration policy.
e. Possible Soviet reactions and response to the release:
--The basic question in the Soviet mind would be why the US
government published an assessment of effects of a nuclear attack
at a time when the US and USSR appear to be progressing toward a
SALT agreement. The Soviet leaders would interpret the decision
to publish an unclassified analysis of Soviet civil defense programs
in terms of US foreign military and negotiating policy rather than
of CIA's effort to educate the public, the Congress and execptive
branch agencies. Soviet political writers would be more impressed
by the fact of the publication than by the accuracy of the informa-
tion. The Soviet press would probably characterize publication of
the paper as a victory for "anti-Soviet" forces and opponents of
SALT in the US.
--Although the effect of the publication on SALT itself is
harder to foresee, the report would probably have at most a
marginally harmful effect on present negotiations. It might
cause the Soviets to hesitate more than otherwise about expanding
US-USSR negotiations to include civil. defense. Soviet leaders
would almost certainly believe that the CIA publication represented
an effort to stake out a public position on major US concerns in
advance of working group discussions on civil defense. This
consideration, given the apparent Soviet belief that the USSR
leads the US in civil defense, may reinforce any current Soviet
hesitation about the value to the USSR of civil defense negotiations.
s--On the other hand the Soviets conceivably could be encouraged
to enter civil defense negotiations by the belief that the CIA
paper (like recent OSD statements about US ASAT development) may
presage a major US civil defense effort. This is unlikely, however,
because the Soviets would probably conclude that stepping up the
US civil defense effort, in view of the US experience with civil
defense in the 1960s, would meet political resistance. Soviet
propaganda about the CIA report would seek to contribute to such
resistance, and to portray the report as an exaggeration by CIA
"cold-warriors."
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SUBJECT: Unclassified Study of Soviet Civil Defense
f. Some of the disadvantages of making the study public might be
lessened or eliminated if the study were not released directly to the
public media by the DCI. Some other options:
--Provide the unclassified study to a Congressional committee
for release by the Congress. An indirect release of a DCI assess-
ment under this procedure would be responsive to Congressional
requests and would avoid setting a precedent for the direct release
to news media of DCI assessments on Soviet strategic capabilities.
The release would not, however, be under the control of Administration
officials for whom the IIM on Soviet civil defense was prepared.
--Provide the unclassified study to the Secretary of Defense
for release in summary form in the unclassified version of his
Annual Defense Department Report. In this case the release would
be made by a policymaking official of the Administration, but the
findings of the study in summary form would be much more subject
to misinterpretation than the complete study. Moreover, the
findings might be subjected to a Department of Defense interpretation
different than what we intended.
3.. Staff Coordination: This memorandum has been coordinated with the
DD/NFAC, DDO, D R, NIO/SP, NIO/USSR, Legislative Counsel, Assistant for
Public Affairs, Chief, Congressional Support Staff and the Chairman of the
Interagency Working Group on Civil Defense.
4. Recommendations:
a. Recommendations of staff elements differ. The Assistant for
Public Affairs is not aware of any pressures other than from some members
of Congress for a public disclosure on the subject. He and the NI0/USSR
and the NIO/SP conclude that the disadvantages outweigh the advantages of
releasing the paper at this time. The remainder of the Staff, noting
particularly the Congressional interest in an unclassified assessment,
are in favor of the release. All members of the staff b j e_ve,_boweve-r,
that rel easi ngg the paper throuq a a` r a Qmmi i:t would be..-
a direct release by the DCI or to a release of.parts of
the paper in the Annua Defense Department Report.
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SUBJECT: Unclassified Study of Soviet Civil Defense
b. On balance, I personally am inclined against release of
the memorandum at this time. The Agency is already much too much
in the news. If the study should become a major press topic, CIA
could be depicted as having a policy purpose in releasing this
material just as the defense budget is under consideration and
...a SALT treaty is in prospect.
c. If your own inclination is to release the study, I agree
that you should first consult with the Secretary of State as
recommended by Mr. Hetu.
d. Should you decide to release the study, I suggest that,
in line with past practice, you advise members of NFIB concerning
your intention and invite their comment;
25X1
Attachments
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SUBJECT: Unclassified Study of Soviet Civil Defense
25X1
Distribution:.
1-DCI
1 - ER
1 - D/NFAC
1 - DD/NFAC
1 DDO
1 D/OSR
1 - LC
I - A/DCI/PA
I - NIO/USSR
1 Ch/CSS/NFAC
i OSR/SE/S
1 NIO/SP
1 - NFAC Registry
NIO/SPA
4 Jan 78)
`SECRET
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