STAFF NOTES: CHINESE AFFAIRS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00608R000300080030-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 31, 2004
• Sequence Number: 30
• Publication Date: December 22, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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Top Secret
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W
ES UP
Chinese affairs
0
TES
Top Secret
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December 22, 1975,
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CHINESE AFFAIRS
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December 22, 1975
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Another Leath in the Party's Family. . . . . . 4
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A Semblance of Stability
Expanding. Civil Aviation 10
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Recent PRC Claims for
China's Foreign Trade.
Grain Output. . 18
Economic Notes:
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Shanghai Transport Booms 20
CHRONOLOGY . . 21
ANNEX: Education: Back on the Front Burner . 23
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Another Death in the Part 's Family
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The death of party vice-chairman Kang Sheng on
December 16 should have little effect on Chinese
policy-making. Kang had 'peen inactive for several
years, although he appeared at the party congress
in 1973, at National Day ceremonies in 1974, and at
the National People's Congress this year. Kang was
rumored to be ill at least since 1971, and he was
in a wheelchair for the National Day celebrations
in 1974. He was aligned with the party's left wing
and reputedly recruited Chiang Ching into the party
in the 1930s. Although his supposed illness may not
have prevented him entirely from advocating leftist
causes in higher party councils, the actual extent
of his influence in recent years is impossible to
determine.
The memorial service held for Kang on December
21 brought out all active Peking-based Politburo
members. The namelist, given in order of party
rank, revealed no changes. Chiang Ching, for
example, despite the many setbacks she has suffered
this year, remains the highest ranking member of
the Politbrro, following the elite Standing Committee.
Another highlight of the service was the reappearance
of young party vice-chairman Wang Hung-wen, who pre-
sided over the ceremony. Wang's appearance was his
first in Pekir.g since last May and was virtually
mandatory under the circumstances. He reputedly had
returned to Shanghai earlier this year for further
"seasoning" as a result of his less than glowing
performance as a member of the hierarchy in Peking.
Party vice---chairman Yeh Chien-ying, who himself
has been ailing, delivered a rather warm eulogy,
claiming that Kang was "beloved by the people of the
whole country." Kang, whose career was spent mainly
in security.and internal intelligence work, was in
December 22, 1975
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fact probably more feared than loved, and his
role in support of party leftists during the Cultural
Revolutio:a undoubtedly did not endear him to the
moderates.
passing from the scene.
remarkable longevity, the old guard is slowly
Mao, the ailing Chou En-lai, and 90-year-old
Chu Te, who has made several public appearances
despite his age, did not attend the ceremony but
did send wreaths. The same was true of aging
Politburo member Liu Po-cheng.
There are signs that the party's most prominent
intellectual, the octogenarian Kuo Mo-jo, is ill,.
Kuo has not appeared publicly since October. He
sent a wreath to the Kang Sheng ceremony and has
missed several events hosted by the Chinese Academy
of Sciences, of which he is president. On some
occasions, these events have been held in Kuo's
name, a formulation used fox. Premier Chou En-lai.
Whether or not Kang's death means that the
left has lost yet another voice, it ci;)es point up,
the age of the current leadership. At 77, Kang
wa-. the same age as Chou En-lai and Yeh Chien-ying,
both of whom are ailing to some degree, and was
younger than Mao, Chu Te, and Liu Po-cheng. Earlier
this year, Politburo member and co-founder of the
party Ting Pi-wu died at the age of 90. Despite
December 22, 1975
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The persistent factionalism and worker unrest
that has plagued China for more than a year seems
to have abated somewhat as a result of a combina-
tion of both harsh and conciliatory measures. Al-
though there are still signs of dissatisfaction
among the populace, the worst seems to be over in
terms of strikes and factional fighting.
Workers,who have been striking for higher wages
throughout the year have apparently won at least
temporary relief as several provinces have adopted
wage adjustment systems on a trial basis. A final
decision on wages may be included in the new five
year economic plan, which begins in January, but no
definitive word has yet come from Peking on the
subject. For now, the provinces are experimenting
with a variety of wage schemes that benefit lower
paid workers who have been in the same grade for many
years. In some areas, such as Y.wangtung, Kwangsi,
and Heilungkiang, lower paid workers are getting a
pay raise while apparently remaining in the same
grade. in Hupeh, however, lower paid workers will
reportedly be promoted either one or two grades,
depending on their length of service.
Because they focus on the lower grades, these
adjustments are not an excessive drain on the
economy. Thus, the provinces have found a relatively
inexpensive way to appease the workers. In Kwangsi,
for example, strikes and slowdowns began to disappear
after the implementation of a wage revision.
Workers in Yunnan, by contrast, reportedly are
still disgruntled because there has been no change
in the wage system, but most of them are at least
back on their jobs. Yunnan and strife-torn Chekiang
have been the most difficult areas to bring under
control.
December 22,
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The general unrest in Yunnan had apparently spread
to the Hui minority group, which had raided PLA armor-
ies, hijacked trains, and held mass rallies to pro-
mote the notion of a separate Hui region. Leaders
of the so-called Hui rebellion were arrested and sent
to Peking for political study sessions. In addition,
the Yunnan provincial leadership took steps to improve
the living conditions of the Huis. This carrot and
stick approach has apparently been successful, and
talk of an autonomous Hui state has died down.
Leaders of other troubled provinces are appar-
ently talking tougher and carrying through with their
threats. In Fukien, where factional problems still
are affecting production, the provincial party boss
reportedly has warned those engaged in factional fight-
ing that they will be sentenced to labor reform. Lower
level officials--allegedly numbering in the hundreds
--have reportedly been removed or reassigned. A party
leader in Tibet has publicly issued similar threats
in regard to lower level officials responsible for
agriculture who are following the wrong political
line and fail to correct their errors.
Although Peking has made some headway in
stemming the worst of the disorders, the long-sought
stability down to the grassroots is still somewhat
elusive. Factional rivalries, even when under con-
trol, are virtually impossible to eliminate entirely
and are likely to spring up again at the slightest
sign of tension or political indecision in Peking.
In this regard, the recent leftist assault on edu-
cational policy--and especially any harsh moves
against the perpetrators of this attack--could spark
a resurgence of factional activity in the provinces.
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December 22, 1975
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Etc aildin Civil Aviation
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Peking has added 21 new routes and 58 new flights
per week to domestic air operations since April, bring-
ing total routes to 115 and total flight3 to 344. Air-
ports and aircraft inventories are also being expanded.
International air operations are plagued by low
traffic demand and continuing losses on existing routes,
although China continues to seek new international air
agreements. China now offers flights to only 10 for-
eign countries and is served by 10 foreign airlines.
Peking has reciprocal air agreements with more than 30
countries, however. The most recent agreements were
signed this fall with Finland and West Germany. The
surge of new foreign flights to China that occurred in
the last few years has stopped, probably reflecting
high fuel prices, Peking's stringent visa policy, and
the general economic slump.
Chinese aircraft inventories continue to grow
despite serious under-utilization of the recently
added 10 Boeing 707s and 8 British Tridents. Origi-
nally bought to augment the 5 Soviet IL-62s on inter
national routes, several of these radium and long
range aircraft are being flown on domestic flights
alona w 'th 31 Soviet AN-24s and 45 IL-14s.
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December 22, 1975
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Civil Air Routes
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Recent PRC Claims for China's
Foreign Trade
Although Peking has not published data on the
value of China's foreign trade since 1959, for the
past three years it has released fragmentary-sta-
tistics on the percentage increases in China's for-
eign trade.
Dollar values estimated from the sporadic Chi-
nese statements and from trading partner statistics
are as follows:
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1952
1965
1972
1973
1974
Chinese From Trade
Statements* Partner Data*
1,890 1,830
4,130 3,880
6,130 5,920
10,700 10,090
14,175 14,005
*MiZZion US DoZZarR
December 22.. 1975
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The Chinese have released a new figure for grain
output in 1974 that is far larger than output claimed
for any previous year--because soybean production
has been included.
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For each year from 1970 through 1973, the Chi-
nese announced an absolute figure for the output of
grain, which included rice, wheat, coarse grains,
and potatoes. In 1974 the Chinese reported only that
output for that year was 2.4 times that of 1949.
The derived output figure based on this increase would
be 260 million tons. CIA, however, believes that
this total is a bit high. Weather in 1974 was generally
unfavorable, and output was probably closer to 255
million tons.
The new total for 1974 (announced at a UN FAO
conference in Rome in mid-November by the vice-minister
of agriculture and forestry, Yang Li--kung) is 274.9
million tons. Minister Yang also repeated the claim
that 1974 output was 2.4 times that of 1949, and the
coupling of this increase with an absolute figure
makes it clear that the 1974 official output figure
(2.428 times the 1949 grain and soybean output) in-
cludes soybeans--and is consistent with our esti-
mates.
Official Chinese Grain Claims
(MiZZion Metric Tons)
CIA
Estimates
YEAR 1949 1957 1973 1974 1974
TOTAL 113.2 195.0 -- 274.9 275.0
GRAIN 108.1 185'.0* 250.0 -- 255-260
SOYBEANS 5.1 10.0 -- -- 15-20
December 22, 1975
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Peking announced recently that the 1975 harvest was
"even higher. than 1974, itsel! a high 'production year."
This statement downgrades previous claims that the
1974 harvest.w,as a record one and su Its that an
increase in this year will be small.
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ECONOMIC NOTES
Shanghai Transport Booms
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A major bridge across the Huang-pu River
connecting Shanghai with a major petrochemical com-
bine is nearly completed. The rail section of the
double-deck structure was completed in late August;
the road will be done soon.
This bridge and other transport developments
continue to spur industrial growth in Shanghai,
China's largest city. Public transport has been one
of the vital ingredients in Shanghai's industrial
growth rate, which has averaged over 9 percent between
1966 and 1974. Nearly 6 million people--half the
city's population--use Shanghai's public transport
daily.
December 22, 1975
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CHRONOLOGY
December 3-10 Chinese People's Association for
Friendship with foreign countries
delegation visits Afghanistan.
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December 4 People's Daily replays Red FZa article
attacking education policy. 25X1
December 5 Chinese trade and economic exhibit opens
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Li Chiang and Czech Vice minister.
in Peking by Foreign Trade Minister,
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December 8 Visiting Minister of information from
Benin (formerly Dahomey) meets with
party central committee member Yac
Wen- uan; departs for home December
December 8,9, Various Romanian Delegations visiting
& 13 China meet with Chen Hsi-lien Hua
Kuo-feng, and Chiao Kuan-hua,
December 8-17 Chinese trade delegation led by Wang
in Mali. 25X1
Yao-ting, Chief of the China Council
for the Promotion of International
Trade, visits Thailand; meets Prime
Minister Khukrit on December 9.
December 9 1976 Sino-Czech trade agreement signed
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December 11 Peking's first ambassador to the
Phillipines, Ko Hua arrives in
Manila.
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Chinese industry and trade delegation
concludes two-week visit to Singapore.
December 11-- Former Italian prime minister and
21 Christian Democrat party leader
Fanfani visits China; meets with
Teng Hsiao-ping and Chiao Kuan-hua.
December 14 Former Shantung Military District
commander Tung Kuo-kuei identified as
commander of the Hunan Military
District.
Party vice-chairman Kang Sheng dies.
December 18 Delayed announcement of visit to Peking
by delegation from the Marxist-Leninist
Revolutionary Party of Salvador.
December 19 Chao Tzu-yang identified as first .
secretary of Szechwan Province.
December 21 Memorial ceremony for Kang Sheng,
presided over by Wang Hung-wen,
his first appearance in Peking
since May.
President Manuel Pinto Da Costa of the
Democratic Republic of Sao Tome and
Principe begins official state visit.
December, 2
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is almost certainly aimed at Minister of Education
more conventional', pre-Cultural Revolution practices
Chou Jung-hsin, a leading advocate of a return to the
ANNEX
Education: Back on the Front Burner
The radical changes in education introduced five
years ago as a result of the Cultural Revolution are
again being defended, but chances are still good that
they will undergo some, if not considerable, modifica-
tion over the next year or so. Since the first of the
month, Red Flag, People's Daily and the provincial
media have all carried adamant defenses of the Cul-
tural Revolution reforms while attacking advocates of
the more traditional approach to education. Red Flag's
verbal. assault on "bad elements in,education circles"
The current' debate, which seems to have been
going on below the surface for several months, may
have been forced into the open by several speeches
Chou made in September and October. In his October
speech, Chou criticized the reforms of the Cultural
Revolution and claimed that there had been an over-
emphasis on practical application at the expense of
theoretical training. He also deprecated a model cur-
riculum that the radical faction.was then promoting.
Chou's speech was circulated as .a centrally-originated
document, indicating that his views commanded consid-
erable support at the upper levels of the regime.I
Mao's position-in the current infighting is crit-
ical and, on most major points, his sympathies appear
to.be with the moderates. Chou Jung-hsin quoted him
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his own approach to the education prob-
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It is probable that Mao has not given wholesale
endorsement to the moderate poeition however. Having
fathered many of the radical educational reforms him-
self, he may well have a problem in backing away too
fast and too unequivocally. The leftists seem to be
aware of the Chairman's vulnerability and"have made
liberal use of his quotations from an earlier"period
when he was more radical on this issue.
disastrous educational stagnation--a statement that
In any case, Mao's tilt toward the moderates has
undoubtedly left the radical faction, led by Chiang
Ch'ing,:. further isolated. This latest blow comes on
the heels of leftist setbacks in the cultural realm--
also at'the hand of Mao--and a steady decline in re-
cent months. of Chiang Ching's political stature. In
all probability, it was this erosion of radical clout
that emboldened moderate elements to step up their
criticism of the educational system, the last remain"
ing edifice to the Cultural Revolution. Likewise, the
leftists probably realized that if their educational
reforms were overturned, they would be left with little
defense for the high cost of the Cultural Revolution.
it may have been this sense of the high stakes that
led the radicals to seek support in the public do-
main. Moreover, Chou Jung-hsin probably left himself
vulnerable through his references to "10 years" of
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in effect questions the legitimacy of the Cultural
Revolution itself.
Even before the initial salvo was fired on De-
cember 4 with the broadcast of the lead article in
Red Flag, the leftists had apparently appealed to
students at Tsinghua and Peking universities. These
two institutions have traditionally been centers of
political. activism as well as models that other
schools in the country watch closely for signs of
new educational trends. Peking University, moreover,
was specifically criticized in the speeches of Chou
Jung-hsin. There are signs that since September
there has been considerable activity--all of it
peaceful--at these campuses on behalf of the Cultural
Revolution reforms. It is not surprising that the
students, most of whom are from working class back-
grounds and are the direct beneficiaries of the re-
forms, would be quite sympathetic to the leftists,
who undoubtedly were well aware of this reservoir
of support. It is no accident that the December 4
Red Flag article was written by persons from Peking
and Tsinghua universities.
There are a number of other hints that the left-
ists feel themselves on the defensive in this politi-
cal contest. The detailed, point-by-point refutation
of the moderate position, characteristic of the De-
cember 4 Red Flag article and much of the subsequent
media play, reflects this defensiveness. In particu-
lar, the articles go to unusual lengths to refute the
notion that the current educational system is turning
out graduates who lack professionalism. They cite
numerous examples of student contributions to eco-
nomic progress, emphasizing scientific achievements,
A few articles plainly admit that there are "defects,"
but hasten to add that any new system requires time
to prove itself and that the educational reforms
brought about by the Cultural Revolution are no
exception.
Finally, the leftists have displayed a certain
amount of caution in trying to pin labels on their
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opposition. Unlike numerous political battles in
the past, the mudslinging seems muted. The opposi-
tion is portrayed as misguided, but the insinuation
that it is in some way anti-socialist is for the
most part avoided.
At the same time,. in an attempt to sustain their
reforms, the leftists have not hesitated to play on
the insecurities of the large number of cadres in the
universities who were purged during the Cultural Rev-
olution and later returned to positions of influence.
An important Red Flag article broadcast on December
11 singles out these cadres and admonishes them to
pay attention to seeing things from a proletarian
outlook.
The parameters of this educational debate are
familiar, and the issues have been bandied about from
time to time within the leadership during the past
few years. The last major outbreak of polemics on
the education issue occurred in the spring of 1973,
when university entrance examinations were briefly
made a primary criterion for admission. A counter-
attack that summer forced the moderates to retreat
on this issue.
The outcome of the current round is likely to
be quite different. Unlike 1973, the moderates today
are far stronger, while the political stock of the
left has precipitously declined during the past year
and a half. There can he little doubt, judging from
the ambitious economic goals set by the coalition of
moderates around Vice-Premier Teng Hsiao-ping, that
economic growth is their chief and overriding concern.
An educational system that places a priority on
quality and relies more heavily on proven methods
probably has a great deal of appeal to these men--
and provides the additional political dividend of
further circumscribing the left. Finally, and per-
haps of decisive importance, unlike 1973 Chairman Mao
has added his own political weight to the moderate
side. All of these factors suggest that the left is
at best fighting a rear-guard action.
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