THE SITUATION IN INDOCHINA (AS OF 1600 EST) NO. 4

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00608R000300070016-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 16, 2004
• Sequence Number: 16
• Publication Date: April 6, 1975
• Content Type: IM

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CENTRAL INTELLI(ENCE ArENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
6 April 1975
The Situation in Indochina
(As of 1600 EST)
No. 4
Political 'Developments
1. Thieu's obvious intention to remain in power has
produced mounting dissatisfaction in both military and
civilian circles, but as yet there is no firm evidence
of a serious move to force his ouster or resignation.
2. 'rhe reactions of Senate President Tran Van Lam
may best reflect the general political situation in the,
country. Lam conceded Saturday that' his efforts to Per-
suade Thieu to step aside in favor of an "executive
council" headed by reneial Ky had failed. Moreover,
he admitted that despite what he felt was universal
dissatisfaction with Thieu, the President still had the
trump cards and "he is playing them coolv." Some people
had been arrested on vague charges of coup plottina and
others had lost their 'draft deferments and were being
sent to the, front lines. The labor force, including
government bureaucrats, is reluctant to speak out against
Thieu in the wake of rumors that Viet Cong agents are now
surfacing to spread confusion among the people. Military
State men are equally reluctant, fearing that any unsuccessful
Department coup would bring disgrace to them and reprisals against
review(s) their families. Religious factions, especially the
completed. Catholics, do not want to takt any action that would
help the Communists. Thus, in Lam's opinion, so long
as Thieu retains the loyalty of a few high-level military
NSA review(s) completed. %
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officers and the police, his removal from office will
not be an easy task to engineer.
Communist Reactions
3. Communist reaction to political develcpments
in South Vietnam has focused on US support to the Thieu
government; so far, there has been no reaction from
either the Viet Cong of North Vietnarnr!se to Thi.eu's
speech. Hanoi has been preoccupied criticizing the
US evacuation of Vietnamese refuc;ees and orphans. An
article in the party daily Friday called the evacuations
a "shrewd and malicious plot" to force "our people to
leave their native lands." Premier Pham Van Dong in a
radio broadcast Sunday charged that the 'JS evacuation
plan was "abominable" and "unhealthy,"
4. , Viet Cong commentary has focused more on develop-
ments in the recently "liberated" areas of South Vietnam,
claiming that life is "returning to normal." The Com-
munists also claim that a political solution could be
arrived at following the departure of President Thieu
and members of his "clique." The Viet Cong have not
identified who they would be willing to negotiate with
in a new government or who comprises Thieu's clique,
although at a press conference in Saigon:_ Saturday, a
Viet Cong spokesman claimed that the "number is not a
big one."
Delta Action Levels Off
5. The bulk of Communist-initiated military action
continues in the form of shellinas of government positions
in the northern and central provinces of the delta. The
Binh Thuy airfield, just outside CEn Tho, was hit by
seven rockets last night. No heavy offensive-action was
mounted by either side on April 6, but the North Vietna-
mese 4th Division is maintaining pressure on the South
Vietnamese units defending Can Tho City.
6. The 21st Division commander is following his
recently-adopted tactic of maintaining a mobile blocking
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type of defense rather than committing his troops to
large-scale offensive operations that could result
in heavy casualties. This tactic appea,:s to he work-
ing well so far. Government officials ;believe the
division's blocking role is effectively keeping the
Communists off balance, and this accounts for the
Communists' failure thus far to launch their expected
-attacks against the city.
7. A slight upswing in optimism among regional
staff officers rests on the substantially increased
availability and effectiveness of air: support. The
delta is now receiving at least 60 sorties of strike
aircraft daily, and government unit;:, are no longer
complaining that pilots are bombing from high altitudes
that preclude any degree 'of accurac/.
8. The regional commander has been strengthen-
ing the defenses of~Moc Hoa in the northern delta and
the South Vietnamese 9th Division units supported by
armor and -increased air support n:)w Dave the military
edge on the battlefront that some military leaders feel
could be -the first big test of the resolve of Saigon's
forces_in the remaining third of the country.
Status of Units Evacuated from Northern Provinces
9. The commander of.the'South Vietnamese Marine
Division evacuated from Da Nang is now regrouping the
unit at Vung Tau along thq coast and has more 'than
5,000 marines. Of the* three brigades that are being
reassembled and rearmed, one is almost full strength,
well-equipped, and is considered combat ready. The
other two brigades are at about half strength and one
of these should be operational by late next week.
10. The Marine commander has.been given trucks
and artillery and will soon move, the operational bri-
gade to the Marine Train ing-Center outside Saigon for
the purpose of bolstering the confidence of the popu-
lation in the capital.
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11. Parts of the South Vietnamese Airborne bri-
gade that were brought out of the northern provinces.
have been resting and refitting at Long Binh. One
battalion was sent on April 4 to reinforce goa'-2rnment
units in the than Rang area of Ninli Thuan Province.
The government still is holding onto small enclaves
at both Phan Rang and Phan Thiet, because the North
Vietnamese have been slow to occupy these weakly
defended areas of southern Military Region 2. There
have also been some renor.ts that the Communists have
not yet moved into Nha Trang in force, but Saigon's
military presence there is weak.
12. Much of the South Vietnamese 2nd Division,
which fled from Quang Ngai and Quang Tin provinces in
Military Region 1, is now in Binh Tuy Province. The
division commander is attempting to reorganize 4,000
or so troops but has encountered difficulties. Many
of the soldiers have been reluctant to turn in their
weapons, and some were involved in stealing and loot-
ing in the provincial capital of Ham Tan, a seacoast
city that has been deluged with military personnel
and civilians arriving by boat from the northern pro-
vinces. The 2nd Division commander has managed to
subdue'many of the unruly troops and has placed them
aboard ships for several days to allow tempers to cool,
permit a screening and,selection according to military
unit, and preclude any serious disorders when they are
shipped to various camps for reorganization into fight-
ing units.
NORTH VIETNAM
Transports Flying into South Vietnam
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13. Hanoi has begun fl. incr transport aircraft into
northern South Vietnam.
nine North Vietnamese aircra , including an AN- , an
IL-14, an LI-2, and six helicopters- flew into Phu Bai
airfield on April G. Phu Bai is d Located just south of
Hue. The North Vietnamese had been flying helicopters
into northern South Vietnam for several weeks, but this
is the first time transports have flown'into the area.
The stepped-up flight activity probably represents 'an
effort by Hanoi to move in additional administrative
personnel to stabilize the situation in the northern
provinces which they' recently captured.
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CAMBODIA
The Tactical Situation
1. Increased Khmer Communist attacks today forced
elements of the Cambodian Army's 3rd Division to abandon
the town of Thnal Totung on Route 4 west of Pochentong
airport. Significant amounts of eauinment were left
behind and several hundred go-vernment troops are missing.
Other 3rd Division units withdrew in a more orderly
fashion from a position just southeast of Thnal Totung.
Despite the loss of these outlying positions, most of the
3rd Division still is well dug-in along the primary
defense line protecting the army's main ammunition dump
near the airport and should be able to prevent any fur-
ther Communist gains, at'.least for the next few days.
2. -Insurgent forces today also kent Phnom Penh's
northwestern defenses under steady pressure but were
unable to make any further territorial.gains. govern-
ment maintenance crews managed to repair a number of
aircraft last night and the air force was able to flv
more than fifty tactical missions today, most of them
in support of government units north and northwest of
Pochentong airport. Communist rocket and artillery
attacks against the airport slackened today.
3. In the countryside, the Communists have stepned-
Qp their attacks against the nrovincial canital of Yom.-
pong Speu, on Route 4 southwest of Phnom Penh, and the
situation there is becoming serious. Southeast of Phnom
Penh, ground attacks against the provincial capital of
Prey Veng last night forced government units to abandon
an outlying position. A small number of survivors from
Neak LLio'hg' A'nd Banam have 'begun?,.filtering ''into Prey''Veng
and Svay Rieng--now the onlf two government-held towns
east of the Mekong River.
Evacuation Status
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only 69 official members of the US Mission and 102
private US citizensrema.ined in Phnom Penh. The
evacuation list, however, still includes over 600
third country nationals and Cambodians. Ambassador
Dean is still convinced that the situation in the
capital will unravel rapidly if large numbers of
government officials and Cambodian employees of the
US Mission begin leaving and that the lives of any
remaining US officials would he enclang=eared. He also
speculates that the relative lull in battlefield
activity around the capital is'ominous and that if the
evacuation is not completed soon, the "final extrac-
tion will have to be carried out under hostile fire."
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Political Developments
5. Acting Cambodian' President Saukham Koy met
with US Congressional staff members today and made
an impassioned plea. for supplemental aid. Koy said
that a favorable vote oi. the aid question would buy
him time to arrange what in effect would be an orderly
surrender. Noy said that under presb-nt circumstances
the "best feasible solution" would be for the govern-
ment,to give in to Sihanouk's demands and to invite
the ]:Prince back to Phnom Penh. Kov envisioned tying
the "invitation" to an agreement that Communist forces
would not enter Phnom Penh and would allow the con
t'inued delivery of relief supplies 'to the capital.
If supplemental aid is not forthcoming, Noy said that
the government would have no choice but to surrender
unconditionally allowing 'insurgent forces to dnter Phnom
Penh. He warned the Congressional. staffers that a
"bloodbath" could resuil.t. Koy was undoubtedly aiming
to shock his guests but his comments also indicate that
government officials now realize the severity o,f the
situation and that any hope of a compromise solution
has vanished.
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