CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A009700100001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 2, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 28, 1967
• Content Type: REPORT

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n r_ \/ 4 N1 Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Central Intelligence Bulletin
DEPT OF STATE review(s) completed.
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Top S~e~c~et
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28 February 1967
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28 February 1967
Central Intelligence Bulletin
CONTENTS
Vietnam: Current situation report. (Page 1)
Indonesia: Suharto pressing Congress to limit
action against Sukarno. (Page 3)
NATO-UK: Council representatives critical of
British agreement to negotiate friendship treaty
with USSR. (Page 4)
Nigeria: Ojukwu lays groundwork for Eastern
Region to assume greater independence. (Page 5)
Chile: Senate rebuffs Frei on proposed constitu-
tional amendment. (Page 6)
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`Savannakhet
NORTH .bong Hoi
VIETNAM
?Pakse
,Sihanoukville
f-?7 r Kontum?
?Quang Ngai
Qui Nhon
?Nha Trang
SOUTH VIETNAM
25 50 75 100Miies
0 25 50 75 160
Kilornelers
4?Da Nang
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2#3 Ii e CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Map
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*Vietnam: (Information as of 4:30 AM EST)
South Vietnamese Political Affairs: [Political as-
sociates of Premier Ky and Chief of State Thieu are
making major bids to win civilian support for the pres-
idential aspirations of both leaders
iTran Quoc Buu, chief of South Vietnam's largest
labor group, reportedly intends to campaign for Pre-
mier Ky among the members of his union. Another Ky
booster, prominent politician Dang Van Sung, is said to
be working for the cooperation of the Cao Dai and Hoa
Hao political-religious groups]
[Supporters of Chief of State Thieu, on the other
hand, are reportedly developing a civilian front to en-
dorse the military candidate for President. They as-
sume this will be Thieu. The activity suggests that Ky
and Thieu are taking seriously their unannounced can-
didacies and that they are taking appropriate measures
to gauge their chances for success]
The Military Situation in South Vietnam: The enemy
mortar attack on the US airbase at Da Nang on 27 Febru-
ary killed 11 Americans and seriously wounded 27 others,
according to revised casualty reports. Eighteen US air-
craft were damaged and five communications vans were
destroyed.
From positions about four miles south of the base,
the Communists for the first time fired Soviet-designed
140-mm. barrage rockets--a weapon not previously known
to have been in the North Vietnamese or Viet Cong inven-
tory. Some of the 51 rockets fired hit a village near the
base, killing 32 South Vietnamese civilians and damaging
about 200 homes. (Map)
(continued)
28 Feb 67
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North Vietnamese Political Developments: A four-
man delegation, led by the chief of the DRV mission to
the International Control Commission, arrived in Ran-
goon on 25 February, according to western press re-
ports. The event is considered potentially important
because UN Secretary General Thant is in the Burmese
capital.
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The North Vietnamese may make contact with U Thant
despite their avowed rejection of any UN role in a Viet-
nam settlement. The DRV delegates could use such a
meeting to reiterate to U Thant alleged US violations of
the Geneva Accords and to impress upon him Hanoi's
contention that a settlement of the war must be along the
lines of the DRV's interpretation of those accords.
Changes in North Vietnamese Government: Among
several organizational changes in the DRV government
recently announced by Hanoi, the most significant was
the upgrading of the Ministry of Heavy Industry by the
appointment of politburo member Le Thanh Nghi as its
head. Until this time politburo members headed only the
ministries of defense, public security and foreign affairs.
In view of North Vietnam's small industrial base, it
is not yet clear why the Ministry of Heavy Industry should
receive such influential leadership at this time. It is
possible that Hanoi is undertaking a review of its long-
range plans for industrialization because of the damage
done by US bombing. Le Thanh Nghi's appointment may
also be connected with the major reconstruction a d re-
pair efforts brought on b the bombing.
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Indonesia: General Suharto is pressing Congress
to modify its action plan against Sukarno f
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s Suharto's rationale is his need to maintain sup-
port within the armed forces and to avoid further re-
sentment and violence in pro-Sukarno areas. Suharto
apparently believes that the turnover of power of 20 Feb-
ruary was as far as the regime could go and still main-
tain unanimity among the four armed services.j
1Meanwhile, anti- Sukarno political activists will
continue to demand Sukarno's suspension as president
and a public trial. They already are maintaining that
Congress cannot limit itself merely to confirming the
20 February transfer of power. Since General Suharto
has called on the nation to accept all decisions made by
Congress, he may be preparing the way for a com-
promise between pro- and anti-Sukarno elements
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which might lead to suspension of Sukarno as presi-
dent but no trial.
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NATO-UK: rMost of the representatives to the
North Atlantic Council have sharply criticized Prime
Minister Wilson's agreement to develop a "treaty of
friendship and cooperation" with the USSR._'
At an informal meeting, Secretary General Brosio
argued that such a treaty would lead to a division of
the alliance between those members who had declared
their friendship for the USSR and those who had not.
The representatives of Italy, Canada, and Denmark
supported Brosio, noting that a UK-Soviet treaty would
generate "uncomfortable" popular pressure in their
countries to follow suit.
The German and Dutch representatives criticized
London's failure to consult with its NATO partners
and stressed the need for a common political line to-
ward the USSR. The German delegate claimed that
the broad title of such a pact would be interpreted as
a "radical" change in British foreign policyi
The French representative termed the UK action
not really compatible with "alliance obligations," not-
ing that Paris had turned down a similar Soviet bid.'
lWhile pique over lack of consultation is probably
involved, the vigorous criticism of Britain appears to
reflect genuine concern over the potentially divisive ef-
fect which Soviet bilateral overtures of this nature
could have on the NATO countries.I
.British officials say they will begin a study of what
should go into the proposed treaty, but emphasize that
Wilson made it clear to Kosygin that nothing in the treaty
would imply a change in Britain's attitude toward its
NATO commitments.
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Nigeria: Eastern military governor Ojukwu ap-
pears to be laying the groundwork for a unilateral as-
sumption of still greater regional independence after
the end of the fiscal year on 31 March.
On 21 February the Eastern government issued a
decree giving the governor authority to impose martial
law in any part of the region. The decree appears aimed
at forestalling subversive activity by troublesome mi-
nority tribes in the East. Recent reports indicate that
the East's army--officially one battalion--has been re-
organized as a brigade, and that extensive recruiting
has been undertaken.
Ojukwu, in a radio address on 25 February, warned
the other regional military leaders that unless the agree-
ments made in Ghana last month were fully implemented
by 31 March he would consider himself free to take any
measures necessary to protect Eastern interests.
COjukwu told US and UK representatives in Enugu that
the next two weeks would be crucial. He has asked to
see them again early this week, and the US ambassador
and the UK high commissioner as well. Ojukwu's sec-
retary added that the financial situation is critical be-
cause the East needs substantially more revenue to
take care of the approximately one million refugees from
other parts of Nigeria.'
The Lagos press has strongly attacked Ojukwu's de-
cree. His threat to make further moves toward inde-
pendence should encourage those hardliners in the other
regions who are pressuring Gowon to take military meas-
ures to halt the Eastern Region's moves toward inde-
pendence.
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Chile: President Frei's second rebuff by the
Senate in less than six weeks will further complicate
the Chilean political situation,
Frei's proposed constitutional amendment permit-
ting the president to dissolve Congress and call new
elections failed to pass in the Senate on 23 February.
In spite of strong pressure by the administration, the
only support outside Frei's own Christian Democratic
party came from the Nationalists and the Communists.
The effect of this vote on Frei's position is unclear.
The government had insisted on an early vote, possibly
with the intention of injecting national affairs into the
forthcoming municipal elections, which normally hinge
on local rather than national issues. Although the
Senate's vote looks like a defeat for Frei, Ambassador
Dungan comments that the government probably never
contemplated making the concessions necessary to en-
act the reform proposal.
28 Feb 67
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