HEARING - PROTOCOL AMENDING THE SINGLE CONVENTION ON NARCOTIC DRUGS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP74B00415R000300230001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 80
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 5, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 27, 1972
• Content Type: OPEN

Approve~~uO r -01
WA00511I1G1Y LIl\ ~P~R1EOI~LC CONVENTION ON NARCOTIC DRUGS
HEARING
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
NINETY-SECOND CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
ON
EXECUTIVE J, 92D CONGRESS, 2D SESSION
PROTOCOL AMENDING THE SINGLE CONVENTION ON
NARCOTIC DRUGS, 1961
(1) OLC
(1) OMS
(1) LY/SO
(1) 4S
(1) Ir?/CI~
(1) 1ThI/CINM
(1) CBP/NARC -
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1972
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
J. W. FULBRIGIIT, Arkansas, Chairman
JOHN SPARKMAN, Alabama
MIKE MANSFIELD, Montana
FRANK CHURCH, Idaho .
STUART SYMINGTON, Missouri
CLAIBORNE PELL, Rhode Island
GALE W. MCGEE, Wyoming
EDMUND S. MUSKIE, Maine
WILLIAM B. SPONG, JR., Virginia
GEORGE D. AIKEN, Vermont
CLIFFORD P. CASE, New Jersey
JOHN SHERMAN COOPER, Kentucky
JACOB K. JAVITS, New York
HUGH SCOTT, Pennsylvania
JAMES B. PEARSON, Kansas
CHARLES H. PERCY, Illinois
CARL MARCY, Chief of Staff
ARTHUR M. KUIIL, Chief Clerk
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CONTENTS
Statements by-
Page
Bevans, Charles I., Assistant Legal Adviser, Department of State;
accompanied by Donald E. Miller, Chief Counsel, Bureau of Nar-
cotics and Dangerous Drugs ; and G. Jonathan Greenwald, Office of
the Legal Adviser, Department of State-------------------------
In
ll
J
44
gerso
,
ohn E. Director, Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs,
U.S. Department of Justice; accompanied by Donald E. Miller, Chief
Counsel; and George Belk, Assistant Director for International
Affairs ----------------------------------
2
Itossides, Eugene T., Assistant Secretary for Enforcement, Trade and
Operations, Department of the Treasury ------------------------
I
17
-
nsertions for the record :
Foreign region personnel, supplied by BNDD-----------------------
Fo
i
di
9
re
gn
strict offices, supplied by BNDD-------------------------
Bud
t
9
ge
requests and appropriations for Bureau of Narcotics and Dan-
gerous Drugs, supplied by Department of Justice_________________
B
13
ureau of Customs increases in manpower, equipment, and so forth,
supplied by the Department of the Treasury--------------------
Inf
ti
29
orma
on concerning the granting of diplomatic immunities to rep-
resentatives of foreign governments and their personal baggage
upon arrival in the United States, supplied by the Department
of the Treasury----------------------
"F
Fi
"
34
ree
x for Addicts?
, article by John A. Hamilton, the New York
Times, June i, 1972--------------- --------------------------------------------
Twelv
t
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41
e s
a
es which abstained at the Geneva Conference in the vote
to adopt the protocol amending the single convention, supplied by
the Department of the Treasuryy--------------------------------
State
t i
47
men
n response to Senator Pearson'.,, request for additional
discussion of the implementation of the additional authority and
responsibility given the International Narcotics Control Board, sup-
plied by Department of State -_---_--_-.----_--_
-
A
~i1
_
nswer to question submitted by Senator Percy to Mr.
t
15 5
o question submitted by Senator Percy to Mr. Bevans------
L
tte
t
M
a.,6
r
e
o
r. Charles I. Bevans from Senator William B. Spong, Jr.,
containing additional questions, June 29, 1972, and Mr. Bevans'
reply of July 14, 1072 -----------
Lette
t
M
59
r
o
r. Eugene T. Rossides from Senator William B. Spong, Jr.,
containing additional questions, June 29, 1972, and Mr. Rossides'
reply of July 28, 1972---------------
Letter t
M
J
07
o
r.
ohn E. Ingersoll from Senator William B. Spong, Jr.,
containing additional questions, June 29, 1972, and reply of Au-
gust '2, 1972, from Mr. Gene R. Ilaislip, Special Assistant to the
Director ------------------------------------------------------
71
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PROTOCOL AMENDING THE SINGLE CONVENTION ON
NARCOTIC DRUGS
TUESDAY, JUNE 27, 1972
UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9 :30 a.m., in room 4221,
New Senate Office Building, Senator William B. Spong, Jr., presiding.
Present : Senators Spong, Fulbrig ht, Church, Javits, Pearson, and
Percy.
Senator SPONG. The hearing will come to order.
The Committee on Foreign Relations this morning will hear testi-
mony relating to the protocol recently adopted by a United Nations
Conference in Geneva to amend the Single Convention on Narcotic
Drugs, 1961. The Single Convention, to which the United States
became a party in 1967, is the basic multilateral treaty governing
international control of narcotic drugs, including opium, heroin, and
cocaine. Ninety nations have ratified the convention and additional
countries are in the process of becoming parties.
The protocol to amend the Single Convention is designed to
provide for a threefold approach to the problem of preventing
illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and the abuse of those drugs : (1) It
would strengthen the international control machinery to enable it more
effectively to curb the excess and illicit cultivation of the opium poppy,
as well as the illicit production, manufacture and trafficking in narcotic
drugs; (2) it would expand the provisions of existing bilateral extra-
dition treaties; and (3) it would establish guidelines for each nation's
effort to avoid drug abuse and for the treatment of individual drug
abusers.
I am pleased to welcome our witnesses this morning : Mr. John E.
Ingersoll, Director of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs
within the Department of Justice; Mr. Eugene T. Rossides, Assistant
Secretary of the Treasury for Enforcement and Operations; and Mr.
Charles I. Bevans, Assistant Legal Adviser for Treaty Affairs in the
State Department.
We all are, of course, intensely concerned with the rising problem of
drug abuse in this nation and with the international traffic in illicit
narcotics which, directly and indirectly, brings harm and misery to
hundreds of thousands of our citizens. I hope that this morning, with
the help of our witnesses, we will be able to view this problem in a
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broad context, to learn,more about the expanded effort being made by
this Government to deal with this problem and, finally, and more spe-
cifically, to gain an understanding of how the new protocol would
contribute to that effort.
Our first witness will be Mr. Ingersoll. We are very pleased to have
you with us this morning.
STATEMENT OF JOHN E. INGERSOLL, DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF
NARCOTICS AND DANGEROUS DRUGS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE; ACCOMPA4IED BY DONALD E. MILLER, CHIEF COUNSEL;
AND GEORGE BELK,.ASSISTANT DIRECTOR FOR INTERNATIONAL
AFFAIRS
Mr. INGERSOLL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and distinguished mem-
bers of the committee.
First of all, with the chair's permission, I will introduce my col-
leagues who are at the table. On my right is Mr. George Belk, the
Assistant Director for International Affairs; and on my left, Mr.
Donald Miller, the Chief Counsel of the Bureau.
I am pleased to have this opportunity to appear before you today
in connection with your inquiry into proposed amendments to the
Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs.
NATURE. OF INTERNATIONAL NARCOTIC DRUG TRAFFIC
I will first address myself to the nature of the international narcotic
drug traffic, as you have requested. This traffic is a production and
merchandising system based on the slavish demands of addicted in-
dividuals. In the United States we estimate these at approximately
half a million, which we believe represents a sharp increase over the
previous decade. The heroin market in this country presents an ideal
circumstance for illicit: traffic. The addicts are numerous, their demand
is constant, their actu4l wealth or purchasing power, whether earned
through wages or in crime, is considerable, and the product which
they crave originates in countries where production labor costs are
extremely low. From origin in the form of opium, the drug is con-
verted into morphine base and ultimately refined into heroin. The
entire movement is dependent upon clandestine activity.
The principal vulnerability of this commerce is in the length and
complexity of its line of supply. This makes it susceptible to attack
where police forces can be organized with knowledge and sincerity of
purpose. The mission of our Bureau is to do just that in the United
States and to provide technical expertise abroad so that foreign
governments may do the same. I believe strongly in the desirability
of combating this traffic at its source and for that reason have placed
increasing emphasis on our Bureau's international mission. Attached
to my testimony are tables indicating the scope of this increase in
terms of the location q.nd number of our foreign offices and the agent
personnel which staff them.
Since fiscal year 196'9, the number of our offices has increased by 260
percent and our agent personnel by 258 percent. In addition, I up-
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graded our commitment organizationally in the fall of 1971 by estab-
lishing the position of Assistant Director for International Affairs.
One of the missions of our foreign offices is to gather intelligence
since the fall of 1971, the Central Intelligence Agcney has been given
q,-mandate, by the President to useTits facilities also fnr nht;,ir-'n lrn
t. telli nence. These sources of knowledge have been further augmented
by the active commitment of the Departments of State, Defense, and
Treasury.
On the basis of current assessments, we estimate the total worldwide
production of illicit opium at approximately 1,300 metric tons. Of
this, perhaps 700 tons are produced in Southeast Asia, mainly in the
triborder area of Thailand, Burma, and Laos, called the Golden Tri-
angle. Principal producers of the remainder are India, at approxi-
mately 250 tons; Afghanistan, at 100 tons; Pakistan, at 100 tons; and
until recent improvements in collection, Turkey, at 50 tons. An addi-
tional quantity of approximately 1,700 tons are produced for legiti-
.mate medical purposes in the Middle East and Central Asia.
We believe that between 6.5 and 10 tons of heroin are consumed
annually in the United States which, on the basis of conversion ratios,
equates to approximately 65 to 100 tons of crude opium. It is, there-
fore, clear that total illicit production is far in excess of that required
to supply the United States and indeed most of the production of
Southeast Asia is, and always has been, consumed in that area. In our
programs and efforts to reform international law and control ma-
chinery, we are concerned with the whole of this illicit production
but our specific operational aim is that part of the traffic which par-
ticularly supplies the United States.
Throughout the decades of the 1950's and 1960's, the narcotics supply
line to the United States appeared to have achieved some degree of
stability. The bulk of the heroin was derived from Turkish opium
refined into morphine base in Turkey and then smuggled into southern
France where it was further refined into heroin. From France, the
heroin was usually smuggled in through the port of New York or
indirectly by way of Canada. A persistent but smaller scale and less
organized traffic in heroin originated in Mexico and affected the south-
western portion of the United States. Finally, a small trickle of
Asian heroin accounted for occasional important cases, though con-
stituting an insignificant portion of the whole.
EVENTS EXPECTED TO ALTER PATTERNS OF WORLD TRAFFIC
Three major events which have now been set in motion can be ex-
lPected to radically alter the pattern of world traffic. These are
first, the prospective elimination of Turkey as the principal source
of narcotic drugs entering the United States ; second, the launching
of a vigorous and unprecedented attack on the centers of the French
heroin underworld; and, third, the discovery by Asian traffickers of
lucrative drug markets among Americans which they can be ex-
pected to attempt to exploit as they did previously with our troops in
South Vietnam. Since these three developments can be expected to
dominate the future shape of the narcotics traffic, I will, turn next
to consider each of them separately in greater detail.
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1'66RKISIH GOVERNMENT'S BAN ON GROWING OPIUM POPPY
The heroin e itering the United States from Europe is largely the
product of predominantly French and Turkish criminal organizations.
For decades opium poppy crops have been raised by tens of thousands
of Turkish fanners ir} the Anatolian Plain. It is grown in small
plots in addition to other subsistence crops because of its, cash value
and it is also put to a variety of nonnarcotic uses. In theory, the Turk-
ish Government has always maintained a monopoly on the purchase
of the harvested opium for legitimate medical markets although until
recently less than effective efforts were made to insure that this law
was strictly enforced. In this environment, farmers would sell some
part of their harvest to drug traffickers at the site of their local village
without knowledge or interest in its ultimate destination.
The opium is often reduced to morphine base with crude processing
materials at or near a. village site. Turkish criminal elements have
organized the movement of the morphine base from the village to
assembly points in Turkey and finally to a point of ultimate delivery
to a laboratory pickup man in France or West Germany. Often the
morphine base will move by sea on board Turkish vessels and be
thrown overboard at prearranged points in waterproof containers near
the harbor of Marseilld. Overland shipments usually pass through the
Balkans into West Ge many where some 700,000 Turks have settled
since the postwar period.
This course of dealiigs has developed quietly and without inter-
ruption for over 20 years into a well-defined pattern of criminal ac-
tivity. More recently, the policy of the U.S. Government has focused
increasingly on destroying; the very base. of this pyramid of activity.
That base is the illicit diversion of opium from areas of legal pro-
duction by farmers ignorant of its destination or the havoc which it
brinms to the cities of our country.
After expressions of interest by the President, the Secretary of
State, and strepuous representations by myself personall- and by our
Ambassador in Ankara, the gravity of the situation to' the United
States as well as other countries has come to be realized.
In June of 1971, the Turkish Government announced that a total
ban on the growing of the opium poppy would be brought into effect,
following the harvesting of the last legitimate crop in 1972. In the
meantime, efforts to collect as much as is actually grown in the remain-
ing period have been sharply increased, and it is expected that far less
of the crop will be diverted to illicit purposes than was formerly the
case. '
I should emphasize that in spite of the fact that the Government of
Turkey has changed its leadership twice since the declaration, there
has never been any suggestion or apprehension on our part that it
would not be carried through. Sometime in 1973, hopefully, whatever
illicit opium stockpiles exist in Turkey should be depleted, and the
base of narcotic trafficking activity for over two decades should vir-
tually cease to exist.
Where will the French and Turkish traffickers turn? Will they be
able to readjust and prove themselves versatile enough to establish
new sources o~ supply'? Before addressing this question, let me first
examine the developments in France.
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FRENCH IIEROIN UNDERWORLD
The French heroin underworld is based principally in the Marseille
area where most of the heroin laboratories are believed to be located.
This has been reaffirmed by the seizure of two laboratories by French
enforcement authorities during the first 6 months of this year. Many
of these violators are of Corsican origin and are often men in their
50's who have been engaged in clandestine operations of one kind or
another since the French underground resistance of World War II. A
group will usually consist of a small number of principals with one or
more contact men who deal with outlets in the United States. Others
specialize in financial arrangements or in organizing couriers for
smuggling into the United States. Falsified documents are extensively
employed for this purpose, and smuggling techniques may range from
body concealment devices to concealment within oscilloscopes, false
bottom suitcases, boxes of frozen vegetables, ski poles, or automobiles.
The heroin traffic in southern France has grown like an abscess
while the French Government and people remain unaware. Addiction
was increasing in France itself, and it is currently estimated that ap-
proximately 20,000 heroin addicts are located principally in the Paris
and Marseille areas. As recently as July of 1970, there were only seven
full-time narcotics agents in Marseille assigied by the French Govern-
ment to deal with this problem.
One of my first acts upon becoming Director of BNDD in 1968 was
to visit our Ambassador in France to discuss the matter. This led to a
meeting with the French Chief of Police Judiciaire in Paris in May
of 1969. Thereafter, efforts to involve the French more actively cul-
minated in the signing of a special agreement on February 26, 1971,
by former Attorney General John Mitchell and the French Minister
of the Interior.
President Nixon himself has discussed the matter personally with
President Pompidou.
Public and Government interest is now at a peak in France, and
the narcotics traffic is regarded as a No. 1 law enforcement priority.
As a result, French police manpower dedicated exclusively to this
effort has increased by 400 percent since 1969, to a present level of
145 officers, with 160 projected for the end of 1972. This escalation of
activity has not only resulted in elimination of the two heroin labora-
tories previously mentioned, but also in significant seizures of heroin,
including the largest single case on record in which nearly a thousand
pounds were seized on board a French fishing trawler in the Marseille
harbor destined for the Western Hemisphere, probably Florida.
Our own agent personnel in France has similarly increased from
four agents in fiscal year 1969, to 11 in fiscal year 1972. This does not
include a number of other agents working special assignments for
shorter periods of time. There are numerous examples of outstanding
police work which have resulted from these increases. Several months
ago, two French nationals sought to recruit an American national in
Paris for the purpose of smuggling a large quantity of heroin. There-
after, one of our agents posing as an Air Force sergeant made contact
with them, ostensibly for this purpose. The agent represented that he
was assigned to a general's aircraft and could easily smuggle the con-
traband into the United States without detection.
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In May of this year, the trafficker delivered 120 kilograms of heroin,
worth approximately $52 million in the streets of New York, to our
agent in Brussels for smuggling on board the general's aircraft. Some
part of the heroin was actually flown to the United States where a
delivery under surveillance was made to drug violators in this country
awnitinL the shipment in New York. Five individuals were arrested
at that time, including the alleged head of a trafficking system which
had brought large amounts of heroin and cocaine into the United
States for the past 7 years. Also among the five was a French citizen
who is believed to be in charge of making financial arrangements for
sophisticated groups of international traffickers. Simultaneously, on
the other side of the Atlantic, the two French traffickers were arrested
in Belgium.
The point. I wish to emphasize here is that both the quality of inter-
national cooperation and the level of enforcement activity so much
surpasses anything in the past that it admits of no comparison. For
the first time in two decades. the French heroin underworld can no
longer operate without fear. They no longer can trust to the safety (if
Marseille as their sanctuary.
It is our hope that the pressure will eventually cause them to break
and disintegrate. Specialized operations which would be beyond their
ability to appreciate, or even suspect, are underway.
The developments in France and Turkey represent an immediate
promise for the future. Let me turn, finally, to the third element I have
mentioned which, by contrast, confronts us with a new threat.
DRUG TRAFFIC IN SOLTTI EAST ASIA
The drug traffic in Southeast Asia has historical precedence stretch-
ing back to the days of the clipper ships and the opium wars of China.
It is both large and lucrative, and until recently has been aimed al-
most exclusively at markets in the immediate geographic area. With
the exception of Hong Kong most of the traffic has been in smoking
opium rather than in heroin. But the presence of U.S. military per-
sonnel in South Vietnam immediately adjacent to a major production
area has changed the picture.
In part because of the drug abuse epidemic sweeping the United
States and because of the ready availability of drugs in Southeast
Asia, many of our young soldiers proved vulnerable targets for the
traffic in heroin. Our first indications of the presence of heroin in
South Vietnam came in, December of 1969. In 1970, the trickle turned
into a stream; and in 19,71, the stream into a torrent of heroin pouring
out of the Golden Triangle. New heroin refineries were established in
Thailand and Laos specifically to serve this demand. Ethnic overseas
Chinese merchant-traffickers who have long controlled the drug mar-
kets suddenly became aware of the new business opportunities repre-
sented in the American drug epidemic.
Criminally inclined Americans located in Southeast Asia likewise
became aware of the profits to be reaped in serving as the link between
criminals in the United, States and traffickers in Asia.
In other testimony before the Congress earlier this year, I have dealt
with the special enforcement units which we have created both in
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Thailand and Laos. These efforts are already producing results. On
June 10, our agents and Thai police officers seized 1,600 kilograms of
opium together with an array of processing chemicals. The accom-
panying arrests led to the discovery and elimination of an illicit lab-
oratory 2 days later. I have also previously dealt with the high-level
cases involving ex-servicemen in Bangkok and drug traffickers in the
United States.
As a result of accumulating intelligence, we have reason to believe
that certain ethnic Chinese criminal elements in America have geared
up an operation to take advantage of the heroin availability in South-
east Asia. Common language, culture, and in some cases perhaps fam-
ily ties, make for a natural and easy connection with Asian traffickers
who are also of ethnic Chinese origin. Chinese seamen serve aboard
most of the world's merchant fleets, and we find that many of these
are picking up quantities of heroin in either Bangkok, Hong Kong, or
Singapore and jumping ship with it in a variety of North American
ports. Here, prearranged contact is established with Chinese-Ameri-
can violators.
In essence, the evidence points to the establishment of a new pattern
which affects places never previously of any significance to the drug
traffic. Either as the result of actual seizures or our intelligence, we
believe these shipments have cone through such diverse seaports as
Norfolk, Charleston, Miami, New Orleans, Los Angeles, Seattle, Van-
couver, New York, and the Great Lakes' port of Chicago.
Our attack on this particular trafficking situation is engaging the
efforts of our Asian and domestic regional offices in close coordination
with the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the U.S. Bureau of
Customs, and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. This effort has
already produced significant arrests and seizures of several kilograms
of heroin, particularly in New York and Miami.
In view of the abundant production of opium in Southeast Asia and
the obvious efforts which are being made to market a portion of it in
the United States, it is clear that this area could potentially replace
Turkey as the source of heroin in our country. At the present time, the
Asian traffic still remains relatively unorganized and contributes only
a small, but nevertheless growing, percentage of the heroin marketed
here.
TWO QUESTIONS TO BE ANSWERED IN FUTURE
Two questions, therefore, remain to be answered in the future,
which are: (1) Can our enforcement and diplomatic efforts succeed
in containing the Asian heroin traffic directed at the United States
while still in its infancy, and (2) will the traditional drug traffickers
in Europe and the Western Hemisphere be able to reestablish. sources
of supply in the heart of an alien culture? Neither of these questions
can be answered with certainty at this time. We have and are continu-
ing to make notable progress in containing Asian traffic. The accoin-
pli.shments which I have mentioned today in the recent elimination of
a heroin laboratory in Thailand, and the attack on ethnic Chinese
trafficking systems in the United States, are examples of this.
The second question is more problematic. Thus far, there is no indi-
cation of any large-scale attempt by French, Turkish, or Western
Hemisphere traffickers to establish organized sources of heroin in
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Asia. However, we have to keep in mind that there still exist many
French influences in the Indochina area. Hopefully, the pressure on
both sides of the Atlantic may lead to the disintegration of these key
elements altogether. We leave, however, one clear example of the versa-
tility of heroin traffickers in organizing criminal activity across cul-
tural lines. One of the now variations on the European trafficking pat-
tern has been the recent influx of Latin American violators.
According to our study of major seizures, their importance, though
still second to the French has grown steadily since 1968. They have
been able to engraft the ?outh American contrabandista system di-
rectly on to European sources of heroin. This proof of versatility re-
emphasizes the need to keep a sharp watch on Southeast Asia and
other potential sources of supply.
COMPLEXITY OF PROBLEM AND SCOPE OF NEW INITIATIVES
In the foregoing analysis of the international drug traffic, I have
attempted to convey something of both the complexity of the problem
which confronts us and, the great scope of the new initiatives which
are only now getting underway. Cause for optimism may be found in
the fact that, whereas the problems have existed with equal complex-
ity for many years, the breadth of our current effort far exceeds any-
thing attempted in the past. In essence, our country has finally real-
ized, and other key nations have finally realized, that the problem is
a cancer and not a, headache; and it must be treated with surgery and
not with aspirin.
PROGRESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
The spirit of this realization is also found in the progress in inter-
national law. In February 1971, an international treaty called the
Convention on Psychotropic Substances was successfully negotiated
in Vienna between 71 nations. This treaty will provide some minimum
of controls over the international commerce in categories of drugs
of abuse, which have previously been subject to no such restrictions.
It is now before the Senate for advice and consent.
Similarly, our Government has proposed and sponsored amend-
ments to the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961, designed
to strengthen the power of international bodies to enforce the re-
strictions on narcotics. Qn May 25 of this year, 71 countries attending
the Geneva conference voted for adoption of these amendments, and
47 countries have already signed them subject to final ratification.
Many opium-producing countries have complained that the Single
Convention amendments force them to adopt restrictions on opium
production while industrial nations are reluctant to accede to the
Convention of f'sychotropic Substances which affects the drugs they
manufacture. Opt- Gov .rnment, as one of the latter manufacturing
nations, has sought to dispel these doubts by assuring all countries
of our sincere support for the international control of all categories
of drugs of abuse.
I have no reservatiops at all in recommending these major im-
provements in international law to the Senate and to the people of
this Nation.
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Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I will be happy to attempt to re-
spond to any questions you have.
(Attachments to Mr. Ingersoll's prepared statement follow:)
Support
Agents personnel Total
End of 1969------------------------------------------------------
26
4
30
End of 1970------------------------------------------------------
27
9
36
End of 1971------------------------------------------------------
49
24
73
Present onboard as of June 19, 1972-.-------------------------------
93
60
153
End of 1972(planned)---------------------------------------------
115
71
186
End of 1973------------------------------------------------------
(9
(')
(')
End of'fiscal year 1969------------------------------------------------
13
Present -------------------------------------------------------------
47
LOCATION OF BNDD FOREIGN DISTRICT OFFICES
FISCAL YEAR 10119
Mexico City, Lima, Rome, Paris, Beirut, Istanbul, Bangkok, Seoul, Singapore,
Hong Kong, Montreal, Saigon, and Ankara.
Vietnam:
Saigon.
Afexico ct Central America:
Mexico City, Guadalajara, Hermosillo, and Monterrey.
Panama & South America.:
Panama City, Panama; Caracas, Venezuela; Asuncion, Paraguay; Buenos
Aires, Argentina ; Lima, Peru ; Quito, Ecuador ; Rio de Janeiro, Brazil ; Bogota,
Columbia ; Brazilia, Brazil ; and La Paz, Bolivia.
Near East:
Ankara, Turkey ; Istanbul, Turkey ; Izmir, Turkey ; Beirut, Lebanon ; Kabul,
Afghanistan ; Tel Aviv, Israel ; Tehran, Iran ; and Islamabad, Pakistan.
Southeast Asia:
Bangkok, Thailand; Chiang Mai, Thailand; Vientiane, Laos; Kuala Lumpar,
Malaysia ; Singapore ; Phnom Penh, Cambodia ; and New Delhi, India.
Far East:
Tokyo, Japan ; Hong Kong ; Manila, P. L; Seoul, Korea ; and Okinawa.
Europe:
London, England ; Paris, France ; Marseilles, France ; Madrid, Spain ; Bar-
celona, Spain ; Rnbat, Morroco ; Bonn, Germany ; Frankfurt, Germany ; Munich,
Germany ; Milan, Italy; Rome, Italy ; and Brussels, Belgium.
Senator SPONG. Thank you very much, Mr. Ingersoll. It is very com-
prehensive testimony and most helpful.
In an article entitled "The World Opium Situation," which was pre-
pared by BNDD (Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs) and
printed in the .June 1971 Congressional Record it was noted that one
problem with the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs was a
lack of enforcement authority on the part of the International Nar-
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cotics Control Board. Do you believe the protocol, in any way, helps
to overcome this problem since it does not provide for any enforce-
ment authority?
Mr. INGERSOLL. Mr. Chairman, it will help. It will certainly not
solve the problem. First of all, the International Narcotics Control
Board will be able to modify opium producing estimates in countries
where it seems that surpluses led to diversion of legal stocks; and, sec-
ond, the Board, under the terms of the amendment, may reduce a
country's production by an amount equal to the amount that went into
the illicit traffic in that country in a previous year.
In addition the Board- may request, not force, but may request a coun-
try to admit an inspection team to examine the situation. The country
can still reject help from the Board but at least it must do a study and
submit proposed remedial measures to the Board.
Of course, one of the )imitations of international treaties when deal-
ing with criminal activity is that each government is sovereign in
legislating and enforcing criminal law, and much will rest on world
opinion as to the effectiveness of its performance. So it will help. It
certainly by no means pretends to solve this particular problem.
INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS IN TERMS OF TREATMENT
Senator SPONG. You, have touched on this next question in your
testimony, particularly with regard to recent efforts in France, but in
the article I referred to in the previous question it is noted that-and
I quote :
Given the present scale of opium-based drug abuse, it is unlikely to be lastingly
suppressed without, greater, international cooperation in treatment and enforce-
ment programs as well as in attempts to control production directly.
Would you evaluate international efforts in terms of (1) treatment;
(2) enforcement programs ; and (3) control of production?
Mr. INGERSOLL. In the area of treatment, I would say that only a
handful of countries are performing effectively. In those cases, I think
the drug problem is rather small, with the exception of the United
States.
The World Health Organization provides materials and references
on treatment programs that are available or in use in the world in
various nations; and each country that has had a severe drug problem
and that has mounted a treatment program has seemed to do this in
direct relationship to its own culture and standards. For example, the
United Kingdom treats its addicts in a manner that is far different
from the way Japan approached the problem, Japan required manda-
tory treatment programs and a drug-free treatment environment
whereas in the United, Kindom, on the other hand, treatment is not
institutionalized completely and heavy use is made of drug mainte-
nance programs.
In the United States we are taking a middle road, I think, between
these two extremes.
The country of Iran has a very serious addiction problem and in
this case both the World Health Organization and the United States
have offered assistance.; Article 15 of the Protocol embodies language
which implies the desirability of parties having treatment programs.
This is a matter of local decisionmaking and one which each govern-
ment has to undertake itself.
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INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS IN TERMS OF ENFORCEMENT PROGRAMS
In the area of enforcement, the situation again is improving. I think
the reason we have had so much difficulty in persuading governments
of other countries to step up their enforcement programs is because
drug problems have not been of high priority in enlisting their action
and for many years the common retort was, "That is an American
problem."
Now, more and more of these countries are finding a spread of the
drug problem within their own territories and so they are taking in-
creasing action and paying more attention to it.
At a World Conference I attended last October, for example, the
delegates repeatedly referred to this as a worldwide scourge and I
think that best typifies the reaction of many governments at this time.
The example of Turkey, while it will not put a complete stop to
narcotic trafficking and will indeed not stop drug addiction in the
United States itself, does show what can be done by a government
which is concerned that it was unable to control diversion of what
started out to be a perfectly legitimate production for use in medicine.
And because it could not control diversion into illicit trafficking, it
decided to cease opium production altogether.
The same kind of approach would not be successful in many of the
other countries I have mentioned because they simply don't have the
same degree of control over the territory in which opium is produced
that Turkey has. Nevertheless, in these other countries we have seen
increased controls. For example, Laos, until last fall, did not have a
law that made the production and movement of opium illegal. It
passed a law, and since that law has been in effect they have been very
effective in enforcing it.
In many countries in Southeast Asia-Thailand is another ex-
ample-there was no law against opium production until the late
1950's and it apparently takes a great deal of time to overcome the
inertia that an absence of law has created.
I might also add to this that many nations are moving toward the
establishment of central narcotic bureaus for law enforcement and
regulatory purposes-places such as Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand,
Laos, the Philippines, and perhaps generally.
Senator SPONG. In your statement you used the figure of a half
million for the number of those in the United States that you estimate
are presently addicted to hard drugs. How did you arrive at that
figure?
Mr. INGERSOLL. This is a statistical extrapolation of some known
data which mainly is based on addicts who have been identified either
by virtue of having come to the attention of local police agencies or
to medical authorities throughout the United States. From this sample,
using a well-verified statistical technique that is used in other processes
in estimating populations, the figure of about 565,000 has been obtained.
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12
Before that technique was used, estimates that were reported on the
bases of just the. sample figure which was derived from the reporting of
about 40 communities around the country.
FZSTIMATE REVISED UPWARD
Senator SPONG. How much of an upward revision does this
represent?
Mr. INGERSOLL. That is very hard to say, Mr. Chairman, because
until the last 2 or 3 years no effort was made to estimate the total
population. I think that it is fair to say, however, that it represents a
substantial increase over what existed 10 or 15 years ago. By that, I
mean very substantial.
COORDINATION PROBLEMS
Senator SPONG. Thee have been reports that the activities of the
Bureau of Narcotics algid Dangerous Drugs and the U.S. Customs have
sometimes been hindeied by coordination problems. Would you care
to comment on that?
Mr. INGERSOLL. I thipik that such reports, and particularly what ap-
pears in the popular press from time to time, are gross exaggerations.
I think it has to be expected that where two organizations are operat-
ing in the same area from time to time that there will be conflicts, and
I am not going to deny that operational conflicts have occurred. How-
ever, I do not think that these have impeded the Government's pro-
gram against drug trafficking and I think that a look at the record of
both the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs and the Bureau of
Customs during the last couple of years show the great improvement
that both agencies have demonstrated. This supports my contention
that whatever minor operational conflicts may have occurred in the
field from time to time certainly have not impeded overall progress in
controlling the traffic; and, I might say, that at this time the relations
between the Director of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs
and the Commissioner of Customs have never been better. We are in
constant communication and we direct our forces explicitly and per-
sonally from time to time when we have a mutual operation going.
Rn S1TE
r.n mmo o
r. INGERSOLL.
e ch rges ?
Senator PEARSON. us two or three questions came to mind as I
followed your very excellent statement.
GOVERNMENT EFX'ORTS RELATING TO ADDICTION INCREASES
'I would be interested if you would put in the record, although it
deals with our domestic effort, what the effort of our Government has
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been in relation to the increase of addiction in the last decade that you
cited, and I would like, if you would, to put the figures as to your
budget requests and budget authorizations and appropriations and
manpower figures in.
I must say that while there is a limit to the number of people who
might serve our Government in overseas capacities, the recitation of
the number from four to 11 in Marseilles seems like a relatively
insignificant increase at the very heart of what some of this problem is.
Mr. INGERSOLL. Senator, I will be very happy to comply with your
request but may I point out also that our agents have no enforcement
authority.
Senator PEARSON. I understand that.
Mr. INGERSOLL. They are present there for advisory purposes
Senator PEARSON. I understand.
Mr. INGERSOLL (continuing). And to provide assistance. I think
what we should examine is the increase in resources that other govern-
ments have put into this campaign.
Senator PEARSON. And they are substantial, are they?
Mr. INGERSOLL. Yes, sir.
(The information referred to follows:)
BUDGET REQUESTS AND APPROPRIATIONS FOR BUREAU OF NARCOTICS AND
DANGEROUS DRUGS
(Supplied by the Department of Justice)
Attached is a tabulation of the budget requests and appropriations for BNDD
and its predecessor agencies during the previous ten years. One of these agencies,
the Bureau of Drug Abuse Control, did not exist for this entire period of time.
These figures do not represent total Government expenditures on, drug law
enforcement activities inasmuch as other agencies, particularly U.S. Customs,
have been involved in this effort to some degree throughout the period in question.
COMPARISON OF BUDGET REQUESTS AND APPROPRIATIONS ENACTED
[In thousands[
Year
Requested
Approved
by Congress
Year
Requested
Approved
by Congress
1.
1962:
(a) FBN--------------
$4,462
$4,462
(b) BOAC-------------
NA
NA
5.
1966:
(a) FBN-------------
6,050
6,050
(b) BDAC------------
2,199
2,199
2.
1963:
(a) FBN-------------
4,777
4,767
(b) BDAC------------
NA
NA
6.
1967:
(a) FBN-------------
6,275
6,275
Total -----------
4,777
4,767
(b) BDAC------------
5,107
5,107
3.
1964:
(a) FBN-------------
4,450
5,350
(b) BDAC------------
NA
NA
7.
1968: BNDD --------------
14,374
14 374
8.
1969: BNDD--------------
20, 455
18, 533
Total--. -----------
5,450
5, 350
9.
1970: BNDD--------------
27,772
27,772
10.
1971: BNDD ---------
44,201
43,592
4.
1965:
11.
1972: BNDD--------------
66,639
65,039
(a) FBN-------------
5, 657
12.
1973: BNDD--- ------
1 73,053
r 74,053
NA
1 Approved by House and Senate Subcommittees. Transfer to GSA for space not reflected.
(Seep. 73 for additional material.)
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RECORD OF WEST GERMAN GOVERNMENT
Senator PEARSON. You made particular reference to France and, of
course, I understand that, but you also indicated that some of the
processing was being done in West Germany. What is the record of the
West German Government?
Dir. INGERSOLL. I didn't mean to imply that we know of any heroin
processing that is occurring in `Nest Germany; however, West Ger-
many is used as a trans=shipment country from Turkey and from the
Middle East into France. It may be possible that violators will be
moving, or may have already moved to Germany because of the pres-
sure in France. We are particularly concerned about cities such as
Hamburg, but we have dialog and communications with a variety of
people in the West German government, members of the Bundestag,
members of the Government itself and the police. The West Germans
at this time are moving toward the establishment of central coordina-
tion of narcotics control which at the present is mainly in the hands
of the several provinces. As you know, 'Vest Germany is a federated
government of the almost pure variety and enforcement responsibility
basically lies at the province level.
A meeting, for example, was called by Minister Emke who is the
Chief of Ministries of the German Government, of all of the provin-
cial prime ministers-and they have all agreed to coordinate and co-
operate with the national government in this effort.
BNDD has offices in three cities in Germany-Bonn, Frankfurt,
and Munich, and the German police and German customs service have
made several large seizures of morphine base. They are setting up an
intelligence unit at this time. This will be a computerized intelligence
system with sonic 2,000 terminals to feed narcotics intelligence into
a central unit; so we think they are doing quite well.
Senator PEARSON. His there been a significant increase in the use
of drugs and drug addiction among our troops in Western Europe,
especially in Germany?
Mr. INGERSOLL. There is some increase ; however, most of this is in
the use of hashish. There is sporadic availability of heroin but not
continuing availability' of heroin to our troops in West Germany.
Of course, we were very concerned that the same type of situation
that occurred in South Vietnam does not occur there; and the U.S.
Army in Europe is very active in enforcement and education and other
preventive efforts.
ENFORCEMENT OF kBSOLUTE BAN BY TURKISH GOVERNMENT
Senator PEARSON. Let me ask you this last question and that is:
You have expressed co~isiderable confidence that the Turkish Gov-
erninent with the changes of administration and the passage of the
law would be able to enforce its absolute ban at the end of the 1972
crop. Given the failure to enforce its prior reputation of having a.
monopoly on the purchase of that opium that was produced, do you
see a greater capacity or greater resolution on the part of the Turkish
Government or is it easier to control an absolute ban than it is the
absolute, total purchase Of the production?
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Ml'. INGERSOLL. Yes, sir.
Senator PEARSON. What is the source of this confidence you have in
the implementation of the Turkish Government in its very consid-
erable and very laudatory act?
Mr. INGERsoLL. Well, it is easier to enforce an absolute ban pro-
vided that the proper inspection of the terrain is carried out; and
we have reason to believe that they will do that. I think also an under-
standing of the Turkish mind underlines some of the confidence that
I have. The peasant class in Turkey understands either a complete ban
or complete permissiveness in these kinds of matters and they have
difficulty in understanding the gray area in between, particularly
since there is no significant addiction problem in Turkey. The peasant
farmer on the Anatolian Plain looks at the opium plant as a useful
plant, not only because of the cash that it provides but also because
it serves as fuel, as fodder; the oil is useful in cooking; the seeds
are useful as condiments on bakery goods-he cannot understand the
problems and the difficulty that the white powder derived from opium
causes on the streets of New York and elsewhere in the United States.
But he can understand when his government says no more produc-
tion; and the government officials in Turkey involved in this grogram
are optimistic that the farmer will comply, particularly since the
Turkish Government will be compensating the farmer for the cash
loss that he will incur during the first several years while changes in
economic development are being made.
Senator PEARSON. I thank you very much, Mr. Ingersoll.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator SroNG. Thank you, Senator Pearson.
POSSIBILITY OF INCREASED ILLICIT TRADE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
I would like to pursue for a moment, Mr. Ingersoll, the possibility
of increased illicit trade in Southeast Asia.
It has been suggested that the Florida based Trafficante family has
become involved in Southeast Asia. Also, in 1971, after certain suit-
cases containing heroin were seized at Orly Airport in France, sources
in Vietnam and Laos suggested that the French connection was ar-
ranged by a man named Theodas, who is a member of the French-
Corsican underworld and manager of a hotel in Vientiane, Laos.
Could this be considered evidence of a move of the illicit traffic
toward Southeast Asia?
Mr. INGIRSOLL. I think that the probability that French traffickers
will move to Southeast Asia is quite good and I think they probably
have been making arrangements ever since the ban on Turkish opium
production was announced. There is probably still a considerable
amount of opium that originated in Turkey in the pipelines that will
satisfy their requirements for an undetermined period. However, as
they move. to Southeast Asia their logistical lines of supply will be
extended. I think this will make them more vulnerable to effective
police intercession.
As I mentioned in my statement, there is still a heavy French in-
fluence in Indochina and I am not naive enough to believe that all con-
nections between French and Asian criminals have been broken merely
because of the absence of the French Government in that area.
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16
COUNTRIES NOT PARTY TO SINGLE CONVENTION
Senator SPONa. Are, there countries which are not parties to the
Single Convention which could in your judgment, become major pro-
ducers as our efforts in Turkey and elsewhere take effect?
Mr. INGERSOLL. Yes,, Mr. Chairman, there are some producing coun-
tries at this time that qre not parties to the Single Convention. Iran is
one although it does participate in United Nations activities in drug
control. Iran is taking steps to ratify the Single Convention and, I be-
lieve, Laos is as well.
Senator SPOti G. How about in the Western Hemisphere?
Mr. INGERSOLL. Mr. Chairman, I don't think I can answer that ques-
tion, but I will be very happy to supply an answer for the record, if
you wish.
Senator SPONG. Thank you.
(See p. 65 for State. Department answer with which Mr. Ingersoll
concurs.)
CURBING ~RODUCTION AND SUPPLY OF OPIUM
Senator SPONG. In comparison with the amount of opium needed to
supply addicts, the production is quite large. Do you believe produc-
tion and supply can be curbed?
Mr. INGERSOLL. In terms of the requirements in the United States
it is true that production is very large; however, until this year, to
the best of our knowledge, most of the opium production was used
throughout the world and the demand in various parts of the world
is stilrquite high.
As far as the United States is concerned, I think that we cannot just
focus our efforts on tl~e control of supply. It seems to me this is an
emergency type of effort that we have to maintain until we reduce
the demand in_ this country ; and the demand can be reduced by first
providing adequate treatment for those who are addicted at this time.
then, hopefully, we can change the attitudes of Americans toward
drugs and drug abuse over a longer period of time so that the demand
will disappear.
But I regard law enforcement and control efforts as really a first
aid treatment, if you will; an emergency activity pending a long-
range solution to the overall problem.
Senator SPONG. I an going to ask you to provide the following for
the record, if you will : I would like a country by country estimate of
illicit opium production in the current year, and a comparison with the
estimated production in those countries 5, 10, and 20 years ago. In addi-
tion, I would like to know what basis you have used for your estimate.
I know this is not easy but we would like for you to do as well as you
can with this, Mr. Ingersoll. (See p. 72.)
SUCCESS OF EUROPEAN EFFORTS TO STEM DRUG PROBLEM
Senator SPONG. I would like to ask you to summarize on one point :
Do you believe that the drug problem in Europe is now being success-
fully stemmed, or would you say that present European efforts are 50
percent or 75 percent successful-or would you use some other figure?
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Mr. INGERSOLL. I don't know that I can quantify that, Mr. Chair-
man, because I think Europe is just getting started and they are where
we were maybe 5 or 10 ears ago, both in respect to the extent of the
drug problem and their' reaction to it. I think most Europeans will
agree with that assessment; they are at least 5 years behind us in all
I espects.
Senator SPONG. And certainly a part of their increased interest in
enforcement has been the fact, that the problem is growing within their
own countries?
Mr. INGERSOLL. There is no question about that. It seems to be human
nature to wait until a problem becomes a crisis before action is taken
against it or before it is given priority attention. I think that occurred
in the United States as well.
Senator SPONG. There is a disparity between the number of parties
to the Single Convention-I believe there were over 90-and the num-
ber of countries which have thus far signed the protocol, 47, expanding
the powers of the International Control Board.
Do you attach any significance to this and do you expect full par-
ticipation in the protocol?
Mr. INGERSOLL. I think the representative of the State Department
can answer that better than I can, Mr. Chairman ; however, I do know
that these amendments were very controversial among the parties to
the Single Convention and also those who participated in the Geneva
Convention, and I thought 41 signing subject to ratification was a
good record in view of the handicap we started with. But I would
prefer to defer to the State Department representative on that
question.
Senator SPONG. We will be hearing from him.
Thank you very much.
Senator Pearson, do you have any further questions?
Senator PEARSON. No.
Senator SPONG. We would appreciate the information we requested
for the record.
Mr. INGERSOLL. We would be, very happy to provide it.
Senator SPONG. Thank you for your testimony; and Mr. Belk and
Mr. Miller, thank you.
Senator SI>oNG. Mr. Rossides?
STATEMENT OF HON. EUGENE T. ROSSIDES, ASSISTANT SECRE-
TARY FOR ENFORCEMENT, TRADE AND OPERATIONS, DEPART-
MENT OF THE TREASURY
Mr. ROSSIDES. Mr. Chairman, good morning.
Senator SPONa. We are pleased to have you with us. Do we have
copies of your statement?
Mr. ROSSIDES. Mr. Chairman, I did not bring a prepared statement.
I thought I would give a general statement and answer any questions.
I apologize but I have lived with this problem and I can easily lay out
to the committee and submit whatever additional information or put
my opening remarks into a more formal presentation.
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Senator SPONG. It is not at all necessary. Are there some prefatory
remarks you would like'to make?
Mr. RossIDES. I would very much, Mr. Chairman.
Senator SPONG. All right.
Mr. RossIDEs. Let me say, first of all, that it is a great pleasure to be
invited by this committee to discuss what I consider, and I think you
consider, one of the. crucial problems facing our Nation, namely, the
problem of drug abuse: I think this distinguished committee can play
an additional role in this matter.
BIPARTISAN EFFORT IN AREA OF DRUG ABUSE
I think what we have seen in the last three and a half years is a
tremendous bipartisan effort and accomplishments in the area of drug
abuse.
Frankly, prior to January 1969, very little was done in this area on
a coordinated basis either by the executive or the legislative branches
of Government; and sijice that time under the leadership of President
Nixon, with the full bipartisan support of the Congress, in my judg-
ment, we have made substantial progress.
I happen to take an optimistic view that for the first time we are
succeeding ; we are turning the tide in a multidimensional approach
and attack on this problem.
PROBLEM 1LEVATED TO FOREIGN POLICY ISSUE
I think the President's multifaceted program has led the way, and
if I could quickly mention them and the first and most important
point, frankly, is what concerns this committee particularly : For the
first time we elevated this problem to a foreign policy issue. Instead
of the nonsense of the past of dealing with foreign governments by
agents, as dedicated as't.hey may be, that is not their function, for the
first time we elevated it to a foreign policy issue and the President
took a direct, personal interest, solicited the cooperation of foreign
governments such as Mexico, Turkey, and France, through the De-
partment of State; directed Secretary of State Rogers to make this
a high priority item.
The Department of State has done an enormous jQb in this area in
the last 31/2 years. It has been an unheralded job and I
would like to lay out some of the things that I think they have
accomplished.
First of all, the Ambassador now is informed this is a foreign
policy issue. In the past, whoever held the idea that the enforcement
problem was a foreign policy issue? Mr. Chairman, I submit that 50
years from now, the role of the President and the Congress in alerting
not just our Nation but the world community to this problem, will
go down in history far more than what we are doing in Vietnam and
elsewhere in many ways.
We have had a U.N. International Narcotics Control Board for
many, many years, and it did literally nothing. Governments talked
about this and gave an annual comment, a few of them; but once the
President raised this in his U.N. speech on the 25th anniversary,
again it alerted the world. That does not mean we don't have a lot
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more to do, because I am not that optimistic in that sense. We have to
pressure ourselves: we have done a tremendous job in 31/2 years;
we have to do a lot more. Many of our friends and allies around the
world have done a fine job, but they have got to do a lot more; and I
am not so sanguine that without continuing attention by our Govern-
ment, and particularly the Congress, it is apparent our officials can-
not speak out as easily as the Congress, to keep the viewpoint that
this is an urgent world problem. Let's take France, Mr. Chairman, as
an example
Mr. PL ARSON. Pardon me. What do you mean when you say, "our
officials cannot speak out"?
Mr. ROSSmES. Well, Senator, what I mean is, you cannot-I can-
not criticize another Government, because it is misinterpreted. I can
congratulate other Governments and say "we can do more, and they
have been doing a good job"; that is what I meant.
Senator PE ARSON. I see.
1MTr. ROSSIDES. Mexico has done a fine job, but she has to do more.
France has done an outstanding job, which I will indicate, but more
should be done; but just like our own Government, more should be
done in this matter.
But France, who had not been as aware of this matter before,
through the diplomatic efforts in raising this to a diplomatic level
where the President himself became involved, the Department of
State became involved, and the extraordinary job done by Ambassador
Watson-I guess of all of our Ambassadors around the world-I
would have to single out Ambassador Watson's performance in work-
ing quietly and effectively with the French Government to obtain
their cooperation and pointing out that it is their problem as well. The
French Government realizes they have a great number of addicts in
France, and that is a world matter and a humanitarian matter; and,
I think, as Mr. Ingersoll pointed out in response to a question from
Senator Pearson, it is not so much the number of our agents there,
it is how much of an increase of agents by the French Government,
and they have clone an extraordinary job in the last year. Their
seizures by their French customs service on March 2 of 935 pounds
sterns directly from the initiatives taken to make this into a world
problem, to make it realized that it affects everybody.
Now, in Turkey, they have done a fine job, and it was a courageous
act by the Turkish Government to legally ban the opium production
as of this weekend. The enforcement of that we have to pay a great
deal of attention to and keep working cooperatively with them to in-
sure proper compliance.
So I say that in this area of foreign affairs-take Southeast Asia,
which is another great problem area--the whole history of the people
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20
is smuggling as a way of life. lY7'e have made a lot of advances there
in hopes of preventing the percentage of opium and heroin coming
from Southeast Asia, to keep that percentage from increasing. For the
first time we are a littl . bit ahead of the game through the initiatives
we have taken under tie leadership of the Department of State in
working with these various Governments in setting up teams.
Through our efforts in the customs service, we uncovered the major
ring in gouth America, the now famous, or infamous, Ricord case;
and somehow not only the French Corsicans came not only across the
South Atlantic but also through South America and in the United
States. Through the coirtrabandista system, goods are smuggled into
the Southern Ilemisphere; and with an empty airplane at destination,
why not put something in it and bring it here; and we stopped that.
The first thing was to raise the drug problem to the diplomatic level,
and the leadership of the State Department in this area has been, in
my judgment, tremendous in projecting the interests of the United
States and the world community, and, frankly, this is an issue on
which all Governments can agree upon, and it can help bring the world
community together, which it has done in this example more than it
has done in other issues which are divisive.
CUSTOMS-TO-CUSTOMS COOPERATION
As an example, one of the programs we started in the Treasury in
the spring of 19(9 was customs-to-customs cooperation. This was the
first line of defense, Mr. Chairman, for in our country and in most
countries, there are efforts to prevent the smuggling. We were able to
successfully have in the, past the Customs Cooperation Council to pass
smuggling laws. We are very proud of our sister customs service offi-
cers in France.
Mr. Chairman, we actually had meetings with the Communist
countries behin the Iron Curtain, customs to customs, and I also had
the pleasure of hosting the Bulgarian and Yugoslav Directors of Cus-
toms, as an example, during their recent visits to the United States.
Let me go quickly to the other points of the administration's multi-
faceted program and then stress Treasury's specific role and then
answer any questions.
You cannot jlist talk about this as an enforcement problem, ob-
viously. As the President stressed, for the first time on a Federal level,
the crucial roles of research, education, and rehabilitation, enormous
increases in budget, and, I think, significant and successful attempts
for better coordination, of the many diverse agencies working in this
area of the Federal Government.
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Third, we differentiated between the criminal structure in the legis-
lation that passed the Congress as between heroin and marihuana, so
the one which is the more serious remains a felony, of course, but on
the marihuana, the gradation and also flexible penalties for handling
youthful offenders, so with a first offender that slate can be wiped
clean whether it is a soft or a hard drug.
Fourth, substantial increase in budgetary support for Federal law
enforcement in the two main agencies, the Bureau of Narcotics and
Dangerous Drugs, and our own Bureau of Customs. Additionally, in
this area last year, the President initiated the Treasury-IRS drug traf-
fic program where we do tough tax investigations of the middle- and
upper-echelon drug dealers, extremely successful 'programs which I
will comment on further.
Fifth, you cannot beat this unless you get the community involved
in this problem; and I have said this in public many times, it is a two-
way street. Unless the community cooperates with the law enforce-
ment agencies, it will not beat the heroin problem. Blacks are breeding
blacks in this country, and Spanish are breeding Spanish speaking-
and whites are breeding whites; the drug traffic in Bedford-Stuy-
vesant, my home borough in Harlem, St. Albans, Watts-are run by
blacks, drug traffickers elsewhere by Spanish speaking, and by whites
elsewhere.
CENTRAL ROLE OF STATES
Now, sixth and last is, of course, the central role of the States. Now,
before this administration, frankly, a number of States-California
and New York-which had the main problem were doing the best
work, but a lot of it going down the drain because you did not have
the total picture : a total program, diplomatic as well as Federal en-
forcement and rehabilitation.
We must understand that there are over 350,000 State and local law
enforcement officials, and that is crucial; and I cite you the example
of Japan, Mr. Chairman, the closest to the source with the largest
supply, the largest supply of opium in the world, had a serious heroin
problem after World War II. She has beaten that problem by tough
enforcement, by her customs service and her internal police, and by
her educational programs and total community action.
TREASURY'S ROLE -THREEFOLD
Very quickly, Treasury's role is threefold : Our primary responsi-
bility is to stop smuggling; and before January 1969, Customs was
literally out of that business, and this administration brought it back
into it with enormous accomplishments with the support of the Con-
grsess on Appropriations Committees and the full Congress.
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Statistics on seizures J can supply; just as an example, last year
over 1,000 pounds, 1,100 pounds of almost pure heroin, an extraordi-
nary accomplishment, Mr. Chairman; in addition, the number of ar-
rests and seizures of al) drugs have increased dramatically. No one
knows how much is getting in. That is a statistics game, but we cer-
tainly know from the amount that we have seized, the amount that for-
eign governments have seized, that in my judgment the supply of
heroin has peaked. It does not mean the number of addicts has peaked,
but I think for the first time we are finally giving the smugglers and
drug peddlers a run for their money.
A second area, an extraordinarily successful one, and I am going
to have our 12-month report shortly, is our IRS drug program.
We have, in a short 11 months, 718 middle- and upper-echelon drug
dealers in the United States under tax investigation, 412 agents
throughout this country. We have had tremendous cooperation with
our sister Federal enforcement agencies and local and State. police-
there is an example of a key organization in southern California with
narcotics agents that we have been trying to get for years and could
not get the actual narcotics evidence. We have them under a solid tax
investigation, and with the cooperation of our sister agencies with
California and Federal,, we are going to break that organization and
take the profit out. of it.
The third area of Treasury involvement, we have from the very be-
ginning of this administration at Treasury, taken the position in
dealing with any country on this problem of lining up the various
items of American interests in that country, so when we talk about
economic aid, economic assistance, that certainly had to be a factor
in relation to whether or not that country was properly enforcing its
drug laws and cooperating with us. Nov, of course, there has been the
bill that has passed the Congress, and upon the President's deter-
mination that a country is or is not cooperating, it is, up to the Secre-
tary of the Treasury
Senator Sro:vo. That. legislation originated in this committee.
Mr. RossIDES. Right. This is a most important position, just like
our position on expropriation. What a country does on drugs should
concern not just the United States, but all the international lending
institutions. It is silly to be pouring money into a country and have
it go down the drain because that country really is not doing its job
on drugs.
Mr. Chairman, that is. a quick overview. Let me mention specifically
some of the things we did.
For instance, in Virginia, we have increased our number of people
there. We don't have many people there, but as an example one of
the substantial cases that we had which affects Virginia and the, Dis-
trict of Columbia. It started out as a mail case which Customs had un-
covered-William Herman Jackson-and he had a smuggling ap-
paratus stemming from Southeast Asia here, and stemming from
that lead and tip and involving cooperation with other agencies, we
were able to convict there members of that group just last month, and
they are awaiting sentencing today. But it is a tough problem. I think
we are making substantial progress; a lot more has to be done.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator SPONQ. Thank you, very much.
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PROBLEMS OF COORDINATION BETWEEN BUREAUS
You mentioned increased coordination and cooperation between the
various governmental agencies. I asked Mr. Ingersoll to comment
upon any problems of coordination between the Bureau of Narcotics
and Dangerous Drugs, and the Customs Bureau. I wonder if you have
anything to say with regard to that.
Mr. ROSSIDES. Well, I would echo Director Ingersoll's comments,
Mr. Chairman. Certainly there is bumping as there are in many
aspects of governmental operations where two agencies in part of
their duties overlap. I am not trying to belittle that, but I think it is a
normal amount of bumping. In the beginning, it might have been more
than that. We have it under control, and I think the two organizations
are working much better today.
But let me say this, that that is like a pimple compared to the suc-
cess of the beefing up of both of these organizations and the coopera-
tion that has occurred between them. There is a problem, a small one,
and I am not too concerned about it. We are working it out within the
executive, and with the coordination of our committees.
METHOD OF ILLEGAL ENTRY
Senator SPONG. What method of illegal entry represents the most
difficult problem for the enforcement efforts that you are connected
with?
Mr. ROSSIDES. The most difficult method of entry of any enforcement
effort, not jest our own, at this point involves the light aircraft, com-
ing across the southern border, and small craft landing along the
coast. Last year, Treasury proposed and the Appropriations Commit-
tee and the Congress approved-I forget the amount; I think it was
approximately $15 million--for equipment for this antiair intrusion
program along the southern border. We are working in close coordi-
nation with the Navy on the development of proper radar and sensor
devices which are semioperational now and will be operational within
the next-fully operational say, within the next month-to help close
part of that gap along the southern border. When I say part of it, we
can't patrol the whole border, but there are certain key spots which
radar today cannot handle and that is what we are going after, and we
are making it tougher on the air intrusion by the light aircraft. This
is simply the contrabandista system, and it ties in with other aspects
of the problem.
And here is what we are trying to say to our colleagues and friends
in South America, and this is being projected by our Ambassadors :
the contrabandista system of smuggling goods is too dangerous when
it involves drugs. One is that it may seep into their own societies in
South America, but allowing the smuggling to go on by light aircraft
into South America helps destroy their economies, reduces the amount
of duties that they collect by customs, unfair competition to the honest
businessman trying to sell in a particular country. But that is the big-
gest problem we have today, the method whereby we think most of the
heroin and marihuana is coming, via light aircraft.
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CBS DOCUMENTARY
Senator SPONG. Did you see. the CBS documentary Sunday night?
Mr. RossIDns.,I did, Mr. Chairman.
Senator SPoNa. Would you care to comment on it?
Mr. RossTDES. Well, they never did contact us. I think they were
a little bit in error regarding the question of the air intrusion, because
we have a program and it is working, not working perfectly; it is
improving and it is making it tougher. In my judgment, we are cut-
ting the supply ; and the fact that one department didn't apparently
want to answe their question-as an example, we are the ones re-
sponsible, and t icy never came to us because we have a program which
is off the ground on the. antiair intrusion. However, I will say it was a
remarkable performance in working and developing the actual meth-
ods of the aircraft. I egngratulate them on that. As I say, there were
just one or two points that I would have nitpicked with them on, but
I thought it was a remarkable show as to our problem. We are doing
more than indicated, but that is a different question.
DRUG TRAFFIC TIIROU~II HAMPTON ROADS, VIRGINIA, AND DULLES
AIRPORT
Senator SPONG. You made some mention of my own State of Vir-
ginia. Our State crime commission filed a comprehensive report a few
months aoo and mentioned the traffic coming through the port of
Hampton Roads. Would you comment on the extent of the drug traffic
through Ham pton Roads; the success or lack of success of efforts to
curb it; and the extent of drug traffic through Dulles airport?
Mr. R.ossIDEs. Right. ,We don't know the extent ; no one knows the
exact figures and that is one of the great problems in this area. In our
tax program we can give exact figures--how many people, how much
seizure-but in smuggling we don't know. To use the word substantial
would be overstating it for Virginia as an entry point. Hampton Roads
is not a basic entry point although there is some.
The same at Dulles. I)ulles is not a main entry point from overseas.
The key entry points are Miami, the. whole southern border, where
light aircraft are used;; of course, there is entry through New York,
Lake Champlain and Rouses Point. We have increased our manpower
at Dulles, for instance, couriers conic in, and transit elsewhere, say, at
Houston where there is not extreme foreign entry and Customs might
not conduct extensive searches. So I would say there has been some
increase through Dulles. So we have increased manpower and are work-
ing closely witTi Virginia authorities to handle the matter.
I think of more interest. is the fact that in our IRS drug trafficker
program as of this week, we had 19 targets in Virginia. This morning
I was informed that five more have been added this month so there are
24 middle- and uppper-echelon drug traffickers, smugglers, financiers.
dealers who are under tax investigation in Virginia.
Senator SPONG. Senator Pearson?
JAPANS SUCCI'jSS IN PREVENTING DRUG SMUGGLING
SenatorPEARSON. I was intrigued by your comment in relation to
the Japanese and I think if I remember your statement, you said that
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through tough enforcement and educational programs they had beaten
the problem. I am intrigued that any nation or group of people who
have a problem of this severity can beat the problem.
Would you expand on that?
Mr. R.ossIDES. Yes, Senator Pearson, and they have, and we should
use that as an example, and particularly since they are closest to the
largest supply of heroin. As a matter of fact, one of the positions that
this administration has taken was that in the multidimensional attack
you just simply cannot talk about trying to stop the growing of opium
as a source around the world; you have to attack that but if you are
depending on that, forget it. I think the figures presented this morning
show what a small percentage of the total opium production in the
world can supply all the heroin needed in the United States.
What the Japanese found after World War II was a very serious
heroin addiction problem and they went at it, yes, by their very great
social control of their community, I guess, but what they-the J apa-
nese authorities-diplomatic and enforcement-have stressed to us was
the tough enforcement by their customs service primarily to prevent
the smuggling into Japan of drugs.
Every internal policeman-and take the Japanese police force in
Tokyo; it is not a question of a special squad of 100 or 300 or 500 men;
every one of the 40,000 policemen in Japan, in Tokyo, is a drug expert
in the sense that he has had the requirement to go through a drug
course and is looking for drugs. Sure, they have a special squad, but
every one of them, and they feel that they get more concern, they get as
concerned about a marihuana seizure today as we do about a heroin
seizure. And it is there; it is a question of probably they don't have
the question of corruption, rooting out corruption in this problem.
I first became aware of it through the Washington Post-I had not
been as aware of Japan's enormous success in this until the Washing-
ton Post, a few years ago, wrote a long article, very detailed, a full
page on the inside as well as the front page, an article about their
efforts.
U.S. CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT COMPARED TO JAPANESE CUSTOMS
Senator PEARSON. Would you say your customs enforcement is as
good today as the Japanese were at the time? Where are we deficient?
Mr. RossIDES. Well, let me say, as good as the Japanese are today.
Senator PEARSON. At the time they were "beating the problem"?
Mr. RossiDEs. I would say they have a tighter control but I don't
have enough of the details. Let's put it this way, Senator: When we
carne-when this administration calve on board we had 9,000 person-
nel in the Bureau of Customs. The Bureau of Customs had been the
poor sister at the Treasury then and before, when I was there in the
1950's, in the Eisenhower administration. All the attention was on the
revenue side and they did not have the support they should have had
from the Office of the Secretary, frankly.
President Nixon in 1969 proposed a major supplemental on July 14,
1969, and pointed out that customs-directed them to initiate a major
antismuggling program. So from that point we increased to approxi-
mately 13,000. We have come a long way.
In comparing us today to the Japanese customs, I think it would be
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unfair to say we are weaker or stronger. I would have to get a closer
comparison. I would have to say we have such an enormous increase
that we are proud of it, and these men in customs and IRS have made
the seizures; manpower is one of the differences. We need a heck of a
lot more manpower. We, have a lot of mileage to cover and need addi-
tional equipment for the southern border. But we have been given
just about as much in the past as we were able to digest at that time
and we have no fault to say to our Appropriations Committee at this
time.
I would say that we have had other problems. Take the fact we had
to supply the sky marshals. It was a program that had to be developed
where they would be up in the air and on the ground and doing pre-
departure controls, so we had an additional thousand we had to train
there. It was like bringing customs out of the dark ages in 1969.
On enforcement, on tariff and trade affairs, they had simply been
neglected and they are well on their way to being the premier customs
agency in':the world; but I would say-I don't want to say the Japa-
nese are ahead of us-b ' t we can profit from their experience.
Senator PEARSON. I thank you very much and I thank the chairman.
Senator SPON(i. Senator Fulbright?
LACK OF CORRUPTION IN JAPANESE FORCES
The CIiAIRIAN. This Japanese experience interests me as it did
Senator. Pearson. Why , dont they have corruption in their forces?
Mr. RossIDES. Well, I cannot say, Senator, that they don't, and I
threw that out without enough thought, possibly; but in our discus-
sions with our Tapanese. colleagues and customs service, it is clear that
drugs-that no quarter Is given when it comes to drugs, anyone who
accepts bribes and so on, it has developed that you just don't do it or
else, in this area.
The CHAIRMAN. I am just trying to get at what is behind it. I
mean
Mr. RossIDES. The fear.
The CHAIRMAN. Obvously there is a lot of money in Japan, just as
there is here. When you say they don't have corruption, the reverse, I
assume you mean we do have it. How do they treat their people when
they do catch them; whet do they do with them? Do they convict them
or to they allow them to go on bail? Is it 4 or,,) years before they come
to trial?
Mr. ROSSIDES. I am nqt qualified
The CHAIRMAN. I am;just trying to make a case.
Mr. RossIDEs, I don't know all the facts whether there is or is not
corruption, and, really, I don't want to get off on that too much; I can
discuss it a little bit. I think it is that the way we understand it, that
there is such a fear of drugs in the Japanese society that when they
attack this problem I think anyone who might have wanted to try to
corrupt an official found that he was not successful but I would have
The CHAIRMAN. How did they create such an attitude? Is this an
educational. project?
Mr. ROSSIDES. Oh, yes, in good part, part of the multidimensional
:approach is educational and they stressed the educational-in their
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journals, in their literature regarding the problems of drugs and what
it does; in other words, to them drugs pollute the mind and body; it
is as simple as that.
The CHAIRMAN. They have educated. We ought to know that, but
how did they educate them? We ought to be able to learn from the
experience of some of these people who solved this problem.
Mr. Rossrnrs. I think for the first time we in the last 31/2 years have
done an enormous job in education.
The CHAIRMAN. Have the Japanese done the best of any country you
are aware of?
Mr. RossIDES. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
The CIIAIR14rAN. What about the Chinese? After all, we first read
about the Chinese in the opium wars; they had their experience with
it, too. Is it a problem there?
Mr. ROSSIDEs. We understand no, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. It used to be a very great problem?
Mr. ROSSIDES. Very much so; in fact, I recall when the President re-
turned from his historic trip to the People's Republic he pointed out
in his conversation, one of the comments, the feeling he got was that
the Chinese were very annoyed at the white race because it was the
white race that had introduced opium into China.
The CHAIRMAN. How did they control it?
Mr. RossIDES. Well, the Chinese Communists have ways of control-
ling their people a lot more than we have in controlling our people and
I don't think we want to use those methods, but we understand that the
People's Republic made a set. program of eliminating perhaps not
fully, but eliminating the use of opium in Red China and quite success-
fully. Now, our main problems are the other Chinese, the overseas
Chinese, who, our intelligence indicates, are the primary group in
control of the opium traffic in Southeast Asia.
The CHAIRMAN. They do it to make money. They don't use it?
Mr. RossIDES. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. That is all.
Senator SroNG. Senator Javits?
Senator JAVITS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Rossides, you are making an enviable record as Assistant Sec-
retary in this area. Do you recommend this treaty to us?
Mr. RossIDES. Very much so, Senator Javits.
Senator JAVITS. Now, will you tell us
Mr. RossIDES. For the first time this protocol puts a little more teeth
into the United Nation's efforts. A lot more can be done by the United
Nations, and this protocol will help substantially.
Senator JAVITS. Now, will you tell us to what extent, if any, the
Chinese are now cooperating in damming up the flow of drugs, espe-
cially heroin or cocaine or those derivatives?
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28
Mr. fOSSIDEs. Well, when you say the Chinese, Senator, are you
talking about
Senator JAVITS. Main) and Chinese.
Mr. ROSSIDES. The People's Republic?
Senator JAVITS. Right.
Mr. RossIDES. We have had no-I don't want to say no problems-
no problems that we know about of any effort by the People's Republic
to be in control of the .rug trade either to our troops or to the United
States. Now, charges had been made, as you know, in the past and,
frankly, I have read practically every one of the intelligence reports
because we made special efforts' to trv to find out whether or not any
evidence could be traced back to the People's Republic, and every one
of the agencies had to come up with a negative.
ANTIMARIHVANA AND ANTIHEROIN CAMPAIGNS
Senator JAVITS. Now, there was a television program on the other
night which indicated that we are spending a good deal of money to
control the growth of marihuana or to spot its importation from
Mexico. Can you give us some idea as to what funds and resources we
are throwing into the antimarihuana campaign as contrasted with
what we are doing about hard drugs ?
Mr. RossiDEs. Yes, enator Javits. We do not distinguish between
antimarihuana and anti heroin campaigns. Unfortunately, when we
initiated Operation Intercept in 1969, and I was cochairman of the
committee that started it in February of 1969 in finding out what is the
scope of the problem and what do we recommend to the President,
I was cochairman along with the now Attorney General, and that was
a task force on, heroinx marihuana, and dangerous drugs, it covered
everything. But when we submitted-when the Attorney General and
the Secretary of the Treasury, Secretary Kennedy, submitted a report
to the President in June and then a decision was to move ahead and
have a massive effort a1 the border, it was unfortunate that everybody
took it as if we were just going after marihuana because 15 percent,
we estimated of the heroin used in this country comes from opium
grown and cultivated and refined in Mexico.
INCREASES OF MANPOWER AND EQUIPMENT
We increased efforts along the borders particularly, Senator, as I
earlier pointed out; we had very few personnel in customs and we
increased by 1,000 through the special supplemental appropriation
that was submitted in September of 1969 and passed by the Congress
in the fall of 1969. In addition in 1971, in the regular appropriation,
Customs has increased., manpower in this area at least 2,000 during
the last 31/2 years.
So for the first time we are getting the equipment-in last year's
appropriation bill approximately $15 million for aircraft, radar, and
sensormgl devices to take care of the main problem, namely, the intru-
sion by light aircraft, as well as small craft.
For the first time wg are contendini with smugglers. In my judg-
ment, we have actually made them take a step backward because of
the antismuggling program, the efforts of the Bureau of Narcotics
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and Dangerous Drugs and most recently the tremendous efforts of the
Internal Revenue Service on tax investigation.
The actual figures I will be happy to supply for the record of the
increases of manpower and equipment, but there has been a substantial
budgetary increase on enforcement, as well as the education and
research.
Senator JAVITS. Would you supply that? I ask unanimous consent
that it be included at this point in the record.
(The information referred to follows:)
BUREAU OF CUSTOMS INCREASES IN MANPOWER, EQUIPMENT, AND SO FORTH
(Supplied by the Department of the Treasury)
Manpower--------------------------------------------------------
8,103
11,120
3,017
Cost of operation__________________________________________________
$89,911,000
1$193,340,000
$103,429,000
Aircraft
1
26
25
Automobiles------------------------------------------------------
313
903
590
Boats------------------------------------------------------------
0
22
22
Sector intelligence units_-__________________ _ ---------------------
0
5
5
CADPIN (customs automatic data processing intelligence network)......
0
a 161
a
JCO
1 Estimated.
' Computer.
' On-line terminals,
REPORT OF FEDERAL COMMISSION ON MARIHUANA AND HARD DRUG ABUSE
Senator JAVITS. Now, are you familiar with the report of the Na-
tional Commission on Marihuana and Drug Abuse, headed by Gov-
ernor Raymond Shafer, of which I am a member and which found
that marihuana should not be classified with the dangerous drugs, so
called, like heroin, and that it is a diversion of our effort and resources
to put them on a parity in terms of enforcement?
Mr. ROSSIDES. Well, let me say this, Senator : I have read-I am
familiar with-the report; I have not read it all. The HEW Special
Action Office would be more responsible on the medical aspects of
the problem but I do agree with the administration's position regard-
ing marihuana, that it should not be legalized; and I would point out,
though, that I agree with the Commission's position to the extent that
you must differentiate between heroin and marihuana, and this ad-
ministration early in September of 1969, as part of the drug abuse
bill that was before the Congress at that time, recommended a differ-
entiation and penalties as between heroin and marihuana, which was
most important; but it has not gotten the credit for that; and we also
put in the provision, first offender provision, so that any youth on a
first offense, whether it was marihuana, heroin, or anything, the slate
could be wiped clean.
But, Senator, I have seen too many cases of heroin where the per-
son started on marihuana ; and when we are going after smugglers,
the smuggler does not say, "I am just a heroin smuggler"; he may
have started out as a diamond smuggler, gold smuggler, or watch
smuggler, so what we are trying to do is to stop smuggling and I am
sure the Commission, which I am sure they did want was to stop
the smuggling of items coining in-you can't say, "Now at San Ysidro
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we will just look for heroin"; we are looking for and stopping smug-
gling, so you will stop both. Our main emphasis is heroin.
NO PHYSIOLO(ICAL PROGRESSION FROM MARIIIUANA TO HEROIN
Senator JAVITS. If you will forgive me-it is kind of a mixed bag;
it is one thing for a smuggler to be smuggling heroin and marihuana
and I can agree with you on that, and the Commission did not come
out in any way to denigrate our effort to stop smuggling; but it is
quite another thiig for you to extrapolate that those who use mari-
huana go to heroin. The Commission, after spending several million
dollars, found exactly to the contrary, that they don't. There is no
causal relationship. It surprised me, too, but after all, that is why
objective, rational people were appointed to look at research results
rather than extrapolating from one case or whatever we might know.
As a matter of fact, I don't know of any such cases and I have had
a lot of experience in this field.
Mr. ROSSIDES. Senator, I didn't mean to-I qualify it; absolutely,
there is no physiological progression from marihuana to heroin and I
was not suggesting that. I did not mean to suggest that, because I
think that we have properly downgraded the marihuana in compari-
son to heroin; and our efforts are heroin oriented, no question about
it. You take our IRS drug trafficker program, that is, after the heroin
rings, there are of the 178 targets that we have around the country,
there are several, say, that are large scale marihuana smugglers or
dealers but this is heroin oriented.
TREATY1iS EMPHASIS ON HARD DRUGS
Senator JAVITS. So we leave, a right to expect that in the implementa-
tion of this treaty, this convention, the emphasis will be the same on
hard drugs'?
Mr. ROSSIDES. Yes, sir.
DIFFICULTY OF GIrTTING PROBLEM AT PRODUCTION END
Senator JAVITS. Now, isn't it a fact, and I don't want to detain you
any further-other members are waiting, to question you-isn't it a
fact that the whole poppy production which is necessary to supply all
the demand in the United States can be confined to such a small area
that it is extremely difficult to get at this problem at that end? I am
not saying that we shouldn't try but to met at the dreadful addiction
problem which wo have in the United States, especially in my home
area where an estimated half of the addicts are and where the figure
has risen within a decade from an estimated 100,000 to an estimated
350,000, isn't it a fact that this cannot be our main reliance in dealing
with this scourge.?,
Mr. ROSSTDES. Absolutely, Senator, and that thinking in the past is
what has helped cause time problem today. This administration re-
versed that and it has put that down in the order of priority and has
pointed out that less than-I think it is-1 or 2 percent of the land-
mass that is commonly being used to supply poppies can supply the
U.S. market. That does npt mean, though, the tremendous achievement
with the treaty with Turkey has not been as significant as we hoped
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because they were the symbol, because some 80 percent of the heroin
stemmed from poppies grown there.
But the first order of priority is to keep the stuff out, education,
research, and rehabilitation. We turned that around. Before we had
the idiocy of thinking, "Oh, well, we will just stop it at the source and
that will take care of it," instead of the combined attack through edu-
cation, through research, rehabilitation, enforcement, working with
the foreign governments to enforce, stop it from being smuggled in
and working at it internally.
Senator JAVITS. I am satisfied with your answer; I get its implica-
tions, but I think what you said might be translated to mean that first
priority should be this effort to eliminate growth and so on; you
don't mean that?
Mr. EossIDES. No ; I meant the opposite.
Senator JAVITS. I understand you now, what you meant, but you said
it differently.
NUMBER OF ITARD DRUG ADDICTS IN NEW YORK
Senator SPONG. Senator Javits, just for your own information, Mr.
Ingersoll testified earlier that his most current figure on the number
of hard drug addicts in the United States is a half million; based on
your New York figure, you would have more than half.
Senator JAVITS. I wouldn't say that. I hope and pray we don't have
half, but our figures are a little bit higher. There is a difference in
figures, but the order of magnitude is the same. If they have doubled,
more than doubled in 10 years or tripled in 10 years, I think the im-
pact on the country is the same. I don't challenge Mr. Ingersoll's
figures at all.
Senator SPONG. Senator Percy?
EMPHASIS SHOULD BE IN ITARD DRUGS
Senator PERcy. Mr. Secretary, I would reemphasize what Senator
Javits has said on the question of priority. We handled that legisla-
tion in the Government Operations Committee and affirmed that vir-
tually the entire emphasis of this should be in hard drugs. The last
figure I had-560,000-a tremendous figure now, far higher than the
quarter of a million we were talking about a relatively few months ago.
JOB DONE BY AMBASSADOR ARTHUR WATSON
I understand you mentioned in your testimony that Ambassador
Watson has done an outstanding job in France, and I did insert a
newspaper article in the Record some time ago that commented on the
job that he has done. What can we learn from his experience-how he
went about it, what he did that could be usefully employed as tech-
niques and approaches and procedures in other countries where we need
similar cooperation?
Mr. Rossmrs. I would say that he took seriously the President's and
Secretary of State's statement that this was the highest priority item,
No. 1.
The Ambassador, and I have talked to him personally about these
matters, told me he spent 75 percent of his time on this drug matter
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because he understood it, He came back and I remember talking to him
about it when he visited, He took a walking trip through Harlem and
the South Bronx in New York City, my home area; but what the
Ambassador did, and here is a businessman who came in as an
ambassador, his was the quiet technique, the effective technique, of
getting a job done.
He was not trying to be bombastic and make loud speeches of attack
and so on; he worked quietly day in and day out with French officials
on the highest levels, explaining and asking how to cooperate, and
very important, two things, to point out they had their own drug prob-
lem, and this is one of the major breakthroughs, that you cannot be a
major transit production place without having it seep off into your own
society, into your own culture.
Second, and very important, is that this is the kind of traffic that
everyone could be against and he capitalized on that point, the crim-
inal elements were reaping huge profits out of this and that this
affected other nations and other allies and here he was able to work
quietly day in and day out, but the intensity of his concern and if
this-and it is, I say-I am one to extol the virtues and accomplish-
ments of the State Department in this area-it has been unheralded.
You know everyone tries, wants to talk about Vietnam or SALT and
so on, but as I said earlier this problem, if it is as serious as we think
it is, and I have suggested to some of the people in the media to stop
the nonsense of sending someone for a 1-day visit to some of these
places. "If you want to do a job, if you are concerned about the drug
problem in New York City, and I don't know how many men you have
in Saigon but send a team to Turkey, to France, to Mexico, not for a
1-day visit, keep them there, and report day in and day out what
that country is doing." I, as a Government official, cannot be asking
every day what is France doing, what is Turkey doing, what is Laos
doing, but the newspapers can report it factually, report what is hap-
pening, what is being done, and not enough of that is being done.
But Ambassador Watson, in typical methods of diplomacy in his
own quiet, effective way, has transmitted to his own staff and to the
French officials the intensity of the problem and that has helped.
Senator PI:RCY. Well, having worked with him over a period of years
on a number of international problems and seeing him deal with the
International Chamber of Commerce's problems, I know he zeros in
on a problem, makes his' mind up as to a solution and if he can be part
of it, and he is effective, and I imagine what you are saying then is
that all of our embassies have to recognize that the President has
assigned priority No. 1' to this particular problem, and that it must
be implemented in the effort that we put in abroad.
WILL IRAN REPLACE TURKEY AS MAJOR SOURCE OF OPIUM?
Can you tell me a little about Iran? Is there any likelihood that
Iran will replace Turkey as a major source of opium after Turkey
imposes its total ban after this year?
Mr. RossIDEs. Probably not; probably not, because they have better
enforcement of production there. They had legal production; they
had gone out of legal production in the 1950's but then when Turkey
and Afghanistan continued the illegal production, they Mound out that
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drugs were being smuggled from those countries into Iran which has
a very large addict population. So the Iranian Government reinsti-
tuted the legal production for the addicts in Iran. For the older ones,
there are very strict procedures as to who gets the drugs, and they are
trying to curtail it that way. They have stated publicly and the offi-
cials have stated to me, and stated it publicly to the Shah, if Turkey
and all her neighbors go out of legal production, she will.
Now, Turkey has, as of the end of this week, banned production.
Our greater problem would be India, Afghanistan, and Pakistan.
Senator SPONG. Iran has been tough, if not tougher, than the Japa-
nese as far as penalties are concerned.
Mr. RossIDEs. Correct, Mr. Chairman. I forget the figure, but it is
a death penalty, and I forget whether 40 were executed last year.
Senator SPONG. More than a hundred have been executed, I believe,
since they enacted the stiff penalties. Excuse me, Senator Percy.
SENATOR SPONG'S TRIP DURING RECESS
Senator PERCY. It is all right. I subscribe to the Spong report and
I noticed with great interest the latest edition which shows the routing
of the trip you intend to take during our recess.
Senator SPONG. I will be glad to take you with us.
Senator PERCY. I can't go but I am delighted you are probing these
areas.
DISCUSSION BETWEEN SHAII OF IRAN AND PRESIDENT NIXON
Certainly the Shah has been most cooperative, and I am wondering
if there is anything you could say as to whether this was a subject
of discussion between His Majesty and the President when the Presi-
dent was there?
Mr. ROSSIDEs. Not really ; it was-I understand it was on the agenda ;
we recommended it; and I know the State Department did; but I
don't know what-if it was discussed. I am sure it was discussed but
I don't know what the substance of the discussion was.
Senator PERCY. But we really feel in Iran now adequate procedures
have been adopted to prevent Iran from becoming
Mr. ROSSIDES. The transit point.
Senator PERCY (continuing). A source of supply?
Mr. RossIDES. I believe so. On top of that, Senator, we are much
more concerned with our cooperative and other programs with the
surrounding countries.
Senator PERCY. Do you have an estimate of how many diplomats
have diplomatic immunity, how many employees of embassies come
into this country with diplomatic immunity?
Mr. ROSSIDES. I do not. I think the State Department representative
may want to comment on it. I don't know the figures, but let me men-
tion this, and we have been working with the State Department
about it in this area. There is abuse of the diplomatic immunity by
various individuals but it is a tricky and complex area; obviously, the
ambassador coming into a, particular country and he is the ambassador
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to that country, has diplomatic. immunity. What the degree is for the
people down the line is. another question. One of the major cases that
we in customs succeeder in uncovering was when a customs inspector
at JFK uncovered 170; pounds of pure heroin, and the person had
the diplomatic passport but he was not accredited to the United
States; it was the son of the Panamanian Ambassador to Taiwan,
a case you may recall. Ile had five suitcases and there was a technique
of having it in transit. When the inspector wanted to open it .up he
said, "I am in transit," and we said, "Sorry," and he took the chance
because he was not a technical expert on diplomatic immunity. We
said, "No," and he had no diplomatic immunity despite the fact that
he may have had a diplomatic passport.
We work with the State Department, and the State Department
has-my understanding is-talked with the various embassies quietly
and with various governments, to make sure that they will be as tight
and tough as they can about diplomatic passports.
Now, certain countries, and I didn't want to get into the names of
the countries, are very lax about this, and we are tightening up and
we give a much tougher; examination to a diplomat coming, or alleged
diplomats or persons who are alleging diplomatic immunity from those
countries, primarily a few in South America.
Senator Pnxc3-. I would like to have a figure from the State Depart-
ment as to how many people we are talking about that we have to be
concerned about if they have diplomatic immunity.
Are there known techniques? Can you tell me what we can do? In
other words, if a dog is sensitive by odor to the presence of the drug,
is it possible then for any procedure to be worked out without invading
diplomatic courtesy to then impound and hold in escrow a suitcase,
whatever it may be, until such time as proper authority is brought
from that country to open it and inspect to see if their employee is in
effect using diplomatic immunity to Smuggle?
Mr. ROSSIDES. Let me :submit for the record a memorandum in con-
junction with the State Department. We obviously have sensing de-
vices. If we have a sensing device, and there is something in a pouch
or bag, then the question is whether or not the diplomatic immunity
prevents our opening it. But we have a suggestion there that maybe
we can work out a procedure for those persons even if they have dip-
lomatic immunity so it is put on the side and not opened unless an
appropriate person from that country is present. It is a tough one;
historically every so often a major case stems from the use by diplo-
mats of that diplomatic iininunity.
(The information referred to follows:)
INFORMATION CONCERNING TIE GRANTING OF DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITIES TO REPRE-
SENTATIVES OF FOREIGN gOVERNMENTS AND TIIEIR PERSONAL BAGGAGE UPON
ARRIVAL IN THE UNITED STATES
(Supplied by the Department of the Treasury)
Under the provisions of items 820.10 through 820.60, Tariff Schedules of the
United States, free entry is accorded, upon the request of the Department of
State, to the baggage and effects of representatives and employees of foreign
governments and of cem taig public international organizations such as the
United Nations, their immediate families, suites and servants, whether accredited
to the United States or en route to or from other countries to which accredited.
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Free entry is also accorded under similar circumstances to baggage and effects
of diplomatic couriers, designated high officials of foreign governments and
distinguished foreign visitors and 'their immediate families, and persons desig-
nated pursuant to statute or treaties ratified by the United States Senate.
The privilege of free entry of baggage and effects does not necessarily entail
freedom from inspection. Sections 10.29(c) and (f) of the Customs Regulations
as presently in effect limit the granting of inviolability to the persons and bag-
gage of the foreign representatives listed below :
1. Ambassadors.
2. Ministers.
3. Charges d'affaires.
4. Secretaries, counselors, and attaches of foreign embassies and legations.
Ordinarily no distinction is made between those foreign representatives who
are accredited to the United States and those who are in transit to or from
other countries to which they are accredited.
The baggage of foreign representatives of classes other than those listed
above is subject to inspection. In the case of routine arrivals of persons carrying
diplomatic passports, however, there is little likelihood that any baggage ex-
amination will be made. The usual procedure in connection with such an arrival
consists of the prior submission by the Department of State to the Bureau of
Customs of a request for free entry and other privileged treatment for the ar-
riving foreign representative. The Bureau then screens the request and, if It
appears to be in order, approves it and so advises Customs officers at the port
of intended arrival. Unless Customs Officers at the port have a valid reason to
believe that the baggage of the arriving foreign representative contains contra-
band merchandise, no search will be made. Further, the baggage of the foreign
representatives listed in sections 10.29(c) and (f) of the Customs Regulations
is presently inviolable as previously stated. Diplomatic pouches are exempt from
examination, of course.
On the other hand, when a foreign representative arrives in the United States
unannounced, Customs officers at the port of entry examine his credentials (in-
cluding his passport and visa) and determine at that time whether he is entitled
to diplomatic immunity and exemption from baggage examination.
Personal baggage accompanying consular officers and their families is exempt
from examination pursuant to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations
unless Customs officers have serious reason to believe that it contains articles
other than for official or personal use, or articles which are prohibited importa-
tion or exportation under the laws or regulations of the United States. That
Convention has been ratified by the United States Senate.
At the present time, a task force within the Bureau of Customs is rewriting
and clarifying the Customs Regulations pertaining to the inspection of diplo-
matic baggage.
The following figures, provided by the Department of State, give the approxi-
mate number of foreign nationals resident in Washington who have diplomatic
immunity :
Attached to Embassies :
Diplomats ------------------------------------------------------ 11,700
Employees ----------------------------------------------------- 3,200
Attached to diplomatic missions to OAS:
Diplomats ----------------------------------------------------- 100
Dependents of diplomats----------------------------------------- 85
Total -------------------------------------------------------- 5,085
Excludes family members, for whom accurate statistics are not available.
Senator PEucy. How about our own? I wouldn't want to imply we
are just concerned about people from abroad coming to this country;
how about stopping it on military transport? I-Iow closely are we
watching this? And I must say, I have observed at Air Force bases the
laxity of import customs procedures, and we know, revealed in the
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Government Operations Committee, in those hearings on the Southeast
Asian problem that American personnel were using General Abrams'
plane to smuggle liquor in case lots.
Now, if they can bring in a hundred cases of liquor and get by with
it, certainly using military transport with the number of planes we
have got going back and: forth must be a tremendous temptation, par-
ticularly with the thousands of American forces that are dealing with
or are users of drugs, and the high incentive to bring it back in, not
only for sale but for their own personal use if they are on it.
,rfLITARY AND DRUGS
Mr. RossIDES. This is one of our major concerns and one of the major
reasons why we moved in as quickly as we did regarding the military
and drugs a year and a half ago.
Two aspects: One, I frankly would like to say a word and congratu-
late the Department of Defense on its drug-antidrug abuse efforts.
When we came in, the administration-the best pamphlet on drug
abuse, frankly, n-as in the Department of Defense. They were alert;
they were tryino to get out information to the troops and so on.
Now, when it it in December of 1969, the first really sizable evidence
of No. 4 heroin going to our troops in Vietnam, I am frankly surprised
the enemy had not tried to do that earlier, and then in 1970 a lot more,
in the summer of 1970 Much more. The Department of Defense moved
quickly on a number of fronts, but the one front we were involved in,
we immediately moved into a close customs-military working relation-
ship to develop the manpower; the military did a lot of the customs
work because we simply did not have the manpower, but DOD with
its amnesty program tied into a tough predeparture inspection of
troops coming back and their effects helped, in my judgment, to re-
duce a great deal of the drugs coming in.
I think the efforts of Pr. Jaffe, and the military personnel helped to
reduce the' percentage; but the key problem currently and for the fu-
ture is the, fact when you have over half a million Americans near
the closest source of supply of opium that obviously a certain percent-
age of the, fellows are going to develop contacts, techniques, proce-
dures, routes, and personal contacts, that could develop a source of
a smuggling route. This is why I said earlier that I felt that for the
first time we were a little ahead of the game. We estimate up to 10
percent, 5 to 10 percent of the heroin in this country comes from opium
produced in the Golden Triangle. The President and the Departments
of State, Treasury, Defense, and Justice, moved quickly and we now
have country plans and our Ambassadors are working actively with
these various countries. We have a long way to go, Senator, but for
the first time at least it is out in the open and we are moving.
Senator PERCY. I have no further questions.
SURVEY TAKEN IN II4LINOIS ON GOVERNMENT SPENDING
I would like just to comment on a survey that I took among my own
constituents in Illinois, .asking them two questions : "Where do you
think Government should cut its spending?" The space program was
ver high, and the military.
econd, "Where would you like to see Government increase its
spending?'' Way ahead of anything else was drug abuse control.
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I think one of the most popular bills we ever passed was the $800
million to combat drug abuse, and certainly everyone in the country
is recognizing that the high cost of crime, running in the tens of bil-
lions of dollars, is so directly related now to the fear they may have
in their own homes. Heroin use in the Chicago area is spreading to the
suburbs at a rate three times as fast as heroin use in our city areas, and
crime is following right with it.
I really feel that an outstanding job is being done but probably all
we can say is whatever we are doing is not enough.
Mr. ROSSI DES. Yes, sir.
Senator PERCY. I think we will certainly support ,all of your efforts
in tins area.
Mr. ROSSIDES. Thank you.
Senator PERCY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator SPONG. Senator Church, do you have any questions?
Senator CHURCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
TESTIMONY LAST YEAR OF PATRTCK MURPHY, NEW YORK CITY POLICE
COMMISSIONER
Last year, this committee had a hearing on international traffic in
narcotics. We considered a number of bills that were then pending
before the Senate, one of which in modified form was enacted into law
dealing with the sources of heroin in foreign lands and what this Gov-
ernment could do to discourage the production of illegal poppy and
the illegal tragic of heroin and derivatives. At that time, Nye had as
one of our chief witnesses the police commissioner of the city of New
York, Patrick Murphy, and I remember rather vividly his testimony.
He said:
I call for greater Federal efforts directed at the sources of illegal narcotics
abroad because law enforcement at our borders, as intensive, well financed, and
ingeniously equipped as it has been and promises to be, has not succeeded and
probably cannot succeed in substantially reducing the flow of illegal drugs into
this country. It is simply a physical impossibility to close our borders to the nar-
cotics traffic as long as opium and heroin are available abroad to the hordes of
parasites who consider the possibility of detection an acceptable risk to take in
light of the fantastic profits they can make. Often enough unfortunately they
succeed.
It has thus become obvious that no amount of money spent by local govern-
ments for narcotic enforcement can produce any substantial results while the
sources of heroin remain unmolested.
In developing that point, he described the United States as though it
were a sieve, the holes of which could not be plugged no matter how
much money we spent even if we finally put the Armed Forces of the
United States to constructive use such as trying to plug those holes.
Even our Army, he testified, would be insufficient. We talked about the
myriad of ways which heroin can be smuggled into this country no
matter how elaborate the efforts is to prevent it from happening.
Would you agree with that?
Mr. Rossinns. No, Senator, if you want me to elaborate I will be
happy to. I don't want to get into a dispute with our distinguished
commissioner in New York city. He is wrong; Japan has proven lie is
wrong about the question whether you can stop smuggling. You can
stop it; you have to have a total war and it includes not just
smuggling. If all you did was to depend on trying to stop smuggling,
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forget it, yon are not going to do it. If you allow a. foreign government
and foreign countries to produce it at will, to refine it at will, and
have a massive amount doming ill
Senator PERCY. But you see that was his point.
Mr. RossiDEs. No ; waits a minute ; if I may finish.
Senator PERCY. His point, as I understood it, was you have to reach
the sources.
Mr. RossIDES. Ile is wrong there, too. That was what I wanted to
get into.
Senator PERCY. You don't have to reach the sources?
MULTIDIMENSIONAL SUPPORT
Mr. RossDEs. You hale to have multidimensional support which I
believe the Preside 1)t-arid with the full support of Congress embarked
on earlier-and in my judgment, for the first time we are contending
with the smugglers; for the first time we are getting them to take a step
backward and it is-very quickly-on the enforcement end it is a sev-
eral pointed program. Crucial is the need to stop the smuggling but
also crucial is to get the various countries to do their job It is idiocy
to talk about the United, States doing in this area what we have tried
to do, say, in the military; it is not up to us to police the world on
heroin enforcement but It is up to us, and the State Department has
been doing this, to get France to contribute more people in its own in-
terest to enforce it. wh ich;they are doing.
So if France is havipg tough enforcement internally and at its
borders by customs, if Turkey is doing the same, if Mexico is doing
the same and we are doing the same at our borders and internally, we
can make the-we can put them out of business.
PROGRAM OF TOUGH TAX INVESTIGATION
Additionally, internally we have this program which I mentioned
earlier of tough tax investigation; we have over 718 under investiga-
tion now to take the profit out, but it has now been determined, and I
agree with you thoroughly, that the source, stopping the source, the
idea of putting in the amount of money that would be required for
crop substitution, is ludicrous. It was a misguided thought in the past
and has led us to most of the problems we have today because less
than 2 percent of the total production of opium would easily supply
all the U.S. markets. So what are we going to do, hop from one country
to another and another? But the effort and the agreement with Turkey
was historic and of substantial importance because Turkey was the
symbol and because she supplied about 80 percent of the opium that
came in as heroin for this, country.
My point is that
UNITED STATES PAYS TURKEY
Senator PERCY. But we, pay Turkey, do we not?
Mr. ROSSIDES. We have a program of crop substitution and effort
which, in my judgment, is a sound one; but that is it. In other
words
Senator PERCY. But we: pay Turkey, do we not?
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Mr. ROSSIDES. We have an agreement to assist them in a cooperative
effort.
Senator PERCY. Doesn't that involve money?
Mr. RossIDES. Yes.
Senator PERCY. Can't you answer my question?
Mr. RoSSIDES. Yes.
PROBLEM WITH OTHER COUNTRIES
Senator PERCY. All right. Now, having paid Turkey for doing it,
what kind of problem does this present with other countries,? Should
they ask equal treatment?
Mr. ROSSIDES. Yes, Senator, but my point is, that is why I stressed
the point that it was worth it in Turkey because they were the symbol
and they supplied most of the heroin. We are not-we have now told
these other countries we are not-"doing the same with you; it is your
job to police your own area," because here, Senator, in this area we
now have the opportunity; they are members of the U.N., with this
protocol they will have to do more and if we beef up properly our own
external and internal enforcement at the borders and internally we
may not have to rely on whether or not a particular country is not
cooperating because the rest of the world community will cooperate,
and with the force of public opinion we can do it.
Senator PERCY. But you just said that 2 percent is enough. So sup-
pose you get less than one or just one or two or three countries that
don't cooperate, then don't we still have the problem?
Mr. R0SSIDES. Yes, but then it would be easier to have the enforce-
ment against them. Say a particular country X, and there are one or
two that I don't feel are cooperating adequately, Senator, are transit
points, say; well, you can concentrate your enforcement capability there
so if any traffic is coming from those countries they are going to get a
very special review. The development of intelligence-you are going
to work in that particular area, so what I am trying to say is that for
the first time we are turning the tide but we are so far down and we
have a long way to go to get back up to where we were--Iam basically
optimistic ; I think we have turned that tide.
This committee can help not just in this protocol but in the amend-
ment passed last year about economic aid, for instance. My own feeling
is you just don't deal with a country on isolated points, but we now
have the statute which Treasury has been in favor of and Treasury
has felt this before, that if a country is not cooperating, what is the
sense of pouring millions into that country of any kind, whether it is
a grant or loan.
Senator PERCY. And the law now permits the President discretion
to withhold aid?
Mr. Rossini?s. Correct, but we need the spotlight put on these coun-
tries by the Congress and media more and more.
Senator PERCY. Why wouldn't it be a great help to take the profit
out of drugs?
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Mr. ROSSIDES. It would be.
Senator PERCY. Isn't that the tremendous magnet that makes the
whole system operate and makes it function through the underworld?
Mr. RossiDES. Correct, Senator, and this is one of the programs that
we at the Treasury are most proud of. The President initiated last
June of 1971, and we now have as of 11 months, June 1, 718 middle-
and upper-echeloi i drug traffickers in 38 States, 51 metropolitan com-
munities, under tough tax investigation and as of June 1 we collected
more cash than was appropriated.
Senator PERCY. But to take the profit out of it-that way you have
got to catch them, don't you?
Mr. RossiDES. No, no ; that is my point. You say catch them. We don't
have to catch there. The beauty of this is you don't have to catch them
with the drugs. 117-hat we do is we have a target selection committee
chaired by my office, composed of BNDD and the Bureau of Customs
and the IRS. We have target screening to get at their targets ; working
with the State and local police we get additional targets, and one case
I mentioned, in southern California, a major ring, the major ring in
southern California, for years the narcotics agents, Federal and State,
had been after there and we couldn't get the goods on them because
they can insulate themselves from the goods at the street level. When
we started this tax program we suddenly found out a lot of income
had not been reported and we indicted one of that group and are going
to be. indicting several more.. I say this is one of the most effective ways
to do this.
Senator PERCY. What I wanted to suggest was something much more
sweeping than this, a general availability to addicts through super-
vised clinics of free drug substitutes that would satisfy their craving
so they wouldn't be forced to turn to robbery to get the money to buy
drugs from the irnd?rworld. It seems to me that would be the most
direct and leffecti ve method of taking the profit out for the criminal
element and the pressure off of the addict.
Mr. RossmEs. Well, this is another part of the administration's pro-
gram, the rnultidirnensional approach on the research and rehabilita-
tion and treatment, more money for the first time ; before January
1969 it was zero -well, not zero but practically zero-the only two
States really doing anything were New York State and California
and for the first t ime I think it is $300 or $400 million appropriated in
the special !action passed by the Congress and the methadone program
is one the administration has been pushing. If you are talking about
methadone' as the substitute, fine; I don't profess to be a doctor but I
rely on my former boss, Senator Javits, when T was with him in the
Attorney General's office-I relied on Senator Javits and Governor
Rockefeller to say methadone is the way and the doctors I have talked
to, fine, that does not mean methadone for everybody.
Senator PERCY. I understand.
Mr. ROS IDES. That is,part of it but in the District of Columbia, in
Washington, D.C., earlier this year you may recall, Senator, the Wash-
ington Post, which has not been notoriously friendly to this adminis-
tration, had an article pointing out that for the first time heroin sup-
ply was down, the availability, but it said that for the first time the
treatment at clinics couldn't take the number that were coming but
they did a little bit later.
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. Senator PERCY. Yes, but this is what makes me think that there is
great promise in this clinic approach as a pressure valve
Mr. RossIDis. Oh, yes.
Senator PERCY (continuing). To give addicts an alternative to hav-
ing to deal with the criminal element, the underworld, and pay the
price, the profit that the underworld now realizes from victimizing the
heroin addict.
Senator SPONG. I was under the impression that Senator Church's
question was much more probing than just methadone. Consequently,
without reviewing what the administration has done, and what it
hasn't done, would you comment on the British system?
Mr. ROSSIDES. Right. Well, he said substitute, sir.
Senator SPONG. He did?
Mr. ROSSIDEs. Heroin maintenance is a myth. The British system is
moving away from it. The Vera Institute program, in my judgment,
is erroneous and counterproductive. There was a recent article in the
New York Times by one of the members of the editorial board-I can't
remember his name, and I would like to submit it for the record-who
had a detailed article pointing out those few who were advocating
heroin maintenance and had failed to reveal all the facts, and the
British were moving away from it; it would be a disaster to the blacks,
and it would be-I am not going to get into the medical aspects, but
I would like to submit one article because it is a very interesting one.
Senator SroNO. We would be pl eased to receive it.
(The information referred to follows:)
[Prom the New York Times. June 5, 1972]
FREE Fix FOR ADDICTS?
(By John A. Hamilton)
A free fix for junkies? An experimental program that gives heroin to heroin
addicts under the label of "research"?
Community leaders in New York City, where a scaled-down proposal along
this line is receiving renewed interest from the Lindsay administration, have
denounced the idea as "a cruel hoax" and as "colonialist-type thinking." The
nation's leading drug experts are also strongly opposed to the whole concept.
Dr. Vincent Dole of Rockefeller University, who developed the use of metha-
done in the treatment of heroin addiction, calls the thought of dispensing heroin
itself "insanity." Dr. Jerome Jaffe, head of President Nixon's Special Action
Office for Drug Abuse Prevention, notes the need to supply addicts with as many
as five shots of heroin daily and concludes that any heroin-dispensing program
would prove "a logistical nightmare."
One of the founders of the British system for treating narcotics addicts, Dr.
Richard Phillipson, shares these views. The British system rests on the treatment
of addiction as an illness rather than as a crime and, for a while, this treatment
consisted mostly of dispensing heroin to heroin addicts. Dr. Phillipson, who is
now with the National Institute of Mental Health in Washington, warns against
this nation's trying slavishly to follow his original model. He points out that
while some heroin is still dispensed in Britain, the British system recently has been
moving toward an increased use of methadone.
Nonetheless, despite all this, there are those who persist in advocating a heroin-
dispensing program for New York City. The Vera Institute of Justice has pre-
sented a formal proposal to Mayor Lindsay's Narcotics Control Council and
some members of this council are urging its implementation, linking the drug
problem with the crime problem and arguing that if addicts received free heroin
they would no longer rob to maintain their habits.
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Such an argument may now have special appeal to Mayor Lindsay. Out flat
emotionally after his futile Presidential foray, badly bruised in budgetary
scuffles with both the City Council and the Board of Estimate, the Mayor is re-
ported interested in launching new programs in problem areas that would at
least give the appearance of innovation and activity.
But the fear of crime, as real as it is, and the need for a mayoral initiative are
hardly persuasive reasons for'launching a heroin program in the face of commu-
nity and medical opposition. ' The proposal has serious flaws. It is said that
heroin is essential to "lure" street addicts into treatment programs, but the truth
of the situation in New York City is more the reverse. There are long waiting
lists of addicts unable to gain entrance into existing treatment programs, es-
pecially the more successful methadone programs. There is less a need for a
"lure" than for expansion of these programs. At Bikers Island and at the Tombs,
the Manhattan House of Detention, men behind bars plead with medical visitors.
"Hey, man," one said to Dr: Dole recently, "I'm in here now. I've been in here
before. I'll be in here again. I need to get into a drug program."
Dr. Dole told him that most 'programs were now full.
The methadone programs that Dr. Dole runs require funds. Any experimental
heroin program would drain away funds. Where methadone can be administered
once a day and addicts can be stabilized to hold jobs, heroin would have to be ad-
ministered more often and addicts would continue to suffer the "highs" and
"lows" that go with such addiction. The staffing of a heroin program would have
to be double or triple or more that of a methadone program. Again, a drain on
scarce funds.
Dr. Phillipson's "grave reservations" about giving addicts a free heroin fix find
support in the most recent figures made available by the British Home Office. As
of the end of 1970, these figures show that Britain had only 1,430 narcotics ad-
dicts, compared to the estimated 150,000 now in New York City. Of these addicts,
the Home Office figures show that only 183 were being maintained on heroin.
Another 254 were receiving a combination of heroin and methadone, while the
bulk, some 738, were receiving methadone alone. A remaining group of 255 were
listed as "therapeutic" addicts, having acquired their addictions from drugs
taken during illnesses or operations ; these were receiving a variety of other
drugs.
Thus, the free fix that the British now give addicts is not usually a free heroin
fix, as some advocates of a heroin program here seem to imply ; on the contrary,
the British are moving away from the use of heroin and toward the use of meth-
adone. The Vera Institute's proposal for a heroin experiment has a section de-
voted to a discussion of the Sritish system, but it somehow neglects to mention
either Dr. Phillipson or the figures from the Home Office.
Senator SPONG. Mr. Ingersoll did not touch on this subject today,
but lie made a speech earlier this month in California in which he
said substantially what you have just said, so I assume you concur in
his views?
Mr. RossiDES. I have not read his speech, but I have discussed this
with Dr. Jaffe, the medical adviser, and I concur definitely in that,
what you are referring to-Mr. Ingersoll's remarks and Dr. Jaffe's
position on this.
THRUST OF U.S. DIPLOMATIC EFFORT
Senator SPONC. I want to clarify several points in your replies to
Senator Javits and Senator Church. I think the Turkish experience
was a noble gesture on their part and a good thing on our part. But,
do you advocate giving any priority to this method of curtailing abuse
throughout the world?
Mr. RossIDES. Definitely not; that is correct, Mr. Chairman. I think
it was well worth it regarding Turkey because she supplied so much
of it here, but we .ire not about to be giving that kind of money to other
countries just because they raise opium. The thrust of our diplomatic
effort is to get each nation to meet its responsibilities to the interna-
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tional community, to protocols and conventions that they are part of,
and to their own people.
Senator JAVITS. Mr. Chairman, would you yield just one minute?
I would like to say that heroin maintenance is a big problem for us in
New York and I have thought it over very carefully and I have been
active in this field since 1955, when I was Attorney Generalof New
York, and I think in the totality our experience in this country, con-
sidering the black community and the poor community, I would now
be against it, especially with methadone as a very feasible alternative.
DEGREE OF SURVEILLANCE AND ENFORCEMENT BETWEEN MARIHUANA AND
HEROIN
Senator SPONG. Thank you.
Now, one other question. I am not sure that I understood your answer
to Senator Javits regarding the degree of surveillance and enforce-
ment between marihuana and heroin. Would you discuss that in more
detail?
Mr. IZossIDEs. What I meant is this, Mr. Chairman : We are concen-
trating on heroin so that if we had one man available and we have a
tip on marihuana and heroin it is not a close question. If we had 10
tips on marihuana and three on heroin, those three would be on heroin;
that is the thrust of it.
Along the border when a group is dealing with smuggling, as you
saw from the film the other night, it can be heroin and marihuana so
if we are tracking a plane we don't know whether it is heroin or mari-
huana, or an individual in a truck; that is my point. We seized 170,000
pounds of marihuana last year. The-se were major seizures along the
border, and in cars and trucks, 300-pound lots, 500-pound lots, but
we don't have the problem-I think the Senator is thinking more
about the internal part when the local police-you are not going to
be-you don't have the manpower to be worried about some kid that
has possession of some marihuana; you are going after heroin but at
the borders, we are stopping and investigating a smuggler.
Senator SPONG. You may have covered this in response to Senator
,Percy, but I want the record to reflect it fully.
Do all diplomats have courtesy of the port, i.e., do they enter with- -
out the customary inspection by customs officials?
Mr. ROSSIDES. No, sir; we will submit the differentiation as to who
does. Obviously, an Ambassador and obviously key officials and it
does not mean an ambassador traveling through the country; he has
to be accredited to that country. We will lay out those rules and it may
be a fruitful area which we are pursuing with the State Department,
maybe a fruitful area for further discussion with this committee.
(See p. 34.)
Senator SPONG. Thank you very much for your testimony this
morning.
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Mr. RossIDEs. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator SPONG. Mr. Beyans?
Mr. Bevans, we thank. you for being here. And, I thank you for
your patience. Because r. Ingersoll had to catch an airplane, we
allowed him to testify earlier, but I think the more logical proceeding
would have been to have beard from you first.
STATEMENT OF CHARL*S I. BEVANS, ASSISTANT LEGAL ADVISER,
DEPARTMENT OF STATE; ACCOMPANIED BY DONALD E. MILLER,
CHIEF COUNSEL, BUREAU OF NARCOTICS AND DANGEROUS
DRUGS; AND G. JONATHAN GREENWALD, OFFICE OF THE LEGAL
ADVISER, DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Mr. BEVANS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and other members of this
distinguished committee. It is a pleasure to appear before you. I think
the discussions this morning and statements made were most interest-
in. I am very glad to have with me this morning Mr. Donald E.
Miller, Chief Counsel of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous
Drugs. Mr. Miller was Alternate Representative of the United States
to the United Nations Conference at Geneva this year to amend the
Single Convention. Mr. Miller is at my right.
I also have at my left Mr. G. Jonathan Greenwald of the Legal
Adviser's Office of the Department of State who also was a member of
the U.S. delegation to the Geneva Conference in March of this year.
The Department of State- appreciates the opportunity to present
its views on the Protocol Amending the Single Convention on Nar-
cotic Drugs.
AMENDMENTS RESULT OF INCREASED DRUG TRAFFIC, EXPERIENCE UNDER
SINGLE CONVENTION
The amendments embodied in the protocol, which was submitted
L
to the Senate by the Presi
dent with his message of May 4, 1972, are the
result of the terrifying increase in illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and
nearly 8 years of experience under the Single Convention. The devel-
opment of the amendments and their adoption are a part of President
Nixon's all-out effort to combat the scourge of drug abuse.
U.S. DELEGATION TO U.N. CONFERENCE IN GENEVA
At the United Nations Conference held in Geneva March 6 to 24,
1972, which adopted the Protocol, the U.S. delegation was headed
by Ambassador Nelson G. Gross of the Department of State and, in
addition to other members of the Department, the delegation included
representatives of the lepartment of Health, Education, and Wel-
fare, the Department of Justice, the Department of the Treasury, the
Special Action Office for Drug Abuse Prevention and two congres-
sional advisers, the Honorable Ancher Nelsen and the Honorable
Charles B. Rangel.
The composition of this delegation reflects the representation of
both the legislative and executive branches of the Government in the
formulation of the amendments. The broad international interest in
the amendments and acceptance of their provisions is reflected in the
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sending by 97 States of representatives to the conference and by five
other States of observers.
ADOPTION OF PROTOCOL
. In adopting the protocol, 71 States voted in favor of it, none against,
and 12 abstained. Up to June 23, 47 States had signed the protocol,
ADMENDMENTS WILL BE OF SUBSTANTIAL VALUE
We believe that the amendments will be of substantial value in
stemming the flood of illicit traffic by strengthening the international
drug control machinery, assuring expert assistance to countries that
need it in controlling drugs, facilitating the prosecution of narcotics
laws offenders, and providing for national measures against the abuse
of drugs.
Along with these benefits, we believe the many consultations, dis-
cussions throughout the world and the debates in the conference that
led to the formulation and ado tion of the amendments have sharp-
ened a worldwide awareness ofpthe dangers of drug abuse, and have
impressed upon all nations the need for more effective international
cooperation, better national controls and more active efforts to prevent
the abuse of drugs.
Most of the amendments have for their purpose the strengthening
of the International Narcotics Control Board. Those amendments will :
(1) Increase the Board's present membership from 11 to 13; (2)
assure better continuity by increasing the term of office from 3 years
to 5 years, with a provision for staggered terms; (3) strengthen the
independence of its administrative staff; (4) assign the Board ex-
plicit responsibility for preventing illicit cultivation of the opium
poppy and the illicit production, manufacture and traffic in narcotic
drugs, and for limiting the legal cultivation, production, manufacture,
and use of drugs to the amount required for medical and scientific
purposes ; and (5) expand the types of information governments
are to provide the Board ; also expand sources of information beyond
that supplied by governments and organs of the United Nations to
include information supplied by the specialized agencies of the United
Nations-including WHO, among others-and by other intergovern-
mental or international nongovernmental organizations with special
competence in the drug field.
AUTHORIZATIONS AND REQUIREMENTS IN NEW AMENDMENTS
The new amendments will authorize the Board (1) to take action
not only where it has reason to believe that the aims of the convention
are being seriously endangered by the failure of any country to apply
the convention but also in cases where there exists evidence that a
country may become an important center of illicit activities regarding
narcotic drugs; (2) to take the initiative in proposing that a study
designed to develop remedial measures be conducted in a drug troubled
area by the government concerned in cooperation with the Board ; and
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(3) to recommend to competent United Nations organs or to special-
ized agencies that technical and financial assistance be provided a gov-
ernment to carry out its obligations under the convention.
The Board is not only authorized but is also required, where there
is a serious situation that needs cooperative action at the international
level, to call the matter 'to the attention of the Economic and Social
Council and the Commission on Narcotic Drugs with appropriate
recommendations. The council in turn may then draw the attention
of the General Assembly to the matter.
MEASURES EXPECTED TO INCREASE AUTHORITY AND RESPONSIBILITY
OF BOARD
One of the amendments creates a direct link by which, for the first
time, States will be able to pass timely information to the Board on
international illicit traffic and the Board will be authorized to take
remedial action.
The Board is also authorized to require a State to reduce its legal
production of opium when the Board considers that there is a link
between production of opium in that country and the international
illicit traffic.
These are the principal measures that are expected to substantially
increase the authority aid responsibility of the Board to curb excess
production, and manufacture of narcotic drugs and illicit drug
activities.
PROVISIONS ON EXTRADITION EXPANDED
The provisions on extradition in the Single Convention will be ex-
panded to include the substance of provisions embodied in the 1970
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft
(hijacking) to deny drug offenders a haven anywhere from prosecu-
tion. The amendments in this connection will rectify at one stroke the
gap in those of our bilateral extradition treaties which do not presently
cover narcotics offenses.
MEASURES REQUIRED OF PARTIES
The amendments requiring the parties to take measures for the
prevention and abuse of drugs by education, treatment, aftercare, and
rehabilitation of individuals as Is provided in the 1971 Convention on
Psychotropic Substances, and to consider, where appropriate, the
establishment of regional drug centers for scientific research and
other cooperation are considered to be of substantial importance.
EFFECTS OF RATIFYING PROTOCOL
The Department of State is convinced that the amendments in the
protocol will constitute an important improvement in international co-
operation and controls regarding narcotic drugs.
The Department of State is also convinced that ratification of the
protocol by the United States will encourage many other states to
ratify and bring into force at an early date the many improvements
that will be effected by entry into force of the protocol.
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The protocol carne into being within a relatively brief period as the
result of the initiative taken by the United States; other countries
will be expecting us to take the lead in ratifying it. Also, our ratifi-
cation of the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances, now pend-
ing in the Senate, would encourage approval not only of that con-
vention but also approval of the present protocol by other countries.
The Department of State hopes the Senate will soon give its advice
and consent to ratification of that convention and the Congress will
enact the implementing legislation required for its application.
For over 60 years the United States has been in a position of leader-
ship in the development and continually strengthening international
controls over drugs subject to abuse. We believe that leadership is
especially important at the present time.
The Department of State joins with the President in strongly re-
commending that the Senate give its advice and consent to ratification
of the protocol.
Senator SPONG. Thank you very much, Mr. Bevans.
PROSPECTS FOR WIDESPREAD RATIFICATION OF PROTOCOL
What are the prospects for widespread ratification of the protocol?
Mr. BEVANS. Mr. Chairman, we consider those prospects to be good.
We had a total of 97 countries participating in the conference directly,
with five others having observed there; 47 of them had signed at
the time we received the latest report, June 23, 71 voted to adopt it;
no one voted against the convention; 12 countries present abstained.
Senator SPONG. Why did 12 states abstain and can you tell me or fur-
nish for the record a list of the States that did?
Mr. BEVANS. We will be glad to.
Senator SPONG. Fine.
(The information referred to follows:)
TWELVE STATES WHICH ABSTAINED AT TIIE GENEVA CONFERENCE IN THE VOTE To
ADOPT TIIE PROTOCOL AMENDING THE SINGLE CONVENTION
(Supplied by the Department of the Treasury)
The twelve states which abstained at the Geneva Conference in the vote to
adopt the Protocol Amending the Single Convention were Algeria, Bulgaria,
Burma, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Hungary,
Mongolia, Panama, Poland, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, and the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics. Some of the states that abstained explained their
reasons for doing so.
Burma explained that it was in general agreement with the broad principles
underlying the amendments but abstained because it considered some would be
difficult to implement in the sensitive circumstances prevalent in Burma.
The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics explained that it abstained from voting
on the Protocol as a whole because it contained a number of provisions unac-
ceptable to it. It considered it inappropriate that the Protocol's provisions ex-
tended to States which were not parties -to the Convention, paricularly since
Article 40 of the Convention prevented a number of States from becoming parties.
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The USSR was also opposed to the granting of extensive powers to the Board
and objected to the Board's determining the drug requirements of States. It wel-
comed, however, the spirit of understanding and compromise which had led to
the adoption of an article on reservations which would enable reservations in
respect of a number of articles, in particular those which were not acceptable
to the USSR.
Bulgaria explained that it abstained for the reasons stated by the USSR.
Poland explained that it abstained because it could not understand the in-
sistence upon amending the provisions of the Convention with respect to the
powers of the Board regarding annual estimates of drugs ; that it opposed the
inclusion of an amendment giving the Board authority with respect to the amount
of opium that may be produced. It also stated that the fact that several coun-
tries had been prevented from attending the Conference was contrary to the
universal approach necessary for a successful fight against drug abuse.
Mr. BEVANS. In many; instances, the state that did not sign at the
Conference just had not, made up its mind at that time. It wanted to
study the protocol further.
witness:)
In other instances the Delegation was not provided with full powers by its
government which wished to reserve the option until it had studied the protocol.
Then, again, there are a few States which have not signed or adhered to the Con-
vention and they may not sign the protocol until they take that step.
Senator SPoNO. New ork kept doing that during the ratification of
the Constitution or something; they abstained forever. We would, for
the record, however, like to have a list of those which abstained. (See
p.47.)
SANCTIONS AGAINST NATIONS REFUSING COMPLIANCE WITH BOARD'S
RECOMMENDATIONS
Are there any effective sanctions against those nations which refuse
to comply with International Narcotics Control Board recommenda-
tions?
Mr. BEVANS. Mr. Ch{Iirman, we have considerably strengthened
those sanctions. We continue to have the recommendatory embargo.
We did not succeed in getting the mandatory embargo. We don't feel
that was a great loss because even though we have had the recom-
mendatory embargo provision in conventions for some 30 years, they
have never recow mended an embargo against any state. They have
considered it at times but they didn't find it necessary. They got action.
We do believe that by the formulation and negotiation of this
protocol we have aroused a worldwide interest, and we have taken the
leadership which will be. followed in faithfully applying the protocol;
but just leaving the protocol itself, we do not think, is going to be
enough. Like any treaty, you have to have the public officials and the
public back you up to have it enforced and we believe that that will
continue to exist.
PARTICIPATION IN PROTOCOL
Senator SPONC. I asked this question of Mr. Ingersoll and he re-
ferred it to you, so I will; repeat it :
There is a significant' disparity between the number of parties to
the Single Convention and the number of countries which have thus
far signed the protocol expanding the powers of the International
(The following information was subsequently supplied by the
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Narcotics Control Board. Do you attach any significance to this and do
you expect full participation in the protocol as well?
Mr. BEVANS. Yes, sir; I do expect full participation in the protocol.
We must remember it was just in March that this protocol was
adopted and it was It hardfought conference. We didn't get every-
thing we asked for but we accomplished a great deal and I am fully
confident that all the states party to the Single Convention will even-
tually become parties to this protocol.
Now, of course, the first 40, the required number to bring it into
force, are the hardest ones to obtain but once an international instru-
ment like this is brought into force, the momentum increases for ap-
proving it by ratification or coming in separately by accession.
Senator SroNG. So your answer is that you do not attach any
significance to the present disparity and you anticipate full
participation?
Mr. BEVANS. Yes, sir, I do.
Senator SPONG. All right, sir.
HANDLING TURKEY UNDER PROTOCOL PROCEDURES
In the case of Turkey, considerable expense is anticipated in adjust-
ing their economy from its reliance on opium production. How would
Turkey have been handled under the procedures provided by the
protocol had there been no other assistance and no other agreement?
Mr. BEVANS. We-Mr. Chairman-I do believe that we would have
had some progress in having Turkey improve her control of the drugs
there; but I don't think we would have been able to do it in time to
accomplish the objective which we believe we are accomplishing by
Turkey's having reached the decision to discontinue altogether the
production of opium. It is one of those matters, I think, very much of
time and I do not anticipate that this protocol is going to cure every
evil of the drug traffic and drug abuse. It is only one of many measures
but we consider it a very important one of the measures required.
Senator SrONO. The United States presently has bilateral drug
agreements with several countries, including France and Mexico. Does
the protocol either increase or diminish the need for such additional
agreements?
Mr. BEVANS. I would say in the course of time it would decrease the
need but I would say that it would not replace it altogether and I think
we are going to still continue to need such agreements at least until
the protocol enters into force and even after that I believe we will
need some, but I believe it will decrease that need, but I can't say it will
replace it.
Senator SPONG. The United States is scheduled to provide $35 mil-
lion to Turkey over several years for crop substitution and other ac-
tivities to curb poppy growth. Does the State Department believe
similar aid will be required for other countries which we hope to
induce to restrict production?
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Mr. BEVANS. Mr. Chairman, I think that depends very much on the
circumstances, upon the urgency of the particular case and whether
some other measures might be effective. The Bureau of Narcotics and
Dangerous Drugs is conducting a very intensive course of training
and supplying equipment and other materials like that to help coun-
tries to do better law enforcement in order to have better controls and
the like. So it is difficult to say ahead of time just what would have to
be done in a particular case.
The Turkish case, I think, was one of the most urgent cases and
required the action that was taken in the supplying of the funds.
Senator SPONG. Does the State Department have any reports on the
reaction of the Turkish people to the agreement banning poppy
production?
Mr. BEVANS. Well, the reports that I have seen have indicated that
they are going along with what their government requires of them. Of
course, whether they are Turks or whether any other people, farmers
are among the most conservative people in the world and when you
have generation after generation accustomed to growing a particular
crop it takes a good bit of doing to get them to change, but we are
optimistic about the program succeeding.
Senator SPONG. Is the United States currently negotiatinm drug
agreements with any other countries believed to be sources of illicit
drugs?
Mr. BEVANS. Well, when you ask if we are negotiating drug agree-
ments it would depend upon what particular kinds. We are negotiating
agreements to give technical assistance training for better policing and
better finding and locating of illegal cultivation of the opium poppy,
better customs inspection and the like. I am not aware of any other
country right now in which we are giving aid on a scale comparable
to that in the case of Turkey.
Senator SPONG. Are you including within the activities of technical
assistance, encouragement for growing crops that are alternative to
the opium poppy ?
Mr. BEVANS. Yes, sir. That would be very much along that line and
would bring our Department of Agriculture into the picture in assist-
ing with those matters.
Senator SPONG. Senator Pearson?
Senator PEARSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. I,evans, I want to compliment you and those who negotiated
this agreement for getting what you did. Of course, we never achieve
all of the goals in international conferences that we seek, but what
were some of the points of agreement that were considered to be of
major importance that were not subject to agreement? Where, may I
ask you, were your areas of disappointment?
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Mr. BEANS. Well, actually, we started out by seeking more than
we proposed during the conference. We had a team headed by Am
bassador Popper, our Ambassador to Cyprus, and Ambassador Jova,
our Ambassador to the Organization of American States, who con-
sulted with many governments to ascertain just what measure of agree-
ment might be reached at the Conference. As a result of those con-
sultations, our proposals were shaken down pretty close to what we
obtained in the Conference. We were asking for a mandatory embargo,
for example, and that was given Lip; we were asking for a particular
right of local inquiry which was transformed into a provision for on-
the-spot study. I don't think we lost much in these changes.
Senator PEARSON. You indicate that the amendments will strengthen
the International Narcotics Control Board and that the amendments
would further authorize the board to, for example, prevent the illicit
cultivation of the opium poppy and take action where there is reason
to believe that the aims of the conventions are not being seriously
carried forward. How are you going to do that? What is the im-
plementation ?
Mr. BEVANS. Well, we look at the system, how it works ; each country
is required to give an annual estimate of the amount of drugs that it
is going to require for consumption, the amount it is going to need to
manufacture other drugs and the like.
The country is also required to submit annually statistics on the
amounts of drugs it actually produced, imported and exported, con-
sumed, utilized in manufacturing other drugs and drugs seized. The
Board examines any disparity between the estimates and the statistics
and where it finds there is an excess of amounts in the statistics they
look into that and try to find out why it exists. If the statistics exceed
the estimates for the year the country concerned will be asked to cut
back that much in the next year unless it can show a good reason for the
increase. With respect to the production of opium, we have been able to
obtain in this Protocol a requirement of reporting on the amount of
opium that is going to be planted, on the amount that is expected to be
produced, so that the Board can look ahead and estimate better what
the world supply of opium is going to be for medical purposes.
Senator PEARSON. I wish you would put it in the record. That bell
is a vote.
(The information referred to follows:)
STATEMENT IN RESPONSE TO SENATOR PEARSON'S REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL DISCUS-
SION OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF TIIE ADDITIONAL AUTHORITY AND RESPoNSI-
BILITY GIVEN TIIE INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL BOARD
(Supplied by Department of State)
Article 2 of the Protocol amends Article p of the Single Convention by adding
to that article an additional paragraph reading as follows :
"4. The Board, in co-operation with Governments, and subject to the
terms of this Convention, shall endeavour to limit the cultivation, produc-
tion, manufacture and use of drugs to an adequate amount required for
medical and scientific purposes, to ensure their availability for such purposes
and to prevent illicit cultivation, production and manufacture of, and illicit
trafficking in and use of drugs."
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In its application of thg provisions of the above-quoted new paragraph 4 of
Article 9, the Board pray exercise the additional authority granted it in other
amendments to toe Single Convention. For example, under Article 6 of the Proto-
col the Board may take action not only on the basis of information submitted to
it by Government, under the. Single Convention or of information communicated
by United Nations Organs but also on the basis of information communicated to it
by specialized agencies of the United Nations or by other governmental organiza-
tions or international nom;-governmental organizations which have direct com-
petence in the matter. Thii; substantially broadens the Board's sources of infor-
mation for asking explanations from governments, making recommendations to
governments, or taking other action under the Convention. If the Board has
reason to believe that thq' aims of the Convention are being seriously endan-
gered by the reason of thg failure of any country or territory to carry out the
terms of the Convention, the Board may propose to the government concerned
the opening of consultations or request it to furnish explanations. Even if there
is no failure on the part of it country in applying the Convention, but it has be-
come, or there exists serious evidence that it may become, an important center
of illicit cultivation, production or manufacture of, or traffic in or consumption of
drugs, the Board may propose to the government concerned the opening of con-
sultations. These new provisions permit much earlier and broader action by the
Board in the taking of mea?ures to correct a dangerous situation before it becomes
too serious and to look into situations that it could not consider under the Con-
vention in the absence of the Protocol.
After taking such action the Board may, if it is satisfied that it is necessary
to do so, call upon the government concerned to adopt remedial measures as
would seem under the circumstances to be necessary for the execution of the
provisions of the Conventiop.
The Board may also under the amendments, if it thinks such action necessary,
propose to the government concerned that a study be carried out on its territory.
The Board may, at the request of the government concerned, make available the
expertise of one or more persons to assist the government in the study. If the
Board finds that the government concerned has failed to give satisfactory ex-
planations, or has failed to adopt any remedial measures which it has called
for, or if there is it serious situation that needs cooperative action at the inter-
national level with a view tp remedying it, it may call the attention of the parties,
the Economic and Social Council and the Commission on Narcotic Drugs to the
matter. It is required to do this in especially serious situations. The Council
may in turn draw the attention of the General Assembly to the matter. These
amendments will give the Board a considerable increase in authority to obtain
full information regarding a dangerous situation, supply expert assistance to a
country when needed, encourage a country to take necessary measures to curb
drug traffic, and provide, for the first time, consideration by the most represernta-
tive United Nations political organ when it particularly grave situation warrants
activity at that high level.
The Board may, when taking the above-mentioned measures, recommend that
the parties stop the import of drugs, the export of drugs, or both, from, or to a
country concerned, either fpr a designated period or until the Board is satisfied
as to the situation in the territory. Although never used, the authority to recom-
mend an embargo is considered to be an important residual power for use, or
potential use, in certain circ).xnrstances.
The Board may,, with the agreement of the government concerned, recommend
to the competent United Nations organs and to the specialized agencies that
technical or financial assistance, or both, be provided to a government to carry
out its obligations under the Convention. This is an important recognition-for
the first time in a drug control treaty-that simple police measures may not
always be enough and that in some instances a state that wishes to do a better
job may have a complex social and economic problem that the appropriate inter-
national bodies will have to assist it with.
If under Article 11 of the, Protocol the Board finds that a country has not lim-
ited the opium produced within its borders to licit purposes in accordance with
relevant estimates prnd that d significant amount of such opium produced, whether
licitly or illicitly, has been introduced into the illicit traffic, the Board may de-
cide to deduct all or a portion of such amount from its estimated production for
the next year in which suclj a deduction can be technically accomplished. If the
situation is not satisfactoriiy resolved the Board may take the measures men-
tioned above. This amendment gives the Board a clear mandate to take measures
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necessary to curb the production of opium where a clear link to the illicit traf-
fic has been established.
Under Article 5 of the Protocol the Board may, with the consent of a govern-
ment concerned, amend the annual estimates submitted by that government and,
in case of disagreement between the government and the Board, the latter may
establish, communicate and publish its own estimates for the information of
states dealing with that government. This provision, which is in addition to the
special power with respect to the estimate for production of opium, will have a
salutary effect in keeping estimates closer to actual needs for drugs.
The foregoing are the most important of the additional measures that may be
taken by the Board. With specific authority and responsibility for limiting the
cultivation, production, manufacture and use of drugs to an amount adequate
for medical and scientific purposes and a mandate to prevent illicit cultivation,
production and manufacture of, and illicit trafficking in and use of drugs, the
Board will be able to function far more effectively after the Protocol is brought
into force. The new powers are far-reaching and emphasize the need for gov-
ernments to be cooperative and activist in drug control. They rely to a consider-
able extent on high visibility public disclosure and discussion of serious prob.
Join situations. No state wishes to be considered soft on drug control and we do
not think any government will regard these powers lightly. We think, therefore,
that these powers and this Protocol will substantially increase the possibility of
meaningful action to implement the high aims of the Convention.
Senator SPONG. We will recess for 10 minutes while we go vote,
and we will then come back.
Senator Percy, would you like to ask questions now?
Senator PERCY. Mr. Chairman, did the bell just ring? I wonder if
it would be all right if I asked the three or four questions that I have?
Senator SPONG. You proceed and I will go vote and then come back.
Senator PERCY. Very fine. Thank you.
EXTRADITION PROVISIONS OF PROTOCOL
The questions I have, Mr. Bevans, deal, first, with the extradition
process.
Mr. BEVANS. Yes, sir.
Senator PERCY. I know this is a difficult one to negotiate in view of
the differing systems of justice that various countries have. Is there
any likelihood that the extradition provisions of the protocol would
be controversial enough to retard the pace of ratification?
Mr. BEVANS. I doubt it, Senator Percy, because the protocol provides
that the provisions therein on extradition are subject to the constitu-
tional limitations of a party, its legal system and domestic law. This
gives a country considerable leeway in deciding whether it can apply
those provisions. We feel tliat it supplies a workable framework which
would be available to any country that really wants to make a serious
effort to extradite and we believe the world interest is aroused to the
point where they are going to deny any haven to offenders of the nar-
cotics laws.
(The following information was subsequently supplied by the
witness:)
Furthermore, the language of the Protocol under which narcotics offenses are
to be deemed to be included in bilateral extradition treaties is taken from the 1970
Hijacking Conventions, which has already been signed by 81 countries and has
been ratified or acceded to by 36 countries and is presently in force.
Senator PERCY. From our standpoint, with what countries will this
provision prove the most useful ?
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Mr. B1 ANS. It would be the countries from which opium is flowing
into the United States or from which operations are conducted but
where our present bilateral extradition treaties do not cover narcotics
offenses, We would close this gap immediately once this Protocol is in
force and, although we are pursuing as fast as we can the amendment:
of our existing bilateral extradition treaties, that will require consid-
erable time and we don't know when we shall have all those treaties
amended.
PROCEDURES TO GET BOARD TO ORDER OPIUM PRODUCTION REDUCTION
Senator PERCY. What, procedures would a state have to take to get
the Board to order a reduction in production of opium? In other words,
could an approach by the United States alone bring about a reduction
order?
Mr. BEVANS. If the l?nited States found that there was evidence
of some other states piling up opium which might have a tendency
to seep into the illicit market, we could report that to the Board
and ask that something be done about it. The Board would be en-
titled to look into the situation and take appropriate action including
a reduction of opium production where circumstances warrant.
WOULD TREATY PRECLUDE DOMESTIC REFORII IN ATARIIIUAN I LAWS?
Senator PERCY. Now, my last areas may have been covered by previ-
ous witnesses before I was able to come in, but I think because of
your own responsibility, duplication here may be desirable, certainly
in view of Senator Javits;' concern also.
As I understand the treaty, it requires all parties to maintain do-
mestic criminal penalties against the use, possession, or trafficking
in marihuana. Now, as we know, we have had many commissions
which have taken positions on this. The President's Commission on
Marihuana and Drug Abuse recently recommended the elimination of
all criminal penalties for private use of marihuana. This approach
has been supported by the Le Dain Commission in Canada, two com-
mittees of the American Bar Association, the Committee on Crime
headed by John Finletter, former deputy director of the Bureau of
Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, and others.
My specific question is, would the treaty if ratified preclude this
domestic reform in the marihuana laws?
Mr. BEVANS. The provisions in the single Convention applicable
to marihuana must be q.onsidered in the light of the definitions at
the beginning of that Convention. Marihuana is a member of the
Cannabis family of plants. Cannabis is defined in article I of the con-
vention as meaning the flowering or fruiting tops of the Cannabis
plant (excluding the seeds and the leaves when not accompanied by
the tops), from which the resin has not been extracted and by what-
ever name they may be designated.
Then Cannabis resin ,is defined as meaning the separated resin,
whether crude or purified, obtained from the Cannabis plant; and
then we have the purified, plant defined as any plant of the genus
Cannabis.
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But in examining through those provisions, one will find the state-
ments regarding Cannabis are general; for example, article 28, para-
graph 3 of the Single Convention provides that the parties shall adopt
such measures as may, be necessary to prevent the misuse of and illicit
traffic in the leaves of the Cannabis plant.
Now, it seems to me that the misuse of the leaves is essentially in
this particular case a matter for national legislation but you would
be obliged to prevent illicit traffic in the leaves of this plant
Senator P1,,RCY. Well, just the usage, because I think this could really
be a hangup in our ratification of this treaty, if we could not remove
the use of marihuana from the criminal category.
Mr. BEVANs. May I ask my colleague, Mr. Miller?
Mr. MILLER. Senator, there is a paper that was prepared by a dis-
tinguished lawyer in Boston, William Chayet, for the National Coln-
mission on Marihuana and Drug Abuse. Ile conducted a survey of the
requirements of the Single Convention and he came to the conclusion
that the United States is not obligated under the provisions of article
36 to maintain imprisonment penalties
Senator PERCY. I am very sorry I am going to have to leave; other-
wise, I will miss this vote.
(The following information was subsequently supplied:)
ANSWER TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY SENATOR PERCY TO MR. BEVANS
Question: Would the protocol, if ratified, preclude domestic reform in the
marihuana laws? Despite the mounting evidence that mere users of marihuana
should- not be defined as criminal, would the Congress be barred by international
law from enacting the recommendations of theMarihuana Commission
Answer: The Protocol is compatible with the liberalizing trends in United
States drug legislation which reduce penalties on users as well as with the
further liberalizing trends with respect to marihuana recommended by the groups
you have mentioned.
The Single Convention, to which of course the United States is already a party,
requires the United States to adopt such measures as will ensure that production,
manufacture, export, import, distribution of, trade in, use and possession of can-
nabis or marihuana, as any other drug controlled by the Convention, will be liiii-
ited exclusively to medical and scientific purposes. It does not specify the precise
measures a party should take but it requires that activity in cannabis or mari-
huana contrary to the Convention "shall be punishable offenses when committed
intentionally, and that serious offenses shall be liable to adequate punishment
particularly by imprisonment or other penalties of deprivation of liberty."
The Protocol introduces significant additional flexibility into these provisions
by providing that "when abusers of drugs have committed such offenses, the
Parties may provide, either as an alternative to conviction or punishment or in
addition to conviction or punishment, that such abusers shall undergo pleasures
of treatment, education, after-care, rehabilitation and social reintegration . .
This provision would leave it to the discretion of the United States whether it
wished to provide criminal penalties for use of marihuana, perhaps including
imprisonment, or whether it wished to discourage misuse of the drug through
other means such as education. Ratification of the Protocol would thus increase
the range of options open to us.
Senator PERCY. I will submit my question for the record because I
think it should be answered. I have one other question.
Mr. BEVANS. May I give you a reply in writing?
Senator PERCY. Thank you very much indeed.
(Short recess.)
Senator SroxG. I apologize for that interruption, Mr. Bevans.
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Senator Percy did not complete his questioning. He will submit his
question to you for the record, which will be held open.
Mr. B'EVANS. Tank you, sir.
(The information referred to follows:)
ANSWER, TO QUESTION ~UBMITTED BY SENATOR PERCY TO MR. BEVANS
Question: The decisions as to which drugs should be controlled by the Psycho-
trdpic Convention, and on which schedule they should be placed, would be made
by the United Nations Coimmission on Narcotic Drugs, which is not a health or
scientific body. Can recommendations of the World Health Organization be
ignored by the Commission 2n favor of "economic, social, legal, administrative
or other factors"f
Answer: Recommendation communicated by the World Health Organization
to the Commission On Narcotic Drugs regarding controls over a. substance under
the Convention on I'sychotr?pic Substances can not simply be ignored by the
Commission. Although the (1ommission is empowered to make the.final deter-
mination whether a, particular substance with respect to which the Organization
communicates a recommend tion shall be controlled or the existing controls
over a substance shall be clanged, the Commission is required to take into
account, "the communication, from the World Health Organization, whose assess-
ments shall be determinativg as to medical and scientific matters."
Article 2 of the Convention, which provides in paragraph 4 for the making
by the Organization of assessments of substances and for the communication of
those assessments with recommendations regarding controls, provides in par-
agraphs 5 and 6 as follows :
"5. The Commission, taking into account the communication from the
World Health Organization, whose assessments shall be determinative as to
medical and scientific matters, and bearing in mind the economic, social,
legal, administrative anal other factors it may consider relevant, may add
the substance to Schedulf I, IT, III or IV. The Commission may seek further
Information .from the World Health Organization or from other appropriate
sources.
"0. If a notification i}nder paragraph 1 relates to a substance already
listed in one of the Schedules, the World Health Organization shall communi-
cate to the Commission Its new findings, any new assessment of the substance
it may make in accordance with paragraph 4 and any new recommendations
on control measures it nay find appropriate in the light of that assessment.
The Commission, taking, into account the communication from the World
Health Organization as under paragraph 5 and bearing in mind the factors
referred to in that paragraph, may decide to transfer the substance from one
Schedule to another or to delete it from the Schedules."
The above-quoted provisions were formulated and adopted on the basis of
many years of experience by representatives of governments in dealing with the
placing of drugs under international controls. The Commission on Narcotic
Drugs is composed of dedicated and conscientious individuals and their views
are based upon the advice of health authorities and other authorities of their
respective governments. Their views are very strongly health-oriented as is in-
dicated by the composition of the delegations participating in the twenty-fourth
session of the Commission. Thirteen of the twenty-four member states of the
Commission were represented by authorities of health agencies. Sixteen alternate
representatives and advisers were from health agencies. Twenty-five of the in-
dividuals participating had the title of doctor. It would seem unthinkable that
such individuals would not be sincere In taking into account the assessments
and recommendations of the' World Health Organization and be equally assidu-
ous In seeking to solve public health and social problems resulting from the
abuse of drugs. The decision's taken by the Commission with respect to controls
over psychotropic substances and over preparations containing those substances
are required by the Convention to be taken by a two-thirds majority of the mem-
bers of the Commission.
U.S. FOREIGN AID WHICH HAS GONE INTO DRUG PROGRAMS
Senator SPONG. I Would like, for the record, to ask you to provide
a i~ountry-by-country breakdown of the amount of U.S. foreign assist-
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;) I
anee which has hone into drug programs in the past 5 years. (See
p. 61. )
PARTICIPATION OF OTHER COUNTRIES IN INTERNATIONAL DRUG
EFFORTS
I would also like to ask you if there are other nations participating
in international drug efforts outside their borders. For example. are
other nations contributing adequately to the U.N. Special Fund for
Drug Abuse Control? Have other nations sent personnel into still
other nations to work on drug control?
Mr. BEVANS. Yes, sir.
Senator SPONG. Could you respond to the last question?
Mr. BEVANS. About whether they are adequately contributing to
the U.N.fund?
Senator SroNG. I asked : (1) if there are other nations participating
in international drug efforts outside their own borders; and (2) if
other nations are contributing adequately to the United Nations spe-
cial fund for drug abuse control ; and (3) if other nations have sent
personnel into other countries to work on drug control.
Mr. BEVANS. We have some figures here, Senator. I could read them
to you, if you wish inc to do so with respect to the U.N. fund that you
mentioned.
Taking our own contributions first, of $2 million, Canada, $150,000;
France, $100,000; the Federal Republic of Germany, $310,482; the
Holy See, $1,000; Morocco, $2,000; Saudi Arabia, $2,000; Sweden,
$20,790; Turkey, $5,000; Vietnam, $1,000; and then we have a non-
governmental figure, $6,830, which brings those contributions to
$2,099,102.
Senator SPoNo. Of which how much is Ours?
Mr. BEVANS. Ours is $2 million of that. Now, we have some pledges;
may I mention those? The pledges now made and existing are Canada,
$250,000
Senator SroNG. In addition to the amount they have already con-
tributed ?
Mr. BEVANS. Yes, sir. I understand that is additional. They have
given $150,000 and they have pledged an additional $250,000; Cyprus
$2,550; Greece, $2,000 ; Iran, $5,000; Italy, $101,350; Norway, for the
fiscal year 1973, $41,580; the United Kingdom, $1.25,000; which is a
total of existing pledges of $602,106.
Unspecified pledges of contributions have been made by Argentina
and Switzerland. India has offered to contribute expertise, training,
and educational facilities.
Senator SPONG. In addition to the moneys subscribed or pledged,
are there any nations participating in drug efforts outside their own
borders?
Mr. BEVANS. May I ask Mr. Miller if he will answer that?
Senator SPONG. Yes.
Mr. MILLER. I can try to address myself to that, Mr. Chairman.
There have been officers from France in the United States; in fact,
in the agreement that was worked out with France between the At-
torney General of the United States and the Minister of Interior of
France it was in the agreement for a French officer to be stationed in
the United States.
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Additionally, Mexican officers, frequently, from time to time, and
working in cooperation with U.S. officers in border areas come across
to assist in investigation. Likewise, the Mounties from Canada fre-
quently come into the United States helping us in a case; but insofar
as the concept of stationing officers in other countries is concerned,
this really is entirely a U.S. effort. Other countries have not engaged
in that type of program yet. We are now concentrating on having
schools in foreign countries training foreign officers on how to con-
duct drug investigations.:. Hopefully, the concept will spread.
Senator SroNc. Is Germnany doing anything beyond its borders?
Mr. MILLER. I have heard that Germany is working to some extent
in Afghanistan to help their police set up better law enforcement
measures generally, and included in that would be drug control efforts.
Senator Sro o. Mr. I~igersoll earlier this morning mentioned the
difficulties in Germany proper because of the federal structure of its
government. Do you share his view that there will be a national effort
in Germany in the near fjiture?
Mr. MILLER. Oh, indeed, I think it is well on its way.
Senator SPONG. Thank you very much, gentlemen.
Senator Percy will submit his questions and I will look forward to
anything documented that you want to give in response to a question
I put to you.
The hearing is adjourned.
(Whereupon, at 12:40 p.m., the hearing was adjourned, the commit-
tee to reconvene subject to the call of the Chair.)
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APPENDIX
Mr. CHARLES 1. BEvANs,
Assistant Legal Adviser for Treaty Affairs,
Department of State,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR MR. BEVANB : Pursuant to the hearing on June 27 before the Senate For-
eign Relations Committee on the Protocol amending the Single Convention on
Narcotic Drugs, 1961, I would appreciate it if you, on behalf of the Department
of State, would supply the following information for the hearing record :
1. A list of the countries with which the U.S. has bilateral agreements relating
to drug control.
2. A country-by-country breakdown of the amount of U.S. foreign assistance
which has gone into drug programs in the past five years, together with an indica-
tion of the specific purpose for which the funds have been used.
3. A listing of contributions by the U.S. and other nations throughout the
world to the United Nations Special Fund for Drug Abuse Control.
4. A summary of activities undertaken by other nations to curb the drug trade
outside their borders. (There is no need to include participation in the Single
Convention, since we already have a list of those nations.)
5. A summary of activities undertaken by the Department of State to restrict
the international flow of illegal drugs.
6. A list of the 12 nations which abstained from signing the Protocol.
7. A list of nations which are considered potential sources of illegal drugs but
which have not signed the Convention.
8. A country-by-country breakdown of the number of State Department per-
sonnel abroad engaged in drug control work with an indication of the exact
activities in which they are involved.
How do these personnel figures compare with similar figures for 5, 10 and
20 years ago?
9. In which countries have personnel in the Department of State been most
active in efforts to control drugs? Has this pattern changed over the past five
years, and do you expect it to change in the next several years?
1.0. Which diplomats have "courtesy of the port," i.e., which ones can enter
without the customary inspection by customs officials?
What evidence is there that diplomatic immunity is being abused with respect
to drugs? Are diplomats from one part of the world believed to be abusing diplo-
matic immunity more than those from other parts?
Thank you for your assistance on these matters.
Sincerely,
WILLIAM 13. SPONG, JR.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, D.C., July 14, 1972.
l:Ion. WILLIAM B. SPONO, Jr.,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR SENATOR SPONO: I thank you for your letter of June 29, 1972 requesting,
pursuant to the hearing on June 27 before the Senate Foreign Relations Com-
mittee on the Protocol Amending the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961,
that I supply on behalf of the Department of State certain information for the
hearing record.
(59)
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The Department of State 'appreciates this opportunity to supply in the en-
closures to this letter information on the following items set forth in your
letter :
1. A list of the countries with which the U.S. has bilateral agreements relating
to drug control. (Tab 1)
2. A country-by-country breakdown of the amount of U.S. foreign assistance
which has gone into drug iirogrims in the past five years, together with an
indication of the specific purpose for which the funds have been used. (Tab 2)
3. A listing of contributions by the U.S. and other nations throughout the
world to the United Nations Special Fund for Drug Abuse Control. (Tab 3)
4. A summary of activities undertaken by other nations to curb the drug trade
outside their borders. (There is no need to include participation in the Single
Convention, since we already have a list of those nations.) (Tab 4)
5. A summary of activities' undertaken by the Department of State to restrict
the international flow of illegal drugs. (Tab 5)
6. A list of the 12 nations. which abstained from signing the Protocol. (Tab 6)
7. A list of nations which are considered potential sources of illegal drugs but
which have not signed the Convention. (Tab 7)
8. A country-by-country breakdown of the number of State Department per-
sonnel abroad engaged in drug control work with an indication of the exact
activities in which they are i -volved.
How do these personnel figures compare with similar figures for 5, 10 and 20
years ago? (Tab 8)
9. In which countries have personnel in the Department of State been most
active in efforts to control rugs? Has this pattern changed over the past five
years, and do you expect it to change in the next several years? (Tab 9)
10. Which diplomats have' "courtesy of the port," I.e., which ones can enter
without the customary inspection by customs officials? (Tab 10)
What evidence is there that diplomatic immunity is being abused with respect
to drugs? Are diplomats from one part of the world believed to be abusing
diplomatic immunity more than those from other parts?
I hope that the enclosed information will be useful to you. If I can be of any
further assistance, please let ;me know.
Sincerely yours,
CHARLES I. BEVANS,
Assistant Legal Adviser.
WIIIC1 THE UNITED STATES HAS BILATERAI.
RE ATING TO DRUG CONTROL
Austria
Belgium
Bolivia
Cambodia
Canada
China, Republic of
Cuba
Czechoslovakia
Denmark
Ecuador
Egypt
France
Germany, Federal Republic
Greece
India
Italy
Japan
Laos
Mexico
Netherlands
Poland
Portugal
Romania
Spain
Switzerland
Thailand
Turkey
United Kingdom
Viet-Nam
Yugoslavia
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2. COUNTRY-BY-COUNTRY BREAKDOWN OF AMOUNT OF U.B. FOREIGN ASSISTANCE
WHICH HAS GONE INTO DRUG PROGRAMS DURING THE PAST FIVE YEARS
AID assistance in narcotics control'
Thousands
Fiscal year 1967: Turkey, agricultural development and control loan____ $3, 000
Fiscal year 1970:
Mexico, Enforcement equipment (grant) ----------------------------- 1,000
Fiscal year 1972:
0
Vietnam -------------------------------------------------------
0
5
Public safety-----------------------------------------------
450
Customs advisers--------------------------------------------
50
Customs survey--------------------------------------------
16
Drug abuse research----------------------------------------
30
BNDD program '--------------------------------------------
1,000
Laos -----------------------------------------------------------
1,100
Public safety advisers and equipment------------------------
107
Customs advisers and equipment-----------------------------
514
Treatment and rehabilitation--------------------------------
111
Special narcotics investigation group (equipment) -------------
66
Program support including project manager, Air America Inspec-
tion Service, Air Support, Communications------------------
302
Turkey --------------------------------------------------------
15,700
Foreign exchange compensation______________________________ 5,000
TMO-Collection final crop--------------------------------- 300
Agriculture Development including Agricultural Advisers----__ 10, 400
Philippines : Public Safety including advisers, equipment and participants 230
Bolivia: Bolivia narcotics brigade budget support--------------------- 19
Argentina: Customs training in United States ------------------------ 12
International organization : U.N. Special Fund for Drug Abuse Control'- 000
Interregional costs-------------------------------------------------- 25
Total -------------------------------------------------------- 20,632
1 Training in narcotics control has been a regular feature of the Office of Public Safety
Police Academy in Washington since 1902. Additionally, as part of AID's regular public
safety program, narcotics advisory assistance had been provided to Vietnam prior to fiscal
year 1972.
2 Funds transferred to another U.S. agency for Implementation.
NOTE.-Additionally the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD)
regularly conducts training programs for foreign officers. Since 1968 BNDD has
given intensive drug enforcement training to approximately 2,000 law enforce-
Dient officers from 56 foreign countries, including the areas of Africa, East
Asia and the Pacific, Europe, Latin America, the Near East and South Asia.
13NDD estimates the total expenditure for this 5-year program to be nearly
$500,000.
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3. CONTRIBUTIONS BY TILE U.S. AND OTHER NATIONS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD TO THE
UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL. FUND FOR DRUG CONTROL
Contributions Paid
--------------------------------------
United States------------
$2,000,001,
-
Canada --------------------------------------------------------
150,000
France ---------------------------------------------------------
100,000
Germany, Federal Republi --------------------------------------
310,482
Holy See----------------------------------------------------
1,000
Morocco -------------------------------------------------------
2,000
Saudi Arabia---------------------------------------------------
2,000
Sweden --------------------------------------------------------
20,700
Turkey --------------------------------------------------------
5,000
Vietnam -------------------------------------------------------
1,000
Nongovernmental -----------------------------------------------
6,830
Pledges
Canada ----------------------------------------------------------
$250, 000
Cyprus -----------------------------------------------------------
2,550
Greece -----------------------------------------------------------
2,000
Iran --------------------------------------------------------------
5,000
Italy ------------------------------------------------------------
101,350
Norway ---------__ --
---------------------------------------------
74, 620
Sweden (Fiscal Year 1973) -----------------------------------------
41,580
United Kingdom---------------------------------------------------
125,000
NOTE.-In addition, India has offered to contribute expertise, training, and
educational facilities.
4. SUMMARY OF ACTIVITIES UNDERTAKEN BY OTHER NATIONS TO CURB THE DRUG
TR{1DE OUTSIDE THEIR BORDERS
I
Outstanding example of drug control cooperation with the United States by
other nations-Canada, France, Mexico, Thailand, Turkey, and others-are set
forth in "United States Foreign Policy 1971, A Report by the Secretary of
State" (see Tab 5, paragraphs 8-16).
Thirteen other nations sept top-ranking pollee officials to a two-week seminar
sponsored in Washington in September 1971 by BNDD together with the narcotic
control agencies of France z}nd Canada. The participants discussed all aspects of
the international drug traffic and the means of combatting it.
The meeting in Canberra, Australia, in November 1971 of regional enforce-
ment officers was a first step' toward increased regional cooperation on efforts to
cope with the growth, production and trafficking in illicit drugs in Southeast
Asia. Australia, Cambodia, 'Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, New
Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Viet-Nam partici-
pated in that meeting. The t7.S.A., the United Nations and INTERPOL were rep-
resented by observers.
The contributions and pledges to the United Nations Special Fund for Drug
Abuse Control by 16 other:countries in addition to the U.S. and the offer by
India to contribute expertise, training, and educational facilities (see Tab 3) are
further examples of activities that should assist in curbing the illicit drug trade
outside their borders.
In 1971 President Pompidou of France submitted to the United Kingdom and
other European Community Governments a proposal to promote greater co-
operation on drug abuse and illegal drug traffic among those governments, which
is being acted upon by the Community.
The Federal Republic of Germany has assigned men to Afghanistan and
Turkey to assist in police training, including drug control.
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5. SUMMARY OF ACTIVITIES UNDERTAKEN BY THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE TO RESTRICT
THE INTERNATIONAL FLOW OF ILLEGAL DRUGS
(The following, with minor modifications, is taken from "United States
Foreign Policy 1971, A Report of the Secretary of State")
The Department of State is the primary agency for coordinating international
controls over drugs. Its activities to restrict the international flow of illicit drugs
are being conducted on many fronts.
Assigning the drug problem high priority among foreign policy issues, the
Department last August appointed at the Assistant Secretary level a Senior
Adviser to the Secretary and Coordinator for International Narcotics Matters,
son G. Gross.
Drug Control Coordinators have been designated for the Department's re-
gional and functional bureaus, and in July the regional bureaus began setting
up Interagency Narcotics Control Committees with representation from State,
A.I.D., Justice, Treasury, Defense?yJA, and USIA. Drug control officers have
also been designated at most of our nussions to coordinate the Country Team
efforts abroad.
In August, the President further strengthened the Department's role in dealing
with the foreign supply and international trafficking in drugs and narcotics by
establishing the Cabinet Committee on International Narcotics Control under
the chairmanship of the Secretary of State. Other members of the Committee
are the Attorney General; the Secretary of Defense ; the Secretary of the Treas-
ury ; Ambassador George Bush, U.S. Representative to the United Nations ;
Agriculture Earl L. Butz.
Specifically, the Cabinet Committee will : (1) develop comprehensive plans and
programs for drug control; (2) assure the coordination of all activities of inter-
national scope; (3) evaluate all such activities and their implementation; (4)
make recommendations to the Director of the Office of Management and Budget
concerning funding of activities; and (5) make periodic reports on the progress
of its operations to the President. The Cabinet Committee is supported by a
Working Group composed of high-level personnel from each of the member agen-
cies plus the Special Action Office for Drug Abuse Prevention. After three in-
formal meetings, the first formal meeting of the Cabinet Committee was held on
September 28 and the second on December 1G. The subgroups have met dozens
of times.
A major project initiated by the Cabinet Committee is the preparation of
narcotics control action plans for more than 50 countries considered to have a
current or potential involvement in the production, processing, consumption, or
transiting of illicit hard drugs. The focus is on world supplies, trafficking, and
smuggling of heroin and cocaine destined for the U.S. market or U.S. personnel
abroad. The action plans include a description of the drug situation, a statement
of goals, the strategy to achieve such goals, estimated costs, priorities, and a
general timetable for implementation. These plans are being forwarded to For-
eign Service posts to serve as a basis for opening discussions with host govern-
ments for the negotiation of bilateral narcotics control action programs.
One of the principal international goals of the United States is an end to
opium production and the growing of poppies. The development of effective sub-
stitutes for the opium derivatives, particularly codeine, which is now used for
medical purposes, would eliminate any valid reason for opium production. In
the interim, because there are still indispensable medical uses for opium, and
because production of the opium needed for medical purposes is a legitimate
source of income in some countries, we are pressing ahead with programs (1) to
develop synthetic substitutes for opium derivatives, (2) to assist countries in
their efforts to end illicit drug processing and trafficking and illegal opium pro-
duction, and (3) to make national and international control more effective.
A major effort is being mounted in the law enforcement field. Intelligence
gathering on international narcotics trafficking has been strengthened, and all
appropriate law enforcement arms of the U.S. Government--the Bureau of Nar-
cotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD), Bureau of Customs, and Public Safety
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Division of A.I.D.-are stpping up their activities abroad. These efforts have
already begun to yield results. Information furnished by French authorities in
cooperation with American agencies led to the seizure of the equivalent of over
two tons of heroic in 197 ;. liopg Kong police, in cooperation with our BNDD,
seized over 12,000 pounds of opium in 1971 compared with 95 pounds in 1970.
On a day-to-dai basis, the U.S. Government is proceeding both bilaterally and
multilaterally against the illicit drug traffic and the supplies that feed it. Bi-
lateral cooperation has been closest with Canada, Mexico, France, Turkey, and
other countries which havg special relationship with us or to the problem of
drug control as it affects ul. Collaboration with Canada and with Mexico is espe-
cially important because of our common frontiers.
A Franco-American Intergovernmental Committee on Drug Control has been
meeting periodically to review the cooperative arrangements and to discuss how
to improve them. At the invitation of the Americans and French, Canadian rep-
resentatives from the Royal Canadian Mounted Police have also participated in
the work of the Committees since November 1970. The primary objective of this
trilateral cooperative effort is the discovery and closing of heroin conversion
laboratories in France and the interception of the illicit heroin traffic to North
America. An agreement signed with France in February 1971 provided for
French agents to operate in the United States and for U.S. agents to operate in
France. The success of this cooperative effort has been demonstrated by substan-
tial heroin seizures made >y French and American police.
The Governments of the United States and Mexico have been collaborating in
narcotics trafficking programs since 1969 when a Joint Working Group was es-
tablished. Our cooperative effort has resulted in the seizure and destruction on
Mexican soil of large quantities of narcotics and psychotropic substances aimed
at the illicit market.
On June 30, the Prime 1Vtinister of Turkey announced that the production of
opium would be banned in that country. A decree specified that production will
be restricted to four provinces for the fall 1971 planting, and that complete
abolition of opium production will go into effect when the crop is harvested in
June of 1972. Since that a nouncement, two additional steps have been taken
by the Government of Turkey. The first was the passage in August of a strict
opium licensing and control law. Secondly, the Turkish opium monopoly has
completed purchases of opium gum from the 1971 harvest. The collection of 149
tons, which was more than double the previous year's 61 tons, was larger than
any annual collection in the past eight years and represents a significant re-
duction of leakage into illicit channels.
In response to the Turkish decision to ban opium production, the U.S. Govern-
ment sent a high-level mission headed by the Secretary of Agriculture to Turkey
to provide technical advice on agricultural and agro-industrial development in
the area where poppy growing will be eliminated. We have assured Turkey of
our readiness to provide fipancial assistance to help prevent foreign exchange
losses from legitimate exports of opium gum and poppy products and to help
establish development activities in the affected areas.
The agreement with Turkey was particularly significant since it will remove
the major source of opium for heroin marketed in the United States. We are
interested in similar cooperative arrangements with governments of other coun-
tries along the illegal trade route which runs from the Middle East through
Europe to North America, and increasingly through South America.
We are also seeking cooperative plans with the governments of countries
in Southeast Asia where there is substantial illegal or uncontrolled production
of opium. That is the area to which the illegal traffickers will turn increasingly
as existing sources of supply in 'the Middle East are closed to them. Two major
accomplishments can already be cited. On September 28, 1971 the United States
and Thailand signed a Meviorandum of Understanding by which the two coun-
tries pledged mutual action against the supply and trafficking of illicit nar-
cotics and dangerous drugs. Of equal significance, on November 15 the Lao
Government implemented a narcotics law which for the first time in Laotian
history prohibits the growing, processing, trading, and use of opium and the
opiates. These actions will form the basis for cooperative efforts between the
two countries and the United States to combat the drug problem in Southeast
Asia and reduce the flow of heroin.
In Vietnam the United States is fully supporting the Vietnamese Government's
anti-smuggling and narcotics campaign to prevent drug abuse by Vietnamese and
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Americans alike and eliminate Vietnam as a transshipment point for narcotics
to the United States. Among our forces, U.S. military authorities in Vietnam
are also applying vigorous control measures to the same end.
In the international field we have been working multilaterally, within the
United Nations and other international organizations, and within the framework
of the international drug control system established and operating under treaties.
International efforts to bring opium and other narcotics under effective control
have a long history and have in fact been successful in controlling the legal
manufacture of narcotic drugs for medical use. Although world requirements for
morphine have increased more than five times since the 1930's, there is no evi-
dence of any substantial leakage to the illicit traffic from the licensed factories.
Now the challenge to the international control system is to bring the illegal and
uncontrolled production of narcotic raw materials under equally effective con-
trol and similarly to extend control over psychotropic or so-called mind-bending
substances.
? The United States, which produces a large percentage of the psyychotropic
substances entering the illicit drug traffic, joined with 22 other nations on Feb-
ruary 21, 1971, to sign in Vienna a Convention on Psychotropic Substances. This
is the first international instrument for the control of such substances as the
hallucinogens (including LSD), amphetamines, barbiturates, and tranquilizers.
On June 29 the President submitted the Convention to the Senate for its early
advice and consent to ratification.
In March 1972 the United States Delegation, headed by Mr. Nelson G. Gross,
the Senior Advisor to the Secretary of State and Coordinator for International
Narcotics Matters, and Mr. William I. Cargo, Director of Planning and Coordi-
nation, and including other members of the Department of State, together with
representatives of the Departments of the Treasury, Justice, and Health, Edu-
cation and Welfare, took a leading part in the adoption of the Protocol Amend-
ing the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961, which is now pending before
the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification.
6. NATIONS WIiICII ABSTAINED FROM SIGNING TIIE PROTOCOL AMENDING TILE SINGLE
CONVENTION ON NARCOTIC DRUGS
Twelve of the nations which participated in the Geneva Conference at which
the Protocol Amending the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs was adopted in
March 1972 not only abstained from signing the Protocol at the Conference but
also abstained on the vote to adopt the Protocol. Those twelve nations were Al-
geria, Bulgaria, Burma, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cuba, Czecho-
slovakia, Hungary, Mongolia, Panama, Poland, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Repub-
lic, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. However, Panama subsequently
signed the Protocol in New York. Colombia, Finland, and Israel, which also par-
ticipated in the Conference, have subsequently signed the Protocol in New York.
Other nations which participated in the Conference and have not yet signed
the Protocol are Afghanistan, Australia, Austria, Burundi, Canada, Ceylon,
Dahomey, El Salvador, Gambia, India, Iraq, Ireland, Jamaica, Japan, Kenya,
Korea, Kuwait, Laos, Libya, Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger,
Nigeria, Pakistan, Poland, Portugal, Saudi Arabi, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singa-
pore, Switzerland, Thailand, Tunisia, and Uruguay.
It should be noted that signature of such an international agreement has
essentially symbolic significance. States which sign do so subject to ratification.
Those which do not sign may nonetheless accede to the agreement. In many cases
a State prefers not to sign but to study the agreement in its capital and then
make the decision whether to become a party to the agreement in the course of its
ratification procedure. Signature of an international agreement, on the other
hand, is a pledge to submit that agreement to a State's ratification procedure
but does not prejudge the decision that may be reached therein. We know that a
number of states which have not yet signed the Protocol feel favorably about it
and, in some instances, cosponsored the amendments with the United States.
7. NATIONS WHICH ARE CONSIDERED POTENTIAL SOURCES OF ILLEGAL DRUGS BUT
WHICH HAVE NOT SIGNED TIIE SINGLE CONVENTION ON NARCOTIC DRUGS
The following nations are potential sources of illegal drugs, either as producers
or as stations on the illicit traffic route. Depending upon illicit traffic develop-
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inents, other nations may become sources as well : Bolivia ; Colombia ; Laos ;
Nepal; and Singapore.
8. COUNTRY-BY-COUN'T'RY BRE4KDOWN OF NUMBER OF STATE DEPARTMENT PERSONNEL
ABROAD ENGAGED IN DRUG CONTROL AND INDICATION OF EXACT ACTIVITIES IN WIIICII
THEY ARE INVOLVED
Each U.S. diplomatic mission has designated a Drug Control Coordinator.
In the countries named it the attached list, for which Narcotic Control Action
Plans have been or are beir+g developed, the Coordinator will be devoting all or
a major part of his time to drug control efforts.
In the following countries where drug control Is critical for U.S. policy ob-
jectives, several officers are;actively involved in and give substantial portions of
their time to drug control matters including the Chief of Mission, the Deputy
Chief of Mission and the Chief of Political or Economic Section, as well as at
least one other mission offic r : Paraguay, Panama, Mexico, Turkey, Afghanistan,
Thailand, Laos, Viet-Nam, Surma, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy
and Canada.
This engagement of States Department personnel abroad in drug control work
has taken place during the past year and reflects both the extent of the drug abuse
problem in the United States and the U.S. Government decision to make drug
control internationally a high priority foreign policy objective.
NARCOTICS CONTROL ACTION PLANS
Africa.-Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya.
Ncar ]East and tio~uth Asia.-Afghanistan, India, Iran, Lebanon, Pakistan,
Turkey, Nepal, Ceylon, Isragl, Greece, Egypt.
Latin America.-Mexico, Panama, Colombia, Bolivia, Chile, Paraguay, Peru,
Jamaica, Argentina, Brazil,; Ecuador, Uruguay, Venezuela, Guyana, Barbardos,
Bahamas, Netherlands Antitles.
Europe.-Prance, Germany, Italy, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Romania, Austria,
Spain, England, Denmark, Sweden, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Switzerland, Bel-
gium, Canada.
East Africa and Pacific.--Burma, Cambodia, Laos, Philippines, Thailand, In-
donesia, Viet Nam, Ilong Kong, Singapore, Korea, Malaysia.
0. COI?NTRIES IN WHICII PER91ONNEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE HAVE BEEN MOST
ACTIVI IN EFFORTS TO CONTROL DRUGS
State Department personnel abroad have been most active in cooperative efforts
for drug control in the following countries :
Turkey Laos
France Paraguay
Mexico Panama
Federal Republic of Germany Burma
Italy Viet-Nam
Thailand
This pattern has been established during the past year. In June 1971 the
President made drug control, a high priority foreign policy objective of the United
States. In August 1971 the President established the Cabinet Committee for Inter-
national Narcotics Control. Since that date narcotics control action plans have
been developed for about 60 countries (see list under Tab 8).
It is expected that this pattern will continue during the next several years.
Subject to budgetary and personnel resources made available, the Department
of State is prepared to maintain and, if required, to intensify these efforts.
10. DIPLOMATS WHICH HAVE THE "COURTESY OF THE PORT", E.G., THOSE WHICH CAN
ENTER WITHOUT TIIE [ USTOMARY INSPECTION BY CUSTOMS OFFICIALS
All diplomats accredited to the United States, those accredited to other coun-
tries transiting the United States, and those accredited to the United Nations are,
under the present United States Customs Regulations, permitted entry without
examination of personal effects. Those regulations are, however, presently being
redrafted with a view to egnforming them with the tenets of the Vienna Con-
vention on Diplomatic Relations which permits the inspection of personal bag-
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gage of a diplomat if there are serious grounds for presuming that it contains
other than articles for official use of the mission or for his personal use or mem-
bers of his family or articles whose import or export is prohibited by law.
There is evidence that diplomatic immunity has been abused by some holders
of diplomatic passports, especially by ones other than those referred to above.
There have been a few actual instances of abuse by diplomatic agents but it
would be difilcult to conclude tact those from any one part of the world are
abusing diplomatic immunity more than those from other parts.
lion. EUGENE T. RossiDES,
Assistant Secretary of the Treasury,
lVash.ington, D.C.
DEAR MR. RossiuEs : Pursuant to the June 27 hearing on the international
drug situation before the Senate Foreign. Relations Committee, I would appreciate
having the following questions answered for inclusion in the hearing record :
1. How many official points of entry into the U.S. are there and how do you
determine how to allocate your resources among these points?
2. Through which points of entry do you believe the major portion of the
heroin conies? Where have your largest seizures taken place?
3. Has the entrance pattern been consistent throughout the last K to 10 years,
i.e., are most of the drugs coming in through one section and has this been
true over a period of time, or has there been a change in the pattern?
4. Please provide, for the record, a breakdown of the location of your agents
dealing with drug control and seizures. Please compare this with the location
of such agents for drug-related purposes 5, 10, and 20 years ago.
Thank you for your assistance.
Sincerely,
TIIE DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY,
Washington, D.C., July 28, 1972.
DEAR SENATOR SPONO : In reply to your letter of June 29, 1972, I am submitting
the answers to the four questions you posed, plus some additional information
which may be of assistance to you.
For your information and guidance in evaluating the following answers, you
should be aware of the distinction between the various types of customs officers.
Customs Inspector.-Uniformed officer stationed at all normal points of entry
to examine passengers, baggage, cargo, and vehicles entering the United States.
(3348 current strength)
Customs Patrol Officer.-Uniformed or plainclothes officer who patrols the
waterfronts and airports to detect those who might attempt to circumvent nor-
m.al inspection channels. (606 current strength)
Special Agent.-Plainclothes officer who conducts the investigative work in an
effort to be prepared to apprehend the smuggler when he arrives, or identify
and arrest those who have penetrated the customs barrier. (1012 current
strength)
Question 1.-How many official points of entry into the United States are there
and how do you determine how to allocate your resources among these points?
Answer.-At the present time there are 297 official ports of entry into the
United States as well as 74 official stations, making a total of 371 official points
of entry. Within the larger ports are numerous administratively-determined loca-
tions at which Customs Inspectors are located to clear passengers and/or
merchandise into the country. In large ports this could be a bridge, highway, or
tunnel, an airport, a rail station, a ferry dock, a marine terminal, or any com-
bination of these facilities. The number of Customs personnel that are assigned
to various ports and stations depends upon the quantity of merchandise, number
of carriers, number of passengers, hours of service required, and distance to the
next Customs port or station along the land border or coastline. Such complex
considerations make determination of manning level dependent upon individual
consideration of each port's particular traffic patterns and location.
Question 2.-Through which points of entry do you believe the major portion
of the heroin comes? Where have your largest seizures taken place?
Answer.-We believe that the major entrance points for heroin are New York
City and Miami, Florida. Our intelligence reports that large amounts of heroin
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68
are also being smuggled into the United States in vehicles crossing our Southern
borders from Mexico and in cargo shipments from vessels coming in at our large
seaports.
We have made two fairly large heroin seizures from vehicles crossing our
Southern border in the past two years and have made three large heroin seizures
from cargo shipments in the past five years.
Our largest seizures ov yr the past two years have been from
(a) Contrabandista aircraft flying the South America/Miami route;
(b) Trapped automobiles from many European ports to Canada, Mexico,
and eastern seaboardycities, mostly New York and New Jersey ; and
(c) The son of it toreign diplomat who used his status to clear heroin-
loaded suitcases at Miami and New York.
Question 3.-Has the entrance pattern been consistent throughout the last 5 to
10 years, i.e., are most of ,the drugs coming in through one section and has this
been true over a period of,time, or has there been a change in the pattern?
Answer.-During the past 5 to 10 years, patterns have changed from the tradi-
tional "mule or courier" 1 ody carrying or using false-bottom suitcases arriving
in the United States froi;li Europe direct to the eastern Seaboard or through
Canada or Mexico. Today large organizations ship 50 to 100 kilograms at a time,
are well-financed, always have controllers on the scene, and when they are ar-
rested are much more in4ined to cooperate than the couriers of the past.
Most of the large heroi seizures in the past were made in New York City or
its environs. This is still true today, but Miami personnel have made some very
large seizures during the past two years.
Enclosed are records of {najor heroin seizures over the past two years. You will
note that most of the seizures originating in Europe or South America are large
seizures, the small ones are from Southeast Asia or from Europe to Canada in
false-bottom suitcases.
Question 4,-Please provide, for the record, a breakdown of the location of your
agents dealing with drug control and seizures. Please compare this with the loca-
tion of such agents for drug-related purposes 5, 10, and 20 years ago.
Answer.-We believe you are most interested in our Special Agent positions in
question four, but we have also added our present disposition of CPO's. Since
over the period of years offices have been added and deleted, we have grouped the
figures by major geographical areas.
1972
1952
1962
1967
1972
CPO's
Northeast (New York, Boston, Baltimore, Rouses Point, etc.)- _
52
86
94
231
317
Southeast (Atlanta, Miami, New Orleans, San Juan, Virgin
Islands, etc.)
16
30
38
146
160
Southwest (Houston, San Antonio, EI Paso, New Orleans, San
Ysidro,etc.)---------------------------------------------
57
41
55
324
33
West coast (Los Angeles, San Francisco, Honolulu, Anchorage,
Seattle, etc.)---------------------------------------------
24
62
32
178
78
Midwest (Chicago, Detroit, Buffalo, etc.)----------------------
20
17
69
98
18
Foreign ----------------------------- i ------------------
12
23
15
35
----------
Total______________________________________________
181
259
303
1,012
606
[The present complement of CPO's is a marked reduction in the numbers we previously had. The chart depicts the
smuggling potential today by comparing entries and arrivals to the number of CPO's)
Vessel arrivals ----------- ------------------------------------------
59,000
53,000
51,000
Aircraft arrivals -------------------------------- ------------------
68,000
167,000
308,000
Passenger arrivals ------------------------------------------------
3,900,000
4,731,000
13,698,000
Formal entries
1:086,000 1,086,000
1,476,000
2,773,000
Number ofpatrolofficors__
1,650
550
606
We believe that the effect of the patrol officer is to either force the smuggler
to go through normal channels where he is vulnerable to the Customs inspector,
or to lay more detailed plans which are time-consuming, costly, and make him
more susceptible to discovery through investigation by the special agents.
I
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I sincerely hope that the above information is adequate for your needs. Should
any further questions arise, please let me know.
Sincerely yours,
SIGNIFICANT HEROIN SEIZURES IN UNITED STATES AND CANADA JULY 1970 TO
PRESENT
A. Bulk shipments of heroin moved from South America to U.S. via Contra-
bandista Aircraft.
B. Bulk shipments direct from V ranee to the New York area in Automobiles.
C. Bulk shipments from France and Spain to San Juan, Mexico, and Canada in
Automobiles later driven across the borders.
D. Bulk shipments from South America and Europe in suitcases carried by
Diplomats.
E. Bulk shipments on cruise ships to the Caribbean and on to South Florida and
other U.S. ports.
F. Small shipments from Southeast Asia via APO, MAC, and Body Carries.
Quantity
Data (pounds) Smuggling method employed Country of departure
Miami, Fla_________________ July 29, 1970
4
Courier/suitcase ---------------- _ Curacao.
Da_ Oct. 20, 1970
94
Private air---------------------- _ Paraguay.
Toronto, Canada ------------ Nov. 28, 1970
22
Suitcase ------------------------- Frankfurt.
Montreal, Canada ---------------- do____-__
18
-----do------------------------- Paris.
Miami,Fla_________________ Dec. 12, 1970
40
Unknown_______________________ Unknown.
Do------------------------do-------
210
Cargo air_______________________ Paraguay.
San Juan, P.R-------------- Jan. 18,1971
58
----- do ------------------------- Dominican Republic.
Forth Monmouth, N.J-------- Apr. 5, 1971
17
Official mail --------------------- Bangkok, Thailand.
New Jersey ---------------------- do -------
97
Automobile____________________ Le Havre, France.
Honolulu, Hawaii____________ May 16, 1971
4
Thermos jugs, suitcase----------- Hong Kong.
Miami, Fla ------------------ May 22, 1971
155
Cargo air_______________________ Buenos Aires.
San Juan, P.R-------------- May 29, 1971
246
Automobile --------------------- Bilbao, Spain.
Montreal, Canada___________ June 22, 1971
110
___do_______________________ Le Harve, France.
J. F.K. Airport, N.Y--------- July 8, 1971
156
Suitcase, diplomat_Panama.
Toronto, Canada____________ July 15. 1971
4
Suitcase ------------------------ Italy.
Laredo, Tex________________ Aug. 26,1971
24
Automobile tires________________ Mexico City.
New York_________________ Sept. 14, 1971
206
Automobile_____________________ France/via England.
Do____________________ Sept. 22, 1971
186
do_________________________ Genoa, Italy.
Do____________________ Sept. 29,1971
69
Suitcase, Braniff baggage switch-- Chile/Argentina,
Paraguay.
Do------------------ Oct. 6, 1971
39
Cargo, oil paintings ------------- Argentina.
Sacramento________________ Nov. 11, 1971
3
Mail, APO______________________ Thailand.
Travis AFB_________________ Dec. 30, 1971
17
Cargo, military airlift Do.
Miami, Fla_________________ Jan. 3,1972
238
Laundry bags, cruise ship -------- France.
Do____________________ Jan. 10, 1972
147
-----do------------------------- Do.
Honolulu, Hawaii____________ Jan. 26, 1972
18
Courier, body___________________ Singapore.
New York__________________ Jan. 27, 1972
86
Unknown, possibly champagne France.
boxes.
Miami, Fla_________________ Apr. 5, 1972
22
Seaman courier_________________ Hong Kong.
New York__________________ Apr. 26, 1972
18
Teakwood chests________________ Do.
Detroit, Mich _________-____ May 10, 1972
5
Housesearch _ __________________ Unknown.
New York__________________ May 11, 1972
2.2
Lancia automobile, imported Le Havre, France.
July 1, 1970.
Do____________________ May 16,1972
264
Military footlockers -------------- France via Belgium.
Seattle_____________________ May 24, 1972
10
Molded oriental plaques _ Damascus, Syria.
Douglas, Ariz_______________ May 26, 1972
6.8
Vehicle door panels -------------- Mexico.
Blaine, Wash_______________ June 12,1972
18
Stereo speakers_________________ Hong Kong via Vancouver,
8.C.
New York ------------------ June 27, 1972
4
Housesearch____________________ Hang Kong.
Do____________________ July 4,1972
6.5
Suitcases_______________________ Bangkok.
COCAINE SEIZURES
AUGUST 1970 To DATE
A. Bulk shipments of cocaine moved from South America to U.S. via contra-
bandista aircraft and in household effects.
B. Couriers traveling from South America to U.S. via commercial air and vehicle
make probes at numerous Ports of Entry.
C. Seaman couriers oil Chilean and Columbian vessels continue activity.
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70
Quantityy
Date (pounds) Smuggling method employed
J. F. K. Airport, ------ N.Y-------- Aug. 8,1970
2% Body carry_____________________ Argentina.
D___________________ Aug. 20, 1970
o
41/ Suitcase ------------------------ Chile,/Mexico.
Miami,
Fl a__-- Sept. 2;1970
4
----- do -Colombia.
Dulles Airport ------------ __ Oct. 5,1970
26
Comm. Air, Sec ----------------- Do.
Do__________________ Oct. 7 1970
8'/a-----do------------------------- Do.
Hoboken,N.J----- Oct. 12 970
6% Vessel_________________________ Chile.
Miami, Fla--------------- -_ Oct. 14 1970
34 Diplomat suitcase --------------- Do.
Norfolk, Va----- .------- -_ Oct. 22,;1970
4 __do ------------------------- Do.
J. F. K. Airport, N.Y------ _ Nov. 11, 1970
13- Smuggler's vest ----------------- Do.
Miami, Fla____,_______Nov. 14, 1970
12
Suitcase ------------------------ Peru.
J. F. K. Airport, N.Y_____. _ Nov. 18,1970
8
----- do_________________________ Peru, Colombia.
Do__-___________ _ Nov. 21,;1970
5
Crew cemm,'Air----- _________ Colombia.
Miami, Fla______________ _ Dec. 4,1970
88
Cargo air_______________________ Peru.
Tampa, Fla_____ Dec. 7,1970
34
Vessel__________ Chile.
J. F. K. Airport, N.Y______ _ Dec. 10, 1970
11
Suitcase________________________ Bolivia.
Honolulu, Hawaii_____ __- - Dec. 11, 1970
8
__-__do------------- ----------- Colombia/Mexico,
Sidney.
Miami, Fla________________ Jan. 20; 1971
16
Suitcase ______________ Chile.
Laredo, Too-------------- Feb. 14;1971
12
Rental vehicle___________________ Unknown via Mexico.
Mexico City Airport- Feb. 16,:1971
17
Suitcase________________________ Chile.
Do____________________ Feb. 19,1971
4
-----do--------------- --------- Do.
Do___________________ Feb. 21,1971
9
----- do ---------------------- Do.
Do -------------------- Feb. 22;1971
18
-----do------------------------- Do.
Do ---- -----do- -----
4
----- do ----------------------- Do.
Miami, Fla ----- --------- _ Feb. 24,'1971
10
In-transit baggage switch--------- Unknown via Panama.
St. Thomas, V.1 - ______ Mar. 14,;1971
9
Suitcase________________________ Peru via Trinidad.
New Orleans,La--------- - _ Mar. 23,1971
9
Tables via air cargo- Chile.
Baltimore Airport_______ - Apr. 20, 1971
7-'
Girdle, precleared_______________ Ecuador via Nassau.
Los Angeles Airport-____._ _ Apr. 27,11971
23
Body carry____________________ Colombia.
Philadelphia Piers -------- - - May 5, 1971
2j
Body carry and crew quarters-____ Chile.
Miami Airport___________ May 17,.1971
2
Body carry ___-______----------- Colombia.
New York piers ----- -_. _ May 18,1971
5%
Body carry and crew quarters----- Peru.
San Antonio Airport ------ May 23; 1971
2
Body carry_____________________ Do.
Miami Airport______________ May 30,1971
2
-----do------------------------- Colombia.
Do_________________ _ June 5;1971
2
Coffee cues____________________ Do.
Los Angeles Airport___ __ _ June 9,1971
7
Suitcase________________________ Mexico.
Do________________ _ June 10,1971
6-'
-----do------------------------- Do.
Do_________________ -- June 2251971
I
Body carry____________________ Colombia.
Miami Airport____________ _ June 26, 1971
5
Suitcase_______________________ Costa Rica.
New Orleans, La ---------- ______do_,_____
4% -----do ---.. -------------------- Nicaragua.
Miami Airport June 281971
3 -----do------------------------- Peru.
San Ysidro, Calif----------- July 3,1971
2j Body carry --------------------- Maxico.
Tucson -------------------- July 29,1971
3
Car, under front seat ------------- Do.
Nogales__________________ Sept. 7,1971
2%
Car Do.
Miami Airport_____________ Sept. 11, 1971
2%
Body cary_____________________ Ecuador.
New York_ __.- Oct. 6;1971
19%
Cargo, picture frames _ Argentina.
Los Angel3s Airport_ ------ Oct. 15; 1971
4%
Body carry, purse --------------- Peru.
J.F.K. Airport- ---------- -- Nov. 11, 1971
5/
Body carry____________________ Chile.
Los Angeles Airport ------ Nov. 21
1971
I
Wooden statues in suitcase ------- Bolivia.
,
J.F.K. Airport, N.Y-------- Dec. 4,1971
10
Suitcase-- --------------------- Spain.
SanYsidro,Calif. - ___ _ Dec. 8,1971
4% Car/spare tire
Mexico.
Los Angeles Airport______ ------- do _______
3 Bodycarry ---- __-_
__________ Colombia.
San Juan Airport_______ _ - Dec. 11, 1971
1 Body carry, shoes in suitcase_____ Do.
J.F.K. Airport, N'.Y--------- _ Dec. 23,.1971
4% Body carry_____________________ Chile.
San Juan Airport ---------- _ Jan. 9,1972
3 -----do ----- __________________ Colombia.
Miami Airport______ __ Jan. 13, 1972
54 Household effects/air freight------ Chile.
San Juan Airport --------- _ Jan. 23,1972
1 Purse________________________ Colombia.
J.F.K. Airport, N.Y----------- Jan. 27,1972
6% Suitcase________________________ Ecuador.
SanYsidro,Calif. - _______ - Jan. 28,1972
2% Body carry--------------------- Mexico.
Los Angeles Airport____ _ Feb. 1,1972
11 Body carry, suitcase_____________ Peru.
J.F.K. Airport, N.Y-------- - Feb. 2,1972
10 Suitcase______________________ Colombia.
Miami Airport_________ _ Feb. 4,1972
23 Aircraft spare parts______________ Do.
Do______________ __ Feb. 10;1972
4 Body carry Do.
J.F.K. Airport, N.Y_----- _._____do----- _
4 Courier overcoat_________________ Panama.
Do________________ Feb. 17,1972
6 Body carry_____________________ Colombia.
Miami Airport ----------- Feb. 25;1972
6'/?-----do------------------------- Ecuador.
San Juan Airport----------------- do_ _..___
1 -----do------------------------- Colombia.
Port Newark, N.J--------- _ Mar. 6,1972
I Body carry, seaman Do.
J.F.K. Airport
N.Y
------ --
do
4} 11 pairs of shoes
Do
-
,
----
___--
Morehead City, N.C----- ____ Mar. 8 1972
,
-----------------
.
4Y2 Seaman's quarters Do.
Niagara Falls, -------- N.Y---------- Mar. 10
1972
2Y2 Floorboard auto, teddy bear------ Canada.
J.F.R. Airport, -------- N.Y----------- _Mar. 12,1972
2 Trousers pockets in suitcase______ Ecuador.
Miami, Fla --------------------- do -------
.3 Envelope in hand_______________ Do.
Do__Mar. 29,1972
4.6 Looseleaf binders ------ . ________ Colombia.
Do-- --------------- Apr. 5?1972
6.6 Sides, false-bottom suitcase___-__ Do.
Houston, Tex_ _ _ Apr. 12;1972
2.5 False sides, suitcase and men's Do.
shoes.
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Quantity
Port of entry Date (pounds)
Smuggling method employed
J.F.K. Airport --------------- May 4, 1972 7
Girdle, body carry --------------- Panama.
Do____________________ May 7,1972 2.5
Hollowed-out book covers-------- Colombia.
Do ----------------------- do ------- 2.5
----- do----------------------- Do.
Miami, Fla ------------------ do____- 2
-----do -------------- Do.
New Orleans Airport------------- do_______ 9
False-bottom suitcases and Do.
Miami Airport ------------------- do------- 1.5
hollowed-out book covers.
Religious pictures-- ___. ------- Do.
Do -------------------- May 9,1972 .5
Hollowed-out packet- ----------- Do.
Detroit May 10,1972 4
Housesearch Unknown.
Miami Airport-___.-------- May 12, 1972 13
Private aircraft ------------------ Colombia.
Los Angeles/San Ysidro_____ May 16,1972 8
Vehicle doors ------------------- Mexico.
Los Angeles Mailroom_____._ May 17, 1972 2.2
Hollowed-out book -------------- Colombia.
New York Pier 2------------ May 18, 1972 17
Bags on rear of hi-boy ----------- Unknown.
Miami Airport -------------- May 19, 1972 9.4
Suitcase atairport _ ------------ Do.
Do____________________ May 25, 1972 1
Shoes__._--__________________ Colombia.
Do ------------------------- do ------- 1.5
-----do------------------------ Do.
Do ------------------------- do_______ 2.6
Body carry_____________________ Do.
2.2
Do---------------------do
----- do ---- ----------------- Do.
J.F.K. Airport, N.Y May 26,1972
1.0
Manila envelope_________________ Do.
Miami Airport____________ May 28,1972
4.6
Body carry Do.
Miami, Fla________________ May 30, 1972
6.6
Body carry (2)__________________ Do.
Detroit, Mich ___..----------- May 31, 1972
10.3
Convoy, search in house Colombia via Miami.
New York ----------------- July 4,1972 5.5
Body carry--------------------- Colombia.
Ilan. JOHN E. INGERSOLI,,
Director, Bureau of Narcotics amid Dangerous Drugs,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR MR. INGE10SOLL : Thank you very nnrch for taking the time frout your
busy schedule to testify before the Foreign Relations Connnittee on June 27.
As I indicated at that time, I have several questions which I would like to have
answered and included in the hearing record
1. In testimony about a year ago before the Senate Appropriations Counnittee,
you noted that 50 to (10 tons of opium could satisfy the addict population of
the ITS. You also noted, however, that Pakistan illicitly produced an estimated
175 to 200 tons annually, that Afghanistan may produce 100 to 125 tons and
tint the Golden Triangle area of Burma, Thailand and Laos way provide tts
much as 1,000 illicit tons. In your testimony today you indicated that (5.5 to 10
tons of heroin are consumed annually in the U.S. Are the figures of last year
and this year comparable after conversion has taken place? What artunuit of
space is required to grow this amount of opium?
2. For the record, could you provide us with a country-by-country estimate of
illicit opium production in the current year and compare this with estimated
production in these countries 5, 10 and 20 years ago? Also, for the record, could
you provide the basis for the estimate?
3. For the record, could you provide us with a country-by-country breakdown
of where narcotics control agents are currently stationed and where such agents
(from predecessor agencies) were stationed 5, 10 and 20 years ago?
4. Do you have a current estimate of the total amount of heroin entering this
country? Where does most of it originate? What is the basis for this information?
5. How much heroin which was destined for U.S. consumption has been seized
in 1971 and 1972? Where did the major seizures take place? Is it possible to
determine where this heroin originated?
0. What kind of shifts in this geographical pattern of heroin trafficking can
we expect in response to our expanded enforcement effort?
7. What is the going street price of heroin today? Who profits from the heroin
trade?
S. The international drug traffic has developed largely since World War 11.
Could you give us a brief history of such development, touching on major
traffickers, routes, successes and failures of efforts to curtail the trade?
Again, thank you for your assistance.
Sincerely,
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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
BUREAU OF NARCOTICS AND DANGEROUS DRUGS,
Washington, D.C., August 2, 1972.
CAROLYN FULLER,
Legislative Assistant, Office of Hon. William B. Spong, Jr., U.S. Senate, Wash-
DEAR CAROLYN This is in response to Senator Spong's request for additional
information for the record of the recent hearing on June 27 in connection with
the proposed amendments to the Single Convention.
I apologize for the tardyresponse, but the breadth of the material and the press
of other duties has occasioiied some delay.
In his letter the Senator lists eight specific areas on which he wished to receive
responses. Some of these questions are unanswerable because of the paucity of
data. For example, with reference to Question #2, until the last several years
there was no effort to estivate the amount of illicit opium production worldwide,
and no reliable figures can be given for an earlier period. Again, with reference
to Questions #1 and #4. a systematic means of estimating the amount of heroin
entering the United States- has never been devised ; and so figures with consider-
able latitudes are customaFily cited. Nevertheless, we have attempted to respond
to each question to the extent of our knowledge. Each of these responses is con-
tained in separate attachments to this letter.
In addition to the matters contained in the letter of June 27, the Senator also
requested that Nye identify potential opium producing countries which are not
currently members of thec Single Convention. These are Greece, Iran, Laos,
Cambodia, The People's Republic of China, and Columbia. China, of course, has
traditionally been excluded from agreements to which the united States was
a party. Evidence concerning Columbian opium production is scanty but at least
some potential is believed to exist.
Sincerely yours,
GENE R. IIAISLIP,
Special Assistant to the Director.
Question I-Arc the figures of last year and this year comparable after con-
version has taken place?
Answer-This wear's figure represents an increase from 50-60 tons of opium
to 65-100 tons of opium.
What amount of space is,required to grow this amount of opium?
Answer-Opium yield per unit of land is a function of climatic factors and
input of labor and plant nutrients. Yields vary from year-to-year and from
area-to-area. The average Field per hectare of land (2.7 acres) in Turkey is about
10 kilograms (22 pounds). These factors applied to the estimate of 65-100 tons
equal 175,000-270,000 acres.
Question 2-For the record could you provide us with. a country-by-country
estimate on illicit opium production in the current year and compare this with
estimated production in these countries 5, 10 and 20 years ago? Also for the rec-
ord, could you provide the basis for the estimate?
Answer-Until. the U.S. ' Government began in 1960 to direct world attention
toward control of illicit drugs at the source, no comprehensive effort had ever
been made to define the total world drug problem. Most of the data available
on opium production, for example, concerns legal or controlled production. BNDD
began in 1970 with the cooperation of other U.S. Agencies to gather available
data with a view toward estimating illicit opium production. The basis for our
estimates include historic4l data, analysis of user markets, seizures of Contra-
band drugs, and intelligence information from a variety of sources.
Attached is the estimate-, of illicit opium production worldwide.
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A. Illicit production of opium in Southeast Asia, principally the tri-border 750
countries of Thailand, Burma and Laos---------------------------
Consumed locally in the rural areas before distribution-------------- 450
Distributed to wholesalers in Bangkok, Vientiane, Hong Kong------- 300
B. Breakdown of the 300 tons distributed by wholesalers :
To supply traditional Chinese markets outside of the producing
countries :
Hong Kong ---------------------------------------------------
Malaysia, Singapore-------------------------------------------
Philippines --------------------
------------------------------
Macao -------------------------------------------------------
Cambodia -------------
----------------------------------
Vietnam -----------------------------------------------------
120
30
10
10
1
29
Retained in Bangkok, Vientiane and Hong Kong to supply urban de-
mand (in Bangkok and Vientiane) and to convert to heroin to supply
U.S. servicemen in 'South Vietnam, Okinawa, Thailand, Philippines 100
and the growing market in the United States ----------------------
C. Estimates of licit and illicit production in other areas of the world :
Country:
150
35 to 50 tons.
- - -
T o r eY - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- ----------
India - - - --- - - -
-- --- ----------- ------ -----
1,200
0
250.
100 t
150
Afghanistan------------------- --------- - -----------------------
o
.
1
00 to 200
-------------------------- -
Pakistan ----------------------- --
Iran
150
.
a
15
Mexico --------------------------------------------------------
0
to
.
7
U.S.S.R--------------- - - - - - -- --- - - - - - - - - --- - - - - -
-- -
115
100
)
))
PRC (China)-----------------------------------------------------
830
?7
Yugoslavia ---------------------------------------------------
Japan ---------------------------------------------------------
.
5
.
(7)
Total---------------------------------------------------
1,720.830
566.7 to 666.7 tons.
Total estimates worldwide illicit production : 1205 to 1305 metric tons.
Question 3-For the record, could you provide its with a country-by-countryy
breakdown of where narcotics control agents are currently stationed and where
such agents (from predecessor agencies) wore stationed 5, 10 and 20 years ago?
Answer-Attachment 1 reflects the locations and the number of agents assigned
overseas by the predecessor Federal Bureau of Narcotics.
Attachment 2 reflects the current plan and the actual number of agents pres-
ently assigned overseas in the locations indicated.
FEDERAL BUREAU OF NARCOTICS
Italy_________________________
1952: Rome
1967:
,
1962:
Rome, Italy --------------------------
Italy
Rome
---------------
-
Paris,France-------------------------
,
-
---------
___________-
Beirut
Lebanon
MarseiIles, France ____________________
-_______
,
------------------
Paris
France
Beirut,Lebanon______________________
-------
,
---------------
France
Marseilles
Istanbul, Turkey -----------------------
-----
,
----___________ ___
Turkey
Istanbul
Mexico City, Mexico___________________
-__-
,
Thailand
--------- -----
kek
Ban
Lima, Peru -------------------------
---
,
g
Kong
Hon
------------------
Bangkok,Thailand__
g
--------
Singapore -------------- -------------
Hong Kong----------- ---- - -------
Singapore --------------------
Mexico City, Mexico ---------- -------
Monterrey, Mexico----------- ---------
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BURrAU OF NARCOTICS AND DANGEROUS DRUGS
Author-
ized
Author-
agents On board
ized
agents On board
Mexico and Central America:
Mexico Cit
Singapore----------
2 2
y__________________ 8 7
Guadalajara------- . ________ 3 3
Hermosillo ------ _- __ - 2 2
Monterrey--------- -____ 2 2
--------
Saigon, Vietnam______________ 3 3
Total-------------------- 21 19
Total --------- 15 14
Tokyo, Japan----------------- 4 4
Panama and South America:
Panama Cit
P
Hong Kong------------------ 3 2
Manila, Philippine Islands
2 2
y,
anama--------- 2 0
C
V
-----
Okinawa 1
aracas,
enezuela2 2
A
i
0
--------
sunc
on, Paraguay- ______ 2 2
Bu
Ai
-----
Total---------
10 8
-
enos
res, Argent.na____- 6 5
Lima, Peru__________ _________ 2 1
-
-----------
Europe:
Quito, Ecuador______ 2 2
B
ili
B
London, England
1
raz
a,
l
razil_____ 1 1
B
t
C
______________
Paris, France__
7
o
a,
o mbia---- -_______ 2 1
L
ogo
P
_______________
Marseilles
France
4
a
az, Bolivia______ 1 0
,
____________
Madrid, Spain______________ 2
Total-------------------- 20 14
Barcelona, Spain -___--------- 2
Rabat, Morocco_______________ 1
Ankara, Turkey______ _ -.______ 4 4
I
Bonn, Germany_______________ 1
Frankfurt, Germany________ 2
Munich
Germany
2
stanbul, Turkey---__ _______ 2 2
I
,
__
Milan
Italy
2
zmir, Turkey ---________ 2 2
Bei
L
ba
t
,
_______
Rome, Italyy------
3 3
ru
,
e
non_____ 3 2
Kab
l
Af
---------
Brussels, Belgium
--
- 1 0
,
u
ghanistan---- _____ 2 1
T
h
I
_______
--
-------- --
e
ran,
ran -------- -------- - 2 2
Islamabad,Pakistan __ _______ 1 0
New Delhi, India___
Total---------- ------ 17 13
-----
Total---------------------- 28 23
Montreal --------------_----- 2 2
Toronto 1 0
Ban
k
k
Th
l
Vancouver1 1
--------
g
o
,
ai
and. - -- 10 9
Chi
M
T
---
-----
Total 4
ang
at,
hailand-
---- 2 1
Vientiane
Lao
3
,
s ------ - _ - 2 2
Kuala Lumpur, Malays -a------- 2 2
Grand total_________________ 115 94
Question 'f-Do you have a current cstirnate of the total amount of heroin
entering this country? Where does most of it originate? What is the basis for
this information.
Answer-The current estimate of heroin entering this country is 6.5 to 10 tons
annually. This figure represents the amount of heroin thought to be needed to
support they habits of approximately 530,000 U.S. heroin users. About 60%
originates from Near East countries' illicit opium. The remaining 40% originates
from Southeast Asia and from Mexico. These estimates are derived from seizures
of contraband which can. be traced to the source through identification of
traffickers.
Question .5-11orn nt-rich hero-in which was destined for U.S. consumption has
been seized in 1971 and 1972? Where did the major seizures take place? Is it
possible to determine where, this heroin originated?
Answer-Since January 1971, significant amounts of heroin destined for the
U.S. have been taken out of the heroin supply lines. IINT)ll domestic offices and
the Bureau of Customs have together removed over a ton of heroin since the
beginning of last year.
A breakdown of the heroin removed by agency is as follows :
HEROIN REMOVED FROM THE DOMESTIC MARKET
[Amounts in pounds]
1971 1972 (through
May)
BNDD
Customs
--------------------------
432 595
1,109 106
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Since most of this heroin was either seized at a U.S. border or removed within
the United States, it can safely be said that this heroin was destined for sale on
the street in the United States.
however, since heroin is processed from opium, and this comes into this coun-
try indirectly from the opium producing countries of Turkey, Mexico, Laos,
Burma, and 'T'hailand, it has been necessary for the U.S. effort to extend itself
boyond its own boundaries.
With this in mind it is significant to note that BNDD coordinated with foreign
governments in stopping heroin before it could reach U.S. borders. This effort
has led to seizures, not only of heroin, but also of large quantities of opium and
morphine base from which heroin is processed.
The BNDD/Foreign cooperative seizure totals are provided below:
BNDD/FOREIGN SEIZURES
]Amounts in pounds]
Heroin ---------------------------------------------------------------------
Morphine base------------------------------------------------------------
Opium-------------------------------------------------------------------
1972 (through
1971 May)
937 1,730
2,271 874
1,440 843
Since one pound of morphine base chemically converts into approximately one
pound of heroin, BNDD considers the 3,145 lbs. of morphine base seized in the
17 month period as 3,145 lbs. of heroin equivalent. Opium converts to morphine
base on a 10: 1 basis. BNDD therefore considers the 2,283 lbs. of opium seized to
be 228 lbs. of heroin equivalent.
Thus, the foreign cooperative seizures might also be presented as follows :
Heroin or heroin cquivalent
IINDD/foreign seizures : Pounds
1971 ------------------------------------------------------------ 3,362
1.972 (through May) --------------------------------------------- 2,688
For the most part individuals arrested in BNDD/Foreign cooperative seizures
have previously been identified by BNDD intelligence as those persons responsible
for maintaining the illicit drug pipeline to the U.S. or to U.S. servicemen abroad.
Therefore, the heroin removed can be said to have been designed for consumption
in the U.S.
Although the Bureau does not have complete statistics for foreign seizures
made without BNDD assistance, numerous significant seizures by foreign govern-
ments (some of which are listed in the enclosure) indicate that foreign efforts
are also intercepting a portion of the heroin on the way to the U.S.
The sum total of all the hard data available indicates that from January 1,
1971 through May of this year, BNDD, Customs, and BNDD forces in cooperation
with foreign governments have removed at least 8,282 lbs. of heroin or heroin
equivalent destined for consumption in the United States.
One point, however, should be made with regard to these seizures. Tt is im-
possible to estimate the degree to which the drug traffickers are able to resupply
the heroin which is removed from their pipelines. Thus, it is impossible to know
how much or the degree to which these seizures have caused a reduction in the
supply of heroin to addicts in the U.S.
In answer to the second portion of Question 5, there have been numerous
major seizures worldwide in the past 18 months. The majority of these cases
involved extremely large seizures of either heroin or morphine base, and most
that we have -knowledge of took place in Europe and serve as evidence that
Europe is heavily used as both a conversion point of morphine base to heroin
and as a transhipment point of heroin to the U.S. Major seizures have been
made in boats off the shore of Marseilles, in Spain, France, Germany, and Italy
artd in Vietnam, Hong Kong, Laos, and Thailand.
Major domestic seizures were made mostly in port cities or cities near sea
coasts. Frequently these seizures were made in cooperation with Customs.
A representative list of major seizures made since January 1971 is attached as
an enclosure. To the degree that it is possible, the probable source and intended
route of the intercepted drug is also enclosed.
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Amount Probable opium
(pounds),Countr es/agencies involved source tntendeiteoute-or destination -
NDD/foreign cooperative:
March 1971 --------- Marseilles, France--- Heroin____________
Au
ust 1971
Vi
t
37
French authorities, United States, BNDD-------- Turkey
Marseilles
France to Ital
to Ne
Y
k Cit
g
--------
e
nam ----------------- do____-----___-
97
__
,
y
w
or
y.
Thailand Narcotic Bureau, Vietnamese National Southeast Asia ------ Undetermined
October1971-------- Paris, France ------------ do_____________
April1972
R
ll
It
233
.
Police, United States, BNOD.
French CNO, United States, BNDD_____________ Turkey -------
Through Paris to New York Cit
-____-----
apa
o,
aly ------ Morphine base -----_
112
------
y.
Italian authorities, United States, BNDD------------- do------------- Through Italy, probable destination to United
Foreign only:
States.
December 1971 ------ Germany ---------------- do-__---_-___--
M
h 1972
506
German Customs ------------------------------
do
Undetermined
arc
--------- France_____ ____________do____--__---__
D
321
---
-------------
.
French Customs----------------------
do
Do
o_ _ ___-_-___- Marseilles, France Heroin_____________
(in a Marseilles
port).
April 1972---------- Hong Kong -------------- do-------------
NDD (domestic):
January 1972 ------- Miami, Fla--------------- do_-_------___-
Do
N
Y
t
900
80
372
-----------
------------
.
-----do------------------------------------------do------------ To Guadalupe, Mexico, to Miami, Fla.
Hong Kong Narcotics________________________ Southeast Asia ------ Undetermined.
BN DD______________________________________ Turkey ------
France to Miami to New York
------------
ew
ork Ci
y---------- do-------------
NDD/customs:
78
-------
.
-----do------- --------- --------- -------------do------------- France to New York City.
May 1971 ---------- San Juan, P.R------------ do_____________
September 1971
N
Y
k C
t
246 BNDO, U.S. Customs----------------------------do-----
France to Spain to Mexico t
U
it
d St
t
-----
ew
or
i
y ----------- do_____________
--------
o
n
e
a
es.
200 -----do-----------------------------------------do------------- France to New York City.
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Question 6-What kind of shifts in this geographical pattern of heroin traf-
ficking can we expect in response to our expanded enforcement effort?
Answer-Immediate shifts for which there is already some indication involve
greater exploitation of Southeast Asia and Mexican sources. Beyond this, Af-
ghanistan, Pakistan and India must be considered potential sources.
Question 7-What is the going street price of heroin today? Who profits from
the heroin trade?
Answer-The going street price of heroin varies from city to city depending on
the demand for heroin in relation to its availability. Thus, a national "average"
price must be interpreted as a general guideline since the price is subject to fluctu-
ation in any given area, and certainly from city to city.
With this in mind the daily cost of heroin to an addict is about $30 a day with
the average dose costing about $6; this price may vary from $2 to $12 a dose de-
pending on the city.
Almost all persons who are involved in heroin production and distribution
profit from it. This includes the poppy growers, whose profits are smallest, the
chemists who convert morphine into heroin, those who arrange and finance
heroin smuggling into the U.S., the smugglers themselves, the high and mid-level
wholesalers, and street level pushers.
Within the United States, heroin dealers, regardless of their level of involve-
ment, usually realize 100% profit on whatever they invest in their "business".
Question 8-The International drug trade has developed largely since World
War II. Could you give us a brief history of such development, touching on major
trafckers, routes, successes and failures of efforts to curtail the trade.
Answer-Traffic in contraband narcotics from Europe to the U.S. was com-
pletely disrupted during World War II. In the aftermath of the war the traffic
was fairly rapidly reestablished with opium from the Near East to heroin labora-
tories in Italy and France. Heroin imports from Europe to the United States
became a major interest for organized crime which resulted in new Federal leg-
islation in 1950 required mandatory sentencing for narcotic traffickers. U.S.
addict populations appeared to stabilize at less than 100,000 during the 1950's
and early 1960's. During this period the illicit traffic can be characterized as
highly organized with very limited amateur participation because of the high
risk created by mandatory sentencing.
During the early and mid-sixties drug experimentation with marihuana and
the hallucinogens developed along with the youth culture and has been associ-
ated with numerous social phenomena current during the past decade. Since
1969 rising heroin abuse has been documented and is associated with a variety
of social factors.
From a law enforcement standpoint the drug problem has simply grown faster
than our criminal justice systems' ability to handle it. Increased demand for
drugs along with increased availability are apparent factors reflected in current
problem definition.
Since the sources for illicit narcotic drugs are external to the U.S., the national
policy has been to cooperate with other nations in strengthening international
controls over drugs. Since 1969 extraordinary emphasis has been placed on con-
trol of illicit drugs at the source. In line with this emphasis all feasible means
are being considered for development of programs to bring about more effective
international control of drugs. The drug control programs with Mexico, France,
Turkey, Thailand and Laos are being followed up with appropriate programs in
other areas as opportunity permits.
Attachments : Examples of significant cases. Papers detailing trafficking routes.
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