'OPEN SKIES' TASK FORCE REPORT (U)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83M00171R000300150002-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 4, 2005
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: April 1, 1982
• Content Type: MF

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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
Intelligence Community Staff
1 April 1982
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Dr. Victor H. Reis
Assistant Director, Office of Science and
Technology Policy
SUBJECT: "Open Skies" Task Force Report
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1. I am forwarding herewith the report of the "Open Skies" Task
Force. Organizations represented in the Task Force review included:
NASA, Commerce, State, OMB, Defense, ACDA, OSTP and the Intelligence
Community Staff. Our conclusions and recommendations outlined in
paragraph 3, while not necessarily unanimous in every case, reflect the
general consensus of the Task Force. 0
2. The Task Force examined the following topics:
a. "Open Skies" -- whether this concept is a viable
national space policy option.
b. Imagery Declassification -- whether, as a corollary
of "Open Skies," an active program for declassification of
satellite photoreconnaissance imagery should be adopted.
c. Constraints on Civil Earth Satellite Remote Sensing
Systems -- whether the limitations specified under current
policy should be continued or relaxed.
d. Nondiscriminatory Data Dissemination -- whether the
current affirmative policy on civil system data dissemination
should be continued or modified.
3. The results of the Task Force's deliberations are provided in
Annexes A through D to this report. The Task Force's conclusions and
recommendations on the questions and issues reviewed may be summarized
as follows:
a. A new interagency study on the "Open Skies" proposal
is not appropriate or realistic for inclusion in the ongoing
National Space Policy Review being conducted under OSTP aegis.
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b. Current basic policy on continued security protection
for satellite imagery materials and on enhancing the availability
of those materials for U.S. intelligence, military, and civil
federal agency uses should be affirmed and reiterated. In
addition, however, a study should be conducted by the DCI to
determine the feasibility of establishing a mechanism and
applicable criteria for U.S. nonfederal users to seek access to
selected imagery materials in those specific instances that are
judged to be in the national interest.
c. Current national policy regarding controls on civil
remote sensing satellites should be continued.
d. The policy stated in PD/NSC-37 that "federal civil
earth imaging from space, at resolutions at or better than ten
meters, will be permitted under controls and when such needs are
justified and assessed in relation to civil benefits, national
security, and foreign policy" should be affirmed. The added
stipulation should now be provided calling for periodic review
of these resolution constraints to determine when there is need
for threshold change.
e. The Department of Commerce should be charged, in coordi-
nation with the DCI and other departments and agencies with
interest in remote sensing, to study the scope of legilsation
that may be required to assure the means for federal control
over private sector satellites. In conjunction with this study
the DCI should examine whether controls in addition to those on
ground resolution are now required for other aspects of space
data, such as substantive content, timeliness, spectral resolution,
etc.
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f. Present policy of nondiscriminatory access should be
affirmed in principle and extended to the private sector. It
is believed that the costs, particularly in the international
arena, of change or reversal of the policy would substantially
outweigh possible benefits.
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Attachments:
As stated
a
"Open Skies" Task Force
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QUESTION REVIEWED
Should the U.S. Adopt an "Open Skies" Space Policy to Include Intelligence
Photoreconnaissance Imagery?
Background
1. The original "Open Skies" plan was advanced by President Eisenhower
as a potential bilateral arrangement. at the 1955 Geneva Conference of
Heads of Government and applied at that time solely to aircraft photographic
reconnaissance. Since 1960 the "Open Skies" concept essentially applies
to space satellites as these became the primary vehicler "national
technical means" for overhead imagery reconnaissance.
2. The present "Open Skies" issue is based on Dr. Teller's concept,
originally outlined in 1976, broadly proposing that all photographs
taken by U.S. satellites--and particularly surveillance quality imagery
from intelligence reconnaissance space systems--be declared to be in the
public domain and that procedures be established to inform the public of
what photos are available and provide them on request. The proposal was
for U.S. unilateral action that in effect would place U.S. satellite
imagery collection systems at the disposal of the international community
and would stress the open publication of imagery products for beneficial
purposes such as conflict avoidance and resolution, discovery and checkmate
of aggression, disarmament and peace treaty monitoring and verification,
national resource surve s, as well as warning and assistance in case of
natural disasters. I
Discussion
3. This proposal has from the outset posed serious problem for
U.S. national security and foreign policy interests generally and for
the national overhead reconnaissance intelligence collection program in
particular. Major objections to the proposal continue to be:
a. Such a disclosure policy could conceivably lead not only
to loss of photoreconnaissance from space, but to more severe
vulnerability,
b. Open "publicity" concerning our photoreconnaissance
activities might make the photo satellites appear as more of a
threat to the Soviets (and possibly the underdeveloped nations as
well) resulting in increased pressure to extend the concept of
national sovereignty to include "outer space" and to restrict
the "right" of one nation to remotely sense the territory of
another nation without consent.
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d. Satellite photography is both ambiguous and controversial,
and interpretation of such photography could emerge as a source of
controversy so large as to overshadow any real benefits from the
"Open Skies" proposal. It is not clear that public disclosure
would substantially change the overall public confidence in our
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4. The "Open Skies" concept for space photography and its ramifications
for the national intelligence reconnaissance effort have been repeatedly
considered in studies and assessments carried out in the course of the
several interagency space policy reviews over the past five years.
Consistently, the concept has been found to be not feasible or practical
as national policy. Such reviews have included the extensive assessment
submitted by the PRM-23 Study Group in August 1977, followed by the
further studies incident to issuance of PD/NSC-37 in May 1978 and PD/NSC-
42 in October 1978. PD-42 specifically called for an in-depth assessment,
completed in March 1979, on the question of declassification of photo-
reconnaissance imagery--the essential prerequisite underlying the "Open
Skies" proposal. That study affirmed the extensive national security
risks inherent in any broad declassification of intelligence satellite
imagery hut did show merit in some selective declassification approaches.
Conclusion
5. The Task Force* concludes, on balance, that the "Open Skies"
proposal is not appropriate or realistic for inclusion in the on oing
National Space Policy Review being conducted under OSTP aegis. II
Exc ussiive of the OSTP member
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QUESTION REVIEWED
Should the Imagery Products Derived from Intelligence Photoreconnaissance
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Background
1. Present policy is based on Presidential Directive/NSC-37,
"National Space Policy", dated 11 May 1978. That directive provides as
follows:
a. Protection of Sensitive Information. The nature, the
attributable collected information, and the operational details
of intelligence space activities will be classified, and as
necessary to protect sensitive aspects, will be controlled in
special compartmented security channels. Collected information
that cannot be attributed to space systems will be classified
according to its content.
b. Security restrictions on intelligence space satellite
products will be selectively relaxed by the DCI to implement the
following changes to permit wider use of space-derived intelligence
information.
o The fact that the United States conducts satellite
reconnaissance for intelligence purposes, without
disclosing the generic type of activity, will be
classified CONFIDENTIAL* and handled outside the
special security control system.
o The existing special product controls will be used
sparingly, and then only for those products and
data that reveal sensitive aspects of the program
as determined by the DCI.
o Operational aspects of intelligence space activities
shall be afforded strict security protection within
a special access program system as determined by
the DCI.
o Strict control over public statements and background
concerning space reconnaissance will be maintained.
o Further changes to the space intelligence security
policy can be authorized only by the President.
was declassified by President Carter on 1 October 1978.
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*Subsequently, the fact that the U.S. conducts satellite reconnaissance
specifically for intelligence purposes relating to arms control matters
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c. Selected space-related products and technology shall be
made available to civil agencies within appropriate security constraints.
Discussion
2. PD/NSC-37 basically reaffirms the policies vigorously implemented
by the DCI since 1973 (a) to facilitate and broaden the availability and
use of satellite imagery materials outside special security control
channels and (b) to support expanded use by the federal civil agencies
of satellite imagery products. Pursuant to these policies, extensive
guidelines and procedures for decompartmentation and sanitization of
satellite imagery materials have been developed and disseminated worldwide
to the Federal Government imagery user community. In order to maximize
the use of imagery-derived products outside of special control channels,
the established current policy is for the initial preparation and dissemi-
nation at standard levels of classification of the bulk of products
derived from reconnaissance satellite imagery. Presently, virtually all
of the derived information on areas throughout the world and the great
majority of the imagery products are initially issued at standard
classifications outside of special compartmented controls. Also, virtually
all nonsensitive derived information and some imagery on U.S. areas are
authoritanding use at the unclassified level on a nonattributable
basis. IuI
3. Under aegis of the DCI, mechanisms--including COMIREX and the
Committee for Civil Applications of Classified Overhead Imagery of the
United States--exist to consider expanded uses of classified imagery to
meet specific needs of the federal imagery user community. These
arrangements, however, do not provide for direct access to classified
imagery by nonfederal users such as state and local governments, industry,
or the academic community. Limited public access is provided by dissemination
of imagery-derived information to users through such mechanisms as the
use of maps compiled from unattributed imagery sources and the authorization
permitting federal mapping agencies to publish UNCLASSIFIED photomaps
derived from classified imagery of the U.S. in accordance with specific
4. Under present policy any special requests for private sector
use of materials derived from classified imagery satellite systems would
have to be processed through the appropriate federal component of the
national imagery user community. The effectiveness of these channels is
restricted at this time, however, since open acknowledgement of the fact
of U.S. satellite photoreconnaissance thorized only for the specific
purpose of arms control verification.
5. On the basic question of broader declassification and public
release of satellite imagery, an exhaustive interagency study was carried
out in early 1979 pursuant to a charge under PD/NSC-42 for an options paper
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on the question of a selective and phased public release of photore-
connaissance imagery or information. That study affirmed the judgments
and policies contained in PD/NSC-37 on the continued need for classification
of satellite imagery materials while selectively relaxing security
restrictions to facilitate wider uses of such materials. There is no
apparent need to repeat that effort in conjunction with the OSTP Space
Policy Review.
Conclusion
6. The current basic policy on continued security protection for
satellite imagery materials and on enhancing the availability of those
materials for U.S. intelligence, military, and civil federal agency uses
should be affirmed and reiterated. In addition, however, a study should
be conducted by the DCI to determine the feasibility of establishing a
mechanism and applicable criteria for U.S. nonfederal users to seek
access to selected imagery materials in those soecific instances that
are judged to be in the national interest. u
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ISSUE ASSESSED
Should U.S. Private and Federal Civil Remote Sensing (Imaging) Satellite
Capabilities be Restricted in the Interest of National Security. If so,
how?
Background
1. Current national policies impose restrictions on federal civil
remote sensing satellite capabilities and activities in three areas:
transfer of classified technology, quality of remotely sensed data
(better than 10-meter spatial resolution requiring review and approval)
and radio frequency mapping. National policy now requires U.S. Government
authorization and supervision or regulation of all U.S. earth-oriented
remote sensing satellites. International treaty obligations also require
U.S. Government supervision of private sector space activity. The
national policy restrictions were imposed to:
a. Protect satellite intelligence collection and exploitation
from foreign knowledge or interference.
b. Preclude potential revelation of sensitive information
regardin U.S. defense facilities and activities (national and
tactical).
c. Preclude distribution of data which could reveal details
on imaged nations of military intelligence value to third countries,
or use of data for purposes not in the U.S. interest.
d. Avoid adverse international reactions which would result
from open nondiscriminatory availability of remote sensing data
of a depth and detail which the sensed nation would judge to be
intrusive and threatening.
e. Preclude revelation of sensitive intelligence capabilities,
technologies and techniques, and risks incurred thereby. ^
2. Restrictions are now an issue both because new private remote
sensing satellite programs are within technical reach by the private
sector and since it remains unclear to what degree the government currently
has the legal means to control private sector remote sensing programs.
a. Outer space treaties and current national policy require
U.S. Government authorization and supervision or regulation
of all U.S. earth satellite remote sensing. To what degree
national policy control can be extended to the private sector
without additional legislation is an unresolved question. It
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should be noted, however, that current munitions export control
laws could be utilized as a control mechanism. These laws
require licensing for export of spacecraft, spacecraft electronics,
and electronic equipment, cameras and photogrammetry equipment.
Export controls would include taking such equipment and technology
out of the U.S. in any manner.
b. New remote sensing techniques and technologies available
to the private sector, if applied, would create considerably
higher quality and new types of information. Resolutions better
than 10 meters could impinge on national security and foreign
policy interests.
c. On the other hand, foreign technological capabilities are
now threatening to surpass present and planned U.S. civil capa-
bilities and in the process may mitigate the above national
security concerns.
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Alternatives
3. Alternative A: Continue existing national policy of imposing
technological constraints on civil remote sensing satellites while placing
no constraints on the geographic areas that may be imaged.
a. PRO:
(1) Precludes open distribution of sensitive data
on U.S. facilities, activities and interests.
(2) Avoids international confrontations and adverse
reactions over distribution of data considered sensitive
and intrusive by sensed foreign nations. Foreign reactions*
to the nondiscriminatory distribution of imagery approxi-
mating the current 10-meter ground resolution limit has not
yet been tested but should be before the limitation is
removed or reduced.
(3) Avoids foreign challenge to intelligence satellites
and U.S. position of free passage in and unconstrained remote
sensing from space.
(4) Government regulation could assure Federal Govern-
ment access to privately sensed data, which could be denied
without regulation.
(5) Facilitate continuation of the policy of non-
discriminatory access to remote sensing products. ^
A more detailed discussion of the impact of a significant reduction or
removal of resolution constraints on Soviet attitudes and arms control
is given in the attachment to this annex.
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b. CON:
(1) May require new legislation to impose constraints
on the private sector. Discussion or debate on legislation
would incur substantial risks of exposing sensitive information.
(2) Acts as a disincentive for private sector partici-
pation. Therefore, tends to erode competitive position
of U.S. private sector vis-a-vis the foreign sector.
(3) New remote sensing technologies require new methods
of measurement to determine sensitivity thresholds which will
be more difficult to apply and enforce.
(4) Does not take into consideration the trend and
availability of technology, both domestic and foreign, that
permits higher resolution imagery capabilities from space.
4. Alternative B: Relax present technological controls on civil
remote sensor capabilities and apply future controls only by constraints
on the geographic areas that may a imaged.
a. PRO:
(1) Encourages private domestic participation in remote
earth sensing in that it removes some existing barriers to
commercial opportunities and is consistent with efforts to
transfer the federal remote sensing program to the private
sector.
(2) Avoids trying to define an arbitrary technological
restraint that may be difficult to maintain in the face of
modern technology development.
(3) Gives the U.S. private sector more of a free hand
in competing with increasingly aggressive foreign remote
sensing activities.
(4) Makes benefits from earth resource sensing in the
areas of renewable and nonrenewable resources available to
the private sector and the public, subject to such geographic
collection restraints as may be defined.
(5) Emphasizes the peaceful nature and purpose of the
remote sensing systems.
(6) May avoid international confrontation on "consent
regime" issue by appropriate definition of restricted areas--
since by not tasking an area the imagery is nonexistent and
therefore not subject to free and open dissemination arguments.
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(7) Provides a means to limit the collection of sensitive
data to our national security sensor systems while allowing
civil systems to collect freely in nonsensitive areas. ^
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b. CON:
(1) Encourages private activities to pursue a goal
of achieving high resolution imagery.
(2) Nondiscriminatory distribution of data determined
to be excessively intrusive could jeopardize the status
of intellience satellites and evoke threats of hostile
actions against satellite vehicles.
(3) Will require public reversal of carefully con-
structed U.S. public policy opposing prior consent to
acquisition and dissemination of remote sensing data.
(4) Enables the private sector to impose proprietary
constraints on data distribution and use, contrary to current
policy of nondiscriminatory distribution of remote sensing
data.
(5) Invites challenges to the private sector regarding
legality of data acquisitions, distributions and use.
(6) Definition of restricted areas, especially domestic,
would be subject to continual debate and perhaps FOIA challenges.
(7) Would make available high resolution and timely
imagery data of significant intelligence value to adversaries
of all sensed nations. Sensitive U.S. facilities and activities
could be publicly exposed without government recourse.
(8) May conflict with U.S. treaty obligations for con-
tinuing supervision of the activities of nongovernment organi-
zations in space. r_1
Discussion/Conclusion
5. The Task Force consensus is that there is a national security
requirement continuing controls on civil remote sensing imagery
satellites.
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ISSUE ASSESSED
Should the U.S. Continue Its Policy of Nondiscriminator Access to
Data from Civil art ate ite Remote -Sensing ystems
Background
1. The U.S. policy favoring nondiscriminatory access to data
acquired by civil remote sensing satellites is one facet of an overall
policy, consistently pursued since the late 1960s, of U.S. opposition to
so called "consent regimes" for the conduct of remote sensing. As it
has evolved over the years, this policy has four principal facets:
a. U.S. insistence on the right to use space for remote
sensing without the need for prior notification to, or approval
by, the sensed State.
b. U.S. insistence on its right to disseminate or disclose,
at its discretion, remotely sensed data without restriction,
geographic or technical, (i.e., the right, ultimately to publicly
disclose even reconnaissance satellite data if our national interest
dictates).
c. With respect to civil remote sensing systems, the U.S.
has consistently supported a policy of both unrestricted data
acquisition and nondiscriminatory access to the data, subject
only to such considerations as fair price, copyright, or
preferential access to data for researchers working with data
obtained by certain "experimental" remote sensing activities.
d. With respect to civil systems, the U.S. has consistently
opposed international proposals to impose resolution or any other
technical thresholds on data openly disseminated. However, to
facilitate achieving international acceptance of this position, and
to protect the classified intelligence systems against international
opposition, the U.S. has had a classified unilateral policy of
imposing general resolution limits, initially at 20 meters, and
more recently (since 1978) at 10 meters. The question of compatibility
between the current U.S. policies favoring both nondiscriminatory
data dissemination and limited capabilities for civil s stems is
addressed separately in the attachment to this annex. t
2. In actively implementing its policy on nondiscriminatory data
access, the U.S. has over the past decade successfully enlisted direct
foreign participation in the U.S. LANDSAT program through the establishment
of LANDSAT ground stations in ten foreign countries, the provision of
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direct LANDSAT data readout to foreign ground stations, and the sale of
ground station and associated LANDSAT equipment to participating countries.
In addition the U.S. has regularly made the data acquired by its civil
remote sensing systems available for nondiscriminatory purchase on a
worldwide basis, from a central unclassified archive of LANDSAT data.
In the area of weather remote sensing international cooperation is very
extensive, involving the incorporation of French and English instruments
on NOAA satellites and direct eption of U.S. satellite weather data
by more than 100 countries.
3. U.S. support for nondiscriminatory data access has been predicated
on the belief that the policy is fully consistent with Article I of the
1967 Outer Space Treaty which specified that the exploration and use of
outer space shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of
all countries and that outer space shall be free for exploration and use
by all states without discrimination. Other factors which underlay U.S.
policy favoring nondiscriminatory data access have been a desire to
increase foreign acceptance of remote sensing, and to allay foreign
suspicion and fears about the nature of the data acquired and the uses
to which such data might be put.
4. On the whole, the policy has been reasonably successful in
achieving these objectives. Over the years since 1969 foreign attitudes,
as reflected particularly in the views of some important, but initially
suspicious third world countries, have moved closer to the U.S. view
although external factors such as the increase in the number of countries
who have launched or plan to launch civil remote sensing systems; e.g.,
India, France, Japan, Canada, etc., no less than U.S. persausiveness
have contributed to this result. Few nations today any longer maintain
that remote sensing per se must be subject to specific prior approval of
the sensed state. While -a number of nations would still favor a regime
requiring approval by a sensed state to the dissemination of data to
other countries or private parties, some key third world countries have
moved closer to the traditional U.S. position of accepting nondiscriminatory
access as the most feasible and efficacious way of protecting themselves
from unfair economic exploitation. u
5. As participation of the private sector in civil remote sensing
programs has been more actively explored pursuant to PD/NSC-54, questions
have arisen on the necessity to provide for preferential or proprietary
interests in remotely sensed data as an investment incentive. To adopt
an affirmative policy on this, however, would entail major modification
or completereversal of the long standing national policy of nondiscriminatory
access.
Alternatives
6. The Task Force has. reviewed two basic alternatives under this
issue.
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a. Reaffirm the present U.S. "policy" position supporting
nondiscriminatory access to civil federal remote sensing data
an expan tat policy to cover private sector activity.
b. In order to stimulate private industry participation
in civil remote sensing programs, modi y or abandon U.S. polite
tavoring nondiscriminatory data dissemination. r----i
Assessment
7. If the U.S. modifies or abandons its dissemination policy in
order to accommodate private industry desire for preferential or propriety
interest in remotely sensed data, we should expect to incur international
political costs in the form of:
a. A revival of strong suspicions among third world
countries as to U.S. intentions in space.
b. A revival of the now largely dormant interest in
imposing regimes of consent not only on data dissemination but
on the conduct of remote sensing per se.
c. Some erosion of support for U.S. space policy among
nations that have been traditionally supportive.
d. Concern and resentment on the part of nations which,
at our urging, have purchased LANDSAT ground stations, invested
in the training of indigenous personnel and who will see in our
change of policy an abandonment of U.S. interest and concern.
e. Reinforcement of the belief that remote sensing data,
in the hands of advanced nations, confers unfair economic
advantages and thus reinforcement of the tendency among third
world nations to regard information about natural resources as
"national" and "privileged".
While the above list is not exhaustive and reflects merely considerations
by this Task Force, it does point up that there indeed are significant
potential international political costs to be incurred if the U.S. moves
toward policies favoring preferential or proprietary access to remote
sensing data.
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8. Some representatives of private enterprise, however, have
indicated that without some assurance of government and financial
assistance or support, and arrangements for preferential or proprietary
access to data for investors, the private sector is unlikely to find
remote sensing an attractive investment prospect. On the other hand,
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still other private sector representatives have said that nondiscriminatory
access to the raw data from remote sensing systems would not be a problem
provided t~investors' proprietary access to the analyzed data is
assured.
Conclusion
9. The Task Force recommends that present policy of nondiscriminatory
access be affirmed in principle and extended to the private sector. We
believe that the costs, particularly in the international arena, of
change or reversal of the policy substantially outweigh possible benefits.
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Are Current U.S. Policies Favoring Both
Nondiscriminator Data Dissemination and Those Limiting
vi Systems Compatible Over the Long Run? (S)
Cil
Capa i hies of
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1. This question confronted the Task Force at several points
during the course of its discussions and is of sufficient importance to
be separately highlighted. II
2. We believe the answer to this question is basically yes with
the possible exception of that facet of our dissemination policy which
eschews acceptance of any resolution or technical thresholds on data
subject to open dissemination. 0
4. The Task Force has not had the opportunity in the time available
for the present space policy review to explore this potentially troublesome
problem adequately, but we believe that it must be considered carefully
at some future point. fl
D-5
Approved For Release 2005/03/24 P83M00171 R000300150002-7
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