HURWITCH TESTIMONY ON CUBA POLICY BEORE FULBRIGHT COMMITTEE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP73B00296R000200050087-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 29, 2002
• Sequence Number: 87
• Publication Date: September 1, 1971
• Content Type: TELEGRAM

~4pproved For ReleaseD2~PARTMENT -R STATE TELEGRAM 50087-0 MFG. 7-71
715
CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEM BY PER # TOTAL COPIES: REPRO BY
STATSPEC
UNCLASSIFIED HCF548
PAGE 01 STATE
170861
19-80
ORIGIN
INFO
ARA-14
0CT?- 01
E= 1 1 CIAE-00
DODE-00 PM-06
NSAE-00
NSC- 10 P-03
RSC-01 PRS-0 1
I0-11 /109 R
DRAFTED BY:ARA :RAHURWITCH
APPROVED BY:ARA/CCA:RLFUNSETH
.R 162249Z S_EP 71
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO ALL AMERICAN REPUBLIC DIPLOMATIC POSTS
CINCSO POLAD
UNCLAS STATE 170861
SUBJECT: HURWITCH TESTIMONY ON CUBA POLICY BEFORE FULBRIGHT
-"
COMMITTEE
1. TRANSMITTED FOR BACKGROUND AND POSSIBLE USE OF POSTS IS
PUBLIC STATEMENT OF DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY HURWITCH BEFORE
SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE, SEPTEMBER 16, 1971.
PURPOSE OF HEARINGS WAS TO OBTAIN DEPARTMENT?S POSITION ON DRAFT
SENATE RESOLUTION 146 CALLING FOR REPEAL OF PUBLIC LAW 87?733
OF OCTOBER 3, 1962 AND ON DRAFT SENATE RESOLUTION 160 WHICH:
(1) ASKED PRESIDENT TO TAKE STEPS TO REVIEW U.S. POLICY TOWARD
CUBA WITH OBJECTIVE OF BEGINNING PROCESS LEADING TO RE-EST-
ABLISHMENT OF NORMAL RELATIONS BETWEEN U.S. AND CUBA; AND (2)
EXPRESSED SENSE OF SENATE THAT U.S. SHOULD SUPPORT OAS RE-
EXAMINATION OF THOSE RESOLUTIONS RELEVANT TO CUBA;..
2. TEXT FOLLOWS: QUOTE MR. CHAIRMAN AND MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE:
I AM VERY PLEASED TO HAVE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO TESTIFY BEFORE
THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS ON SENATE JOINT RESOLUTION
146, A JOINT RESOLUTION TO REPEAL PUBLIC LAW ?87-733, AND UPON
SENATE RESOLUTION 160, EXPRESSING THE SENSE OF THE U.S. SENATE
WITH RESPECT TO U.S. POLICY TOWARD CUBA.
H-02 INR?06 L?03
SS-14 USIA-12 EUR?14
WITH REGARD TO SENATE JOINT RESOLUTION 146, AS THE DEPARTMENT
State Dept. review CotApe d For Release /~1 F(; }RDP73B00296R000200050087-0
 Approved For Release 2004/11/29 : CIA-RDP73B00296R000200050087-0
DEPARTMENT OF STATE TELEGRAM
UNCLASSIFIED
PAGE 02 STATE 170861
HAS STATED BEFORE--IN LETTERS OF MARCH 12 AND JUNE 3, 1970--
IT NEITHER ADVOCATES NOR OPPOSES REPEAL OF PUBLIC LAW 87?733
SINCE THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH DOES NOT DEPEND ON IT AS LEGAL OR
CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY FOR OUR POLICY TOWARD CUBA. HOWEVER,
THE DEPARTMENT WOULD NOT WISH THIS POSITION TO BE MISINTERPRETED.
THE JOINT RESOLUTION WAS EXPRESSIVE OF A COMMON UNDERSTANDING
OF THE LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE. BRANCHES AT THAT TIME OF THE
THREAT TO THE PEACE AND SECURITY OF THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE
NATIONS POSED BY THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT?S POLICY OF INTERFERENCE
IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF THESE NATIONS THROUGH SUPPORT
OF SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES. AND BY ITS MILITARY TIES WITH THE SOVIET
UNION. THE HISTORY OF THE ACTIONS UNDERTAKEN BY THE ORGANIZATION
OF AMERICAN STATES IN RESPONSE TO THIS THREAT IS WELL KNOWN
TO THE COMMITTEE.
IN THE DEPARTMENT ? S VIEW, THERE. HAS BEEN NO SIGNIFICANT CHANGE
IN THE BASIC CONDITIONS UPON WHICH U.S. CUBAN POLICY HAS BEEN
BASED IN THE YEARS SINCE 1962 THAT WOULD WARRANT A CHANGE IN
U.S. POLICY. THEREFORE, THE CUBAN RESOLUTION OF 1962 STILL
REFLECTS U.S. POLICY TOWARD CUBA.
THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF OUR POLICY TOWARD CUBA WERE DES-
CRIBED AS FOLLOWS BY PRESIDENT NIXON IN HIS REPORT TO THE
CONGRESS OF FEBRUARY 25, 1971:
?'CUBA CONTINUES TO EXCLUDE ITSELF FROM THE INTER-AMERICAN
SYSTEM BY ITS ENCOURAGEMENT AND SUPPORT OF REVOLUTION
AND ITS MILITARY TIES TO THE SOVIET UNION. THE LATTER MEANWHILE
ATTEMPTED TO EXPAND ITS INFLUENCE AND ITS MILITARY PRESENCE.
?"WE DO NOT SEEK CONFRONTATIONS WITH ANY GOVERNMENT. BUT THOSE
WHICH DISPLAY UNREMITTING. HOSTILITY CANNOT EXPECT OUR ASSISTANCE.
AND THOSE WHICH VIOLATE THE PRINCIPLES OF THE INTER-AMERICAN
SYSTEM, BY INTERVENING IN THE AFFAIRS OF THEIR NEIGHBORS OR
BY FACILITATING THE INTERVENTION OF NON-HEMISPHERIC POWERS,
CANNOT EXPECT TO SHARE THE BENEFITS OF INTER-AMERICAN COOPERATION.
WE WILL WORK CONSTRUCTIVELY TO REDUCE THE DISRUPTIVE EFFECT
OF SUCH ACTION."
UNITED STATES POLICY, THEREFORE, DERIVES FROM THESE PRINCIPAL
CONSID RATIONS: OUR NATIONAL INTEREST- OUR OBLIGATIONS AS A
MEMBER pr9' FWdWfteLsPT2P?4i1/9A 1 -f 9M. Q0 0?M7'MN OVER
 Approved For Release 2004/11/29 : CIA-RDP73B00296R000200050087-0
% DEPARTMENT OF STATE TELEGRAM
UNCLASSIFIED
PAGE 03 STATE 170861
CUBA?S EXPORT OF ITS REVOLUTION; AND CUBA?S MILITARY TIES TO
THE SOVIET UNION.
WITH REGARD TO THE LAST, THE CRISIS OF OCTOBER 1962 AS WELL AS
THE MORE RECENT DEVELOPMENTS LAST YEAR AT CIENFUEGOS ARE IL-
LUSTRATIVE OF OUR CONCERN ABOUT CUBA?S PRESENT MILITARY TIES
WITH. THE SOVIET UNION. YOU WILL RECALL MR. CHAIRMAN THAT AT
CIENFUEGOS, CUBA PERMITTED THE SOVIET UNION TO TAKE NEW STEPS
WHICH COULD HAVE AFFORDED THE SOVIETS T:HE ABILITY TO AGAIN
OPERATE OFFENSIVE WEAPONS SYSTEMS FROM THIS HEMISPHERE. PRES-
IDENT NIXON STATED ON FEBRUARY 25, 1971, THAT THIS WOIJLD HAVE
BEEN CONTRARY TO THE EARLIER UNDERTAKING BETWEEN THE SOVIET
UNION AND THE UNITED STATES FOLLOWING THE MISSILE CRISIS.
ONLY AFTER A PERIOD OF DISCUSSION WITH THE SOVIET UNION DID WE
REAFFIRM OUR UNDERSTANDING AND AMPLIFY IT TO MAKE CLEAR THAT
THE AGREEMENT INCLUDED ACTIVITIES RELATED TO SEA-BASED SYSTEMS.
CUBA?S OPEN PURSUIT OF A POLICY OF ATTEMPTING TO SUBVERT
EXISTING GOVERNMENTS IN THE HEMISPHERE AS WELL AS ITS COOPERATION
WITH SOVIET MILITARY PURPOSES CONTINUE TO CONSTITUTE, IN OUR
VIEW, A THREAT TO THE PEACE AND SECURITY OF THIS HEMISPHERE.
I WISH TO INVITE THE COMMITTEE?S ATTENTION TO THE FACT THAT,
CONSISTENT WITH THE ABOVE-DESCRIBED POLICY STATEMENT BY THE
PRESIDENT, OUR CONCERN IS BASED UPON EXTERNAL, NOT INTERNAL,
POLICIES AND ACTIVITIES OF THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT.
BY REFRAINING FROM STEPS THAT MIGHT ASSIST CUBA AND BY
STRONGLY SUPPORTING THE. MEASURES ADOPTED BY THE OAS, THE UNITED
STATES HAS NOT SOUGHT THE OVERTHROW OF THE PRESENT CUBAN REGIME
BUT RATHER SOUGHT THE REDUCTION OF CUBA?S CAPABILITY TO EXPORT
ARMED REVOLUTION AND THE DISCOURAGEMENT. OF SOVIET ADVENTURES IN
THIS HEMISPHERE. AS A RESULT, CUBA HAS BEEN DEPRIVED OF SUB-
. STANTIAL SUMS OF HARD CURRENCY WHICH WOULD. OTHERWISE BE AVAIL-
ABLE TO PROMOTE CUBAN GOALS IN LATIN AMERICAN AND SOME OF THE
ENERGY, MONEY AND MANPOWER NOW REQUIRED TO KEEP THE CUBAN
ECONOMY FUNCTIONING WOULD OTHERWISE BE AVAILABLE FOR SUPPORT
OF SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES. CUBA TODAY, (DUE ALSO IN PART TO
PRIME MINISTER CASTRO?S MISMANAGEMENT) IS NOT AN ATTRACTIVE
MODEL LIKELY TO STIMULATE EMULATION ELSEWHERE IN THE HEMISPHERE.
MOREOVER, CUBA IS A FINANCIAL BURDEN FOR THE SOVIET UNION,
COST I I p1Tci ed[Fb150Re E 2VOV1I1/?91ECI MF93B R900 M5 7e0
 Approved For Release 2004/11/29 : -CIA-RDP73B00296R000200050087-0
DEPARTMENT OF STATE TELEGRAM
UNCLASSIFIED
PAGE 04 STATE 170861
THE DEPARTMENT WISHES TO ASSURE THE COMMITTEE, HOWEVER, THAT
THE ABOVE DESCRIBED U.S. POLICY TOWARD CUBA IS UNDER CONSTANT
REVIEW TO DETERMINE WHETHER SUCH POLICY TOWARD CUBA CONTINUES
TO SERVE THE COMPLEX OF U.S. NATIONAL INTERESTS INVOLVED, OR
WHETHER SOME OTHER POLICIES MIGHT NOT SERVIE BETTER. ANY SUCH
REVIEW WOULD, OF COURSE, TAKE INTO ACCOUNT OUR COMMITMENTS IN
THE OAS.
WE RECOGNIZE, MR. CHAIRMAN, THAT THERE IS GREAT FERMENT IN
LATIN AMERICA. WE KNOW THAT MODERNIZATION BRINGS EXTENSIVE
AND FREQUENTLY UNSETTLING CHANGE. WE ARE NOT OPPOSED TO CHANGE.
I WOULD RECALL THAT PRESIDENT NIXON IN HIS TOAST AT A DINNER
HONORING PRESIDENT CALDERA OF VENEZUELA ON JUNE 2, 1970,
SAID, "...ALL OF US COME FROM AND WERE BORN TO THIS WORLD,
OUR NATIONS, THROUGH VIOLENT REVOLUTION. NOW OUR CHARGE AND OUR
TASK IS TO PROVIDE THE MEANS AND THE METHOD THROUGH WHICH THOSE
GREAT CHANGES THAT NEED TO BE MADE IN THE WORLD, IN OUR OWN
COUNTRIES AND IN THE WORLD, CAN BE MADE THROUGH PEACEFUL
CHA NGE.go
NOR ARE WE BENT UPON A POLICY THAT INSISTS THAT OTHERS FOREGO
THEIR HISTORIES AND TRADITIONS AND ARRANGE THEIR SOCIETIES TO CONFORM
TO OURS. WE FIRMLY BELIEVE THAT OUR NATION WHICH VALUES
A PLURALISTIC SOCIETY AT HOME SHOULD IN EQUAL MEAURE RESPECT
DIVERSITY ABROAD o
IN THIS CONNECT ION, I WOULD ALSO RECALL THAT PRESIDENT NIXON
HAS STATED THAT WHILE WE HOPE THAT GOVERNMENTS WILL EVOLVE
TOWARD CONSTITUTIONAL PROCEDURES, WE. DEAL WITH GOVERNMENTS
AS THEY ARE. OUR RELATIONS DEPEND NOT ON THEIR INTERNAL
STRUCTURES OR SOCIAL SYSTEMS,. BUT ON .ACTIONS WHICH AFFECT US
AND THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM.
THE GOVERNMENT OF CUBA ADVOCATES CHANGE, HOWEVER, THROUGH
VIOLENT MEANS. CUBA?S POLICIES ENCOURAGE POLARIZATION WITHIN
THE MANY FRAGILE SOCIETIES OF LATIN AMERICA AND TEND TO LEAD
TO REPRESSIVE REGIMES OF THE RIGHT OR DICTATORSHIPS OF THE
LEFT WHEN SUCCESSFUL. CUBA'S POLICIES HAVE ALSO FORCED OTHER
NAT IONS OF THE HEMISPHERE TO DIVERT A PORTION OF THE SCARCE
RE SO U&Apipe)VDMffY6rll V-fos*t2QQ4/AIM29 : E R-FCt7BBOOMMDOQZ00PM THEIR
INTERNAL SECURITY CAPABILITY, INCLUDING THE PURCHASE OF ARMS,
 Approved For Release 2004/11/29 : CIA-RDP73B00296R000200050087-0
DEPARTMENT OF STATE TELEGRAM
UNCLASSIFIED
PAGE 05 STATE 170861
IN ORDER TO COUNTER CUBAN INFLUENCE,, ILLUSTRATIVELY, THE THEN
PRESIDENT OF COLOMBIA, DR. CARLOS LLERAS RESTREPO, A WELL-
KNOWN LIBERAL STATESMAN, REPLIED TO A REPORTER'S QUESTION IN
FEBRUARY 1970 AS TO WHETHER HE THOUGHT HIS COUNTRY SHOULD
FOLLOW CHILE' S EXAMPLE IN SEEKING A NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS
WITH CUBA:
"CHILE IS IN THE SOUTH AND WE ARE IN THE CARIBBEAN. COLOMBIA
AND VENEZUELA ARE COUNTRIES WHICH HAVE BEEN LASHED BY GUERRILLA
MOVEMENTS, BY URBAN INTERVENTIONS IN OUR DOMESTIC MATTERS.
THAT IS THE SOURCE OF CUBA? S SANCTION. I DO NOT BELIEVE CHILE?S
POSITION IS THE POSITION OF THE CONTINENT AND I CONSIDER IT IS
CUBA THAT MUST CHANGE TOWARD US AND NOT THE REVERSE. WE HAVE
HAD TO INVEST MAJOR SUMS TO MAINTAIN PUBLIC ORDER BECAUSE. OF
THE CUBANS
MR. CHAIRMAN, OUR CONSULTATIONS WITH OUR LATIN AMERICAN NEIGHBORS
IN THE HEMISPHERE SUGGEST THAT THE VIEW OF FORMER PRESIDENT
LLERAS REFLECTS PREVAILING SENTIMENT
IN ITS CONTINUING REVIEW OF POLICY TOWARD CUBA, THE DEPARTMENT
SEES NO EVIDENCE OF ANY DEVELOPMENTS THAT MATERIALLY AFFECT
THE TWIN FOUNDATIONS OF U.S. POLICY. ON THE CONTRARY, THE MOST
RECENT EVIDENCE CONFIRMS THE VALIDITY OF CONTINUING THIS POLICY.
CUBA CONTINUES TO INTERFERE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF
OTHER HEMISPHERIC NATIONS BY PROVIDING TRAINING IN CUBA FOR
URBAN AND RURAL TERRORISTS-BY PROVIDING MONETARY AND OTHER
MATERIAL SUPPORT TO SUBVERSIVE GROUPS--AND OCCASIONAL DIRECT
PARTICIPATION BY CUBANS IN INSURGENCIES. ON JULY 26 PRIME
MINISTER CASTRO OPENLY TOOK SIDES IN THE PENDING URUGUAYAN
ELECTIONS AND DREW A STIFF REJOINDER FROM THE URUGUAYAN
GOVERNMENT HIS PUBLICLY EXPESSED DISAPPOINTMENT OVER THE TURN
OF EVENTS IN BOLIVIA DREW THE REMINDER FROM THE BOLIVIAN
GOVERNMENT THAT CUBANS IN 1967 AND AGAIN IN 1970 HAD BLATANTLY
INTERFERED IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF BOLIVIA, A NATION
THAT HAD EXPERIENCED ONE OF THE MOST FUNDAMENTAL SOCIO-ECONOMIC
EVOLUTIONS IN THE HEMISPHERE IN 1952, SEVEN YEARS BEFORE HE
CAME TO POWER. LAST MONTH, ON AUGUST 27, PRIME MINISTER CASTRO
VIGOROUSLY REAFFIRMED THAT HE WOULD NOT ABANDON HIS SUPPORT
FOR VIOLENT CHANGE IN OTHER NATIONS OF THE HEMISPHERE AND SPOKE
OF C 1 pr9vgg4" 94giRgtp89s oOQ41l7U2Q4AMRg?e7 2DRFROQQR0IDA CPSZ 1 GUER-
RILLAS.
 Approved For Release 2004/11/29 : CIA-RDP73B00296R000200050087-0
DEPARTMENT OF STATE TELEGRAM
UNCLASSIFIED
PAGE 06 STATE 170861
DESPITE PRIME MINISTER CASTRO' S RENEWED EFFORT TO PROJECT HIM-
SELF AS A LATIN AMERICAN REVOLUTIONARY LEADER, IT IS FAIR TO
SAY THAT IN THE PERIOD 19681971 THERE SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN
SOME FALLING OFF IN THE MATERIAL SUPPORT WHICH CUBA
PROVIDED TO SUBERSIVE MOVEMENTS IN OTHER COUNTRIES. AS HAS
BEEN PREVIOUSLY TESTIFIED BEFORE THIS COMMITTEE, CUBAN SUPPORT
HAS. BECOME MORE SELECTIVE AND THERE HAS BEEN. A SHIFT FROM RURAL
GUERRILLA WARFARE TO URBAN TERRORISM. CUBAN ADOPTION OF NEW
TACTICS ON SUBVERSION, HOWEVER, DOES NOT MEAN THAT IT HAS RE-
NOUNCED SUPPORT OF VIOLENT REVOLUTION; NEITHER DOES IT
REPRESENT AN ABANDONMENT OF OTHER FORMS OF SUBVERSION; WHICH
WE BELIVE CUBA CONTINUES TO REGARD AS USEFUL POLITICAL TOOLS?
AN IMPORTANT FACTOR ACCOUNTING FOR SOME REDUCTION IN CUBAN
SUPPORT IS THE FACT THAT THE MEASURES ADOPTED BY THE OAS TO
COUNTER CUBAN INTERFERENCE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF OTHER
COUNTRIES HAVE SUCCEEDED IN WEAKENING CUBA?S CAPABILITY TO COMMIT
SUCH INTERFERENCE. CUBA'S LONG SERIES OF DISASTROUS FOREIGN
ADVENTURES, CULMINATING IN THE CHE GUEVARA 1967 FIASCO IN
BOLIVIA, HAD ITS EFFECT AS WELL. FINALLY, ECONOMIC MISMANAGEMENT
AT HOME MATCHED THE FAILURE ABROAD. PRIME MINISTER CASTRO
SAID I N AUGUST 1970 THAT IF CUBA HAD NOT GIVEN FULL SUPPORT TO
REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENTS IN LATIN AMERICA, IT WAS IN PART BE-
CAUSE "WE HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE TO TO ABANDON NOW THESE POLICIES
WHICH HINDER THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT?S CAPABILITY TO ACHIEVE
ITS OBJECTIVES WOULD THEREFORE BE NEITHER PRUDENT NOR JUST-
IFIED .
WITH REGARD TO SENATE RESOLUT.IN 1'60, THE' DEPARTMENT OF STATE
NOTES THAT THE PROPOSED RESOLUTION IS IN TWO SECTIONS. I SHALL
ADDRESS COMMENTS TO EACH.
THE FIRST SECTION PROPOSES THAT IT BE THE SENSE OF THE SENATE
THAT THE PRESIDENT TAKE STEPS TO REVIEW.U.S. POLICY TOWARD
CUBA WITH THE OBJECTIVE OF BEGINNING A PROCESS WHICH WOULD
LEAD. TO THE REESTABLISHMENT OF NORMAL RELATIONS BETWEEN THE U0S.
AND CUBA. IT APPEARS TO ASSUME THAT A PROCESS LEADING TO
THE REESTABLISHMENT OF NORMAL RELATIONS BETWEEN THE U.S?
AND CUBA WOULD SERVE U.S. INTERESTS AND THAT SUCH A PROCESS
WOULD p~\*IIF)or ft> ole R@ 'L'hl2%T SI~tLk~C~3p@ q?&O4t20g4P18T-Ol'O BE
TRUE. WE BELIEVE THAT THE RESOLUTION MIGHT BE MISINTERPRETED
 Approved For Release 2004/11/29 : CIA-RDP73B00296R000200050087-0
DEPARTMENT OF STATE TELEGRAM
UNCLASSIFIED
PAGE 07 STATE 170861
TO IMPLY THAT WE ARE NO LONGER CONCERNED OVER PRIME MINISTER
CASTRO? S POLICIES OF DEMONSTRATING HOSTILITY TOWARD THE U.S.,
OF EXPORTING HIS REVOLUTION, AND OF SEEKING EVER CLOSER MILITARY
TIES WITH THE USSR. IT COULD WELL ENHANCE HIS PRESTIGE AND
LEND HIM THE STATURE ON THE INTERNATIONAL SCENE HE SEEKS BUT
DOES NOT ENJOY. I BELIEVE IT WOULD ALSO GIVE AN AURA OF LEGI-
TIMACY TO THE EXTREMIST MOVEMENTS SUPPORTED BY CUBA THAT SEEK
VIOLENT OVERTHROW OF GOVERNMENTS IN LATIN AMERICA. THESE ARE
SOME OF THE PERTINENT POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS,
FROM THE ECONOMIC STANDPOINT, THE U.S. HAS LITTLE, IF ANYTHING,
TO GAIN ARRANGEMENTS HAVE BEEN MADE WITH A NUMBER OF FRIENDLY
NATIONS TO ASSURE A RELIABLE SUPPLY OF SUGAR FOR THE U.S.
DOMESTIC MARKET; THEREFORE CUBAN SUGAR IS NOT ESSENTIAL AS LONG
AS THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT REMAINS IN POWERS THE ABSENCE OF CUBAN
TOBACCO OR THE FEW OTHER CUBAN EXPORT PRODUCTS HAS ALSO
NOT HAD SIGNIFICANT EFFECT UPON OUR ECONOMY.
THUS, FROM THE STANDPOINT OF U.S. INTERESTS, UNLESS THE
CUBAN GOVERNMENT WERE TO ABANDON ITS POLICIES AND ACTIONS WHICH
CONSTITUTE A THREAT TO THE PEACE AND SECURITY OF THE HEMISPHERE,
THE BENEFITS TO BE DERIVED FROM NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS WITH
CUBA ARE NOT READILY APPARENT, WHEREAS THE COSTS ARE CLEAR.
U.S- POLICY TOWARD CUBA IS NOT, AS I HAVE STATED AT THE OUTSET,
INFLEXIBLE. SHOULD THE GOVERNMENT OF CUBA ABANDON THE POLICIES
BY WHICH IT EXCLUDED ITSELF FROM THE FAMILY OF AMERICAN NATIONS,
THE UNITED STATES WOULD, IN CONSULTATION WITH THE OTHER MEMBERS,
REVIEW EXISTING POLICIES IN THE LIGHT OF SUCH NEW CIRCUMSTANCES.
THE PRESIDENT SAID AS MUCH PUBLICLY ON APRIL 16 OF THIS YEAR;
ON APRIL 19, FIDEL CASTRO IN 'DIRECT REPLY TO THE PRESIDENT?S
STATEMENT, DECLARED THAT HE SCORNED NORMALIZED RELATIONS WITH
THE UNITED STATES. SEVERAL DAYS LATER, (ON APRIL 21) THE NEW
YORK TIMES EDITORIALIZED:
HIS (CASTRO?S ) STANCE IMPLIES THAT CONTINUED HOSTILITY IS
IN THE INTERESTS OF THE CUBAN PEOPLE.
??CASTRO?S VERBAL SUPERMILITANCY CAN ONLY BE INTERPRETED
AS A PUBLIC ATTACK UPON AND REPUDIATION OF THE MORE CONCILIATORY
LINES NOW BEING FOLLOWED IN MOSCOW AND PEKING. HIS WORDS GUARANTEE
UNFOR'F?!M4V1d1tF,or1R gaVL R 1AMR. -PPMW@ 0Q4t%05@?$a7FQ NUE .
 Approved For Release 2004/11/29 CIA-RDP73B00296R000200050087-0
DEPARTMENT OF STATE TELEGRAM
CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEM BY PER # TOTAL COPIES: REPRO BY
UNCLASSIFIED
PAGE 08 STATE 170861
BUT HE HIMSELF MUST NOW BEAR THE RESPONSIBILITY."
WE KNOW OF NO BASIS FOR BELIEVING THAT CUBA, WHICH FORCED THE
R EAK IN RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES, WOULD NOW WELCOME
THEIR REESTABLISHMENT.
WITH REGARD TO THE SECOND SECTION .OF THE PROPOSED RESOLUTION,
HEMISPHERIC POLICY TOWARD CUBA INCLUDING THAT OF THE U.S.
DERIVES FROM A SERIES OF RESOLUTIONS, ADOPTED BY THE ORGANIZATION
OF AMERICAN STATES AT MEETINGS CONVOKED AT LATIN AMERICAN IN-
ITIATIVE. THESE RESOLUTIONS EXCLUDED THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT OF
CUBA FROM PARTICIPATION IN THE OAS. THEY CONDEMNED CUBA FOR
ACTS OF INTERVENTION AND AGGRESSION AGAINST VARIOUS COUNTRIES OF
THE HEMISPHERE AND IMPOSED SANCTIONS SUSPENDING ALL TRADE AND
SHIPPING AS WELL AS DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN MEMBER COUN-
TRIES AND CUBA UNTIL TH OAS DECIDED BY A TWO-THIRDS VOTE THAT
CUBA HAS CEASED TO BE A THREAT TO THE PEACE AND SECURITY
OF THE HEMISPHERES
THE DEPARTMENT NOTES THAT THE PROPOSED SENATE RESOLUTION EN-
VISAGES A REEXAMINATION BY THE OAS OF ITS CUBAN POLICY AND
CONCURS, THAT SHOULD CIRCUMSTANCES SO WARRANT, REVIEW OF POLICY
TOWARD CUBA SHOULD PROPERLY TAKE PLACE WITHIN THE OAS BUT ONLY
WHEN A CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCES WARRANTS SUCH A REVIEW. UNILATERAL
CHANGE OF POLICY TOWARD CUBA BY ANY OF THE OAS MEMBER NATIONS,
VIOLATES BINDING OBLIGATIONS TAKEN UNDER THE TERMS OF THE RIO
TREATY, DEROGATES FROM THE PRESTIGE AND AUTHORITY OF THE OAS
AND CONSEQUENTLY WEAKENS THE TIES THAT BIND THE NATIONS OF THE
AMERICAS. FOR THIS REASON, _IT IS NOT THE INTENTION OF THE UNITED
STATES TO TAKE UNILATERAL STEPS, MUCH LESS WITHOUT PRIOR CON-
SULTATION WITH THE OTHER OAS MEMBERS, THAT WOULD LEAD TOWARD
NORMALIZING RELATIONS WITH CUBA. FOR THIS REASON WE HAVE DEPLORED
CHILE'S ACTION.
ALTHOUGH THE U.S, IS9 OF COURSE, PREPARED TO PARTICIPATE
IN THE DISCUSSION OF ITEMS PLACED UPON THE OAS AGENDA, THE
DEPARTMENT DOES NOT BELIEVE THAT THE CONSIDERATIONS WHICH LED
TO THE SUBSTANCE OF THE OAS RESOLUTIONS AFFECTING CUBA HAS
CHANGED IN ANY SIGNIFICANT WAY; THEREFORE NO Q HESS
RESOLUTA 06vetff( -AFl 94n4A29Wg6fR _38@4~ > T-JHAT
THE OAS, WHICH PRIME MINISTER CASTRO AS RECENTLY AS A FEW
 Approved For Release 2004/11/29 : CIA-RDP73B00296R000200050087-0
DEPARTMENT OF STATE TELEGRAM
UNCLASSIFIED
PAGE 09 STATE 170861
WEEKS AGO CHARACTERIZED AS THAT CESSPOOL, THAT FILTH, THAT
CADAVER,- SHOULD DIGNIFY CUBA BY ALLOCATING ANY OF ITS VALUABLE
TIME TO TAKING NOTE OF IT
FOR THESE MULTIPLE REASONS, THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WOULD OPPOSE THE ADOPTION ON RESOLUTION 160 BY THE UNITED
STATES SENATE. UNQUOTE
IRWIN
Approved For Release 2004/11/29 : CIA-RDP73B00296R000200050087-0