FOOD FOR THOUGHT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B00100R000300070032-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 20, 2005
• Sequence Number: 32
• Publication Date: January 18, 1980
• Content Type: MF

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NFAC #0457-80
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment
18 January 1980
1 ~
MEMORANDUM FOR: National Intelligence Officers
FROM : Chairman, National Intelligence Council
SUBJECT : Food for Thought
Attached are some questions for possible use in your
monthly warning meetings next week.
Richard Lehman
Attachment
This memo can be downgraded to
UNCLASSIFIED when separated from
attachment.
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FOOD FOR THOUGHT
I. USSR: Fallout from the Intervention in Afghanistan
Soviet Perceptions of US Reactions: Brezhnev's Pravda interview
suggests that the Soviets anticipate a sharper and more long-lasting
decline in bilateral relations than occurred during the first six
months of the Carter administration. If the Soviets have in effect
written off prospects for serious dealings with the present admin-
istration, will they feel more disposed to respond to US retaliatory
measures with countermeasures of their own? Alternatively, if
Brezhnev's harsh rhetoric is a short-lived tactical response to the
President's statements and actions, will the Soviets seek to contain
the damage to bilateral relations?
Brezhnev's Authorit : In view of Brezhnev's personal responsi-
bility for foreign policy since early 1973, will events set in motion
by the intervention impair Brezhnev's prestige and authority in the
CPSU and encourage renewed challenges? Will Afghanistan become a
political football in maneuvering in the coming succession contest?
TNF: What effect might post-intervention developments in East-
West relations have on Soviet policy on NATO's TNF modernization?
Was Moscow's rejection of the NATO offer to negotiate limitations on
medium-range missiles in Europe prompted by the post-intervention
climate, or was it part of Moscow's original scenario for opposing
TNF? Is Soviet rejection aimed primarily at dividing the European
allies from the US and exploiting Dutch, Belgian and West German SPD
reservations and conditions?
Inter-German Relations: Might the Soviets and East Germans now
be inclined to adopt stronger reactions to the TNF decision than
they had intended prior to 25-27 December? Soviet and GDR spokesmen
have warned that TNF could not only damage GDR-FRG relations but affect
the situation in Berlin as well. Might Gen. Yepishev's visit to GSFG
on'24-27 December have been related to imminent Soviet countermeasures
in Berlin? Embassy Moscow has raised the possibility that the Western
reaction to Afghanistan may cause the Soviets to "lash out with a
counter reaction of their own" and suggested renewed attempts to
terminate Allied patrols in East Berlin "might well be one such step."
Eastern European Nations: Might Soviet actions in Afghanistan
cause increased apprehension among the East European leaders? Might
their fears of Soviet intervention provide the spark for outbreaks
of anti-regime demonstrations, in Poland, for example? How is the
equation altered if Tito dies in the near future?
z~c ` . _I 8 ~aTL_.2DD0
P83BUa1OUROUD30Q6Wd3 1 Sources
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II. Afghanistan
Pakistan Border: Do the Soviets believe that the Muslim insur-
gency cannot be contained or destroyed as long as the Afghan-Pakistani
border remains open? How far are the Soviets prepared to go in press-
ing the Pakistanis to curtail Afghan insurgents' activities in Pakistan?
Military Aid to Pakistan: How will Moscow respond if Pakistan
accepts a substantial increase in military assistance from the US
and/or China? Will the Soviets play the "Baluchi card" by increasing
support for Pathan and Baluchi independence or endorsing Babrak's
advocacy of integrating Pakistani Baluchistan into Afghanistan?
III. Iran
Prospects for Khomeini: Are events moving closer to a catalytic
turning point which could abruptly transform the hostage situation and
the Khomenini regime's prospects? Do any of the following seem more
likely than before?
a. A showdown between Khomeni and the Revolutionary Council,
on the one hand,and the embassy captors, on the other.
b. A sharp escalation of the minorities' confrontation with
Tehran; a declaration of independence by the Kurds or Azarbayjanis.
c. Strong Iranian reaction to moves by the US and its allies
to impose economic sanctions: Moinfar's renewed threat to cut
off oil exports to any country which imposes sanctions; moves by
the captors to place the hostages on trial as spies.
d. Bolder Iraqi military probes or provocations, diplomatic
initiatives to abrogate the 1975 Algiers accord, or break diplo-
matic relations.
IV. Iran-Iraq
Iraq is sharpening pressures on Tehran, and recent events have
increased chances of an escalation of mutual hostility. Iraqi Deputy
Prime Minister Tariq Aziz has called for the return of "Arab territories"
acquired by the Shah in the Algiers accord. If Iran, as expected,
rejects Baghdad's demands for revision of the 1975 agreement, will
the Iraqis apply even stronger pressures which might trigger a serious
clash?
V. S ria
Initial assessments have concluded that the Baath congress and
Assad's changes in the leadership will not be effective in arresting
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his declining political base and checking Sunni extremist attempts to
overturn Alawite dominance.
What are the implications of these judgments for Assad's policies
in the next three months? Will he sharpen his campaign against Arab
"reactionary regimes"?
VI. Lebanon
Have the chances of strong Lebanese Christian reaction to the
appearance of Iranians in southern Lebanon increased?
What are the Begin government's calculations regarding the pros
and cons of "unleashing" Haddad's forces again"?
What would be the likely impact on Syrian and Israeli policies of
an escalation of fighting throughout southern Lebanon?
VII. The Yemens
The Alert Memorandum of 12 January covered the major warning
issues. Additional questions might include:
-- Who is now calling the shots in Aden? What is the present
status of the traditional cleavage between Ismail's northerners
and the southerners?
What is Iraq's perception of recent events? Might the Iraqis
attempt to forestall a PDRY takeover under the guise of a
unity agreement by ordering the Baathists in the YAR to oust
Salih? Would a Baathist coup attempt provoke PDRY military
intervention in the YAR?
Have chances increased that Salih will order an attack on
Saudi forces occupying disputed territory along the undemarcated
border?
Soviet Perceptions: How does Moscow assess the present situation?
Which faction in Aden are the Soviets backing?
Ismail has long been regarded as a Soviet protege. Is this still
valid?
How do the Soviets view their recent arms agreement with Salih in
the context of unity negotiations?
Does the Soviet scenario call for jettisoning Salih in favor of
backing a unified Yemen under PDRY control?
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125X1
ea
h
V inese military reaction about which we have n
Are events building toward an early showdown which could destroy
the London agreement?
Nkomo's conciliatory statements on his return to Salisbury suggest
on overture to Muzorewa for an election alliance or a coalition govern-
ment after the elections against ZANU. How will ZANU react if its
leaders adopt a "worst case" interpretation of these events?
IX. Vietnam-Kampuchea-China
The major judgments in the Alert Memo of 7 December seem to remain
valid. The principal question for judgment is why the Vietnamese
offensive in western Kampuchea has been delayed.
-- Did the Soviets persuade Hanoi to postpone the offensive
because they feared that if it occurred concurrent with their
intervention in Afghanistan, it might "overload the interna-
tional circuits" in a potentially dangerous way by creating
an impression of a concerted Soviet and Vietnamese military
initiative? The Soviets would be concerned that such an
impression might provoke an overreaction in the US, Western
Europe, China and Japan.
-- Did the Chinese deliver a stiff ultimatum which caused a last-
minute change in Hanoi's schedule--a blunt and persuasive
thr
t f C
Have the actions oft arnn -~, Acc r v cv; 1 h.. u-.! ...
Are opposition leaders preparing to challenge Chon and/or provoke
a confro tatip ov1err~he~timing of constitutional revisions and electio
frontation with the NDP and student militants in thenextUthreeomonths?
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