MEETING WITH OFFICIALS FROM ISOO AND NARS, 5 FEBRUARY 1981 (U)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85B00236R000200150019-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 5, 2005
• Sequence Number: 19
• Publication Date: February 9, 1981
• Content Type: MFR

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0 9 FEB 1981
SUBJECT: Meeting With Officials From I__ and NARS,
5 February 1981 (U)
1. In attendance were Steve Garfinkel, Harry Mason, and
Laura Kimberly from ISOO; Milton Gustafson, Edwin A. Thompson,
and Jo Anne Williamson from NARS; and, representing the Agency,
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2. This meeting was a followup to an earlier meeting with
Harry Mason of ISOO. NARS officials, particularly Mr. Thompson,
Chief of the Records Declassification Division, were concerned
over the fact that, in responding to FOIA requests, the Agency
sometimes invoked FOIA exemption (b)(3) only for information when
a case could be made for asserting (b)(1) as well. They were
afraid that that could not assure us that the information would
not be inadvertently released in the future. Classified material
is stored in a separate vault at NARS. Unclassified material is
kept in the archives boxes, and the archivists are charged with
screening the boxes before they are made available to researchers
to ensure that documents covered by NARS restrictions or FOIA
exemptions are not included. NARS takes the position that all of
the FOIA exemptions other than (b)(1) are discretionary and that
their personnel. are authorized to make these judgments.
Subsequently, Mr. Gustafson, who is Chief of the Diplomatic
Branch at NARS, approached ISOO, asking whether the CIA was
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3. In the earlier meeting, Mr. Mason seemed to be persuaded
that, depending upon the context,0 often has to be excised 25X1
from documents. The DDO spokespersons explained their reluctance
to claim that the release of information over 30 years old
warranted continued classification, i.e., that its unauthorized
disc_l.o:surre would result in "at least identifiable damaage to the
national security," even though it concerns intelligence sources
and methods. Mr. Mason was also assured that the courts had
consistently ruled that the CIA statutes, 50 U.S.C. 403(d)(3) and
50 403 U.S.C. 403g, were valid (b)(3) statutes. In addition, he
was advised that we did not consider the application of these
statutes to be discretionary and that it was incumbent upon NARS
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to develop and implement procedures to ensure that none of our
(b)(3) information is ever disclosed to researchers without CIA's
prior approval. (Much of this had been discussed previously with
Mr. Thompson in telephone conversations with (U)
4. The 5 February meeting, which was held at CIA
Headquarters Building, was convened at the request of
Mr. Thompson. It started out with Mr. Thompson summarizing the
problem. He seemed somewhat perplexed by the fact that CIA
representatives had reviewed these documents under the systematic
review program and had certified their need for continued classi-
fication. Yet, when the documents were referred to the Agency in
connection with FOIA requests, the CIA did not claim the (b)(1)
exemption. He asked once again if it would not be simpler for
the Agency to cite (b)(1) as well as (b)(3), and suggested that
ISOO could promulgate a definition of "identifiable damage" broad
enough to cover the information in question. The DDO spokesper-
sons pointed out that the reviewing officials, knowing that they
might have to sign affidavits at a later date, would refuse to do
this. It was pointed out that it seemed ironic for NARS and ISOO
to criticize the Agency for declassifying information when they
are constantly admonishing federal agencies against needless
classification. (U)
5. Mr. Gustafson again questioned the need to withhold this
information under (b)(3), noting that researchers can very easily
insert the initials CIA in the blanks. The importance of avoid-
ing official acknowledgement of the location of CIA stations in
particular locations was explained to him, along with the
possible consequences of such an acknowledgement. When
Mr. Gustafson questioned whether the Agency's two statutes quali-
fied as valid (b)(3) laws, he was assured that the courts had
consistently accepted themas such. This was verified by
Messrs. Thompson and Garfinkel. (U)
6. Once that there was general acceptance of the fact that
the (b)(3) information identified by the Agency would have to be
protected from inadvertent disclosure, the discussion got around
to ways and means. The NARS people seemed to think that the best
thing would be to place the sanitized version of the document in
the archives box, attached to a withdrawal sheet explaining the
location of the full-text version. Instead of storing the full-
text copy in an envelope at the back of the archives box--the
usual practice--Mr. Gustafson believed that it would be prefer-
able to set up a special file. As an added precaution, it was
suggested that the Agency might ask the Archivist to add a new
general restriction to cover the sort of information the Agency
wants protected. What is needed is a letter from the DCI to the
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Archivist of the United States, requesting that a restriction be
placed on all documents containing information relating to intel-
ligence sources and methods. The letter would have to explain in
some detail just what constitutes an intelligence source or a
method, and should also note that such things as the names,
titles, etc., of Agency personnel and organizational units are
included. The letter would have to specify the period of time
that the information has to be protected. For example, we could
have the restriction good for 75 years after the date that the
document was originated. Or we could have the restriction
effective for a lesser period of time, such as 40 years, after
which time it would be subject to a second review by the
Agency. Mr. Thompson and Mr. Garfinkel offered to review our
letter in draft to make certain that. it met their needs. Later,
in a telephone conversation with Mr. Thompson offered
to consult with the drafter at any time. The CIA people present
at the meeting seemed to agree that it would be appropriate that
OGC prepare the letter for the DCI's signature. (U)
7. Moving on to another topic, Mr. Thompson questioned
on the matter of the restrictions the Agency has
placed on access to the OSS records accessioned by NARS last
year. When indicated that the CIA might not be
willing to liberalize them, Mr. Thompson pointed out that the OSS
records in RG 226 had been open to researchers for years, without
any requirement that NARS obtain the consent of individuals whose
names appear in the documents. He stated, further, that he
regarded the restrictions as totally unreasonable and. that NARS
never should have accepted the records under those terms.
Mr. Thompson said that, unless an accommodation was reached, NARS
would have to return the records to CIA's custody.
observed that a William Cassidy of California had notified IPD of
his intention to request the records under the FOIA unless NARS
made them available to researchers. (U)
8. Actions required of the Agency:
a. Some office (OGC would seem to be the logical com-
ponent) must be tasked with drafting a letter from the DCI to
the Archivist of the United States asking that NARS add to
its general restrictions provisions for the protection of
intelligence sources and methods, etc., as discussed in para-
graph 6, above. If further guidance is needed, Mr. Thompson
of NARS can be reached on 523-3165. (U)
b. We need to resolve the problem of the restrictions
placed upon the OSS records which NARS finds unacceptable.
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Otherwise, NARS is apt to return the records to the CIA and
we will be faced with processing them under the FOIA--in
which case, only that information which, if disclosed, would
clearly constitute an unwarranted invasion of the privacy of
others can be withheld. (Under guidelines approved by former
DCI William Colby, with few exceptions, names appearing in
OSS documents have been released in fulfilling FOIA
requests.) (U)
c. We obviously need to sharpen our criteria as to
what information requires classification beyond 20 years. It
must appear to NARS that the A .enc 's left hand does not know
what its right hand is loin .
FPLG, when considering the same documents under the FOIA,
sometimes says "not sol" To further complicate the situa-
tion, when such documents are considered in connection with
mandatory review requests from the Presidential libraries,
FPLG, in order to protect the information, will maintain that
classification must be continued. (Under GSA regulations,
such documents are not public records and access is con-
trolled exclusively by classification and donor
restrictions.) (U)
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IPD/CES/lr 9 Feb 81
Distribution:
Orig - IPD FOIA Policy
1 - DDO/IMS/FPLG
1 - IPD Chrono
1 - Corres
1 - DIS
A- CRD
1 - OGC
1 - RMD
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