THE BIG SECRET OF PEARL HARBOR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75-00149R000700490026-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 52
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 28, 2004
• Sequence Number: 26
• Publication Date: April 2, 1954
• Content Type: OPEN

The United States News (i) World Report 0
APRIL 2, 1954
: CIA-RDP75-00149R000700490026-7
20 CENTS
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EXCLUSIVE
By Rear Admiral Robert A. Theobald, U. S. N., Bet.
WITH CORROBORATIVE FOREWORDS BY
Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. N., Ret.,and
Fleet Admiral William F. Halsey, U. S. N.
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The Washington Contribution
to the Japanese ,Attack
What is the truth about Pearl Harbor? This
question is still being asked, 12 years after the
attack and notwithstanding eight investiga-
tions.
These investigations, in the minds of many
people, left disturbing questions still un-
answered, curious actions unexplained.
Who was really to blame for this worst of
all U.S. military disasters?
Now comes a new explanation. It's in a
book called "The Final Secret of Pearl Har-
bor," written by Robert A. Theobald, a rear
admiral in the U. S. Navy, now retired, who
was in command of destroyers at Pearl Harbor
at the time of the attack.
Admiral Theobald puts the responsibility
for Pearl Harbor on one man: President Frank-
lin D. Roosevelt.
The President, he says, deliI; erately invited
the Japanese attack, knew i was coming,
and deliberately withheld this knowledge
from U. S. commanders in Hawaii.
This, the author says, is why Pearl Harbor
,
was caught by surprise on Dec. 7, 1941, why
4,575 Americans were killed or wounded, 18
ships sunk or damaged, 177 airplanes lost,
President Roosevelt's purpose? To bring
U. S. into the war agair st Nazi Germany, ac-
cording to Admiral Thoobald. He says thai
Mr. Roosevelt was cony nced that a Japanese
attack was the only wc y to win solid publi(
support for the war tha he believed the U. S
should fight.
To support his clair, I, Admiral Theobalc
bares official records. Hit prints the secret Jap?
anese messages, deco( led and delivered tc
the White House, that ievealed the Japanes(
plot in advance of the attack. He tells wha ?
went on behind the s.:enes in Washington
In the eight official ir vestigations, conduct.
ed under Democratic Administrations, mos
of the blame for Pearl I- arbor was put on twc
men: Admiral Husband E. Kimmel and Lieut
Gen. Walter C. Short, th. m top U. S. command..
ers in Hawaii. Admiral Theobald calls this or
injustice, says the full s ory was kept a politi.
cal secret. Corroborativi forewords were writ ?
ten by Admiral Kimmel irtd Fleet admiral Wil.
liam F. Halsey. In his f( reword, Admiral Hal ?
sey says that Admiral Kimmel and General
Short were "military rr artyrs."
48 JOILD -REPORT, April 2, 1954
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PEARL NARBO
By Rear Admiral
Robert A. Theobald, U.S.N., Ret.
(Although Admiral Theobald's book will not
be published until April 28, 1954, by the Devin-
Adair Company, book publishers, 23 East 26th
Street, New York City, U. S. News & World Report
has obtained first serial rights throughout the
world to print it in advance of regular book pub-
. I ication.
(The entire contents of this magazine are pro-
tected by copyright. No part of the material from
the book "The Final Secret of Pearl Harbor" in
excess of 500 words may be reprinted or used in
radio or television broadcasts without written
permission of the copyright owners. The copyright
on the first serial rights is held by United States
News Publishing Corporation, and the copyright
on the book is held by Rear Admiral Theobald
and the Devin-Adair Company of New York.
(Any permission to reprint in excess of 500
words prior to April 28, 1954, must be obtained
from United States News Publishing Corpora-
tion. Quotations of less than 500 words are re-
leased for morning newspapers of March 30,
1954.?Editor's note.)
The full text of the book follows:
ADMIRAL KIMMEL'S FOREWORD
REMI ADMIRAL THEOBALD's studies have caused him to
conclude that we were unready at Pearl Harbor because
President Roosevelt's plans required that no word be sent
to alert the Fleet in Hawaii. He has produced a readable,
concise, and convincing presentation of the evidence which
supports his deductions regarding the President's plan and
the details of its execution. In my philosophy I can .find no
reasons which justify the formulation and execution of such
a plan. The individuals in high position in Washington who
willfully refrained from alerting our forces at Pearl Harbor
should never be excused.
The Commanders at Pearl harbor were never informed
of die text nor even given a summary of the American note
delivered to the Japanese Ambassadors on November 26,
1941, which effectually ended the possibility of further ne-
gotiation and thus made the Pacific war inevitable. They were
never informed that the United States had assured the British
of armed support if the Japanese attacked the British. The
existence of this assurance was divulged during the Congres-
sional Investigation in 1946.
During some three months prior to the attack, several
inconsequential Japanese intercepts were supplied to me,
but a great number of vitally important messages which dis-
closed Japanese intentions were never supplied to the Com-
manders at Pearl Harbor, notably: the Tokyo-Honolulu
dispatches regarding the exact location of ships berthed in
Pearl Harbor; the Tokyo-Washington messages which em-
phasized a deadline date by which the Washington confer-
ence must reach a satisfactory agreement or "after that things
are automatically going to happen."
No hint of vital intercepts received, decoded, and delivered
to responsible officials in Washington on December 6 and
December 7, 1941, was sent to the Navy and Army Com-
manders in the Hawaiian area.
Admiral Theobald was serving as Commander, Destroyers,
Battle Force and was actually- in the Port of Pearl Harbor
when the Japanese attacked. He assisted me and was present
when I gave my testimony before the Roberts Commission.
He writes with the authority of personal knowledge con-
cerning the proceedings of that Commission as well as the
events that preceded the attack on the Fleet.
New London, Conn.
December, I 953
(Continued on page 50)
HUSBAND E. KIMMEL
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy (Retired)
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ADMIRAL HALSEY'S FOREWORD
ADMIRAL THEOBALD'S book digests and correlates the results
of his painstaking research into a mass of documentitry
evidence. Whether or not you agree with any or all of his
conclusions, his book is a "must" or evm-y American who
believes in fair plmmy. Bead it with an open nand and arrive
at your own conclusions. I find in it an approach different
from any I have previously seen to the disaster at Pearl Har-
bor on December 7, 1941.
At that time I was one of die three senior commanders
of the Pacific Fleet, serving under Admind Kimmel. I am
sure he kept inc informed of all the intelligence he possessed.
Certainly I did not know then of any of the pertinent "Magic
Messages." All our hitelligence pointed to an attack by ,lapan
against the Philippines or the southern awas in Malaya or
the Dutch East Indies. While Pearl Harbor NV:LS considered
and not ruled out, WC Mass ()I the evidence Illade available
to us pointed in another direction. Ilad we known of Japan's
minute and continued interest in the eiact location and
movement of our ships in Pearl I larbor, as indicated in the
"Magic Messages," it is only logical that we would have
concentrated our thought on meetnig die practical cer-
tainty of an attack on Pearl Harbor. I Inm SURe I would have
protested the movement of my "Fisk Force to Wake Island
in late November and curly December. I am also sure no
protest would have been necessary; because if Kimmel had
possessed this in he would not have ordered that
movement.
I then had my flag in the I.:Wt./paw, one of the two carriers
we had operating in the Pacific. 'Hie second was the lxxing-
ton, part of a Force under hear Admiral Newton's command.
The Saratoga, the third and only other carrier assigned to the
Pacific Fleet, was on the 'est Coast of the United 3tates,
completing periodic overha ml and repair.
We were sadly deficient n long-distance scouting Imlanes.
The only Army planes aviu able were B-18's. These Planes
were slow, shortlegged, and unfitted for overseas se( rkting.
There were not sufficient I firs-Navy scouting plan( s and
good, old, slow, and cumbe some work horses?to run i con-
tinuous :360? search without wearing out materiel an I per-
sonnel. We were further handicapped by directives rec uiring
the training of large quotas of personnel in these plum es for
service in the Atlantic!. 'Ellis together with the transfer of the
carrier Yorktown to the EaN Coast of the United States, was
a tremendous dram on our Iread sliin resources.
Nevertheless, had the "N:agic Messages" been kncom to
us, there can be no doubt Oh t a :360 search would hay m been
ordered and maintained to t me breaking point of materi?1 and
personnel.
I have always considerem. Admiral Kimmel and ( eneral
Short to be splendid officers who were thrown to the ?volves
as scapegoats for something over which they had no c )ntrol.
They had to work with wha they were given, both in :quip-
ment and information. Th !y are our outstanding n ilitary
martyrs.
Fishers Island, N. Y.
September, 195:3
AUTHOR'S INTRODUCTION
Having been present at Pearl llarbor on December 7, 1941,
and having appeared with Admiral Husband E. Kimmel when
that officer testified before the Roberts Commission,* the au-
thor has ever since sought a full understanding of the back-
ground that made that day possible. For many years. he gath-
ered and pieced together the available evidence which ap-
peared to shed light upon the Washington happenings con-
cerned with that attack. These studies produced very definite
conclusions regarding the [flannel in which our country's
strategy had been shaped to entice the .lupanese to attack
Pearl Harbor, and the efforts that have siuce been made to
keep these facts from the know ledge of the American People.
For over three years, the thirt). -nine-volume set which com-
prises the Record of Proceedings of all the Pearl Harbor In-
vestigations has been available to the author. Serious study
? Admiral Kimmel had asked the antlior to act ,b his (=umbel 'felon.:
the Roberts Commission, but the Admiral was tot allowed taitinsel.
Nevertheless, although his status byloie the I:oininission was
anomalous, the author did accompany the Admiral whenever the
latter testified before that body, and late on Ow first day of that
testimony was sworn as a witness. During the disetission connected
with this swearing, the to Ilostit ig exchange ocrfirred:
Justice Roberts: -So it is understood that Nou are not .meting as
counsel.-
Admiral Theobald: ''Ni. sir.
General McCoy: ?fla: ,aliniral is not on trial, of cour.e.-
Justice Roberts: -No, this is not a trial of the admiral, ill any
sense.-
It has always been difficult to understand Ji it ice Roberts. state-
ment that Admiral Kimmel was not on trial. The Commission came
into being to investigatc the surprise attack upon the Fleet which
he had commanded at the time, iind it was .!..14.ncrally recognized
that the result of tl iC inquiry wofild be the sevi?re arraiginm nts of
Admiral Kimmel and General Short, which did constitute the prin-
cipal findings of the Commission: findings which km. ere given wide
publicity at the earliest possible moment.
WiLLIAM F. I ALSEY
Fleet Admiral, U.S. Nary
of these volumes has cause c many revisions of errors n de-
tail, Ina it has served to div !st tla' writer's mind of all doubt
regarding the soundness batik COI1CIUSi011S.
D. is firniilv believed that those in Washington who knew
the facts, decided from the first that. considerations. A pa-
triotism and loyalty to die r wartime Cenomander-in-Chief
required that a veil of seem ?.cy should be drawn abort the
President's handling of the s tuation which culminated in the
Pearl Harbor attack.
While there was great jii tification for this secrecy luring
the continuance of the war, le reasons for it no longei exist.
The war is finished. Preside it Roosevelt and his admi -Astra-
tion are now history. Dictan s of patriotism requiring s:crecy
regarding a line of national conduct in order to presi rve it
for possible future reputitio i do not apply in tins ca ;e be-
CallSe, ill this atomic age. IaL!ilitating an enemy's surpr se at-
tack, as a big a war, is unthinkable. Our
Pearl Ilarbor losses would j reclude that course of action in
the future without considera ion of the increased destri.ctive-
'mess of present and future )(capons. Finally, loyalty t( their
late President in the [natter if Pearl I larbor would be better
served today, if his frien ud! would discard their pol ey of
seciecv in favor of lull putt icily.
Another consideration vos?? m. COM-
understanding of the v Peat0I1Ar14(43tcp, is the
thought of justice to the professional reputations o Ha-
waiian Commanders. Achnii al Kimmel and General Hiort?
a justice which is long overt cue.
Thriaighout the war, inai 'mien ance of the national m -morale
at the highest possible level demanded complete publi con-ook,
fidence in the President ion. his principal military advisers.
During that time, the public could not be given cause to as-
sign a tithe of blame for the Pearl Ilarbor attack to W;J-illing-
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-int rural -ecrefof Pearl Harbor
ton. And so, dating from the report of the Roberts Commis-
sion, most of the responsibility for Pearl Harbor has been
placed upon the two Hawaiian Commanders. This carefully
executed plan which diverted all suspicion from Washington
contributed its full measure to the successful conduct of
the war.
The time has come when full publicity should be given
to the Washington contribution to the -Pearl Harbor attack,
in order that the judgment of the American people may as-
sign to Admiral Kimmel and General Short no more than
their just and proper share of the responsibility for that
tragic day.
Manifestly, many readers will be reluctant to agree with
the main conclusions which have been reached in this study.
In recognition of this fact, the normal sequence of deductive
reasoning is discarded in favor of the order used in a legal
presentation. The case is stated at the outset, and the evi-
dence is then marshalled and discussed. The reader is thus
enabled to weigh each fact, as it is presented, against the
conclusions, which have been firmly implanted in the mind
of the author by the summation of these facts.
PART I
The sole purpose of the subject matter contained herein is
a searching for the truth, and it is hoped that the absence of
any ulterior motive is apparent throughout. Comments of a
critical character concerning the official actions of officers fre-
quently intersperse the pages which follow. No criticism of
'the officer is intended. Those officers were obeying orders,
under circumstances which were professionally most trying
to them. Such comments are necessary to a full understanding
of the discussion of the moment, however, but there is no
intention to impugn the motives of any individual. Patriotism
and loyalty were the wellsprings of those motives.
There is necessarily considerable recurrence of the same
thought and argument in the development of the successive
phases of this closely interwoven subject. Sometimes this has
been unavoidable if the connected flow of a particular line
of reasoning was to be maintained. At other times, the repeti-
tion was deliberately used for emphasis.
Marblehead, Mass.
February, 1954
RouLarr A. TILEOBALD
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy (Retired)
President Roosevelt Brings War
to the United States
&Orel
MAIN DEDUCTION:
PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT
CIRCUMVENTS
AMERICAN PACIFISM
I N THE SPEING OF 1940, Denmark, Norway, Holland, Belgium
and France were conquered by Germany, and throughout
the remainder of that year Great Britain's situation was so des-
perate that many expected her collapse early in the ensuing
year. Fortunately, however, the Axis powers turned East in
1941 to conquer Greece and to attack
Russia.
There is every reason to believe that
when France was overcome President
Roosevelt became convinced the United
States must fight beside Great Britain,
while the latter was still an active belliger-
ent, or later sustain the fight alone, as the
last democratic stronghold in a Nazi world.
Never, however, had the country been
less prepared for war, both psychological-
ly and physically. Isolationism was a domi-
nant philosophy throughout the land, and
the armed forces were weak and conse-
quently unready.
The United States not only had to be-
come an active participant in democracy's
fight as quickly as possible, but a people,
completely united in support of the war
effort, had to be brought into the arena.
But, how- could the country be made to
U. S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, April 2, 1954
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fight? Only a cataclysmic happening could move Congress
to enact a declaration of war; and that action would not
guarantee that the nation's response would be the completely
united support which victory has always demanded. This was
the President's problem, and his solution was. based upon the
simple fact that, while it takes two to make a fight, either one
may start it.
As the people of this country were so strongly opposed
to war, one of the Axis powers must be forced to involve the
United States, and in such a way as to arouse the American
people to Wholehearted belief in the necessity of fighting.
This would require drastic action, and the decision was un-
questionably a difficult one for the President to make.
In this connection, it should be remembered that Japan,
Germany, and Italy signed the Tripartite Treaty on Septem-
ber 28, 1940, by which the three nations agreed to make
common cause against any nation, not then
a participant in the European war or the
Sino-Japanese conflict, which attacked one
of the signatories.
Thereafter, the fact that war with Japan
meant war with Germany and Italy played
an important part in President Roosevelt's
diplomatic strategy. Throughout the ap-
proach to war and during the fighting, the
primary U. S. objective was the defeat of
Germany.
To implement the solution of his prob-
lem, the President: (1) instituted a suc-
cessful campaign to correct the Nation's
military unpreparedness; (2) offered Ger-
many repeated provocatiouS; by violations
of neutrality and,ditifeinafic usage; (3) ap-
plied ever-increasing diplomatic-economic
pressure upon Japan, which reached its
sustained climax on July 25, 1941, when
the United States, Great Britain, and the
ADMIRAL THEOBALD
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The Final Secret or Fearl Harbor
Netherlands stopped their trade with Japttn and subjected her
to almost complete economic encirclement; (4) made mutual
commitments with the British Milne .Minister at Newfound-
liutd in August. 1941, whidi prinnised mutual support in the
event that the United States, Great Britain, or a third country
not then at war were attacked by Japan in the Pacific; (5)
terminated the Washington conference with the NOW Of No-
vember 26, 19.11, which gave Japan no choice but surrender
or war: (6) retained a weak Pacific Fleet in I lawaiian waters,
despite contrary naval advice, where it served only one diplo-
matic purpose, an invitation to a Japanese surprise attack; (7)
furthered that surprise by causing the Ilawaiiati Commanders
to be denied invaluable information from decoded Japanese
dispatches concerning the rapid approach nf the war and the
strong probability that the attack WOUld he directed at Pearl
harbor,
Tins denial of information was a vital feature of enticing
a Japanese surprise attack upon Pearl Harbor. If Admiral
Kimmel and Ceneral Short had been given the knowledge
possessecl by the Washington authorities, the Hawaiian Com-
mands would have been alerted against an 011?PiCilS attack.
The Pacific Fleet would have kept the sea during the first
TRANSCRIPT OF THE
AUTHOR'S NAVAL CAREER
Entered Naval Academy, June, 1903
Graduated from Naval Academy, September. 19(115
Gunnery Officer, U.S.S. New York, Flagship of U. S.
Squadron with British Grand Fleet, 1917-1918
Promoted to Commander. September. 1918
Executive Officer, Naval Post Graduate School.
1919-1921
Destroyer Command, Asiatic Fleet, 1922-1924
Commanding Officer, Naval Post Graduate School.
1924-1927
Executive Officer, U.S.S. West Virgivia, 1927-1929
Under Instruction, Senior Class, Naval War College,
1929-1930
Secretary of War Plans, Navy Department, and
Member of Joint Army-Navy Planning Com-
mittee, 1930-1932
Promoted to Captain. February, 1932
Chief of Staff, Destroyers, Pacific Fleet, 1932-1931
Member of Advanced Class, Naval War College,
engaged in Seminar study of Japan and Pacific
War, 1934-1935
In Charge, Strategy Division, Naval War College.
1935-1937
Commanding Officer, U.S.S. Nevada, 1937-1939
Chief of Staff, U. S. Fleet, 1939-1940
Member. General Board, Navy Department. Spring
of 1940
Promoted to Rear Admiral, June, 1940
Commanding Cruiser Division Three. Summer of
1940
Commanding Flotilla One. Destroyers, Pacific Fleet,
1940-1941
Commanding Destroyers, Pacific Fleet, December,
1941-May, 1942
Commanding Northern Pacific Force. May, 1942-
January, 1943
Commandant. First Naval District, 19-13-1944
Retired from Active Service, February, 1945
0001907
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days of December, 1941, u Itil the issue of peace or v ar had
been decided. With the hi Oily effective Japanese esi-ionage
in Hawaii, this would has' caused Tokyo to cancel tae sur-
prise attack,
The problem which lace I Lincoln during March et 1861
was identical in principle?t ) unite the sentiment of the North
behind the policy of comp( Iling the seceded Southeri. states
by force of antis to return to the Union. For a month after
Ins inauguration, he made ic) move, and then South Ca:olina's
insistent demands for the st rrender of Fort Sumter gave him
the answer to Ins problem. Ile refused to surrender the fort,
and dispatched a fleet to r?provision it. South Cana a then
fired the first shots of the ( ivil \-Var. Pearl Harbor wa . Presi-
dent Boosevelt's Fort Sunni r.
Diplomatically, Presiden Hoosevelt's strategy of forcing
Japan to war by unremittii g and ever-increasing diplomatic-
economic pressure, and by simultaneously holding ou-: Fleet
in 1 lawaii as an invitation le a surprise attack, was a cc mplete
success. Militarily, our ship and personnel losses ma De-
cember 7, 1941 as the day of tragic defeat. One is to ved to
conclude that the anxiety :o IlaNT Japan, beyond an possi-
bility of dispute, commit lie first act of war, caus?.d the
President and Ins civilian .dvisers to disregard the nilitary
ads ice which would somew 'at have cushioned the blo v. The
President, before the CVC1 t, probably envisaged a Panay
incident' of somewhat Ian yr proportions. Despite tie fact
that the attack laid the lc indation for complete vic:ory, a
[milk price was paid, as t e following account of th2 ship,
plane, and personnel losse; discloses,
The Pearl Harbor Losse..: Facts and Figures
The Japanese clearly in ended that their entire sirprise
attack should be delivered against military ohjectivci. The
first wave's of the attack W !re delivered against the t:irfields
on the Island of Oahu?Ar ny, Navy, and Marine Cc rps?tc
reduce the air-borne oppo Rion as much as possibl The
main attacks began 15 mi lutes after these prelimin try at-
tacks, and were primarily lirected against the capital ships
in Pearl Harbor. Damage i acted upon smaller vesse Is was
clearly the incidental cow equenee of the main op e ration.
Very few planes dropped ti .?,ir bombs upon the city of Hono-
lulu. Three planes did so n the late phases of the attack,
but their last-minute chan: is of course indicated that this
was done because those i articular pilots did not (are to
encounter the severe anti-a rcraft fire that was then b irsting
over their main target are:.
In December, 1941, the 2apital ships of the Pacific Fleet
numbered twelve: 9 Battle hips; :3 Carriers. Of these_ eight
Battleships but none of th t Carriers were present ii Pearl
Ilarlitir at the tiine of the Japanese attack: the Battleship
Co/orado was in the BITI1Crt011 Navy Yard; the --'arrier
Enterprise was in a Task 'orce returning from Wal e; the
Lexington was in a Task 1 orce I caving planes to M dway;
the Saratoga was on the We St Coast, having just comp eted a
Navy lard overhaul.
The results of the Japa lese air attacks upon fin U.S.
Pacific Fleet in Pearl I larb r on December 7, 1941, v 'ere as
follows:
Battleships:
Arizona, total loss, as her t Tward magazines blew up;
Oklahoma, total loss, capsize d and sank in harbor?latei raised
solely to clear harbi r of the obstruction and resunk.
oft Oaltu;
Ca/ifornia, tcst Virgiuna, ank in upright position a: their
berths with quarter leeks awash?much later raised,
repaired, and returr ?el to active war service;
? U.S.S. Panay, an American ; linboat, sunk by Japanese b )mbing
planes on the Yangtze River on December 12, 1937.
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The Final Secret of Pearl Harbor
Nevada, beached while standing out of the harbor, to pre-
vent sinking in deep water after extensive bomb dam-
age-repaired and returned to active war service;
Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Tennessee, all received damage
but Of a less severe character.
Smaller Ships:
Cruisers: Helena, Honolulu, and Raleigh were all damaged,
but were repaired and returned to active war service;
Destroyers: Two damaged beyond repair; two others dam-
aged but repaired and returned to active war service;
Auxiliary Vessels: 1 Seaplane Tender, 1 Repair Ship, both
.severely damaged but repaired and returned to active
war service;
Target Ship: Utah, former battleship, sank at her berth.
The Japanese attacks upon the various Oahu airfields re-
sulted in the following U. S. plane losses: Navy 80; Army 97.
U. S. military personnel casualties were: Navy, including
Marine Corps, 3077 officers and enlisted men killed, 876
wounded; Army, including the Army Air Corps, 226 officers
and enlisted men killed, 396 wounded. Total: 4575.
The Japanese losses were 48 planes shot down and three
midget submarines destroyed. These vessels displaced 45
tons and were of little, if any, military value.
&a/am 2
PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT'S
PROGRESSIVE MOVES
TOWARD WAR
Progress Toward Military Preparedness
DESPITE the many handicaps that had to be overcome, the
President's campaign for military preparedness was
markedly successful during 1940 and 1941. His best ally was
a Congress with a majority in each House anxious to wipe
out the many years of inadequate appropriations for the mili-
tary and naval establishments. On September 3, 1940, the
United States obtained long-term leases to outlying bases in
British territory, in exchange for 50 old destroyers. On Sep-
tember 16, the Selective Service Act became law. By the end
of 1940, Congress had voted: an immediate increase of the
Army to 1,000,000 enlisted men, with an eventual goal of
4,000,000; 50,000 planes for the Army Air Corps; 170,000
enlisted men for the Navy, and 34,000 for the Marines; 15,-
000 planes and 10,000 pilots for the Naval Air Force; and a
naval building program which envisaged an eventual two-
ocean navy and embraced 17 battleships, 14 heavy cruisers,
40 light cruisers, 197 destroyers and 74 submarines.
Continuing his efforts, the President, on December 29,
1940, made a radio plea to the country for support for further
large increases in the Army and Navy; and the budget sub-
mitted in January, 1941, recommended the then tremendous
peacetime appropriation of $10,811,000,000 for the military
and naval establishments. On April 10, 1941, the United
States acquired defense rights in Greenland; and in July,
1941, with the consent of that government, American mili-
tary forces occupied Iceland.
Provocation Offered Germany
Germany's complacent acceptance of American violations
of neutrality was a surprising feature of the European war,
between June, 1940, and December, 1941. In fact, it was
soon apparent that Germany did not intend to contribute to a
break of diplomatic relations with the United States. Ameri-
can military intervention in Europe in World War I had
proved decisive, and Hitler obviously was not courting a
repetition in World War II.
The important American violations of neutrality during
that period were: (1) shipments of considerable amounts of
war material to Great Britain, commencing immediately after
Dunkirk; (2) the acquiring of overseas bases in British terri-
tory, and in Greenland and Iceland; (3) the giving to Great
Britain of 50 old destroyers, during a state of war between
that country and Germany and Italy; (4) the President's
broadcast warning to the Axis, December 29, 1940, that no
Dictator could weaken American determination to help Great
Britain; (5) the enactment of Lend-Lease, on March 11,
1941, and, thereafter, the extension of this unilateral war-
time aid to the countries arrayed against the Axis-Great
Britain, Russia, China, Greece, Holland, Norway, and
Czechoslovakia; (6) the closing of the German and Italian
consulates and the freezing of the assets of those countries in
the United States by Executive Order, in answer to Axis
attacks on American shipping; (7) the President's explanation
to the world, in July, 1941, that the American occupation of
Iceland was undertaken to forestall a possible seizure by
Germany; (8) the announcement, also in July, 1941, that the
United States Navy would keep the sea lanes open to Iceland
and to all other advance garrisons, which meant a campaign
against German submarines in the middle and western Atlan-
tic'; (9) the President's public statement on September 11,
1941, that American naval vessels and planes would fire on
Axis ships which entered waters vital to American interests.
American Pressure on Japan
President Roosevelt's progressive tightening of the diplo-
matic-economic pressure on Japan was most significant. On
January 26, 1940, six months after its abrogation by the
United States, the American-Japanese commercial treaty
lapsed; and through 1940, successive restrictions stopped
shipments of airplane fuel, scrap metal, and much-needed
machinery and machine tools to Japan. On October 9, 1940,
this country discontinued subsidies on wheat shipped to the
Far East. During 1941, Anglo-American support caused the
Dutch East Indies to refuse to be forced into Japan's eco-
nortic empire. Early in 1941, Great Britain, The Netherlands,
and the United States commenced to extend financial and
military aid to China; and at the same time, the Anglo-Saxon
countries began the recall of their citizens from the Far East.
On May 29, 1941, in retaliation for Japanese seizure of
American gasoline in Haiphong, an Executive Order stopped
export from the Philippines to Japan of raw materials essen-
tial to the prosecution of war. On July 25, in answer to
Japan's seizure of French Indo-China, the United States,
Great Britain, and The Netherlands, acting in concert, froze
Japanese assets and stopped all trade with the offending
country.
On Sundtry, August 17, 1941, the day of his return from
the Newfoundland meeting with Mr. Churchill, President
Roosevelt held a conference with Ambassador Nomura, dur-
ing which two State Department papers were read and dis-
cussed. Copies of these papers were given to the Japanese
Ambassador for transmission to his government.
Both documents contained strongly worded passages,
though they were mainly concerned with a summary of
*Throughout the fall of 1941, American destroyers attacked Get-
man submarines with depth charges with unknown results. During
September and October, German submarines inflicted the following
damage: U.S.S. Greer torpedoed; U.S.S. Salinas, supply vessel,
torpedoed; U.S.S. Kearney, destroyer, torpedoed; U.S.S. Reuben
James, destroyer, sunk.
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PRINCIPAL CHARACTERS OF THE PEARL HARBOR STORY
PRESIDENT [FRANKLIN D.] ROOSEVELT SECRETARY OF WAR [HENRY L.] STIMSON
SECRETARY OF STATE [CORDELL] HULL SECRETARY OF NAVY [FRANK] KNOX
Officer, 1941* Duty in late 1941
General [George C.] Marshall Chief of Staff, U. S. Army
Brig. General [Leonard T.] Gcrow Assistant Chief of Staff, War Plans Division
Brig. General [Sherman] Miles Assistant Chief of Staff, Military Intelligence Divis on
Colonel [Rufus S.] Bratton Chief, Far Eastern Section, Military Intelligence D vision
Colonel [Otis K.] Sadticr Army Communications Service, Signal Corps, War
Department
Admiral [Harold R.] Stark Chief of Naval Operations
Rear Adm. (Royal E.] Ingersoll Asst. Chief, Naval Operations
Rear Adm. [Richmond K.] Turner Director of War Plans
Rear Adm. [Leigh] Noyes Director, Naval Communications
Captain [Theodore S.] Wilkinson Director, Naval Intelligence
Captain [ John R.] Beardall Aide to President
Captain [Flank E.] Beatty Aide to Secretary of Navy
Commander [Laurance F.] Safford Head, Communications Security Division, Naval
Communications
Commander [Arthur H.] McCollum Head of Far Eastern Section, Naval Intelligence
Lt. Comdr. [Alwin D.] Kramer In Charge, Translation Group, Communications
Security Div.
Admiral [Thomas C.] Hart Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet
Admiral [Husband E.] Kimmel Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet
Lt. Gen. [Walter C.] Short Commanding General, Hawaiian Department
Gen. [Douglas] MacArthur Commanding General, Philippine Department
*Officer and rank at time of Pearl Harbor.
Rank in 1945**
General of Army
Lieut. General
Major General
Colonel
Colonel
Admiral, Retired
Admiral
Admiral
Rear Admiral
Vice Admiral
Rear Admiral
Rear Admiral
Captain
Captain
Captain
Admiral, Retired
Rear Admiral, Re:.
Maj. Gen., Retired
General of Army
* * Rank at time of Congressic ial Investigation.
it conversations between the ALnbassador and the
State Department dining the preceding months, which had
been interrupted when Japan occupied French Indo-China.
Admiral Nomura was told that they were to be given the
status of merely reference material. This permitted the Presi-
dent to express the American views in language which, in a
formal note, could have precipitated an immediate crisis be-
tween the two countries.
One of the papers was an answer to proposals for a meet-
ing between President Roosevelt and Prince Kamoye, the
Japanese Prime Minister, and for the resumption of Ow infor-
mal conversations in Washington. Its most significant extracts
were as follows:
"The Acting Secretary of State ... pointed out that the
government of the United States could ()Lily assume that
the occupation by Japan of French Indo-China . . con-
stituted notice to the United States that .1apan had Liken
by forceful means a step preparatory to embarking on
further movements of conquest in the South Pacific area.
The government of the United States accordingly had
no alternative but to inform the Japanese Ambassador that,
in the opinion of this government, the meLtsures then taken
by the Japanese Government had served to remove the
basis for further conversations relative to ti peaceful settle-
ment in the Pacific area:
"It goes without saying that no proposals or suggestions
affecting the rights and privileges of either the United
States or Japan would be considered except as they [night
be in conformity with the basic principles to which the
United States has long been committed;
"If ...a program based upon peaceable and constructive
principles Wen' to be adopted for the Pacific and if there-
54
after any of the countries or areas within the Pacific were
menaced, the policy of ai ling nations resisting aggiession
would continue to be to lowed by this governmer t and
tins government would ()Operate with other mai( ns in
extending assistance to al y country threatened."
The other paper conclude 1 with this warning:
", . . This government tow finds it necessary to : ay to
the government of Japan lint if the Japanese Government
takes any further steps in iursuance of a policy or program
of military domination by .orce or threat of force of
iieigh-
boring countries, the gove nment of the United States will
be compelled to take imm xliately any and all steps ?vhich
it may deem necessary to' ,ard safeguarding the legit Mate
rights and interests of th! United States and Ann rican
nationals and toward insu ling the safety and secur ty of
the United States."
On September 3, 1941, th a United States asked Jap in to
accept the following four 1 rinciples as the basis foi any
further discussions: (1) resi cct for the territorial inti grity
and sovereignty of all natioi s; (2) non-interference iii the
internal aflairs of other natio is; (3) equality of opportanity
in trade and economic matter: ; (4) status quo throughot t the
Pacific area.
Diplomatic exchanges di ring September accompl shed
nothing, and on October 2, e United States asked for clear-
cut evidence that Japan intem ed to withdraw her troops from
China and Indo-China. On October 16, Prince Kon aye's
Cabinet resigned and two d Lys later, that of General Tojo
was installed. Washington in mediately recognized that this
change of Cabinets was a de cided step toward war.
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Japan had to break the economic ,encirclement to which
she had been subjected since July 25 or abandon her plans to
establish what she euphemistically characterized as the Asiatic
:0-Prosperity. Sphere. So, about the middle of November,
'Ambassador Extraordinary Kurusu joined Admiral Nomura,
the accredited Japanese Ambassador, in Washington to nego-
tiate a solution of U.S.-Japanese issues.
As a basis for the settlement of the differences, the Am-
bassadors proposed that: (1) the United States give Japan
all the oil she needed, and release the frozen Japanese assets;
(2) the United States cooperate with Japan to secure the
goods and commodities from the Dutch East Indies, which
the two nations needed; (3) Japan agree to withdraw troops
from French Indo-China, "upon either the restoration of
peace between Japan and China or the establishment of an
equitable peace in the Pacific." In the meantime, Japan would
withdraw troops from Southern Indo-China when the United
States agreed to the foregoing proposals, provided the United
States and Japan should mutually agree not to advance troops
into Southeastern Asia and the South Pacific, except into that
part of French Indo-China where the Japanese troops were
then stationed.
Mutual Commitments at Newfoundland
Fifteen days after the United States, Great Britain, and
The Netherlands stopped their trade with Japan as an answer
to the latter's military occupation of French Indo-China,
President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill met at
Newfoundland. The conference lasted from August 9 to
13, 1941.
The one official pronouncement concerning the conference
was a joint statement, known as the Atlantic Declaration,
which was released in Washington on August 14. This con-
sisted of the enunciation of eight principles which set forth
the lack of aggressive intentions on the part of the two coun-
'"rAries, the postwar conditions which they deemed essential to
a better world, and certain postwar actions which they con-
sidered should be taken against the aggressor nations follow-
ing their defeat.
The Atlantic Declaration was an expression of lofty senti-
ments, which did nothing to further Anglo-American coop-
eration in the rapidly developing Pacific situation, which was
the reason for the conference. The neutral character of the
whole declaration is reflected in its preamble, which read,
"The President of the United States and Prime Minister
Churchill, representing His Majesty's Government in the
United Kingdom, being met together, deem it right to make
known certain common principles in the national policies of
their respective countries on which they base their hopes for
a better future for the world."
No one, for a minute, can entertain the thought that Presi-
dent Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill made a twenty-five-hun-
dred-mile round trip through a submarine-infested ocean,
accompanied by high-ranking diplomatic, military, and naval
advisers, to produce nothing more concrete than this neutral
pronouncement. Fortunately, for the record, later events con-
clusively indicate that the two national leaders experienced a
satisfactory meeting of their minds at Newfoundland, and
that the understandings reached in their private talks consti-
tuted powerful support for their ensuing prewar diplomacy
in Pacific matters.
The Prime Minister had undoubtedly hoped to lay the
foundation for an Anglo-American alliance at the conference.
He undoubtedly left Newfoundland fully cognizant of the
strong isolationist sentiments in the United States, and with
an appreciation that Japan's aggression must be counted
upon to bring the United States into the war, despite the
President's conviction that American participation was essen-
tial to ensure allied victory.
These facts and the complete understandings with which
the two leaders parted are attested by the following passages
in Mr. Churchill's speech to the House of Commons on
January 27, 1942:
"We therefore have lain?I am putting it as bluntly as I
can?for nearly two years under the threat of an attack by
Japan with which we had no means of coping. But as time
has passed, the mighty United States, under the leadership
of President Roosevelt, from reasons of its own interest and
safety but also out of chivalrous regard for the cause of
freedom and democracy, has drawn ever closer to the con-
fines of the struggle. And now that the blow has fallen,
it does not fall upon us alone.
. . The probability since the Atlantic conference, at
which I discussed these matters with Mr. Roosevelt, that
the United States, even if not herself attacked, would come
into the war in the Far East, and thus make final victory
sure, seemed to allay some of the anxieties. The expecta-
tion has not been falsified by the events. It fortified our
British decision ?to use our limited resources on the actual
fighting fronts."
Two features of the foregoing quotations are worthy of
particular attention. First, there is the statement that Presi-
dent Roosevelt's leadership brought the United States pro-
gressively closer to the war. Secondly, the Atlantic Conference
provided Mr. Churchill with sufficiently strong assurances of
U. S. military support in the Far East to enable him to base
important wartime military decisions on those assurances.
What stronger evidence can there be that President Roosevelt
did make positive commitments at Newfoundland?
The following incidents offer further evidence that the
conference produced mutual understandings:
On August 17, 1941, as we have just seen, President Roose-
velt wasted no time upon his return to Washington in taking
action calculated to agitate further the already strained U. S.-
Japanese relations;
November 7, 1941, the President asked the Cabinet
whether it thought the country would support active inter-
vention by the Government on behalf of a nation subjected
to further Japanese aggression in the Far East, and received
the unanimous opinion that it would;
November 10, 1941, Prime Minister Churchill publicly
announced in. London that if war broke out between the
United States and Japan, Great Britain would declare
war upon Japan "within the hour"?a commitment he
would never have made, with the tremendous war bur-
dens his country was then supporting, unless he had his
quid pro quo.
This close alignment of American and British diplomacy
is conclusive proof that secret talks of the two leaders at
Newfoundland produced an understanding so complete that
it was an alliance in all but name. About December 5, when
it was too late for American isolationism to affect the march
of events, Great Britain received the assurances that con-
verted this understanding into a military alliance.
This event became known as follows. Based on the assur-
ances, ?the War Office in London, on December 6, sent
the following order to Air Marshal Brooke Popham, the
British Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Air Forces in
Malaya:
WE HAVE NOW RECEIVED ASSURANCES OF AMERICAN ARMED
SUPPORT IN CASES AS FOLLOWS: (A) WE ARE OBLIGED TO EXE-
CUTE OUR PLANS TO FORESTALL JAP LANDING ON ISTHMUS OF
KRA OR TAKE ACTION IN REPLY TO NIPS INVASION ANY OTHER
PART OF SIAM; (B ) IF DUTCH INDIES ARE ATTACKED AND WE
GO TO TIIEIR DEFENSE; (C) IF JAPS ATTACK US THE BRITISH.
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THEREFORE WITHOUT REFERENCE TO LONDON PUT PLAN IN
ACTION IF FIRST YOU HAVE GOOD INE0 JAI, EXPEDITION AD-
VANCING WITH THE APPARENT INTENTION OT LANDING IN KRA
SECOND IE THE NIPS VIOLATE ANY PART OFTHAILAND.
IF' NEI ARE ATTACKED PUT INTO OPERATION PLANS AGBEED
UPON BETWEEN BRITISH _SND DUTCH."
This dispatch WaS ((noted vcrhIiiit in 3 report of its re-
ceipt which the U.S. Naval Observer ID Singapore made to
Admiral Hart in Manila. Having no knowledge of the matter.
the Admiral relayed the Singapore message to the Nav De-
partment, with a request for instructions. The Pearl Harbor
attack forestalled any \Vashington reply, and thereafter none
was needed nor made. Consequently, nothing noire concern-
ing the incident has ever hrell made public. NVe do not know
how the assurances were transmitted from Washington to
London. We do not know what instructions, if any, were
given to Admiral Stark and General :Marshall. Certainly. ncine
were ever sent to Admiral !fart.
This dispatch from the British 'War Office to the Com-
mander-in-Chief in Singapore, sent before the Japanese at-
tack upon Pearl Harbor. is definite proof that Anglo-.Ameri-
can military cooperation was always an assured fact atter
the Newfoundland emilerence.
Termination of the Washington Negotiations
with Nomura and Kurusu
On November 26, 19-11. Seeretai huh Lamled the Japa-
nese Ambassadors the note which purported to Net for the
American proposals for resolving tile
issues 1 c1v. cell the two
countries. Stripped of its diplomatic et:dr:lag('
stated, the note suggested that, in exchatige for a new trade
agreement and the unfreezing of each other's assets, japan
agree to: (1) the acceptance of complete defeat in the Sino-
Japanese war, by the withdr;teval of all her forces from China;
(2) her tacit surrender to die economic encirclement, by a
similar withdrawal from French Indo-Chinit. whose inviola-
bility would thereatter lie respected: (3) her participation ill
a nonaggression treat , evliaiSe pr.ictieai 'fleet wiodii 1)0
to guarantee the following lands from attack: the Philip-
pines. Siberia. the Dutch East Indies, (hina. Thai; Hi)
the ttbolition Of the japanese-ereated puppet goverimicnts
in China and Manchukuo. by promising with the United
States to support HD government in Chola but that of Chiang
Kai-shek; (5) the practical .tbrogation of lapanese obliga-
tions to Germany and Italy under the PrOVINIMIN Ill the
Tripartite Treaty.
711e details of the American note Were reported to lokyo
in the Washington Embassy dispatch # 189 (see Chapter 5).
These American proposals were absolutely devoid of dip-
lomatic finesse. A far more subtle. note resisting the japanese-
suggested solution would have been equally eflectiee
breaking off the negotiations. The only possible conclusion is
that Pre ident Roosevelt wanted to be absolutely sure that
Japan's miswer would be a declaration of war. Ile used an
iron-shod club instead of a diplomatic rapier to attain his
purpose.
Everyone concerned recognized that this mite put a ii end
to the Kurusu-Nomunt negotiations, and that war was in-
evitable. Secretary 111111 at once informed the beads (i1 the
Army and Navy that diplomatic negotiations had failed, and
that further action [oust be the responsibility of the Armed
Forces. Tokyo, by secret dispatch, immediately told the Japa-
nese Ambassadors that the American proposals were totally
unsuited as a basis for further negotiations. 011 November
27, President Roosevelt talked to Mr. Churchill on the trans-
Atlantic telephone. and the IleWS 11111SI have been most
welcome to the British Prime Minister, who had striven for
so long to gain the United States as ant active war ally.
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President Roosevelt, by tin note of November 26, defi i itchy
amid deliberately brouglit v lir to die United States Ile
had flung the gauntlet into Japan's face, The lattet's at-
tempt to break the encircle' lent had failed. She mus now
slirrelIder or fight, and there vas no question what her a iswer
would be.
Al-ter all hope of a settl ?meta had vanished, Pre ident
Roosevelt sent a personal ap heal to die Emperor, askin him
tin preSerVe peaCe. TIRS ;Irrivo ] in Toky0 SO late that Ain tassa-
dor Grew was unable to de iver it before the Pearl Harbor
attack. One can only conch de that this dispatch New sent
solely for its possible effects ii the pages of history.
The Fleet in Hawaii
Tin' Pacific' ["hot was a tallied in Ilawaiian wate.S by
uttlet of Pre,ikhlit Ituoseve t from April, 1940, until the
Pearl Ilarbor attack.
Admiral J. 0. Richards() I, Commander-in-Chief o' the
Fleet (luring 19-10, visited Alashington twice in the latter
hall of that year, to confer with the President and ti e of-
ficials of the State and Navy i)epartments. During these iisits,
he recommended that the lret be withdrawn to the West
(loast hecause: I ) the ship: were inadequately manmd for
55 ,1r; (2) the Hawaii:in area ,vas too exposed for Fleet train-
ing during the existing intern) tional tension; (3) the Fie de-
fenses .ecainst both air and s dimarine attacks were far t'low
iho' required standards of str ingth. In limitary, 1941, was
unexpectedly relieved of ti Fleet command by Acmiral
Kimmel.
In one of Ilk talks with Admiral Richardson, Pre: idellt
Roosevelt explained that th Fleet was being kept i i the
mid-Pacific because its prem ice there helped to deter Japa-
nese aggression in the Far ilast. This statement most have
been made to help the Pres ;lent surmount an embarn.ssing
moment in the conversation. as he could not tell the IV mi-al
the real reason for retaining, tie Fleet in Hawaii. Pearl Harbor
is blither I win the Inlam Sea-Formosa line than New
York is trim] Gibraltar. The Fleet then based in Ha\ 'aiian
waters was neither powerli I enough nor in the nee 'ssary
sit ategic position to exert :tie positive influence upon J. pan's
plans (or Eastern Asia. TI at could only have bee I ac-
complished by basing tut adt (plate naval force in the 1 hilip-
pines. And that Ficct coo (.1 not possibly operate i i the
Western Pacific because its train (tankers, supply vessels,
etc. I was totally inadequati to sustain such operatic ns at
such a distance from a per nanent major base?a [tic that
would tillt l'SC:lpe the trainec :wanes(' espionage' in 11 twaii.
Certainly, the .japanese did I (It hesitate to move into F ench
Indo-China in July, 1941.
Furthermore, in \larch, I )41, the already inferior I acific
Was further weakened vc the detachment of three 1 attic-
ships, one aircraft carrier, f mr light cruisers, and eig iteen
destroyers for duty in the At antic; and ill June, 1941, 1Vash-
ington gave serious considera ion to the transfer of three addi-
tional battleships to the Ada] tic. Such changes in Fleet ilispo-
sitions, iii those critical clip! nnatic days, would never have
I een made without the Pres ...lent's approval. NVith the effec-
tive Japanese espionage in 1 awaii and in the Panama _lanai
Zone, changes in the streng th of the Hawaiian force and
naval movements hetween tle Pacific and the Atlantic were
reported to Tokyo as soon a ; they happened. Gonsequ
the willingness to
WCakCII On Pacific Fleet in the face c.:" that
well-known espionage, at a time when diplomatic pressure
upon Japan should have bee' strongly maintained, is pc sitive
proof that President Boosev !It was not concerned wit 1 the
Fleet's diplomatic effect two Japan.
A passage in another of Pr .isident Roosevelt's convers ttions
with Admiral Richardson in most revealing. The At miral
(Continue?na page 58)
11604011128_,EPORT, April : , 1954
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The Final Secret of Pearl Harbor
ADMIRAL HUSBAND E. KIMMEL
Commanded Pacific Fleet
AS HISTORY
WAS MADE
Photographs
on this page
all were taken
in 1941
LIEUT. GEN. WALTER C. SHORT
Commanded Hawaiian Department
JAPANESE ARE BRIEFED THE PLANES TAKE OFF BOMBS AWAY OVER HAWAII
These photos, from captured Japanese newsreels, show how the attack was carried out
GEN. GEORGE C. MARSHALL
Then, Army Chief of Staff
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RE,ORT, April 2, 1Y.54
ADMIRAL HAROLD R. STARK
Then, Chief of Naval Operations
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The Final Secret of Pearl Harbor
asked NVIlether or not the United States would declare war. if
japan should attack the Nlalay Peninsula. the Dutch East
Indies, or Indo-China. 'Ile President rephud that he was not
sure that the United States would fight, even if the Philippines
were attacked. Then after a pause, he added that hy was
firmly convinced, however, that this country would he drawn
in(() a Pacific war, because wars had a was- of expanding. and,
sooner or later, Japan would commit the act which would in-
volve this country.
These remarks are worthy it careful scrutiny. If we would
not fight for the Philippines, we certainly would not fight for
Guam. The President, therefore, LI ouch hiresec no Far Eastern
action that would surely cause the United States to fight and
with the Asiatic eliminated. only IWO) possible Pacific areas
remained, Hawaii and the Panama Canal. It is important to
note the clear proof, which we here have, that by (knitter.
1940, President Roosevelt was firmly couvinced that when
Japan went to war, that country would soon COrrin ut all
overt act against the United States, and it was his insistence
that was keeping the Pacific Elect in its exposed position
in Hawaii.
Information Withheld from the Hawaiian
Commanders
As this chapter is concerned with Pret-ident Roost-YeIt's
moves toward scar, we are here interested solely in the part
which he playedll I
.11 ss i?mo.cong o, in:urination from
Admiral Kimmel and Gelieral Short. An oh that role would
necessarily be confined to the formulation the decision and
its implementing orders to Admiral Stork and Colic-rid
Marshall,
In August, 1945, certain opinions of the Naval Court of
Inquiry and the action of the Secretary of the Navy on those
opinions were published. The Court critic:lice! Admiral Stark's
judgment because: Inc failed, during the critical period be-
tween November 26 and 1)ecember 7, 194 I. to transmit to
Admiral Kimmel important information which he had regard-
ing the Japanese situation: he did not immediately transmit,
on December 7, the taut that a message had been received
which appeared to indicate that a break in diplomatic rela-
tions was imminent, and that an attack in die. Hawaiian area
might be expected soon.
The concluding paragraph of the action by the Secretary of
the Navy on the Proceedings of the Court rontained the fol-
lowing statement: "Achnir:d Harold R. Stark. (SN ( Retired ),
shall not hold any position in the United States Navy which
requires the exercise of .superior judgment."
The next da, at least one ?Vashington- 1). L. newstrapet
carried the Admiral's reply to these stricture's. Ile said that his
conscience was cot mel clear, because all his Official Let 0)115
ill the days before Pearl Ilarbor hail been governed by orders
from "higher authority.- Admiral Stark repeated that state-
ment, at least (Mee, ili private correspondence. During those
days, President Roosevelt was the only naval authority higher
in the elude) of military command than Admii:d Stark.'
It will be noted that the Admiral was replying to criticisms
of his denial of information to Admiral Kimmel. the most
arresting action of his administration in the period hue! ire'
Pearl Harbor. Therefore, when he said that eN erylliing, that
he did during the torte was done On order of higher authority,
his statement could olds have meant that, for
.(ior months
hefore the attack, invaluable inlOrmatiOn Wits denied the Pa-
cific Fleet Commander by the direct order Ill Presalent
ROOSeVelt.
If such an order was issued to the- Navy, one innst
have been given to the- Army. Such an order to only one of
the military services would have been completely ineffective.
And the evidence says that General !Marshall was given a
similar order. From early August to Decoinber 7, ( micral
Short received no more of the vital information km wn in
Washington than did Admi al Kimmel.
There are only two possi rle explanations of the wh )lcsale ".1"
withholding of this inform ition from the Hawaiian Com-
manders-either it was don ) by order of the- Presidm t (11 it
-
was the result of a decision jointly re-ached hy General Mar-
shall and Admiral Stark. The professional educatien, ex-
perience, and reputation of he two officers makes it n'
think-
ahilr' that either could reach such a decision on Ins ow I initi-
ative, or agree to it unless h had no option in the mat -er.
Once again, we are face I D face with the same fact- orders
from President Boosevelt pi, vented practically all of a vital
iidormation concerning tin developing Japanese situation
from being transmitted to th 3 Hawaiian Commanders.
And there are two other ncidents which strongly s mport
that deduction.
When the Washington in gotiations were, in effect, termi-
nated by the American IlOtt of November 26, it was neces-
sars that some word be s N'it to the outlying corm umds.
Failure to do this would ha- c been too challenging a Jact to
the future reader of the hist( ry of these events. The President
himself directed that this be done. Secretary Stimson e nphit-
sized that fact before the An Pearl lIarbor board to ? splain
his unnatural participation in the drafting of the War Eiopart-
ment dispatch.
Normally, the preparation and sending of such a m tssage
would be a routine matter, entirely within the province of
the military authorities, whic i would not receive even pissing
attention from either the Pr isident or the Secretary of War
'I he beet that the President :onsidered it necessary to direct
the Army and Navy to sent the so-called war-warnin mes-
sages of November 27 (see -2hafffer 8) is positive proc I that
he not only knew that vital i fformation was being denicd the
Hawaiian Commanders, but fluff he expected that dm ial to
el?itinue unless he ordered o lerwise.
The above incident en- phasized President Roos tvelfs
:whom; on the evening of ketember 6, 1941, About 9:30
P.M., %Own he sass: the I:3 p trts of the Japanese messa4e re-
ceived on that Saturday, he !aid to Mr. Harry Hopkins, "This
means war.- Later that sam ! night, according to reast nably
conclusive evidence. the Pio sident talked to Admiral tark,
alter the latter had returnee from the theatre. And y no
Message Was sent to the I lass aiian Commanders on that night
or during the next loren0011. Me message, sent about 11C Jli on
Sunday, was On Ceneral NIA] shaths initiative, and arriv?I too
late. as we shall sec.
Why, alter the. interest In had taken in the sendirn of a
message on November 26, di 1 President Roosevelt do m thing
on the night of December b to assure that Admiral Kimmel
iinch General Short were inb rmed of the receipt of the mes-
sage %I-filch -meant svar" TI e only possible conclusion again
is because he did not want tl ose Commanders to be Ulf( Fined
that the war was only hours Away.
? As it was the Admiral's ninihil try decisions that were cinch r lire,
the orders from "higher audio] ity" which lie received must have
been military order), and the President, as Commander-in Chief
nit the Armed Forces, is the on ly civilian government officii l that
can legally issue such ordeis the Clad of Nas-al Open. tions,
This is so because the Secretary if the Navy, by law, cannot et ercise
militars command. Consequen lv, Secretary Knox did not have
the laWinl aiithorit> to order Ad ii iral Stark to withhold Mimi lotion
from Admiral Kimmel, which c mid have infected that Elect Coin-
mander.s military decisions, mor to alter the composition of Ole
Ilculs or their dispositions, in or juipation of the outbreak of mstil-
Mos. All sodi (Wilco:, which Acin iral Stark received from ":iigher
authority- during those days, mist therefore have come to him
direct from l'resident ltoosevel
On the other hand. the Scurc ary of the Navy exercises cor iplete
authority over the naval estalilit hment in matters of administ:ation
and routine po ne-mu ho mu' In m such natters, the Chief of Naval (.pera-
films is hills subject to the orde-s of the Secretary.
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00 0 8 0 953
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Approved For Release 2005/01/05 : CIA-RDP75-00149R00_0700490026-7
The Final Secret of Pearl Harbor
PART Il
e?aftreft
MAGIC
Magic Was for Washington and Manila
But Not for Hawaii
The Japanese Purple Code
THE Japanese high-security communication systems were all
enciphered )hered codes. The Purple Code differed from the others
in that it employed a machine to accomplish its enciphering
and deciphering.
Washington broke this Purple Code so completely that not
only was the code recovered and the cipher recognized as ma-
chine controlled, but the mechanics of the machine were also
fully diagnosed. As a consequence, a number of Purple cipher
machines were fabricated for use by American and British de-
crypting units.
In the use of an enciphered code, it is the universal practice
to change the cipher periodically, usually once every twenty-
four hours. A cipher schedule is communicated to the stations
using the code, well in advance of the date upon which that
schedule becomes effective. In the Purple machine, the key to
each cipher was the setup of its internal mechanisms. The
promptness with which the Japanese dispatches were decoded
during the fall of 1941 clearly indicates that the American and
British decrypting units were intercepting the transmissions
of the cipher schedules.
Magic and Its Washington Distribution
The breaking of the Japanese diplomatic codes was a de-
crypting achievement of a high order. In recognition of that
fact, the information obtained from the decoded Japanese
dispatches was termed "Magic," and was so designated among
its Washington recipients throughout 1941.
During the latter half of that year, the War and Navy De-
partments had identical organizations for the processing of
Magic, and to avoid duplication of effort, the intercepted Japa-
nese traffic was divided between the two Departments on a
twenty-four hour basis. The Navy unit decoded and translated
messages received on the odd-numbered days of the month,
and the Army did the same for those received on the even-
numbered days.
In the Navy Department, the task of decrypting and de-
coding was performed by the Communications Intelligence
Unit, a subdivision of the Communications Security Division
of the Office of Naval Communications. The short designation
of the Security Division was OP-20-G, and that of the Intelli-
gence Unit was OP-20-GY. The translation unit which com-
pleted the processing of the decoded traffic was designated
OP-20-GZ.
The officer in charge of OP-20-GZ in late 1941 was Lieu-
. tenant Commander Kramer, whose duality of tasks in the
- handling of Magic made him subject to the orders of two
superiors. In the work of translation, he was under the Head
of Communications Security Division. When messages were
ready for distribution, he made the deliveries under the direc-
tion of the Director of Naval Intelligence.
In the War Department, the decoding and translation were
accomplished by the Signal Intelligence Service, under the
U. S. NEWS & WORLD REPDRT, April 2.1.254
Approvea For Release 2005/01/05:
control of the Signal Corps. Each processed message was de-
livered to the Far Eastern Section of the Military Intelligence
Division, whose Chief, Colonel Bratton, made the deliveries
for the War Department.
There were seven recipients of Magic on the Navy De-
partment Distribution list, and six on that of the War Depart-
ment. Fourteen finished copies of each message were pre-
pared, and OP-20-GZ and the Signal Intelligence Service each
supplied the other with seven copies of every message which
it processed. The recipients were:
Navy Department War Department
Distribution Distribution
President Roosevelt Secretary Hull
Secretary Knox Secretary Stimson
Admiral Stark General Marshall
Rear Admiral Noyes Brig. General Gerow
Rear Admiral Turner Brig. General Miles
Captain Wilkinson Colonel Bratton
Commander McCollum
The War and Navy Departments employed identical meth-
ods to safeguard the deliveries of Magic. The messages were
carried in locked pouches, to which only the recipient and the
officer who made the deliveries had keys. One locked pouch
was delivered to each recipient or his authorized representa-
tive. The usual practice was to leave the pouch on oEe delivery
round, and to pick it up with its contained messages for return
on the next. One copy of each message was filed, and all other
copies were destroyed as quickly as possible. With only six re-
cipients on its distribution list, the War Department could
file a copy of every message at the moment of its receipt.
Colonel Bratton and Commander Kramer usually followed
the same practice for the night distribution of important mes-
sages. The procedure was to deliver the locked pouch to the
recipient at his home or wherever he might direct. Colonel
Bratton, however, at times varied this procedure by deliver-
ing the pouches to officers on night duty in the respective
offices of the several recipients, with the caution that the
messages called for prompt delivery.
All the Japanese diplomatic and consular posts could receive
high-frequency radio, but none was equipped to transmit.
Consequently, most of the outgoing Tokyo diplomatic traffic
was sent by radio, although the cables were also occasionally
used. On the other hand, the messages to Tokyo had to be
transmitted by commercial cable or radio, except in the rare
instances when use was made of the trans-Pacific telephone.
During the latter half of 1941, the Japanese diplomatic
traffic increased greatly. Fortunately, the Tokyo-Washington
and the Tokyo-Berlin circuits covered the developing diplo-
matic situation very thoroughly, and the U. S. intelligence
services concentrated on those circuits during that time, with
such attention to other Japanese traffic as these priority re-
strictions made possible. The first of these two. circuits cov-
ered the U. S-Japanese negotiations and relations, while the
second one gave information of the exchanges between Japan
and her future Tripartite Treaty allies, Germany and Italy.
Distribution of the Japanese Purple Machines
When the Purple machines became available in Washing-
ton, at least one was shipped to London. Two machines were
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retained by the Communications Intelligence Unit in the
Navy Department, and two by the Signal Intelligence Service
in the War Department. This permitted each of the Washing-
ton decrypting units to have one machine always set for the
cipher of the current twenty-four hours, with the other at
band for use on the traffic of the preceding and other earlier
such periods.
In April. 1941, the last machine available in the Navy De-
partment was shipped to the Commandant of the Sixteenth
Naval District in the Philippines: additional personnel, re-
quired to fill out a complete decrypting unit, accompmmied the
machine. The organization was established in the caves on
Corregidor Island. The information contained in the outgoing
Tokyo diplomatic messages was thus assured to the Omni-Kind-
er-in-Chief of the Asiatic Fleet and the Commanding Gen-
eral of the U.S. Army Forces in the Philippines. There w :is no
Purple machine for 11awaii.
Several thoughts immediately come to nmind. First. when
orders for the manufacture of these machines were placed in
Washington, why did they not provide or two or three
spares? If the thought of tile spares had been overlooked, the
later fabrication of an additional machine could not have been
too lengthy a job. In any event, why not take Care of Anted-
can needs, including Hawaii, before giving moo,: of these Purple
machines to the British, who were
no, our ;Allies at the time?
There is one assured fact: these sell-evident solutions to the
problem of providing one or more Purple machines for the
Hawaiian Commanders aro too obvious to have been over-
looked when the decisions regarding the allecation of the num-
chines were hieing made.
The distribution of Purple inachines which Wati in ade Meant
that the Hawaiian Intelligence Units would never be able to
decode any of the intercepted Japanese diplomatic traffic.
The naval unit at Pearl Harbor could only continue to con-
centrate its efforts solely upon deductions that could be oracle
from such features of Japanese naval radio trtmffic as ship's calls,
volume of messages, and direction finder bearings of identified
transmitting units.
The joint Congressional Committee was told that the
Manila area was chosen as the location of the last Purple ma-
chine available in the Navy 1)(T:tame:tit be:cause the Philip-
pine stations were the most efficient in the Pacific in the re-
ceiving of: Japanese radio messages. That wits a fact .ms tar as
the Tokyo-Berlin circuit was concerned, but the explanation
was a decidedlx lame one. The Hawaiian reception of Japa-
nese radio traffic was also eminently satisfactory, and the
presence of the mnaM U. S. Naval Forces in that area made it
highly desirable militarily that the Nlagic, known to Wash-
ington and the Asiatic Commands, should also be available: to
the Ilawalian Commanders.
As we have seen, it would certainly have been possible to
supply a Purple machine to Pearl Harbor by July at the- latest,
and to codect any existing decrypting deficiencies in the
_Radio Intelligence Unit at that Base by dad time. Intercep-
tion of the .lapanese messages and their deer yption iii I Lovaii
would have been the complete answer to the reasons later
given on the witness stand to explain why Magic was denied
to Admiral Kimmel and General Short.
The two principal explanations of that denial by Army and
Navy witnesses before the various investigations were: the
great volume of the japanese secret traffic:, the possibility
that the re-transmission of 'Magic from \Vashington to
Hawaii might inform the JapamieSe that their codes had
been compromised, if they had similarly broken the Ameri-
can codes.
When the decision to locate the last Purple machine in the
Philippines was reached, thought must have been given to the
desirability, from a purely military standpoint, of making
Magic available on the spot in Hawaii. The failure to accom-
60
plish this must therefore ha r -c been a deliberate act, a id not
an oversight. There was et rtainly no military considm ration
that would support a decisim n not to do so. The only p rssible
conclusion is therefore that lie failure to do so was pa t of a
definite plan, which envisap d the denial of !Magic to the Ha-
Willi an Commanders and th m assurance that this inforination
wmorld be available to the Sia tic Commanders.
The Complete Denial o. Magic to Hawaii
After Mid-August, 1941
Admiral Kimmel told the Joint Congressional Com nittee
that. dimming July, 19-11, he received the meanings of seven
decoded Japanese dispatch( S. but that, after early August:,
the Navy Department sent loin no word which adeqaately
portrayed the growing ten: ion between the United States
and Japan, or suggested time possibility of Japanese action in
the flaw:Miami mmrra in event t 1 war. The timing of this :iienee
is nmost significant. The dipl rmatic-economic encirelem?nt of
Ivan had then been in effec: less than three weeks. Pre ident
Roosevelt returned from his Newfoundland confer-mem with
Mr. Chureltill in the middle DI August. Japan was soon to be
forced by the United States o choose between war or s men-
der to the encirclement.
Despite the fact that Adm Ural Kimmel received the infor-
mation from secret Japane. e communications during July,
19-11, the control of the diss mination of military intell gence
from intercepted Japanese m wssages had been greatly tight-
ened by both the War and Navy Departments durir g the
early spring of that year.
'11 us change in the Wa Department came into effect
through the enunciation of a policy by General Marshal that
the knowledge of the U.S. to decode the intercepted
Japanese traffic was to be rem tricted to the least possible num-
ber of persons, and that no distribution of Ii formatior from
that source should be made outside Washington. if, ;t any
time, the' Director of War Ph us considered that dissemi ration
of such intelligence WaS nee mssary, he would prepare tie re-
quired dispatch for General Nlarshall's action. Cognizance of
this dissemination was thus restricted to the Army Chef of
Staff and the Director of \?'m r Plans.
Parallel actimm mi the Na x y Department was the re.