CUBA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82R00025R000400160011-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 27, 2004
• Sequence Number: 11
• Content Type: BRIEF

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DRAFT DCI BRIEFING FOR
VINSON SUBCOMMITTEE
CUBA
In Cuba, the last major withdrawal of Soviet
military personnel appears to have been com-
pleted.
A. Since the 1962 missile crisis, some 20,000
Soviet servicemen have been pulled out in
four major withdrawal periods, with about
5,000 personnel leaving the island during
each period.
B. The most recent period extended from the
beginning of May through the end of July,
during which time more than 5,000 Russians
sailed from Cuba on 14 Soviet passenger
ships.
II. It now appears that there are only about 2,000
Soviet military technicians and advisors left
in what has become essentially a Soviet mili-
tary aid and advisory group on the island.
A. All Soviet communications facilities in
Cuba have-been deactivated or turned over
to the Cubans except for one naval link
which will probably terminate operations
soon,
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VNo Soviet operational or combat units are
known to remain on the island.
III,/Thus the Cubans almost certainly have full con-
trol over the operation of all Soviet weapons
left behind, including the surface-to-air mis-
siles.
A. The Soviets have removed all their sensitive
radar and communications gear, and as far
as we can tell, they now give only advice
to the Cubans armed forces, backed up by
th it political and economic leverage.
. However, we cannot exclude the possi-
bility that the Soviets have retained
some sort of physical restraint over
the actual firing of the SA-2 missiles
in Cuba.
IV. \ Both the Soviets and Cubans have indicated, how-
ever, that they do not intend to get into a
wrangle over the U-2 issue until after the US
elections, at which time Castro has said he
will take the issue to the UN General Assembly.
A. Castro also took the occasion of his 26 July
speech to play down the U-2 issue somewhat.
He said that "for the sake of peace" he
would be patient with the U-2 planes for
the time being.
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1.C/ here is-always the possibility of an
unauthorized shootdown or an impulsive
decision by Castro in reaction to an
exile raid or minor clash with the US.
2. In any case, Castro probably has little
confidence that the Soviets would pro-
vide any real assistance if the US
forcibly reacted to a U-2 shootdown.
`V. Castro's defiant reaction to OAS sanctions against
his regime indicates no letup of Cuban subversion
in Latin America. It belies a report we had
from Venezeula early in July that Cuba,, pos-
sibly at Soviet urging, was restricting its
upport for revolutionaries.
A. Castro in his 26 July speech asserted Cuba's
right to support revolutionaries in any
country which opposes his regime.
1. He specifically sent his encouragement
to the "courageous" rebels and guer-
rillas of Venezuela and Guatemala.
B. The speech suggested that only those coun-
tries which shun the effort to isolate
Cuba can count on immunity from Cuban
subversion.
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1. He praised Mexico in particular for
voting against the OAS sanctions, and
offered to conclude a mutual non-in-
tervention treaty.
2. He added that Chile, Uruguay, and
Bolivia--which also opposed the sanc-
tions--could join in.
indicate continued
Cuban support for extremist revolutionary
groups, some of which are planning stepped-
up operations in the fall.
A. Ithe
Cuban attache in Mexico City met clan-
destinely on 22 July with Honduran Com-
munists to offer arms and funds to help
them get guerrilla operations going by
September or October. Honduran Communists
who have been trained in Cuba in guerrilla
warfare are beginning to infiltrate back
into Honduras.
Cuba is reportedly providing $7,500 a
month to support left-extremist organi-
zations in Peru. Peru's best-equipped
group for guerrilla warfare now is re-
ported to be planning to begin operations
in October.
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C. Venezuela's pro-Castro FALL--the Armed
Forces of National Liberation--also is
reliably reported to be preparing for
a renewed terrorist campaign in October.
D. The former Cuban ambassador to Brazil
and a known Cuban intelligence officer
recently met an emissary of ex-Brazilian
President Goulart's brother-in-law,
Leonel Brizola, to offer him assistance
in carrying out guerrilla operations
against the Castello Branco government.
Cuba's principal organization for "ex-
porting the revolution" to Latin America,
the General Directorate of Intelligence
(DGI). Its main purpose is to channel
Cuban advice and assistance to Latin
American "national liberation" groups,
The DGI appears to be a highly profes-
sional organization, and is advised by
Soviet intelligence experts.
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