VAL;ID CONCEPT IN NUCLEAR AGE IS DETERRENCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75-00001R000300490022-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 2, 2004
• Sequence Number: 22
• Publication Date: September 2, 1964
• Content Type: NSPR

.W t1J. i ' I t iv Uh' il. z
NEWS
Approved For Releasgff 04/~1T4 CIA=F
a ii(, Concept
In Nudear Age..
Js Deterrence
By RAY CROMLEY Cuban move was planned, the
Soviet leaders were still riding"
ACENTRAL INTELLIGENCE high and the U. S. probably ap-'
,"AGENCY study seems to con- peared to them to be uncertain
elude that the greatest risk of and cautious.
nuclear war in the years ahead
may come from U. S. actions "The U. S. had chosen not to.
which convince Soviet leaders run the political risks necessary;
we lack determination in a to save the Bay of Pigs expedi-
tion; the U: S. had accepted the.!
The study by Willard Matthias erection of the Berlin Wall with
little the CIA Board of National tecclhnics move
and the than U. dyad
Estimates, bays: . S. had ac-%
cepted the neu(ralisl solution lii
"While it is most unlikely ... Laos.
Soviet leaders will choose to car-
ry out actions they know to
carry a high risk of general war,
such knowledge is not easy to
come by.. .
"In this age of mobile striking
forces'" and hardened missile
sites, it does not appear possible
to build a nuclear force capable
of destroying an enemy's capa-
bilities and simultaneously pro-
tecting oneself .. .
"Even extremely large num-
bcrs of.-high-cost weapons would
'provide no assurance of victory
-.or even survival. Thus, if there
is any valid and rational concept
today upon which to develop or
measure a strategic military
force, it is that of deterrence.
"But one cannot find any rule
jfor determining that a stated
;level of forces will deter and
,that another will not.
Deterrence d e p e n d s, says -
Mr. Matthias, in very consid-
erable measure on how the
enemy sizes up "the determina-
tion and will power of his op-
"U. S. formal statements re-
garding Cuba canveyed an air
of studied uncertainty.
"In military planning, despite
substantial iv increased programs:
.of missile deployment, the U. S. i
was advocating a gr e`er con-
volitional capability and a coun-'
ter-insurgency program.
to the Soviets that the diplo-
matic and military stance of the
U. S. was that of a power seek-
ing to avoid confrontation ? and
'fearful of its consequences, and
therefore a power which could
be subjected to a series of set-
backs without high risks of
forceful resistance."
The U. S. show of determina-
tion in the Cuban Missile Crisis
of 1962, convinced Soviet leaders
we did mean business, Mr. Mat-
thias says. Ile thinks that will
stand the U. S. in good stead for
a little while.
But he says there will be
other times and other places in
which Soviet leaders could again
read a lack of willpower in
U. S. actions. This could lead
to trouble.
This study has the "general
approval" of the CIA Board of
National Estimates, "tho no at
tempt has been made to reach
complete agreement. on every!
point." . .. . , . _,
Approved: For Release 2004/11/29 ; -CIA- RDP75.-00001 R6003bQ496622-8
ponent."
The Matthias study gives an
example - how the U. S.; by
seeming to be afraid. of a con-
''frontation, set the stage for the
Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962.
Says this CIA paper:
"In the International atmos-
l phere of early .1962, when the
STS,